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Origins of American Sociology

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Origins of American Sociology

*THE SOCIAL SCIENCE MOVEMENT
IN
THE UNITED STATES*

by

L. L. Bernard

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY

and

Jessie Bernard

WINDENWOOD COLLEGE

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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TO
HOWARD W. ODUM
Master of Social Science
and
Restorer of Sociology to the South
in Recognition of
His Encouragement of the Work
of Which This Is a Part

Preface

The present volume, as the title suggests, is a contribution to the history of the origins of sociology in the United States. It does not cover all the antecedents of sociology in this country, but it does give an account of that movement—which is designated as the Social Science Movement—as the most direct and immediate predecessor of the academic discipline sociology. The authors have so presented the Social Science Movement in this volume as to indicate the manner in which it led up to modern sociological theory from a phase of early social philosophy stemming from the French Enlightenment and the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, on the one hand, and from a later college and university discipline known as Social Science in the period extending from the late eighteen-fifties to the eighteen-nineties. The authors have also attempted to show how the early reform emphases in Associationism and Post-Associationism, in the economic schools of Social Science, in the American Social Science Association, and in kindred Social Science organizations, led in the last third of the nineteenth century to applied sociology and to Social Work. These are the chief immediate antecedents of sociology in the United States. The other antecedents are more remote and philosophical and call for a separate treatment not easily assimilable to the present volume.

The authors are aware that they have surveyed and opened up a new avenue in the social sciences, which leads directly to the establishment of sociology as an academic discipline in the late eighteen-eighties and in subsequent decades. It is not the widest of the avenues among the social sciences, but it is one of importance. It is of varying width and distinctness and the surfacing is sometimes more or less disturbed. The structures along its sides were sometimes, especially in the earlier part of its development, more pretentious than solid and permanent, and sometimes mere shanties; and not all of the space was built upon. But it is an avenue, nevertheless, and throughout its length it offers a fairly clear perspective of the science of

sociology which stands as the new and rather imposing building at its head. The name of this avenue is Social Science, written with capital S's.

The Social Science Movement which is treated in this volume refers to the growth of the old Social Science discipline, from its beginnings in French social philosophy of the eighteenth century and in Fourierism in the early nineteenth century up to the time when it became a respectable academic discipline and began to merge into sociology and the several other social sciences toward the end of the nineteenth century. The authors have not attempted to treat the history of social science in general in this work. The delimitations of subject matter in the present volume are stated clearly in the introductory chapter, to which the reader is referred. They have been interested particularly in the origins and the immediate antecedents of sociology as they appear in the Social Science Movement. But of course these are in many cases antecedents of the other social sciences also.

This volume grew out of the seminar in American Sociology offered by L. L. Bernard at the University of North Carolina in 1928-1929. More specifically, it sprang from a general survey of the antecedents of American Sociology as a distinctive discipline in the general group of the social sciences. These antecedents of sociology are, of course, numerous—too numerous to be investigated adequately by a single individual. After outlining them, the instructor asked for volunteers from a group of graduate students of more than average ability to assume responsibility for the study of various ones of the antecedents. This request for volunteers was later extended to instructors in other universities. Several papers and monographs has resulted from this cooperative undertaking, some of which have already been published. Others will find their place in print from time to time.

Jessie Bernard, then a graduate student, undertook to investigate the influence of Auguste Comte upon American sociology and to use the results as a doctor's dissertation. Finding it impossible to secure some of the needed materials in this country, she later postponed the completion of the study and chose another subject for her doctoral dissertation. In the meantime L. L. Bernard had collected considerable material on the development of the Social Science Movement in the United States. Consequently they pooled materials and efforts and produced the present work.

The preparation of this work has indeed been a laborious task, but not one without intellectual and other compensations gratifying to the scholar and researcher. Together and separately the authors have visited most of

the older colleges and universities of the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Canadian border to the southern extremities of the country in search of data bearing upon the history of the social sciences in the United States. They have spent many months of labor in the Library of Congress and other libraries in this and other countries collecting data, some of which have been incorporated in the present volume. They have made trips to France and England in order to consult special collections of manuscripts, especially those of the Positivist center in Paris and of M. Paul Edger, secretary of the center in 1935, and in order to interview Positivist and other leaders. They have also had the advantage of access to perhaps the largest single collection of printed materials in existence on this and closely allied subjects—approximately 12,000 volumes—assembled by the investigators from all parts of this country, Western Europe, Canada, and Latin America. Altogether some twelve years went into the collecting, sifting, writing, and compression of the materials in the present volume.

It is impossible for the authors to distinguish adequately between their separate contributions to the subject matter either as to quantity or as to specific chapters and pages. The impress of each is on every page, perhaps in each paragraph. In general it may be said that Jessie Bernard is primarily responsible for Chapters III–XII, XV–XIX, XXV–XXVI, XXXIII, XXXVIII–XLVIII, LVI–LIX, and that L. L. Bernard made the chief contributions to Chapters I–II, XIII–XIV, XX–XXIV, XXVII–XXXII, XXXIV–XXXVII, XLIX–LV, LX. But in almost every chapter for which one author is chiefly responsible there are paragraphs and other elements contributed primarily by the other author. The whole of the work was finally edited, organized, largely rewritten, and prepared for publication by L. L. Bernard.

The authors are naturally hopeful not only that this work may find its use as a textbook introductory to the study of American Sociology, but also that it may prove to be a useful reference work for the other social sciences and even for courses in history, philosophy, and social work. They think that it should also appeal to the more intelligent general readers interested in the intellectual and institutional development of our culture. The authors are aware that there will probably be various criticisms, especially from those who believe that the division lines between the social sciences go back to Adam, or beyond, and also from those who doubt the significance of anything of which they have not previously heard. To both of these the authors would urge a little free research instead of taking their ideas second

and third hand. To those who point out definite errors of statement or emphasis they will feel genuinely grateful.

The authors wish to express their deep appreciation to The Social Science Research Council, Inc., for an allowance toward transportation costs to France in 1935 for the purpose of consulting documents there; to the very obliging and cultivated M. Paul Edger and other members of the Positivist group in Paris who aided them so generously in their research in that city; to the staff of the Library of Congress for their numerous courtesies through several seasons of research and repeated visits to that institution over a period of several years; and to the numerous librarians and library assistants and other college and university officials who assisted with their records at the many higher educational institutions visited. The authors are no less grateful to the National Youth Administration of Washington University which assigned student typists to do part of the manuscript work. The authors would also like to mention particularly in this connection their gratitude to Dr. Orval Bennett, Dean Richard F. Jones, and Miss Louise Carter.

L. L. BERNARD
JESSIE BERNARD

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Introduction

Two Streams of Social Thought. Within the last two decades we have been made increasingly aware of the two streams of social thought which have stemmed from before the nineteenth century. Both were directed ultimately toward the improvement of human welfare, but their approaches were entirely different. One of these, the liberal democratic tradition, developed primarily in France and England. It stressed the importance of reason, of natural laws, of science, of the individual; and it minimized the state. The other, in large measure a German product, was authoritarian in character. It stressed the importance of the culture, the nation, the folk, the race, the state. The Social Science Movement in the United States in the nineteenth century, whose history we are to trace here in some detail, belongs definitely to the first of these streams of thought. In fact, it may be said to epitomize the democratic philosophy of life. An appreciation of this Social Science Movement gives one perhaps the fullest possible insight into the American democratic temper and social idealism. The Movement expresses at once the finest aspirations of that emphasis upon individual realization and social justice which was the peculiar inheritance of our colonial and frontier society in America and of that later insistence upon a scientific methodology as a means to the attainment of these objectives.

Both the authoritarian and the liberal democratic movements were insistent upon this latter endeavor, but in very different ways. Only the liberal democratic movement developed an adequate conception of individual rights and social justice. The authoritarian philosophy was based essentially upon a theory and practice of regimentation of men who were deemed incapable of governing and planning for themselves. It was administrative rather than legislative in its outlook. Its methods have been adequately described in a largely overlooked volume by the late Albion W. Small, entitled *The Camerlists*.

The liberal democratic methodology was adopted in this country from the British and the French philosophers of the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries by that remarkable group of revolutionary and post-revolutionary social philosophers who also played such a conspicuous part in the initial organization of the American system of government. Prominent among these were of course Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Paine, and John Quincy Adams. The movement was developed on its political side by these men, their contemporaries, and their successors. In the course of time this methodology was largely lost in the maze of political intrigue and log rolling and found its highly attenuated theoretical expression in the superficial and threadbare commonplaces of the political orators and Fourth of July speakers. It is not our purpose to follow this degenerative development at this time, although it would be interesting, and in some ways fascinating, to do so.

The Aims of the Social Science Movement. Our purpose is to trace the methodology of liberal democratic ideas, stemming ultimately from the British social philosophies of the seventeenth century and magnificently reinforced by the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, and finally transplanted to the United States as an ardent practical democratic idealism. As the reader will see for himself, this practical idealism, viewed apart from practical politics, was at first radical and Utopistic in character. It was shot through with many absurd notions and much wishful thinking, but it always carried one distinctive note—the ideal of organizing human knowledge into a single body of Social Science and of making it available for individual and social improvement. It was equally the endeavor of its promoters that this knowledge should be possessed and employed by the masses of the people themselves for their own betterment.

The Naming of the Movement. These methodological and practical ideals always carried in this country the symbolic title of Social Science, here capitalized to distinguish it from the collective title of the discrete and separate social sciences in general. The history of the term Social Science itself reflects the growing conviction in the minds of men that the methods of science in general should be applied to social problems and their solution as well as to the physical world, and that mystical solutions should be discarded. This conviction found expression in several different names, as Victor Branford has pointed out:¹

¹ Victor Branford, "On the Origin and Use of the Word Sociology," in *Sociological Papers* (London, Macmillan and Co., 1905), pp. 5-6.

Between Vico's "New Science" and Comte's "Sociology" the infiltration of various kindred phrases, such as Social Science, Science of Society (Condorcet), Science of Man (St. Simon), would seem to mark a general tendency toward the expansion of science into the field of humanistic studies. Among Comte's contemporaries, J. S. Mill (only eight years younger than Comte) held pronouncedly that the time was ripe for marking off from other studies—both scientific and philosophical—a general social science, and for this he himself proposed a particular designation. In 1836 Mill defined the scope and character of this department of studies, using as titular synonyms, these, among other phrases—Social Philosophy, Social Science, Natural History of Society, Speculative Politics, and Social Economy. This essay of Mill ("On the Definition and Method of Political Economy") appeared six years before the completion of the "Positive Philosophy." Lacking the large historical interests of Comte, Mill necessarily conceived of Social Science in a considerably different way from Comte. But after the appearance of the "Positive Philosophy," Mill very considerably modified his views of Social Science.

As time passed, the Movement lost most of its futile Utopianism and was chastened by greater logical and scientific discipline and brought into line with respectable scientific method. Soon after the middle of the nineteenth century text books began to appear and the new discipline "Social Science" was introduced into college and university curricula. A national unified Social Science association was formed, which in turn gave rise to various separate social science and reform associations. On its academic side the movement was finally transformed chiefly into the science of sociology.

The Subject of This Study. This book is a history and criticism of this movement to create a special and unified science of human society and social welfare in the United States in the nineteenth century to be known as Social Science. It is not a history and criticism of the development of the various separate social sciences in this country. Although this latter project would be a worthy undertaking, we are concerned with a great historic movement less abstract and more human, almost heroic in its aspirations. The last men who participated in this endeavor have now passed off the stage and in our quickly changing world their effort to construct a single body of scientific knowledge which would be used as the basis of an intellectual and scientific solution of the welfare problems of mankind is almost forgotten by the general run even of academic men. Our generation of scholars and men of affairs has become largely lost in administrative details of scientific investigation and the application of knowledge to the problems of social control. We look askance at large

scale programs of human betterment, either suspecting that they are Utopistic and impractical or that they contain some element of radicalism destructive of the existing order. Scarcely a generation has passed since the academic scene and the world of practical affairs were in daily contact with such outstanding leaders of the Social Science Movement in this country as John Bascom, Arthur Lapham Perry, David A. Wells, Edward Atkinson, William Graham Sumner, Frank B. Sanborn, John W. Draper, Goldwin Smith, Andrew D. White and President Gilman of Johns Hopkins University. All of these men, and many others, were outstanding crusaders—scientists of high standing, but nevertheless crusaders—in the cause of a special Social Science which should investigate, plan, and promote human welfare.

The Character of the Movement as a Whole. As was indicated above, the Social Science Movement was a non-political attempt to produce a social theory and a methodology which could be used as an intellectual instrument for the betterment of the lot of mankind. It grew up alongside of the special social sciences and for a time seemed to overshadow them. Where it found it convenient to do so, it made use of these special sciences to construct its own system of ideas and plans of social revision and reform. It was not confined to any one country, but was the idealistic intellectual legacy of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment to nineteenth century Europe and America. It was naturally most fully developed in England, France, and the United States, but it also found adherents in Italy, Germany, Russia, Spain, the Latin American republics, and in almost all other civilized countries of the world. In England there was a powerful Social Science Association headed by Lord Brougham which issued approximately fifty volumes of proceedings dealing with the problems that Social Science sought to solve in that country. The scientific and literary output in France and the United States was scarcely less voluminous.

In all of these countries the Social Science Movement grew and came to a climax and declined in importance at approximately the same time. Its decline was not due to a lack of interest in it, but rather to its success. Its field of interest became so large, the volume of knowledge required to function in it effectively grew to be so immense, and the degree of specialization required of its members so extreme that these requirements finally caused it to break up into a large number of social science associations of more limited scope. Thus it lost its unity and the Social Science

Movement was merged in the several special social sciences and social technologies. Only sociology, its chief successor, has in some degree kept alive throughout subsequent decades that unified interest in and endeavor to solve the problems of social welfare as a whole. But, in more recent years, there has been a backward swing in all of the social sciences and technologies away from ivory tower isolation toward this common unitary view and concern to utilize the data of the social sciences for human betterment.

The Movement in the United States. In the United States the Social Science Movement passed through several phases. The earliest, springing directly from European post-revolutionary radicalism (described in Part I of our treatment), was the Associationist Movement led by Albert Brisbane, W. H. Channing and others, and is treated in Part II of the present work. This phase of "Social Science" came into disfavor in the eighteenth-forties because of its lack of tested scientific data and its excessive Utopian baggage. The Movement received a much needed infusion of systematic scientific and philosophic principles from the Comtean and Spencerian positivism around the middle of the nineteenth century (Part III); and an earnest attempt to found a systematic school of sociology in line with the major purposes of the Movement was made in this country as a result (Part IV). But this infusion of abstract methodology proved to be more than the rank and file of followers could digest and there was a minor revival of the radical phase of the Social Science Movement, or Associationism, mixed in with Comtean Positivism, extending over essentially the same period from about 1850 to 1870 (Part V). At about this time the trained political economists began to take note of the Social Science Movement and rescued it in some degree from the realm of abstract social philosophy. Approaching it from the double standpoint of nationalist and neo-classical economic theory they gave to the Movement a decidedly economic welfare slant (Parts VI and VII). In 1865 these economists and various other groups of responsible interested persons imbued with a wholesome respect for scientific methodology and data formed the American Social Science Association, which continued in existence for nearly fifty years (Part VIII). This body gave birth directly or indirectly to such powerful associations as the American Prison Association, the National Conference of Social Work, the American Historical Association, the American Economic Association, the American Political Science Association, the American Sociological Society, and many more. The

discipline Social Science had already begun (1865) to find formulation in textbooks and to enter into college and university curricula (Part IX). It developed a methodology in three distinct phases: speculative (Part X), historical (Part XI), and statistical (Part XII). With the absorption of the Social Science Movement into the other social sciences and the establishment of Sociology as its chief successor and as one of the family of the special social sciences, the movement as such came to an end soon after 1900.

Such, in brief, is the story of this non-political social philosophy and scientific methodology, unified about the ideal and endeavor for the promotion of social welfare, which we intend to trace in this volume.

Methods Employed in This Study. In presenting our materials on these several aspects or emphases in the Social Science Movement we shall use the following method. A brief sketch of the personnel and organizational aspects of each type of Social Science will be given first, and this will be followed by a summary or résumé of the theories involved. Readers should not expect to find too much that is wholly new or original in these American theories. The people of the United States, as intimated above, retained until well past the middle of the century an essentially colonial habit of mind, looking to Europe for their ideas, and especially was this the case in the realm of social theory. They sat, so to speak, on the banks and watched the stream of European thought flow past, dipping in occasionally for whatever struck their imagination or seemed to serve their needs. It is interesting to see what they took and how they reacted to it. Our justification for reviewing the American aspect of a movement so largely dependent in its early stages upon European antecedents is of course the contribution it made to American life and the orientation of a characteristic American social philosophy. The significant thing for American students in the review of the Social Science Movement in the United States is the part it played in the development of our national enthusiasm for social welfare and the improvement of social conditions. It made a very important contribution to what we may perhaps call the distinctive pattern of the American habit of mind in dealing with social questions, and it gave rise primarily to that "Distinctive American social science," sociology. It is these contributions that we intend to emphasize especially in this treatment.

The method used in integrating the present treatise has been inductive. A detailed, almost page-by-page examination was made of all the impor-

tant periodicals of the period under consideration in the Library of Congress, and of all relevant books in our own extensive collection of materials on American social thought. All significant references to Social Science were noted and filed. Any work that claimed the title of Social Science, or any writer who called himself a Social Scientist, as well as outstanding members of the American Social Science Association, were included and studied. When the materials were gathered they were classified and organized. The classification that seemed to fit the data most adequately was the one finally adopted and herewith presented.

It should perhaps be pointed out in this connection that many of the men here discussed did not know they were taking part in the movement as here described. And it is quite certain that they did not expect to be written about as a group. Indeed it is quite probable that many of the earlier men in the various branches of Social Science were not even aware of one another's existence. The present study organizes for the first time into a coherent whole the many strands that went to make up the movement.

The Principle of Selection Used. The principle of selection used excludes the works of many important social thinkers of the period simply because they did not claim or recognize the title of Social Science as applicable to themselves, although their points of view might be indistinguishable from those of the men who did thus classify themselves.² Thus the present work is not a history of the whole field of social thought, but only of the significant phase of writing in this field lying chiefly between the years 1840 and 1890 which called itself Social Science or in some way recognized its close kinship with the movement.

The works of a number of doubtful writers who lived and thought before the Social Science Movement was established on a firm academic basis—including such names as Orville Dewey, Ezra Seaman, and Archibald Grimké—are not treated in this volume, because these men did not specifically characterize themselves as Social Scientists, nor were they in sympathy with the Associationist phase then in the ascendant. Obviously they were a part of the movement in the more liberal sense and would have so regarded themselves had they done their work at a slightly later date, when the conservative aspects of the movement were dominant. The internal evidences of their kinship are so patent that they would have been included

² For example, the important work of Henry Hughes and George Fitzhugh, both of whom published in 1854. See L. L. Bernard, "Henry Hughes, First American Sociologist," *Social Forces*, XV: 154-174 (Dec., 1936), and L. L. Bernard, "The Historic Pattern of Sociology in the South," *Social Forces*, XVI: 1-12 (Oct., 1937).

in our treatment in spite of the mere verbal technicality of not being listed as members of the movement, if there had been space to include them. On the other hand, those men who evidenced no sympathy for the objectives of the movement were of course omitted. Although Francis Lieber was a member of the American Social Science Association shortly before his death, his name has been omitted from our treatment of the movement (except briefly in connection with the history of statistics), because his work was not done in connection with any of the various groups of Social Scientists discussed in this volume.

For the sake of an adequate perspective, we begin the story with the transplanting of Social Science theories from the Old World—especially from France—to the New World. It is our endeavor to show how the democratic reaction of common sense and the logic of human events dispensed with Utopianism and turned to a more dependable method, drawn at first from the Comtean Positivist philosophy and later from the more practical theory of the political economists. All of the social sciences learned something from this trial and error movement in American social theory, but out of it finally came the recognized and accepted academic discipline of sociology. In this ultimate sociological discipline the welfare motive of the old Social Science Movement still contests for supremacy with the more abstract and neutral emphasis of detached science. But this contest does not belong to our story. First, then, we turn to the origins of the Social Science Movement in pre-revolutionary Europe.

PART ONE

Backgrounds and Ideals of the Social
Science Movement

The Eighteenth Century Backgrounds of the Social Science Movement

An Age of Enlightenment and Its Bases. The eighteenth century has been called the Age of Enlightenment, or the period of the French Enlightenment, the object being to stress the overwhelming contribution of the early social philosophers to this new "age of reason" and of intellectual curiosity and hopefulness. This was the century in which such great intellects as those of Saint Pierre (maturing from the seventeenth century), Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Turgot, Diderot, D'Alembert, d'Holbach, Helvetius, and Condorcet were making their extraordinary contributions to the social analysis of history and to the criticism of the institutions of mankind. Perhaps never before, since the century following the Periclean Age, had such a distinguished group of thinkers brought their combined powers to bear upon the solution of the riddle of mankind—the meaning and conditions of existence of men living together in society. The contributions of these French philosophers were, moreover, as much greater than those of the great Greeks as was this newer age more advanced than that initiated by Pericles.

The transcendent contributions of each of these two ages of enlightenment were due to very similar causes. In each a series of new physical inventions and geographical discoveries, making possible the marked expansion of industry and commerce, had stimulated territorial expansion, to a marked increase of percapita wealth—especially in liquid possessions—and to a rapid extension of political speculation and participation on the part of the middle classes, who were now becoming intellectually active. Such ages of enlightenment seem always to be preceded or accompanied by periods of economic and political expansion. This was the case with the golden ages of literature during the Sung dynasty in China (960-1126) and in the period of the Mogul invasions of India. A similar connection between the economic and the intellectual occurred in the age of the consolidation of Ancient Hebrew literature and philosophy following the eco-

monic and political expansion consummated by Solomon and his immediate successors. Similar periods of enlightenment, although not of the first magnitude, characterized the thirteenth century in Europe, following the Crusades and the development of the Commercial Revolution, and the sixteenth century, following the age of world exploration and discovery and the opening up of new continents to trade and exploitation, with the consequent vast increase of wealth and leisure for artist and intellectual classes. But it remained for the eighteenth century, profiting from a vast wealth accruing from momentous inventions and a rapidly growing new experimental science, to exhibit the most convulsive manifestations of intellectual activity yet known to mankind.

Age of Discussion and Social Science. There was yet another marked similarity of conditioning factors basic to the Greek Enlightenment of the fifth century B. C. and the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century A. D. Both were preeminently ages of discussion. It was in the former period that the Sophists had raised the dialectical method of forming public opinion to such an art that, as Saint Paul said at a later date, all the Athenians were searching for new ideas, and Athens itself became a great intellectual center. Out of this free intellectual atmosphere developed the Socratic symposiums, immortalized and continued by Plato, and the first universities, typified by the Academy and the Lyceum of the Greeks. But the media of discussion of the French Enlightenment had been vastly improved over those of the Greeks. Private discussion now had the advantage of the intellectual dinners given by such men as d'Holbach and Helvetius. The universities had been vastly improved and systematized by means of formal instruction offered by a large corps of trained scholars, and supported by increasingly adequate libraries and by laboratories for scientific investigation. Moreover, the masses of the people themselves were now entering the arena of discussion by means of journals of opinion, the omnipresent pamphlet, and a rapidly increasing stream of books produced at ever cheaper prices. While only a few of the common people could read this literature, nearly all of them could understand it when it was read to them, and meetings of the proletariat to hear new ideas read were becoming popular and frequent, and clubs of the people for the discussion of the ideas of the philosophers, not always diluted, were beginning to be a regular part of the intellectual life of Paris. Thus the new social and physical science theories of the times were no longer confined to an intelligentsia, as in Ancient Greece, but were being actively spread among all classes of the population.

The press in particular, though hampered by restrictions and censorship, was rapidly rendering new ideas and ideals universal and creating a mass of liberal public opinion hitherto unknown. Both philosophers and people could now begin to discern the general outlines of society as a unitary whole, and the intellectual stimulus that this new insight gave was truly remarkable. It marked the beginnings of a true Social Science. It was now possible for the first time for the social sciences to develop, because a derivative and universal social consciousness was now for the first time becoming a reality.¹

The New Orientation. So rapid and overwhelming was the break with the past on the physical or technological side of the new culture and in the new spirit of logic, which sought to discover truth through experiment and observation rather than through revelation and the redistillation of tradition, that men of genius, and sometimes even the common herd, were brought to question all the postulates and authoritative dicta of the past. Philosophers came to believe that mankind had been victimized and bound in caves of darkness by their superstitious reverence for tradition in the putative form of revelation. They were convinced that the old deductive logic, starting from premises established and perpetuated in tradition and superstitious authority, had held them chained to error and kept them from the light of new knowledge and experience. They sought a new inductive logic which would start from the present with its greater immediacy and superior reality and validity and lead them to the discovery of new intellectual worlds of ideas, which would be not less startling and perhaps more profoundly significant and useful than those which had already been brought to light by the aid of the mariner's compass and sextant and in the physical and chemical laboratories and in the artisans' work shops. They believed that the priesthoods were working magic upon the people by means of the wands of superstition and were commanding ignorance of the new science in the name of a galaxy of supernatural beings, whom they dominated and held incommunicado from the public, but whom they made responsive to their own slightest beck and call. They believed also that charlatan priesthoods, of whatever religious professions, were all alike in seeking to keep the people—even nobles and kings—ignorant of the new enlightenment in order that they might exploit their labor and their wealth and power in the interests of sacerdotal institutions that more fittingly represented the powers of darkness than those of light.

¹ See L. L. Bernard, "The Evolution of Social Consciousness and of the Social Sciences," *Psychological Review*, XXXIX: 147-164 (Mar., 1932).

The New Program. With such an outlook upon the mental world about them, the philosophers who created the Age of the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, initiated a vigorous attack, first, with the object of destroying the old obstacles to a trustworthy new science and, second, with the purpose of creating a new philosophy of nature and of human life. Thus the efforts of the philosophers of the Enlightenment were exerted in the direction of two main endeavors. In the first place, they realized very clearly that the new order of science and the new logic of inductive observation and experiment could be made effective for the masses of men only after the theological dragon that guarded the temple of wisdom from the approach of the profane had been destroyed. But the killing of the dragon was an extremely dangerous task to be undertaken only by heroes of the first order, fit to contest for place among the earth's greatest. These dragon fighters appeared as a group of deists of the seventeenth century in England. From them Voltaire, the greatest of them all, learned the art ² and finally delivered the *coup de grace* to the scaly old monster that had so long breathed hell fire against all who dared raise their voices and hands against this champion of Stygian darkness. But merely to destroy the guardian of the cave of superstition who had placed a curse on the seekers of light was not enough. It was, in the second place, necessary to create a new theory of knowledge, a new philosophic system of the universe and of man. This work also was begun in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by such astronomical geniuses as Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, and it was carried out on more philosophic lines in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Fontenelle and Saint-Pierre, and by d'Holbach, Helvetius, Turgot, and Condorcet.

Preparatory Work in the Natural Sciences. Here we have an ascending inductive analysis of nature, beginning with the generalities of mathematical astronomy and proceeding through the world of plant and animal life, and finally embracing the mind and constitution of man and even the organization of society. What Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo and Newton began by way of the establishment of a self-active universe, with a center expanding from the mundane to the solar, guided according to the laws of motion and movement discovered by these men, was completed in the brilliant work of La Place, who offered a naturalistic account of the origin of worlds to replace the Mosaic myth of personal creation by magic, and in the discoveries of Herschel, who established the superiority of the galactic

² Norman Lewis Torrey, *Voltaire and the English Deists* (1930).

system over the solar. The work of the eighteenth century in chemistry gradually removed the agency of spirits from the processes of chemical metathesis and even replaced the metaphysical assumptions of phlogiston and chemical affinity with a mathematics of chemical reactions. Gradually the classifications of plants by Linnaeus and of animals by Cuvier laid the foundation for the construction of the curve of impersonal evolution to replace the theological dogma of special creations; but this task was not finally achieved until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the brilliant inductive observations of Darwin made possible the victory of his conclusions regarding the self contained processes of natural selection over the theory of specific divine intervention.

Preparatory Work in the Human Sciences. A naturalistic interpretation of human personality was even more difficult to establish in opposition to the dogmas of spirit control and the dominance of a deterministic "free will" over the acts of men. The theological religions that still reigned over the masses of mankind in the eighteenth century continued to cling, through their traditions and written sacred literatures, to the belief in spirit determination of conduct. According to this literature and these traditions, in early times the gods themselves had personally directed mankind individually and collectively in the management of their lives. Then, the greater gods going far away to isolate themselves from too close contact with men, had continued for some time to speak to men by means of oracles, priests, and prophets. In the meantime, the lesser gods—both good and evil spirits—had kept up a close contact with human kind, motivating them to extraordinary deeds. Even the New Testament carries numerous accounts of spirit possession, and the folk beliefs of the Middle Ages and even of more modern times, have preserved tales of supernatural interference and control and have passed on this method of interpretation to the present. In the process frequently they have been aided and abetted by the official servants of the Church.

Hobbes (1588–1679) and Locke (1632–1704) and Hume (1711–1776) and Condillac (1715–1780) had done good service in endeavoring to bring the analysis of human personality and mental behavior onto a naturalistic basis. They had sought to find the mechanics of conduct within the constitution of the individual and in his conditioned responses to his environment. Even yet the analysis of the association of ideas or, as we now call it, the conditioning of responses, made by John Locke in the seventeenth century, has not been surpassed fundamentally by the work of such physiologists as

Pavlov or Bechterev. By means of such modes of realistic interpretation of conduct the writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had laid the foundations for an objective naturalistic, as opposed to a supernaturalistic, theory of human behavior.

The Free Will Doctrine. But in spite of the work of Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Condillac, the theologically conditioned students of human nature, that is, of the personalities of men, held stubbornly to one of their most redoubtable fortifications of obscurantism—the dogma of free will. The doctrine of free will is a most curious contradiction in itself. It originated in the theory of spirit possession referred to above. The will that was supposed to direct the behavior of the person was originally a foreign, invading, animating spirit. When the growth of human enlightenment finally forced intelligent thinkers to abandon belief in spirit possession, the more theologically minded found refuge in a theory of the dualistic nature of the human personality, which had descended from fairly early times. Each person, according to this view, consisted of a body, which was thought not to be self-active or animate, and a spirit or soul, which was the conscious or animating and vital principle governing and directing the body. If this spirit or soul deserted the body for any considerable length of time the latter underwent dissolution or died. This soul or spirit had complete power over the body, and alone could direct its behavior.

The spirit in turn might be directed by good or evil forces. The pious soul, according to the magic mythology of the orthodox theology, should keep constantly in touch with sacred powers through prayer, lest it be tricked into formal or appetitive disobedience by the powers of darkness. Such a soul constantly grudged the time it was compelled to give to the direction and guidance of the carnal needs of the body and sometimes deliberately deserted it to its fate in death and oblivion. In any case, the truly pious soul welcomed with thanksgiving its final release from its carnal charge and returned to its hosts in heaven with a feeling of profound relief and satisfaction at having won its freedom from tutelage. It was now free from the temptation of the evil spirits to which its mission on earth and its association with purely mortal appetitive matter subjected it.

If, on the other hand, it was a lost soul—lost to the heavenly hosts because it had been won by the denizens of the nether world—it was none the less immortal. While it remained above ground it must constantly perform the commands of the Satanic master in enticing the body which depended upon it for guidance into dissipation, impurity, corruption, and crime, and

finally deliver it over to the devastating indignities of Hell. Even in Hell itself the soul that had yielded to evil was in the constant service of the Devil and took the keenest delight in the promotion and perpetuation of evil.

If one looks upon the body as the personality, it has, according to this theory, no freedom of action at all; if the soul is considered as the true personality, it has no freedom of choice in particular cases, but only in its general allegiance to good or evil; but if both the body and the soul are together regarded as constituting the personality, the combined entity could have no more freedom than the freest element in the combination—the soul.

Thus the modern theological doctrine of "free will" which rested upon the belief that the soul was free to guide the body was not a theory of free will at all but of the most completely regimented will, that is, a theory of outside spirit determinism of the most uncompromising kind. The soul guided and controlled the body completely, except when it deserted the body. But the soul itself was not even a free agent, with power to direct the body as it saw fit, but rather a member of a closed corporation, always specifically under the control of either heavenly or infernal powers. Its only sure power of choice was whether it should serve God and the angels or the Devil and his minions. This choice having once been made, it must take orders continually from its celestial or its Plutonic master.

The Sensational School of Behavior. Intriguing as such theological and metaphysical speculation may have been, and still may be, to those who prefer mysticism to science, it was never of course based on any scientific foundation. It grew out of the dreams of primitive men and the fancies of priestly metaphysicians. A new group of thinkers of the eighteenth century sought to build on the work of Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Condillac a naturalistic interpretation of human behavior. Already their predecessors had taken the body rather than the soul as the basis of behavioristic investigation, because the body was subject to observation and experiment and the soul was only a phantom and an inference from the behavior of the body. Lamettrie (1709-1751), Diderot (1713-1784), d'Holbach (1723-1789), and Helvetius (1715-1771) in France and Hartley (1705-1757) and William Godwin (1756-1836) in England headed the new movement to discover just how and why the human personality behaves. D'Holbach³ sought to reduce the interior organization of man to a series of physiological or physico-

³ *Christianisme Dévoilé* (1767); *Le Système de la Nature* (1770); *Système Social* (1773); *Politique Naturelle* (1773-1774); *Morale Universelle* (1776).

chemical mechanisms. He supposed that these mechanisms proceed naturally when initiated by impulses or stimuli resulting from physical contacts with the environment and that they lead over to psycho-physically coordinated responses to the environment. This was the sensational philosophy of conduct. If his generalizations lacked the insight and knowledge which have refined modern behavioristic explanations of stimulus-response mechanisms, or behavior patterns, he nevertheless was headed in the right direction. The experimental work of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has broadened and deepened and refined the work of the sensational school of d'Holbach, but has not reversed his most general contentions.

The Environmentalist Theory of Conduct. But it was the work of Helvetius, Hartley, and Godwin that established the behavioristic derivation of conduct from environmental stimuli rather than from the tutelage of supernatural spirits or a soul. They began that splendid analysis of the influence of environment upon human behavior that has been so fruitful in the scientific analysis of personality in our time. Starting with Locke's explanation of the association of ideas or the conditioning of responses, they gradually analyzed and unravelled the field of social stimuli on the one hand and constructed a system of response mechanisms on the other which interpreted and specified the conditioning pressures of the environment in human conduct. It is true that from our present vantage ground much of the work of Hartley,⁴ Helvetius,⁵ and Godwin was crude and overdrawn. Certainly it was vastly over-simplified, for how could they know all the complexities of response that proceed from an endowment of ten billion or more neurons in the cerebral cortex and from an objective culture ever growing in complexity and in subtle power to fashion and provide new stimuli to human action? But these men of the eighteenth century enlightenment set the pattern of thought and investigation which, after a period of biological overemphasis in the latter half of the nineteenth century, is again asserting itself in the most fruitful manner. To the early naturalistic analysts of behavior—Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Condillac—and also to the later constructive proponents of the theory that personality is primarily a synthetic integrated system of responses of the organism to the environment—Diderot, d'Holbach, Hartley, Helvetius, and William Godwin—we owe the sure beginnings and foundations of a naturalistic science of human personality. The significance of this theory of personality

⁴ See his *Observations on Man* (1749).

⁵ See his *De l'Esprit* (1758) and *De l'Homme* (1773).

is that it removed physical man from the category of a puppet attached to a capricious spirit or soul which merely perpetrates upon the living human being the whimsical will of a more or less malevolent and self-centered supernatural despot and gives to him the status of a self-active being, but not one free from the vicissitudes and necessities of adjustment to the world in which he lives.

The Philosophers' View of Supernatural Intervention. It was in large measure this consequent realization that man is dependent upon his social and physical world not only for his very being, but also for the nature of the personality which he develops and the behavior which he must manifest, that drove him to a more profound consideration of the nature and mechanics of this world in which he lives. Here again tradition and the sacred writings of the Church, so sedulously enjoined upon the common man by the threatened hell-fire of the great dragon, had placed the origin and control wholly outside of man himself. The world, including man and his institutions, had been created by a supernatural being and was still subject to his control. This control according to theological teaching, had not been very successful. As the philosophers of the Enlightenment irreverently stated it, God had apparently not been able to cope effectively with the Devil for the control of his own creatures and from time to time he had abandoned them to their fate in the nether world. But, finally, being unable to appeal either to human reason or to human self-interest, he had sent his only-begotten son (born of a Jewish woman, the wife of Joseph, in the little Galilean town of Nazareth) to perform a magical sacrifice for the human race and by dying for them physically save them from a spiritual death. Apparently this effort also was unsuccessful, and men still remained evil for the most part and governed themselves abominably, both politically and morally. Even the ministrations of the Catholic church (later supplemented by numerous Protestant denominations of Christianity) left by the only-begotten son to carry out and complete his work while he went back to Heaven, had not been very much, if any, more successful. God had ceased to give directions personally for the governance of mankind and those that the Church was ever ready to offer, and even enforce to the best of its ability, either were but little heeded or, if applied, sometimes seemed to do more harm than good.⁶

⁶ See John Bunyan's strikingly similar analysis of this situation, but from a Puritan standpoint, in his *The Holy War* (1682), and J. A. Froude's psychological analysis of Bunyan's point of view in his life of Bunyan; see also A. S. Patton's *The Losing and Taking of Mansoul; or, Lectures on the Holy War* (New York, 1859).

A Secular Plan for Human Salvation. Such was the way essentially in which the philosophers of the French Enlightenment looked upon the condition of human society and the existing plight of mankind. In fact, synthetically speaking, these are almost the very words of these philosophers abstracted from their various sources and rearranged constructively. So many other agencies, both divine and secular, as well as a mixture of the two, had tried and failed to better the condition of mankind, that they concluded that human effort itself should make an attempt at its improvement. With their new science and their new logic the philosophers would work along naturalistic lines. First, they would analyze human society historically and in cross section and then, secondly, they would construct a scheme for its betterment, in fact, in the words of Condorcet, for its indefinite progress and improvement. Unquestionably this was a most worthy proposal. It showed the truly philanthropic spirit of the philosophers of the eighteenth century. They were not content merely to tear down the past. They were not iconoclasts for the sake of iconoclasm. It was not until the nineteenth century that an intense opposition to this endeavor to improve the condition of mankind by secular means developed among certain radical extremists—Bakunin and the anarchists generally—who were more intent upon removing the false structures of the past than upon building new and better ones upon their ruins. Even Voltaire, reputedly the great image breaker, was not on principle hostile to the existing order. He only sought, like the great Erasmus, to attack obvious evils and to suggest a better way. But it was inevitable that the minions of the supernatural, or at least the defenders of the great dragon, should be scandalized and deeply offended by the temerity of this handful of philosophers who seemed to believe that they could do what God and his only-begotten son and the Church together and successively had failed to do—save mankind from the ravages of the Devil. And, besides, sin was a very profitable institution to the Church. What would be the use of a Church—one might almost say of the only-begotten son and of God himself—without sin and the Devil. No Satan, no holy redeemer or redemption. It was a puzzling problem. And, moreover, the new philosophy—the inductive, naturalistic approach—attacked the very groundwork of the Church's philosophy and theology. They were not compatible. If the philosophers of the Enlightenment were right, the Church was wrong and God himself (by the Church's interpretation of its theological manikin) was an impostor. It need not surprise us, therefore, that the theologians did not welcome the efforts of the philoso-

phers to analyze society and offer a theory and a plan for its improvement—for its indefinite perfection and perfectability. This antagonism persists even into our day and it was especially marked when the beginnings of the Social Science movement which we intend to depict in the following pages first got under way. •

The Secular Plan in Detail. But what, in the concrete, was the approach of these philosophers of the eighteenth century Enlightenment to the analysis and improvement of society? Having established the naturalistic character of the personality of the individual member of society and having traced the origin of his behavior and personality, at least in their chief differential aspects, back to environmental stimuli and organization, they already had established one important leg to the table of their social law. By means of this conception of the determining influence of environment—of the social environment, we may say—they projected the sociological conception of culture. They perceived that this environment is the source of infinitely numerous and complex stimuli which are reproduced through the imitative process in the individual, and that through the inventive process new patterns of behavior are produced and enter into new creations of personality, thus becoming in their turn patterns in a newly evolving environment, which again gives rise to new personality responses. Vico, by means of his discovery, early in the eighteenth century, of a common nature or pattern of human conduct and institutions in the literature of the classical nations, had made the concept of an objective socially self-existent culture (or social environment) possible. Behind Homer's personality he had discovered Greek tradition and back of the personalities of the classical heroes and gods he had revealed the conceptualized folkways and mores of a whole civilization. But it remained for Helvetius and Godwin and their fellow philosophers to complete his work of uncovering the basic nature and function of culture by showing how one age perpetuates itself in the next and how each succeeding age transforms the past sufficiently to secure progress. Vico had revealed the essence of tradition and had proclaimed progress, but he had not reduced its mechanisms from a metaphysical mysticism to a naturalistic process or set of processes. This task the philosophers of the French Enlightenment set for themselves and went far in the direction of accomplishing.

How Man Creates the Pattern of History. Another leg to the new table of social science or social law was provided by the inductive generalizers from the data of history. Here also Vico (1668-1744) had set the mode in his

Scienza Nuova (1725), but he had not sufficiently separated the process of induction from metaphysical and theological presuppositions. Although he ruled out supernatural personal direction from the developing panorama of secular history and retained it only for Sacred or Jewish history, he still accepted the metaphysical dogma of the implicit (Platonic) pattern in the "nature of things." The more impersonal Natural Law had merely replaced the personal deity in his scheme for the ordering of things. The French philosophers went much farther than this in seeking to uncover the laws of human social development. They dropped the concept of a predetermined pattern and sought to discover the changing synthetic pattern of society in the naturalistic evolution of human events as a function of man's adjustment to his environment, physical and social or cultural. The difference is that Vico believed the pattern was preexistent and implicit in the events or data and he sought to uncover or reveal it from the study of literature and history, holding that it was everywhere essentially the same. The French philosophers, on the other hand, believed that the pattern itself was created by the events of history and that it grew both in complexity and in rational completeness with the growth of historic fact. Moreover, man's increasing understanding of this pattern, constantly made more visible by the light of naturalistic social analysis, helped to shape and form the pattern, thus creating it in part through the rational intervention of man. But they realized, of course, that the pattern of civilization never could be created wholly by human intelligence as long as man had not learned to master and control nature to fit the demands of his will and needs. Yet even this mastery over nature they hoped ultimately to achieve and thus to set man free to shape entirely by human will and knowledge the pattern of his society and thereby to achieve ultimately unlimited progress. Such was the buoyant dream of the last of the great philosophers of the Enlightenment in France, the gentle Condorcet.

From Fontenelle to Voltaire. But the road from Vico to Condorcet, with its accompanying transformation from a ready made pattern of civilization implicit in Natural Law or the nature of things, over to the conception of a pattern of society ultimately to be fashioned entirely by means of human intelligence guided by a naturalistic science, was a long one which had to be traversed by many weary, if eager, minds. Fontenelle (1657-1757) had helped to pave this way by his implicit attacks upon the magical emphases of the old theology and his subtle innuendo in favor of the inductive ob-

servational method.⁷ Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) had gone even farther and had all but repudiated the old theology in his emphasis upon the new science of nature, which however often failed in his hands to detach itself sufficiently from metaphysical mysticism. To his open advocacy of science—for which he was expelled from the French Academy—he added an ardor for the reform of the social abuses which persisted in the name of the sacred political and theological traditions of the past. This ardor created nothing short of a scandal and might have cost him his liberty or his life had he not possessed a saving flatness of style that prevented his being much read and a compensating reputation for being a good but wholly impractical idealist—a reputation that seems ridiculous in the light of the fact that his ideas more than those of anyone else of his time have found subsequent fruitful issue.⁸ But it was Voltaire (1694-1778) who examined the past critically and in detail for the purpose of discovering what events in the long course of history had found fulfillment in subsequent events. He it was who first traced the history of social institutions with an open mind, endeavoring to discover inductively what had been the true course of history, instead of seeking to support a preconceived theory of the pattern of historical society.⁹ In the light of our present knowledge his work appears less brilliant than it did in his own generation, but it opened a new pathway which was to be travelled increasingly by his successors.

From Rousseau to Condorcet. It can scarcely be said that Rousseau (1712-1778) added much to the analysis of history, if indeed he did not pervert its true meaning. His contribution must be found elsewhere. But Turgot (1727-1781) in his brief work¹⁰ added much by way of analysis of the general principles of historical development. More brilliant still from the standpoint of concrete investigation was the work of Montesquieu (1689-1755), who went to the sources of historical information with the inductive method and created, or at least greatly expanded, a theory of climatic influences and another theory of the development of political institutions as functional modes of human adjustment in the struggle for coadaptive survival. Viewed as a study of the technique of collective organization for purposes of making an effective adjustment to the demands

⁷ See his *Dialogues des Morts* (1683); *Histoire des Oracles* (1686); *De l'Origine des Fables* (1724).

⁸ See Paul Albert, *La Littérature Française au Dix-Huitième Siècle*, pp. 21-42.

⁹ See his *Essai sur les Mœurs* (1756).

¹⁰ See his *On the Historical Progress of the Human Mind* (1749).

of cooperative existence, the *Spirit of Laws* (1748) is a remarkable book. It is almost, if not quite, the first attempt to look in detail at the history of political and social institutions in the light of their functional evolution as technologies of social adjustment on a naturalistic basis. These are of course words that would have been quite foreign to the mind of Montesquieu, but in our modern terminology they express quite fully the general purpose which the great Montesquieu had in mind. Voltaire attacked this question of discovering the growing pattern of civilization inductively from a general review of the facts of history. Turgot sought to condense this process of historical evolution into a briefer set of principles, that is, to be systematic where Voltaire was only descriptive. Montesquieu was the first to trace the development of a specific set of human institutions as the functioning modes of adjustment to environmental pressures growing out of the adjustment process itself and not imposed by some personal or metaphysical power from without. But Condorcet (1743-1794) was the first to attempt to systematize the theory of the total development of history by reducing its panorama to a series of concrete stages of successive and connected phases of that development process. There was of course much that was immature or defective in the adventurous thought of Condorcet. For example, we may not be able to accept his classification of stages in their entirety, and much less may we believe with him that in the fairly near future we may be able so to master the laws of nature as to control the environmental setting of man even to the degree of working out a system of indefinite progress for mankind which will conserve all energies and result in a perfected society.¹¹ The difficulties in the way of such a result are much greater than Condorcet could realize with the knowledge that was available to him. But here again we must acknowledge that his thinking was on the right track and that he only exaggerated possibilities that are invaluable even for that degree of their realization that is feasible. There is nothing in the circumstances of Condorcet's thinking that could justify us in repudiating his method or system as a whole. He belongs among those immortals who sought and found a new and naturalistic mode of interpreting society in the light of science and in no small degree is he worthy of the characterization of the Father of Social Planning.

The Rise of Social Technology. A third leg supporting the table of social science or social law is the development of a sound system of social

¹¹ See his *Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain* (1795).

planning or of social technology. We no longer depend primarily upon the data of history for the analysis of social processes and the discovery of social principles and social laws. From the study of history the philosophers progressed to the study of ethnological and anthropological data, a transition which was already under way in the work of Montesquieu and Condorcet. In the nineteenth century this dependence of sociological analysis upon ethnological data was much more marked and became in Spencer, Tylor, Letourneau and others almost an obsession. With them induction from ethnological and cultural data seemed almost the only inductive method of sociology offering at the same time sufficient detachment from the present and an adequate sample from which a sound system of sociological theory might be generalized. But the objections to the ethnological approach were almost as great as those to the historical approach. Accordingly we have now come to study primarily the data of contemporary society by means of the statistical method. The advantages of such a sociological method are obvious from the standpoint of adequacy of sample, applicability of conclusions to the situation in hand, and the realism of the investigational process.¹²

Although reform was a strong motive in some of the philosophers of the eighteenth century—and especially in the thinking of Saint-Pierre, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire, Turgot, Condorcet, and Godwin—it was nevertheless not the ruling passion of that age. The philosophers of the Enlightenment were much more concerned to understand than to change the nature of the society in which they lived. Social reform has been especially characteristic of the spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the growth of the method of generalizing from contemporary facts, which calls especial attention to the social situation in its abnormal adjustment aspects, has done much in the way of stimulating the drive for social reform.

Rise of the Social Science Movement. Furthermore, the motivation to the study of social evils, or of social maladjustment, for the sake of their removal has been itself in turn one of the strongest of the stimuli leading to the scientific analysis of society. The Social Science Movement, with which we are concerned in this volume, was itself primarily the product of this urge to understand and correct the social evils of the times. The Social Science Movement was not the product of pure speculative social

¹² See L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist*, XXXVIII: 292-320 (Apr., 1928).

theory, although it made use of such pure theory whenever and wherever it found it convenient to do so. The Social Science Movement was, as we shall have frequent occasion to say in the pages that follow, a synthetic one and it arose as a practical device for the assemblage of all possible available data bearing upon the social ills of the time. The society of the early nineteenth century had become acutely aware of itself and of its shortcomings and inadequacies and it—or at least its most civically-minded leaders and thinkers—had reached the point of ethical and social determination at which they were engaged in the search for all possible intellectual and moral resources with which to better human social conditions. Consequently, they drew from moral philosophy, from history and politics, from economics, from educational theory, from medicine and sanitation, from the newer spirit in religion, and from the study of all sorts of current problems, such as immigration, political corruption, penology, poverty, what material was available and erected these data into a new synthesis which they called "Social Science." The Social Science Movement, including its exponent academic discipline "Social Science," thus naturally arose and came to fruition in the nineteenth century, although it had its beginnings or foreshadowings definitely in the eighteenth century. It was the child of the urge for social reform and it allied itself especially to that aspect of social science in general which we have called social technology or social planning.

The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries Contrasted. This fact brings us more concretely to the further consideration of a circumstance of some importance to the orientation of our study of the Social Science Movement—some major differences of outlook between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. In spite of its strenuous intellectual activity the eighteenth century never became fully aware of itself analytically. Of course its philosophers were very busy examining its institutions and devoted much of their attention to the criticism of their shortcomings and failings. The strong demands of Saint-Pierre for various social reforms, the mordant criticisms of Voltaire upon the obscurantist tendencies of the Church and upon current superstitions in general, the biting condemnation of the ossification and non-functional nature of all social institutions levelled by Rousseau at existing society, the sanguine appeal of Condorcet from the present to the future, the vindication of the doctrines of philosophical liberalism against tory defeatism by Godwin in England, offer sufficient evidence that the century's leading thinkers were not blind to the malad-

justments of society as it existed. But still it is true to say that not even these men had made any thoroughgoing analysis of the state of human society in their time. The eighteenth century was almost as much of a phantasy to the leading minds of that age as was the Utopistic future which some of them envisaged as a dream of an unlimited progress and perfection of mankind.

The Outlook of the Eighteenth Century. The reasons for this incompleteness of social self-knowledge in the eighteenth century are not far to seek. In the first place, the attention of the philosophers of the Enlightenment was upon the past rather than upon contemporaneous events. But their harking back to the past was of a very different kind and for a very different purpose from that of the apologists for the great dragon. Their aim was not to bow the knee in praise and worship, but to criticise and condemn. With the exception of the quixotic Rousseau, all of them found the roots of the evils of the present in the ignorance, dogmatism, obscurantism, and narrow self-seeking absolutism of the past. The church and the monarchy with their complement of clergy and nobility especially drew their attacks. They had not yet sought to study the present in itself in order to find if it bore in its fundamental organization, to which all men were attached, the seeds of evil which could be destroyed only by a cross sectional reorganization as well as by an extirpation of the past in the present. For them, evils inhered in irrational social survivals rather than in exploitive social organization. Indeed, as we said above, the philosophers of that age had no adequate method for analysing their present. They approached the study of society from the standpoint of the generalization of historical data; and even when later they came to propose sociological principles and laws on the basis of ethnological facts they were no closer, perhaps not as near, to an understanding of the present. From both points of view, the historical and the ethnological, they were able to see current society only as a system of survivals. That it had in it many survivals, some of them disconcertingly mischievous and dangerous to the welfare of men, there can be no doubt. But that it also had weaknesses which grew out of oppressive social organization in the immediate present and which penetrated to the very heart of the social system there can be as little question. Witness for example the devastating system of taxation which threw the burden of support of social institutions upon those least able to bear it. There were also the unjust levies upon commerce and agriculture, the hunting privileges of the nobles, the non-resident ownership

evils with the concentration of the intelligentsia in Paris, the increasing civic and economic burdens which had been thrown upon peasants as compensation for their freedom from serfdom, and the growing extravagance and favoritism of the reigning dynasty.

These and many other evils, which to be sure had roots in the past as do all practices, but which were for the most part relatively recent in their growth and had little essential connection with the traditional church and monarchy, were scarcely observed or spoken of by the philosophers. In a sense they knew that they existed but these were concrete and to them more or less isolated evils. They would scarcely fit into the great society which they saw almost exclusively in historical perspective. They were not outstanding features of the great institutions which historical investigation and generalization had emphasized. They were more or less isolated, and sometimes local, phenomena. Philosophers could scarcely be expected to take major cognizance of them. After all, they were building up a theory of society on the basis of historical perspective rather than on that of a cross section analysis of contemporary society and its prevailing maladjustments. Thus it was that the philosophers largely ignored the irritating and oppressive features of the present system, the more readily perhaps because the philosophers were not themselves usually members of the oppressed classes. For the same reason they were not reformers in the concrete. They viewed society over a long perspective and the maladjustments in the social system that impressed them most were those with wide historical perspectives; and they were also more specifically intellectual than economic problems. The philosophers were keenly aware of logical inconsistencies in the perspective of institutional development. They could be deeply wounded by the lag of church or state behind the new knowledge of mankind and a disregard of the requirements of the new logic gave them positive pain. But the poor might remain poor, government might continue to be oppressive in details and the masses might be in the darkest ignorance; and still these facts would not disturb their serenity of mind nearly as much as would the anomaly of a primitive theology or of an illogical metaphysics surviving into the present from the past.

Generality of Social Analysis of the Time. It is significant that of the four men who were most keenly aware of the local and concrete ills of the society of that day, two of them—Saint-Pierre and Rousseau—were reared in relatively narrow circumstances, and the latter was a child of the people accustomed to experience and resent their sufferings. Saint-Pierre

was one of the keenest critics of actual misgovernment in his time, while Rousseau sought to plan a theory of political control and a doctrine of sovereignty based upon the social contract which would give to the people the balance of power.¹³ Condorcet and Godwin¹⁴ were idealists and moralists who had had ample opportunity to observe the sufferings of the people even if they had not participated personally in them. Yet these two men were far from being concrete and detailed in their analysis of the social situation of the time or in their proposals for reform. The reforms they advocated were as general and as little concretely factual as were their analyses of society. It is not to be wondered at that these men, even at their best and in their most sympathetic moods, could not get down to a concrete analysis of society as it was. They had no method, no system of analysis that was adequate to the purpose. Political economy, the theory of government, moral philosophy, jurisprudence, were still in their abstract stages of development. To be sure there was one work of a concrete analytic character in political theory—the *Spirit of Laws* of Montesquieu—and an even more factual analysis in the field of political economy—*The Wealth of Nations* of Adam Smith—but beyond these there was nothing worth mentioning. Even the *Commentaries* of Blackstone in the field of jurisprudence was a special plea for the propertied and commercial classes rather than an objective treatise on civil reform legislation; and there was nothing better than Paley's works on moral and political philosophy before the end of the eighteenth century. These were, to be sure, symptomatic of what was to come in the way of detailed social analysis, but as yet they were mainly symptoms. The theory of Natural Law still dominated the theory of human relations and the philosophers had scarcely escaped its general abstract limitations, although they were preparing the way by means of their emphasis upon a new inductive naturalism as a basis for concrete social analysis and valuation.

Concrete Social Analysis in the Nineteenth Century. Already at the dawn of the nineteenth century this movement for a naturalistic, as distinguished from a metaphysical, analysis of society was under way. The beginnings of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Helvetius, Adam Smith, Godwin, and others in this direction were bearing fruit. One of the chief accelerations it received was from the school of Bentham, and especially that bril-

¹³ See *The Social Contract* (1762) and the *Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes* (1755).

¹⁴ See his *Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* (1793) and *The Enquirer* (1797).

liant group of ethicists, jurists, economists, political analysts, and moral philosophers who followed more or less in his trail. While the work of this school did not bear its maximum fruit until around the middle of the nineteenth century, it acted as a leaven upon social analysis and reform from its very earliest decades. The new economics of James and John Stuart Mill and of McCulloch and Jevons, the moral philosophy and ethics of Combe, Whewell, Bain, Spencer, and Leslie Stephen, the jurisprudence of Austin and Maine, the political studies of Stubbs, Hallam, and May; the historical analyses of Macaulay and Green; the political psychology of Mill, G. H. Lewes, G. C. Lewis, Maine, and Bagehot, are but a small earnest of the factual emphasis upon an understanding of the present which members of the Benthamite school and of other schools brought to bear in the field of social science. By the middle of the nineteenth century the average man of education had a fairly adequate grasp of the century and of the society in which he lived. And this was in spite of the fact that the universities and the public schools still stressed the culture—and the esoteric culture at that—of the past instead of the current civilization. This knowledge had come for the most part through the labors of the independent schools and the writings of the publicists, reenforced by a wealth of magazine publication previously undreamed of. The great reviews of England and America, and later of France and Germany, were the text books of the current civilization.

Growth of Reform Associations. This growth in concrete knowledge of contemporary society and in social self-analysis in the nineteenth century was of two kinds essentially. On the one hand it was more marked by a great increase in intensity and on the other by an equally great expansion or growth in extent. In the nineteenth century the handful of philosophers in each country who speculated interestingly, discoursed eloquently, and investigated enthusiastically the phenomena of society and generalized their results expansively and grandiloquently was replaced by an equally numerous group of equally earnest, if less polished and less self-confident, students in almost every center of population of any size. In every important city of England, America, and the continent there sprang up discussion groups of men who associated for the benefits of mutual encouragement and criticism. Out of many of these discussion groups grew various reform organizations, or the latter depended on the former for advice and a certain measure of guidance. These investigators and discussers of the new knowledge of society worked strenuously at their task.

Even a partial list of such societies would overrun our pages, but they were both numerous and productive. By such means the nineteenth century came to be socially self-conscious and to understand itself as no other century—not even the century of Enlightenment, the eighteenth—ever had before. With the coming of social self-understanding and a knowledge of the specific shortcomings of the current civilization, reform organizations sprang up everywhere in the most advanced countries. There were prison reform societies, the chartist movement, numerous communistic colonies, cooperative undertakings and associations, anti-slavery and abolitionist societies, temperance societies, and many more. Along with such movements, which were largely in the nature of crusades against evils, there were many others that were predominately constructive in character. Among these were the public health movement, the movement for the development of professional nursing standards and training, associations for organizing and administering relief, associations for the promotion and reform of the poor law, Christian missionary societies, associations for improving the condition of the poor, for the dissemination of Christian knowledge, for the promotion of popular education, for the diffusion of scientific knowledge, and scores of others of like or similar purpose and character.

The Social Science Movement. The Social Science Movement was one of these more constructive and more general attempts at social reform that grew out of a more adequate social self-analysis and popular understanding in the nineteenth century. It was never merely a movement for the direct abolition of evil. It was rather at its best and in its heyday of development a semi-academic movement for the collection and diffusion of knowledge regarding the conditions and needs of society. It sought rather to discover through scientific analysis that information by means of which the people would be able to improve their own condition. Thus it was essentially a democratic movement which depended on the participation and functioning of the largest possible number of capable citizens. In this respect it was a true child of the nineteenth century rather than offshoot of the philosophic paternalism of the Age of the Enlightenment. It must not be supposed of course that in its beginning the Social Science Movement was either very scientific or academic. As a matter of fact, as our pages will show, it was at first largely philosophic and metaphysical—philosophic in that it dealt largely with beneficent or philanthropic generalizations and metaphysical in that it depended on a system of apriori generalizations rather than on the firm basis of inductive scientific analysis and general-

ization. Such it was indeed in the eighteen-forties and the eighteen-fifties, but in the eighteen-sixties most of the old sentimental and metaphysical content had disappeared from the movement and it increasingly based itself largely on an academic discipline which began to be taught in the colleges and universities. In this form the movement was surprisingly successful and like all true movements it found its chief success in giving way to the specialized offspring movements which it had created. Thus by 1890 or 1900 there was no longer a Social Science Movement worthy of note, but it had given rise to a number of offspring disciplines and constructive reform movements which still carry on most successfully the work it began. The more aware modern society becomes of itself the more active these agencies for social understanding and social welfare also become.

Social Science Defines Itself as a Social Reform Movement

Orientation. The story we undertake to tell here is of two ideals which arose or were formulated at the end of the eighteenth century, the ideal on the one hand of social reform, reconstruction, progress, and on the other, the ideal of science. The union of these two ideals produced the new challenging discipline whose name reflected its compound origin—the discipline, that is, of Social Science. It is perhaps needless to point out that “the Social Science movement” in the title of this book does not refer to all the social sciences considered generically, but to the one specific discipline, Social Science, which sought to apply the revolutionary spirit of science to the multitudinous and varied problems which the collapse of feudal society and the emergence of industrialized society were producing. The concrete, pedestrian, specific, almost technical social sciences—economics, sociology, political science—may have made important contributions to modern life, but on a plane very different from that of Social Science which, as a movement, was much more epochal than anything specific it may have accomplished. For it represented the transition from a theologically oriented society to a scientifically minded one. Social Science, in other words, as the expression is here employed, was not a generic term, for all the social sciences; it was the religion of a society in the throes of industrialization, just as theology had been the religion of the old feudal world. And it is this exalted discipline with its high idealism which is the subject of our study in this and the following chapters.

The Question of Origins. A social or an intellectual movement is not like a regiment of toy soldiers, the same at every step. It is better compared to a cloud that begins in one form and ends in another. For a historical moment it has an identity of its own. Before that it was something different; after that it becomes something else again. It is inaccurate therefore to say, “It began at such or such a time,” or “It ended thus and then.” The dates 1840 to 1890, taken to delimit the Social Science movement in the

United States are therefore in the main artificial, like the dates delimiting any other historical period. In this study we shall not scruple to go back of 1840 when this is necessary to fill in the picture and to set the background; nor to extend our view beyond 1890 when we find remnants of the movement extending beyond that date.

The only justification for limiting the study to this specified period is that one must begin and end somewhere, and the best place to begin is where it has become obvious to all thoughtful observers that some sort of specific movement is in process. One might, to be sure, begin at 1865, as Small did in his *résumé*,¹ with the organization of the American Social Science Association. This is clear-cut and definite, but such a beginning leaves the movement quite without roots or antecedents, and 1865 proves actually to be an even more artificial date than 1840. The Civil War was such an important fact in American history that we are likely to forget that our post-bellum history, however tangential it may seem, had its roots in American social processes existing before that war. The war had tremendous motivating and reinforcing consequences in every department of our national life, but the currents that flowed afterwards, whatever their direction and volume, had their inception in numerous rills that had existed previously. The Social Science movement in the United States had a continuous development. The Civil War repressed and obscured it in the South temporarily and accelerated it in the North. But to understand the movement in its entirety we must go back of the war itself.

The Significance of the Eighteen-Forties. There is, moreover, some definite logic in the date 1840 as a starting point in our study of the Social Science movement in the United States. Comte's *Positive Philosophy*, it will be recalled, began to appear in 1830. The final volume, which dealt specifically with a social science, saw the light in 1842. The date 1840 also marks the opening of a new phase of the history of statistics in this country, and statistics, as we shall see, was one of the strongly stressed factors in the Social Science movement itself. It was, furthermore, in the eighteen-forties that discerning observers first began to feel the distinctively nineteenth century flavor in the thoughts and ideas of men to which we have already referred. Mill, Darwin, Spencer, Marx—in fact, the whole galaxy of nineteenth century thinkers in the field of social thought—were just

¹ A. W. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, XXI: 721-864 (May, 1916).

coming upon the scene. The age was beginning to assume the traits that were to characterize it for posterity. The first decades of the century still belonged largely to the eighteenth century in outlook. It is only as we begin to approach the middle of the nineteenth century that we begin adequately to perceive its characteristic flavor. And, finally, practically all historians of the American mind agree that the eighteen-forties constitute a distinctive era in our history. In political, economic, religious, and social thinking, to say nothing of the development of mechanical technology and industry and transportation, it was the beginning of a new era in our national life, and in the life of mankind, which was reflected in that special field of human thought which we call Social Science.

The New Era in America. What, then, was America like in the eighteen-forties? What was its *Zeitgeist*? What sort of setting did it furnish for this new movement that was to grow to such important dimensions in the next fifty years? We may well pause awhile to consider these questions.

An Age of Change. It was, first of all, an age of transition. It was an age of humanitarianism. It was an age of agitation. It was, basically, an age of reform. Parrington² characterizes the whole period between the War of 1812 and the Civil War as one of extravagant youth devoted to a cult of romanticism, a period of revolutions which ultimately prepared the way for the final triumph of the middle class objectives in America. The old colonial America, with its gloomy outlook upon life, its static viewpoint, was dying. The exploitation of natural resources and the growth of national wealth were basic economic facts in the gradual reorientation which was then taking place. The very active stimulus which the success of the Revolutionary War had given both to economic development and to the spirits of men no doubt also played a part. It was a tremendously exhilarating experience to the colonial mind to have succeeded in establishing a new nation. The impetus to change was too strong to spend itself in that one revolution. And just as the political revolution had been based on French and English liberal philosophy, so the intellectual revolutions that were to follow were to be based in large measure upon French and English radical philosophy also. Men's minds were becoming accustomed to the idea of change as a normal process. Indeed, the belief in social change—

² Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, II. *The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860* (1927), p. iii.

progress, as the admirers of the French Enlightenment liked to call it—was to become a cardinal tenet in the new religion of Democracy. And as a result social reform became the great rallying cry of the age.

An Age of Enthusiasm. The gathering exuberance and agitation of the early years of the century seemed suddenly to be precipitated in the eighteen-forties. Commons³ distinguishes three great philosophizing periods in American history, one just preceding Jefferson's presidency, another in the eighteen-forties, and the last in the present era. And of the second of these three periods, he says that it

far outran the other periods in its unbounded loquacity. The columns of advertisements in a newspaper might announce for Monday night a meeting of the antislavery society; Tuesday night, the temperance society; Wednesday night, the graham bread society; Thursday night, a phrenological lecture; Friday night, an address against capital punishment; Saturday night, the "Association for Universal Reform." Then there were all the missionary societies, the woman's rights societies, the society for the diffusion of bloomers, the seances of spiritualists, the "associationists," the land reformers—a medley of movements that found the week too short. A dozen colonies of idealists, like the Brook Farm philosophers, went off by themselves to solve the problem of social existence in a big family called a phalanx. The Mormons gathered themselves together to reconstitute the ten lost tribes. Robert Owen called a "world's convention" on short notice, where a dozen different "plans" of social reorganization—individualistic, communistic, incomprehensible—were submitted in all solemnity. It was the golden age of the talk-fest, the lyceum, the brotherhood of man—the "hot air" period of American history.

An Age of Reform. In spite of certain reactionary elements to be described below, which may be found to flourish in all societies and in every age, this was essentially a period of enthusiasm for reform. Nor is this reformistic characterization of the age simply a historical projection backward from the present on the part of modern writers like Commons and Parrington. Contemporary observers saw their age in precisely the same light. Theodore Parker thus describes⁴ the years around 1840 as

the most interesting period of New England's spiritual history, when a great revolution went on, so silent that few even knew it was taking place. The Unitarians . . . had conquered and secured their right to deny the Trinity; they had won the respect of the New England public, had absorbed most of

³ John R. Commons, ed., *Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, VII. *Labor Movement 1840-1860* (1910), pp. 19-20.

⁴ Theodore Parker, *Experiences as a Minister* (1859), quoted by F. B. Sanborn in his *S. G. Howe* (New York, Funk and Wagnall's, 1891), pp. 115-116.

the religious talent of Massachusetts, and possessed and liberally administered the oldest and richest college in America. Mr. Garrison . . . was beginning his noble work. . . . Dr. Channing was in the full maturity of his powers; and, after long preaching the dignity of human nature as an abstraction, and piety as a purely inward life . . . began to apply his sublime doctrine to actual life—in the individual, the State, and the Church. In the name of Christianity the great American Unitarian called for the reform of the drunkard, the elevation of the poor, the instruction of the ignorant, and, above all, for the liberation of the American slave. Horace Mann . . . began a great movement to improve the public education of the people. . . . The rights of labor were discussed with deep philanthropic feeling and sometimes with profound thought. Mr. George Ripley, a born democrat, . . . made an attempt at Brook Farm so to organize society that the results of labor should remain in the workman's hand. The natural rights of women began to be inquired into, and publicly discussed.

Another contemporary claims ⁵ that

the dominant sentiment of our epoch is that of social progress. We think we cannot be mistaken in this. If the development and growth of this social element be not the dominant sentiment of the age, we would ask, what mean these demands for social reform which come to our ears on every breeze, from every land? What mean these movements among the people, these combinations of even workingmen to meliorate society? . . . There is no mistaking the spirit of the times. We see it everywhere. . . . All these and a thousand other circumstances, we could mention, had we room, are proofs to us, that men's minds and hearts are busy with the social state, and that the real sentiment of our epoch is the sentiment of social progress.

An Age of Social Emphasis. Recently we have hailed with acclaim the assertion from a number of contemporary writers that our civilization has advanced further on the mechanical and industrial than on the ethical and social side and that the next great task in the struggle for human progress is to bring the spiritual up to par with the material elements in our culture. It has been urged that the social sciences should be advanced to a perfection comparable with the mechanical sciences in order that we may control our social relationships as efficiently as we have learned to master our physical world. In short, it has been asserted by these contemporary prophets of a new and better social order that we must so perfect the social sciences and technologies that they may be able to dominate and direct the applications of the physical sciences and technologies to the production of goods that promote human welfare rather than those

⁵ O. A. B., "Education of the People," *Christian Examiner*, XX (new series, II, May, 1836), p. 168.

that further human destruction; those that make for peace and good will and health and understanding rather than those that contribute to war and class rivalry, human degeneration and ignorance. They express the belief that we can never have a fit society until the social sciences merit and gain that universal respect that will enable them to dominate the physical sciences and their applications, just as the spiritual or social values in our civilization must dominate the mere material values and processes of society.

But this viewpoint, which has appealed so strongly to the more spiritually and ethically minded of our generation, is not new. It was being urged vigorously in the eighteen-forties. For example, A. P. Peabody, pastor of the South Church, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was insisting that the ingenuity and skill which had been applied to the material world must now be applied to specific social problems. He said ⁶

the practical skill, which has almost exhausted its resources, in the material world, must apply itself to the reorganization of human society. That the social system is out of joint is only too obvious. Here are the vast masses of superfluous and unproductive wealth; there the crowded ranks of the suffering, the starving, the degraded, the enslaved, for whom no healing or restoring influence has even gone forth. These are the valleys to be exalted; those the mountains to be brought low. War . . . must be put away, and good faith brought down to the details of domestic and social life, and thence . . . infused into the machinery of governments and the counsels of nations. Grovelling toil, both among the sordid rich and the hunger-driven poor, must be made to relax its demands and to equalize its burdens, so that in all classes of society the mind and heart shall claim their rights and have their dues.

General Reconstruction Demanded. Not only were specific and concrete reforms insisted upon by the leading spirits of this age; a general social reconstruction was demanded with equal earnestness. "It should not be dissembled," says one writer of the period, "that what is called *social reform* is becoming the great subject of interest, as well as declamation, especially in our age, and day, and country."⁷ Formerly the cry was for agrarian or financial or commercial or constitutional reforms. "Now, however, the watchword is Social reform. It is no more merely measures concerning person or property; no longer modification even fundamental

⁶ "The Intellectual Aspect of the Age," *North American Review*, LXIV: 286-287 (Apr., 1847).

⁷ O., "Inductive Theory of Civilization: The Social System and Its Modern Reformers," *American Review, A Whig Journal*, VI: 382 (Oct., 1847).

of particular institutions. Nothing less is proposed distinctly than the reconstruction of the social system itself. Spirit of the age—march of intellect—progress of civilization—reorganization in short of society, are phrases becoming familiar to even the multitude of our day. . . .”⁸

The period of the eighteen-forties and fifties was, then, in the eyes of contemporaries, whose observations are more immediate if not more authentic than those of later historians, as well as in the eyes of modern commentators, a time of social ferment. Reform was in the very air. A strong conviction prevailed not only that something could be done about human ills, but also, indeed, that something should and must be done about them as well. Men had faith that society was amenable to reason, that rational control was possible and feasible—indeed necessary. They believed that social life, as well as nature, was guided by natural laws and that once man discovered these laws and conformed to them, the refractory problems of social life would vanish. They were confident that every evil had its remedy.⁹ To them an obstacle was something to be overcome.

The Reaction against Idealism and Enthusiasm. So marked was this enthusiasm for a new world outlook and interpretation, for making the world over according to a pattern of what it should be rather than leave it as it was, that it often aroused the antagonism of reactionaries. In the United States it was allowed to go more or less unchecked. In Europe, however, it aroused the antagonism of the conservative minded. Some of these, like Mrs. Hannah More, the English pietist, opposed it because they saw in it a challenge to and a denial of the goodness and wisdom of God; and they were very desirous of defending God and of keeping both him and his reputation what they ought to be—according to their own view of things. Others, the unscrupulous exploiters of the old order, motivated neither by a love of God nor by a devotion to idealism, and the sordid characters—whom Dickens describes so well in his novels—wanted to keep things as they were because they had a strong vested interest in the evils and the corruption of the age. Nor did this group mind telling the world what they wanted. For the enthusiasts and idealists they had neither tolerance nor love nor pity, but they persecuted and prosecuted them at every turn and they released against them the hyenas and the jackals of the press and the pulpit and the platform, and the balladists, to

⁸ *Ibid.*, 383.

⁹ Massachusetts Board of State Charities, *Second Annual Report* (Oct., 1865), p. 213.

wound and worry them into submission. Only men like Dickens and Thackeray, who were more clever than the hyenas and the jackals, more astute than the enthusiasts, and more ethical than the conservatives (whether in God's name or in Mammon's) dared come to their defense and put these beasts of prey and their keepers to flight by means of the greatest masterpieces of fictional satire of the age.

There was still another group of opponents of the idealists and enthusiasts who objected to them on the ground of esthetics and human dignity, or as they sometimes said, of human decency. Of these defenders of cold placidity and correct inanity in the existing order—it might be too rude to suggest that they were incapable of biting the hands that fed them—the Reverend Isaac Taylor, an English Divine of considerable note and a compiler of literature of less distinction, may be taken as typical. His work on *The Natural History of Enthusiasm* (1829) is the classic apology for this sterile point of view.

In the United States there were, of course, fewer Hannah Mores and perhaps no genuine Isaac Taylors of sufficient note to be mentioned here. We were not lacking, however, in a strong spirit of defense of the fitness of things as they were. In the absence of the Hannah Mores and the Isaac Taylors, so crude were we in our higher aesthetic development and especially in our powers to make of God a thorough gentleman who would be shocked at an excess of enthusiasm in behalf of his own religion and morality, that we went farther in our crude enthusiasm for human justice and social reform for the promotion of the welfare of the masses than would have been possible among any but the lowest classes of Europe. But with all this popular idealism and enthusiasm, however crude it may have seemed to the social elite and the economically and politically elect, our forebears of the eighteen-forties assuredly did not lack "rough neck" defenders of special privilege who were ready to fight in press, pulpit, political forum, at the bar and on the bench, to say nothing of in the market place and in the open field of battle if need be, for their supposed "natural rights." In the eighteen-forties, alongside of those who still proclaimed this to be a land of liberty and of democratic progress—and endeavored to make it such in reality—these other men, the exponents and advocates of privilege, fought equally hard, if not more stubbornly, against the rising tide of democracy and the growing spirit of public welfare.¹⁰

¹⁰ See the histories of the United States by John Bach McMaster and Edward Channing and Claude G. Bowers for illustrations bearing out this interpretation.

The Recessive Idealists. This strong reaction against reform had its effect upon the more timid reformers themselves; some of these were intimidated into finding a more passive method of reform, to fall back upon "evolution" as a device to put their ideals into effect rather than to run the risk involved in the use of violence in forcing a triumph of social idealism. Others, like the philosophical anarchists and the "scientific socialists" of the Karl Marx stripe, sometimes depended upon evolution, but in their moments of impatience they spoke of or practiced revolution as a means of hastening the slow and uncertain process of evolution. Others still, disheartened by the failure of revolution, turned to a sort of mystical and recessive faith in "the destiny of mankind," or some other such obscurantist faith and slogan to appease their hurt and disappointed souls.

In Europe the more tender-minded who could not bear the apparent failure and aftermath of the French Revolution, had retreated with Chateaubriand, Lamartine, Goethe, and Scott, into the elegant melancholy of the French and German romantic movement. Some of these disappointed idealists, like Lamennais, Joseph DeMaistre, and Victor DeBonald, had by way of solace sought the vague emotional inebriety of mystical religion and the artistic phantasy and romance of the middle ages.¹¹ There was a marked reversion to the spirit of the past when all the world seemed to be under the protective influence of two great institutions, the Church and the Empire. They sought again to live in the shadow of this authoritatively managed world, as they believed it to have been in the past. With them wish was father to the thought. They created highly colored pictures of a romantic age which never existed except in the imaginations of men whose gentle souls had been wounded in a world too much filled with the struggle of an inadequately conceived and a half-planned democratic idealism against the bitter harshness of an unconscionable social and political reality. It was a period in which the mediaeval novel had its greatest vogue. Histories of the crusades and of chivalry were published in unprecedented numbers. The art critics, led by Ruskin, went back to the old masters of painting and architecture for an inspiration for a new world order which should be a resurrection of an imagined old order as a more comfortable mode of self realization than that of fighting out the battles of democracy upon the hard fought fields of industrialism and popular sovereignty. It was an age in which the dream of romantic paternalistic socialism and even

¹¹ It is true of course that Lamennais later repudiated this retreat of the spirit in the reform age of the eighteen-forties.

of communism reached its climax preparatory to the appearance of a more opportunistic class struggle for social democratic control. There was a return of the "best minds" to the Mother Church in search of peace in her bosom—the age of Newman and of the Oxford movement and of the French New Catholic party. Also, it was a period of renewed orthodoxy in religion and politics in the face of many disillusionments with the new idealism. It was a time in which slavery and autocracy were justified in the United States as never before, when Gladstone was still a conservative defender of reaction in England. It was the epoch of Latin American dictatorships following the failure of the romantic attempts of an enthusiastic and undisciplined people to establish democratic self-rule. It was the period of Metternich and the Holy Alliance and of reaction in Europe; of the administrations of Tyler, Polk, Pierce, and Buchanan and of the Mexican War in the United States; of the rise of "Napoleon the Little" in Europe.

Significance of the Recessive Idealists. Thus, alongside the idealistic ferment and the increasing technological change, the drive for reform and the employment of science in the achievement of human betterment which we have already described, there was this retrogressive retreat of wounded and frightened souls into the arms of fancied security offered by the old and tried conservative institutions and the leaders of reactionary policies. But even this struggle for peace and security at any cost or concession must be looked upon as a phase of the new fermenting idealism. It was not a surrender to the crass unconcern and social negativism of the past. It was just another way of seeking to realize the dominant idealism of the age, this time by taking refuge in the arms of the only dependable institutions these hurt souls knew, covered as these institutions were with the glamor of an imagined paternalism or a maternal interest which did not really exist. Such a retreat seemed at the time a surer and better method of achieving their aspirations than to seek the harder way of creating new democratic institutions, pledged to the realization of popular aspirations. It may have been—it undoubtedly was—a mistaken, regressive form of idealism, but it was a sort of warped and crippled idealism just the same. No one can doubt that Saint-Simon, Lamartine, Lamennais, Newman, Ruskin, William Morris, and others of their kind believed that their faces were turned toward the future rather than toward the dead and festering past.

We are however concerned but incidentally with the timid and recessive personalities who sought one retreat or another from the hard realities of life here and now. We refer to them only as a foil the better to bring into

relief the strong, powerful, and aggressive idealism of the Social Science movement which set up for itself the positive goal of a far reaching and fundamental social reform program, such as only men of a forward outlook and great courage could embrace.

Social Science" Defines Itself as Scientific Idealism

The Aggressive or Scientific Idealists. Almost in direct opposition to the recessive and religious idealists, discussed in the previous chapter, who gave away their cause through conformity to a frequently more or less insincere and largely blind conservatism oriented always toward the past, were the aggressive or scientific idealists who sought to achieve their ends by intelligent action rather than by faith and conformity. These more robust spirits of England, Europe, and America found their solace in a future but realistic Utopia rather than in an adoration of an idealistic past. They put the golden age of their dreams in front instead of behind them. They looked forward, each according to his particular predilections, to a society governed by harmony, by reason, or by science. The theory was abroad that just as disease and illness in the individual were the result of disobedience to natural laws of health, so, by analogy, social ills were due to a lack of harmony of men and groups with the great natural social laws which should govern mankind. It was believed that if philosophers or scientists could discover these laws and make society conform to them, the social ills would vanish and health could be restored to the body politic.

This was not an entirely new idea, for, as we have seen, it had been uppermost in the minds of such choice eighteenth century spirits as those of Saint-Pierre, Turgot, and Condorcet. The one thing that was new, distinctive, and of transcendent importance in the spirit of this age was the widespread appeal to science as a sanction rather than to theology and metaphysics. Intelligent and realistically thinking men had caught up the mantles of Saint-Pierre and Condorcet and had come to believe in the possibility of a reconstruction of their world by means of science then and there and in their own generation. This new popular belief in science as an agency for social perfectability was a factor in the thought and social

dynamics of this age all too lightly emphasized by the historians and contemporary observers, although its power of orientation and its strategic importance were incalculable. It was a new popular note which had its beginning in those years and was to become dominant in American thinking some decades later. This appeal to science as an instrument of social control and as a sanction or criterion of right and expediency rather than to theology or to metaphysics was destined to transform the whole tenor of the American mind and place it on a new tack toward social reconstruction. It was in this decade of the eighteen-forties that men in general began to think in terms of what Comte called the positivist or scientific age of thought instead of in terms of the ages of theology and metaphysics.

The American Revolution had been justified by a theory of natural rights, by a Law of Nature, by the whole French metaphysics of the eighteenth century. By the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century reforms backed by appeals to humanitarian sentiments were numerous. Theological sanctions have not lost their grip completely, not even in our day, and they were still very strong in the eighteen-forties. Although humanitarian idealism based on theological¹ and metaphysical sanctions remained a powerful factor in human motivation for reform, the new and distinctive note that was already being sounded at this time by the leaders of American social thought was this confident appeal to science, to the overt and the demonstrable, rather than to the obscure and the mystical.

Science Becomes a Shibboleth. Science, to be sure, had never lacked devotees and admirers even in theocratic old New England. As the Beards² point out, it was in the very year that the Pilgrims settled at Plymouth, in 1620, that Bacon's *Novum Organum* was given to the world. Since the full implications of Bacon's theories of induction for the future of theology did not become clear until the time of Comte, the theologians were able to continue to be among the most devoted admirers of science without realizing the danger it offered to their system. Increase Mather, Jared Eliot, John Winthrop, John Banister, Mark Catesby, John Clayton, John Mitchell, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin—these are among the names of those who interested themselves genuinely in the natural sciences in colonial

¹ Let us not say religious, since there are social and logical, as well as theological, elements in religion. It is quite clear that the usual religious sanction before the Age of Enlightenment, and even down to the present for the masses of men, has been theological rather than social or scientific. See L. L. Bernard, "Religion and Theology," *The Monist*, XXXII: 61-88 (Jan., 1922).

² Charles A. Beard and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (1930), pp. 151-152.

America.³ Nevertheless theology was the Puritan's real mistress, and it was not until near the end of the eighteenth century that science began to come into its own. And then, quite suddenly, under the inspiration of the French Enlightenment, the adoration of science became almost a passion. At the beginning of the nineteenth century physical science was respectable enough to gain admission into college curricula,⁴ alongside of the classics and mathematics. At Yale, for example, under the celebrated Silliman, the physical sciences became immensely popular. Nor should it be forgotten that the United States served as an asylum to such scientists as Thomas Cooper and Joseph Priestly, both of whom were profoundly interested in democracy and social problems.

Franklin's work had touched the imagination of men everywhere, in Europe as well as in America. The travels of Humboldt, the work of Davy and of George Stephenson, and the experiments of Whitney and Fulton, had appealed to the practical interests of all modern men. In the second quarter of the nineteenth century the material results of the sciences were becoming so overwhelmingly evident and impressive that it is little to be wondered at that in an age which sought its reward in this life rather than in the hereafter, science itself should inherit much of the prestige and homage formerly accorded to theology. Furthermore, men desired material and visible rewards, or at least tangible spiritual benefits. Nor is it surprising that all the disciplines, even theology itself—in accordance with the principle of acquisitive mimicry—⁵ rushed in eagerly to participate in this prestige and homage, claiming for themselves the character of sciences. It was at this time that the old Moral Philosophy, which had been so closely related to theology⁶ and was the chief depository of the early beginnings of what are now Sociology and Social Psychology, was rechristened Moral Science by such writers as George Combe⁷ and Francis Wayland.⁸

Transformation of the Disciplines. It must not be forgotten, of course, that the meaning of the term science was in many respects different in the eighteen-forties from what it is now. It then retained much of its originally derived meaning, being considered simply as "knowledge." All of the dis-

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.

⁴ Edward Channing, *A History of the United States: V. The Period of Transition, 1815-1848* (1921), p. 258.

⁵ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology* (1920), Ch. LV.

⁶ See Pufendorf's classification of Natural Law, Moral Theology, and Civil Law in his *De Officio Hominis et Civis* (1675).

⁷ *Moral Science*, Edinburgh, 1840.

⁸ *Moral Science*, Boston and New York, 1835.

ciplines, in so far as they consisted of organized and classified or regularly accessible knowledge, were regarded as sciences. This conception of science persisted long after this period and is immortalized in Ray's *Practical Arithmetic* of almost a generation later in the definition, "Science is classified knowledge." It persists as good form in most of the Latin countries today—where all knowledge disciplines are regarded and spoken of as sciences—alongside of the more modern conception of the term. Indeed, from the standpoint of philology (which was regarded as an excellent test of the correctness of definitions until well after the middle of the nineteenth century), this is the correct meaning of science. *Scire*, to know, and *scientia*, knowledge, are readily transformable into the English word *science*, considered as a body of ordered or organized knowledge. At one time the discipline of philosophy (including the separate disciplines of natural, mental, and moral philosophy) was regarded as a compendium of all verified knowledge. The new conception of science as experimentally tested knowledge did not become generally accepted until after the middle of the nineteenth century, and the conception of science as a logic of investigation (by analogy with the current notion of philosophy as a logic of verbal analysis and synthesis) is more recent still, although we shall see later that the idea was not wholly foreign to this period. In the light of this earlier and more inclusive view of the nature of science it is not surprising, therefore, that theology and philosophy, in their various forms, should have sought to assume the protective coloring of science, as organized fields of knowledge.

Theology Emulates the Scientific Method. Theology, indeed, claimed that it was the science of sciences. A contemporary theologian of the era says: "Thus is Natural Theology a more comprehensive science than any other. It includes all others. . . . It is the queen of all the sciences except the revealed; . . . it is, with this exception, the true *scientia scientiarum*. All the merely human sciences are imperfect without this."⁹ The Natural Theology here referred to was a new discipline which had arisen as the answer of traditional theology to Deism and the new homage to science. Its avowed purpose was to demonstrate God's handiwork and wisdom throughout the world of those accountable causal relationships which science had undertaken to make orderly and clear. Perceiving that our modern mechanistically described world no longer had a place for a philosophy of control of the universe and of human destiny by fiat and the whim of the reputed Creator, who took the form of the Old Testament divinity,

⁹ A Society of Clergymen, "Natural Theology," *Bibliotheca Sacra*, III: 260 (1846).

that it could only with growing impatience tolerate even a theory of miracles as exceptional and lawless phenomena out of the ordinary run of events, the natural theologians revamped their theory of creation and subjected their teleology to scientific control rather than to the personal whim of a tribal and emotional divinity who had survived in literature and tradition from Old Testament days. This Natural Theology found its most systematic and authoritative expression in Paley's treatise on *Natural Theology* (1802) and in the Bridgewater Treatises written by eminent British scientists to bolster up a toppling traditional theology which depended on miracles for its support; but it also had its devoted adherents in America, where usually its chief arguments were included in the treatises on the Evidences of Christianity.

Rise of the Social Sciences. History, which had previously been a form of polite literature, also began at this time to regard itself as a science, at least in the opinion of many writers. Thus, for example, H. C. Murphy declared:¹⁰

History may be defined to be the science of human nature, as shown in a full, correct, and philosophical account of the experiments which have been tried upon humanity ever since its first existence. We say *science*, because it has principle of its own, evolved by a correct mode of reasoning from well determined facts. Modern history is particularly entitled to this character: it differs from the ancient in that it is more philosophical, that it looks into the constitution and very soul of science, that it regards man more as a social being than as a mere individual one, and that it examines the nature of commercial relations,—a vital subject concerning the improvement and well-being of man, but which had no interest for the ancients.

Murphy next proceeds to list some of the principles of history as a science.¹¹ Prescott also considers history to be a science,¹² as did many other writers whose work we shall consider in greater detail in a later chapter. DeBow's *Review* ran a series of articles on "The Science of History" in the eighteen-forties,¹³ and in 1849 there appeared a book called *Remarks on the Science of History*.¹⁴

¹⁰ H. C. Murphy, "The Philosophy of History," *North American Review*, XXXIX: 36 (July, 1834).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹² William H. Prescott, *Biographical and Critical Miscellanies* (Ed. of 1845), p. 89. This article was originally published in 1829.

¹³ C. C. S. Farrar, "The Science of History," *DeBow's Review*, V: 58-64, 127-34, 211-20, 346-57, 445-54 (Jan.-June, 1848).

¹⁴ Published in Boston by Crosby and Nichols.

In 1837 a book by Barbara O'Sullivan Addicks appeared with the title *Essay on Education, in which the Subject is treated as a natural science*. The introduction to the first volume of Hunt's *Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Monthly*, in 1839, informs the reader that commerce is not a business but a science.¹⁵ In 1832 a Lady of Boston had translated Baron Degerando's *Visitor of the Poor*, which appeared with an introduction by Joseph Tuckerman, and was very favorably received. A reviewer of this book states that "the author endeavors . . . to raise charity to the dignity of a science . . ." ¹⁶ DeBow, in an article on "Characteristics of the Statesman," originally prepared in 1842 but not published until some years later, speaks of the science of legislation.¹⁷ Archaeology was characterized as a science in 1845,¹⁸ and by 1849 ethnology was already being referred to as an American science.¹⁹ In 1852, A. P. Peabody concedes the title of science to political economy.²⁰ Thomas Cooper and others would seem to have so regarded it many years earlier. In 1842 a book called *Introduction to Legal Science*, by Silas Jones, was published in New York, and in 1848 the *American Review* included an article on "Representative Government" which was taken from an unpublished work on the *Science of the Laws*.²¹ In 1861 G. H. Smith wrote an article on "Law a Perfectible Science."²² Statistics, or "statistical science," of course, considered itself a science from the beginning of its existence as a discipline.²³ Although the Paley tradition of Moral and Political Philosophy, successors to the old Law of Nature and of Nations,²⁴ had long prevailed in America, these two disciplines were now also taking on the name of science, becoming respectively moral science and political science.

The Rise of Political Science. The idea of a political and moral science,

¹⁵ *Loc. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁶ *North American Review*, XXXVI: 111 (Jan., 1833).

¹⁷ *DeBow's Review*, XX: 41 (Jan., 1856).

¹⁸ "A Sketch of the Progress of Archaeological Science in America," *Southern Literary Messenger*, XI: 420-433 (July, 1845).

¹⁹ E. G. S., "American Ethnology. Being a Summary of Some of the Results Which Have Followed the Investigation of This Subject," *American Review*, IX (n.s., III, Apr., 1849): 386.

²⁰ A. P. Peabody, "Commercial Intercourse with British America," *North American Review*, LXXIV: 169 (Jan., 1852).

²¹ *Loc. cit.*, VII (n.s., I, Mar., 1848): 280-285.

²² *North American Review*, XCIII: 330-341 (Oct., 1861).

²³ See e.g., *Hazard's United States Commercial and Statistical Register*, II: 199-201 (Mar., 1840).

²⁴ L. L. Bernard, "The Social Sciences as Disciplines: United States," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, I: 329.

or a science of government, was not new; for as early as 1774, and again in 1782, John Adams had spoken of "the divine science of politics."²⁵ In 1806 Joel Barlow had pointed out²⁶ that

The science of political economy is still in its infancy; as indeed is the whole science of government, if we regard it as founded on principles analogous to the nature of man, and designed to promote his happiness. As we believe our government to be founded on these principles, we cannot but perceive an immense field of improvement opening before us; a field in which all the physical as well as the moral sciences should lend their aid and unite their operation, to place human society on such a footing in this great section of the habitable world, as to secure it against further convulsions from violence and war.

Barlow further pointed out that "In our country, and at this early epoch in the course of republican experiment, no subjects of research can be more important than those embraced by these two branches of science," namely, morals and politics.²⁷ Research in morals, government, and laws are as yet "so vague in their nature, and have been so little methodized, as scarcely to have obtained the name of science,"²⁸ in spite of the importance of these subjects. Thomas Jefferson, writing to Thomas Mann Randolph in May, 1790, recommended Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws* for the study of the science of government.²⁹ The prospectus of the *American Review of History and Politics*, founded in 1811, stated that "Whatever maxims of wisdom applicable to our institutions the best writers either ancient or modern can afford on the science of government, will be industriously sought and quoted. . . ." In 1845 appeared N. Beverly Tucker's book called *A Series of Lectures on the Science of Government*, and some years earlier an article by the same author on "Political Science" was published in the *Southern Literary Messenger*.³⁰ At about the same period he published separately a *Discourse on the Importance of the Study of Political Science, as a Branch of Academical Education*.³¹ A reviewer of Dove's *Theory of Human Progression*, 1852, asserted that "the attempt in this work is to show that politics may be reduced to a science."³² In 1855, G. C. Welling wrote an article

²⁵ *Works of John Adams*, edited by C. F. Adams (1854), IX: 339, 512.

²⁶ "Prospectus of a National Institution, to be Established in the United States" (1806). Reproduced by G. Brown Goode, in the *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1889, p. 134.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²⁹ *Works of Thomas Jefferson*, edited by Paul Leicester Ford (1904), VI: 63.

³⁰ *Loc. cit.*, V: 559-566 (Aug., 1839).

³¹ Richmond, 1840.

³² *American Review*, XV (n.s., IX, Jan., 1852): 89.

on "The Science of Politics," in which he presented a classification of the sciences, with a final category called the *Man Sciences* of Political Economy and of Politics.³³

The New Science of Society. Now if theology, history, education, commerce, charity, legislation, archaeology, ethnology, political economy, law, statistics, morals, and politics could all aspire to the title of science at these early dates, it would indeed be strange if the theory of reform and progress should not have done the same. Why not a science of society, by analogy with the science of government or of politics? In an age when all the disciplines were aspiring to become sciences, it is not at all unthinkable that a science of society, or a Social Science, should also arise. And that, of course, was exactly what happened.

As early as 1784 John Adams, writing to a French correspondent, said, "I really think that the science of society is much behind other arts and sciences, trades and manufactures,—that the noblest of all knowledge is the least general."³⁴ This is probably the first reference to a science of society in this country, although Adams apparently had in mind a science of society more definitely politically than sociologically oriented. In 1800 Dupont de Nemours, at Jefferson's suggestion, drew up a university curriculum in which one of the proposed schools was called Social Science and Legislation,³⁵ but apparently nothing practical ever came of this plan. In spite of these early explorations in the direction of a general Social Science, the actual maturation of the idea was retarded for almost half a century. As late as 1841, W. E. Channing in a letter to J. C. L. Sismonde de Sismondi said, "What you call social science is in its infancy."³⁶

Reasons for the Delay in Its Development. Why was the Social Science movement so retarded, once the idea had seeped into the country? A number of explanations are conceivable. The problems that seemed most pressing in the first years of national independence were political and economic. In that period the new form of government was being tried out for the first time; Americans were very self-conscious about their essay at republicanism and their intellectual eyes were focussed on their new political machinery. There was everywhere a desire to see how the system would function and what results it was producing. The subtler phenomena of social

³³ *North American Review*, LXXX: 353 (Apr., 1855).

³⁴ *Op. cit.*, IX: 522.

³⁵ Herbert B. Adams, *Jefferson and the University of Virginia* (1888), pp. 49-50.

³⁶ W. H. Channing, *The Life of William Ellery Channing*, D.D. (6th ed., Boston, American Unitarian Association, 1899), p. 517.

processes were seen chiefly in terms of political processes, if at all. Furthermore, the problems which stimulated Social Science were largely those of an industrial and urban society, and the United States in the first years of the nineteenth century was still predominantly non-industrialized. Also, as we have suggested elsewhere, there were not sufficient data—statistical or historical—as yet available upon which to construct a true science of society, however conscious Adams, Jefferson, and Channing may have been of the need for such a science.

A not less important cause of delay in the development of Social Science was the great scatter of its data and the abstractness of the processes of generalization necessary to formulate its laws and principles. Already, in Chapter II, we have had occasion to see that even the philosophers were slow to grasp the unity or interdependence and the wholeness of human society. Such a conceptualization of human relationships in the large had to wait upon a universe of discourse, a specialized terminology or language, capable of describing all of these complex and multiple relationships. We saw such a frame of discourse beginning among the Greek Sophists and the great philosophers who followed them. We also saw it increase greatly in efficiency among the contributors to the French Enlightenment. But even these philosophers were able but inadequately to conceptualize all the intricacies of interrelationship in the great society. Perhaps a more or less adequate world view of society was made possible by the rise of ethnology and its wide range of data covering a great diversity of peoples with a multitude of customs and traditions and by the multiplication of newspapers, books, and reviews dealing with matters of public opinion and a great variety of social processes of all kinds in the early nineteenth century. These developments, supported by a rapidly expanding literate public, finally multiplied sociological concepts to the point at which the beginnings of a systematic Social Science were realized. That this achievement of a tentative Social Science was possible in Europe before it was in America was probably due to a number of causes, but in particular to the wider range of world contacts common in Western Europe and also to the fact that Europe had a larger supply of speculative philosophers already accustomed to the processes of abstract thinking. But neither in Europe nor in America was it possible to develop a trustworthy Social Science before the advent of a science of statistics devoted to the generalization as well as to the collection and the classification of data, and this time had not yet arrived, as we shall later see, in any part of the world.

European Relations in Social Science. The retardation of the development of Social Science in the United States may, however, have been due primarily to the fact that the European movement had not as yet secured sufficient volume to stimulate a similar movement in the United States. We must not forget that America was, in spite of its political independence, still an intellectual colony of the old world. In the matter of the integration of a new and unified Social Science, as in many other respects, it followed the lead of, rather than anticipated, the intellectually more admired Europe. It was indeed England that first developed a well defined Social Science movement, a fact which may have been due to her early industrial development and to the emergence of a complicated set of social problems arising out of the new industrial-social order. These more practical factors were doubtless also reinforced by the traditional liberal temper of the British people which had long motivated them in the direction of social welfare programs sponsored by the people themselves as contrasted with the authoritarian methods of Germany.

The two elements which constituted the basic fabric of the Social Science movement—the spirit of social reconstruction and the prestige of science—were by no means localized to the United States. They were, in fact, general European phenomena as well. The passion for reform to which we have referred above had its counterpart in Europe. As J. T. Adams has pointed out,³⁷

We have always shared in and been influenced by the currents of thought and life in Europe. . . . At the same period which we are now describing in New England there was in Europe, in the words of John Morley, "A great wave of humanity, of benevolence, of desire for improvement—a great wave of social sentiment, in short," which "poured itself among all who had the faculty of large and disinterested thinking." This outburst ended in several European countries in the revolutions of 1848. In our country it ended in the Civil War. What we have to trace, therefore, is only a local manifestation of a world movement.

Similarly, the prestige of science in America of the eighteen-forties was a European phenomenon as well. In fact, many of the enthusiasts, like Condorcet and Godwin, had carried their faith in the efficacy of science to limits that sometimes still strike us as a bit absurd. Yet their enthusiasm for science is quite understandable when we consider what had been accom-

³⁷ James Truslow Adams, *New England in the Republic, 1776-1850* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1926), p. 353. Reprinted by permission of the publishers.

plished by the long line of brilliant investigators of the eighteenth century, including the mathematicians and exact scientists, such as Fourier, Lagrange, Laplace, Carnot, Coulomb, Volta, Scheele, Lavoisier, Cavendish, Davy, Berthollet, Dalton, Linnaeus, von Haller, Jussieu, Buffon, Cuvier, Bichat, Lamarck, and Treviranus.³⁸ •

The Why of Social Science. The two elements in the Social Science movement to which we have already referred—the passion for reform and the worship of science—were by no means independent of one another. Indeed, the powerful impetus to reform was no doubt, as we have already indicated, due in part to the tremendous shock of the impact of the new scientific discoveries and inventions of such men as those listed above upon a cultural pattern that was adjusted to a more or less fixed and antiquated outlook upon life. Life which had moved in a slow and even pace was now greatly accelerated by the invention of new means of transportation and communication. Suddenly, as history measures time, men perceived that life is dynamic. The theological viewpoint had taught men to look upon the present as simply an interlude between the fall of man and the day of judgment. But the discoveries in science of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and the subsequent substitution of the metaphysics of progress for the theological epic of man, especially in France, had shocked the minds of men into a new channel of thought. A desire for reform as optimistic, as confident, and as buoyant, as the old theological conviction of the inevitability of human misery in this vale of tears was melancholy and gloomy, took possession of the age.

As a matter of fact the precipitation of activities for reform in the eighteen-forties represents the second great wave of enthusiasm for science in this country. The first had occurred in the generation of Franklin and Jefferson, as we have indicated, although it had touched only the leaders, not the masses. But the first third of the nineteenth century had seen, largely under the stimulus of Jefferson's belief in education, the establishment of numerous academies and colleges. There were even seminaries for the education of women. Science was taught in these schools. A generation was trained in the appreciation of science. By the eighteen-forties all this semi-popular emphasis upon science was beginning to bear fruit.

A Fundamentalist Obstacle to Social Science. It is, perhaps, well to recall in this connection that there was for a long while in the minds of many

³⁸ Victor Branford, "On the Origin and Use of the Word Sociology," in *Sociological Papers* (1905), p. 4.

persons an attitude of positive disapproval of the application of scientific methods to the analysis and control of human affairs, just as there was opposition to the ideal of reform. As a matter of fact, the opposition to science came from much the same group of people, but not entirely so. Those fundamentalist theologians who believed that God had made a perfect universe in the beginning and had supported this assumption by an appeal to natural theology were quite unwilling to lay any of the blame for an imperfect society upon either the divine or the natural order of things. The trouble, they thought, lay in the sinful nature of man which had been opposed to God's handiwork since the Fall in the garden of Eden. They did not attempt to explain why God had created a perfect universe and had given perfect rules for the guidance of society and yet had failed to create a perfect human race and had included the Devil in the divine order of things (if indeed he was not outside of and a rival to God's creation). These theologians would have regarded any questioning on these points as sacrilegious and as further evidence of the fallen awful state of the questioner. To imply any need for reform of the general principles governing society was inexcusable. They apparently regarded the secular social conventions established in the laws and by the governments not prescribed or revealed in the Scriptures as nevertheless having the divine sanction, simply because the rulers of the earth claimed title to their authority in the name of divine right or by divine sanction. All radical doctrines looking toward a new ordering of society on a secular basis, and especially those that appealed to the sanctions of Social Science rather than to revelation, were regarded as anti-religious and to be condemned. Hence, their opposition to science and to reform was one of the same pattern and motivation.

But the rising industrialists, who profited by the applications of science to industry, were not opposed to science as such. They generally favored the exact sciences which brought them new inventions and more wealth. They were opposed only to Social Science, or human science, which, they clearly perceived, threatened their earnings in the name of a more just distribution of wealth and operated in behalf of a newly organized and more democratic social order. These men also identified Social Science with social reform and hated the former because they dreaded the latter, but ostensibly for another reason than that urged by the theologians. Not all industrialists, however, were economic fundamentalists. Some of them, like Fourier, Robert Owen, Albert Brisbane, and Jean Godin were, as we shall see, true friends of both Social Science and social reform.

PART TWO

The Associationist Phase of Social Science

General Sketch of Associationist Social Science

General Character of Associationism. Although John Adams had spoken of a science of society as early as 1784, the first substantial phase of the Social Science movement in the United States was Associationism, the American counterpart of Fourierism, which flourished in the United States in the eighteen-forties. The followers of Fourier in the United States called themselves Associationists rather than Fourierists for the two following reasons: ¹

1st. Charles Fourier often and earnestly protested against giving the name of any individual man to the Social Science, which he humbly believed to be, and reverently taught as a discovery of Eternal Laws of Divine Justice, established and made known by the Creator. 2d. While we honor the magnanimity, consummate ability and devotedness of this good and wise man, and gratefully acknowledge our belief that he has been the means, under Providence, of giving to his fellow men a clue which may lead us out from our actual Scientific and Social labyrinth, yet we do not receive all the parts of his theories, which in the publications of the Fourier school are denominated 'Conjectural'—because Fourier gives them as speculations—because we do not in all respects understand his meaning—and because there are parts which individually we reject; and we hold ourselves not only free, but in duty bound, to seek and obey Truth wherever revealed, in the Word of God, the Reason of Humanity and the Order of Nature.

In many respects Associationism was really tangential to the wider movement as a whole, since the leaders of the later Social Science movement repudiated it entirely. They regarded it as more or less fantastic and even as in some respects immoral.² But since it assumed the sanction and even

¹ *The Phalanx*, April 20, 1844, 103-106. Reproduced in J. R. Commons, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (Cleveland, 1910), Vol. VII, p. 198. The rejected elements of Fourier's system no doubt included his criticisms of certain institutions such as marriage which did not fit well into the American *Weltanschauung*.

² For example, S. G. Howe, one of the early leaders in the eclectic phase of the Social Science movement, had this to say of Fourier's *Theorie de l'unité universelle*, in a letter to

the title of Social Science it must be considered as belonging legitimately within the sphere of the general movement. As contrasted with the later phases of Social Science, Associationism was romantic, spectacular, demagogic, popular, and Utopistic. It managed to convert to its point of view the Transcendental colony of Brook Farm, with its coterie of brilliant literary, artistic, and more or less philosophic, minds. It stirred people's emotions and made them talk and argue. Numerous articles and books were written about it, both to promote and condemn it. Its humanitarian principles inspired people to action of a concrete and appealing sort. It assumed, in fact, many of the aspects of a craze and its pronouncements and questions were therefore news, whereas the soberer activities of the later Social Scientists lacked the dynamic qualities of the craze and were seldom regarded as news.³ For these reasons, perhaps, and because it was so symptomatic of its age, historians have given more attention to the early form of Social Science, that is, Associationism, than to the later and more scientific phases of the movement.

Parrington on Associationism. Parrington⁴ sees the social Utopianism, of which Associationism was simply a phase, as one of three major strands in the social, literary, and philosophical renaissance which was occurring in New England in the early years of the nineteenth century. This renaissance, according to Parrington, was the counterpart in the intellectual and social realm of the industrial and economic revolution taking place at this same time, a revolution which disintegrated aristocratic ideals and organization and put the middle class into the political saddle. The old aristocratic order of noblesse oblige was being cleared out to make way for the new capitalistic or bourgeois regime then emerging as a result of the in-

Charles Sumner, 1847: "It is the work of a great mind, led astray by a false philosophy; the Herculean effort of a blind giant. . . . Among the morals to be drawn from the book is the important one that the clearest heads and the kindest hearts may be cloudened and hardened by a life spent in an immoral and vicious, though ever so refined a community." Reproduced in *The Journals and Letters of Samuel Gridley Howe* (Edited by Laura E. Richards, 1906-1909), pp. 255-256. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, D. Appleton-Century Co.

³ Sometimes, however, the news made by the Associationists was of an unwelcome sort, as was the case in the following instance, cited by F. L. Mott, in his *History of American Magazines*, Vol. II, 1850-1865 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1938): "The free love doctrines of certain communist groups aroused wide popular antagonism, and the police raid on Albert Brisbane's Progressive Union Club in New York, under columns of exposé in the newspapers of that city, produced an excitement which *Leslie's* said was 'only equalled by the fall of Sevastopol and the arrival from Arctic regions of Dr. Kane'" (pp. 207-208). Reprinted by permission of the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

⁴ Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, II. *The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800-1860* (1927), p. 319.

dustrial revolution. The ethical motivation of this renaissance, says Parrington, was due to its romantic purpose, namely, its aim to humanize the new society then in process of growth. French liberalism, he points out, won its way into New England by round-about and devious paths,⁵ and finally emerged in the form of Channing's Unitarianism, an ethical religion with a strongly humanitarian bias. Thus the heretical French philosophy which had entered Virginia in the 1770's as Physiocratic agrarianism, and which had gone west to the frontier to become an indomitable individualism, was finally transferred to New England by Channing and transformed into an anti-Calvinistic religion which preached human perfectibility after the model of the later French Enlightenment and the possibilities of making the sojourn of man on earth something more than a gloomy resting place on the way to judgment day. Unitarianism was thus the vehicle for disseminating eighteenth century French idealism throughout New England, as Jeffersonianism had earlier been the vehicle for spreading those same ideals throughout the South and Southwest.⁶ That the New England capitulation to the persuasive French philosophy was so long delayed was due to the tough tenacity of Calvinism which had dominated the New England mind so thoroughly as to have become second nature to it. The battle royal which the humanistic doctrines of Unitarianism had to wage with Calvinism before the former finally won the contest is among the most interesting and significant events in the history of American thought, but its consideration lies outside the scope of the present study. For our purposes it is sufficient to note Parrington's interpretation of Associationism as one of the offshoots of the American version of eighteenth century French liberalism.

Associationism and Science. If it were not for the fact that Associationism claimed for itself the title of science it would have little more place in a history of the Social Science movement than its parent, Unitarianism, or its sibs, Abolitionism, Pacifism, Feminism, or any of the other *isms* of that age. It possessed in common with all of these the traits of an ardent, emotional reform movement, Utopistic or at least millennial in character, which stirred deeply the humanitarian impulses of its followers. All were speculative social philosophies of the time, but Associationism in particular included a considerable number of fantastic and even impossible schemes of social renovation of a speculative character. Associationism, in spite of

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. vi-vii.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

the fact that its social psychology and economics were not the least dependable, alone of these *isms* insisted upon claiming for itself a scientific status. We must, therefore, tear it from its theological and metaphysical matrix and consider it as a phase of the Social Science movement, for in fact such it earnestly considered itself and persistently sought to be—if indeed it did not regard itself as the characteristic embodiment of this movement.

The insistence of the Associationists that their system constituted a science does not, it need scarcely be noted, mean that it actually was genuinely such a science, nor does its inclusion in the present study indicate that it should be so considered. The important consideration, from our historical viewpoint, as we have indicated in the preceding chapter, is simply that its adherents proudly and piously claimed for it the status of a science.

Science and Scientific Laws. The concept of science itself changes like any other concept from age to age. A century ago, when thought was still so largely under the dominance of theology and the metaphysics of Natural Law, science was conceived in theological and metaphysical terms, as, indeed, it still is even among many social scientists in good standing today. The function of science was conceived, therefore, in that day as that of “discovering” laws already existing in nature or in the mind of God.⁷

None of the adherents and expositors of science had yet attained the point of view made possible and initiated by the epoch-making theory of Comte that scientific laws and principles are not formulated in the mind of a pre-existent Supreme being nor inherent in the very nature and constitution of the universe as a body of Natural Law, but are the intellectual projections of human thinking, the result of an attempt to see all phenomena as functionally related parts of an orderly system. Man is born into chaos, except for the very elementary guidance his inadequate equipment of instincts gives him in making his earliest adjustments to his environment. But he cannot live with any degree of satisfaction in this chaos. Consequently he learns to look meaning into his world, that is, to project order into the chaos of forces, factors, and stimuli which surround and operate upon him. At first he integrates specific perceptions of concrete objects in this environing chaos. Every child of normal intelligence does this, just as the human race as a whole has done it before him. From concrete perceptions he moves forward to abstract conceptions. These are nothing more nor less than the recognition of similarities among a large number of other-

⁷ L. L. Bernard, “Scientific Method and Social Progress,” *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, XXXI: 1-18 (July, 1925).

wise discrete phenomena which enable the perceiver or conceptualizer to classify perceived phenomena that have acquired similar or related meanings for him under the same general headings and to utilize or manipulate them logically for the same or similar adjustment ends.

Science and Social Laws. Social laws and principles are merely the broader and more stable conceptualizations of phenomena of this type which can be used for guidance in thinking or making practical material adjustments. The essential fact is that all such conceptualizations are not inherent in the human mind or in nature, but are projections of order into the chaos of isolated and undefined perceptions called forth by man's need for a better working adjustment to his social environment. They are in the nature of projective inventions.⁸ The Fourierists or Associationists, like their reformistic contemporaries, were metaphysicians primarily, and upon occasion even theologians, in their mode of thinking. They saw social laws as psychic entities emanating from the mind of Divinity or as orderly generalizations (Natural Laws) inherent in the order of Nature. They did not grasp the human experiential and experimental or relativistic character of science and of its principles. They believed that the principles of Associationism, as they understood them, were a part of the personal revelation of God made for man's guidance in a new and complex industrial world, or at least those principles of human nature and of human association inherent in the Natural Order itself (for they believed there was a Natural Order). They believed therefore that these principles were scientifically accurate, definite, incontrovertible, and unchangeable.

Associationism and Religion. So far from being a science, Associationism was in fact a religion, with a theory of history, of society, of human nature, and of a future heaven, just like any other religion. The essentially religious character of Associationist Social Science was not only admitted, but even emphasized and insisted upon by its sponsors, without any sense of inconsistency whatever with their claims for scientific standing. Thus W. H. Channing, at the Associationist Convention of April 4, 1844, says:⁹

It would be doing injustice to this occasion, not to open our discussions of the Principles of Social Reorganization, by an expression of feelings with which we have come up, from far and near, to this assembly. It is but giving voice to what is working in the hearts of those now present, and of thousands whose

⁸ L. L. Bernard, "Invention and Social Progress," *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, XXIX: 1-33 (July, 1923).

⁹ *The Phalanx*, April 20, 1844. Reproduced in Commons, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 189.

sympathies are at this moment with us over our whole land, to say, this is a Religious Meeting. Our end is to do God's will.

The religious pattern of thought is also revealed in a resolution of a similar convention (February 22-23, 1844) to express their gratitude "for the earnest zeal and efficiency with which they [the advocates of Social Science, particularly the editors of the *New York Tribune*, *The Phalanx*, and *The Present*] devote themselves to the propagation of the truly glad tidings of great joy in relation to the Social Destiny of Man."¹⁰

We shall find this strongly religious and theological emphasis recurring again and again throughout all phases of the Social Science movement. The reason is not difficult to find. Since most of the scholars and learned men of this country were divines their peculiar bias colored practically all philosophical discussions. They alone had sufficient background in scholarship to react intelligently to Social Science. In the colleges, even those not sectarian in spirit, the courses in which Social Science first appeared, were taught by the presidents, who were almost without exception ministers. As late as 1880, Cliffe Leslie pointed out that even political economy in the United States was strongly theological in viewpoint.¹¹ This was still more markedly true a third of a century earlier.

As a religion, Associationism was an almost point for point counterpart of Calvinistic Protestantism. Like Unitarianism, it rejected the old Calvinistic ferocities and substituted a more benign view of God and man. But the old framework remained. Associationist Social Science answered the same type of questions as that put by the Scotch catechism, but it answered these questions differently. If Calvinism taught that human nature was depraved and that it must therefore be repressed, Associationism insisted that human nature was good and that it must be followed exclusively in social organization. For the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, Associationism substituted a glorious social destiny of man, a sort of Utopian Cooperative Commonwealth which later became an essential element in the creed of doctrinaire Socialism. The framework of men's thoughts had been thoroughly set to run in Calvinistic and deterministic channels, and even when men reacted against such doctrines they nevertheless retained the old forms.

Although the new social philosophy of Associationism dispensed with

¹⁰ *The Phalanx*, April 1, 1844, p. 98. Reproduced in Commons, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 246.

¹¹ T. E. Cliffe Leslie, "Political Economy in America," *Fortnightly Review*, XXXIV: 488 ff. (Oct., 1880).

Calvinism—in fact revised its main teaching regarding the original nature of man and his ultimate destiny—it did not do away with determinism. It held as religiously to the eighteenth century doctrine of inevitable progress, so optimistically formulated by Condorcet, as Calvinism had clung to the belief in the ultimate and inevitable damnation of the larger portion of the human race. Like the French philosophers, from whom they had stemmed intellectually, the Associationists believed that human progress was as much a part of the Law of Nature as the Calvinists had thought, and still believed, that eternal damnation was a postulate of the Law of God. Some of the Associationists even went so far as to express the belief that progress was a part of the divine law and connected it up with the New Testament dispensation of the atonement, asserting that the coming of Jesus as an atonement for Adam's sin had reversed the old Calvinistic order in which all men were under the ban and had provided a new constitution of hope and continuous progress for mankind.¹² Thus, like the philosophers of the Enlightenment, they placed the golden age in the future and built around this doctrine a new metaphysical—sometimes even a theological—religion in which their "Social Science" would be the gospel of the new order and regeneration of man. Thus even in revolt they remained true to the old religious frame of reference.¹³

Albert Brisbane. It was through an enthusiastic young journalist, Albert Brisbane (1809-1890),¹⁴ that Fourier's doctrines were transmitted to the United States. Brisbane, the son of a well-to-do New York landowner, had been very deeply impressed by the social philosophy of his tutor in New York, John Monesca, under whom he had studied. This social philosophy stimulated him greatly since, probably because of his Scotch cultural heritage, which was at that time much occupied with cultural history and social philosophy, he had already been thinking on the subject of man's social destiny. As a gentleman of means he went abroad to study, taking work under Cousin and Guizot, among others, but he derived no satisfac-

¹² See Albert Brisbane, *A Concise Exposition of the Doctrine of Association* (New York, 7th Ed., 1844), p. 2; also the writings of the Unitarian theologians of similar date, especially William Ellery Channing, William H. Channing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Amos Bronson Alcott, Theodore Parker, and Octavius Brooks Frothingham.

¹³ The old discipline of moral philosophy had had a similar pattern. See, e. g., Gladys Bryson, "The Emergence of the Social Sciences from Moral Philosophy," *Internatl. Jour. Ethics*, XLII: 306 (Apr., 1932).

¹⁴ The biographical data on Brisbane are based on the article by W. Randall Waterman in the *Dictionary of American Biography*, III: 52-55, and *Albert Brisbane, A Mental Biography*, by Redelia Brisbane (Arena Pub. Co., Boston, 1893).

tion from any of these instructors, whose teaching impressed him as formal and sterile. He therefore went to Germany and studied under Hegel. But here, too, he was disappointed in the intellectual guidance he received and he went off to Constantinople. At the age of twenty-one he returned to Paris, convinced that social evils could be removed only by a fundamental reorganization of society. He rejected Saint-Simonism, in which he had dabbled, but when he came across Fourier's *Traité de l'Association Domestique-Agricole* (1821-1822) he felt that at last he had found what he was looking for, and for two years thereafter he studied under Fourier's personal direction.

Fourier and Brisbane. François Marie Charles Fourier (1772-1837) was a French business man who, quite in the manner of the social philosophers of his day, had developed a most interesting and suggestive philosophy of history and theory of society. The stages of history since the fall of man were, as he conceived them, savagery, patriarchy, barbarism, civilization (i. e., contemporary society), guarantyism, simple association, and composite association or harmony. The last three stages belonged to the future and referred to a system of social organization in which the human passions, instead of being repressed as at present, would be encouraged and used as guides to behavior. The result would be that since God had endowed all men differently, presumably to serve different social functions, each individual in following his native promptings would find himself acting in the best interests not only of himself but of society as a whole. In this future society, social organization would take the form of phalanxes of about 1800 people working together on about 5000 acres of land, under cooperative living and working conditions. And thus, finally, social harmony would be achieved.¹⁵

To Fourier, engaged in the hum-drum routine of business, this system was no doubt a delightful escape mechanism, and we can imagine what pleasure its elaboration must have given him. To young Brisbane, son of a wealthy land owner, the idyllic and semi-rural life pictured in Fourier's system must have seemed like the real and necessary future of society. His capitulation was complete and he spent years of effort in attempting to convert the world to the new gospel. He returned to the United States in 1834, somewhat broken in health; but as soon as his health permitted—five

¹⁵ For an excellent brief analysis of Fourier's theories see Robert Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany* (1874), pp. 168-170. See also *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, VI: 402-404.

years later—he began a vigorous propaganda campaign, with what success we shall presently see.

Brisbane's Propaganda Activities. In New York Brisbane organized a Fourier society, gave lectures on the subject of Fourierism, and suggested that similar activities be undertaken by others in different parts of the country.¹⁶ In accordance with this suggestion similar societies did actually spring up throughout the country.¹⁷ Indeed, Brisbane was himself surprised at the interest he evoked. In the meantime he had captured the imagination of Horace Greeley, who offered him the use of his *New York Tribune* as an avenue of publication. Thus Brisbane's paper, *The Future*, which he had been editing for two months, was transferred to the columns of the *Tribune*. This arrangement, however, was by no means satisfactory to the readers of the *Tribune*. Brisbane got no further in his explanations of Fourier's Social Science than the industrial parts when letters of protest began to pour in and he was obliged to discontinue his column.¹⁸ Undaunted, however, he edited the *Chronicle*, wrote twice a week for the *Plebeian*, and finally, in October, 1843, established *The Phalanx, or Journal of Social Science*, "Devoted to the Cause of Association, or a Social Reform and the Elevation of the Human Race."¹⁹

¹⁶ In the *New York Daily Tribune* for July 9, 1842, for example, there appeared a notice to the effect "that the friends of Associationism in the City have founded a Society bearing the above name [Fourier Association of New York], the object of which is to aid the propagation of the principles and doctrines of Association. The Society has a large Lecture Hall in the most central part of the City, capable of containing five or six hundred persons, where Lectures are delivered once or twice a week." The notice further suggests that "Where there are several persons in a place who believe in Association; we would advise them to form a Society in their town or city, and connect it with the Society here; the Societies can then communicate with each other, and carry out measures of general interest with much more promptness and energy than if no regular organizations of the kind existed. If a chain of Societies could be established in some of the towns and cities throughout the country, all connecting closely with the head Society at New York, it would be a powerful means of propagating the Cause." This notice is reproduced in John R. Commons (ed.), *Documentary History of American Industrial Society, VII: Labor Movement, 1840-1860* (1910), p. 185.

¹⁷ *The Phalanx*, in February, 1844, for example, describes such a Fourier Club in Southport, Wisconsin, which met once a week for lectures and discussions of the principles of Social Science. *Loc. cit.*, p. 70. Reproduced in Commons, *op. cit.*, pp. 186-187. Similar groups were organized in Rochester, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, and Cincinnati (*The Phalanx*, No. 18).

¹⁸ Albert Brisbane, *General Introduction to Social Science* (1876), p. iii.

¹⁹ Other journals consecrated to the propagation of Fourier's theories were *The Social Reformer*, published in Boston by John Allen and Joseph A. Whitmarsh, whose object "will be the exposition of the Science of Unity, and the laws of attractive organized industry discovered by Charles Fourier," and William H. Channing's *The Present* (1843-1844), whose aim was "to aid all movements which seem fitted to produce union and growth in religion, science and society. . . . It will seek to reconcile faith and free inquiry, law and

W. H. Channing and Brook Farm. Unfortunately, from the point of view of Associationism as a secular movement, at about this time (1843) William H. Channing was converted to the new social gospel, and through him, the Brook Farm Colony in the winter of 1843-1844.²⁰ We say unfortunately, not because Channing and the Brook Farm colonists were not brilliant and outstanding men, for they were; more brilliant, perhaps, than Brisbane and Greeley themselves. But Associationism was not ripe for a practical trial as yet, as Brisbane himself later confessed.²¹ And even if it had been, the brilliant, unstable intellectuals of New England, overly sensitive to every Utopistic wind that blew, were not the people to try it. That phalanxes should fail was a foregone conclusion. But inconspicuous phalanxes in the wilds of Ohio or Wisconsin might have failed without discrediting the idea as a whole. Brook Farm was too conspicuous to do anything without widespread publicity.

The Effect of Brook Farm. The conversion of Brook Farm to Associationism was the crucial event in the history of Associationist Social Science. It changed the whole tone and temper of the movement. As Noyes points out,²² New York had been the center of the movement before this, but now the headquarters were shifted to Massachusetts. Brisbane, Greeley, and Parke Godwin had been the recognized heads of the movement, but now William H. Channing became the real leader.²³ The old New York Conventions were succeeded by a National Union of Socialists, which met at Boston. As long as the movement remained in the hands of the New York journalists it continued to be more or less firmly anchored to its original purpose. When the Massachusetts men came into control, German transcendentalism with a goodly mixture of New England theology gradually transformed it. The Massachusetts mind was sympathetic to the ideals of Associationism, but as Parrington says,²⁴ collectivism and communism were alien to Yankee individualism. New England, therefore, emphasized

liberty, order and progress: to harmonize sectarian and party differences by statements of universal principles, and to animate hopeful efforts on all sides to advance the reign of Heaven on earth." *The Present* was merged with *The Phalanx* in 1844.

²⁰ The details of this process of conversion are presented in the form of original documents by John Humphrey Noyes in his *History of American Socialisms* (1870), Chapter XXXIX.

²¹ *General Introduction to Social Science* (1876), p. iv.

²² John Humphrey Noyes, *op. cit.*, pp. 529-530.

²³ Channing was very much of an orator. "His zeal and eloquence . . . for a short time, well entitled him to the honors of the chief Apostle of Fourierism. In fact he succeeded to the post of Brisbane" (Noyes, *op. cit.*, p. 530).

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 350.

the more mystical elements in the system rather than the concrete reform elements, as Brisbane had done. The temperamental differences had their overt expression. Brisbane did not get along well with the Transcendentalists personally.²⁵ The change produced by the New England group in the Associationist movement is succinctly and tellingly summarized in the subtitle of *The Phalanx*. When Brook Farm took over control of the movement, *The Phalanx, Journal of Social Science* became, significantly, *The Phalanx, Organ of the Doctrine of Association*.

The Phalanx. *The Phalanx* had been originally without doubt an imitation of its European counterparts, the French *Phalange, revue de la science sociale*, published, with interruptions, from 1834 to 1849 in Paris, and the *London Phalanx*, published in England from 1841-1843. The first seven numbers of the American publication had been under the direct management of Brisbane and Osborne Macdaniel.²⁶ The motto on the title page was the same as that on the title page of Brisbane's *Social Destiny of Man* (1840), viz., "Our Evils are Social, not Political; and a Social Reform Only Can Eradicate Them." The editors state that *The Phalanx* will explain Fourier's system and "enter into a frank and impartial criticism of the present false system of Society, and will expose its evils, and the defects of its leading social Institutions—among other:—its repugnant, ill-requited, and degrading system of industry:—Its system of Free Competition or false rivalry and envious strife and anarchy in Trade and Industry:—Its system of anarchical Commerce:—Its menial system of Hired Labor or labor for Wages:—The unjust and unnatural relation which it establishes between Capital and Labor:—Its defective and partial systems of Education:—Its permanent conflict of the individual with the collective Interest—its system of isolated Households. The *Phalanx* will discuss political, social and religious questions on the broadest grounds of universality and impartiality, and with reference to their practical bearing upon Social Progress and the Happiness of Mankind. . . ."

The Phalanx contained sixteen very large pages per issue and the subscription price was to be \$2.00 the year. The editors had planned to make it a weekly if enough subscriptions could be obtained, otherwise a monthly.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ Noyes, in the work cited, pp. 212 ff., gives a list of contributors to *The Phalanx*. Among the names of men who wrote for it are those of Greeley, W. H. Channing, Rev. B. F. Barrett, Fred Grain, Edward Giles, Solymon Brown, P. Maroncelli, E. P. Grant, H. H. Van Amringe, D. H. Barlow, Lydia Maria Child, Mrs. M. S. Gove, and Stephen Pearl Andrews.

By April, 1844, it became clear that it could not, for the present at least, be a weekly. At that time Channing's *The Present* and Parke Godwin's *The Pathfinder* merged with *The Phalanx* and the plan was to publish it every two weeks until it was possible to make it a weekly.

Editorial Policy. With the shift in leadership from New York to Massachusetts, a change in editorial policy became evident. At the April 4, 1844, General Convention of the Associationists, an Executive Committee had been appointed whose duties included that of editing *The Phalanx*.²⁷ This editorial Committee consisted of Parke Godwin and W. H. Channing, in addition to the original editors, Brisbane and Macdaniel. Brisbane, however had gone to Europe to get some manuscript material of Fourier's, with the result that the editorial duties fell upon the other members of the committee. And now the complexion of the journal began to change, but the change was so subtle that it is difficult to formulate it in words. We have already commented on the modification of the sub-title which marked the transition from control by the New York group to that by the Massachusetts group. Copious translations from Fourier, as well as notes on the doings of local phalanxes in various parts of the country continued to be published. But one feels that the more mystical and religious members of the editorial committee were getting increasing control of the journal.

This change in editorial policy had a dampening effect. Being more mystical and theological in their outlook than the publicists and the journalists, who had formerly been responsible for the publication, these men were consequently more sensitive to the criticisms of their heterodox religious opinions which came from their readers. The movement was thus put on the defensive against the attacks of the conservative clergy, and this change was reflected in *The Phalanx*, which now began to give undue emphasis to matters of religious controversy. The earliest members had a more social orientation, were more reformistic, more aggressive. The later ones were more mystical, more theological, more defensive. The leading original articles in the first numbers were by Brisbane and Macdaniel. Those in the later issues were by various writers, and especially by Parke Godwin. In the later numbers fiction was introduced; there was more news of pha-

²⁷ The other duties of this Executive Committee were "2nd. To receive, record, and diffuse information in regard to existing Associations and others which may be organized within the year. 3rd. To communicate all possible intelligence to those who in any part of the country may wish to unite practically with any Associations. 4th. To arrange a system of concerted action with Associations throughout the United States, for the thorough and systematic diffusion of Social Science, and a knowledge of the practical details of Association. . . ." (*The Phalanx*, Apr. 20, 1844. Reproduced in Commons, *op. cit.*, p. 201).

lanxes; and less emphasis upon theoretical discussion. Articles appeared defending Fourierism against criticisms in the theological quarterlies. These changes did not occur abruptly; and it is impossible to measure them by any specific quantitative criterion. But one feels the transformation in the atmosphere of the pages as he goes through them consecutively. That the new editorial policy was due to the New England influence is unquestionable.²⁸

The Triumph of Mysticism. Unfortunately these changes reacted upon Brisbane himself. In December of 1844 he returned from Europe with the Fourier manuscripts he had gone to get and in a letter to the Associationists of the United States announced that "A class will be formed of persons who have time and capacity to prosecute the study of the Mss., and higher parts of Social Science. . . ." ²⁹ So far, he says, the practical and industrial aspects of the doctrine have been emphasized, but now "the time has . . . come when it is necessary to make known the higher parts—those parts relating to the theory of the passions and faculties of the soul; the theory of cosmology; of the Immortality of the soul; of the causes of Evil; the material unity of the Globe, and other great questions which are embraced in the science of Universal Unity. . . ." Here we see clearly exhibited the growing mysticism and theological bias of the movement. The "practical and industrial" parts give way to discussions of the soul, cosmology, causes of evil, and the science of universal unity.³⁰ Other factors than the New England influence may have played a role in this change of emphasis. It may be that the practical impetus had exhausted itself in the establishment of the various associations and phalanxes. Or it might be proper to assume that the practical minded reformers of the movement, like Greeley, for example, were being drained off by other more concrete reforms, leaving the main movement to the more mystically inclined. *The Phalanx* itself continued only until May, 1845, when it became *The Harbinger*, "Devoted to Social and Political Progress, to be published by the Brook Farm Phalanx simultaneously in New York and Boston." It was to be democratic, "devoted to the cause of a radical, organic social reform." It was to discuss and defend Fourier's doctrines.³¹ The triumph of the Brook Farm group was now complete.

²⁸ "These manifestations of religious feeling," says Noyes, in the work cited above, "were mainly due to the presence of the Massachusetts men, and especially to the zeal of William H. Channing" (*Op. cit.*, p. 228).

²⁹ *The Phalanx*, No. 21.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Announcement in *The Phalanx*, No. 22,

The Associationist Theory of Human Nature

The Social Destiny of Man. Let us turn now from the general sketch of the Associationist movement contained in the preceding chapter to a brief examination of the contents of its theories as expressed by Brisbane in his *Social Destiny of Man: or, Association and Reorganization of Industry*.¹ Although this book is based almost exclusively on Fourier, the American followers of Fourier did not take over his system intact, and in this presentation we may get a pretty good idea of just what was accepted and what was rejected.

The book contains two interesting plates, one a Sketch of the Edifice of a Phalanx, showing a vast, palatial structure set down in the midst of a lovely countryside, and the second, a Ground Plan of the Building, being, so to speak, a blue-print of the structure. In the Preface Brisbane points out the difficulties involved in social reform, the prejudices against it, and the ineffectiveness of political measures and administrative reforms in dealing with social problems. "As the question of a change in the Social System does not occupy public attention, as in the field of Social Science nothing has been done—as no data [data?] exists [sic] whereby to judge this important question, we have a right to demand for the principles which we shall set forth, an impartial examination, and to protest against a hasty and presumptuous criticism."² A brief sketch of Fourier's life is given, including the statement that "Fourier devoted nearly forty years of untiring and patient labor to the discovery of laws of a true system of society,

¹ Published, 1840, in Philadelphia. Pp. 480. Three years later, in 1843, Brisbane published *Association: or A Concise Exposition of the Practical Part of Fourier's Social Science*. This was a smaller volume, containing only 80 pages. It was in popular demand, however, and ran through numerous editions, later ones being called *A Concise Exposition of the Doctrine of Association, or Plan for a Reorganization of Society, which will secure to the human race, individually and collectively, their happiness and elevation, Based on Fourier's Theory of Domestic and Industrial Association* (7th Ed., 1844).

² *Loc. cit.*, pp. iii-iv.

which would put an end to the miseries of mankind. . . ."³ Of the thirty-five chapters, eighteen are wholly or partially the work of Fourier and the remainder, consisting of comments, elaboration, or applications, are by Brisbane.

The object of the book is two-fold, namely: (1) critical, i. e., "to prove that industry exercised by isolated families, or as—it might be termed—piece-meal, fragmental cultivation, is a miserable system of waste and poverty";⁴ and (2) constructive, i. e., to show "that Association is possible, that it is the destiny of man, the only order in which his attractions, passions and instincts find a true development, and a useful employ. We will also show, that Labour, exercised in groups and series of groups, can be rendered ATTRACTIVE, and that the solution of the two vast problems, HARMONIC ACTION OF THE PASSIONS, AND ATTRACTIVE INDUSTRY, solves all those social and political difficulties which have baffled the efforts of legislative enactments, administrative reforms, moral codes and revolutions."⁵

In accordance with these two objects the book is divided logically into two parts. The first nine chapters deal with the evils of present day society or civilization. They constitute a cogent and telling criticism, modern in flavor, of what we now call the wastes of an unplanned economy. The economies and efficiencies to be had by Association, or what we would call cooperation, are elaborated in some detail and with conviction.

The constructive part of the book has really three aspects. Beginning with Chapter X, there are seven chapters on psychological theory, that is, on the theory of the passions and their operation; Chapters XVIII to XXIII, inclusive, deal with the philosophy of history; Chapters XXIV to XXXIV describe concretely the manner of establishing phalanxes and give practical instructions as to their location, architecture, system of education, etc. The final chapter, on Passional Attractions, presents a theory of social dynamics.

The Sanctions to His Social System. In order to secure a proper perspective of the Associationist theory of society as set forth by Brisbane it is necessary to approach it through his philosophy of sanctions. This procedure, however, offers some slight difficulty, because there is no internal evidence that Brisbane had any very clear or logical conception of his use of sanc-

³ *Ibid.*, p. iv.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

tions to justify his social system. Even the system of social organization itself, while quite clear in its main features in his mind, was not the result of careful analysis as to social evils and social needs. He had taken it over rather uncritically and emotionally from Fourier, who was not himself a very logical thinker. Both men were apparently much clearer as to what they wished to achieve socially—the social organization they desired to erect—than as to the philosophical sanctions which they must urge as its justification. Even the social system itself bears very clearly the earmarks of traditional Utopian theory and can be, for the most part, traced back in its main outlines through Francis Bacon and Thomas More to Plato. But philosophic sanctions were necessary for such proposals, for they were the fashion of the time. These they picked out, more intuitively than systematically, from the current philosophic theories of the age. The two systems of thought ready to hand for use in this connection were the new Scotch psychology of human nature, then so prominent among social thinkers, and the philosophy of history with its theory of an inevitable progression of society as set forth by Condorcet, which had dominated the late eighteenth century.

It might have been logically expected that Brisbane would have used the philosophy of history sanction as of most importance in justifying the social order which, following in the main the teachings of Fourier, he sought to erect. It is through this approach that he seeks to establish the historical continuity which he claims will eventuate into Association. Yet it is by no means certain that he gave primary importance to this sanction, but rather the contrary, for he expounds it in the latter part of his book, and he treats it somewhat incidentally as compared with his emphasis upon human nature and the passions as bases of association.

A Theory of Human Nature. A theory of human nature is basic to all great systems of thought. As William Ellery Channing, who had himself projected a work on *The Principles of Moral, Religious, and Political Science*, points out: ⁶

All our inquiries in morals, religion, and politics must begin with human nature. The ends for which a being is made, his relations, his true course of conduct, depend upon his nature. To comprehend the former, we must understand the latter. Accordingly, certain views of man are involved in all speculations about the objects of life, and the proper sphere of human action. On such

⁶ Quoted by William H. Channing in his *The Life of William Ellery Channing* (6th ed., Boston, American Unitarian Association, 1899), pp. 437-438.

views all schemes of society and legislation are built. Every great statesman, every reformer who has introduced a revolution in the affairs of nations, has been impelled and guided by his estimate of man. It is the want of a true science of our nature, that has vitiated all past systems of government, morals, and religion. No book can be written wisely, no plan wisely formed for the improvement of mankind, which has not its origin in just reverence of the powers of the human spirit. And not only is it true, that morals, religion, and politics, in their application in certain views of human nature; but every individual's principles, his whole system of duty, will take its character from the light in which he regards himself and his race. . . . All the relations of life will wear different aspects to men who interpret differently the beings by whom they are sustained.

Perhaps the most important part of Brisbane's work for our purpose is, therefore, the section on human nature, including the passions, since this appears to be the chief sanction upon which he builds his theory of social organization, that is, Association. It is a rather confused and complicated psychological system which the author presents, poorly articulated as to details, although well integrated into the system as a whole. First of all, there are eight basic motives, or "stimulants" which would operate in a phalanx, namely, (1) "the attraction of friendship, of charm of sympathies and contrasts of character between persons composing the Group";⁷ (2) "attraction for particular occupations, for constructing machinery, for chemical experiments, for breeding cattle, for floriculture and horticulture, and for various branches of the fine-arts and sciences";⁸ (3) corporative rivalry or emulation;⁹ (4) "corporative enthusiasm, based upon the pride of belonging to a Series celebrated for the perfection of its products";¹⁰ (5) "elegance of all exterior objects connected with industry";¹¹ (6) honorary distinctions, such as badges, crosses, orders, medals;¹² (7) "charm of corporative uniforms, banners, emblems of industry and music";¹³ and, finally, (8) "a just and satisfactory division of profits to every person, man, woman and child, according to the *Labor, Capital* and *Skill* of each."¹⁴

Importance of the Passions. The importance of the passions in a scien-

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 119.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

tifically organized society is emphasized and re-emphasized by Brisbane. "No globe," says Brisbane,¹⁵

can organize social harmony until the law regulating the action of the passions is discovered. Fourier . . . has accomplished this important task, neglected by all men of science, both ancient and modern, because they took it for granted that the passions were bad and incapable of harmony. . . . The study of the passions and those tendencies should have been the primary object of the investigation of science. Had it discovered the law which regulates their action, it could have deduced from that law a social system adapted to them, which would have enabled man to attain to his destiny.

These important passions, according to Fourier, are twelve in number. They are as follows: five sensitive passions (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch); four affective passions (friendship, love, ambition, paternity); and three distributive or directing passions (emulative, alternative, composite).¹⁶ The first set of passions bends us toward elegance, riches, and material harmonies; the second, toward (primary)¹⁷ groups and passionai harmonies; the last, in the direction of (derivative) series and the concert of masses. All together they lead to "unityism or tendency to universal unity in weights, measures, languages, customs, social relations, etc., etc., and to universal Association, and to the Administrative unity of the Globe."¹⁸

In the present organization of society, however, these passions are perverted or smothered and thwarted, with unfortunate results.¹⁹ Association would use them, not suppress them, for "of all impieties, the worst is that impertinent prejudice, which suspects the Divinity of having created men, the passions and the materials of industry, without having fixed upon any plan for their organization," says Fourier.²⁰

The Passions Described. The first five passions require no discussion, since they are simply the familiar five senses that appear in practically all contemporaneous psychological systems descriptive of the human faculties. The four affective passions, however, have special significance, for they²¹

govern social relations, or those of individuals; Friendship tends to social equality, and to the leveling of ranks; Love regulates the relations of the sexes;

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹⁷ The authors have added the words "primary" and "derivative" to the paraphrase of Brisbane's statement in order to clarify the meaning for present-day readers.

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 160.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 162-166.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 157. See also p. 456.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 453.

Paternity those of ages and generations; Ambition produces hierarchy of ranks and distinctions among individuals; it establishes in society gradations of all kinds, based upon skill, merit, talent, etc.; it is opposite in its effects to friendship.

The last three passions—the distributive—are also interesting in their operation. Note, for example, how emulative passion operates in society:²²

The satisfaction of this passion is so imperative a want of the human mind, that in the absence of real rivalries, it seeks with avidity in our present societies fictitious ones, at the theatre, in novels or at cards. If a party be given, some artificial intrigue must be created for the guests, cards must be put in their hands, or a political cabal concerted. . . . The Creator has given us this passion, because, in a system of attractive industry, every man, woman and child must be a member of a large number of Series, and take a strong interest in the rivalries and pretensions of one of the Groups of the Series, or of even two or three.

As for the Composite Passion, it appears to be nothing more nor less than what we now call psychological facilitation. "This passion to be developed, requires the enjoyment of at least two pleasures at the same time."²³ The familiar example of the facilitating effect of music is even added by way of illustration.²⁴ The Alternating Passion or passion of variety is the reverse angle of the psychology of monotony or fatigue. It is based on the fact that "all nature requires change,"²⁵ a truth which we ought to recognize, he thinks, rather than fight against it. Similarly, "each of the twelve passions has its function assigned it; if we examine each separately, we see the different ends to which man is impelled; if we examine them collectively, the general end. From this special and general examination, we can deduce the laws of a social system, which will enable us to attain those ends:—that is—our Destiny."²⁶

Perversion through Civilization. The influence upon the thinking of Fourier had by Rousseau and his doctrine of the corruption of primitive morality through the agency of human institutions is quite evident at this point, and Brisbane has taken over the viewpoint without criticism. He fails to grasp the essential distinction between the levels of primitive and modern culture and makes a sentimental assumption, in line with the con-

²² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 168.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 168–169.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 453.

temporaneous doctrine of modern degeneration or devolution, that primitive morality was ideal and that modern standards had declined under the impact of an artificial civilization. He says that in our present social systems we consider these passions as vices,²⁷ but

when we are acquainted in detail with the social order to which we are destined, we shall see that these pretended vices . . . become . . . guarantees of virtue and riches; that the Creator has known perfectly well in what manner to create the passions, so as to be adapted to social unity . . . and that human reason, instead of criticising his work, should exert itself to discover a social system in affinity with them. No moral theory will ever change them, and according to the law of Duality of Destiny, they will intervene perpetually to lead us to Evil in civilization, and to Good in Association.

This assertion, that civilization perverts and represses human nature, thus degrading and vitiating it, whereas Association exhorts it by harmonious exploitation of the passions, is repeated again and again, almost wearisomely, throughout the work.

Passional Attraction. Since "the science of Association consists solely in knowing how to *form and develop in full accord a mass or Phalanx of Passional Series*, perfectly free, impelled by attraction alone,"²⁸ it is necessary that we shall examine in some detail the nature of this Attraction. Passional attraction, it appears, is of the same stuff as the attraction used by God "to direct and govern the movements of planets and suns . . . and animals and insects."²⁹ Indeed, "Attraction is the only known interpreter between God and the Universe."³⁰ As a matter of fact, "how can there be Unity in the system of the Divinity, if the lever of universal Harmony—Attraction—be not applicable to the human race, as it is to planets and animals,—and if Attraction cannot be introduced into Industry, which is the foundation or pivot of the social mechanism?"³¹

The answer is, that there could not be such unity without Attraction; as a matter of fact, such Attraction can be introduced into industry. "There must exist a unitary passional code, composed by God and interpreted by attraction."³² The evidence for this assertion is four-fold.³³ First, passional attraction constitutes a

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 461.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 469.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 471.

permanent Social guide and revelation, inasmuch as Attraction impels us continually by impulses, which are as fixed and unvarying at all times and in all places as the lights of reason are fluctuating and deceptive. The experience of all centuries proves that Attraction is unmutable. . . . From this unmutability of Attraction, it becomes evident that any science relative to its action and effects, would be a positive science, and that any social system based upon it, would be a code dictated by God and interpreted by a permanent revelation, for Attraction is never silent or uncertain. How important is the research of his code, which once discovered, would become a true and unvarying guide in social politics, and replace our irreconcilable theories and systems.

Secondly, Attraction constitutes an economy of means for God. That is, as Supreme Economist, he would naturally use the same method in governing us as in governing the planets.³⁴ Thirdly, government by Attraction makes unnecessary constraint and coercive measures, such as courts, prisons, etc.³⁵ And, finally, worlds governed by Attraction receive direct and positive recompense, whereas those that deny it, that is rebel worlds, suffer direct and passive punishment.³⁶

Some Peculiarities of Attraction. The discussion of Attraction itself sounds like the formulation of the codes of modern advertisers and propagandists. Attraction is the force that makes us want to do the things that God—or the advertiser—thinks we ought to do. Brisbane says, "Attraction is, in the hands of God, a magic wand, which enables him to secure from love and pleasure the performance of work, which man can alone obtain by constraint or violence. It gives charm to functions, which are in themselves the most repulsive."³⁷ The classic case that springs to one's mind immediately is Tom Sawyer's technique in getting his yard fence white-washed by his playmates. This, we might say, is the sum and substance of Attraction in its application to practical living. It is the conditioning of desired responses through the manipulation of the natural passions.

But there is also another and more ponderous metaphysical significance to Attraction. It is clear that Fourier and Brisbane see it as the human aspect of the Newtonian principle of gravitation. In other words, God has but one unitary law for his universe, but this law is manifested variously in its several applications. It is the law of gravitation as it governs the harmony of worlds; but it is desire as it applies to human hearts and applies to personal motivation in the field of social harmony or adjustment.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 473-474.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 474.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 476.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 479.

These two men were not alone in applying this sort of monistic metaphysics to a theory of social forces. We shall find it recurring in the writings of Henry C. Carey and others. Social Science had not yet and has not yet, for that matter, freed itself from contemporaneous physical analogies.

Theory of Motivation. The Associationist theory of the relation of reason and instinct (passion) is, like all the other elements which constitute the system, quite in the Scotch tradition. Says Brisbane, "It is supposed that men act from reason, and that it is an impelling power; this is another error; reason enlightens the passions, spreads, so to say, before them all attendant circumstances, and points out the results which may be produced immediately, or at a future time by their action; but those passions do not cease to be the sole source of activity."³⁸ Again, he says, "Reason, it is clear, is without weight or influence and the more we observe man, the more we see that he is entirely guided by Attraction; that he hears to reason so far only, as it aids him in the attainment of his pleasures and in the means of satisfying Attraction."³⁹

This view of the essential distinction between the functions of the passions (or the instincts and emotions) and reason, or the analytical element in human mentality, is a very old one. It is so clearly stated in the writings of Hutcheson that one is almost compelled to believe that this or some other Scotch moral philosopher was the immediate source of Fourier's theories on the subject.⁴⁰ This theory that only the passions or emotions motivate or compel action and that reason or human understanding serves merely to guide the individual in selecting the best means to achieve the ends that his passions set for him persisted throughout the nineteenth century and was emphasized very strongly by the American sociologist, Lester F. Ward.⁴¹

According to Brisbane and his master, instinct and passion are essentially one and the same thing. A passion in action, functioning as a drive toward an objective in behavior, is an instinct. This is again quite in keeping with the Scotch metaphysical school of social psychology, or rather of moral philosophy as the subject which then embraced social psychology was called. This identification of emotion and instinct has persisted in the Scotch

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 213.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 472.

⁴⁰ See, for example, Robert Blakey (1795-1878), *The History of Moral Science* (1833).

⁴¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, 1883, Chs. IX-XIV; *Pure Sociology*, 1903, Ch. VI; *Psychic Factors in Civilization*, 1893, Ch. XX.

school and is manifest particularly in the work of Shand ⁴² and McDougall.⁴³ One of the most powerful instincts, according to Brisbane, is that to pursue happiness. This so-called instinct he considers "truer than the reasonings of science."⁴⁴

An Instinct of Progress. The most important use of the theory of instinct as a motivating and control factor by Brisbane was made in connection with the discussion of historical change, in which an instinct of social progress is invoked by him. He says,⁴⁵

It is a general belief that great social changes must be gradual, that neither human science nor human power can control them, and that man to organize a more perfect system of society, must go through a regular series of social transformations. If it be asserted that this is the only mode of progress, which is reserved for the human race, then we declare the assertion erroneous. Nature—not trusting the fulfillment of her plans to human science or to the efforts of individuals—has implanted in man an instinct of social progress, which, it is true, will lead him through a series of transformations, to the attainment of his Destiny; but she has also reserved for his intelligence the noble prerogative of hastening this progress, and of anticipating results, which, if left to the gradual movement of society, would require centuries to effect. Social progress therefore may be effected by instinct or by genius.

Error of the Hypothesis. The absurdity of an instinct for social progress is so patent as to require no refutation. What, for example, would constitute the structural basis in the nervous system of such an alleged instinct? At one time in social evolution the adoption of steam engines constitutes progress; somewhat later, the use of electric engines. Now supposing, however absurd such a supposition may be, that we did have an instinct for adopting the steam engine, then such an instinct would stand in the way of further progress when later electrically run engines were invented. In order to make progress at all on an instinctive basis we should have to possess an instinct for each form of behavior which constitutes a progressive adaptation to environment at that particular time—a supposition which is obviously illogical, since one cannot inherit a behavior pattern for an adjustment which was never made before, and each of these progressive adjustments is of course new to the race.

The supposition that one can have a general instinct for progress, or an inherited behavior pattern which includes all possible progressive adjust-

⁴² Alexander Shand, *Foundations of Character* (1914).

⁴³ William McDougall, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (1908).

⁴⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

ments is so ridiculous that anyone except possibly a Scotch philosopher of the old school, can see the absurdity of it. This phase of the subject has been discussed adequately elsewhere.⁴⁶ Moreover, what is progress in our behavior at one time may be retrogression at another time. The very essence of progress is change; while that of instinct is stability. Furthermore, there is by no means unanimity of opinion as to what precisely constitutes social progress. There are many thoughtful people in the world who believe that the western or occidental notion of social progress as an accumulation of technologies and material possessions is a false idea. Have our "instincts of social progress" then betrayed us? If we did actually have instincts for social progress there would be more agreement as to what constitutes this progress, and more uniformity of methods in achieving it.

Periods of social decay likewise are difficult to explain if we posit an instinct for social progress. Can whole nations lose this instinct, regain it, develop it again—all within a few centuries? Perhaps an even more important consideration in this connection is the fact that the term progress as used by Brisbane and his fellow Associationists is meant to signify social progress. Social progress is a collective matter and is conditioned by a vast number of social factors, of which individual motivations are only a part, although an important one.⁴⁷ Even with the utmost concentration of individual motivation, instinctive or rational, upon invention and social progress it would not be possible for progress to be achieved through individual effort alone, regardless of custom and tradition and of physical and social conditions. But further discussion of this point is fruitless. Indeed refutation of such an absurd instinct probably accords it more dignity than it warrants. One of the authors of this work has already dealt effectively with the claims of such far fetched functional concepts and value-complexes—such as social progress, for example—to the title of instinct. The reader is referred to this study for further discussion of the question.⁴⁸

Conflict with Orthodox Theology—The Cause of Social Evils. This, then, was the theory of human nature as set forth in Associationist Social Science.⁴⁹ It will be identified readily as the reverse of the Calvinistic

⁴⁶ L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1926), Ch. IX.

⁴⁷ L. L. Bernard, "The Conditions of Social Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVIII: 21–48 (July, 1922).

⁴⁸ L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (New York, 1924).

⁴⁹ There was also a set of twelve impulses, but Brisbane simply lists them without discussion. They are as follows: 1. The twelve passions, 2. Scale of characters, 3. Attractions, 4. Repugnances, 5. Instincts, 6. Tastes, 7. Discords, 8. Contrasts, 9. Sympathies, 10. Antipathies, 11. Rivalries, 12. Natural vices (*Op. cit.*, pp. 178–179).

shield and thus, at the same time, as a challenge to orthodox religion. Conservative New England divines promptly recognized it as such and detected in it a rival. Since Fourier's philosophy of history, which we shall discuss presently, took its departure from the Christian theory of the fall of man, they did not take exception to it. But the Associationist theory of human nature was in direct opposition to that of Christianity, and especially to that of New England Protestant Christianity, which was only beginning to feel the softening effects of Unitarianism. It was, therefore, the Associationists' theory of human nature that became the chief target of the theologically minded critics. These divines considered the whole Social Science idea as basically wrong since it implied, with the perversity of the whole "degrading" ⁵⁰ French philosophy, that not original sin but social mis- or mal-organization was the cause of human suffering and of social ills. They had ample basis for their suspicions of the Associationist heterodoxy on these points. Says Brisbane, "We assert that the evil, misery and injustice, now predominant on the earth, have not their foundation in political or administrative errors, in the defects of this or that institution, in the imperfection of human nature, or in the depravity of the passions: but in the False Organization of Society Alone." ⁵¹ Again, he says, "The condemnation of human nature in order to exculpate society, has been a universal error of science." ⁵²

Conflict with Orthodox Theology—The Remedy for Social Ills. The remedy for crime and depravity offered by the Associationists was equally unorthodox and anti-theological. Perhaps the first time that many of the New England theologians had ever read a truly sociological analysis of social maladjustment and prescription for its cure was when this book by Brisbane appeared. His statement was as dogmatic on the environmental side as any proposal by the theologians from the subjective personal regenerative standpoint could have been. Brisbane's principle follows.⁵³

To do away therefore with crime and what is termed moral depravity, we have not to change man's nature, create a new being or a new race, as is so often asserted; we have only to change the social organization and the vicious direction, which the passions receive from it. The great question therefore,—the only one truly worthy of the efforts of genius and of a century which pretends to be enlightened—is to plan the means of a reform in the social edifice.

⁵⁰ Unsigned, "Godwin's Thoughts on Man," *Christian Examiner*, XI (n.s., VI, 1831), p. 269.

⁵¹ *Social Destiny of Man*, p. 2.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 252.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

To all of which the divines replied, "Stuff and nonsense," if not "Heresy." For example, they said, "The radical error of Fourierism—we mean its refusal to acknowledge the deep-seated and wilful perversity of man—vitiates the discussion for us."⁵⁴ Again, the orthodox critics declared their faith in the subjective approach to social reform as follows: "Improvement must come from individual fidelity to Christian principles, rather than from any social organization. Society will come right, when all its members are right."⁵⁵ There were a number of articles in this period emphasizing the subjective and non-sociological viewpoint that the evils of society were due basically to the sinfulness of human nature and not, as Associationist Social Science declared, to defective social organization.⁵⁶

There were too many theologically trained minds within the Associationist ranks, once the movement came under the control of the Massachusetts group, for it to be insensitive to this barrage of verbal shafts. *The Phalanx*, as we have intimated, took due notice of them. In the seventeenth number of that journal there appeared an article on this point in which the author stated that he did not deny sin; but, he added, there are enough people harping on that subject, whereas the evils in society are too often overlooked.⁵⁷

The Environmentalist Point of View. Brisbane, less cowed by theological attacks, was himself bolder. The belief that social evils are inseparable from human nature, that they therefore constitute man's natural destiny, he calls "the echo of a prejudice which has sunk deeply into the minds of men. It has destroyed all hope of a better future, and, with that hope, the most powerful stimulant we could appeal to, to search for a better order of things."⁵⁸ It took courage in 1840 to call the Christian theory of human nature and society simply a prejudice!

Another angle of the theological objection is represented by A. P. Peabody who claimed⁵⁹ to have not

⁵⁴ Unsigned review of George H. Calvert's *Introduction to Social Science*, in *The Christian Examiner*, LXI (n.s., XXVI, 1856), p. 317.

⁵⁵ Notice of the Fourier Convention, Boston, 1844, *Ibid.*, XXXVI (n.s., I, Jan., 1844), p. 144.

⁵⁶ See, e. g., J. F. C., "Fourierism," *Ibid.*, XXXVII (n.s., II, July, 1844), pp. 57-58; W. J. A. Bradford, "The Icarian Community," *Ibid.*, LIII (4th series, XVIII, Nov., 1852), pp. 372-386; D. W. Clark, "Fourierism," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVIII (3rd series, V, Oct., 1845), pp. 545-549.

⁵⁷ See also, in No. 22 of *The Phalanx*, the reply to an article, "Fourierism and Similar Schemes," in the *Universalist Quarterly and General Review*, Jan., 1845.

⁵⁸ *Social Destiny of Man*, p. 28.

⁵⁹ A. P. Peabody, "The Intellectual Aspect of the Age," *North American Review*, LXIV: 287 (Apr., 1847).

the slightest faith in Fourierism, or in any of the plans for creating a social machinery which shall move aright of its own momentum. We do not believe that Providence ever meant that human institutions and arrangements should produce the highest results by their own independent and self-adjusting action. It is essential to our best moral discipline that the bands, wheels, and pulleys of the social machine should be constantly liable to be thrown out of gear and out of plan, and should thus need weights of our own addition and compensations of our own device,—the incessant and vigorous exercise of our best powers of mind and heart.

But since this criticism was based on an assumed knowledge of the intentions of Divinity, and since everyone is supposed to be equally entitled to an opinion of his own in this matter, there was really no room for argument. It was simply one man's interpretation of the mind of God against another's.

We recognize, of course, hidden behind the ostensible elements of this controversy the old, but newly recognized, issue of cultural environment versus heredity, the modern analog of the ancient doctrinal antagonism between grace (intelligent self-direction) and original sin (man's organic nature and impulses). Social reformers have always run against the argument that "You can't change human nature" and the doctrine of original sin. In the past, even more than in the present, there has been an abundance of theologians and conservative politicians and the specially privileged to maintain the one doctrine or the other. Nevertheless cultural accumulation and change go right on modifying human nature, in spite of all the arguments that it can't be done. Even the type of human nature that attempted to establish Fourieristic communities, for example, seems to us today strange and out of date. We shall return to this point presently. The dogma of original sin itself has become largely one of those theological curiosities more fit for an ecclesiastical museum than for a realistic controversy today.

Friendly Criticism of Associationism. However, the judgment against Fourier and the Associationists was by no means without mitigation. Thus, S. O., writing in the *Christian Examiner* is willing to concede that the Associationists "have called attention to many crying evils of our civilization and have thrown much light upon the philosophy of society."⁶⁰ He is, however, somewhat impatient with the profession of Fourier to have discovered the true Social Science,⁶¹ and with the Associationist who "is content with no judgment short of the declaration, that he has hit upon the complete

⁶⁰ *Loc. cit.*, XLV (n.s., X, 1848), p. 207.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

science of society.”⁶² The author defines a socialist as one who aims “to reform society by a new social science.”⁶³ The term embraced Owen as well as Saint-Simon. Owenism, he believes, has been reduced to an absurdity and Saint-Simonism has vanished.⁶⁴

Similar Theories of Society. It is interesting to note how frequently Owen, Saint-Simon, and Fourier are spoken of in the same breath.

Owenism and Associationism were, from our point of view, really quite distinct. They were in actuality rival but more or less friendly religious doctrines—for religious they were, and even theological, as we have seen. Owen denied that Associationism was a science, but he was willing to concede that the Fourier system was a good intermediate step toward his own Rational System.⁶⁵ Since Owenism was so closely associated in the popular mind with Fourierism, and since Owen himself spoke of a “science of society,” it might be worth while to say a word or two about his system. Part Two of his *Book of the New Moral World, containing the Rational System of Society, founded on Demonstrable Facts, Developing the Constitution and Laws of Society* (1833), contains “The Principles of Society,” in which he asserts⁶⁶ that

The elements of the science of society, or the social state of man, contain—
 1st, A knowledge of the principles, and their application to practice, of the laws of human nature: laws derived from demonstrable facts, and which prove man to be a social being. 2d. A knowledge of the principles and practices of the best mode of *producing* in abundance the most beneficial necessities and comforts for the support and enjoyment of human life. 3d. A knowledge of the principles and practices by which to form the new combination of circumstances for *training* the infant to become . . . the most rational being. . . .
 5th. A knowledge of the principles and practice by which to govern man under these new arrangements in the best manner, as a member of the great family of man. 6th. A knowledge of the principles and practice for uniting in one general system, in due proportions, these several parts of the science of society: to effect and secure, in the best manner for all, the greatest amount of perma-

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 285.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ See *New Moral World*, Jan. 11, 1845, p. 225; also Commons, *op. cit.*, VII: 170–171, and *The Phalanx*, Dec. 9, 1844, also in Commons, *op. cit.*, pp. 223–225. For a German discussion comparing and contrasting the systems of Owen and of Fourier, see Herman Krieg's article in the *Volks Tribun* (New York), September 26, 1846, p. 1, quoted in Commons, *op. cit.*, VII: 225–231. See also George Ripley and Hugh Doherty, “Robert Owen, Saint-Simon, and Fourier,” *The Phalanx*, No. 2.

⁶⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 43. For further data on the life and theories of Owen, see G. D. H. Cole, *The Life of Robert Owen* (2d ed., 1930).

nent benefits and enjoyments, with the fewest disadvantages. Without a knowledge of the principles of these elements, in their whole extent, as a foundation for the future fabric of society, it will be unavailing, and useless to commence practical measures. These elements form the architectural materials with which to build up a new state of human existence; and without a distinct knowledge of this outline, the builder² will be wholly at a loss how to proceed with the superstructure.

It is clear from this quotation that he was more concerned with the method to be used in determining human nature and in applying its principles to the problems of social organization than he was in asserting dogmatically a theory of human nature. However, Owen did have a theory of human nature and it was very closely related to that expressed in the works of Helvetius and Godwin, whom he had studied assiduously. It is noteworthy also that Owen's theory of human nature was much more practical and less mystical than that of Fourier. But we shall not enter into it here because it never became a marked and powerful doctrine in the United States, assuming the proportions of a religious social movement, as did the doctrines of Fourier. Perhaps its failure to assume such importance was due to the fact that Owen lacked such a champion of his views as Brisbane proved to be for Fourier. However, it should not be forgotten that the theories of environmentalism and human nature relayed by Owen from the eighteenth century philosophers became the widely disseminated possession of American Social thinkers, although they were not labelled with his name.

The Associationist Theory of Social Organization

The Philosophy of History. In the eighteenth century, which was preeminently the century of the philosophy of history, the historical approach would undoubtedly have been regarded as the one of chief value for the justification of Associationism, but the psychological interpretation of man and of his institutions was coming to be very influential in the nineteenth century. Begun by Hobbes, Locke, Condillac, and Hume, it had been broadened and strengthened by Hartley, Helvetius, William Godwin and Adam Smith, and by other Scotch philosophers, until it now seemed to many that social organization grew naturally out of the so-called instincts and natural moral propensities of man. But as important as these subjective factors in social behavior and social organization seemed to many, the rival environmentalist theory of social causation, which at that time took the form of the philosophy of history, appeared to many others to be of equal or of even greater importance. As we have already seen, the eighteenth century, with its new perceptions of social phenomena and its sure grasp for the first time in history of the full significance of social organization and social evolution, had matured two modes of explaining and interpreting these important new phases of social consciousness and behavior. These were the theories of human nature, for which the Scotch ethical philosophers were primarily although not exclusively responsible, and the philosophy of history, for which the French naturalistic philosophers were the chief but not the sole sponsors. Fourier and Brisbane had undoubtedly been influenced by the first of these lines of thought here named and they accordingly made it primary in their philosophy of society. However, they were too close to the French Enlightenment—with its strong emphasis upon a pattern of historical progress, now considered as an inevitable postulate of the metaphysical theory of Natural Law—to disregard this aspect of the question of sanctions or justifications for proclaiming the new social order which they regarded not only as an inevitable

successor to the present stage of civilization, but in fact as now approximately due.

Brisbane, himself, therefore, as we have seen, presented a philosophy of history as well as a theory of human nature, to function as a basic sanction for his theory of social organization. We shall now return to a consideration of this approach to Associationism from the standpoint of historical philosophy as a preliminary to an analysis of the theory of social organization itself. In the following passage we see how Brisbane used his theory of cultural evolution, as set forth in his philosophy of history, as a sanction to his scheme of social organization:¹

Four societies have existed on the earth, the Savage, Patriarchal, Barbarian and Civilized. Under these general heads may be classed the various social forms, through which man has progressed up to the present day. *If four have existed, may not a fifth or even a sixth be discovered and organized?* Common sense would dictate that there could, although the world hitherto has entertained a different opinion.

In our efforts to prove the possibility of a reform in the social organization, no preliminary is more important than that of doing away with the almost universally entertained opinion, that society cannot be changed. It is a prejudice which rises up at every moment, and in the mind of every individual; it repels investigation and all unprejudiced discussion of this important problem. To combat with a chance of success this deeply rooted prepossession, let us enter into an examination of the four periods above mentioned, and by a study of their mechanisms, particularly that of civilization, judge whether other social principles—perhaps more just and equitable in their action—can be established.

He is thus at the outset establishing to his own satisfaction not only the possibility but even the inevitability of social change as the most important prerequisite for accepting the theory of Associationism.

The Four Stages. The main characteristics of the four stages—savage, patriarchal, barbarian, and civilized—are summarily sketched as follows:²

The Savage [Stage]

The leading characteristic of the savage state is its refusal or avoidance of industry. . . . So simple is the organization of this period, that it can scarcely be called a society. To the horde belong in common fields, forests and streams. Hunting and fishing form the two sources from which it forms its subsistence, and each of its members takes as a right the spontaneous productions of Nature, wherever he finds them. . . .

¹ Albert Brisbane, *Social Destiny of Man* (1840), p. 269.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 270-278.

The Patriarchal [Stage]

This society . . . is without importance or influence. The first step, however, in social progress, takes place in this period: Industry begins to be developed; flocks are reared; a few branches of manufactures are undertaken, and some other of the elements of society are called into existence. Man becomes attached to the soil, and commences its cultivation; he looks to his own industry for subsistence, and does not trust to the precarious mode of existence of the savage,—to hunting and fishing. . . .

The Barbarian [Stage]

A rapid stride in social progress characterizes the third or Barbarian period. Industry receives an important and in some respects a brilliant development; agriculture and manufactures become the occupation of the mass, and the arts and sciences are called into existence. . . . This period must consequently be considered as an important social progress, although accomplished at the expense of the liberty of the mass, and accompanied by the most oppressive tyranny,—the corporal slavery of the producing classes. . . .

Civilization

In this society man accomplishes the task of his social infancy,—the development of the elements of Industry, Art and Science, which are necessary to the founding of Association. . . .

In the first ages of civilization, war is the leading occupation of society; in later ages, commerce and industry take its place. . . .

This last statement, it might be added parenthetically, is curiously like the later theory of Herbert Spencer, in which he implies the tendency for industrialism to supplant militarism.³

Having, by means of his theory of history, satisfactorily established the fact of social change, Brisbane is by no means dogmatic with reference to the exact sequence of stages through which cultures develop. The four stages sketched above have not always occurred in just the order stated, owing to various disturbing and interfering factors, but such is the logical order. He says: ⁴

The four societies which have existed on the earth, should, according to the natural course of things, succeed each other with regularity; but various circumstances,—soil, climate, rivers, seas, formation of countries, etc., influence to a greater or less degree their form and character. Some nations develop themselves faster, some more slowly; some pass over entire periods, particularly the Patriarchal, and organize the Barbarian at once; others after passing a short time in Barbarianism enter the first age of Civilization. A nation, after

³ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology: Political Institutions* (1882), pp. 659–660,

⁴ *Social Destiny of Man*, p. 283.

having progressed as far as the second or third age of civilization, may, by the action of disorganizing events—revolutions within or invasions from without—be suddenly arrested in its career and retrograde to the barbarian period.

Brisbane and Cultural Relativity. In this passage Brisbane shows himself to be quite modern in his views as to the relativity with which these stages or forms of culture succeed one another. At a time when many, and perhaps most, ethnologists and archaeologists were reputed still to believe that the succession of cultures followed a fixed and invariable order,⁵ and almost a generation before Lewis H. Morgan published his famous work, *Ancient Society*, in which he discussed the development of the forms of civilization, Brisbane saw clearly that there was no inherent metaphysical order in the evolution of culture, but that this evolution took place in close correspondence with the limiting and conditioning factors imposed by the larger physical environment within which culture itself originated and had its growth. It is also worth noting that this insight on the part of Brisbane was manifested fully two generations before it was brought to popular attention by the so-called newer school of cultural anthropologists, who within the last generation have promulgated the principle as one of the major discoveries of "scientific anthropology," and used it as the chief basis of their criticism of classical or comparative anthropology. It is of course true that Brisbane's societies or stages are not at present recognized as the major divisions of cultural development, the patriarchal being now considered as a subdivision of the barbarian culture. Also, the recent anthropologists have directed their criticisms of fixed succession of stages mainly against the so-called economic stages or food economies rather than against the major divisions of culture as such; but the principle of criticism remains the same. It should likewise be observed that Brisbane recognized the validity of a logical order of cultural succession, that is of a predominant cultural succession, while admitting its variability within certain limits. This is undoubtedly scientifically the more justifiable view, since it conforms more closely to the facts of cultural evolution than the rather extreme position of the "scientific" anthropologists of the invidiously critical school.

Civilization. Brisbane believed our society now to be in the fourth stage of development, that is, in the stage of civilization. He proposes to present, "metaphysically speaking, a map of civilization," by the aid of which "we can see what progress this society has made, and in what manner it is destined to terminate," since at the time he wrote, according to Brisbane,

⁵ See R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (1920), pp. 430 ff., for a criticism of this point of view.

"Politicians and Legislators may be compared to travellers, wandering in some strange and uninhabited country, who have neither compass, maps, nor other means by which to direct themselves. Like those travellers, they are wandering in the labyrinth of civilization, without a true social science to guide them; legislating for the requirements of the moment without any high object or policy in view." ⁶

It is Brisbane's purpose to give to the legislator as well as to the intelligent citizen some insight into the significance of this civilization in which we live. He wishes also to present a plan by which such men may guide themselves and others in achieving the social reforms or improvements which will constitute the essence of Association. It is true, according to Brisbane, that the "instinct for social progress" and other instincts, if untrammelled, should do much to lead mankind out of the blind alleys of which he speaks. But these beneficent forces in the nature of man can find a free opportunity to operate for human welfare and betterment only under the ideal social organization—that is, Association—which he proposes.

The Four Phases of Civilization. Civilization, like society in general, also has four phases or stages, according to Brisbane. "A society," he says, "like an organic body, has its different ages—has its infancy, growth, maturity, decline, and dissolution." ⁷ In this statement Brisbane does not show himself to be original. He has merely copied the views in this respect which were current in his time.⁸ Even Lord Byron had set forth a poetic version of the same theory in his *Childe Harold's Pilgrimage*.

Each of these social periods or ages "commences with some leading principles which distinguish it from the period which precedes it. . . . It then develops the Institutions, Laws, and Customs which are inherent in the principles upon which it is based, and gives to the efforts of the human mind, and to industry, art, and science a character and direction in keeping with those laws and customs." ⁹ Thus the Infancy of civilization establishes the principles of monogamy and feudalism and recognizes for the first time the principle of civil rights of the wife. Society is ruled by a federation of the great barons, with the aid of the illusion of chivalry; for each age has its characteristic illusion, which gives it moral sanction. The Age of Growth establishes free towns and cities and cultivates the arts and

⁶ *Social Destiny of Man*, p. 286.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 283.

⁸ See F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State* (New York, 1910) for a review of such theories.

⁹ *Social Destiny of Man*, p. 283.

sciences. It recognizes the principle of the enfranchisement of the serfs and laboring classes. Government is nominally through representative systems, sanctioned by the illusion of liberty and democracy. The Age of Decline now sets in under the regime of the commercial and fiscal spirit and establishment of stock companies. The ruling principle is maritime monopoly—we should say modern imperialism—and the ruling power is anarchical commerce; while the sanctioning illusion is that of financial prosperity. The fourth or final age is that of Decrepitude, which is characterized by agricultural loaning companies indicating the decline of individual farm ownership, associated farms, and a “discipline system of cultivation.” The reigning principle is that of commercial and industrial feudality. Society is under the control of contractors, of feudal monopoly and an oligarchy of capital. The sanctioning illusion here is that the people have a true form of association.¹⁰

Meaning of the Analysis. This analysis is, of course, Fourier's, but Brisbane accepts it as the true general law of civilization.¹¹ It is meant to show that the so-called democratic or representative system that arises during the period of social growth finally develops into a plutocratic social organization in which the average man returns to a new form of feudalism under the illusion of efficient organization. Such a society as described by Fourier and Brisbane might readily be characterized as either Fascism (regimented capitalism) or Communism (the regimented soviet system) by opponents of those systems. As prophets of future economic-social developments, it can scarcely be said that the exponents of Associationism are wholly unjustified by present developments. Brisbane's analysis of the four ages or phases of civilization is of course illustrated from history,¹² but we lack space in which to present this material.

The Decline of Civilization. However, we may properly give some attention to Brisbane's conclusions regarding the decline of civilization preparatory to the coming of the stage of super-civilization, which he denominates Association. He represents the decline of civilization as a perversion of the good aspects of this civilization. Such perversion is indeed recognized as a very frequent method of producing abnormal adjustments, both personal and social. He says, “Civilization in its decline perverts the germs of good, which characterize its maturity, and after carrying out all the con-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 284.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 285.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 285-330.

sequences of a false application of those germs, brings forth characters, which enable it to pass to the next higher period. Civilization will end with a *Commercial feudalism* or a general monopoly of commerce and industry, and replace individual action and free competition by a false system of Association." ¹³

He predicts maritime monopoly, or commercial imperialism, which will bring about wars of nations and social decline. "It has been reserved to England to exercise this monopoly," he says. "The maritime monopoly of England is the greatest scourge which the descending movement of civilization has inflicted upon the world." ¹⁴ The other great evidence of decline comes from the manipulation of the new science of chemistry, which "becomes in the hands of industry and commerce the means of giving an unlimited extension to fraud and adulteration." ¹⁵

It is, however, from the growth of capitalistic commerce and industry that the greatest impulse to the decline of civilization is to be expected. Indeed, capitalism (the idea, although not the term, is used by Brisbane) will bring us to the final stage of decline and to the dissolution of civilization. ¹⁶

As industry is becoming the absorbing occupation of society, political tyranny is giving way to the tyranny of capital. . . . The world is tending to a commercial and financial vassalage, at which it is destined to arrive, when Commerce,—not content with the profits which it makes in the exchange of products, will discover the means of becoming possessor of the fundamental capital itself, that is, of the soil. As soon as a third of the landed property passes into the hands of large capitalists, and the system of stock-companies is applied to agriculture, an entrance into the fourth Phase of civilization will be effected.

The Establishment of a True Society. The only escape from the evils outlined above is for mankind to take its fate in its own hands and to organize a rational or scientific society. We have already described this projected society in its general outline in Chapter IV of the present work. Consequently we shall confine ourselves in the remaining portion of the present chapter to an account of the method by which the new social order was to be brought about. Brisbane recognized the difficulty of inducing mankind to seek its own development. He says, "the human race, to accom-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 304.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 305.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

plish their Destiny, have to be urged on by force." ¹⁷ It required the driving power of capitalism and its political arm, the actual government, to accomplish this. If left to itself this capitalistic trend would ultimately organize the people into an efficient industrial society, which they might take over from the owners of capital and operate themselves, apparently very much in the manner later predicted by Karl Marx as the ultimate revolutionary culmination of socialism. No form of government, not even a representative democracy, could "arrest the social movement which is tending in this country, as it is in Europe, towards a vast combination in industry, commerce, and finance—a combination which we have designated under the name of *Commercial feudalism*." ¹⁸ This social movement is stronger than any checking political movement could be and cannot be stopped, except by a counter social movement.

Controlled Social Mutation. It is clear that Brisbane and Fourier did not wish to wait for the slow process of evolution through "commercial feudalism" or capitalism to work itself over into Association by means of compulsory evolution. Brisbane denied that social changes are necessarily gradual and that "neither human science nor human power can control them, and that man to organize a more perfect system of society must go through a regular series of social transformations." ¹⁹ This is Nature's method when men do not cooperate. But Brisbane believed in social mutations (although he did not employ the term) long before DeVries propounded the mutation theory for plants. It is only necessary to discover the social laws by means of which such social mutations might be brought about. Consequently he would not wait for the slow course of natural events or ordinary social evolution to accomplish the social changes he desired, but would hasten them by means of an apt utilization of human intelligence. He says, "If, as we believe, a true system of society remains to be discovered, which will relieve mankind from their present misery, there can be no need of waiting to be forced to it by necessity and suffering; provided the elements, which are necessary to the organization, have been called into existence, and that the laws upon which it is based can be discovered." ²⁰ Brisbane was sure, moreover, that Fourier had discovered these laws of social mutation and he himself was undertaking to make them familiar to

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 332.

the American public. Thus it was that he sought to transform society rationally or by controlled mutation.

We may now turn to an account of the social organization which he wished to establish and some of the measures he proposed to employ in achieving this result.

The Plan of Social Organization: Location of the Phalanstery. If the discussions of human nature and of social evolution are the most important parts of Brisbane's book, both from the standpoint of his own emphasis and from that of their service as social sanctions, his analysis of social organization under Association, that is, his application of social psychology to the problem of social adjustment, is certainly the most interesting. It is, indeed, the description of a Utopia. It is, moreover, a Utopia which makes many more concessions to human weaknesses and foibles than is customary; for most Utopias impose rather severe demands upon their inhabitants. His account of the physical setting of this ideal community shows that he neither expects it to be the usual or universal form of human community, nor does he suppose it to be feasible except under especially favorable and selected conditions. He says, "For an Association of 1800 to 2000 persons a tract of land three miles square, say in round numbers 6000 acres, will be necessary. A fine stream of water should flow through it. Its surface should be undulating and its soil adapted to a varied cultivation. It should be adjoining a forest, and situated in the vicinity of a large city, which would afford a convenient market for its products."²¹

He does not tell us whether he expects God, whom he recognizes as a sort of distant and benevolent overlord of Associationism, to create and provide in unlimited numbers undulating regions of fertile soil, penetrated by limpid streams of sweet water, bounded by generous forests, and near by to benevolent cities which would purchase at good prices the products of the phalanstery. Otherwise, the phalanstery must remain the exception rather than the rule among human communities, to be enjoyed perhaps only by the elect of mankind, those so fortunate and intelligent as to become Associationists. But most alarming inconsistency of all! It would seem that phalansteries would be possible only as appendages to that *bête noir* of the Associationists, the modern industrial city! They could not exist without the patronage of the very thing they should, according to this philosophy, seek to destroy! Was the phalanstery as described by this son of a country gentleman, who himself became something of a real estate

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

speculator, after all but a glorified suburb to be occupied only by artistic and philosophic souls who might wish, like Maria Theresa's daughter, to escape from the too ever present strain and ugliness of the city in order to dwell awhile in fantasy?

Internal Organization of the Phalanstery. When Brisbane passes from a description of the location and the general setting of the phalanstery to an account of its internal ordering and its discipline we find the same lofty disregard of the practical and the same insistence upon the ideal regardless of practical or utilitarian consequences. Since the "first and sole aim should be to render Industry Attractive, without regard to objects cultivated,"²² in this community, "it will be necessary to foresee and calculate as far as possible the degree of attraction, which each branch of industry will excite."²³ For example, since plum trees are less attractive than pear trees, fewer should be planted. "The degree of attraction, which each branch of Industry possesses, will be the only guide to follow in the choice of occupation."²⁴ If the members should find it more attractive to cultivate thistles and briars than fruit trees and flowers, the latter should be abandoned without hesitation.²⁵ Remuneration is to be apportioned to labor in the proportion of five-twelfths, to capital in the proportion of four-twelfths, and to skill in proportion of three-twelfths.²⁶ Details of furnishings and architecture are also given, as well as the time regime under which the phalanx should operate. Here also the artistic and subjective criteria predominate over the practical and the commercial. Quite clearly he has described a day-dreamer's paradise worthy of a less serious account of fairy-land.

Brisbane on Education. The most charming chapters deal with education or the manner of inducting infants into their proper place in industry. Since the community was to be communistic the children would be brought up together. Infants are divided into the Sucklings and the Weaned,²⁷ each group with their nursery, and these in turn are divided into the Quiet or Good-natured, the Restless or Noisy, and the Turbulent or Intractable, each with its sub-nursery. The equipment of these nurseries—such as mechanical cradles, elastic mats for the infants to play on—is quite in keeping

²² *Ibid.*, p. 353.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 352.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 353-354.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 396.

with the principles of Association. At six months instruction in sense acuity begins, including the singing of "trios and quartettes three or four times a day in the nurseries." ²⁸ The Intractables will discipline one another, that is, "the most noisy will cease their cries, when they are placed with a dozen other little creatures, as perverse as themselves. They will silence each other by their screams." ²⁹ This may be all very reasonable and logical, but it doesn't sound very Attractive to those who would have to listen. Perhaps he meant to give the deaf employment in such perverse nurseries as these!

Since industrial "instincts" must be developed early, as soon as the children leave the nursery at 21 months of age, as Little Commencers, they are introduced to many aspects of industry in order that their particular attractions may be determined according to more or less modern notions of vocational guidance. In Brisbane's words, "As the branches of Industry of a Phalanx are extremely varied, it is impossible that the child surrounded by them, should not find the means of satisfying several of its predominant instincts; they will be awakened by the sight of little tools, handled by children a few months older than themselves." ³⁰ Among the many characteristics of children, those which will be made use of are as follows: "1st. Propensity to pry into everything, to meddle with and handle whatever they see, and to vary continually their occupations. 2nd. Taste for noisy occupations. 3rd. Propensity for imitation. 4th. Love of little tools and workshops. 5th. Progressive influence of the older children upon the younger." ³¹ Numbers 1 and 4 of these propensities strongly suggest Veblen's so-called Instinct of Workmanship.

Methods of Developing the Vocational Aptitudes. Eighteen separate means are prescribed for use in developing the "instincts for industrial vocations" in these children. As will be seen from Fourier's list of the methods quoted below, the motivation covers a wide range and may be regarded as of a high order, beginning in curiosity and rising to the appeal of freedom, originality, and social emulation. Naturally it would be no simple system of social controls which would make such educational devices effective. Only a highly complicated system of social organization, regardless of its size, could make use of such a system. The list of motivations follows.³²

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 400.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 400-401.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 410-412.

1st. Charm of little workshops, and of little tools, adapted in size to the different ages.

2d. Application of all playthings, such as little wagons, wooden horses, dolls, etc., which are useless in civilization, to purposes of industrial instruction.

3d. Charm of ornaments and uniforms: a feather at present often suffices to bewitch the country lad, and induce him to enlist; what then will be the power of handsome ornaments and uniforms with the child in inducing it to take a part in gay and happy groups with its equals.

4th. Privilege of appearing on parade, and of using tools: we know how much such privileges stimulate children.

5th. Gaiety and animation, which always accompany assemblages of children, when they are engaged in occupations, which are pleasing and attractive.

6th. Pride of having performed some trifle which the child believes of high importance; this illusion is cherished.

7th. Propensity to imitation, which is so predominant in children, and which acquires a tenfold intensity, when their emulation is excited by the exploits of groups of children, a little older than themselves.

8th. Full liberty in the choice of occupations, and in the duration of the same.

9th. Perfect independence, or exemption from obedience to superiors, whom it has not chosen from inclination.

10th. Parcelled exercise, or the advantage of choosing in each branch of industry, and detail which pleases.

11th. Charm of short occupations, varied frequently and animated by rivalry. They are desired, because they do not occur frequently. This is the case with those occupations even which take place daily, for they only require by turns a third or fourth of the members of the group.

12th. Absence of paternal flattery, which is counteracted in Association, where the child is judged and criticized by its equals.

13th. Influence of a regular gradation in uniforms, tools, etc., adapted to merit and ages, which is the only system that charms the child and can call forth dexterity in industry and application in study.

14th. Attractive effect of large assemblages, and charm of belonging to groups, in which an enthusiasm is awakened by uniforms, music and corporate celebrations.

15th. Emulation and rivalry between children of the same age, between groups of the same series, and between divisions of the same group.

16th. Periodical chance of promotion to classes higher in age.

17th. Admiration for prodigies performed by groups of older children,—the only beings whom the younger ones choose as models.

18th. Rivalries between children of different Phalanxes; meetings of groups, and emulative contests between them.

The Principle of Ascending Deference. One of the principles which will be followed in a phalanx is that of ascending deference, that is, the principle that makes children always most admire children just a little bit

older than themselves. He says, "The natural instructors of children of each age are, consequently, those a little superior in age. . . . This natural system of education will be one of the wonders, which will be admired in the first Phalanx. The seven orders or ages of children will direct and educate each other, as nature wishes, by the influence of ascending imitation, which can only lead to the good of the whole."³³

The seven ages of childhood, according to Brisbane, run as shown below. When each age is completed the child chooses as guide another child of the age indicated:

First age, up to 18 months: guide chosen is two years of age.

Second age, 18 months to two years: guide chosen is 30 months of age.

Third age, two years to three years: guide chosen is four years of age.

Fourth age, three to eight years: guide chosen is ten years of age.

Fifth age, eight to 12 years: guide chosen is 15 years of age.

Sixth age, 12 to 15.5 years: guide chosen is 15.5 to 20 years of age.

Seventh age, 15.5 to 20 years: becomes his own guide.

Profuse case illustrations are thrown in throughout the discussion of these principles to prove the concrete feasibility of the plan. It is thoroughly delightful.

Work of the Little Hordes. Before concluding this summary discussion, which is in no sense exhaustive, let us glance at one more element in this system. A problem that troubled Fourier for some time was that of the repugnant and dirty labor of the phalanx. Surely no one could possibly be expected to possess an attraction for this type of work. Even in our own day we constantly hear urged against socialism the objection, "But who would do the dirty work?" Fourier thought he had discovered the true answer to this perplexing problem. This work would be done by the Little Hordes, or children from ten to twelve years of age. Nothing could be more fitting, since "no passion is more marked in children from ten to twelve years of age than that of filth and dirt. If we do not wish to *change the passions*, we must find means of making use of this taste, which Nature, it is evident, gives to one half of children. The combined order will, in the corporation of the *Little Hordes*, make a most precious use in social equilibrium of this pretended depravity."³⁴ The children will, of course, be cleaned and perfumed before and after short periods of labor.³⁵ The incentives will be

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 415.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 444.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 446.

simple, he says. "And what means will be employed to induce the Little Hordes to perform these prodigies of philanthropy? A few honors; the first rank at parades, a salute of supremacy, the privilege of commencing important undertakings, and of occupying difficult posts!"³⁸

Here, as in the alleged instinct for social progress, serious criticism is uncalled for. In the first place, there is no scientific basis for the generalization that children from ten to twelve actually have a passion for filth and dirt. Children conditioned to cleanliness have as great abhorrence for filth as adults. The only children who do have a passion for filth and dirt, if any do, are those who have been conditioned to them. Adequate psychological analysis will show that it is not mud or filth in themselves that children delight in. In their desire to experiment with plastic materials and make things, they utilize whatever objects they find at hand. Frequently the only materials they have to work with are dirt and mud and other "filthy" objects. But if a child is given clean clay to model and other sanitary working and play materials he will almost invariably prefer them, provided he has not been already conditioned to the other types. Furthermore, such a passion in these children as Brisbane assumes does not appear suddenly at ten and disappear at twelve. If it is marked enough to constitute a passion it no doubt begins much earlier and lasts throughout life. However, let us not contaminate Brisbane's idyllic picture by too great insistence upon reality and facts. We may enjoy the services of the Little Hordes in the same spirit as that in which we enjoy the feats of Hercules. They are essentially on a par as far as scientific accuracy is concerned.

Value of the Educational Ideas. The whole discussion of education is charming. It contains a thoroughly sound psychology of learning, so far as motivation is concerned, and many worthwhile suggestions. Indeed, the modern nursery school is in direct line with the phalanx nursery; the same arguments which the present volume states in favor of such cooperative nurseries are used by modern educators in favor of the nursery school. Likewise, modern progressive educationists are in essential agreement with many of these ideas. As a matter of fact, so far as the author's contention that education should be made attractive is concerned, there are many who argue that we have gone altogether too far in our attempt in this direction. What these persons object to however is not to giving to educational devices any intrinsic attractiveness or appeal that they may be made to possess, but rather to the extrinsic or artificial appeal that is attached to

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 447-448.

them, with the result that the children are induced to pursue the devices rather than the education to which they are supposed to lead. Thus many thoughtful educators are constantly reminding us, and wisely too, that the chief function of the school is educational, not merely amusement; that it is no particular virtue to keep the pupil absorbed and active unless he is acquiring that knowledge and those skills that are essential to his successful functioning in the actual living process. It was evidently at this more intrinsic function of education as distinguished from mere amusement that Fourier aimed, regardless of whether his system would have achieved it or not. That is a question which, in the absence of more direct proof, we may perhaps best leave to the opinion of our readers.

Associationism on Trial

The Significance of the Associationist Colonies. Interspersed throughout the original French system of Fourier—which contains a great many valuable and useful suggestions, some of which have since been incorporated into our present-day thinking—were numerous fantastic ideas,¹ most of which were not taken over by the American Associationists. It is rather difficult for us in our present social atmosphere to imagine how sober minded and brilliant ² men could have become so enamoured of the system, charming as it undoubtedly is, even to the extent of actually attempting to apply it in living communities. Such facts simply illustrate the impelling power of collective representations or of the psycho-social environment in moulding human nature. It was “in the air” to found colonies for testing social theories; it was a cultural pattern which had appealed to the imagination of many men of the times. New Harmony, Icaria, Hopedale, Brook Farm, as well as the many religious and sectarian communities of the time, testify to this fact. The unique and important thing in the case of the Associationist colonies, therefore, was not that they were established, but the fact that they claimed their system to be based on Social Science. Other colonies appealed to theological or to humanitarian or to philosophical sanctions.³ Owen, for example, called his system the Rational System. The Associationist colonies appealed to the new criterion of Social Science for

¹ Such, for example, as the possibility of changing the climate of the earth by judicious cultivation (See Brisbane, *Social Destiny of Man*, p. 73), or the possibility of transforming the oceans into lemonade (See Robert Flint, *The Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, 1874, p. 167).

² We may get an idea of the personnel of the movement by considering some of the names connected with it. In addition to those already mentioned there were: George Ripley, who believed that “the purpose of Christianity . . . is to redeem society as well as the individual” (quoted by James Truslow Adams in *New England in the Republic 1776–1850*, 1926, pp. 355–56); Adin Ballou, founder of the Hopedale Community at Mendon, Mass.; A. B. Alcott, later connected with Fruitlands; O. A. Brownson, who later became one of the leading Catholics of the country, and editor of *Brownson's Quarterly Review*.

³ See L. L. Bernard, “Early Utopian Social Theory in the United States (1840–1860),” *The Northwest Missouri State Teachers College Studies*, II: 71–94 (June 1, 1938).

their sanction. For example, in a convention for organizing an Industrial Association, February, 1844, Dr. Radcliffe ⁴

awakened the most earnest attention of the audience, by declaring—that Association was not a mere scheme, like that of Owen's community or a Shaker society, but that it was a science—a stupendous science, far reaching, and ascending to the Most High unfolding the laws of Divine order which reign throughout the Universe, and, at the same time descending and embracing the most lowly, the most humble things of creation.

Extent of the Colony Movement. During the eighteen-forties no less than thirty-three communities claiming to be organized along the lines of Fourierism were actually established in this country.⁵ W. Randall Waterman ⁶ gives the number of Fourieristic colonies as forty. John Humphrey Noyes lists thirty-four Associations and presents historical and statistical facts on number of members, acreage, investments, and duration for many of them.⁷ The West Roxbury Community, founded by George Ripley at the suggestion of Dr. Channing, became the most famous of all under the name of the Brook Farm Phalanx, and center of the whole Association movement in the United States. Other phalanxes were formed in Ohio (8), New York (6), Pennsylvania (6), Massachusetts (3, including Brook Farm), Illinois (3), New Jersey (2), Michigan (2), Wisconsin (2), Indiana (1), and Iowa (1).⁸ In April, 1844, the "first Annual Convention of the Friends of Association based upon the Truths of Social Science" was held in New York and resolved, among other things,⁹

that with a solemn sense of our responsibilities as advocates of the cause of Universal Unity, with an earnest desire to secure consistent cooperation among the Associations of the United States, and to prevent in the outset all possibility of those disunions among Associations, which waste the resources and paralyze the energies of existing Society, we hereby declare that, in our opinion, the time has arrived, when it becomes the imperative duty of the several Associations in our country, which are based upon the truths of Social Science as announced by Fourier, to take measures for the immediate formation of a Union of Associations.

⁴ *The Phalanx*, April 1, 1844. Reproduced in John R. Commons (Ed.), *Documentary History of American Industrial Society, VII. Labor Movement, 1840-1860* (1910), p. 245.

⁵ *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, IV: 99.

⁶ *Dictionary of American Biography*, III: 52-55.

⁷ *History of American Socialisms*, 1870, pp. 15-17.

⁸ These data are from Noyes, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁹ *The Phalanx*, Apr. 20, 1844, pp. 103-106. Reproduced by John R. Commons, *op. cit.* (1910), pp. 198-199.

These general conventions continued until 1850, but in the meanwhile the practical efforts of Associationists took on a different color. As Commons points out, Associationists turned increasingly to concrete reform measures such as those of the land reformers, of organized labor, and of political reformers, and by 1850 they no longer showed much interest in the continued integrity and unity of the American Union of Associationists.¹⁰

Causes of the Failure of the Colonies according to Noyes. All the experimental phalanxes were ultimately disbanded. The reasons assigned for their failures varied. Noyes, contrasting the success of the colonies based upon religious principles with the failure of those based upon socialistic principles, summarizes the reasons given by various men at the time for the failure of the latter, as follows:¹¹

Macdonald . . . "had imagined mankind better than they are." . . . Owen . . . "wanted honesty, and he got dishonesty; he wanted temperance, and instead he was continually troubled with the intemperate; he wanted cleanliness, and he found dirt." . . . The Yellow Spring Community . . . found . . . that "self-love was a spirit that would not be exorcised. Individual happiness was the law of nature, and it could not be obliterated." . . . The trustees of the Nashoba Community . . . acknowledge their conviction that such a system cannot succeed "without the members composing it are superior beings. That which produces in the world only common-place jealousies and every-day squabbles, is sufficient to destroy a Community." The spokesman of the Haverstraw Community . . . settles down into the . . . general complaint that they lacked "men and women of skillful industry, sober and honest, with a knowledge of themselves and a disposition to command and be commanded." . . . Warren found that the friction that spoiled his experiments was "the want of common honesty." . . . Ballou complained that "the timber he got together was not suitable for building a Community." . . . At the meetings that dissolved the Northampton Community, "some spoke of the want of that harmony and brotherly feeling, which were indispensable to success; others spoke of the unwillingness to make sacrifices on the part of some of the members; also of the lack of industry and the right appropriation of time." . . . The failure of the One Menthian Community is attributed to "ignorance and disagreements," and that of the Social Reform Unity to "lack of wisdom and general preparation." . . . There were rival leaders in the Ohio Phalanx, and their respective parties quarreled about constitutions till they got into a lawsuit which broke them up. The member who gave the account of this Association says: "The most important causes of failure were . . . the deficiency of wealth, wisdom and goodness." . . . Mr. Daniels, a gentleman who saw the whole progress

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

¹¹ John Humphrey Noyes, *History of American Socialisms* (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1870), pp. 646-651.

of the Wisconsin Phalanx, says that "the cause of its breaking up was speculation, the love of money and the want of love for Association." . . . The North American was evidently shattered by secessions, resulting partly from religious dissensions and partly from differences about business.

Almost without exception, it will be noted, some form of human depravity is given by these men as the main cause of the failure of the colonies. Noyes concludes, as "a fair induction from the facts" that the absence of religious principles to discipline human nature was the real cause of failure.¹²

A More Practical Explanation. Another reason for failure was offered by W. Chase and Stephen Bates,¹³ namely that

a correct practical social life cannot be laid down fully by a philosopher in his closet; it must grow up and be developed in actual forms, as working people combined, feel the wants of their situation, and as these wants suggest remedies. We do not mean to imply any reflection against the value of science and theory, and the aid of the researches of great and philosophic minds. Very far from it. But we mean that no theory or science can supply the want of experience; and in both theory and practical knowledge, the members of the Phalanx were deficient.

This statement is important also because it represents the type of orientation which marked the eclectic phase of Social Science, as we shall see in a later chapter.

Emerson had anticipated that these colonies, beginning with brilliant, devoted, and able men and women, would ultimately select for membership maladjusted individuals seeking to escape from reality. He declared,¹⁴

These new associations are composed of men and women of superior talents and sentiments; yet it may easily be questioned whether such a community will draw, except in its beginnings, the able and the good; whether those who have energy will not prefer their chance of superiority and power in the world, to the humble certainties of the association; whether such a retreat does not promise to become an asylum to those who have tried and failed, rather than a field to the strong; and whether the members will not necessarily be fractions of men, because each finds that he cannot enter it without some compromise.

No doubt all of these reasons played a part—friction of personalities, inexperience, impracticability, selection of members, and, of course also, loss of enthusiasm.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 655.

¹³ *Spirit of the Age*, December 8, 1849. Reproduced by John R. Commons, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

¹⁴ "New England Reformers," in *Essays*. 2nd series (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1893), p. 251.

Brisbane's Reaction to the Failure of the Colonies. This failure, however, instead of dampening Brisbane's enthusiasm for his Social Science, only convinced him that his propaganda had been too effective. With the waning of public interest he dropped his propagandistic activities for the time being. Some years later he wrote to *The Circular* that none of the colonies was really a practical trial of Fourier's system of social organization. "Now, instead of avoiding the mistakes which he warned his followers against making," said Brisbane, "not one of those Associations realized *a single one of the conditions* which he laid down. . . . In a word, no trial, and no approach to a trial of Fourier's theory has been made."¹⁵

Brisbane's Later Literary Activity. In 1876 Brisbane undertook to publish a "Sociological Series," whose purpose was "to bring before the attention of the Thinking Public the most valuable contribution to this great Science, and to explain in as popular a manner as practicable the fundamental principles on which it is based."¹⁶ The first issue in this projected series was a *General Introduction to Social Science*, containing an "Introduction to Fourier's Theory of Social Organization" by Brisbane and "Social Destinies" by Fourier. Brisbane presented a brief sketch of the history of Social Science, including the theories of Saint-Simon, Comte, Krause, Owen, and Spencer. All these, however, he declares, "are either the creations of individual minds or are based on a few laws fragmentarily developed."¹⁷ Only Fourier's theories are true and dependable deductions from the laws of nature. He asserts that as yet these theories are not only not understood, but they are radically misunderstood, and he proposes to make them clear.¹⁸

It is scarcely surprising that he had little success with this renewed attempt to popularize Fourier. By 1876 the mental atmosphere was no longer particularly congenial to ideas such as this.¹⁹ A public that had read Comte, Buckle, Mill, and Spencer would certainly never again return to Fourier. Brisbane's efforts in this direction were, therefore, foredoomed to failure. Yet there is something quite touching about his loyal devotion to the cause of Fourier's Social Science, his allegiance to it long after it had lost most of the prestige it had enjoyed earlier, his persistence in preaching it to a generation that was busy with other things and whose outlook and orienta-

¹⁵ Reproduced in John Humphrey Noyes, *op. cit.*, p. 660.

¹⁶ *General Introduction to Social Science* (1876), p. 1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. ii.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. iv.

¹⁹ See Ch. XXV for an account of the failure of an attempt to apply Fourieristic principles in practice in the eighteen-eighties in Sinaloa, Mexico,

tion were those of a new age. It is hard not to admire as well as to pity his faithful discipleship, even though the doctrine was, by 1876, an almost complete anachronism. With his death in 1890 practically all traces of the Associationist phase of Social Science disappeared from the American scene.

Other Associationist Leaders. There were other exponents of Fourier's Social Science, but they were of minor importance in comparison with Brisbane. Among these less important offerings to the cause of spreading the system were *A Popular View of the Doctrines of Charles Fourier* (1844), by Parke Godwin²⁰ and *Introduction to Social Science* (1856) by George Henry Calvert,²¹ both the works of journalists. Neither of these men showed the passionate devotion to the system that characterized Brisbane, nor was either as closely identified with the movement as he.

An Appraisal of the Associationist Movement. How, then, shall we interpret Associationist Social Science? What role shall we assign to it? If we look at it from the perspective of world history, Fourierism was one more link in the chain of events initiated by the French Enlightenment—a reaction against the traditional church doctrines and all they stood for with reference to human nature and the conduct and destiny of man. It was a child of the same movement that produced Deism, but it was more sentimental and experimental, especially in a social sense. It was a direct lineal descendent also of the optimism of Condorcet, of William Godwin, and of the earlier philosophic anarchists. It was one of the first blows sealing the coffin of the medieval theological world view. If we look at it from the

²⁰ Parke Godwin (1816–1904) was born in New Jersey, and graduated from Princeton in 1834. After reading law at Paterson he went to Louisville, where he was admitted to the bar and where he practiced law for a short while. Upon his return to New York he became associated with William Cullen Bryant, whose daughter he married in 1842. Through Bryant he became connected with the *New York Evening Post*, of which he was editor in chief from 1878 to 1881. He was also, along with C. S. Briggs and George William Curtis, an editor of *Putnam's Monthly Magazine*. He was among the first to lecture in favor of Associationism and, it will be recalled, he was one of the editors of *The Phalanx* and later of *The Harbinger*. His *Popular Views of the Doctrines of Charles Fourier*, as a matter of fact, was simply a reprint in book form of his articles in *The Phalanx*. See *Dictionary of American Biography*, VII: 51–52. Other works by Godwin include: *Democracy, Constructive and Pacific* (1844), *Hand Book of Universal Biography* (1852), the first volume of a *History of France* (1860), *Out of the Past* (1870), and *Commemorative Addresses* (1895).

²¹ George Henry Calvert (1803–1889) came from a Baltimore family. He studied at Harvard, 1819–1823, and after leaving Harvard went to England. Later he studied history and philosophy for more than a year at Göttingen, being one of the first of the long stream of Americans to study there. He visited Goethe at Weimar in 1825, saw Edinburgh in 1826, and returned to edit the *Baltimore American* from 1829 to 1836. He was essentially a poet, essayist, and literature, and his interest in Fourierism was merely incidental. It is doubtful if his little book exerted any marked influence on the movement as a whole. See *Dictionary of American Biography*, III: 429–430.

perspective of our own national history, we discover that it was but one of a score or more somewhat similar movements of its day, movements, as Commons has shown, for reforms great and small. We have already pointed out that this passion for reform—indeed we might almost call it a hysteria for reform—was one of the most characteristic features of that age, coming as a heritage from the French and English Enlightenments to close the long age of medieval obscurantism, and one of the two outstanding characteristics of Social Science as a whole. It would be too much to expect the movement to have been strictly logical and rational, or even to have been well informed in all of its details. It is significant in the light of its history and antecedents, that it meant and earnestly strove to be all of these better things and that it made use to the limit of its capacity of the knowledge available in its time for its pursuit of the ideal of scientific social control.

The Aims of Associationism. From one point of view Associationist Social Science was perhaps just another reform movement, in the class, let us say, with the movement for the diffusion of the use of bloomers or the Christian missionary movement. There have been those who have described it as such. But in another sense it was much broader and deeper in its scope and much more socialized and far-reaching in its aims than such fantastic movements as dress reform by wearing bloomers or such narrowly dogmatic propagandism as the attempt to establish Christian sectarianism throughout the world. It had about it an air and a purpose that approached the universal. It sought to renovate and enlighten the philosophy of mankind regarding itself, without merely propagating a neurotic conviction or the vested interests of a self-centered hierarchy. It aimed at a new theory of human nature and upon this new philosophy of personality it endeavored to build a new social order. That is the best that any just and philanthropic social reform movement can aim at or accomplish. If it fell short of its objectives in all of these respects, the failure was due more to the inadequacy of the knowledge and understanding of its leaders than to any lack of sincerity and consecration of purpose. In some respects it was amusing, perhaps even occasionally ridiculous, and we may wonder how some of the keenest literary lights of the time could have been drawn into its less dignified aspects. But it must be viewed in relation to its time, as well as in the light of more recent knowledge and criticism, in order to grasp its true import and lofty idealism. And in this connection we must not forget that it won the partial adherence at least of such intellects and devoted and dis-

interested servants of humanity as Nathaniel Hawthorne, George Ripley, George William Curtis, Horace Greeley, Margaret Fuller, B. F. Sanborn, S. G. Howe, Andrew D. White, and D. C. Gilman.

Appraisal by Noyes. John Humphrey Noyes, himself a reformist and utopist leader with a religious outlook, saw Fourierism and its great rival, Owenism, as analogous to and descended from earlier religious revivals. He said,²²

Since the war of 1812-15, the line of socialistic excitements lies parallel with the line of religious revivals. Each had its two great leaders, and its two epochs of enthusiasm. Nettleton and Finney were to Revivals, what Owen and Fourier were to Socialism. Nettleton prepared the way for Finney, though he was opposed to him, as Owen prepared the way for Fourier. The enthusiasm in both movements had the same progression. Nettleton's agitation, like Owen's, was moderate and somewhat local. Finney, like Fourier, swept the nation as with a tempest. The Revival periods were a little in advance of those of Socialism. . . . Thus the movements were to a certain extent alternate. Opposed as they were to each other theologically—one being a movement of Bible men, and the other of infidels and liberals—they could not be expected to hold public attention simultaneously. But looking at the whole period from the end of the war in 1815 to the end of Fourierism after 1846, and allowing Revivals a little precedence over Socialism, we find the two lines of excitement parallel, and their phenomena wonderfully similar.

The Transition from the Religious to the Secular in Social Thinking. If Noyes' viewpoint is correct, and there is no reason to doubt that it is, it illustrates a very interesting point. The vacillation of the American public between Calvinistic fundamentalism and liberal doctrines of social progress and reform at this period indicates that it was then in the throes of achieving a transition from theology to science in its social thinking. We have already pointed out that Social Science, as the Associationists conceived it, was simply the reverse shield of Calvinism, with a metaphysically determined Social Destiny of man—as conceived by Condorcet and the other French advocates of unlimited progress—substituted for predestination, and a benign view of human nature substituted for original sin. Associationist Social Science, occupied in the realm of social philosophy much the same position that natural theology assumed in the world of physical thought; that is, it was an attempt to show that social life was governed by divine laws which, if obeyed, brought social health and happiness to man. It gave lip service to science, just as natural theology did, but at the same

²² *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

time it remained essentially a religious, indeed even a theological, system of thought. Its whole frame of reference, as well as the emotions it evoked, were religious in character.

Men could not be expected all at once to re-orient themselves completely from theology and metaphysics to science. They could accept the idea of social laws—always at this date by analogy with physical and astronomical laws—but they could not yet divorce these laws from divinity. Associationist Social Science allowed theologically trained but liberally inclined men to make without shock at least a verbal transition to a scientific view of society. It accustomed men to think in terms of science and yet allowed them to retain a belief in Providence. The complete transition from theology to science was not made until late in the century. But a beginning was being achieved in the eighteen-forties. Associationist Social Science was one of the first steps in that transition. That the transfer of thought was not easy for men with a long tradition of Calvinism behind them is illustrated by the see-sawing back and forth of the public mind between religious revivals and movements like Owenism and Fourierism throughout this period, as methods of reforming society through the regeneration of the individual and through reorganizing social relationships, alternately applied.

Critical Appraisal of Viewpoint. This is a comparison which, because of the close functional similarity of the two types of reform, deserves more attention than we can give to it at this point. The revival movement was essentially subjective and aimed at the production of a better world through the transformation of individual personalities. This transformation, furthermore, was to be achieved through a mystical cataclysmic conversion and an acceptance by the individual of a divine personality as guide and mediator, a distant ruler who kept his hand closely on the affairs of the universe as a whole, of which man's social affairs were a part. The Associationist Social Science movement was also in large part subjective in its outlook, and especially in its emphasis upon a fixed but benevolent human nature in place of the old Hebraic conception of an evil or sinful human nature. But it repudiated a mystical and a magical method of attaining social reform and reconstruction through personal identification with a divine and absent personality. It was, instead, thoroughly objective in its emphasis upon the importance of social organization and legislation. Its greatest weakness and its most subjective emphasis was apparent in its dogma that a free exercise of man's native impulses or passions would in itself consti-

tute a sufficient method of achieving social reform. In this respect it was in the same category with the Christian revivalists, and perhaps less sound than they; for they at least recognized, as the Associationists did not, that native (as distinguished from cultivated or acculturated) human nature cannot be depended upon to reform the world. If the Christians made the error of supposing that human nature is reformed and educated by a process of mystical identification with divinity or by means of magic, the Associationists would seem to lay themselves open to the charge (as indeed did the anarchists) that they thought there was no need of any sort of transformation of human nature at all in order to produce a better social world.

Theory versus Practice. But as a matter of fact, neither the orthodox Christians nor the Associationists were as stupid and as poor theoreticians as they made themselves out to be. However much the orthodox Christians might in theory and in ritualistic practice cling to the doctrine of magical or mystical conversion as a means of personal and social regeneration, they as a matter of fact made copious use of secular education of the young on the one hand and of social legislation and of administrative reform on the other hand. Only a few orthodox fundamentalists still pretend to disregard the value of any of these objective social devices. Just as little did the Associationists depend exclusively upon the native goodness of their human natures. We have already seen to what an extent and in what detail they laid emphasis upon the importance of education in order to transform and perfect their "perfect" human nature. Their weakest point was in their failure to develop an adequate theory of legislative and administrative reform. The theories of human nature of both the orthodox Christians and the Associationists were mystical and theological rather than realistic and experimental, but their practice was in each case ahead of their theories. The main function of these theories was to defend myths which had become endeared to their devotees through tradition and propaganda; they had little to do with the personal ends of happiness and the social objectives of collective welfare which they were reputed to serve. These objectives were to be secured, if at all, by methods much more realistic and scientific than those yet advanced by either of these movements. The Associationist movement had the advantage at least of having adopted the *name* of science, although it did not achieve the reality of science. The orthodox Christians had not yet achieved either in their theoretical outlook.

PART THREE

The Influence of Comte upon American
Social Science

Early Infiltration of Comtean Social Science into the United States

Associationism Compared with Positivism. Associationist Social Science, as we have indicated, is to be considered as a science merely by courtesy, that is, because its sponsors made a verbal appeal to science as their sanction. It would not have been possible for the Associationists to claim the status of a Social Science if they had understood the real meaning of science. Indeed, the general adoration of science which, among other significations attributed to it, as we saw in an earlier chapter, made science merely one more item of evidence in support of Christianity, was possible only because men had not as yet understood its true nature as meticulous objective method and carefully verified knowledge. It remained for another Frenchman—quite different from Fourier in his intellectual outlook and methodological approach—to restate and to elaborate Bacon's theory of science, to illustrate it, and to apply it to social facts. This other Frenchman, a far greater man than Fourier, and in a very large sense the interpreter, consolidator, and salvager of the best contributions of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment, to which he made distinguished contributions of his own, was Auguste Comte (1798–1857). Comte's statement of the theory of science was a tremendous intellectual bomb cast into the midst of the current of contemporaneous thought, and for a century this problem of scientific method was—through Mill, Spencer, Flint, Mach, Poincaré, Durkheim, and many others—to remain one of the chief problems of philosophy. The detonating effect of Comte's Positivist method in Europe had scarcely had its full effect before it began to extend to America. Let us turn, then, to an examination of the influence of this man's thought upon the Social Science movement in the United States. The present chapter will be devoted to the early reactions to the Comtean method and contentions.

Extent of the Comtean Influence in the United States. There exists an apparent misunderstanding as to the nature and extent of the Comtean influence in North American thought. Thus Parrington explains the fact

that Comte made so little impression on New England as due to the current influence of Transcendentalism and the general unripeness of the country for Positivism.¹ Woodbridge Riley, on the other hand, credits the Comtean system, which he considers the third great wave of French philosophic thought in this country—the first two being the negativism of the Revolution and the eclecticism of Victor Cousin—with having performed a signal service in clearing up the metaphysical fog left by the Transcendentalists.² Even this interpretation, true as it unquestionably is, is, however, very much of an understatement. The Comtean influence in the United States was marked not only in this negative manner, but positively as well. It could not but be so. No one of even moderate intelligence could read the *Positive Philosophy* and not be profoundly influenced by the stupendous intellect of the man who conceived it. Comte was a powerful experience—positively or negatively—to everyone who read him. He was likewise a powerful experience in the history of American thought.

The real function which Comte performed in the history of American thought was that of preparing the way for and, indeed, actually initiating the age of the domination of the scientific world view. It is universally conceded that one of the most characteristic traits of the present day is its faith in science. The scientific way of looking at the world is in fact the most distinguishing mark of the modern "climate of opinion."³ And it was to Comte perhaps more than to any other single individual that this transformation in world view was due.

The Conception of Science before Comte. Lest this statement appear to be an exaggeration of Comtean influence let us examine the situation in some detail. We have already commented on the adoration of science which characterized the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yet when we examine the science which was thus worshipped we find that it is, after all, not the science which we know today, but simply another "wonder-working Providence," basically not so different from that celebrated in the writings of Increase and Cotton Mather. Condorcet's conviction, in spite of his excellent grasp of scientific method, that science might some day abolish death, or Fourier's that it might transform the ocean into lemonade,

¹ Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, III. *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America, 1860-1920* (1930), p. 197.

² Woodbridge Riley, *American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism and Beyond* (2d. ed., 1923), pp. 297-408.

³ See Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (1932), Ch. I.

are evidences that science was, even to scientists themselves, really but a new kind of magic. The nineteenth century anti-Malthusian conviction that science could increase the food supply indefinitely and without limit and at the same time leave enough room for a constantly expanding population is another such evidence of the misconception of the true nature and limitations of science. To this very day, the man-on-the-street looks upon science as a form of super-magic, as a glance at any Sunday newspaper magazine section, or even the ordinary advertisements, will testify.

As a matter of fact, the eighteenth century, in spite of its tremendous brilliance and *éclat*, was, after all, not entirely free from the theological and metaphysical preconceptions of the Middle Ages. In a very charming and delightful little book,⁴ Carl Becker takes this very statement for his thesis and shows that what the Philosophers did was essentially to revamp the old Christian system with more modern materials. The faith that had once gone unquestioningly to God went now to science.

Before Comte, science was looked upon by theologians as simply a handmaiden to natural religion.⁵ They had believed in both science and God. Comte forced the issue with them. They must choose one or the other. They could not claim both. He demonstrated with a deadly array of erudition the fundamental inconsistency of theology and science. He said in so many words that theology, metaphysics, and science were mutually antithetical, incongruous, incompatible. He proclaimed the basic cleavage between theology and science. And theology, which had claimed science as simply one more evidence of Christianity, was put on the defensive. The old aggressive theological attitude which had so long ruled, accustomed to demolishing its opponents with vigorous assaults, began now to go into eclipse. Science was coming to be the true religion of men. It was Comte who restated the theory of science and transformed it from a substitute for Providence to a secular, indeed a human, creation.

Comte's Influence on the Nineteenth Century. Comte was, therefore, disconcerting. The theologians were uncertain exactly what to make of him. With atheists, infidels, and heretics they were familiar. They knew how to cope with such men. They had had time since the Eighteenth Cen-

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ For example: "Science herself is, we know, a religious teacher of important truth. . . ." Unsigned, "Peabody's Christian Consolations," *North American Review*, LXXII: 347 (Apr., 1851). Also: "Science and religion can be in accord only when, occupying aright their respective provinces, they have a hold in proportion to their relative importance in the human soul. But physical science must be the servant, and, in some sense, the expounder of religion. . . ." (*Ibid.*, p. 348).

tury Enlightenment to learn the shibboleths and catchwords of this school and to form arguments against them. But Comte was different. He was no atheist. In fact he detested atheists and the rebellious attitude of atheists as much as anyone. He did not deny God. He simply and literally ignored him. This doctrine of nescience, or agnosticism as it came to be called in later years, was incomprehensible.

In brief, everything about Comte's system was challenging. Almost everything in it was a bombshell cast in the midst of the old intellectual worlds of theology and metaphysics. And it was all doubly shocking to the American mind because of the powerful theological tradition in American thought and because of the almost anarchical individualism which was so characteristic of the country and which was the target for some of Comte's most telling thrusts. It was a terrible shock, for example, to the natural theologians who had learned and taught, especially from Butler's *Analogy*, and from the succession of imitations which followed it, that natural laws were evidences of design in nature and therefore of a Great Designer, to find a man of Comte's erudition—a man who undoubtedly knew more science than they ever would or could know—announce that all we could ever know was the co-existence and sequence of phenomena.⁶ The same facts which natural theology had so long proclaimed as the surest evidences of Christianity were to Comte simply natural laws. All this was inconceivable to the theologians. One of them expresses his surprise in the passage that follows.⁷

Utterly perplexed and embarrassed at finding such a mind as Comte's preferring to consider every subject as *if there were no God*, and even engaged in special pleading here and there to refute the ideas which connect themselves with the belief in a Deity (for which he considers that the idea of Humanity is a more than ample substitute), we can only think that there is perhaps something hopelessly at fault in the statement of the question,—possibly, in every statement of it that can be made by the human mind. What interests us, therefore, is not to answer set arguments, for of these he offers none; but to

⁶ "We are sorry to be obliged to notice, in this connection," says one very fair critic, "the weakness and futility of the direct attempts of M. Comte to assail the religious admiration with which unsophisticated men regard the adaptations of the outward world, and the provisions of natural life. Thus he is at pains to disparage the arrangement of the solar system, apparently for no reason at all. So also he assures us that the functions of the eye, the bladder, and the motive apparatus are not quite what they should be; and again, that artificial works are in their way decidedly better than the natural. . . ." J. H. Allen, "*Comte's Positive Philosophy*," *Christian Examiner*, L (4th series, XV, Mar., 1851), p. 198, footnote.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

conjecture, if we can, what the state of mind may be which chooses negation before belief.

Again, in discussing Comte's analysis of social laws, another writer says: "The unfolding of these social laws, pertaining to the individual, the family, the community and the state, is admirably done, although we repeatedly pause in wonder that a man of such *sagacity* and far-reaching discernment could have been blind to the divinity enstamped upon each pillar and fragment of that social system which he so clearly develops."⁸ But it was not only Comte's insistence that we could know only phenomena and their laws that was challenging. His radical behaviorism also, which even Mill could not stomach, was—and remains to this day—an intellectual bombshell to the theologically and animistically inclined. His law of three stages was, as we might expect, often misunderstood and practically always denied.

In a certain sense Comte may be called the initiator of the nineteenth century. All the men who preceded him—Condorcet, Fourier, and even Saint-Simon—belonged essentially to the eighteenth century. But it was through Comte that the eighteenth century currents of thought became precipitated and projected into the nineteenth century. Almost everything that we think of as distinctively of the nineteenth century in thought may be said to stem from or through Comte. He was perhaps the first great thinker of the nineteenth century. It was the *Positive Philosophy* which paved the way in this country for the later acceptance of the British school of scientists. Indeed, Spencer, Buckle, and even Darwin, were first looked upon as Comtean disciples;⁹ and this view is not so far wrong, despite Spencer's vehement denial and Huxley's no less heated repudiation of the Comtean system.¹⁰

The Periods of Comtean Influence. The whole epoch of Comtean influence in this country and elsewhere may itself be subdivided into a number of rather well defined constituent periods. The first of these might be called the era both of neglect and of enthusiasm, that is, of neglect by the majority and of enthusiasm by scattered individuals; but it was a period also of incomplete understanding of the meaning of the system. It was dominated by Mill's interpretation of Comte as presented in his *System of Logic*

⁸ Unsigned, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, VI: 320-321 (Sept., 1857).

⁹ The evidence for this statement will be presented later.

¹⁰ See Chas. A. Ellwood, *History of Social Philosophy* (1938), pp. 441, 445, 465.

(1843). The second period in the United States began with the publication of Miss Martineau's translation of Comte (1853). By this time the real meaning of the positive philosophy was becoming clear. In this period Comtean influence was at its height. Admiration, attack, criticism, praise, violent repudiation and equally violent espousal, filled the intellectual and emotional atmosphere as the parties in the memorable battle of science and theology began to line up their forces. The third period, beginning in the late eighteen-sixties and earlier eighteen-seventies, is characterized by the eclipse of Comte himself and the substitution of his so-called disciples—Buckle, Spencer, Darwin—as targets of attack and as foci of discussion. The publication of the *Politique Positive* (1851-1854) had by this time alienated many of the earlier admirers of Comte. They felt apologetic and defensive with regard to his later teachings. By the eighteen-eighties, Comte's eclipse was almost complete and Spencer's rule was relatively supreme.

Early Neglect of Comte. Comte, it will be recalled, had begun to publish his monumental *Philosophie Positive* in 1830. Twelve years later, in 1842, the sixth and final volume appeared. In the meantime the recognition given him by the intellectual world was so meager that Comte in the preface to the last volume commented upon it and attempted to explain it.¹¹ Theologians would naturally oppose his philosophy, he says, and they are right, from the point of view of their interests, in so doing. Metaphysicians ignore it because they recognize its superiority to their own systems. The scientists reject it because of petty personal jealousies. Miss Martineau, in the preface of her English translation of the *Philosophie Positive*, also commented on the hatred of the theological world toward the new system.¹² George Frederick Holmes, in a series of articles which we shall have occasion to refer to again, points out as late as 1852 that ¹³

twelve long years elapsed during the slow publication of the successive volumes of M. Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, and nearly ten more have passed away since it was submitted in its complete form to the tribunal of public opinion. The writings of Mr. Lewes, M. Littré, and M. Pinel, and also those of Professor Whewell and Mr. Mill, forbid our supposing that M. Comte's views have been wholly without influence; yet during the whole period of these twenty-one years, in which this system of Positive Philosophy has obtained its legal majority, it has been but twice noticed, as far as we are aware,

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. xvii-xxix.

¹² *Loc. cit.*, p. xiii.

¹³ George Frederick Holmes, "Faith and Science—Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, 1852), p. 9.

in the periodical criticism of Europe,¹⁴ and never in that of America;¹⁵ and even the name of its illustrious author would have remained a *nomen ignotum* to the large majority of the literary world, but for a cursory and unsatisfactory critique upon the work in Mr. Morell's *Philosophy of the 19th Century*, and a less meagre but scarcely more adequate examination of his doctrines in Mr. Blakey's *History of the Philosophy of Mind*. From these scanty sources, but especially from Mr. Morell's very limited and borrowed criticism, have been derived the few passing observations upon M. Comte's philosophy, which have been occasionally hazarded in the ephemeral publications of the day.

Now, however, continues the author, he is anxious "*pro virile parte*, to atone for the neglect with which M. Comte's labours have been hitherto visited." ¹⁶ The period of appreciation was being ushered in.

The Conflict with Theology. How should we account for this neglect of Comte? An American, writing in 1854, explains it as due to two main reasons, namely, in the first place, that scientific men were indisposed to enter into large or general views, that is, that they distrusted theorizers, and secondly ¹⁷

that the reigning science could not, in consistency with its own principles, deny the validity of his method, while to admit his conclusions, was to fly directly into the face of the reigning theology. Thus there was a double allegiance to be maintained; one of consistency, and the other of respectability; and we can readily understand why it was thought best, in the dilemma, to say as little as need be about Comte's inferences, lest the secret sympathy of science should be exposed by a futile attempt to condemn them, or lest, on the other hand, the frowns of the Church should be incurred by an open proclamation of revolt. In other words, Comte, had been more faithful to the spirit and method of modern science, as it is generally conceived by scientific men, than they had dared to be themselves, because of their theological timidity. His conclusions were the logical outgrowth of their premises; but while they persistently held to the premises, they cautiously avoided the conclusions.

In other words, they wished to retain the sanctions both of theology and of science—as Associationists, for example, so blithely and unreflectingly

¹⁴ These reviews, the author specifies in a footnote, are Sir David Brewster's in the *Edinburgh Review* for July, 1838, and Prof. Emile Saisset's in the *Revue des deux Mondes*. He points out that Comte himself comments on this "*strange silence*" in his work, Tome VI, page xxi.

¹⁵ "Since this was written," explains the author in a footnote, "an excellent article on the subject has appeared in a contemporary journal," but he does not specify which of the many articles that now began to appear he is referring to.

¹⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 10.

¹⁷ Unsigned, "Comte's Philosophy," *Putnam's Monthly Magazine*, III: 622-623 (June, 1854).

did—but since they were not as naive about science as the Associationists were, they had more conflicts about it and therefore evaded the issue entirely. Comte, who forced the issue, was therefore unpalatable to the scientists. The author continues: “A determination between Science and Faith was laid upon them, but inasmuch as they could relinquish neither, nor reconcile the two, they found discretion the better sort of valor. They retired from the field rather than join battle, and then satisfied their consciences in respect to theology, by perpetual bowings, grimacings, and scrapings, in token of a fellowship they could not justify.”¹⁸

The ability of theology to intimidate men of science may strike us as astounding, yet we must remember that theology had queened it over men’s thoughts too many centuries not to have gained an authoritative technique in controlling their minds, and that she was by no means ready to give up and surrender meekly to the assaults of a rebellious science. Theology intended, of course, to retain science as one of her own bulwarks. If upstart thinkers like Comte were going to try to wrest it away from her, the best policy to pursue was just to ignore them. Scientists were still her servants.

Other Causes of Neglect of Comte. There were other reasons also why Comte was ignored, continues this writer.¹⁹

Subordinate to this conscious impotence and cowardice of Science, were other more superficial causes which contributed to the general unmindfulness of Comte’s claims. Men of science, regarding his scheme as only another treatise of method, supposed that nothing could be added to the achievements, in that respect, of Bacon, Descartes, Sir John Herschell, and Whewell. . . . Accordingly, they went on with the study of their specialities. Philosophers proper, on the other hand, finding in Comte none of their usual symbols,—none of the customary hair-splitting and thimble-rig about the pure reason, and the categories, and the genesis of the idea of the absolute, into which philosophy has degenerated, retired from it in derision to their void inane. Thus, physicists and metaphysicists were alike disdainful.

Still another cause of the slow acceptance of Comte lay in the very magnitude of his pretensions. As Lewes points out, “a scheme so gigantic might, indeed, have originated in a colossal vanity unimpeded in its pretensions by any definite knowledge of what the scheme implied; for the ignorant are often seduced by their ignorance into pretensions which a little knowl-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

edge would repress." ²⁰ That this factor of distrust was operating as a bar to the frank and ready reception of Comte's ideas is evidenced by the reactions of one writer who tells us his own experiences when he first saw Comte's work. He says, "It is some ten or twelve years since entering the bookstore of Wiley & Putnam, in Broadway, we took from the shelves four large and dingy volumes, printed in French, and bound with coarse, rose-colored paper, purporting to be a treatise on the entire circle of the sciences. The first page we opened upon contained a statement of the imperfections of analytical geometry, and we said, 'Here is a conceited fellow, who believes himself capable of reforming the mathematics.'" ²¹

Ignorance and Malice as Causes. In this particular case the adverse opinion was immediately reversed upon further reading, but with many men, incapable of understanding Comte's erudition and remarkable scientific competence, an unfavorable opinion persisted. We find as a consequence, numerous references to Comte's arrogance, his conceit, his superciliousness, his dogmatism, and the like. For example, Francis Bowen, the professor of moral philosophy and political economy in Harvard College, declared that "for dogmatism and conceit, M. Comte is unrivalled by any philosophical writer we have ever read, with perhaps the single exception of Hobbes." ²² Bowen prophesied quick oblivion for Comte. ²³ Even the great Bancroft, who had enjoyed an excellent German education and was familiar with the master philosophers of that country, had no word of welcome for this greatest of philosophers of the nineteenth century. He says, ²⁴

Here we are met . . . by an afterbirth of the materialism of the last century. A system which professes to reconstruct society on the simple observation of the laws of the visible universe, and which is presented with arrogant pretension under the name of the "Positive Philosophy," scoffs at all questions of metaphysics and religious faith as insoluble and unworthy of human attention: and affects to raise the banner of an affirming belief in the very moment that it describes its main characteristic as a refusal to recognize the infinite. How those who own no source of knowledge but the senses, can escape its humiliating yoke, I leave them to discover.

²⁰ George Henry Lewes, *The History of Philosophy* (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1871), II: 66.

²¹ Unsigned, "Comte's Philosophy," *Putnam's Monthly Magazine*, III: 621 (June, 1854).

²² "Martineau's Translation of Comte's Philosophy," *North American Review*, LXXIX: 207 (July, 1854).

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

²⁴ George Bancroft, *Literary and Historical Miscellanies* (1855), p. 505.

Calvin Blanchard, an erratic but enthusiastic Comtean, who reprinted Martineau's abridged translation of the *Philosophie Positive*, had a unique explanation for the neglect of Comte.²⁵

The clergy are at length aware that the slander and abuse which they have bellowed forth from the pulpit against Paine, have advertised his works more effectually than ten per cent of their own salaries could have done through the newspapers; and hence the profound silence which they maintain with respect to the personality of Comte, and to the name of "The Positive Philosophy." Priests know that the world's old religion is dead; but they mean to prolong its decay to the utmost, in order to feed, like carrion crows, on its rotten carcass; they therefore take every precaution against having it stirred up.

Whatever the reason for the neglect—whether distrust of the theoretical conclusions, the fears entertained by the theologians, unfamiliarity with the problems involved or with the methods employed in their solution, suspicion of the author's pretensions or of his intentions, or a deliberate conspiracy of silence and boycott—it was undoubtedly true that the *Philosophie Positive* was in this country as in Europe a long time in achieving the recognition due it for its great contribution to human thought.

The Influence of Martineau and Mill. In addition to the original French edition, and the works noted by George Frederick Holmes, the main channel through which Comtean influence poured into this country was Miss Martineau's translation of the *Philosophie Positive*, in 1853. It is probable, however, that Holmes underestimated the influence of Mill's *System of Logic* and Lewes' works on Comte as propagators of the Comtean system.

Of Mill's *Logic*, indeed, Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater wrote:²⁶

This is no ordinary book. False or true, pernicious or salutary, for better or for worse, it is, like the great work of Comte, to which it is auxiliary, of an order of which no single generation produces more than one. Indeed, while a rapid succession of treatises, from different hands, on *Logic* as a whole, or on some of its controverted questions, has appeared, since the memorable work of Whately, which, by universal consent, has done more than all else to restore this branch to its proper place in education, the whole put together do not, in our opinion, contain as much clear, close, and deep thinking, as the work under consideration. . . . Having thus shown that we are neither unable nor indisposed to do justice to the ability of the work, we hope it will appear that it is in no captious or narrow spirit that we find ourselves constrained to condemn some of its leading and characteristic doctrines. If these should be found

²⁵ Calvin Blanchard, *The Life of Thomas Paine* (1860), pp. 92-93.

²⁶ Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater, "The Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, XXVIII: 78-79 (Jan., 1856).

to brand it with the stamp of Positivism, as we have before hinted, this is the fault not of us, but of the book itself. We find, however, that we are not alone, nor the first in attributing this character to the book. This is freely done, as if it were a matter of course, by Christian apologists, who find themselves under the necessity of combatting its principles. While we rejoice in whatever truths the book contains, this pleasure is more than neutralized by the monstrous system of error into the support of which these truths are impressed.

The "monstrous system of error" was, of course, the system of Positivism. Logic, continues this author, has been assigned various subject matters by Watts, Whately, and Hamilton, "but under no stretch of meaning, which the word has hitherto borne, had we a right to look for what amounts to an ingenious plea for the Positive Philosophy, under the title of Logic."²⁷ The whole book, says the indignant reviewer, is simply a carefully planned introduction to the climax, which is an elaborate article on Sociology.²⁸

When the drift and aim of a book is to prepare the mind for such a doctrine as this [Comte's law of progress]: to attract the student towards the great work of which it is the beginning, middle, and end; to train his modes of thinking so that he shall meet the bold and persistent avowal of this doctrine, without that instinctive recoil which to unsophisticated minds would be inevitable; is it quite fair to give him to understand that he is studying Logic, and nothing but what properly belongs to it, till the fell work has been accomplished? Had the title of the work been "The Logic of the Positive Philosophy," or "A System of Logic, being an Introduction to the Study of Positive Philosophy, by M. Comte," it would have been a true description of its real character and purpose.

Thus, although Comte's work was itself not widely known directly in this country, Mill's *Logic* had at least prepared the way for its reception in translation, when Miss Martineau's translation finally appeared.²⁹

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ In 1851, Joseph H. Allen pointed out that Comte's *Philosophie Positive* was "more frequently commented on and alluded to than generally read or understood." See "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Christian Examiner*, L (new series, XV, Mar., 1851), p. 174. He also said that "the best general view of M. Comte's style of thinking is to be got from . . . John Stuart Mill" (*Ibid.*, pp. 174-75). An interesting illustration of Allen's point that Comte was more cited than actually read is the case of Theodore Parker. In *The Dial* for 1842, Parker said: "One of the most thorough Baconians of the present day, as we understand it, is M. Comte, the author of the course of positive philosophy just published at Paris; and it is curious to see the results he has reached, namely materialism in psychology, selfishness in ethics, and atheism in theology." (Present citation is from Centenary Edition of Parker's *Works*, IV: 173). George Willis Cooke, commenting on this statement says: "This cannot be accepted as a just estimate of Comte's philosophy. He was positivist, not a materialist. His ethical system emphasized humanitarianism, not selfishness. It is probable Parker was not familiar with Comte's writings" (*Ibid.*, p. 455). As a matter of fact, according to Thomas

The Influence of G. H. Lewes. In addition to Mill's *Logic* and Martineau's translation of the *Philosophie Positive*, a third source of indirect Comtean influence was Lewes' *Biographical History of Philosophy*, originally published in 1846. Lewes was an enthusiastic disciple of Comte and his history of philosophy was really a great Positivist tract. Of this work one of the teachers of philosophy in an American college said,³⁰

Mr. Lewes' work may perhaps be regarded as a formal announcement of the permanent domiciliation of the Positive Philosophy of M. Comte in the Anglo-Saxon mind; and it aims at nothing less than a demonstration of the impossibility of metaphysics, as the preparatory step to the inauguration of the new system. . . . M. Comte, the great author of Positivism, wisely ignored the question of the validity of sensational knowledge. . . . Positivism, as interpreted by Mr. Lewes, is essentially the same that it was in the hands of its author.

In a much more bitter and sarcastic attack upon Lewes and his point of view, two other authors state an even less favorable opinion of his support of Comte in his attack upon the pre-Positivistic methods, as follows: "We find Scepticism again appearing in the system of M. Comte, whose labors have been seconded by J. Stuart Mill and Henry Buckle in England. To show that this is a correct statement, we will refer to the *Biographical History of Philosophy*, by George Henry Lewes, a late English writer, who has undertaken to write the *obituary* of Philosophy, and to introduce us to a substitute in Atheism, as illustrated in the works of Auguste Comte." ³¹

The American Reaction. Nott and Gliddon, apparently, were entirely indebted to Lewes for their knowledge of Comte,³² and at least one reviewer took them to task for their source, indicating that if they had gone straight to the original instead of taking Lewes' biased view, they would have been less complacent in their Positivism.³³

Wentworth Higginson, "It is interesting, as a proof of his promptness and activity as a student, to see that he owned, in 1837, Comte's *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, which was originally published in 1830-1842, and attracted so little attention that it is said not to have been noticed in any leading review until 1846. *But there are no notes in his copy.*" (*Ibid.*, XV: 8-9). (Italics by present authors).

³⁰ Oliver S. Munsell, "Lewes's *Biographical History of Philosophy*," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XLI (4th series, XI, Oct., 1859), pp. 513-526.

³¹ Ephraim Langdon Frothingham and A. L. Frothingham, *Philosophy as Absolute Science* (1864), p. 73.

³² *Types of Mankind* (1854), p. 576, footnote. The reference here is to the *Biographical History of Philosophy*, where "the substance of our remarks may be found."

³³ Unsigned, "The Human Family," *Southern Quarterly Review*, XI: 124-126 (Jan., 1855).

Nor are these the only reasons for distrusting the processes and conclusions of "Types of Mankind," more especially of its latter portion. Discipleship is there avowed, of the phenomenal atheistic philosophy of Comte, known as *positivism*. . . . And it is perhaps but justice to both Dr. Nott and Mr. Gliddon, to admit that they have not fully considered the relation between their theory and the atheistic philosophy to which they have committed themselves. This is the less unlikely, from the indications afforded by Mr. Gliddon, that his acquaintance with Comte's system is derived mainly from the meagre and partial synopsis contained in G. H. Lewes' "Biographical History of Philosophy." That is the only exposition of positivism which he quotes. And, if fully aware of the position he was assuming, he could hardly have ranged himself so complacently among those, whom a thoroughly informed reviewer characterizes so justly "as a cohort of narrow-minded enthusiasts and half-believing admirers, who, on the authority of Mill and Lewes, are taking the atheistic positivism as their creed, while it is unnoticed or despised by the profoundest minds of the age."³⁴

The reaction of American thinkers to the works of Comte, Mill, Lewes, Buckle, Spencer, and their imitators and disciples, constituted the heart of the theoretical phase of the Social Science movement in the United States. The curve of direct Comtean influence, beginning in 1840, reached a peak in the fifties and sixties and began thereafter to decline. It was succeeded by the tremendous influence of Spencer which had begun in 1850 with the publication of his *Social Statics*, and had been stimulated greatly by Youmans' *Popular Science Monthly*, established in 1872, largely to spread Spencer's ideas in the United States; and it did not wane until the beginning of the present century.

Causes of the Obscuration of Comte. If Comte's influence really was as great as we have here indicated, how can we account for its gross underestimation, even by such penetrating historians of American thought as Parrington and Riley, among others? The reasons are many. In the first place, the Comtean influence, as men of that period recognized, was indirect and subtle. The indirect nature of Comtean influence was frequently commented upon by contemporary observers. For example, Oliver S. Munsell, in discussing the deep and lasting impression which the Positive Philosophy was destined to leave adds that it will not be effected "by its direct influence: for we deem the probabilities of its general acceptance, in this or any other country, as the one true, universal and exclusive philosophy, to be very slight indeed. But in its indirect, silent and unconscious influence, it must operate powerfully upon the development of thought and science in

³⁴ The author refers in a footnote to the *North British Review* for May, 1854.

the minds of men, who would reject with abhorrence the system itself, were it presented to them in all its details."³⁵

As predicted, this influence acted not on the masses of men directly, but indirectly, through the leaders of thought. Nor did Comte's work change mature men set in their theologies, the men, that is, of the eighteen-fifties. But the reading of Comte could—and did—prevent a new generation from hardening into the old theological mould. The young men who read Comte in the eighteen-fifties and the eighteen-sixties could never again fully accept the old theological world view.

Again, the first introduction to Comte came at a time when slavery, the Civil War, and their concomitant excitements, occupied the minds of men so that abstract and detached subjects, like Positivism, were temporarily eclipsed. Then, too, Spencer and Mill had a more direct influence because they were much more concrete than Comte, and therefore more congenial to the American mind. They were less radical; they made less of a clean sweep of the old idols. Spencer's Unknowable could, after all, be appropriated even by the theologian as another name for his old familiar concept of the Deity. Both Mill and Spencer also made room for mental science, or psychology, which Comte's thorough-going behaviorism denied altogether, but which Calvinistically oriented minds found indispensable. In short, the British scientists tempered the intellectual wind of science to the shorn lamb of theology and consequently American thinkers turned to them from the, to them, chill doctrines of Comte.

Even personality factors must be taken into consideration in considering the obscuration of Comte. Comte's personality and his later mysticism alienated many people, including Mill, whose disaffection, if not repudiation, influenced many Americans against Comte; for Mill's prestige in this country was tremendous. For these reasons the influence of Comte in the United States is difficult to trace. In spite of all this, however, it cannot be too strongly affirmed that it was Comte who first prepared the American mind to go to school to Spencer and the later British scientists. It is doubtful whether, if Comte had not whetted the intellectual appetite of Americans when he did, they would have devoured so avidly the Spencerian feast.

But if modern writers have been misled as to the true influence of Comte by the more brilliant spectacle of Spencer, contemporary writers were un-

³⁵ "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church, South*, XI: 321 (July, 1857). See also later citations in this volume.

der no such handicap and we may see in their words the tremendous ferment which Comte created. Even the assertions of these who insisted that the Comtean system was too repugnant to "human instincts" ever to gain a footing; or of those who, like Francis Bowen of Harvard—who, incidentally, managed to be wrong about almost every important nineteenth century intellectual issue—predicted immediate oblivion to the system; or of those who declared the errors of the philosophy to be so transparent as to require no refutation—even these assertions sound too much like wishful thinking to be convincing. The general concensus seems to have been that, right or wrong, Comte was certainly important.

Rise and Decline of the Comtean Philosophy in the United States

First American Notice of Comte's Work. We can chart the course of Comtean influence, trace its rise and spread, in the words of contemporary observers, just as we can follow a boat race or a football game in the words of the radio announcer. The very first reference to Comte in this country appears, interestingly enough, in a Boston religious journal, the *New Jerusalem Magazine*, for June, 1840. And it is significant to note that the reference is made simply to refute Comte's theories as they were known up to that date; for of course the final volume of the *Philosophie Positive* had not appeared. "M. Comte, a French savant," says the author, who signs himself simply as N. F. C., "several years since published a course of lectures on what he calls 'Positive Philosophy.' Though received by the scientific world as, in the main, a work of uncommon ability," he continues, "it was disfigured with certain blemishes, which are the more repulsive, as the day for such avowals from any respectable quarter would seem to have gone by." ¹ The author is referring here, no doubt, to the days of Tom Paine and his school of atheists. Thus he continues, "For M. Comte, not content with a masterly grouping of the salient points of *ascertained* science, travels out of his road to profess himself an Atheist!" ² This complete and rather typical misunderstanding of Comte, it might be said, persisted for many years. His identification with the earlier deists, mis-called atheists, may be taken as an almost sure sign that those who so identified him had not read him at all but knew him only second hand. The above statement regarding Comte is prefatory to a reproduction of the article on Comte by Sir David Brewster in the *Edinburgh Review* of the previous year, mentioned by George Frederick Holmes in the excerpt presented in the preceding chapter. The article was reproduced in the *New Jerusalem*

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 368.

² *Ibid.*

Magazine for its "merited rebuke" of Comte and also "for its eloquent yet obvious refutation of M. Comte's inferences."³

Comments of Parker and Channing. Theodore Parker had purchased, as early as 1837, the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, but it is probable that he had not read it, at least with care.⁴ Richmond Laurin Hawkins points out that "marked passages and marginal notes in Theodore Parker's copy of the *Cours* (now in the Boston Public Library) show that Parker studied carefully only the fourth, fifth, and sixth volumes. Dates written by Parker in the volumes indicate that each was purchased shortly after publication."⁵ In 1842, writing in *The Dial*, Parker speaks of Comte, as has been noted in the preceding chapter, as "one of the most thorough Baconians of the present day."⁶ And just as the first reference to Comte in the United States emphasized his seeming atheism, so does this second one also.⁷

William Henry Channing, whose activities in connection with Associationist Social Science have already been commented upon, was also a student of Positivism, although not a disciple of Comte. In a letter to Frederic Harrison, May 18, 1879, he says, "You will observe that I became a student of Comte from about the publication of the first volume of his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. And as each of the volumes successively appeared it was eagerly read and earnestly discussed with my friends, Theodore Parker, George Ripley, and O. A. Brownson."⁸ Channing claimed to have studied all of Comte's works except the mathematical treatises.⁹ His pronouncement on Comte in 1843 was not, however, very appreciative, although it was characteristic of the first shocked reaction of the theologians to the new

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Centenary Edition of Parker's *Works*, XV: 8-9.

⁵ *Auguste Comte and the United States, 1816-1853* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1936), footnote p. 25. Reprinted by permission of the President and Fellows of Harvard College.

⁶ Centenary Edition of Parker's *Works*, IV: 173.

⁷ *Ibid.* In the final form of Parker's "A Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion," written originally in 1841, there are several footnote references to Comte, *viz.*: "One of the most remarkable atheists of the present day is M. Comte, author of the valuable and sometimes profound work *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. . . . He glories in the name [atheist], but in many places gives evidence of the religious element existing in him, in no small power" (*loc. cit.*, I: 21); "M. Comte takes a very different view of the matter [the religious element in primitive societies], and has both fact and philosophy against him" (*ibid.*, p. 26). There are other similar footnote references also, in the same vein, but since this is the 1855 edition of his work, it seems probable that these footnote references were inserted later than the first writing. This is especially probable because the original discourse was written before the final volume of Comte's work was published.

⁸ See Octavius Brooks Frothingham, *Memoir of William Henry Channing* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1886), p. 372.

⁹ *Ibid.*

system of thought. Writing in his magazine, *The Present*, he said, "M. Auguste Comte . . . speaks more with the dogmatic tone of the skeptic than with the spirit at once exact and expansive, reverent and poetic, of the true believer, which the true knower must always be."¹⁰

Comte Viewed as a Philosopher of History. The next reference to Comte appeared several months later.¹¹ In February, 1844, the *Eclectic Magazine*, edited by J. H. Agnew, reprinted from the *British and Foreign Review* an unsigned article on "The State of Historical Science in France," which is a review of the works of Thiérri, Hegel, Vico, Michelet, and Guizot. In the course of this article we come across the following statement of Comte's contribution:¹²

Could we suppose a science of character to exist, there would still be a science of history to construct; but we cannot suppose the one without the other, since they must verify and explain each other. It is to Auguste Comte that we hold the world indebted for the most valuable contributions yet made to both sciences, and it is in his works alone that we have seen the true historical method. We believe, indeed, that a science of history is still to make; but with a deep sense of gratitude we here record our conviction that the fundamental law of human evolution has been discovered by M. Comte, and that therefore the science is now rendered comparatively easy. History has had its Newton. The law of evolution . . . is of the same importance to the science of history, as the law of universal attraction was to the science of astronomy: it may not strike the reader at first, but continual meditation and verification by history will develop its significance. We need scarcely add, that it is indispensably necessary for every reader to study it in M. Comte's work, where alone he can find each portion satisfactorily illustrated. It may seem exaggerated to call a law of mental evolution a law of historical progress,—to take the speculative belief of men as typical of their state of progress in civilization, which includes so many elements besides that of intelligence; but such nevertheless is the truth. The influence of speculation is the main determining cause of the social progress. . . . The law of mental evolution being that of civilization, we are entitled to assume that M. Comte's discovery must form the basis of historical science; but inasmuch as astronomy was far from perfect even after Newton, so also will history remain for some time incomplete. A new investigation of historic record must take place, aided by M. Comte's law, and by the principles of ethology. . . .

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*, Nov., 1843. Reproduced in part in O. B. Frothingham's *Memoir of William Henry Channing*, p. 372; also in R. L. Hawkins, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

¹¹ In 1842, the Lowell Lectures of Professor Walker had touched on Comte's philosophy, but these, unfortunately, were not printed (J. H. Allen, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Christian Examiner*, L (new series, XV, Mar., 1851), p. 174.

¹² *Loc. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

Thus it may be seen that the first references to Comte were mainly reflections of foreign comments, either critical or highly laudatory of Comte. The first three, representing the theological viewpoint, emphasized the positivist and atheistic or sceptical aspects of Comte's system; the other, representing the secular, scholarly viewpoint, emphasized the historical aspect. None was necessarily based upon a thorough first hand examination of Comte's work itself.

J. S. Mill and Littré as Heralds of Comte. In the meanwhile, in 1843, Mill's great *System of Logic* had appeared. This book, it will be recalled, constituted the first great channel of Comtean influence in this country, the book which Atwater considered as simply an introduction to the positive system itself. But important as it was for the new methodology of Positivist philosophy, it did not find immediate recognition. John Brazer, reviewing this work in the *North American Review*, in October, 1845, comments on the lack of interest in the subject dealt with by the book and expresses a hope that it will receive more recognition in this country than it had obtained abroad. He continues: "We quietly take to ourselves some merit for calling attention to these volumes, since we suppose not one in a hundred of our readers has, or can be induced to have, the slightest interest in the subject which they treat."¹³

Of the section on induction, which was to become a storm center of scientific method, he says, "it is, in our opinion, altogether the most original, the most comprehensive, and the most methodical account of the great subject, that is extant in any language."¹⁴ And of the work as a whole, he says that it is "a most original, comprehensive, and thoroughly considered exposition of the subject which it treats, and one which will bear a favorable comparison with any similar product of the English mind, in any age."¹⁵ In spite of these merits, he continues, the book has not been adequately recognized abroad, but he hopes that it will meet with a better reception at home.¹⁶

Precisely the same sentiments are expressed by another reviewer who signs himself "O" in the *Methodist Quarterly Review* the following year. After analyzing the *System of Logic*, he comes¹⁷ to a consideration of

¹³ "Mill's System of Logic," *loc. cit.*, LXI: 349 (Oct., 1845).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 382.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ "Mill's Logic," *loc. cit.*, XXVIII (3d series, VI, July, 1846), pp. 357-358. The author of this review was apparently James O'Connell, whose work we shall discuss in a subsequent chapter.

the science of society, which Mr. Mill denominates sociology. This term . . . is borrowed from *M. Comte*; a philosopher to whom Mr. Mill (as he has himself repeatedly acknowledged) is indebted for *things* as well as terms, and whom we are happy to consider with our author to be—irreligion, of course, excepted—at once the most profound and practical of living thinkers of Europe. . . . We fondly regard the present publication [Mill's *Logic*] as destined, sooner or later, to have a most salutary effect upon the intellectual condition of our people.

That these gentlemen were not mistaken in their hopes and predictions is well borne out by the reaction of Atwater, quoted previously.

Comte's Significance Is Perceived. Other propagators of Comtean doctrines were also appearing by this time. In February, 1847, for example, John Henry Young sent to the *United States Magazine and Democratic Review* a translation of Littré's review of Comte's *Philosophie Positive* from *Le National* of Paris. "I have translated it," he explains, "in the hope that, however slight and inadequate, it may perhaps direct the attention of some intelligent thinkers in this country to M. Comte's own work which I regard as the most profound, and incomparably the most important, philosophical production of this or of any other age."¹⁸

By this time the meanings and implications of the Comtean system were beginning to clarify themselves and the more penetrating observers could see what the true issue was to be. Thus James Walker, then professor of moral and intellectual philosophy (1839–1853), and later president of Harvard (1853–1860), in the *Christian Examiner* for 1849, points out that¹⁹

as the general tone and complexion of the Positive Philosophy, apart from its religious aspects, fall in with the strong empirical bias of the English mind, its impatience of abstractions and German metaphysics and mysticism of every kind, we cannot help thinking that religion, in England and amongst us, is a hundred fold more in danger from this quarter, than from transcendentalism or pantheism. At any rate, the question on the merits of this system, with its corollary in respect to the ultimate fate of all religions, is now an open question; we cannot avert the discussion, if we would:—a discussion which must be expected to hold a prominent place in the controversies of the next fifty years.

These were indeed prophetic words.

A similar analysis of the situation and prediction as to the future were

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*, XX (1847), p. 145. As Hawkins (*op. cit.*, footnote, p. 26) points out, this translation by Young "did not gain a wide circulation, since . . . when Joseph Henry Allen named the few important works dealing with the *Cours* which had come to his notice before 1851, he failed to mention either Littré's articles or Young's translation of them."

¹⁹ "The Philosophy of Religion," *loc. cit.*, XLVII (n.s., XII, 1849), p. 256.

made a few years later by a southern observer, George Frederick Holmes. The Comtean system, he says,²⁰

is assimilated so closely in many respects to the intellectual instincts and appetites of the day, that its secret influence will be almost exactly proportionate to the degree of public disregard with which it may be visited. In that struggle between religion and science which must play so important a part in the intellectual history of the remainder of the century, a large, ingenious, and learned party must recognize Comte as their apostle, and the Positive Philosophy as their creed; nor can the votaries of the Christian faith be prepared to resist the rising deluge of error, unless they have first patiently weighed and dispassionately appreciated the current forms of metaphysical or speculative delusion—and Positivism among the rest.

Here, then, we have clearly stated by two contemporary observers, who saw the issues as they slowly shaped themselves, the true role which the Comtean influence was to play. These two American commentators spoke truly. The issue between theology and science was to be fought out in a long and fierce struggle throughout the remainder of the century. And at the end the victor was to be science. True, the credit was not to be given to Comte, but to his reputed "disciples"—to Spencer, that is, and to Darwin, and to the other British scientists of the late nineteenth century. But, as both of these two observers point out, it was Comte's Positive Philosophy which was to be the true creed of the army of anti-theologians later to rise in defense of the new conceptions of scientific method.

Comte Becomes a Power to Be Reckoned With. We have, perhaps, cited sufficient evidence to show the nature of this first period of Comtean influence, the profound indifference on the part of most thinkers and the enthusiasm on the part of a few. Toward the end of this period the indifference was beginning to be dispelled, and with the publication of Miss Martineau's condensation and translation of the *Positive Philosophy* in 1853 began the second great period. The period of neglect on the one hand and of indirect enthusiasm on the other was over. As the anonymous writer of *Putnam's Monthly Magazine*, previously cited, pointed out,²¹

Comte . . . is at last famous. He has been taken under the especial patronage of Miss Martineau. . . . His books are available in tolerable English; the diminutive lights of small coteries begin to jabber of the virtues of integral calculus; metaphysics and theology are growing decidedly unfashionable; and young men and women will soon be astonished that they could ever have

²⁰ George Frederick Holmes, "Faith and Science—Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIV (n.s., IV, January, 1852), p. 9.

²¹ Unsigned, "Comte's Philosophy," *loc. cit.*, III: 623 (June, 1854),

entertained such antiquated notions as those of God and Infinity, or even suppose anything to have a cause. Phenomena and their laws are now the gospel.

And three years later we learn from W. F. Allen that "Comte is at the present day in Positive Philosophy, with opponents and followers enough, but no rivals."²² In October, 1855, we learn that "the name Comte is gradually becoming familiar to all who take pleasure in philosophical discussions."²³ Even those who dreaded Positivism most, the Presbyterian divines, admitted that it was having a tremendous influence, due to the inherent sinfulness of man. Thus Atwater who, as we have already seen, had warned the colleges against Mill's *Logic* as simply the doorway to Comtean positivism, pointed out that although the Positive Philosophy "has thus far not been sufficiently prominent in this country to command the attention of our chief thinkers,"²⁴ this is now changed. "It is," he continues, "now insinuating itself surreptitiously, or obtruding itself openly, among us, to an extent and through channels that cannot be much longer overlooked or ignored."²⁵ In Great Britain it has, he continues, attracted much attention and has enlisted enthusiastic expositors and defenders "whose productions are undergoing rapid reprint and circulation among ourselves."²⁶ In fact, Positivism had at last become so strong, says Atwater, that writers like McCosh, Tulloch, Thompson, and Bayne attacked both positivism and pantheism as the chief adversaries of religion and God. All systems of atheism and infidelity, says Atwater, soon fall because their folly becomes so manifest that they can go no further, but if their influence is not lasting, it may be broad.²⁷ After assuring his readers that he knows they are in no danger of capitulating to the blandishments of Comte's system he is quick to state that he does not mean that "there is no danger of this system spreading to any serious extent. If absurdity were a sure guaranty of harmlessness, all systems of scepticism would be impotent. But their power lies not so much in any pretended proofs and demonstrations, as in the heart of sinful man, not willing to retain God in its knowledge."²⁸

²² W. F. Allen, "Late German Works on Roman History," *North American Review*, LXXXIV: 227 (Jan., 1857).

²³ Unsigned, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *Southern Presbyterian Review*, IX: 203 (Oct., 1855).

²⁴ Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte [sic]," *The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, XXVIII: 62 (Jan., 1856).

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

At this same time, that is, in the late eighteen-fifties, when the direct Comtean influence was at its height, Rev. Oliver S. Munsell, of Illinois, stated "that perhaps no work of modern times is destined to exert a deeper and more lasting influence upon human thought and human progress"²⁹ than Comte's *Positive Philosophy*. This influence would be exerted, not directly, but indirectly, he believes, "for we deem the probabilities of its acceptance, in this or any other country, as the one true, universal and exclusive philosophy, to be very slight indeed. But in its indirect, silent and unconscious influence, it must operate powerfully upon the development of thought and science in the minds of men."³⁰ He speaks of the "unexpected and unhopd-for welcome" which the system had received in England and America "until we meet familiarly as with household words, with 'Positive Theologies,' 'Positive Systems of Astronomy, Physiology,' etc., etc. . . . thus silently endorsing, without a single protest, a scheme which surely undermines all the foundations of our faith."³¹ As a consequence, he warns his readers to be on their guard.

The Testimony of the Anxious. It is not only in the words of those who recognized the influence of Comte that we can trace its rise and spread, but also in the language of those who vehemently denied its power as well. Acute theologians did not waste words on philosophies which they recognized as without influence. Thus when we read statements like the following from an anonymous source, we can see which way the intellectual wind was blowing. It says:³²

We have no great apprehension of the spread of the Positive Philosophy, at least in its conclusions, which alone are mainly objectionable. . . . It has no adaptation to secure a lasting hold upon the community at large. . . . The errors of the Positive Philosophy are indeed so obvious that it is scarcely necessary to point them out, while their refutation is an easy task for sound criticism.

Atwater, like Munsell, cited above, fears an insinuating rather than a direct attack from the Comtean theories.³³

²⁹ Oliver S. Munsell, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church, South*, XI: 321 (July, 1857).

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

³² Unsigned, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, VI: 329 (Sept., 1857).

³³ Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater, "The Philosophy of Auguste Comte [sic]," *Biblical Repository and Princeton Review*, XXVIII: 85 (Jan., 1856).

Our object in thus presenting the outlines of the system, as a compact whole, and with due authentication, has been not to present an argumentative refutation of it. Such gross atheism and materialism must stand self-refuted with the readers of this journal, who may be presumed to be theists and Christian believers. We have rather desired to let them know what the system is, in its principles, reasonings, and results, that they may the more readily detect them, as they furtively insinuate themselves into the literary, philosophic, scientific, and educational works of our day. . . . A . . . knowledge of the great principles of Positivism is requisite to a due discernment and estimate of the virus, when it partly conceals that it may the better insinuate itself, in powerful and influential treatises.

Another writer seeks to wither the new philosophy and its followers with a blast of menacing contempt. He says, "The fundamental principles of his [Comte's] philosophy are so hopelessly wrong, as to ensure the downfall of the whole structure. Let him that is attracted by its specious generalizations and its scientific pretensions beware."³⁴ Still another uses the *argumentum ad hominem* against the law of three stages. He declares,³⁵

We do not apprehend, that the theory of the French philosopher in regard to the different stages of human development, will long impose on even his most devoted disciples. It rests simply on his dogmatic assertion. . . . We repeat, that we are not afraid such absurd dogmatism will ever permanently disturb the common sense of mankind. These are the wild generalizations of a mind, which, after the confinement of an asylum, sought to extinguish life and suffering in the Seine.

Bancroft based his opposition upon the assumption of a fundamental dualism in knowledge, saying that the Positive Philosophy "is as little entitled to be feared as to be received. When it has put together all that it can collect of the laws of the material universe, it can advance no further toward the explanation of existence, morals, or reason."³⁶ Bowen, likewise, predicted immediate oblivion for the system.³⁷

The Argument from Human Nature. Especially interesting was the argument that Positivism could never amount to much because it was opposed to human nature. George Bancroft lends the weight of his prestige

³⁴ Unsigned, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *Southern Presbyterian Review*, IX: 224 (Oct., 1855).

³⁵ Unsigned, "Comtean Atheism," *American Quarterly Church Review, and Ecclesiastical Register*, XX: 173 (July, 1868).

³⁶ George Bancroft, "The Progress of Mankind," an oration delivered before the New York Historical Society, Nov., 1854, in *Literary and Historical Miscellanies* (1855), p. 505.

³⁷ Francis Bowen, "Martineau's Translation of Comte's Philosophy," *North American Review*, LXXIX: 229 (July, 1854).

to this argument as set forth in the following words: "They who listen to the instructions of inward experience, may smile at the air of wisdom with which a scheme that has no basis in the soul is presented to the world as a new universal creed, the Catholic Church of the materialist. Its handful of acolytes wonder why they remain so few. But Atheism never holds sway over human thought except as a usurper; no child of its own succeeding. . . ." ³⁸

Another writer, presumably a Presbyterian, tells us that all systems ranged against the Holy Word have one defect that incapacitates them from any lasting or expanding dominion over the human mind. They all lack vital warmth. They are cold and cheerless and we find no answer to our pressing needs in them, no relief from our anxieties. Therefore the human mind rejects them all and returns to the blessed Book containing the Gospel, which is warm and precious in its promises and immortal hopes.³⁹ This writer, in emphasizing the trait of wishful thinking in man and the power of appeal of emotional religion as contrasted with the relatively undynamic character of cold scientific analysis, has hit upon one of the weakest aspects of the Positive Philosophy. Comte had himself perceived this aspect and had sought to remedy it by formulating a humanitarian religion, which he furnished with an elaborate ritual, a galaxy of saints, and other objects of habitual reverence and emotional devotion. It is curious that this later aspect of Comte's system, embodied in his *Positive Polity*, never called forth in the United States either the same volume of comment or the same degree of opposition as did his *Positive Philosophy*. Perhaps the reason is that few persons read his works entire, even in the English translation, and there was at the time we are discussing no convenient condensation of the *Positive Polity* to correspond to Miss Martineau's abridgement of the *Positive Philosophy*, which the American critics might consult.

The Argument from Instinct. A special form of the argument from human nature against Comte is illustrated by a Baptist who points out how impossible Comte's system is, using Comte himself as an object lesson, and appealing to the supposed instinctive nature of man.⁴⁰

³⁸ George Bancroft, *op. cit.*, pp. 505-506.

³⁹ Unsigned, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *The Southern Presbyterian Review*, IX: 223 (Oct., 1855).

⁴⁰ Augustus H. Strong, "Philosophy and Religion," *The Baptist Quarterly*, II: 408-409 (Oct., 1868).

There is no place for sin nor for repentance. There is no God to direct the blind resistless forces of nature, or to hear and answer the cry that rises from the desolate heart of man in the Comtean system. . . . And Comte himself has given us proof, if any such were needed, that the human soul revolts at the picture of a universe without a God, and has an instinct implanted in its very constitution, which cannot be satisfied without some semblance of worship.

Another appeal to human instinct as against Comte, probably by Dr. R. L. Dabney, points out that the first consideration in exposing the baseless character of Positivism is that it is "arrayed against the rudimental instincts of man's reason and conscience, as manifested in all ages."⁴¹ Such redoubtable and unusual "instincts" must indeed have constituted a firm defense for a conservative theology. Man is a religious being, continues this author, and there is an ineradicable ground in his nature which makes him recognize the supernatural. His spiritual instincts always assert themselves, even in Comte himself.⁴² McCosh, of the old Scotch school of instinct philosophers, is quite certain that "there is no risk of the British school setting up a religion and a worship so superbly ridiculous as that of M. Comte; but I venture to predict that when it comes, it will be so scientifically cold, and so emotionally blank, as to be incapable of gathering any interest around it, or accomplishing any good, or, I may add, inflicting any evil."⁴³

Another author speaks also of an instinctive belief in a Supreme, or at least a Superior Power,⁴⁴ and still another tells us that "the fact is, we are so constituted as to be under a necessity of referring all qualities and changes to some Essence or Being in whom they inhere, or from whom they proceed."⁴⁵ It is interesting to note that it was chiefly the Presbyterian clergy who found the Comtean system so contrary to human nature and who therefore saw no future for it. Undoubtedly the influence of the Scotch philosophy was operating here. In spite of this supposed certainty, however, they issued solemn warnings against its charms, thus safeguarding the cause of religion by means of the powers of suggestion.

The Comtean Decline. In the eighteen-sixties, as was stated earlier in this chapter, Comte as a direct influence, began to go into partial eclipse. As one writer pointed out, the "atheistic" positivism of Comte was now giving

⁴¹ Unsigned, "Positivism in England," *The Southern Review*, V: 353 (Apr., 1869).

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 354.

⁴³ James McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism* (1871), p. 171.

⁴⁴ Unsigned, "Comtean Atheism," *American Quarterly Church Review, and Ecclesiastical Register*, XX: 177 (July, 1868).

⁴⁵ "Christian Supernaturalism," *The Christian Review*, XVIII: 330 (July, 1853).

way before the "pantheistic moonshine" of men like Buckle, Spencer, and others.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, even as late as 1866, John Fiske spoke of the widespread interest in Comte's philosophy.⁴⁷ Fiske himself was then beginning to spread its doctrines through his own writings.

The third period of Comtean influence dates, let us say, from the late eighteen-sixties. During this period the most important direct intellectual influence in this country was being exerted by Darwin and Spencer, and Comte's system was considerably overshadowed, especially by Spencer's vastly more concrete and interesting writings. But still the foundations upon which the influence of these later writers was based were definitely Comtean, and the critics of the period so recognized them, as we shall presently see.

The Silent Master of Thought. In the meanwhile Positivism in the broader sense of the word had become "the prevailing philosophy of the day."⁴⁸ Now that he was dead, Comte was coming to rule the intellectual world. An alarmed critic declares:⁴⁹

There is a philosophy now rising to power which seems to me more deadly than any other, because it consists in the denial of all philosophy. A philosophy of nescience is worse than a philosophy of omniscience. . . . There are itinerant lecturers among us, who winter after winter, deliver to audiences, innocent of all suspicion of their drift, lengthy tirades against metaphysics, and arguments to show that the observation of our own mental states is as impossible and absurd as to stand still and walk around one's self. There are in all our Sabbath congregations, men who drink in this philosophy of Nescience from magazines and scientific periodicals, and who are prepared thereby to look upon the sermon as so much pleasant moonshine for purblind intellects that cannot bear the sunlight. There are few of us, I am persuaded, who realize to what extent this godless philosophy has taken hold of the educated minds of the generation and has warped their views of religion. You see the results of it, in the disposition of certain divines to accept Mr. Huxley as an authority with regard to creation. . . . Outside the ministry, it appears in the popular hue and cry against metaphysics, and in the increasing lack of sympathy with the Christian church on the part of those whose pursuits bring them most in contact with physical sciences. There has been a vast change in this respect in twenty years.

⁴⁶ Unsigned, "The Phases of Modern Unbelief," *Freewill Baptist Quarterly*, IX: 386 (Oct., 1861).

⁴⁷ John Fiske, "Mill's Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *North American Review*, CII: 276 (Jan., 1866).

⁴⁸ Lawrence C. Johnson, "Positivism," *New Eclectic Magazine*, VII: 329 (July, 1870).

⁴⁹ Augustus H. Strong, "Philosophy and Religion," *The Baptist Quarterly*, II: 402-403 (Oct., 1868).

Science, since Positivism has become the vogue, is no longer content to be a handmaiden of theology, continues the author: "Time was, when physiology and history brought the results of their investigations and laid them upon the altar of religion. The tendency now is to deny that there exists such a thing as metaphysical or moral science, and to treat as a weakness of intellect any attempt to interpret the world of matter by the world of mind."⁵⁰ And all this is due to the influence of Comte. The writer continues: "I do not need to tell you that the Coryphaeus of this new philosophy of nescience is Auguste Comte. Scarcely recognized as a thinker during his lifetime, he promises now that he is dead, to be the master of the scientific thought of the next twenty years."⁵¹

Surely there could scarcely be a stronger testimonial to the triumph of Comte's system of thought than is contained in these paragraphs. We have here, epitomized, the nature of Comtean influence during the third period or phase of its existence. Note particularly the author's statement that Comte's philosophy had predisposed even theologians to accept Huxley.⁵²

McCosh on the Comtean Decline. McCosh, of Princeton, who wrote a book on *Christianity and Positivism*, summarized the course of Comtean influence, in 1871, as follows:⁵³

The world will be in a position fairly to estimate M. Comte, who has often been under-estimated, and as often over-estimated. At first little appreciated by the mass, even of thinkers, he secured at an early stage the admiration of a select few, who discerned the vigor of his intellect and saw the partial truth which his system contained, or who were subdued by his dogmatic spirit and power of assertion; these men spoke of him in exaggerated terms, and compared him to Bacon and Leibnitz. His direct influence has all along been very small, being confined to those who had the courage to read through his ponderous volumes. . . . But his indirect influence through eminent men who followed his method and caught his spirit, has been very great. However, the time of reaction against him and his exclusive pretensions seems to have come.

Sir John Herschel has pointed out his errors in mathematics, continues McCosh; Mill abhors his social system; Spencer criticizes his law of three stages; and Huxley says his dealings with science have little value. He goes on to say, "Every man, after being buffeted about—it may be—in this world, will at last find his level. These men are placing M. Comte some-

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 407.

⁵³ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 171-172.

what lower than I do. But it is a question for them to settle. These criticisms show that the day of M. Comte is fast declining."⁵⁴

The Persisting Elements of Comtean Influence. Even in the period of waning influence, however, Comte's importance was by no means insignificant. As late as 1869 his system is spoken of as having a considerable number of adherents.⁵⁵

When a philosophic system is put forth, which aspires to guide the thoughts of mankind, and through their thoughts to determine their actions; and when the scheme is so ambitious as not only to map out the course of all scientific inquiry, but completely to reorganize man's social and religious life—if such a system finds response in the general state of mind, and has any considerable number of adherents, it is of great importance that its claims and its value should be carefully weighed by those competent to the task, and their conclusions made known for the benefit of all interested. Such a system is the so-called Positive Philosophy of M. Comte. By putting forward large scientific claims, by its vehement repudiation of outworn ideals, by allying itself with the spirit of progress, and by the happy adoption of a term to characterize it, which seems to distinguish it from all uncertain speculation, and fix upon it a basis of certainty, the "Positive Philosophy" of Auguste Comte has undoubtedly exerted a strong influence upon many minds.

And again, in this same year, a less friendly commentator remarks that "the positive philosophy, with its sweeping conclusions, influences the science of this generation to a surprising degree. We are continually told that in France, in Germany, and especially in Great Britain, it is avowed by multitudes, and boasts of prominent names. The tendencies of physicists are, as has been noted, toward Naturalism; the boldness with which the school of Comte lifted up their standard, has encouraged many to gather around it."⁵⁶ And two years later, in 1871, McCosh gloomily predicted that "just as there was a great run two ages ago toward rationalism, and then an age ago toward intuitionism, so there is a corresponding set of youths in our day who will become Comtists, or Millites, or Spencerites, or even Huxleyites; the demand will create the supply; and they will find able men to lead them on over the dreary plain strewn with the skeletons of those who have wandered there and perished."⁵⁷

These are acknowledgments wrung from persons none too friendly,

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 172-173.

⁵⁵ Unsigned, "The Latest Estimate of Positivism," *Appleton's Journal of Literature, Science, and Art*, I: 438 (July 3, 1869).

⁵⁶ Unsigned, "Positivism in England," *The Southern Review*, V: 348 (Apr., 1869).

⁵⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 182.

perhaps openly hostile, to the philosophy of the French master of Positivism. Their surprise at the growth of the system, even at a period when the name of its founder was being somewhat obscured by more popular, if not more powerful, lights, is manifest in their remarks. But there is a glimmering of genuine understanding of the cause of this growth also. It did not escape them entirely that the modern world was demanding a philosophy which explains growth and progress rather than one which emphasizes degeneration and decay; one that seeks to show man how he can use his visible and understandable powers for the achievements of progress in the place of a theology that leaves him the grovelling minion of an obscurantist faith which bids him rely upon magic and ritual and the beating of tom-toms to escape otherwise inevitable destruction and hell fire.

The British Positivists Continue the Influence of Comte in the United States

Comte and the British Scientists. It may seem unwarranted to attribute to Comte the tremendous change in outlook in America during the nineteenth century, described in the preceding chapter, the change that worsted theological Calvinism and substituted for it a scientific world view. To give verisimilitude to this contention it is necessary to show that the philosophy of Comte was a dominant factor in the scientific movement of the last half of the nineteenth century and in particular that he exerted a powerful influence upon the group of outstanding British scientists who led in the world's thought at that time. To establish this fact is, perhaps, not an easy task, but that this view was commonly accepted contemporaneously there can be little reasonable doubt. In order to substantiate the assertion that Mill, Buckle, Spencer, and even Darwin, and the other British scientists, to whom the credit for the change in world view was more directly attributed, and possibly more justly due, were considered at that time as disciples of Comte, let us examine the evidence in some detail.

Mill, Spencer, and Buckle were often linked together with Comte in discussions of positivism. As Brownson pointed out in 1866, "To us who are not positivists, M. Comte, M. Littré, George H. Lewes, Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, Miss Evans, and Harriet Martineau belong to one and the same school."¹ Likewise McCosh takes "as representatives of it [Positivism], M. Comte, Mr. Mill, and Mr. Herbert Spencer. They have auxiliaries in Mr. Grote, Mr. Lewes, Mr. Buckle, Professor Bain, Professor Huxley, and others powerful in particular departments; but these three may be held as the ablest defenders of their peculiar principles."²

The Case of John Stuart Mill. As to Mill the evidence is clear-cut. He

¹ "Herbert Spencer's Biology," *Catholic World*, June, 1866. Present reference to *Works of Orestes A. Brownson*, edited and published by Henry F. Brownson (1906), IX: 435.

² *Christianity and Positivism* (1871), p. 167. McCosh next proceeds to show how they all agree and how they differ.

openly avowed himself to be a follower of Comte, in the early days at least, and he was so recognized in this country. To be sure, he repudiated by his silence the later work of Comte, but in the early years, the years in which he was building his reputation in this country, he was definitely a Comtean. We have already seen that his *Logic* was even looked upon as subtle propaganda for the Positive Philosophy. As one writer pointed out, the Positive Philosophy had been introduced into England by Lewes, who was a convert to the system, in his *Biographical History of Philosophy*, but even "more effectually, because more covertly, by Mill, whose 'System of Logic' has just been welcomed and accepted by M. Littré . . . as the logic of the Positive school."³ The unsigned writer in *Putnam's*, to whom we have already referred several times, pointed out that "the first public recognition of him [Comte] of any importance, we found in the *Logic of Mills* [sic],"⁴ while Holmes asserted that it was Mill who introduced the term sociology into the English language.⁵ Atwater, in reviewing Martineau's translation of Comte, stated that Mill's *Logic* was simply a precursor and preparative for this work, a book "extensively current among us; a work of consummate ability and skill, which is designed to train the intellect of our day to those modes of thought which must terminate in the Positive Philosophy. This book is all the more dangerous, as no such purpose is avowed, and it is constructed with admirable skill for averting the suspicions of the student."⁶ And James McCosh, then still of Belfast, Ireland, but later of Princeton University, spoke of a school of philosophy with considerable influence in England which "has sprung partly from the British school of Hobbes, Hume and James Mill, and partly from the French school of M. Auguste Comte. I call it the British section of Comte. The leader of it is Mr. John Stuart Mill."⁷

Mill as a Shield for Anti-Behaviorism. Mill appealed to the American mind and any system of thought which he espoused was certain to enjoy great prestige in the United States. His later defections from the Comtean system were, therefore, accepted not without a great deal of satisfaction

³ J. W., "The Philosophy of Religion," *Christian Examiner*, XLVII (n.s., XII, Sept., 1849), p. 256.

⁴ Unsigned, "Comte's Philosophy," *loc. cit.*, XIII: 622 (June, 1854).

⁵ George Frederick Holmes, "Fitzhugh's Sociology for the South," *Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church, South*, IX: 195 (Apr., 1855).

⁶ Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, XXVIII: 62 (Jan., 1856).

⁷ James McCosh, "Moral Philosophy in Great Britain," *American Presbyterian and Theological Review*, XVII (n.s., VI, Jan., 1868), p. 12.

by the opponents of the Positive Philosophy. Especially pleasing to Americans was his repudiation of Comte's extreme behaviorism, for at this early date the mystics were opposed to behaviorism, although they did not use the name. In this connection J. H. Allen says, "Mill very justly censures this rapid and summary merging of all mental study into the mere working of the brain and nerves."⁸ Another writer makes a very similar charge against Comte's behaviorism and a like comment on Mill. He says, "In like manner we find him [Comte] in Biology attempting to exclude consciousness from the sources of our knowledge; reducing all our knowledge of mental phenomena to the observation of men's actions, and the form and anatomy of their brains. The absurdity of this is too much even for Mr. Mill."⁹ Still another critic makes a comparable assertion, thus indicating that the clergy believed that in this respect they had an ally in Mr. Mill: "Mr. J. S. Mill, himself a Positivist, has pointed out the error of Comte in assuming the impossibility of a distinct Science of Mind."¹⁰

Although Mill, as Noah Porter points out, made quite a bit of his differences with Comte in his later years, "the deviations from Comte to which he attaches the greatest importance do not seem to be vital. Most of them are entirely consistent with his acceptance of every principle which is characteristic and objectionable in the Positive Philosophy."¹¹ Porter admits¹² that

Mr. Mill does, indeed, dissent from Comte by contending for psychological phenomena as equally legitimate and equally worthy of scientific study with those which are sensible and material. He does, indeed, refrain from asserting that psychical phenomena are within the reach and resources of matter. He does not venture to contend that there are cerebral functions or physiological phenomena. These peculiarities, though important, are not in the highest sense vital, and Mill's metaphysics are substantially Positivist, notwithstanding these positions of dissent.

In the case of Mill, then, the close tie-up with Comte is indisputable. In the early years Mill was an avowed disciple of Comte and if America

⁸ J. H. Allen, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Christian Examiner*, L (4th series, XV, Mar., 1851), p. 182.

⁹ Rev. Thomas Hill, "Miss Martineau's Compend of Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Christian Examiner*, LVI (4th series, XXI, May, 1854), p. 369.

¹⁰ Rev. J. E. Barnes, "Herbert Spencer on Ultimate Religious Ideas," *New Englander*, XXII: 694 (Oct., 1863).

¹¹ Noah Porter, "John Stuart Mill," *The International Review*, I: 402-403 (May, 1874).

¹² Note in *North American Review*, LXXXVII: 565 (Oct., 1858).

preferred his statement of the logic of the scientific method to that of Comte himself, this is incidental to the main fact, namely, that Comtean positivism directly and indirectly was working tremendous changes in the American world view.

Buckle and Positivism. Another great ferment in American thought was produced by the work of Buckle who insisted on tracing not the hand of God in history, but the influence of natural physical and intellectual forces. Much of Comte's influence was exerted through Buckle, whose work was considered as a concrete embodiment of Comte's principles. Published in 1857 to 1861, Buckle's *History of Civilization* became at once a tremendous intellectual influence. It was in very great demand in this country,¹³ partly through the enthusiastic reception accorded it by Theodore Parker. It dazzled its readers by its brilliance. A reviewer who signed himself "L" called it a remarkable, strikingly original, singularly suggestive, frank, fearless, and great work. It gave many a galvanic shock to the reader. It was, therefore, no wonder, he says, that orthodox reviews felt it to be a summons to confront a new champion of subtle and insidious materialism. Although it is a great book, continues the writer, and a remarkable one, "it is full of grave errors. It is vitiated to its very core by false, radically false principles of reasoning; and hence, wonderful as the book is in point of profound thought, immense research, recondite learning, and versatile eloquence, it is an utterly unsatisfactory production, and, in several respects, a most pernicious and demoralizing volume."¹⁴

It was, however, as the following passage shows, considered by some critics to be "one of the literary phenomena of our century. Its appearance in the firmament of letters has startled beholders, like the sudden flight of Donati's comet across the heavens; and as with the celestial visitor, the surprise is occasioned more by the splendor of the train than by the solidity of the nucleus."¹⁵ After paying tribute to Buckle's singular power, his originality and daring, his learning, his ingenuity, his breadth of thought, brilliance, vigor, genius, etc., the same author concludes that Buckle is "in the main, though sometimes inconsistent with himself, a

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ See "Buckle's History of Civilization in England," *Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church, South*, XIII: 58 (Jan., 1859).

¹⁵ Rev. E. Lincoln, Jamaica Plain, Mass., "Buckle's History of Civilization," *The Christian Review*, XXIV: 113 (Jan., 1859).

disciple of Comte, and an advocate of the principles of the Positive Philosophy." ¹⁶

Some Confirmatory Criticisms of Buckle. Roswell D. Hitchcock, the geologist whose aim it was always to prove the existence and wisdom and power of God through science, criticized Buckle for his neglect of race as a factor in history,¹⁷ but considered his work to be the most ambitious expression of the materialistic theory of history. He said, "The recent remarkable work of Henry Thomas Buckle . . . rules out of the problem both the freedom of man and the Providence of God, branding them as metaphysical dogmas, disowned by the inductive philosophy; subjugating all things to mere natural law, and thus making human history what is arrogantly called a 'Positive Science.'" ¹⁸

Francis Bowen, whom we have already seen banishing Comte to immediate oblivion, was similarly irritated by Buckle whom he would not even concede to be a great scholar, as most other critics, favorable or unfavorable, felt constrained to do. He speaks of Buckle's overweening confidence in his powers, of his cool dogmatism which is often as amusing as it is unreasonable, of his egotism, etc. The work, he tells us, is discursive, ill-digested, fanatical. Nor is there any novelty in it. In fact, the whole book is not a history of civilization at all but simply a statement of Comtean doctrines.¹⁹

An Appreciation of Buckle. Much more penetrating was the reception given to Buckle's work by the *National Quarterly Review*. Here an anonymous reviewer puts Buckle in his proper setting, showing his relationship both to Comte and to Spencer.²⁰ This writer points out that it has always been a favorite illusion that social facts are not subject to ascertainable laws. The masses of men consider the phenomena of society to be isolated

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ This interesting criticism was made also by a reviewer who signed himself J.S.P., in *The Radical*, some years later. "The works of Comte, Buckle, and Draper," he says, "have been of inestimable service in this regard; they mark an era in history. But here, as in all intellectual movements in their earlier stages, this has been, we believe, somewhat fragmentary. Comte, Buckle, and Draper have ignored the element of race." *Loc. cit.*, IV: 314-315 (Oct., 1868).

¹⁸ Roswell D. Hitchcock, "The Laws of Civilization," *American Theological Review*, II: 574 (Nov., 1860).

¹⁹ Francis Bowen, "Buckle's History of Civilization in England," *North American Review*, XCIII: 520-521 (Oct., 1861).

²⁰ Unsigned, "Fallacies of Buckle's Theory of Civilization," *loc. cit.*, IV: 30-63 (Dec., 1861). It is interesting to note that Buckle's work was the subject of three separate reviews in this same journal.

facts, incapable of scientific explanation. It was not until the physical sciences had developed that a science of society could arise. Plato, Aristotle, Bossuet, Pascal, Leibnitz, Machiavelli, Vico, Montesquieu, Condorcet, Turgot, Voltaire, all worked in this field and left important contributions. He goes on to say that ²¹

Nothing more was done in this direction, until the unprecedented development of physical knowledge which ushered in the present century was followed by the appearance of the "Philosophie Positive" of Auguste Comte. In this noble work, social as well as physical changes are shown to conform to invariable laws. Comte then founded social science, and opened a path for future discoverers. But he did not perceive, any more than previous inquirers, the fundamental law of human evolution. It was reserved for Herbert Spencer to discover this all-comprehensive law, which is found to explain alike all the phenomena of man's history, and all those of external nature. This sublime discovery—that the Universe is in a continuous process of evolution from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous—with which only Newton's discovery of the laws of gravitation is at all worthy to be compared, underlies not only physics, but also history. It reveals the law to which social changes conform.

This preliminary glance is necessary, in order to comprehend the relation of Mr. Buckle's work to the treatises on social science which have preceded it. . . . Mr. Buckle, it is true, gives us no new method of research, like Comte; nor does he . . . discover any universal law, like Spencer. . . . Proceeding on the method of investigation pointed out by Comte, Mr. Buckle claims to have established . . . four great laws.

However, even these laws are not original with Buckle. His first law, namely, that progress depends on the investigation of phenomena was stated by Comte, as well as by Lewes, Mill, and Spencer.²² Nevertheless, although this reviewer is extremely critical, he is careful to point out the boldness and comprehensiveness of Buckle's views, his fearless candor, his wealth of erudition, his honesty in applying facts, his noble love of liberty, his eloquence. And he does this because previous reviewers have treated Buckle with bitter and contemptuous hostility, exaggerating the defects of his work, and even misrepresenting it.²³

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 32. One review, for example, quite uncharacteristic for the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, where it was published, called Buckle's work a "pile of folly and fiction. Mr. Buckle's performances deserve no place in literature. We venture the prediction, that if the Introduction sees a state of completion in the world, the book, or rather, library, will prove an early abortion. The unfortunate and foolhardy projector will doubtless modestly doubt whether he is not too far in advance of the age; and shall still more diffidently question whether any age will ever overtake him." See the unsigned review of Buckle's *History of Civilization in England*, *loc. cit.*, II (4th series, XIII, Oct., 1861), pp. 694-695.

Other Criticisms of Buckle. One writer, probably Dr. Dabney, spoke of Buckle as, like Mill, another evil portent in the literary horizon, for his theory was essentially positive. Like Comte, he disdains psychology and "does not believe a man's own consciousness a trustworthy witness; and he regards those general facts concerning human action which are disclosed, for instance, by statistics, [as] the only materials for a science of man and society. . . . He regards "positive" science as a much more hopeful fountain of well-being and progress, than virtue of holiness."²⁴ And, then, sarcastically, he points out that since "Americans are always prompt to imitate Europeans (especially in their follies), it is scarcely necessary to add, that the same dogmas are rife in our current literature."²⁵

Francis Wharton, a professor in Kenyon College, Ohio, pointed out the Comtean influence upon Buckle, and then contrasted the two men as follows:²⁶

Mr. Buckle, so far as we can draw his views as a system from the very remarkable volume which is now the only avowed product of his pen [viz., *History of Civilization in England*], accepts and teaches Comte's theory of positive law with the following modifications:—Comte at least in his late writings, insists that ecclesiastical authority and a derivative creed, are essential to complete social development. Mr. Buckle considers the first always mischievous, and declares that no religion is of value that is not the spontaneous product of the believer's intellect. . . . Comte recognizes a variety of agencies by which antecedents are connected with sequences; Mr. Buckle but one, intellect. . . . Comte's basis for induction includes almost every branch of human knowledge, except metaphysics and psychology, which he rejects; Mr. Buckle avowedly, at least, confines himself to statistics. . . .

Whether Buckle actually would have considered himself a disciple of Comte—indeed, whether he was or not—is a matter of no importance in assessing Comtean influence in this country. If Americans considered him in the Comtean tradition, that fact is sufficient to indicate that he represented Comtean influence in their own minds and we must, therefore, credit Buckle's influence in part at least to Comte.

Spencer and Comte. With Spencer the Comtean affiliation was less indisputable than with Mill, since he himself, characteristically, denied any Comtean influence whatsoever in his own thinking. But he could not convince American readers that he was not in the Positivist tradition.

²⁴ Unsigned, "Positivism in England," *The Southern Review*, V: 350 (April, 1869).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

²⁶ Francis Wharton, *A Treatise on Theism, and on the Modern Skeptical Theories* (1859), pp. 315-316.

As early as April, 1856, an anonymous reviewer,²⁷ in tracing Spencer's intellectual origins, pointed out that "he says nothing of M. Comte, whom he seems to have used."²⁷ This drew no backfire from Spencer, presumably because he did not see it. A similar view was expressed some seven years later by Reverend J. E. Barnes, who, in reviewing *First Principles*, stated that²⁸

The spirit of his philosophy is evidently that of the so-called Positive Method, which has so many partial disciples, as well as some zealous adherents, among the thinkers of England, and is exerting, in various indirect ways, a great and increasing influence upon the opinions of the masses in that country. The leading conceptions of this method, as developed by its great originator, the Frenchman, Auguste Comte, are, perhaps, too well known to require special mention. . . . The English admirers and disciples of the great Positivist, since they are not generally his blind adherents, should not be charged indiscriminately with atheism, or irreligion. . . . In Mr. Spencer we have an example of a Positivist who does *not* treat the subject of religion with supercilious neglect, and who illustrates, by his own method, of reasoning upon the highest objects of human thought, the value of those metaphysical studies which it is so much the fashion of his school to decry. . . .

Mr. Spencer Objects. Spencer, however, could not bear to be considered a disciple of Comte. To this review, therefore, he replied early the following year in a letter to the editor, vehemently denying that he was such a disciple.²⁹

Sir:—While recognizing the appreciative tone and general candor of the articles in your last number, entitled "Herbert Spencer on Ultimate Religious Ideas," allow me to point out one error of moment which pervades it. The writer correctly represents the leading positions of my argument; but he inadvertently conveys a wrong impression respecting my tendencies and sympathies.

He says of me—"The spirit of his philosophy is evidently that of the so-called positive method. . . ." Further on, I am tacitly classed with "the English admirers and disciples of the great Positivist;" and it is presently added that "in Mr. Spencer we have an example of a Positivist, who dares not treat the subject of religion with supercilious neglect." Here, and throughout, the implication is, that I am a follower of Comte. This is a mistake. That M. Comte has given a general exposition of the doctrine and method elaborated by science,

²⁷ Unsigned, "Spencer's Social Statics," *Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church, South*, n.s., X: 185-218 (April, 1856).

²⁸ Rev. J. E. Barnes, "Herbert Spencer on Ultimate Religious Ideas," *New Englander*, XXII: 693-694, 695 (Oct., 1863).

²⁹ "A Letter from Mr. Herbert Spencer," *New Englander*, XXIII: 169-171 (January, 1864). This letter was reproduced in the American edition of *First Principles*.

and has applied to it a name which has obtained a certain currency, is true. But it is not true that the holders of this doctrine and followers of this method, are disciples of M. Comte. Neither their modes of inquiry nor their views concerning human knowledge in its nature and limits, are appreciably different from what they were before. If they are Positivists, it is in the sense that all men of science have been more or less consistently Positivists; and the applicability of M. Comte's title to them no more makes them his disciples, than does its applicability to the men of science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote makes these his disciples. My own attitude towards M. Comte, and his partial adherents, has been all along that of antagonism. In an essay on the "Genesis of Science," published in 1854, and re-published with other essays in 1857, I have endeavored to show that his theory of the logical dependence, and historical development of the sciences, is untrue. I have still among my papers the memoranda of a second review, (for which I failed to obtain a place), the purpose of which was to show the untenableness of his theory of intellectual progress. The only doctrine of importance in which I agree with him—the relativity of all knowledge—is one common to him and sundry other writers of earlier date: and even this, I hold in a different sense from that in which he held it. But on all points that are distinctive of his philosophy, I differ from him. I deny his Hierarchy of the Sciences. I regard his division of intellectual progress into the three phases, theological, metaphysical, and positive, as superficial. I reject utterly his Religion of Humanity. And his ideal of society I hold in detestation. Some of his minor views I accept; some of his incidental remarks seem to me profound; but from everything which distinguishes Comtism as a System, I dissent entirely. The only influence on my own courses of thought, which I can trace to M. Comte's writings, is the influence that results from meeting with antagonistic opinions definitely expressed.

Such being my position, you will, I think, see, that by classing me as a Positivist, and tacitly including me among the English admirers and disciples of Comte, your reviewer unintentionally misrepresents me. I am quite ready to bear the odium attaching to opinions which I do hold. But I object to have added the odium attaching to opinions which I *do not* hold. If by publishing this letter in your forthcoming Number you will allow me to get myself right with the American public on this matter, you will greatly oblige me.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

Herbert Spencer.

London, November 21, 1863.

The American Conception of Positivism. To this warm protest the reviewer replied that he had not intended to imply that Spencer was merely a follower of Comte. In fact Spencer's theory of scientific evolution was much better than Comte's. He had simply used the term Positivism in the ³⁰

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 171.

broad sense which it now so commonly bears, as inclusive of opinions and modes of thought differing in various respects, but agreeing in the same general attitude towards the objects and means of theological inquiry which was assumed by the method of Comte. . . . It is true that these characteristics were not original in the philosophy of M. Comte; which, however, embodied them so fully as very naturally to have given name to that general style of philosophizing to which they belong. . . .

However, he continues, if Spencer objects to being called a Positivist, he should no longer be called one.³¹

But the matter was not as simple as all that. Americans, perversely enough, continued to think of Spencer as a positivist, if not entirely as a Comtean disciple. Brownson comments as follows:³²

Mr. Herbert Spencer is naturally one of the ablest men in Great Britain, far superior to the much praised Buckle, and not surpassed, if equalled, by John Stuart Mill. . . . We have heretofore considered him as belonging to the positivist school of philosophy, founded by Auguste Comte, and the ablest man of that school; abler, and less absurd than even M. Littré. But in a note to the work before us he disclaims all affiliation with positivism, declares that he does not accept M. Comte's system, and says that the general principles, in which he agrees with that singular man, he has drawn not from him, but from sources common to them both. This we can easily believe, for in the little we have had the patience to read of M. Comte's unreadable works, we have found nothing original with him but his dryness, dulness, and wearisomeness, in which, if he is not original, he is at least superior to most men. Yet we have not been able to detect any essential difference of doctrine or principle between the Frenchman and Englishman.

Again, an anonymous reviewer in the *Christian Examiner* speaks to the same effect. "The philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer is the second great effort to organize all human knowledge [the first being Comte's],—a nearer approximation than Comtism, in some respects, to a genuine Positivism."³³ Still another writer adds his testimony in further corroboration of this same general point of view. He says, "The array of investigators and followers, who may be classed as Positivists in philosophy is very great. There are great names among them. Mill and Bain and Spencer in England, are minds of rare erudition and acumen."³⁴

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Orestes A. Brownson, "Herbert Spencer's Biology," *Catholic World*, June, 1866. Present reference to *Works of Orestes A. Brownson*, edited by Henry F. Brownson, IX: 435.

³³ Unsigned, "Positivism in Theology," *loc. cit.*, LXXX (new series, I, Mar., 1866), p. 138.

³⁴ Augustus H. Strong, "Philosophy and Religion," *The Baptist Quarterly*, II: 403 (Oct., 1868).

Evidences of the Influence of Positivism upon Spencer. Another writer takes Spencer to task for insisting on the differences between himself and Comte, suggesting that this is an evidence of smallness of mind.³⁵

Despite the obvious points of resemblance . . . between these two eminent thinkers, and others not mentioned, objection has been made by Spencer to the classification of himself in the same category with Comte, or as appertaining essentially to the same school of thought. But the exceptions which he has taken to such classification are altogether insufficient, nor are they by any means well taken. In this respect an author must allow others to be better qualified to judge of him than he of himself. The more especially should Mr. Spencer do so, when it is but too manifest that he has a disposition to disparage Comte, and set himself in opposition to his claims to be regarded as a controlling authority in the realm of thought. His impatience at being assimilated to Comte—his manifest desire to appear different from that great intellectual Titan of the modern world—his disposition to pick flaws in the reasonings of that august thinker—afford but one among many evidences, that Mr. Spencer has exhibited, of what we might venture to term *the small mind*, the more remarkable in one of so transcendent a genius, and of such prodigiously large thoughts, in the main, as he has proved himself indisputably to be. . . . It was not to Mr. Spencer's credit to exaggerate those differences, as he has labored to do. . . . The more to be regretted it is, that, instead of seeking to harmonize the partial differences between himself and so great a thinker as Comte, he should have preferred placing himself in the attitude of "antagonism" toward him.

Where Spencer differs from Comte, it is in Comte's favor, continues this writer; but the essential differences are more apparent than real, more theoretical than practical.³⁶

In spite of Spencer's attacks and criticisms of Comte, he *was* a positivist and in himself an evidence of the power of the Comtean influence. Another writer declares that ". . . Hamilton, Mansel, Spencer, Lewes, Stuart Mill, and Comte, though but ill assorted in many respects, must be ranked together as defenders of . . . the Positive Philosophy or the Philosophy of the Conditioned."³⁷ Again, still another writer of the time comments in a similar manner:³⁸

Comte has become a wonderful intellectual force since his death. We see his influence in all the recent works on the phenomena of mind. Mr. Spencer

³⁵ Leland A. Webster (pseudonym for Robert S. Hamilton), *Present Status of the Philosophy of Society* (1866), pp. 245-247.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 248.

³⁷ Charles W. Shields, "The Present State of Philosophy," *New Englander*, XXVII: 223 (Apr., 1868).

³⁸ Epes Sargent, "No More Metaphysics," *Lippincott's Magazine*, II: 87 (July, 1868).

disclaims its operation, but there is a growing testimony to the fact. . . . Mr. Herbert Spencer, who has many readers in the United States, and from whom great things are expected in philosophy, is sometimes claimed as a follower of Comte; but this he repudiates in the most striking manner, and in doing it he rather under-estimates, we think, the influence of Comte in England. In his doctrine of theological nescience . . . Mr. Spencer . . . does not differ widely from the positivist school.

The Argument of Identity and Similarity. Spencer, Mill, and Huxley (who, it will be recalled, bitterly opposed Positivism) might dispose of Comte's claims in science, acutely observed Lawrence C. Johnson some two years later, in 1870; the theologians might similarly dispose, to their own satisfaction, of his religious vagaries, yet even "when Comte has been eliminated, there still remains that same philosophy which he called the *Positive*—now become popularly applied, and which is really the system of his most vehement opponents as well as of his disciples."⁸⁹ Even as late as 1877, when Spencer was at the height of his intellectual powers and prestige, a reviewer of his *Principles of Sociology* intimated that the author is a Comtean disciple. He comments bitterly:⁴⁰

The barbarous but convenient compound, "Sociology" (borrowed from Comte), sufficiently explains itself. In fact, the vigorous outline sketched by the master who invented the term left to his successors not much more than the task of adjusting its details to the facts of science as they should come to be better known, and especially to an increasing knowledge of society in its earlier stages. It must be admitted, too, that the repugnance which Comte felt to speculative generalizations checked him from risking anything on a doctrine of evolution which forty years ago was imperfectly developed . . . and also that a certain sentimental sympathy with the "primitive or fetichistic" condition of human intelligence took the place with him, of the vastly larger range of accurate knowledge which Mr. Spencer brings to bear—even to the extent of fancying that the unsophisticated tribes of Africa might very likely be the most hopeful disciples of his new gospel of positivism. Mr. Spencer shares no such sentimental delusions.

And college students were learning, at the same time, from a widely used text book in philosophy that "Herbert Spencer . . . though differing widely from Comte in the details of his system, and denying that he is in any sense a Comtean, has nevertheless comprehended and developed

⁸⁹ Lawrence C. Johnson, "Positivism," *The New Eclectic Magazine*, VII: 29 (July, 1870).

⁴⁰ Joseph H. Allen, in a review of Spencer's *Principles of Sociology*, *The Radical Review*, I: 353, 354 (Aug., 1877).

more fully than any other the fundamental principles of Positivism.”⁴¹

The Controversy over the Origins of Positivism. One more line of evidence regarding the influence of Comte upon his age may be noted here before passing on. Comte himself never claimed to be the originator of the theory of science, but he became very closely identified with it, especially under the name of “Positivism.” As Chauncy Wright pointed out,⁴²

The foundation of positivism was laid by M. Comte’s predecessors . . . and, though now often referred to under the name of positivism, does not belong exclusively to M. Comte or his followers. This foundation is the doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge, which denies to human intelligence the power to know anything except phenomena and their orders of co-existence and sequence; which denies any other knowledge of causation than the facts of observed invariable and unconditional sequences in the orders of human phenomena; and denies any other knowledge of substance than observed permanences in the groupings of phenomena. But M. Comte made this doctrine peculiarly his own by the use he made of it, and by the complete definition he gave of it in relation to older doctrines. This was done in his famous historical law, by which he traced the growth of the clear scientific or positive intelligence out of those earlier forms of philosophic belief which he called the theological and metaphysical philosophies.

Comte, in other words, was primarily a Positivist, in the eyes of his American commentators. He was identified in their minds with Positivism. And it was as a Positivist that they denounced him. And, having once taken their stand against Comte, in order to maintain their position, they had to continue to oppose him.

On the other hand, they could also see that the prestige of science was something to conjure with. They could not lightly oppose it if they wished to maintain their intellectual status. They therefore attempted to dissociate the name of Comte from the new scientific method, to demonstrate that Comte was not the originator of the positive method, that science and Positivism were not synonymous, that Comtism and Positivism were not the same. Now there could scarcely be any other motive for such attempts than to discredit the Comtean influence while at the same time succumbing to it. But such efforts would have been quite unnecessary if Comte’s name had not been so thoroughly associated with the new method. Theologians, by dissociating Comte’s name from Positivism could accept Positivism, or

⁴¹ Albert Schweigler, *A History of Philosophy in Epitome*. Translated from the First Edition of the Original German by Julius H. Seelye. Revised from the Ninth German Edition, with an Appendix, by Benjamin E. Smith (1880), p. 453.

⁴² Chauncy Wright, “Mill on Comte,” *The Nation*, II: 20 (Jan., 4, 1866).

science, without embarrassment and with a show of consistency. We may examine one of the most thoroughgoing of such efforts, set forth in the following passage.⁴³

According to Comte himself, Positivism originated with the earliest dawn of real science; but first took definite shape, as a scientific method, in the hands of Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo. He laid no claim whatever to the discovery of this method, and hence never claimed to be the founder of Positivism; yet Positivism and Comtism are confounded by many who fail to observe that the latter is a very imperfect embodiment of the former. Comte holds that our study of Nature "is restricted to the analysis of phenomena in order to discover their laws; that is, their constant relations of succession or similitude and can have nothing to do with their *nature* or their *cause*, first or final, or the mode of their production." But the scientific study of Nature cannot in any way be arbitrarily restricted. It is surely unscientific in the extreme to determine beforehand what the phenomena shall reveal. . . . Further, "Nature" should not be confined to the narrow sense in which Comte uses the word; it must include all that is or can be presented to experience, whether internally or externally. The issue between materialism and spiritualism cannot be thus peremptorily shut out. If the patient study of Nature in its true and wide sense, shall make reasonably certain the existence of the immaterial, then this result will be incorporated into the great body of Positive truths. Comtism is guilty of many inconsistencies, of which Positivism is innocent. For instance, Comte inveighs against the "metaphysical" vice of treating mere abstractions, such as "chemical affinity" or "vital principle," as if they were real causes or active entities; yet he and his disciples not infrequently speak of "natural laws" in terms applicable to real agents alone: . . . Comtism is further inconsistent with itself in sometimes regarding the organism as subordinated to the environment, and sometimes regarding the environment as subordinated to the organism; or, in other words, in alternately accepting and rejecting the freedom of the will. . . . From these illustrations, which might be multiplied, it is evident that Comtism and Positivism are not synonymous, and that the former is only an imperfect embodiment of the latter.

Lawrence C. Johnson⁴⁴ and James McCosh⁴⁵ were also at pains to show that Comte was not the originator of Positivism. This aggressive attack illustrates the fact that Comte had succeeded so well in getting the Positivist position across that theologians accepted it themselves and accused Comte of misinterpreting it.

Conclusion Regarding the Influence of Positivism. The evidence here presented, then, seems to indicate that, although the direct and immediate

⁴³ Unsigned, "Positivism in Theology," *Christian Examiner*, LXXX (new series, I, Mar., 1866), pp. 235-237.

⁴⁴ Lawrence C. Johnson, "Positivism," *New Eclectic Magazine*, VII: 31 (July, 1870).

⁴⁵ James McCosh, *Christianity and Positivism* (1871), pp. 116-117.

credit for transforming the American viewpoint from one predominantly theological to one predominantly scientific is due to the work of the British scientists of the late nineteenth century, their influence was seen by penetrating contemporary observers to be in direct line with Comtean Positivism; and that therefore credit must be given to Comte for a large share in this movement. Although Comte was not the sole founder of Positivism and although he himself admitted and insisted upon the fact that he had numerous antecedents and predecessors, it is impossible, in the light of authentic history, to question the fact that he was the chief formulator of the Positivist system and did most to give it initial, if not final, currency.

In thus emphasizing the intellectual forces operative during this period we would not be misunderstood as believing that other more concrete forces were not also working in the same direction. The growth of inventions, the expansion of industry, the practical accomplishments of natural science in every field, and especially the marvels of electricity—all these were important factors in changing the "Zeitgeist." However, since this study is concerned chiefly with the history of ideas, and especially those ideas that helped to form the social science movement, we lay primary emphasis upon the intellectual forces.

Significance for Social Science. The reader may wonder what the discussion in this chapter has had to do with the Social Science movement in the United States. We may answer in the words of a contemporary.⁴⁶

Here, on the rapidly widening fields of physical science and social philosophy, the latest forms of skepticism have chosen to entrench themselves and prepare for another violent assault on Christianity. But the religious mind of the age is making good the ground already conquered, and qualifying itself for what is indicated as the final struggle in this great debate. *All the main topics of social science are fast claiming the attention of Christian thinkers.*

In brief, Comte had re-stated the theory of science, labelled it Positivism, and aroused the theologians by his contempt for their systems. Social Science, then, like physical science, had to be subdued and made tributary to theology. "Christian thinkers" must therefore study this new discipline. Theology had much less to fear from the physical sciences than from Social Science. The former touched man and his beliefs and loyalties to hierarchies and institutions but indirectly and lightly. But with Social Science it was different. This new philosophy of life was part and parcel of man's

⁴⁶ "L," "Buckle's Civilization in England," *Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church, South*, XIII: 83 (Jan., 1859). Italics are by the present authors.

religion. Unless it could be made to repudiate such subversive doctrines as those of Fourier and Comte (including Comte's followers) and accept the leadership of theology instead, it would be a constant menace to the existing religious hierarchies and vested interests, which were predominantly theological.

Thus, the data here presented show once again that it was primarily in the field of Social Science that the controversy of "Religion vs. Science" was fought out. If this was the case seventy-five to one hundred years ago, it still remains true. But the conflict is not now so intense, because the battle by which Social Science gained for itself a secular instead of a theological direction is already largely won. But it is still true now, as it was then, that the transition from a theological or mystical to a scientific or rational world view, even when in the form of biological controversy over evolution, has been and is being worked out primarily in the field of social relationships. For back of the theoretical arguments of the theologians, ostensibly aiming at the truth, was a much more practical motivation based on a very real fear of the immediate and ultimate consequences of Positivism for human behavior, and perhaps for the persistence of their own dogmas and institutional organizations.

The Direct Influence of Comte: The Modern Times Experiment

A Mathematical Disciple. There were, altogether, at least eight Americans who were in direct correspondence with Comte with regard to some enterprise or program of unusual interest to him and themselves. These were Seba Smith,¹ W. M. Gillespie, Horace Binney Wallace, John William Wallace, George Frederick Holmes, John Metcalf, James O'Connell, and Henry Edger.² At least two of these men, Gillespie and Wallace, had known Comte personally in Paris. Gillespie, whom Comte considered a complete and sincere, though somewhat too timid, Positivist,³ represented the man-of-science type of admirer of Comte. He belongs in our present account only because of an incidental connection. As a mathematician who could appreciate Comte's genius he was closely bound to the philosopher's earlier interest. It was, moreover, only natural that Comte, who believed that mathematics was essentially basic to Positivism, and even to the Religion of Humanity, should also believe that a man who was deeply interested in mathematics and a disciple in that respect must also be his disciple with regard to his Positivist philosophy and religion. In this respect, however, Comte appears to have been mistaken. Gillespie's only practical service to Comte seems to have been his translation of the mathematical parts of the *Philosophie Positive*, under the title of *The Philosophy of Mathematics* (1851). Gillespie visited Comte in the summer of 1850. His attitude toward Comte may be gleaned from the preface to this translation in which he expresses the pleasure and profit which he had received from Comte's work and which had induced him to make it available in

¹ Seba Smith's contacts with Comte consisted of a series of letters on matters purely mathematical. These letters may be found in Richmond Laurin Hawkins, *Auguste Comte and the United States 1816-1853*, pp. 27-38.

² Other Americans who were avowedly influenced by Comte were Edgar Allan Poe and Julia Ward Howe (E. L. Hawkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 60), but their reactions to the great Positivist philosopher were not in the Social Science tradition.

³ Auguste Comte, *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à Henry Edger et à M. John Metcalf* (1889), p. 41. The letter here referred to by page number was dated March 27, 1856.

English to his fellow teachers and students of mathematics.⁴ According to Comte, Gillespie omitted two philosophical introductory chapters against his will, for fear of losing his position, under pressure of Protestant censure.⁵ At any rate, however this may be, it was due to Gillespie's efforts that American students of mathematics were introduced to the mathematical phase of Positivism.

Orientation. We have emphasized in preceding chapters the fact that one of the functions served by the Social Science movement in the United States was that of rendering possible and facilitating a transition from a theological to a scientific and secular world view in philosophic thought and ultimately in public opinion. We have seen how Associationist Social Science became a substitute religion to many or most of its advocates, serving to replace the old theological religion to which they had been adjusted and also how it found a warmer welcome among those of the Unitarian faith than among those who were saturated with the dogmas of Calvinism. In the chapters that immediately follow the analogous practical effect of the Comtean or Positivist Social Science upon the religious and social outlook of the times will be traced. Although the influence of Positivism upon American social ideals was more subtle and less emotional than that exerted by Associationist Social Science, it was probably more far reaching and penetrating and effective in the long run. It is with the religious side of Positivism, the Religion of Humanity, that we shall concern ourselves mainly in this chapter. The intellectual side, or the Positive Philosophy, as distinguished from the Positive Polity, will be more fully, but not exclusively, considered on its practical side in subsequent chapters.

Although the theoretical influence of Comte in this country was great—if not always immediately obvious—the influence of the religious aspect of Positivism was slight. As compared with the impression made upon our social policies and programs by Fourier, for example, it was negligible. In contrast to the thirty to forty Associationist colonies, there was only a single attempt to found a colony according to Comtean principles, and this one effort was led by a naturalized citizen of British birth, by the name of Henry Edger. Nor was it a very successful attempt.

Henry Edger, the John the Baptist to Comte in America. Henry Edger was the most zealous of all the disciples of Comte—"the John the Baptist

⁴ *Loc. cit.*, pp. v-viii.

⁵ *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à Henry Edger et à M. John Metcalf* (1889), p. 41.

of the new Religion of Humanity in this wilderness of America," as he was called.⁶ He was born at Chelwood Gate, parish of Fletching, in Sussex, England, January 22, 1820. Around about 1850, when he was in his early thirties, he came to the United States.⁷ He wandered about in the vicinity of New York for two or three years, seeking rather unsuccessfully some sort of adjustment to the new and unfamiliar conditions which he encountered in the United States. At one time he was a member of one of Brisbane's experimental Fourierian colonies. At another his wife was supporting his family by teaching a village or country school. Then, late in 1852 or early in 1853, he became an enthusiastic member of the Modern Times colony established by Josiah Warren and Stephen Pearl Andrews at Thompson's Station, Long Island, on the basis of the "labor-cost" theory of the former. This colony was located about sixty miles from New York and was apparently partly inspired by Fourierian doctrine and by Warren's early participation in Robert Owen's New Harmony experiment in Indiana. It consisted of a group of families with small holdings, who expected to exchange their products to each other at labor cost, thus eliminating the profits of the middlemen, and to dispose of their surpluses in the nearby city of New York. With these extra earnings they hoped to purchase the things they could not themselves produce in Modern Times. Edger worked enthusiastically in this colony for a number of years trying to make his small holding pay his living expenses, but in this he was disappointed and ultimately he, with others, was forced to confess defeat.

It was while undergoing this economic disillusionment that he became interested in the theories of Comte, probably through the influence of Andrews, who himself was developing in this direction. The more he became disillusioned with the Utopianism of Modern Times the more resolutely and enthusiastically he turned to the Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, apparently largely as a spiritual compensation for his economic disillusionment.⁸ The doctrines of Comte's *Positivist Calendar* had, he declared, "infused peace into his own soul, given an aim and a direction to his own life, substituted radiant and solid hopes for the blank despair in

⁶ Unsigned, "Comtean Atheism," *American Quarterly Church Review, and Ecclesiastical Register*, XX: 339 (Oct., 1868).

⁷ He declared his intention of becoming a citizen in 1851 and was naturalized in 1861.

⁸ The authors of this volume have read the Journals of Henry Edger (comprising some twenty volumes) through the courtesy of his son, M. Paul Edger, of Paris. The Journals appear to justify this interpretation although they are not explicit on the point. The Journals will be edited for publication by the present authors at a future date.

which the grovelling materialism and gloomy scepticism, now really prevalent, naturally result.”⁹ And since the scattered notices in the periodical press gave totally wrong impressions of the Positive doctrines, indicating wilful misrepresentation as well as intellectual obliquity, he took it upon himself to serve as propagandist of the new gospel. He declared: “Gratitude on the one hand for incalculable benefits received, and the duty which devolves upon us all of diffusing the happiness we, ourselves, enjoy, compel the writer, poor, obscure, and devoid of social influence as he finds himself, to lay aside for a moment his habitual employment in rural industry, and occupy, although with fear and trembling, a public position from which he involuntarily shrinks.”¹⁰

Edger's Promotion Activities. His propaganda activities consisted in the promotion of a Typographical Fund for the publishing (by Calvin Blanchard) of important Positivist works, in preaching the Positivist doctrine, and in the attempted transformation of Modern Times into a Positivist community or colony. In this last effort he was only partially successful. Among the published *Modern Times Tracts* were three by Edger, as follows: *Modern Times, the Labor Question, and the Family* (1855), *The Positivist Calendar* (1856), and *The Positivist Community* (1863). Whether there were any other of these Tracts is not indicated. The first of these, *Modern Times, the Labor Question, and the Family*, Comte characterized as “a practical indication of the spirit and tendency of Positivism, clearer and more full than anything I have hitherto elsewhere seen.”¹¹

The Comte-Edger Correspondence. It was in the early eighteen-fifties that Edger began to correspond with Comte. Comte's first published letter to him is dated March 16, 1854.¹² It is addressed simply to “Monsieur”; the second, to “Monsieur et cher disciple”; and thereafter all are addressed to “Mon cher disciple.” All are dated according to the Positivist Calendar, viz., 19 of Aristotle, 66; 20 of Dante, 66; 26 of Descartes, 67; etc. From Comte's letters one can reconstruct the personality of the man to whom he was writing. It appears that Edger confided to him his most intimate troubles and hopes. For example Comte was “profoundly touched by the function which you attribute to Positivism in the re-establishment of your

⁹ Henry Edger (ed.), *The Positivist Calendar* (1856), p. vi.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹² Auguste Comte, *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à Henry Edger et à M. John Metcalf* (1889), p. 1.

own conjugal harmony.”¹³ Edger’s Journals also corroborate this confessional attitude of Edger toward the high priest of his new religion. In 1856 Edger wrote to Comte for advice about his sex life, but without a complete confession of all its irregularities. Comte replied that he himself had suffered similarly in his youth, and prescribed a strict regimen for Edger, including complete chastity from now on (Edger being then thirty-six years of age), and gave dietary suggestions which he thought might help.¹⁴ Apparently Edger had felt his intellectual grasp weakening, for Comte reassured him that the pamphlet *Modern Times* showed “a tone sustained with an energy and dignity which indicate no weakening whatever.”¹⁵

Edger’s Various Proposals to Comte. Although Comte, in the second letter, told Edger that he might aspire to become a priest of Humanity if by proper study, especially of mathematics, he fitted himself for this position, in the next letter he indicated, perhaps at Edger’s suggestion, that he might not qualify for the priesthood proper, but that his functions would be purely apostolic. Comte wrote:¹⁶

I believe that, at your age, and especially because of the handicaps of your position, you may perhaps be forced to renounce the priesthood properly speaking, since you do not quite fulfil the difficult conditions which it demands in the form of an encyclopaedic preparation, without which we should not be able to resist scientific attacks. . . . The fear of never being able to achieve the priesthood, however, should not dampen your zeal, which can be fully utilized in a purely apostolic manner and degree.

Edger, who seems to have been quite unhappy and maladjusted in those years made numerous rather erratic suggestions, to most of which Comte replied with a kindly but definitive veto. For example, Comte rejected Edger’s project for establishing a Positivist monastery, which seemed to Comte “directly contrary to the play of the domestic affections, which our religion erects into the necessary basis of social existence.”¹⁷ Similarly, he suggests that Edger “renounce the project of astrolatric prayers which a praiseworthy but non-reflecting zeal has recently inspired in you.”¹⁸ Comte also begs Edger to renounce his plan for critical publications,¹⁹ since Posi-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

tivists ought to direct their efforts toward organic ends (now that Comte himself had done the criticism). But Edger's plan for the establishing of a Positivist Community secures Comte's generous approval. Regarding it he writes as follows: ²⁰

Your plan of founding a normal agricultural colony operated by true Positivists is more vast and difficult and merits serious attention and my generous encouragement. I leave it to you to decide whether or not you can fulfil the practical conditions which it particularly demands. But I must congratulate you on the idea, and especially on the prospect that you may find among the rich Americans a worthy patron for an enterprise which would convert Modern Times into a provisional center of American Positivism, both civil and religious.

Again Comte writes with respect to the same general proposition: ²¹

I wholly approve of your plan for the gradual enlargement of your industrial life, with the friendly assistance of Mr. Metcalf. I have no fear that this will distract you from the apostolic mission to which you wish worthily to consecrate your principal activity. Whatever their profession, Positivists must especially distinguish themselves in it, the better to recommend their general faith. Your distant village can become both the home of an important industry and the center of a vast propaganda, if your example and your success attract discouraged but pure and devoted enthusiasts.

The Problem of Architecture. Edger, who had been living in a hut, now determined to build a house and to include in it an oratory and chapel for Positivist humanitarian worship. In order that he might proceed with his building in strict conformity with Positivist principles, he wrote to Comte for instructions. In November, 1854, Comte replied to Edger's questions about religious architecture, saying that "the Positive religion prescribes nothing except with regard to temples, whose axes should everywhere be pointed toward Paris. This same law should apply to private chapels which will form part of the normal household of the humblest Positivist. But it is enough that the Believer take this position during his prayers, which can be done any place at all by means of an easy geographical determination." ²² He then continues, with respect to the practice which Edger had described to him as prevailing at Modern Times: "The practice which you describe to me at Modern Times confirms the natural need for order in the least disciplined minds. Although such a rule would be preferable to pure arbitrariness, it would be better not to adopt a uniform direction, but make

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

the disposition of the streets or houses vary according to the prevailing winds in each place.”²³

The Attempt to Establish a Positivist Colony. Edger had begun as early as 1854 to give lectures and hold Positivist services for a few residents of Modern Times who came to hear him. It was not, however, until 1856 that he was able to interest a man of somewhat greater means in his project and to dream of expanding the small group of persons who had been somewhat interested in his Positivist humanitarian propaganda into a real positivist community. The road was hard and rocky, however, for in 1862 the backer with means died and as yet the Positivist Community was still a dream. A year later (September 6, 1863), Edger preached a sermon at Modern Times, published as *The Positive Community*, in which he said,²⁴

The Positivist Community which it is intended gradually to form here, will have for one of its principal objects, the introduction of practical ameliorations in industrial relations, approximations towards normal conditions, among persons in whom the necessarily prior spiritual renovation will be already sufficiently advanced: . . . Our Community will essentially consist, then, in a free aggregation of families rallying around the centre of Positive Instruction here planted. Without any definite territorial limits, it will grow up in sufficient proximity to that centre to be able to co-operate energetically with it. A community of thought and of sentiment existing spontaneously as the very origin of the rallying of the several families, there will be a high degree of adaptation to practical co-operation, the development of which it will be the duty of the spiritual Leadership to foster in every possible way: and thus there may be finally realized a certain degree of approximation, even in external Institutions, to the Normal Social Order, presenting a practical manifestation of that Order which, if it have not all the importance attached to it by our Socialist friends, cannot be other than a highly valuable result, even in respect to the commendation of the corresponding doctrine at once to the public judgment and the popular heart.

I must hasten now to consider very briefly the duties imposed upon us professed Positivists in view of this special mission; and, in the first place, it is our duty, and will be that of all who may come to co-operate with us, to do everything in our power to strengthen the hands of the Central Body to whom our Master bequeathed the transcendently important task of continuing, on the foundation already laid by himself, the organization of the Church of Humanity.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

²⁴ Henry Edger, *The Positive Community: Glimpse of the Regenerated Future of the Human Race, A Sermon, Preached at Modern Times, Long Island, on Saturday, 24 Gutenberg, 75 (5th September, 1863), Being the Sixth Anniversary of the Death (Transformation) of Auguste Comte, Founder of the Religion of Humanity. Printed for the Positive Typographical Fund, Agent: M. Edger, Modern Times (Thompson Station), Long Island, Year of the Great Modern Crisis, 76 (1864), pp. 3-4.*

The necessary priority of the spiritual side of the universal reconstruction, makes everything else dependent on the development of the theoretical action of the Positive Council. This Body can maintain a representative and agent of itself here only by having its own hands energetically sustained. The increase and development of the positive sacerdotal subsidy, and the typographical fund, sole financial instruments of the collective action of our school, and sole material bases of the nascent Church and Priesthood of Humanity, constitute, therefore, the very first duty of every Positivist.

We may interrupt here a moment to point out that Edger was himself a member of the International Positivist Council. At the time this sermon was preached he was agent for the Positive Typographical Fund at Modern Times, and later, when he went to Paris to live, he was director of the Typographical Fund of the Systematic Apostolate of Humanity. Both of these funds represented more of an aspiration than an accomplished reality.²⁵

Duties of the Positivist Humanitarians. To return now to Edger's sermon, he continues with an analysis of the duties of Positivists as follows:²⁶

The duty next in importance and urgency, consists in the use of all secondary and local means for developing and sustaining the positive spiritual action, especially here at Modern Times. We can realize normal conditions, or even some faint shadow of them, only by developing in every possible way the theoretical and educational influence of the Positive Council. To that body we owe a personal spiritual allegiance; and in proportion as we have a lively sentiment of this allegiance, we cannot but devote ourselves, through evil report and thro' good report, to the consolidation of its influence; not only by deference in all things to its advice, and co-operation in all its educational and spiritual action, but by its courageous defence against the various assaults to which, like every

²⁵ This typographical fund, although chiefly a paper affair, seems to have been very close to Edger's heart. Inserted at the end of his pamphlet entitled *The Universal League of Religion*; Series of Systematic Letters to A Faithful and Devoted Disciple in a Rural Village of Ohio, United States of America (1888), is the following "APPEAL TO THE READER. If in the general line of thought pursued in the accompanying publication, or any of the special considerations therein presented, there seems to be something of more or less weight, something which, in this day of profound intellectual and moral disorder, it is in any wise important to have disseminated among our contemporaries, albeit only as furnishing food for serious thought, the Reader is earnestly requested to send as liberal a contribution as he feels able to afford to the undersigned, on behalf of the TYPOGRAPHICAL FUND OF THE SYSTEMATIC APOSTOLATE OF HUMANITY, in order to furnish the means of following up the present publication by others expounding the same General Doctrine. No propagande (sic) of new ideas can be sustained without aid of the kind. There cannot be any spontaneous demand for the exposition of conceptions of which the Public as yet knows nothing, as must needs be the case with those essentially due to Scientific Discoveries dating so to speak only from yesterday. . . ." (*loc. cit.*, p. 1).

²⁶ *The Positivist Community* (1864), pp. 31-32.

other movement of innovation, it will incessantly be liable, and which we know from experience to have, even when most specious, no real foundation but the bigotry and prejudice of those who are morally or intellectually incapable of co-operating with it.

In the third place, we have to devote our utmost energy to the realization as far as possible of the Normal Industrial conditions. The Positive Council having provided us here with just that guidance and instruction without which all attempts at radical practical reconstruction would be necessarily illusory, we have a vantage ground always wanting even to the noblest of prior attempts.

A Utopian Dream and Realizable Ideals. A single millionaire, he adds—adopting the pattern of the Fourierian dream which he had probably acquired while a member of one of Brisbane's projects—could institute an Agricultural Domain, which should contain 1200 acres, according to the *Politique Positive*, erect the normal Patriciate Mansion, normal Village with proletary cottages, spacious Hall, Schools, Bands of Music, organized Industry, and all the other requirements of a Positivist community.²⁷ Returning from this excursion into Utopia, to the more practical possibilities of the present, he adds,²⁸

But altho' none of all this is now within our reach, nor belongs to us to attempt, it does not by any means follow that there is nothing that we can do; that within the Industrial sphere we have no duties, especially as Positivists, to perform. In the first place, we can at all events infuse into our daily lives *the spirit* of the normal order, and in our practical pursuits maintain continually the *sentiment* of the sociality of all industrial functions. We can habitually look at all our affairs from the social point of view. We may keep ever before our eyes the Ideal Type of our community and of the normal Industrial undertakings of which we conceive it to be composed. We may constantly set before us, as our one supreme end, *the approximate realization* of this type, instead of the mere furtherance of our own personal interests.

The Socialists, he declares, had high aims, namely the amelioration of the material situation of those engaged in their schemes, "but our end is much higher; and in morals, the higher the end, the less, not the greater, danger of disappointment. Our principal aim is moral, only secondarily material."²⁹ He ends the sermon in a vein of hope, with the following words:³⁰

Finally, in the present aspect of our cause, our special duty as Positivists is very much summed up in Longfellow's oft quoted line: "Learn to labor and to

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

wait." . . . If we really believe in our Faith, we will know that after all, it is not we who have to work out the Human Future. That Future was not *invented* by positive sociology; it was *discovered*. It is going to be realized any way, in spite of all opposing obstacles. Not our efforts, but the immutable tendencies of Human Nature, eternal, and indestructible, will bring it all about, just as soon, too, as in the nature of things is possible.

Failure. In spite of these brave words, the attempt to make a Positivist Community of Modern Times failed. According to Edger's son, M. Paul Edger, the failure of the community "was attributed by my father to metaphysical preconceptions from which his conversion to Positivism had not yet at that time been able to free him completely."³¹ It is doubtful, however, if the venture could have succeeded even if led by a better qualified person than Edger. The romantic impulse which had precipitated so many such experimental colonies in the eighteen-forties had practically exhausted itself in the eighteen-fifties. But more significant still was the dark and gloomy cloud of the Impending Crisis. Slavery, secession—these were the practical problems of the hour and Utopian communities were no longer in order according to the thought of the times.

Edger, however, continued his propaganda activities. Still, no doubt, animated by the belief³²

that there certainly must be, among the vast numbers alienated more or less from the conventional faiths, or at least sceptical as to their capacity, we will not say to remedy our actual ills, but even to prevent their indefinite increase, some few souls who will perceive almost at the first glance, athwart all the blunders and clumsiness of the expositor, the grandeur and glory of the doctrines expounded, and particularly of the one central conception of the possibility of basing the spiritual culture of man, social and individual, henceforth, upon solid and durable, because scientific, bases.

He went on preaching his new Positivist gospel. In New York, in 1868, says a Christian critic, "on the day of our Lord, before a large and cultivated audience, [Edger]³³ commenced a series of discourses which are to inaugurate a system of Propagandism designed to displace Christianity, and indeed, all Worship, and to hasten that universal triumph of Positivism, predicted by its author, which is to secure the social, political, and

³¹ Personal letter to the authors.

³² Henry Edger (ed.), *The Positivist Calendar* (1856), pp. vi-vii.

³³ Edger is not specified by name at this point. But seven pages further on the author speaks of "the faint echoes of Mr. Edger, who borrows the Christian Sabbath to popularize French Atheism" (*ibid.*, p. 179) so the evidence is clear that he has Edger in mind in the earlier reference.

intellectual unity of our race, when Paris will be the centre of Philosophy, and the Capital of the world." ³⁴ In spite of the "large and cultivated audience," however, the actual number of contributors to the Religion of Humanity in 1867 was only 46, and the total amount of their contributions was only \$750.00. ³⁵ Positivism, in the religious sense, with its emphasis on duties rather than on rights, had no chance in America at that time when the doctrine of rugged individualism was at its peak.

Edger's Later European Career. Edger, deeply discouraged by his lack of success at Modern Times and in New York City, finally went to France, where he made himself Director of the Typographical Fund of the Systematic Apostolate of Humanity, to which he secured but few contributions. In 1882 he began a series of three annual addresses on Comte and his work in the city of Pozsony (Presbourg) to a privately assembled group of people who understood English. The third of these addresses, *Auguste Comte and the Middle Ages* (1885), was the only one printed. A series of eight lectures altogether was projected, to "comprise a complete and au-

³⁴ Unsigned, "Comtean Atheism," *American Quarterly Church Review, and Ecclesiastical Register*, XX: 172 (July, 1868).

³⁵ Unsigned, "Positivism in England," *The Southern Review*, V: 381 (Apr., 1869). The reader may be interested in the summary of subscriptions to the Positive Sacerdotal Subsidy, in the first seven years of its existence (*The Positivist Calendar*, etc., p. 103):

STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF THE SUBSCRIPTIONS TO THE POSITIVE SACERDOTAL SUBSIDY

During the First Seven Years of Its Institution

	1849.	1850.	1851.	1852.	1853.	1854.	1855.
Amount of French subscriptions				fr. 2,400	3,720	3,360	3,796
Amount of subscriptions of other occidental nations				fr. 3,155	2,850	2,480	2,740
Anonymous				fr. 45	830	1,164	520
Total amount	fr. 3,000	3,300	4,200	5,600	7,400	7,004	7,056
Number of French subscriptions				40	48	53	54
Minimum of do.				fr. 5	3,65	5	5
Mean, do.				fr. 60	78	63	70
Maximum, do.				fr. 200	300	300	400
Number of other occidental subscriptions				26	22	21	18
Minimum of do.				fr. 25	25	10	5
Mean, do.*				fr. 100	130	118	152
Maximum, do.				fr. 500	500	500	1,087
Number of anonymous subscriptions of various nations				4	21	5	3
Mean amount of the whole subscription *				fr. 80	82	89	94
Whole number of subscriptions *				70	91	79	75

* Omitting one collective subscription in London in 1852, amounting to 650 f.

thentic account, only from a popular rather than an academical point of view, of the Life and Work of the extraordinary man, who is but now beginning to be known, and who will be truly appreciated only centuries hence." One of these lectures was "to dwell on the brilliant picture of the FUTURE STATE OF MAN UPON EARTH, deduced by Auguste Comte, with strict scientific exactitude, from the wise co-ordination of the several elements of that state spontaneously developed in the past. While in the three subsequent years, the work of Auguste Comte then sufficiently known, at least in its most important aspect, we shall be free to direct our contemplation more specifically to the person of this unexampled Renovator, and in three successive Lectures we will consider *Auguste Comte the Philosopher*, *Auguste Comte the Founder*, and *Auguste Comte the Man*." ³⁶ The work was never completed, however, and Edger died in 1888. ³⁷

Edger's First Disciple. John Metcalf, a New York carpenter, was Edger's first disciple. ³⁸ In July, 1855, Comte wrote to Edger that he was very happy to hear "that, through your mediation, Positivism has made an acquisition as valuable as this one, destined soon to secure for us a great many worthy conversions," ³⁹ and by February of the next year Comte wrote his first letter to Metcalf direct. Metcalf, it appears, had had some difficulty with his family and felt that his brother and sisters had treated him badly. ⁴⁰ Apparently it was during this crisis, when Metcalf was living with Edger in Modern Times and was directing the building of his new house, that Edger got hold of him and converted him to Positivism. For awhile he was happy in Edger's menage, but soon this refuge ceased to be entirely satisfactory and he decided he ought to get married. He wrote to Comte for advice on this matter. Comte agreed that he ought to get married. ⁴¹ Comte also advised him to be reconciled with his brother, on his brother's

³⁶ *Auguste Comte and the Middle Ages* (1885), pp. 113-114.

³⁷ In addition to the works already cited, Edger wrote an article on "Prostitution and the International Woman's League," printed in *The Radical Review*, in 1878. He also prepared for the press the "First Annual Report of the Double Propagande of the Positive Religion of Humanity and the Universal League of Religion. Presented to M. Pi  re Laffitte, Perpetual President of the Society of Thirteen Testamentary Executors instituted by Auguste Comte in his last Will and Testament." In this same last will and testament Edger had been named a member of the Positive Committee.

³⁸ Auguste Comte, *Lettres d'Auguste Comte    Henry Edger et    M. John Metcalf* (1889), p. vii.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

own terms, since nothing else would satisfy his conscience or manifest his dignity better. Comte apparently wanted no conflicts in his disciples. Metcalf had leanings toward Catholic women, which Comte approved, but he advised Metcalf not to limit himself to this field entirely in his search for a wife. The only restriction Comte suggested was that whomever he married, she should be a woman who would submit to a Positivist ceremony as well as to a Catholic or Protestant one.⁴²

During this same period of restlessness Metcalf proposed that he go to Paris to visit Comte. Comte was very touched at this suggestion but advised him not to come until he had mastered the French language. He said he would be happy to open Positivist circles to Metcalf but it would be of no avail if he did not understand French.⁴³ The visit was postponed to the spring of 1858,⁴⁴ but in the meanwhile Comte himself had died. The subsequent career of John Metcalf is somewhat obscure. His family life proved not to be very happy and for a time he absented himself from it, going to Ohio, where he settled in one of the rising towns and plied his trade of carpenter and cabinet maker. Subsequently he was reconciled to his family and his wife went to Ohio to join him. He retained his loyalty to Edger throughout his life, in spite of certain circumstances that might easily have alienated a less simple minded man,⁴⁵ and he retained his Positivist faith until he grew old and died.

Metcalf Acquires a Mission. Comte, it appears, was delighted with Metcalf and assigned to him, simple-minded as he was, the task of converting and proselytizing the proletariat. He wrote, "Your letter of the 20th of Charlemagne, received yesterday, satisfied me profoundly because of your worthy acceptance of the normal career which, in accordance with the whole of your nature and your antecedents, I finally advised for you, in order to furnish today the true decisive type of Positivist proletarian."⁴⁶ In this capacity, as proletarian Positivist leader, it would be Metcalf's duty to fight the two bad tendencies which had corrupted the occidental proletariat, namely the tendency toward unclassing themselves, which characterized those who passed from the proletariat to the bourgeoisie, and the tendency to the use of violence to solve conflicts.⁴⁷ In this capacity, Metcalf

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 82-88.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 83. See also p. 54.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁴⁵ There was a scandal involving Edger and Clara Metcalf, who was then living in the Edger household.

⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 85. See also p. 70.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

was to be virtually a public functionary and as such he must assume "a noble and steadfast veneration toward your industrial leaders,"⁴⁸ which would be the best way to show the moral and social superiority of Positivism.⁴⁹ Metcalf was first to apply these principles to the American proletariat, then to that of Great Britain, and then to that of France.⁵⁰ Comte approved of Metcalf's growing contacts with the Catholics of New York and the efforts he was making to draw them to the true faith.⁵¹ He recommended especially close contacts with the Jesuits, "who are, in all respects, the best exponents and propagators of Catholicism. . . . They should serve us only as auxiliaries, while accepting our leadership, after having freely recognized our superiority. . . . Every other attitude toward them could end only in sterile contacts which, consuming your time and energies, might diminish your zeal by disappointments already easy to foresee."⁵² Comte also heartily approved of Metcalf's publication project,⁵³ a proposed address to working men, which he refers to as a "*precieux opusculé politique*."⁵⁴ Comte suggests that he change the word *Anarchy* to *Protestantism* in the title of this pamphlet, in view of his environment, but not to change the radical equivalence of the two terms.⁵⁵

Metcalf's Propaganda Activities. The actual nature of Metcalf's propagandizing activities is difficult to infer. In fact, they appear never to have been realized in practice in any considerable detail. Many years later, still faithful to Positivist principles, he apparently tried to win over a Congregational minister, Mr. R., in the small town in Ohio where he lived. He reported his interview to Edger, then in Paris, and Edger replied in two small pamphlets entitled *The Universal League of Religion: Series of Systematic Letters to A Faithful and Devoted Disciple in a Rural Village of Ohio, United States of America*. The first was dated 1 Cesar, 100 (April, 1888); the second, Saint Paul, 100 (May, 1888). A series of 30 to 34 such letters was projected, one to appear each positivist month, but only two were ever completed, for Edger died in 1888.

Net Achievements of the Modern Times Efforts. The obvious effects of the propaganda and constructive efforts of Henry Edger and his asso-

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 88. See also p. 62.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

ciates at Modern Times were not reassuring. Edger was not fitted by temperament and previous experience to become a trusted spiritual leader of so abstract and exacting a movement as that of the Religion of Humanity, and John Metcalf did not possess either the natural ability or the education necessary to render him a fit apostle to the proletariat. Of the sincerity of Metcalf there can be no doubt. Edger, too, was deeply interested in the Positivist Philosophy and even more obsessed by the Religion of Humanity, but probably more as a means of escape from his own inner conflicts and overt failures and disappointments than because of fundamental principles. His tendency to become lost in the ritual and ceremony and other formalities at the expense of the greater spiritual and social truths of the Religion of Humanity bears witness to his cultural inadequacy for the apostolate he had assumed. His frequent slips in morals and "falling from grace," and his later rather disgraceful Bohemian career in New York in the years immediately preceding his departure for France, when he became more of a disciple of the sex radicals flourishing there in the eighteen-seventies than of Positivism, testifies to his personal unfitness to become the leader of a great and austere religion seeking only the progress and happiness of mankind.

However, his failure to make Positivism on its religious side an obvious success in America was by no means due wholly to his personal and cultural inadequacies. As we have already seen, there were general social and intellectual factors which were even more opposed to the growth of the Comtean doctrines in this country. Calvinistic orthodoxy still presented too great a barrier to the spirit of a socialized religion to permit it to acquire many adherents. Our political and social theory was equally individualistic and opposed to a program of paternalistic prosecution of social welfare at the expense of private profit and exploitation as urged by Comte. Also, it must not be forgotten that the Religion of Humanity was modelled after Catholicism rather than Protestantism, and that Comte himself showed clearly his preference for the former as against the latter type of religion. The Protestants looked upon the new religion as foreign and perhaps as little better than Catholicism, while the Catholics—whom Comte sought to win over by making his rituals, ceremonials, and creeds as similar to theirs as possible, except that he arrogated to himself the place of the pope and conceived the object of his religion to be social rather than hierarchical welfare—regarded it as a dangerous usurper. Comte was also something of a patrician and authoritarian, holding that the classes as he knew them

in Europe should remain separate and distinct and that the proletariat especially should not encroach upon the privileges of the bourgeoisie. He believed that the average man should take his religious and political direction from his superiors without question. In fact, Comte aspired to be a Fascist dictator in defense of clergy and bourgeois class interests before the day of such dictators. Henry Edger was thoroughly in sympathy with this point of view and frequently attempted to impose his own will as a sort of self-assumed American governor of Positivism upon his associates and followers in the United States. It is no wonder therefore that he failed in this frontier country to secure their allegiance, with the single exception of John Metcalf.

Nevertheless it cannot be said that Edger's efforts were as barren of results as they appeared on the surface to be. It was too early to secure a working organization of the Religion of Humanity in America, and its peculiar character as described above largely barred it from favor as an authoritative institution in this country. But the pamphlets, addresses, conversations, and correspondence of Edger and of other disciples in the eighteen-fifties and sixties probably set many more men to thinking than we have any record of and thus served as a leaven which ultimately produced profound results of an informal character, if not formal and institutional.

The Direct Influence of Comte: Horace Binney Wallace

Horace Binney Wallace.¹ Also within the range of Comte's influence, but of less importance as a Positivist leader, was Horace Binney Wallace, of Philadelphia. Wallace was a quiet, unassuming, modest sort of young man, intellectually eager and adventuresome, who even at college "was held to dwell apart in a world of higher thoughts than those which usually occupy young men of his age."² Like students in the Latin tradition, his approach to the sociological viewpoint was through the study of law, which he viewed "not merely practically, but philosophically."³ His legal works, largely in the nature of commentaries, were considered among "the best known and the most authoritative publications which American Jurisprudence owns."⁴

He was, however, interested in many other things besides the law, being, for example, a fine mathematician, an excellent classical scholar, and also a poet. At the age of twenty he had even projected a new theory of comets,

¹ Horace Binney Wallace (1817-1852) was born in Philadelphia, the son of a prominent lawyer. He was privately educated in early years but entered the University of Pennsylvania in 1830. He transferred to Princeton, however, where he received the A.B. degree in 1835. He studied medicine at the University of Pennsylvania, later switching to chemistry. He abandoned both of these professions in favor of law, studying this last-named subject in his father's office. Although he was admitted to the bar in 1840, he never practiced law professionally, but devoted his time to the writing of legal commentaries. In 1849 he went to Europe to study the arts, and again in 1852. During this second visit he died in Paris, apparently a suicide. His works include: *Commentaries on A Selection of Leading Cases in Various Branches of the Law*, by John William Smith (with J. I. C. Hare), 1844; *Commentaries on A Selection of Leading Cases in Equity by White and Tudor* (with J. I. C. Hare), 1849-1851; *Select Decisions of American Courts* (with J. I. C. Hare), 1847; *Art, Scenery, and Philosophy in Europe*, 1855; *Literary Criticisms and Other Papers*, 1856. See *Dictionary of American Biography*, XIX: 370-371.

² Unsigned, "Horace Binney Wallace," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVI (4th series, VI, Jan., 1854), p. 133.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Unsigned comment in *Literary Criticisms and Other Papers*, by Horace Binney Wallace (1856), p. v.

but later discarded it as too playful.⁵ His mind, it will be noted, was excursive, there being "nothing worth reading that he did not read, nor hardly anything worth thinking about, that he did not profoundly weigh, and think of again and again."⁶

Daniel Webster, a friend of the family, thought so well of young Wallace that he would have liked to put him in public life.⁷ But Wallace himself was not interested in a career of public service. He "filled no public station, and shunned rather than sought, during his whole life, everything like notoriety."⁸ He was, in fact, a very modest person and even wrote his non-legal work anonymously.

Wallace and Comte. Wallace died too young—at the age of thirty-five—to have left any significant stamp on Social Science, but it appears that he was headed in that direction when death overtook him. The Comtean system was calculated to appeal to just this type of sincere, religiously trained, earnest young man⁹ and he had been well acquainted with the *Philosophie Positive* long before it became at all well known in either Europe or America.¹⁰ In the preface to the second volume of his *Politique Positive*, Comte had written that "Since last summer I have known of the existence, fully appreciated, of the valuable Positivist center spontaneously formed among eminent American conservators, particularly in Philadelphia and New York."¹¹ The reference to Philadelphia is to Wallace, who had known Comte personally in Paris. Comte was delighted with him. In the preface to the third volume of the *Politique Positive* he wrote:¹²

In concluding this preface I cannot help deploring the misfortune which has recently deprived me of an eminent disciple—one destined, without doubt, to have become one of the chief pillars of Positivism. When mentioning, in the preface to the second volume of this work, that a distinguished citizen of Philadelphia had given in his adhesion to my principles, I little foresaw that I should so soon have to lament his loss at the early age of thirty-five.

Though our personal intercourse was limited to three interviews, with inter-

⁵ Unsigned, "Horace Binney Wallace," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVI (4th series VI, Jan., 1854), p. 135.

⁶ Unsigned, *Obituary* (1853), pp. 7-8.

⁷ Letter from Daniel Webster to Hiram Ketcham, dated Feb. 22, 1849, reproduced in Wallace's *Literary Criticism and Other Papers*, p. iv.

⁸ Unsigned, "Horace Binney Wallace," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVI (4th series, VI, Jan., 1854), p. 133.

⁹ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. xii.

¹² *Loc. cit.*, p. xvii. The present translation is from the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVI (4th series, VI, Jan., 1854), p. 132.

vals of correspondence as short as precious, I yet knew him well enough to be entitled to judge of the loss which Humanity has sustained in his death. In him heart, intellect, and character united in so rare combination and harmony, that he would have aided powerfully in advancing the difficult transition through which the nineteenth century has to pass. Free from all affectation, his culture, both aesthetical and scientific, was in perfect harmony with his fine organization. Although he gave his youth in part to literary efforts, his spontaneous and free communications to me authorize the belief that he would have distinguished himself in active life in a country where the noble citizen is greater even than the officer of state. I do not exaggerate his merits in ranking him as the equal of the greatest American statesman; and if I name Wallace and Jefferson together, men will fail to recognize the moral and intellectual points in accord between them, only because of the *difference* between them in development and in public position.

His anonymous friend, who wrote the sketch of his life in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, also believed that "all his other studies were only preliminary and preparatory to the one great science of Sociology, to which, had he lived, his mature powers would, we think, have been exclusively devoted."¹³

Edger's Comments on Wallace. Edger, who dedicated *The Positivist Calendar*¹⁴ to Wallace, felt that Positivism, as a religion, had lost a great support in Wallace's death.¹⁵ He says,

The deceased himself [Wallace] was equally a stranger to him [Edger] personally. But the memory of the dead belongs to us all; and Horace Binney Wallace, his objective career being terminated, becomes, in virtue of the services rendered to our holy cause, the elder brother and bosom friend of every sincere Positivist. And his memory is cherished by us the more tenderly, from the fact that Positivism, the most progressive of all doctrines, was appreciated by him principally from its eminent tendency to consolidate social order. For it is not only true that the very conception of progress, isolated from that of order, is as absurd as it is immoral, but the religious aptitude of Positivism, just that which most endears it to all its complete adherents, is also that which could alone command adhesion of one who frankly declares himself a "conservative of the conservatives."

¹³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 136.

¹⁴ The dedication is as follows: "To the Memory of Horace Binney Wallace, Late of the City of Philadelphia, Who Died at Paris, Dec. 16th, 1852, at the Age of 35 Years; a Noble American, Who, Notwithstanding His Unfortunate and Premature Death, Lived Long Enough to Manifest an Eminent Degree of Appreciation of the Renovating Faith, and Who, in the Midst of an Almost Universal Social and Moral Dissolution, Gave Tokens of a Generous Public Spirit, Which, but for his Untimely Decease, Would Doubtless Ultimately Have Developed Him into One of the Pillars of the New Catholic Church; This Little Book is Gratefully and Affectionately DEDICATED by the Author."

¹⁵ Henry Edger, *The Positivist Calendar* (1856), pp. vii-viii, x.

Such an adhesion creates at once a bond of sympathy with all religious Positivists so profound as to fairly obliterate all secondary differences, however important they might seem to the superficial. . . . But his noblest claim to our undying gratitude and unfeigned reverence consists in the fact that minor differences of opinion, differences that would seem to the uninitiated even fundamental, in nowise hindered his becoming one of the most energetic cooperators in the one great undertaking which constitutes the sole necessary initiative and principal permanent basis of the Positivist movement.

Wallace's Views Regarding Comte. Both Edger and Comte, however, seem to have been mistaken in Wallace. Actually he accepted only the Positive Philosophy; he rejected the Positive Polity or Positivism as a Religion. In a letter to a friend he says,¹⁶

From his [Comte's] Atheism I totally dissent. Atheism may be the accident of the individual; it is not a characteristic of the system. In my view, the positive system is a certain and universal method; and religion—the religion revealed to the Church and recorded in the inspired Scriptures—is a reality as certain as life itself; and the correct application of the positive method to the subject of religion, so far from upsetting, will verify and demonstrate the catholic faith. In attempting this application M. Comte has altogether broken down.

I think that I can state to you precisely the character and extent of M. Comte's intellectual merit, and draw the line within which he is an oracle and beyond which he is a babbler.

It is almost a law of man's intelligence, that abstract and logical reasoning is a different sort of mind, or an opposite mode of application, from special and practical sagacity in investigation; that they are distinct faculties or reversed actions of the intellect; and that a person is gifted with immense perfection in one of these ways only under the condition of becoming thereby incapacitated in a corresponding degree as to the other. Thus it was with Bacon. After apprehending and defining with infallible justness the true method of investigation and discovery, and foretelling with accuracy the results that would follow from employing it—after himself fashioning the instrument, and explaining precisely how it was to be dealt with—when he attempted himself to apply it in particular use, as in his collections in natural history, he fell into the fooleries the most inconceivable. He seems not to have been in the least degree competent to conduct the operation of the machine which he had invented. M. Comte's failure is not greater than Bacon's, and is quite analogous to it. When he generalizes, philosophizes, and systematizes—when he reasons upon what has been done, determines upon what principles it has been done, and thence points out what ought henceforth to be done, we are astonished by his piercing analysis, his all-comprehending wisdom. When he attempts to apply his own method to the exploration and establishment of truth in a new department, he exposes

¹⁶ Horace Binney Wallace, Letter to John McClintock, editor, printed in *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVI (4th series, VI, Jan., 1854), pp. 140-142.

himself. The "Cours de Philosophie Positive" is a monument to his prodigious powers in an abstract and an analytic way; the *Système de Politique Positive*, in its bearing upon religion, an equally significant measure of his puny capacity as an original investigator. In applying Positivism to spiritual matters, he proceeds in a style directly repugnant to all his principles and teachings. He sets out by stultifying history, and the experience of forty centuries, and sets up the metaphysical contrivances of his own brain in opposition to the collective and traditionary sense of the race. The attempts of M. Littré and the République Occidentale, to make an application of the positive method to politics, are equally distressing. Those synthetic suggestions toward a so-called reconstruction of society exhibit a complete departure from the principles of the positive method. M. Comte thinks that Positivism is Atheistic. M. Littré thinks that it is republican or radical. I agree with neither. I am a conservative of the conservatives; and it is upon the positive system, as applied to morals and politics, that I found my confidence in the ultimate triumph of sound principles.

M. Comte's writings are of inestimable value to those who know how to use what is valuable in them; dangerous to indiscriminating minds. To derive the fullest benefit from him, we must try him severely and judge him fearlessly. As a guide in regard to the philosophy of philosophy, he is the most enlightened that has appeared since Bacon. I cannot speak of him but in terms of enthusiastic reverence. He is an object of boundless admiration and gratitude to me. But at a certain point his inspiration stops. His illumination extends only through a certain department; beyond it he sees less than the dullest. . . .

We have abundant means of judging M. Comte. He was not the discoverer of the Positive Method; nor is he the highest authority in respect to its characteristics. He was not the first to apply it either to science, or to politics, or to theology. It had been brought to bear upon history, religion, and social subjects before he appeared; and with results eminently conservative and satisfactory. A student of Bacon and of those great men who after had taken up and extended the inductive method, I was myself engaged in applying it to politics, morals, and spirituality before I heard of Comte. From the perusal of his works I have derived immeasurable benefit; but when he comes to fit his method to spiritual affairs, he ciphers entirely, and I proceed without him upon my own original and independent course. As I consider that the religious bearings of Positivism ought to be brought right, before it is introduced to the public, I have been long endeavoring to elaborate that part of the task, and to rectify M. Comte's aberrations in respect to it. I think myself able to contribute some slight suggestions toward founding the true positive conceptions of the religious subject, and developing it demonstratively; and as the results thus arrived at will be found identical with the system of the Church, both in doctrine and in operation, it will follow that the Scripture system was a true revelation. The time is not distant when Christianity will rely entirely upon the positive philosophy for its argumentative support. That philosophy is destined to furnish the demonstration of the Christian truth, and thereby to convert the world.

As I look upon the positive system, also, as offering the only protection in

politics against the disorganizing maxims and passions of the revolutionary and destructive parties of the day, I have thought it most important to present the political bearings of this system in a complete and satisfactory way. I have, therefore, occupied myself for some time upon a history of political philosophy, which I shall perhaps complete in the form of a report to the Smithsonian Institution. I desire therein to trace the rise, and operation, and failure of all the metaphysical systems, and the rise, and partial developments, and imperfect apprehension of it down to the present day. The positive philosophy, as applied to politics, has been used by many before Comte; most of all by Burke. . . . M. Comte has taught us the true philosophy of that philosophy, he estimated and analyzed the method; but the method was in use before him, not only by Burke, but by Montesquieu, Machiavel, and, greatest of all, the half-inspired Vico.

Wallace's Reservations. It seems clear from this passage that Wallace was not unreservedly a disciple of Comte. Wallace died before the *Positive Polity*, setting forth the full theory of Comte's Religion of Humanity, appeared, but it is practically certain that he would not have accepted it entire. Liberal Protestant and student of the Bible—he is reported to have memorized large portions of it—he was undoubtedly too conservative to have made such a wide departure in matters of religious belief. Although he accepted the general theory of scientific Positivism, he was too cautious to wish to have it presented immediately to the masses. According to his own words, he felt ¹⁷

that Comte can never find an audience in the public. His teachings will act on the world only *mediately*; through the writings of men who catching his inspiration will bring it to bear practically upon the mass. The system is not yet completed. It requires much more labor. The mob of literateurs in this country, what can they contribute to the completion of such a scheme? I dread the thing's becoming known, by a few catch-words, to the editorial mind of the country—which catches up some foolish phase of truth “whisks it about and down it goes again”—after being rendered disgusting to all quiet and thoughtful people. Let the people stand out of the way until the Positive development of morals is complete; and then let it be brought before them, not as a thing to speculate about, or dogmatize about—but to receive, and to submit to as they do to the teachings of the mathematician and the chemist. Besides this, until the positive scheme can be shown as a scheme tending to and ending in religion, identical with revealed religion, the public knowledge of it will only tend to evil. The old distinctions between the esoteric and exoteric communication—the Catholic doctrine of the reverse of truth—however liable to abuse in

¹⁷ *Art, Scenery, and Philosophy in Europe* (1855), pp. 343–345. Quoted by Henry Edger in *The Positivist Calendar* (1856), pp. ix–x.

the application, are founded on nature and true philosophy, and in a corrected form of constant operation.

He therefore "never cared to see it [*Cours de Philosophie Positive*] introduced to the public."¹⁸

Similarities to Comte—His Conception of Woman. That there were many similarities of underlying viewpoint and emphasis between Comte and Wallace is quite evident from a perusal of the writings of the latter. Indeed, they were grounded in much the same sort of conservative cultural training and their interests were in many respects similar. An advance in age and greater maturity of thought might have brought Wallace much closer to a discipleship of Comte than he ever attained. The following passage, evidencing the ecstatic adulation of the abstemious recluse for women, might well have flowed from the pen of the author of the *Positive Polity*.¹⁹

As natural energy and intellectual discernment are the masculine elements of the race, so those self-annihilating emotions and affections—that exquisiteness of virtuous sensibility—that secondary and transcendental consciousness—which form the spiritual in our constitution—are the dowry which Providence gave with woman, when her loftier destiny was blended into eternal unity with our kind. . . . From the early days of Christianity, the mother and her child became the symbol of that faith and feeling which were to humanize the world; and from that central idea, as from a germ of diviner life, the whole system of Catholic virtues flowered. When, at a later period, the forces of intellectual vigor, eager to expand into a brighter existence, gushed forth into imaginative art, the maternal relation and the domestic circle became the type of that mystic power which, rising from the ruins of Judea, had pervaded the earth with its transforming energy. The Madonna—that natural apotheosis of woman—is the permanent emblem of Christianity.

Views on Religion. In the matter of religion in general there was also a close similarity to the sympathetic emotional appreciation of all genuine religious experience which is so evident in Comte, although Wallace's penetration of religion is less profound philosophically. To both of these men religion was primarily a beneficent emotional experience. Both were very tolerant of all types of religions, for they saw them in evolutionary perspective and regarded all as having made some necessary contribution to the spiritual life of mankind at some stage of human existence. Thus,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

¹⁹ *Literary Criticisms and Other Papers*, 1856, p. 92.

Wallace causes one of his favorite characters, Woodward (who has many of the philosophic characteristics of Comte), to say,²⁰

I go back to the infancy of man, and trace in the changes thence to manhood the wideness of his spirit from the many phases it has sown. I would regard the mythology of those times as passed away, but not the men nor their relation to that mythology. I look on myself as a moment in the existence of MAN, and regard Paganism as one of the views which in my youth I took of nature. And the rather because Heathénism and Catholicism, each after its sort, are more favorable in the view they take, to the cherishment and growth of religious *feeling*, than Protestantism and our times; and I am unwilling to lose the benefit of that view, but would revive those times within me, renew the old mythology, and be for the purpose and the nonce, a Heathen and a Catholic. By every class of the writings of the Greeks and Romans we may be led to intimate knowledge and constant acknowledgment of the Creator of the earth—to bow to God manifest in the world. In the mistaken view of the Protestant Christian, God is a being to be dreaded, and to be worshipped from a distance.

Thus he seems to share with Comte a preference for the emotional warmth of Catholicism over the cold intellectuality and aloofness of Protestantism. Again, he makes Woodward say of Catholicism:²¹

It was admirably adapted to nurse and promote the warm, the tender, the delicious feelings of the soul. It encouraged worship of beings less awful, less unapproachable than the infinite and eternal mystery of ages. The men associated kindness and commiseration with the mother of Christ. Females hoped for sympathy from one of their own sex, and felt a calm reliance upon her who had felt the storms of temptation, and knew when and how best to administer aid. The circumstances which detach *us* from our connection with the Deity, linked them the more closely. The Protestant, when he is tossed on the ocean of storms, and every rising wave presses danger on his life, trembles at the presence of the God of the whole earth; the Catholic felt the arm of his patron Saint upholding him, and dreaded no ill.

Although he recognizes the contribution made by the pagan religions, and especially those of Greece and Rome,²² he regards Christianity as the highest form of religion yet evolved. He condemns the pagan poets—the “ministers of pleasure”—for their lack of vision and for their Epicurean philosophy of life; “the joyousness of their joy has long been turned to

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

²² *Ibid.*

sadness, and the wild laugh of gaiety comes to our ears like an echo hurled back in mockery.”²³ On the other hand, Christianity has a moral aim: “Christianity, if it has not altered men’s minds, has changed the whole chord of men’s feelings.”²⁴

Emphasis upon a Practical Religion. Like Comte, he professes a contempt for metaphysics and praises a writer on the philosophy of history for his realistic justification of Christianity upon the functional basis of its service to a more ethical and humane regime in modern civilization.²⁵ His conception of the predominant importance of the human sympathetic and moral elements in religion may be illustrated admirably by the following passage in praise of the manner of preaching of Sydney Smith. He says,²⁶

We heartily wish that there were more sermons of modern times, like these of Sydney Smith. The preachers of this day display an utter ignorance of the constitution of that human nature which it is their duty, first to know, and then to elevate. . . . They distinguish subtly; they argue irresistibly; they fulminate magnificently; but they never condescend to attract, allure, and win. The consequence is, that while the air is filled with the strife of tongues, and the city is set on fire with the rivalries of religions, that celestial presence which is the inner soul of all religion—that spirit which “vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in the truth, beareth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things”—has fled away from us to the mountains, and to the vallies, and to the ends of the earth. Far different is the course pursued by the prebendary of St. Paul’s. He sets out by conciliating all our sympathies, and lulling all our animosities against his cause; he goes on through a rich, delightful course of moral reflection, till at last he has made all our natural tastes and inclinations in love with spiritual truth. He sets up a practical standard; he brings men to it by attracting their feelings, and keeps them there by satisfying their judgments.

Distrust of Popular Education. Undoubtedly Comtean are Wallace’s statements regarding popular education and democracy, although these opinions set forth so vigorously at the age of twenty may well have been modified in the direction of tolerance later in life. It is quite clear that he does not consider that popular education improves the lot of the common man or renders him capable, as the Jeffersonians supposed, of managing the public welfare to an advantage. In the words of Woodward he says,²⁷

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 198–199.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 154–155.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

The modern system of things neither commands my respect nor wins my sympathy. This insane craving after 'knowledge,' this diseased exaggeration of the value of facts, and this ruinous mistake of believing information to be education, and of scrupulously separating from public instruction the only essential things, the principles of religion and the rules of duty; this disgusting flattery and stimulation of the mob; this admission of the worthless and scorn-compelling rabble to the decision of questions which they can never comprehend; this breaking of principles over the back of majorities; this utter neglect of all that improves and elevates man, of all that is honorable in conduct, ennobling in wisdom, important in politics, and indispensable in religion—offend alike my reason and my taste, and move me, I confess, to a warmer contempt than wholly consists with the coolness of contemplation.

His scorn for the modern non-classical education, like that of any other conservative, is unstinted. He even throws a slur upon two democratic defenders of human liberties—Algernon Sydney and Hampden—by whom Jefferson set great store. He prefers Plato's metaphysics to Brougham's philosophy of popular enlightenment. We quote his words (Woodward again speaking) as follows:²⁸

I concede fully the importance of scientific and mechanical knowledge in their own place and degree; but to feed with such husks a country demanding sound food, is fatal in its folly, and outrageous in its absurdity. It is not thus that nations are generated. There goes more than this to the making of a virtuous people and a wise community. A people rising to a sense of their responsibilities ask for light on the vital subjects of truth and action, and are furnished with treatises on galvinism and hydro-dynamics! They ask for counsel in the distractions and doubts of political commotion, and are furnished with 'patriotic' lives of the hireling traitor Sydney and the selfish conspirator Hampden. They are laboriously conducted into the regions of 'pure mathematics!' and gratefully entertained with 'familiar accounts of Newton's Principia!' Every man is made capable of dyeing his own coat and assaying his pocket-pieces, but not a solitary step is made towards the completion of that line whereby Plato has traced with golden pencil the image of a perfect man, 'to know what should be done and said to God and man.' For my part, I admit the test of utility in every consideration; I ask of every thing, *cui bono?* And I ask it of Lord Brougham's efforts and publications. Do they tend to make us better, wiser, happier? If they do none of these, let us at once tear from them the lying title of 'useful knowledge,' and no longer deem those benefactors of their race who amuse themselves by angling for popularity with saw-dust bread.

The Platonic Myth. He quotes the work of Taylor, the Platonist, with approval regarding the three orders of society and condemns the aspira-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 320-321.

tions of the masses or third order to prepare themselves to share in the direction of society through education. On this point he is even more emphatic than formerly, declaring that "the present efforts to enlighten by education the lowest class of mankind, is an attempt to break the golden chain of beings, to disorganize society, and to render the vulgar dissatisfied with the servile situation in which God and nature intended them to be placed. In short, it is an attempt calculated to render life intolerable, and knowledge contemptible, to subvert all order, introduce anarchy, render superstition triumphant, and restore the throne of 'night primeval and of chaos old.' " ²⁹ He even goes so far as to explain the increase of crime with the growth of popular education as the result of the latter. Formerly, when the common man was not educated, "ignorance left him leisure to be good," gave him time to listen to conscience and cultivate the heart. This, however, is not all. He continues ³⁰

But now, when the fresh number of the attractive weekly presents its fascinating pages, endorsed by high and stimulating names, every fragment of unoccupied time is given to the high-wrought description and the animated criticism; not a moment is left for self-communion and inward examination. His quiet hours are gone from him. The inobtrusive visits of reflection are shut out, and scared away; he is too busy to think, too excited to feel. In this single result of the absorption of leisure, and the consequent removal of one great barrier to sin,—himself—I find an ample resolution of the difficulty. You may add to it, however, the restless and discontented humor which imperfect knowledge occasions; the rivalry of contempt or envy which it gives rise to; the shade and inferiority which it casts on the tame and unambitious scheme of duty; and, above all, the brilliant objects with which it fills the fancy, as food for meditation, to the exclusion of the events and interests of domestic life, and the general predominance which it gives in the thoughts to the public distant over the private past.

This, perhaps, may seem crude, but as an argument against popular education it was not uncommon. The Positivists were not alone in their distrust of the masses; in this respect they were at one with their orthodox Christian opponents. If they did not still believe in a messiah, they were at least committed to a strong trust in the virtues of an intellectual elite, which somehow were better than other people. However, Wallace appears to have some lingering doubts, for he adds, "It would be an interesting exercise to estimate accurately the comparative benefits and evils which learning has

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 323-324.

produced in all the stages of its history. The results to nations seem always to have been good, but the effect on individuals has sometimes been woefully different.”³¹

Doubts regarding Republicanism. Travelling through an Austrian province he is struck by the animal-like existence of the people and he asserts to his fictitious companion, Count de Mardini (who, like Woodward, is really his spokesman), that it is the duty of the duke who governs the province to raise the people out of their brutish condition. He is informed that this is not possible: “If the duke were to attempt to put in operation any of the many plans of improvement which I know he contemplates, his first and strongest opposition would be in his own household.”³² The count further delivers himself of a doctrine that should have greatly consoled his aristocratic sensibilities. “A prince here,” he says, “is a slave of circumstances. Immemorial custom has petrified around him, and shut him up in a cage of stone. His privileges are compulsory, his rights are duties, his powers are fetters.”³³ If this statement conflicts somewhat with the fear of the revolutionary tendencies of the masses earlier expressed, it seems nevertheless to have convinced Wallace, who contented himself with the reflection that men are born free, at least with an inner spiritual freedom, if not with bodily independence. Thus the dialogue proceeds:³⁴

“That sort of moral freedom which you indicate,” said the count, “is the only freedom that is worth possessing, and it is independent of the form of polity under which it is cherished, for it is the unalienable quality of the unshackled mind and the unsullied heart. But men in this world will fight for names and forms, neglecting the substance. With the efforts that are now going on to republicanize the governments of Europe, I have no sympathy; for I know that they are as foolish as I think they are vain. The honest are free everywhere; the cowardly nowhere. I have seen in democracies a vileness of subserviency that a galley slave might have pitied; and I have found in the ranks of toryism an independence and self-respect that Brutus never knew.”

“Except in the reports of journalists, and the speeches of demagogues, I do not think that the ‘spirit of the age’ in Europe tends at all to republicanism. The monarchies of Europe seem more likely to resolve themselves into democracies,” said I.

“And that mode of government, as now exemplified in Austria and Prussia,” said the count, “seems to me the best that can possibly be contrived, for it is a government of law. If Napoleon had had talent enough to combine properly

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 324.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 359.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 365-366.

the elements that lay around him in abundance, he could have established a government of this nature that would have been perfect; he might have created an administration that would have combined perfect despotism with perfect freedom."

The Theory of Good Government. It must not be supposed, however, that Wallace was any more opposed than was Comte to the establishment of a form of government that would conserve the best interests of mankind. Like Comte he was doubtful of republicanism or democracy and preferred rule by the "philosophers," or at least by the political élite. He says, "The events which secured to this country a popular constitution as a possession forever, made every American a member of the most difficult, responsible and dignified profession which the ability or virtue of man can illustrate—the profession of government."⁸⁵ This art of ruling "is a great moral and intellectual science, in which passions and interests must play in perpetual subordination to the permanent laws of wisdom and truth."⁸⁶ The best guides the masses can have is to follow the example of the great founders of our nation: "the public history and the private writings of those who formed the *entourage* of Washington will afford us important instruction."⁸⁷ Again, he says that in the writings of Milton "we may find the true principles of English liberty, which are the origin of American Independence, and the safeguards of American society."⁸⁸ Thus repeatedly he returns to the guidance of the élite.

But Wallace does not depend upon human experience alone, however enlightened it may be by choice intellects, for the achievement of good government. His basic reliance is upon Natural Law, or the fundamental laws of government. It has been long recognized, he says, that there are such laws operating in the physical world and there can be no doubt of their existence in the social world. "That there are such fixed laws in the moral world, however difficult fully to be discovered, has been felt with the fervor of inspiration, though dimly seen, by some great master-spirits of social science, such as Vico and Burke."⁸⁹ Their proper application would obviate one of the greatest obstacles to good government, which he characterizes as follows:⁴⁰

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 187–188.

The political philosophy of this age appears to us to be characterized rather by sensibility in the benevolent ends which it proposes, than by wisdom in the means which it employs for arriving at them. Its capital fault is, that it legislates *directly* to its objects, in matters in which direct legislation, by human power, is impotent; instead of studying the laws which Nature, or rather, a fore-planning, creative Providence has given to the social relations of humanity, and through them, *mediately*, and often remotely producing the results which it sees to be desirable, or rather so arranging the subjects to be influenced, according to the laws of nature, that the inherent forces in man's constitution shall themselves work out the best effects which Providence has permitted them to reach. In political subjects, man has yet to learn the lesson of his own utter impotency, and till then, he will never know the secret of his boundless, his magnificent capacity to control.

Seeking to apply this principle to the difficult question of legislation with reference to the legal rights of women, he states it as his opinion that the legislators and reformers have forgotten "the law of the inherent moral difference of the sexes. According to this fine conception, characters, thoughts, passions, sentiments, and all things within, have their sexes."⁴¹ With this principle as the basis of his argument he states the proper method of legislative procedure as follows: "Now the office of human government in the matter is this: to ascertain the normal relation of the parties in married life, as it is constituted by abiding natural causes, and, in conformity with that relation, to regulate those things over which it has control, in such a way as to preserve that relation always from violation and disturbance."⁴² He characterizes the current notions regarding the rights of women as metaphysical,⁴³ which in Positivist language is one of the worst things that could be said of them, and then asks the question: "Why as an organic law should there be sought in protection against *the husband*, a promotion of her honor and true dignity whose only safety is through him and in him?"⁴⁴

Wallace's Place in the Social Science Movement. Although Wallace was not a fullfledged disciple of Comte he was in essential agreement with his major Positivist principles. While he was, from the standpoint of the volume of his writings and the recessiveness of his personality, a minor figure in the Positivist reaction from Brisbane's Fourieristic radicalism in the Social Science Movement, he was by no means negligible. He seems to have

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

wielded a considerable personal influence and an even larger literary influence through his more or less fugitive writings, finally collected and published by his admirers after his early death. He did not complete the major work which he had projected and for which he had gathered data in America and in Europe. Consequently, we are compelled to rely upon fragments for our exposition of his views. But we must not be led because of the meagreness of his literary remains to minimize unduly his influence in setting the stage for the more scientific and conservative revision of the Social Science Movement which later occurred. He had abundant avenues for the ephemeral publication of his views and he used them. If he had systematized them into a major opus and left it in print we should doubtless have regarded him as a leading figure in the Social Science Movement.

The Direct Influence of Comte: Calvin Blanchard

Calvin Blanchard. We come next to a very interesting and eccentric character, Calvin Blanchard, very different in temperament and in cultural background from Wallace. Blanchard's major practical service to the Comtean or Positivist movement consisted in reprinting in this country the Martineau translation of the *Positive Philosophy* and the *Social Physics*, among many other books considered radical in his day. Blanchard considered himself to be "a student instead of a disciple of Comte, because the former being at liberty to go ahead, may confer more honor on his teacher and more benefit on his readers, than the latter, by merely following, can. Whether my attempt has, or has not, honored the great master to whom all constructive revolutionists must be indebted for a basis, let the capable determine."¹ Unfortunately we must confess that Blanchard did not always do honor to his great master in thought and deed. Comte would have abhorred his anarchism,² his violent hatred of religion,³ his anti-monogamy and free-love agitation⁴—in short, almost everything that Blanchard fought

¹ A Student of Auguste Comte, *The Essence of Science: or, The Catechism of Positive Sociology and Physical Mentality* (1859), p. iv.

² In 1865, Blanchard published a *New Constitution*, of which Article I was: "All constraint shall be abolished; every man, woman and child shall be fully developed or perfected, and be so situated as to do exactly as they please." See *A Crisis Chapter on Government* (1865), p. 3. He also characterized governments as "triumphant monopolies of murder, robbery, swindling, and all that is atrocious and detestable. Ever since the beginning, they have forced mankind to kill or prepare and hold themselves in readiness to kill each other by thousands and even millions at a time, and by the cruelest and most destructive means that spite can devise" (*ibid.*, p. 1).

³ This attitude runs throughout all his works and is illustrated also in the type of books he reprinted, such as Strauss's *Life of Jesus*, Fuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*, Gregg's *Creed of Christendom*, Macnaught on the *Doctrine of Inspiration*, etc.

⁴ For example, note the following quotations: "Man is engaged in attempting amorousness within bounds which there is no disputing that nine-tenths of the human race are simultaneously longing to burst. Is not this insanity? Is not the world now an immense madhouse? . . . This must be so until human beings are so perfected that love will be *universally reciprocal*" (*The Religion of Science*, 1860, p. 124); ". . . The sexual delights of even Ninon de L'Enclos and her lovers, or of Antony and Cleopatra, will sink into insignificance in com-

for. Nevertheless, in spite of his almost insane⁵ methods of propagating Comte, we must credit him with sincere zeal. He declares,⁶

The author . . . feels that he spends his energies as he does, instead of in "making a fortune," because he cannot help so doing; and he will here take occasion to remark, that were the Presidency (the office of purveyor or cat's paw general to legal robbers) of the U. S., or even of the World itself offered to him through the ballot-box, he should feel compelled by disgust therefor to refuse it; he would not relinquish his present employment, even to become the largest bubble in all the scum which agitating the entire folly of the human race might bring to the surface. He had rather try, however unsuccessfully for the present, to make folly less popular, than to float ever so high on it in either the clerical or demagogical balloon.

Blanchard's Conception of Sociology. To Blanchard, sociology—a term which, following Comte, he used in place of Social Science—meant civilization or the social system or social organization. In his *Essence of Science: or, The Catechism of Positive Sociology and Physical Mentality*, written, as the sub-title suggests, in the form of question and answer, like a cate-

parison with those which will be common to everyone under the reign of the perfection which The Religion and Government of Science will inaugurate and sustain" (*ibid.*, p. 125). In another place, he speaks of monogamy, like polygamy, as having outlived its useful purpose (*Life of Thomas Paine*, 1860, p. 60, footnote). He exalts Rousseau's free love relationships (*ibid.*, pp. 86–87). He also published a Library of Love ("the most recherché ever penned" according to his advertisements), including *The Kisses of Secundus and Bonnefons*, Ovid's *Art of Love*, Dryden's *Fables from Boccaccio and Chaucer*. In another advertisement, after listing a number of the very serious books which he published, he adds, rather insinuatingly: "I also publish several other books very different from those just mentioned." (This advertisement appears at the end of *A Crisis Chapter on Government*, 1864, p. 4).

⁵ The general style of the man is evidence of poor mental balance. The sub-titles of his works are also indicative of imbalance, viz.: *Religio-Political Physics or, The Science and Art of Man's Deliverance from Ignorance-Engendered Mysticism, and Its Resulting Theo-Moral Quackery and Governmental Brigandage*, 1861; *The New Crisis; or, Our Deliverance from Priestly Fraud, Political Charlatanry and Popular Despotism*. Hell on Earth! Murder, Rape, Robbery, Swindling and Forgery Covertly Organized. Cannibalism made Dainty! An exposure of the Infernal Machinations and Horrible Atrocities of Whited Sepulcherism; together with A Sure Plan for its Speedy Overthrow; *A Message to the "Sovereign People" of the United States; exhibiting to Their Majesties the Infernal Treachery or worse Inability of their Religious Counsellors and of their Political "Servants," proving the Identity of the Theological and Ethical Delusions, exposing the Elective Franchise Hoax, and Revealing a New and Self-Evidently Efficient Remedy for Superstition, Despotism and Evil*. The profits of the last-named publication "will be expended in furnishing Clergymen and Politicians with copies thereof gratis" (Advertisement on p. 6 of *Religio-Political Physics*). At the end of his *Crisis Chapter on Government* (1865), he signs himself "Calvin Blanchard, Announcer of the Religion of Science, Professor of Religio-Political Physics, Expositor of the Statics and Dynamics of God Almighty, Advocate for the Constitution Manifest in Human Nature, and Head-Member of the Society for Abolishing Utopia, and Humbug, and Failure, . . . May 5, 1865, Vulgar Era" (*loc. cit.*, p. 4). Other evidence will be forthcoming in quotations cited in the text.

⁶ *The Religion of Science* (1860), p. 108.

chism, the second question is: "What, at present, is Sociology?"⁷ And immediately the reply is:

The universal, habitual, long-established, and therefore cherished and revered anarchy and confusion, resulting from the attempted assimilation, combination, and connection, of materialism with ultra-naturalism—of something with nothing. A jumble, compounded of all which relates, or is supposed to relate, to the formation and preservation of society; or that condition of man, *perhaps* even now somewhat higher, more refined, and more philanthropic, than either individualism or familyism; and which, through universal, all-pervading science and complementary art, will be immensely more so.

Similarly, question three is: "What benefits has our hitherto crude, unscientific, mongrel, monstrous, sociology thus far bestowed on man?"⁸ And the reply is: "Few, if any, other than those purely imaginary or grossly material. It is, and ever has been, contended, by people with intellects far above mediocrity, that human happiness has not been increased by 'civilization,' or hotch-potch sociology; and it is, at the close of 'this poor dying life,' all but universally conceded, that the earth is now but a 'vale of tears,' fit only to be traveled through, post haste, for a better one."

The point of view here expressed would seem to indicate that Blanchard was antagonistic to Social Science, or Sociology, as he defines it. And so he is to the existing theories of society expressed in the prevailing Sociology of his time, which he regarded as merely a priestly and political device to mislead the masses of the people by false representations, promises, and hopes, while they are exploited, repressed, and betrayed by their teachers and masters. As an anarchist he can see no possible good coming out of a social theory or a social system which demands the restraint of natural appetite and desires. In this respect he is more of a follower of Fourier than of Comte, and more of an anarchist still. His conception of a true Social Science is, therefore, a negative one, of a philosophy which will justify mankind in doing what their impulses dictate. He apparently supports Comte because, with his powerful logic—to which Blanchard was not insensitive—he is effectively breaking down the old oppressive and exploitive social order based upon theological dogma and political metaphysical principles. There is no evidence in his writings that he would have gone along with Comte in his positive program of creating a new and scientific social order through scientific self and social discipline.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 10.

⁸ *Ibid.*

An Anti-Utopist Utopian. Although Blanchard considered himself "Head-Member of the Society for Abolishing Utopia, and Humbug, and Failure,"⁹ he was, in spite of himself, a utopist. In typically utopistic fashion he contrasts the evils of actuality with the joys of his future utopia, of actual "sociology" with "positive sociology." The evils of the present order are due to the attempt to reconcile science with mystery; under positive sociology, this absurd inconsistency will be eliminated. Blanchard, in his picturesque manner, answers question four—"Why has hotch-potch sociology—*soi disant* 'civilization,' been little else than a long series of disasters and failures?"—as follows:¹⁰

Because it is founded, or rather attempted to be founded, on savage ultra-naturalism. Man has, for a long time past, been most seriously, industriously, and stupidly engaged in an impossibility; in the absurd attempt to reconcile science with mystery, and found the comprehensible on the incomprehensible; and is thus stubbornly and vainly wasting incalculably more energy and perseverance than would be necessary, by a rational and scientific method, to insure success. How painful, long, and hard, the toil which mental laziness self-inflicts.

Then, in contrast, he asks, "What will *Positive* Sociology be, in contradistinction to the hotch-potch, ultra-naturalistic [supernaturalistic] sociology which disappoints man's expectations, vainly exhausts his energies, mocks his patient endurance, defies even his undaunted perseverance; in short, *always* fails?"¹¹ His answer is,

Positive Sociology will be the science of sciences and its complotory art of arts; the general, universal, science and art, which will result from the farthest extension and highest development of all the special, fragmentary sciences and arts, and be to them what animation is to physical and chemical action; immensely elevating, because adjusting, connecting, and making science and art mutually completeive; and bringing the whole, resulting therefrom, in unison with, and completeive of, humanity, both as individuals and as a whole—as units, or as an entirety; causing thus to result, no less than the Supreme Being; of course, perfect in all its *parts*.

The field of Positive Sociology will be "all which affects mankind; consequently, all respecting the existence of which man can *know* anything."¹² And its functions will be "to perfect man, and invest him with all the benefit, the use, the value, the *reality*, of omnipotence; to empower him to real-

⁹ *A Crisis Chapter on Government* (1865), p. 4.

¹⁰ *Essence of Science* (1859), p. 11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

ize, and *bodily* enjoy, *on earth*, all which can be conceived of *perfect* and even *eternal* happiness.”¹³ The utopistic, day-dream, wish-fulfilment character of Blanchard’s Positive Sociology is further indicated in his description of the functioning of the new system, as follows: “The execution of Positive Sociological law, instead of being intermingled, as that of hotch-potch sociological law is, with groans and tears, and dying shrieks, will be accompanied with music, dancing, gayety, and all that can delight, gladden, and charm; for enchanting woman will now enact her part, and be her own free self, and not another’s slave. Apropos of this, Positive Sociology will FULLY SECURE THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.”¹⁴

Social Organization, according to Blanchard. Positive Sociology, according to Blanchard, will organize mankind into Operators, Scientific Discoverers, and Directors. The Operators will execute what the Discoverers teach, and the Directors “will oversee and regulate the whole performance, and intersperse it with the attractive, gay, charming and joyous.”¹⁵ It will not interfere with individual liberty nor with property, because it will do nothing for mankind which it can do for itself.¹⁶ It is not the purpose of Positive Sociology, he says, to smother the people with paternalistic substitutes for individual initiative. He continues,¹⁷

It will equally avoid enervating the mental organs of the people by inaction, crippling them by over exertion, or distorting them by over exercising some, and proportionately neglecting others. It will, also, like simple nature, preserve the just mean between too much centralization and too much dispersion; between too much centripetal and too much centrifugal social force; and thus, incalculably enlarge individual freedom, and give its full due to that liberty which has now little more than a mere nominal existence; and perfectly secure individual property, which is now the most uncertain of all things, and to keep possession of which, at present, involves more vexation and care than any amount of property is worth.

The operators, being by far the largest body of the people, will, nay, *must* mainly have, hold, and exercise the power which the scientific discoverers will find out the highest and best use of; which use the directors will *theoretically* apply, on a scale commensurate with its importance; thereby enabling the operators *practically* to apply it for the largest benefit of the *whole body politic*, and, necessarily, of the individuals composing it.

Science, and complectory art, when organized into a *systematically* connected,

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

fully developed whole, will extend as far as *ideas* can reach. Nor, until their domain is thus extended, can be elicited and applied the full force of those scientific-artistic-sociological-natural-life-prolonging-happiness-perfecting laws, by which the units of humanity can be enabled to *advantageously* act, in *perfect* freedom, and perfect concert, and in entire unison with the great *All Existence*.

It is clear from this and other passages that Blanchard's notion of social organization is but little advanced over that of the Associationist school of Social Science. It is a sort of utopistic harmony of individualistic and communal interests that he expects to derive from some sort of metaphysical harmony inherent in natural law. Speaking of the superiority of a scientific organization of society under the control of Positive Sociology over that of a theologically motivated social order under Ultra-Naturalism, he says,¹⁸

But scientific unity of social purpose and action, we begin to see, and shall fully show, must, and will, be so systematically proportioned to individual action and aim, as equally to secure the most perfect harmony of the whole, along with all conceivable freedom and individuality of its parts; and thus only, can a final end be put to man's centralizing destructive, or disaggregating, disorganizing, impoverishing, and savageizing action on man, and even to all molestation of man by any other part of nature, with very rare, if any, exceptions.

The Forms of Social Control. Blanchard is insistent that, although the people should become familiar with the scientific laws governing society under a regime of Positive Sociology they would not be able to reap the benefit of this knowledge by means of individual effort alone. Clearly, he is no consistent anarchist. There must be cooperation. He says,¹⁹

To fully develop nature, systematically organized cooperation and unity of true action on a universal scale is requisite. Nor, without such cooperation and action, can science and art be prevented from being the scourge, instead of the savior of mankind. Witness how fragmentary, and consequently anarchial and antagonistic science and art, now operate against each other, and man's happiness and life, and mutually disparage themselves. Labor saving machinery is starving its thousands daily; chemistry is poisoning its millions hourly, by food and drink adulterations, and by quack medicines. To what frivolous, puerile, and vile purposes are painting, and even printing, prostituted; and music is pressed into the foremost ranks of superstition and wholesale human butchery; the former of which is the basis of "law," and the latter of which has arrived at the dignity of both a science and an art, and is held in the highest honor. And thus,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

science and humanity, until completed, and perfectly and truly *systematized*, *must* act.

Mankind has existed hitherto under several forms of social organization and systems of social control. These he enumerates and characterizes in turn. He says Ultra-Naturalism (sacerdotalism, supernaturalism) looked only to happiness in another world and neglected it in this life. Absolutism sought order in this world, but not for the benefit of the people as a whole. "Aristocracy is a hybrid; a cross between naturalism and ultra-naturalism; whether it is a slight improvement or the contrary, is of little importance, since, like its type, the mule, it can go no further."²⁰ The next system of social control to appear in the historic process is Demagogocracy. To this he assimilates such freedomistic movements as the Reformation, the growth of free thought, or infidelity as he calls it, rationalism, etc. Of demagogocracy he says, "Demagogocracy can but cater for the predominant whims and caprices of the majority, and consequently least intelligent and refined portion of the people; and apply, or use, even if demagogues happen to be honest enough to do so, the average wisdom or folly their constituents have acquired under the tuition of ultra-naturalism and aristocracy. It can rise no higher than the tide on which it floats."²¹ For democracy, his next category of social control, he has no greater respect. He says: "Democracy either originates in, or degenerates to, political knavery's meanest trickery in the lowest strata of popular folly. It is the concentrated essence of compound humbug, of the genus Chimera; at most, but the fifth wheel of the car of progress."²² One might almost imagine that he was listening to Mussolini or Hitler speaking. No; he is only repeating, in his own vigorous language, the criticisms of Auguste Comte.

The True System of Control. The true social control and social organization alike are to be found in Positivism: "In Positivism is our only hope. It, alone, has not been tried and proved a failure. . . . [and] it devolves on some one immediately to show how may be formed the nucleus of that scientific-artistic-sociological-natural-individual-liberty-securing, all-perfecting, co-operation, which is to become universal"²³ and lead to the attainment of the ultimate happiness of mankind. Apparently he understands

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

himself to be the man to do the job. He further describes this predicted regime of Positivism as follows: ²⁴

Positivistic, scientifically *discovered* general law, will displace the forgeries, the arbitrarily *made* shams, which pass for law, and regulate society and each individual, as impartially and harmoniously as gravitation does all matter, and each particle; and thus make each, as individually sovereign as they can be conceived to be; and perfectly reconcile order, freedom, and progress. If gravitation had as faint an influence as has *universal* human law at present, material variety would be as undistinguishable as the freedom of the human individual is now chimerical. Need we add, that neither the scientific discoverers, who are to define, and introduce Positivistic law, nor the directors who are to administer it, can be qualified by ultra-naturalism, by right of birth, or by popular election? And that the people who are to practice this law must be perfectly free from ultra-naturalistic notions?

There is much more on these themes of social organization and social control, further elucidating the errors of the older systems here so briefly characterized; but we lack space in which to afford our readers the pleasure of an acquaintance with all of Blanchard's strictures. In the process of his analysis he discusses political corruption, property, taxation, the evils of trade, and many other forms of social maladjustment, all of which spring from the older social systems and all of which will be remedied by Positivistic social control.

Woman's Place in Religion. There are forty-six questions and answers altogether in this work, very much in the same vein as those already quoted. Some of these questions show very clearly the influence of Comte's religious ideas, and even of his tendency to exalt women into the near divine. For example, question 41 asks, "But how will you dispose of mankind's seeming, nay, may I not say evident, natural tendency to worship?" ²⁵ The reply states that the object of worship will be Humanity and that "if such worship ever does take form, woman will undoubtedly be selected for the visible object of it; she being the perfect embodiment, or incarnation, of all which can excite us to adoration. This is sufficiently indicated by the fact that . . . she has always been man's beau ideal of loveliness—his idol. Even demagogocracy has not been able to disfranchise her of this right." ²⁶ But what shall women worship? Women, replies Blanchard, have very

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81-82.

little inclination to worship. They admire each other and kiss each other. At balls they have to be requested to relinquish each other.²⁷ It is impossible to stump a determined utopist!

Blanchard Appeals to Science. The work as a whole is introduced by a preliminary statement, which emphasizes the fundamentally basic character of science in seeking a solution of all men's problems.²⁸

We must accept the whole of Science, or we may as well refuse it altogether. Piecemeal, it can have no *living* existence, and, therefore, can yield us no benefits. Its rightful domain extends through all, from lowest to highest. To exclude science from Sociology—Government—Religion; from the highest of which we are capable of conceiving, is to deprive it of its head; and man, of all which can render life worth having.

Materiality, the phenomenal, the all of which we can conceive, must prove to be all-sufficing, or remain an entire failure. The world must become man's perfectly satisfactory residence—his home—or remain but a miserable point of entrance and departure. The material or phenomenal world, cannot be even a place of preparation for an immaterial one; nor can conditional beings *really* conceive of unconditional ones.

Between the natural and the ultra-natural, something and nothing, sense and nonsense, there can be no connection, no half way.

Unless we concede that nature, when fully developed, will prove capable of satisfying *all* the needs and desires of her children; and that, too, *in this world*, we should forswear her, and transfer our allegiance to the ultra-natural. Reason, we should renounce for blind faith; and the teachings of science for the dictates of mystery; which should, in consideration of the benefits we can expect from these alone, in the event of simple, scientific and artistic nature's impotency, be free to continue to deluge the world with ignorance, and consequent crime and misery; and thus rivet man's affections to things out of the world and keep him villifying and blaspheming the only source of his being of which he can form any conception, and continually rejecting the only savior which earth, or aught that man can comprehend, can supply.

We shall show it to be in the power of man, through the direct agency of science and art, to introduce a *system* of government, which shall depend, for support, on *after approval*, by the *whole people*, instead of being constituted by *previous election*, by *only the majority*; and that thus alone can society be invested with power, sufficient, effectually and forever, to protect itself from the despotism of autocrats, aristocrats, or majorities; and from being swindled, despoiled, humbugged, insulted, enslaved, and even cheated out of by far the greatest portion of life itself, by politicians, demagogues, moral, medical, and all other quacks and imposters, and by sham law manufacturers and mongers.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. iii-iv.

In short, we shall show the capability of science and art, coworking by, through, and with man, and his environment, to completely satisfy him with life, both as to quantity and quality, *in this world*.

A Theory of Primitive Mentality and of Social Development. From this announcement of objectives, Blanchard proceeds to a discussion which he calls "Axiomataical." Primitive man, he says, found nature completely bewildering. His instinctive expedient was the concept of the utterly incomprehensible, apparently the cause of all our woe.²⁹

Here we get a full view of the cause of evil, and that cause suggests the cure. Mystery, the synonym for ignorance, having been organized and palmed off on the world for true religion, or mankind's uniting tie, has become so firmly seated, that nothing short of the equally well organized religion of the science of sciences—the very essence of science—can displace and thus destroy it.

The stupendous mass of evil which ignorance, mystery and falsehood have engendered, is homogeneous; and so inextricably interconnected, that it must stand or fall together. Attacking it in detail, not only further complicates and strengthens it, but postpones the true—the scientific method of its eradication.

Man never could have emerged from his *static* ignorance, except through that dynamical ignorance—mystery—which was the primary basis of that *social organization* which gave *birth* to science.

Mystery, therefore, originated that organization to which it will owe its final elimination as a system; and though the requisites for this consummation have, all along, been gradually preparing, the *advent* of Positive Sociology will be as *generally* surprising as the solution of the greatest of all problems. . . .

The great problem to be solved, is, to find out how to *use* those means which are now *abused*; since uses necessarily produce effects directly contrary to those which abuses produce; all man needs, is, to be as happy as he is now miserable.

Until the *collective* human organism is complete, all must necessarily be more or less provisional and unsatisfactory; and that vast organism is now passing through its most critical stage; four philosophies—the negative, the retrogressive, the stationary, and the positive—simultaneously contending for the mastery.

His System of Philosophy. Blanchard then denounces the first three of these philosophies, in his characteristically highly colored prose, climaxing his invectives with emphatic espousal of the fourth, as follows: "But according to the positive philosophy, man will *rise to* all *conceivable* perfection, *through* knowledge; and mind is a positive and negative consequence, resulting from, and depending on, brain and its prerequisites, and an objective or external matter; and to be as good, as free, and as happy, as can

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. v-vi.

understandingly be desired, is the ART OF ARTS, which requires *nothing more and nothing less* than THE SCIENCE OF SCIENCES." ³⁰

His faith in a blissful, sensuously experienced heaven-on-earth is again expressed in his advertisement of *The Life of Thomas Paine*. Here he tells us that ³¹

The human race, therefore, will achieve on earth the perfection of happiness which man now mistakenly looks for after death. Men and women will be as beautiful and in every way as perfect as "angels" are imagined to be; and life will by natural means, be so lengthened that perfect happiness will last till all the varieties of it which can be presented to the five senses exhaust their value by repetition. "Heaven," and "eternal happiness" are but glimmering, distance-dimmed views of the veritable "Paradise" which science, art, and spontaneous development will secure to man in this substantial sphere.

In another place he again expresses his contempt for the actual state of affairs and appeals to "sociologists" for a remedy.³²

Only when sociologists see that their function is wholly scientific, and get a glimpse of the great art of arts of human perfection which is to correspond to and crown the science of sciences, will humanity be delivered from those popular, sleek-tongued imposters who steal man's old opinions, furbish them over, and sell them back to those from whom they were pilfered, for new; only then, will society be purged from a set of fools whom "a little learning" makes not only dangerous but so impudent as to despise their fellow-men because they are not *all* capacitated to obfuscate history, forge laws, scribble nature-murdering romances for the mediocrity-stuffing papers, turn tragedy to burlesque on the stage, humbug at elections, bamboozle in the Senate, play the Monkey at foreign courts, talk jargon or revamp popularism in the pulpit, spout smartness at the bar, murder justice at the bench, and "pour drugs, about which they know little, into stomachs about which they know nothing."

The Great Revolution and Its Leader. As was suggested above, Blanchard took the *Positive Philosophy* to be the textbook of the greatest of human revolutions.³³

Both the American and French Revolutions were but prominent incidents, or *crisis stages*, in the irrepressible struggle for human rights which commenced when nature implanted in her highest organism, man, that instinct which points

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

³¹ This advertisement appears at the end of *Religio-Political Physics* (1861), p. 3. He then modestly continues by asserting that "no other writer has so clearly shown how to eliminate theology, and its loathsome train of moral, political, and social evils."

³² *The Religion of Science; or the Art of Actualizing Liberty, and of Perfecting and Satisfactorily Prolonging Happiness; Being a Practical Answer to the Great Question,—"If You Take Away My Religion, What Will You Give Me In Its Stead?"* (1860), p. 187.

³³ *The Life of Thomas Paine* (1860), p. 3-4.

to the goal of *development*; that unconquerable desire for *perfect* and *sufficiently-lasting* or "eternal" happiness, which indicates the *common aim* and *attainable end* of science, or art, and of *all* natural, materialistic, or *intelligible* activities:—that thirst for liberty which can be satisfied by nothing short of the revolution which will *remove all constraint*—which will *accomplish* revolution—and thus justify Luther, Rousseau, Paine, Fourier, and all other revolutionists. Of this crowning revolution, the text-book is "*The Positive Philosophy*" of Auguste Comte. . . .

I am not unmindful that there have been hundreds, perhaps thousands of author-heroes and heroines. . . . But it appears to me, that none of their writings have been *quite* such text-books of revolution, as those of Rousseau and Paine *were*, and those of Comte *now are*.

He speaks of a Grand Revolution, of which the author hero was Comte.³⁴ And just as Luther was the forerunner of Rousseau and Paine, so Fourier was the John Baptist of Comte.³⁵

These great works [Fourier's *Social Destiny of Man* and Comte's *Positive Philosophy*] are carrying on a constructive and therefore noiseless and unostentatious revolution; they do not (particularly the latter) appeal to the common understanding, and the masses will know but little about them, until they *feel* their beneficent effects. But the keen observer and the social artist perceive that they have already given a new tone to all the higher literature of Western Europe, and even, to some extent, to that of the United States.

In estimating these two men, however, he ranks Comte above Fourier.³⁶ He announces that "*The Positive Philosophy* has mathematically annihilated a *God* who can have no *practical* existence to *man*,"³⁷ but even he is apologetic about the *Positive Polity*. He says,³⁸

But the mental effort which produced the "Positive Philosophy" was too much for the brain of any one man to make with impunity, as the subsequent writings of the great positivist show. With respect to these, and particularly to Comte's Positive Religion, Mr. Lewes very considerably remarks,—“Let us draw a veil over them;” and I, who have made Comte a study, will add, that any other view than this, with respect to the writings which Comte sent forth to the world *after* the Positive Philosophy, is most unjust.

He defines Social Science as "the *art of arts*; not the *art of political trickery*."³⁹ He considers the *Positive Philosophy* the "greatest work ever writ-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

ten;" but in a footnote he says, "Except two, that I neither name nor tell why." ⁴⁰

An Estimate of Blanchard's Method and Manner. Enough has probably been said and presented to indicate the nature and tone of Blanchard's propaganda. Unquestionably he was compensating for his own humble station in life as a printer; and his style is perhaps too virulent to be altogether effective. Nevertheless, in contrast to the scientist Gillespie, the gentleman-scholar Wallace, the apostle Edger, and the carpenter Metcalf, he illustrates the aggressive, man-on-the-street reaction to Comte. There is nothing reverent, gentle, fervent, or scientifically critical about him. He strikes and he strikes hard, without mincing words. And in all this he calls upon Comte for his sanction. It was no doubt to this type of use of Comte's philosophy that the clergy protested most violently. As one of them said, "Its most deplorable result is the impulse which it has given to irreligion and open atheism. Thousands of ignorant persons, who are incapable of comprehending any connected philosophy, true or erroneous, are emboldened to babble materialism and impiety, by hearing that the 'positive philosophy' knows 'neither angel nor spirit,' nor God. And this is one of those sinister influences which now hurries European and American society along its career of sensuous existence." ⁴¹

The logic of Positivism, says this same writer, is the same as the philosophy of "tap-rooms redolent of the fumes of bad whiskey and tobacco." ⁴² It was certainly true that Blanchard used Positivism to glorify a sensuous existence. ⁴³ And it is possible that his vehement espousal of Comte did more harm than good to the Positivist Philosophy. The use he made of Comte's critical work to justify his attack upon the existing social order, in favor of the anarchism and self-indulgence justified by the theory of human nature put forth by Fourier, while he rejected the constructive proposals of Comte in his later works, has already been explained.

⁴⁰ Advertisement at end of *A Crisis Chapter on Government* (1865), p. 4.

⁴¹ Unsigned, "Positivism in England," *The Southern Review*, V: 348-349 (Apr., 1869).

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 348.

⁴³ Blanchard also wrote a book called *The Art of Real Pleasure* (1864).

The Direct Influence of Comte: The Response from Religion and Ethics

Denominational Differences in the Attitude toward Comte. Another aspect of the influence of Comte in this country is that of the practical effect of the theories of Positivism upon religious doctrine and morals. In this connection it will be of some interest to point out that it was the most liberal and the most conservative denominations—the Unitarian and the Catholic (as represented by Orestes A. Brownson)—that were the most friendly to Positivism. Presbyterians and Baptists seemed most unfriendly, as we can easily infer from the quotations already presented.

Brownson, the converted Catholic, makes particularly interesting comments on Comte and his system. Positivism, he says, is the most open, frank, honest, respectable, the most able and logical opponent of Christianity and Catholicism, but no Protestant can refute it. Only Catholics can, or Protestants using Catholic principles and Catholic arguments. He continues: "The Positivist rejects the church, of course, but he respects Catholicity as a logical system, consistent with itself, coherent in all its parts, and for him there is no *via media* between it and Positivism. If he were not a Positivist, he says openly, he would be a Catholic, by no means a Protestant, which he looks upon as neither one thing nor another; and we respond that, could we cease to be a Catholic, we should be a Positivist, for to a logical mind there is no medium between the church and atheism."¹

From a Unitarian, John W. Chadwick, we have the following appreciation of Comte: "Of course the great majority of religious people would regard such a deity as this sublime abstraction [Comte's Grand Etre, Humanity] as unworthy of comparison with the first person in the Trinity. To me it seems not only worthy of comparison with the first person in the Trinity as popularly conceived, but infinitely superior to him, infinitely more lovable, adorable, and, I will add, respectable, which means able to be respected; and I for one find myself easily able to respect the Great

¹ "Christianity and Positivism," *Catholic World*, XIV: 11 (Oct., 1871).

Being of Comte, but not able even to respect the God of Augustine and Edwards.”² This respect is all the more possible, he continues, because Comte included in the Being, only those who have played their part worthily and not the wicked and the drones. He even includes brute creation which has contributed to human happiness, causing many to laugh at him. So much the worse for them, he says, for “on this head Comte was wiser than St. Paul who said ‘Doth God care for Oxen?’ A God who didn’t was no God for Comte, and would not be for me.”³

Far from regarding Comte’s views on religion as too lax, Chadwick’s criticism of Comte’s ideal of duty was, for example, that it was too severe. He considered Comte’s teachings about God and immortality good as far as they went, but they didn’t go far enough. He says: “I welcome them as an immense addition to our stock of moral inspirations. I am truly grateful to the philosopher who promulgated them with so much energy. . . . There is no reason in the world why we should not cordially embrace the philosopher’s conception of humanity and subjective immortality, and at the same time hold as firmly as ever to our faith in an invisible Creator of whose works collective humanity is but an infinitesimal part.”⁴ This writer does not even laugh at the many absurdities in Comte’s ceremonial, ecclesiastical, and hierarchical system. They only seem ridiculous, he points out, because they have been created *de novo*. The Catholic and Episcopalian systems would seem just as absurd if presented for the first time; they seem natural only because they are so old.⁵ Incidentally, it may be remarked, this is a good example of a failure to distinguish between an explanation and a justification. It is true that the evolutionary growth of Catholic and Episcopal rituals explains their irrational elements, but this would scarcely justify the imitation of them in a religion constructed out of hand.

Another Unitarian who was appreciative of Comte was Octavius Brooks Frothingham, sometimes called the successor of Theodore Parker, who “persistently grounded all religious faith and hope upon the basis of reason, nature, discovered law.”⁶ Frothingham called one of his books, it is interesting to note, *The Religion of Humanity*. As one commentator points out, “Much of Positivism is often reflected in Mr. Frothingham’s speech and

² John W. Chadwick, “The Enduring Elements of Religious Positivism,” *Unitarian Review and Religious Magazine*, V: 380 (Apr., 1876).

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 385–386.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 383.

⁶ Edmund C. Stedman, *Octavius Brooks Frothingham and the New Faith* (New York, G. P. Putnam, 1876), pp. 5–6.

prayer. But in assuming for the title of an important volume which illustrates his religious system, a phrase adopted by the followers of Comte, he seeks to invest the beautiful expression with a more expansive and spiritual comprehensiveness. Still, the idea of human brotherhood, as a religious basis, is frequently advanced by him."⁷

Reasons for Denominational Differences in Attitude toward Comte. The Unitarians were with Comte in his attacks on the barbaric theology of the past, and therefore they could be generous with him. The Catholics were with Comte in his insistence on a universal organization for purposes of social control, and therefore they could be generous with him. The Presbyterian clergy, on the other hand,—who were, after all, a very learned and well educated group of men—were philosophically too near to the Positivists themselves, as Brownson said of McCosh, and adopted too many of their logical principles and arguments to battle them effectively. They were the last men to attempt to refute Positivism.⁸ In other words, the Presbyterian clergy wanted Comte's arguments to support their own philosophical system. They accepted his learning, his science, his encyclopaedic knowledge. They resented the use he made of them. Therefore they were the bitterest in their denunciation of him. There may be other explanations, but this one, based on Brownson's suggestion, sounds quite plausible, and may, at any rate, be accepted as one of the reasons for the attitude expressed by the Presbyterian clergy toward Comte.

Explanation of Catholic Tolerance—Similarities between Catholicism and the Religion of Humanity. Perhaps one of the chief reasons in addition to the one stated above why Catholics generally were inclined to be less critical of the Religion of Humanity of Comte was that it was in reality in some respects a Catholic sect, although it rejected many of the things vital to Catholicism as a historic ecclesiastical system. It of course would eliminate the pope and the entire Catholic hierarchy, as well as its theological and supernatural personnel. But the Positivist religion was constructed so closely along the same lines as historic Catholicism that there was no mistaking the origin of the general framework of the Comtean religious system. Comte was himself descended of a loyal, conservative Catholic family, and was of course thoroughly familiar with the Catholic ritual and organization. Moreover, he had doubtless become so strongly condi-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

⁸ Orestes A. Brownson, "Christianity and Positivism," *Catholic World*, XIV: 3-15 (Oct., 1871).

tioned to these emotionally in his childhood and youth that his attachment to them never afterwards disappeared. In his system he himself, and his successors, if there had been any competent to succeed him, occupied the place of the pope. Henry Edger, in his letters from *Modern Times*, addressed Comte in a manner which suggested such a relationship, and Comte made no objection to the form of the address. The ritual of the Religion of Humanity was surprisingly like that of the Catholic Church, embodying as it did ceremonials similar to the Catholic—but more philosophic and intellectualized and less mystical—performed at birth, puberty, marriage, and death. There was, for example, a ceremony of reception of the child at puberty which bore an especially close analogy to the confirmation ceremony of the Catholic Church. The religion of Comte also had its calendar of saints, although the great men who were to be commemorated by Positivism were scientists and philosophers rather than pious believers and theologians.

Contrasts between Catholicism and the Religion of Humanity. In all of these matters, and in many more, one of the chief differences between the Religion of Humanity and Roman Catholicism was that the former placed the chief moral emphasis upon science while the latter placed it upon a mystical or magical relation with the supernatural. The former emphasized this-world relations and developments, while the latter still placed its chief stress upon other-world relationships and ends. The former sought to make men worthy by means of science and the latter largely by the performance of magic, through its ritual and otherwise. The former emphasized the human at its best in men, while the latter discounted and neglected the human as evil and sought to replace it with the supernatural. But both recognized the powerful controlling influence of ritual and emotional elements in the lives of men and sought to make full use of them, the former as rationally as possible and the latter mystically. Yet, in some respects, as in Comte's substitution of the special adoration of women for the worship of the Virgin, the Religion of Humanity approached closely to the sentimentality of Catholicism.

It was the thought content and the method of arriving at truth, rather than the hierarchical organization of the church and the form of the ritual, that Comte had changed in breaking away from Catholicism. Believing that mankind was ready for a more intellectual religion he had modified the philosophic content, replacing theology with science, but he left the ecclesiastical and ritualistic elements largely intact. Comte had even dared

to hope that he might take over the Catholic Church entire into the Religion of Humanity by means of the appeal to the Catholic masses of this retention of essential identity of form and by means of the appeal to its educated priesthood of a new scientific philosophy in place of the old theology and primitive mysticism of the Catholic Church. One of his disciples, Sabatier, was even dedicated to the task of winning over the Catholic Church, and wrote a number of interesting and worthwhile treatises on religion in pursuance of this objective, but of course he failed of his mission. He, like his master, Comte, had underestimated the devotion of the Catholic masses to a name and had overestimated the degree of freedom of thought in the education of the Catholic priesthood.

Although Comte had produced a Catholic sect of a very superior character, based on his Positivist philosophy on the one hand and on the Catholic ritual and hierarchical organization on the other hand, and although it made a strong appeal to the more enlightened Catholics as it did to the more scientifically minded Protestants, in the end both rejected his Religion of Humanity—the Protestants and free thinkers because of the Roman ritual and hierarchy, and the Catholics because of the replacement of theology and mysticism by Positivist science. As a consequence, only the Positivist philosophy has survived, although the Catholics respected his religion because of its ritualistic and formal emphasis, and the Unitarians and other liberal groups because it rejected magic and supernaturalism and placed the emphasis upon human social relations.

Causes of the Failure of the Religion of Humanity. One is tempted to wonder what might have been the fate of the Religion of Humanity if Comte had adopted a different pattern for his religious organization. Undoubtedly its failure in the United States was due largely to the fact that it followed so closely the Roman Catholic pattern. It was therefore quite ill adapted from the standpoint of cultural selection for assimilation in this country, which was so overwhelmingly Protestant, and even Calvinistic. It was of course perfectly natural that Comte, with his own Catholic origin and sympathies, should have selected the Roman Catholic pattern in promulgating his new faith. Considering the environment in which he lived, he could hardly have done otherwise, in spite of his intellectual rebellion against Catholic dogmas. He probably did not expect to make his strongest appeal to a New World Protestant people, but proposed to win France and Italy to the fold of his new ecclesiastical organization. But as matters turned out, he enjoyed no particular success in the Roman Catholic coun-

tries, except among a few highly select minds. The masses of the adherents of the Catholic faith were far too well regimented by their hierarchy to respond to such a daring challenge. In England and America, on the other hand, both North and South, he came close to a gratifying response. In Brazil the Positivist movement at one time threatened to capture the political organization, and in Argentina it produced a profound impression which the official church had some difficulty in intimidating. In England there was, as we have seen, a rather widespread acceptance of the general principles of the *Positive Philosophy* and the same result might have been expected in the United States if this country had achieved greater scientific maturity and if there had been a more intelligent and a more consecrated Positivist leadership. But the response in these English speaking countries to the Religion of Humanity fell far behind that to the *Positive Philosophy*.

If the Pattern Had Been Different. The transition from even nominal Protestantism to a pseudo-Catholicism constituted too great a step for the people of the United States to take. Even the more intelligent critics of the theological religions of their time could not bring themselves to revolt against uncongenial dogmas, which were nevertheless democratically administered, in favor of a religion which smacked so visibly of mediaevalism, however enlightened its intentions may have been. Obviously Comte's Religion of Humanity was not suited to an individualistic and individualized frontier people organized in a political democracy. If Comte had been able to formulate such a religion, with the same objectives, on the more democratic pattern of Protestantism the result might have been different, although no one can say with authority that such would have been the case. That religious thought in the United States was already ripening toward a readiness to accept a more socialized and ethical type of religion in exchange for the old theology was soon made evident by the large number of secessions from orthodox Calvinism on the one hand and by the softening of the historic religions into more benevolent systems of belief, while for the most part they kept their traditional dogmas and organization nominally intact. It is reasonable to suppose, in view of the facts we have already presented, that this softening process and increasing secession were due in considerable measure to the influence of scientific Positivism. It is interesting to speculate whether a democratic rational religion allying itself closely with Positivism, but without the many peculiarities of the Religion of Humanity, which appeared so absurd to Americans, and without the pseudo-

Catholic ceremonies and rituals and hierarchy, might not have absorbed a great many of the Protestants against orthodox Calvinistic Christianity.

The Moral Effects of Positivism. Closely associated with the problem of the effect of Positivism upon religion is that of the influence of this philosophy of science upon man's ethical and social orientation in the United States. In the middle of the nineteenth century the theologians had not yet learned to distinguish between morals and religion, any more than they had achieved a theoretical distinction between a theological order (or science) and a social order (or science). They identified ethics with tradition and the supposed commandments of God and the ritualistic prescriptions as published in the Bible or as set forth in the legislation of the Church. Very few of these theologians had learned to conceptualize a morality apart from the institutionalized forms of religion, and even less as transcending the theological and ecclesiastical pronouncements and practices of the church. In much the same way they held to the outworn theory that all problems of social order and organization found their sanction in the literary or legalistic and doctrinal examples of the Bible and in the decrees and laws of organized religion. This sort of doctrine was adhered to in spite of the fact that legislators and administrators and judges nowhere any longer took their cues from these sources. It was in their traditions, and tradition dominated even to the exclusion of visible common sense. Those theologians who ventured to seek sanctions for morals and government outside these traditional authoritarian sources nearly always found them in the postulates of Natural Theology, which rested upon a metaphysical theory of Natural Reason and Natural Law. Scarcely any theologian could be found at the middle of the last century who believed that the most reliable sanctions for morals and social control, including social reform, were to be found in the methods and data of secular science. It is this fact that explains the point of view expressed by the clergy and religious and philosophic leaders generally in their opposition to Positivism as a guide to social and individual reform, as expressed in the following pages.

Comte and Social Reform. The Comtean system itself contained both of the elements which characterized Social Science, that is, the ideal of social reform and the ideal of science. To Comte the reform ideal was of equal if not greater importance than the scientific ideal and he was very bitter when his *Positive Polity*, which represented the reform aspect of his system, was not received as the logical consequence of the *Positive Phi-*

losophy. To his followers, however, it was the pure science aspect of the Positive Philosophy which made the greatest appeal. And, interestingly enough, those who were most enthusiastic about the *Positive Philosophy* were the most disillusioned with the *Positive Polity*, as for example, John Stuart Mill. It was the scientific ideal which aroused the most favorable reaction in the United States. The discussion of this aspect of theoretical Social Science will be undertaken in later chapters, which will deal with the problem of method.

The reform ideal was, however, also present in the Positive Philosophy, and American writers did not fail to play up this fact. George Frederick Holmes pointed out in 1853 that the whole theory of Positivism was dictated by a desire to alleviate and remove existing social distress and intellectual anarchy. Comte had exposed popular errors and contemplated a revival of moral obligations and the acknowledgement of duty over positive right, as a means of establishing social and political health. He had sought to do this by a very round-about method, that is, by the negation of erroneous metaphysics and habitual sophistries.⁹ Holmes states the general layout of Comte's plan and aim succinctly as follows:¹⁰

Referring the social difficulties and disorders of the times to the unsoundness of our intellectual principles, to the vague and fluctuating nature of all our speculations about men and states, and to the logical fallacies involved in all our scientific processes, M. Comte deems it necessary to constitute the general science of societies (Sociology) before proceeding to examine questions of politics proper, or of political economy. But, in order duly to create this social science, he examines the grounds and truth of all other human sciences, regarding them as the necessary preliminaries to the examination of the phenomena of social existence.

We shall have a good deal more to say about Holmes presently, but for the moment we shall return to other evidences of the fact that, although the methodological aspect of Comte's system drew more response from American reviewers, they did not overlook the social reform ideals of the Comtean system.

Francis Wharton, a professor in Kenyon College, Ohio, tells us that Comte's mission was noble. He says, "It was, to give it in his own terms, to discover and state the conditions to be developed in modern society, so

⁹ George Frederick Holmes, "The Bacon of the Nineteenth Century," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXV (4th series, V, 1853), pp. 329-354, 489-513.

¹⁰ "Faith and Science—Comte's Positive Philosophy," *ibid.*, XXXIV (4th Series, IV, 1842), pp. 23-24.

as (1) to restore health; and (2) to resolve the anarchy of opinion occasioning social disease."¹¹ In his aims, this author continues, Comte agreed with the American Puritans; but he chose to ignore supernatural agencies, whereas the Puritans depended wholly on them.¹²

Comte as an Exponent of Social Order. Another reviewer, attacking the same problem from a somewhat different standpoint, tells us that¹³

the wide-spread and general dissolution of the sense of obligation, the intellectual and moral anarchy which extensively prevails, the general questioning of all authority, and the rashness with which rude hands attempt the reduction and reconstruction of social order, are evils which demand a thorough investigation. No one has discerned them, or their destructive hearings, with a more profound sense of their disorganizing character than Comte. His great work aims, by the force of learning, powerful analysis, and evolution of social laws, to present those principles of order consistent with the recognized progress of society, which shall secure general conviction and acknowledgement. His aim is a noble one.

Comte stresses morality, continues this author, and it is refreshing to read from such a source a vindication of morality as a basis of social order. The reorganization of society he says is dependent on a modification of the inward life of the people, and not on changes in laws or in the forms of government. Comte wants all the necessary laws of social order established on a scientific basis, so that they will be accepted as implicitly as astronomical laws are.¹⁴

Even Brownson paid his respects to Comte's analysis of contemporary social disorganization. He said, "The positivists understand very well the anarchy that reigns in the modern intellectual world, and the need of a doctrine which can unite in one all the scattered and broken rays of intelligence and command the adhesion of all minds."¹⁵ And Professor Adams, in the *New Englander*, showed that Comte's aim was social and political regeneration and he pointed out how Comte's method of social reform differed from earlier ones.¹⁶

¹¹ Francis Wharton, *A Treatise on Theism, and on the Modern Skeptical Theories* (1859), pp. 247-248.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 248.

¹³ Unsigned, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, VI: 318 (Sept., 1857).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¹⁵ "An Imaginary Contradiction," *Catholic World*, Oct., 1867. Present quotation from Brownson's *Works*, II: 403.

¹⁶ S. Adams, "Auguste Comte and Positivism," *loc. cit.*, XXXII: 63-64 (Jan., 1873).

In noting the lofty aims and extravagant expectations of M. Comte, we should be careful to distinguish his plan of social and political reform from those schemes with which it is liable to be confounded by those who are not familiar with his writings. In distinction from all the forms of communism and socialism which aim to reform society by reconstructing it, the system of positivism aims to reform and reconstruct society and politics by the gradual diffusion of ideas.

The prime aim of Positivism, he goes on to state, was to meet the practical necessities of human society, and its incidental aim was to supply a real want of the intellect. Nothing in Comte is more conspicuous than his conviction that the evils of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were due to the influence of false theological dogmas and of metaphysical abstractions. He is, therefore, antagonistic toward the faith of theism.¹⁷

The Reputed Failure of Comte's Method. It might almost be assumed without saying so that these American commentators believed Comte had failed in his attempt at reform and in the defense of morality. The reason emphasized most strongly for this supposed failure was the fundamental fallacy attributed to Comte's method. Says Holmes: ¹⁸

The Positive Philosophy is then entirely invalid as a reformation of the intellect of the world, for it excludes the idea of such reformation in those very points in which it is most imperatively required. It is valid merely in reference to strict science, and for its full validity even in this respect it requires the cordial recognition and the lively appreciation at all times of nearly everything which M. Comte excludes. If received by itself as the gospel of a new era, it perpetuates and increases the very evils which it would redress or avert; for it petrifies science into the mere instrument of human passions instead of rendering it the obedient instrument for the better fulfillment of the duties and destinies of man.

In other words, it is Holmes' idea that science by itself can never achieve Comte's aim; morality must be fostered by outside, presumably divine, help.

This viewpoint to the effect that the cause of morality and reform cannot be promoted by intellectual analysis alone but must call in the aid of some mystical (magical) principle or the aid and interference of divinity was widespread at the time, and Professor Holmes was only following a general pattern of thought in presenting the argument recorded above. It was to be used with great force a decade later against the contention of Buckle

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 323-327.

¹⁸ "Faith and Science," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, 1852), p. 197.

that human progress is dependent upon intellectual development rather than upon a principle of morality, since morality itself is a by-product of the progress of the human intellect. This insistence upon the necessity of appealing from human intellect to the guidance of the Deity to support a moral and social reform program appears even more specifically in the reaction of other writers than Holmes. One of them says,¹⁹

It is his [Comte's] grand mistake to imagine that any enunciation of positive science can achieve the result [social reform]. . . . It seems impossible for any sane mind to feel at all sanguine, even admitting Comte's premises, of the success of his favorite theories. And yet he rests upon them with a fanatic confidence and undoubting assurance. Although his morality, the base of all social order, is nothing more than implicit obedience to the interests and necessities of humanity, as these are manifested in scientific development, and the examination of the needs of human society, yet he deems it incontrovertibly established. It is true that while the human race exists, with or without a Divinity and a Bible, there must be some elements of morality, but to assume their ultimate triumph in their own unaided strength is the mere fancy of a dreamer.

Error of Leaving out the Supernatural. If Comte had but known it, according to these commentators, the solution of his problem of social reform was to be found in the Bible, the true text book of the social reformer and of the moralist. The same writer quoted above continues in the same vein: "We find there [in the Bible] what an atheistic philosophy must ever desiderate for its social plans, and what an humble piety would have shown Comte to be infinitely superior to all the grand generalizations and sagacious speculations of his own gifted intellect."²⁰ Brownson, also, emphasized the necessity of appealing to supernatural, rather than to scientific agencies in seeking a method for removing contemporary anarchy. His words follow:²¹

But unhappily, though right in asserting the necessity of a grand sympathetic doctrine which shall embrace all the knowable and all the real, they [the Positivists] forget that facts cannot be studied in their synthetic relations unless the mind is previously in possession of the grand synthetic doctrine which embraces and explains them, while the doctrine itself cannot be had till they are so studied. They must take the end as the means of gaining the end! This is a hard case, for till they get the synthetic formula they can only have unrelated facts, hy-

¹⁹ Unsigned, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, VI: 318, 324-325 (Sept., 1857).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

²¹ "An Imaginary Contradiction," *Catholic World*, Oct., 1867. Present quotation from Brownson's *Works*, III: 403-404.

potheses, and conjectures, with no means of verifying them. They are not likely to succeed. Starting from anarchy, they can only arrive at anarchy. Only God can move by his Spirit over chaos, and bring order out of confusion and light out of darkness. . . . If they could succeed in removing the anarchy complained of, they would do so by ignorance, not science, and harmonize all intelligences only by annihilating them.

Of course not all the critics insisted on a theological sanction for social reform. As the Reverend J. H. Allen pointed out, "His [Comte's] first business is to discard a theological basis for the reconstruction of the social system. Thus, in what is the real drift and essential application of his doctrine, we have no quarrel with him; for it is only the position which our national constitution (as opposed to the British) has sanctioned, and which the American people, Catholics and all, have ratified with one accord."²²

It was, then, generally agreed that Comte's social reform ideal was a very good and just one, but that in practice he had utterly failed, because he had failed to see the necessity of securing divine or theological guidance and had neglected to do so.

The Error in This Point of View. As general as was this criticism of Comte's essays at social reform, it would of course no longer be urged seriously, even by leading theologians. The theologians and not the Positivists are now on the defensive with regard to the utility of their respective systems as aids to social and moral reform. In our time theology has to justify its claims as a major support to morality by something more than mere assertion and name calling, using such epithets as atheist and anarchist; in fact, it now has to provide downright evidence of its support of morals. But at the time under discussion theology was in the saddle and it could easily condemn all who appealed to any other criterion of value. As we have seen, the Positivists were everywhere but a small minority, and such was especially the case in the United States. They were easily intimidated, and when (as in the case of Calvin Blanchard) they could not be shouted down, they could at least be drowned out by the public roar.

There is no reason to suppose that the men who made these arguments—that science, unaided by some supernatural agency, could not hope to produce either better men or a better world—were insincere. As a matter of fact they were only too earnest in their convictions. They were so blinded by their own nearsighted vision as theologians and by the prestige of theology that they could not appreciate the value of science in this connection.

²² J. H. Allen, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Christian Examiner*, L (4th series, XV, Mar., 1851), 196.

They were used to the magical method of achieving great ends, whose conditions of achievement were beyond their powers of intellectual analysis. However industrious they may have been in employing their own energies and skills in procuring the minor objectives of life, they were accustomed to pray for the larger ends or goods of social life, as if these were quite beyond the power of mere men to manage and they must therefore rely upon the powers and wisdom of God alone for their accomplishment. In this category of course they placed such objectives as social welfare and social reform in the large. Even the making of good men individually was to them a matter of mystical transformation or cataclysmic transformation of personality by means of conversion. They did not believe it could be done by means of psychological conditioning, dieting, psychiatric regimen, or other form of mental and moral hygiene and by paying strict attention to the necessity of practicing industry, honesty, and cooperative endeavor.

Where the Theologians Failed. Unfortunately the theologians had no adequate conception of the possibilities of social analysis and of social reconstruction on the basis of a science of society. This has been an extremely difficult lesson for mankind to learn—that science can discover social maladjustments and their causes and plan for their reconstructive elimination the same as it can plan the growing of better crops or the improvement of animal husbandry—and the theologians, because of their mystical preconceptions, have been among the last to learn this lesson. This was the scientific message which Comte was trying to bring to them. In his *Positive Philosophy* he had sought to teach men that there was a science of society which had grown up as an extension of the other sciences and that it was now ready to be applied to human welfare and to social reform. In his *Positive Polity* he had endeavored to indicate to his generation the major moral needs of mankind as he saw them and the chief methods of meeting these scientifically. As heart and center of his remedial program he had proposed a new religious system which should be built upon the principles of science—the sciences of human nature and of social organization—instead of upon outworn superstitions and traditions. He, too, like the theologians themselves, believed strongly in the importance of religion, but it was a different kind of religion, an enlightened and scientific religion. Like them, he believed that one must reach most men through the human heart, that is, through the emotions of loyalty, reverence, love, pity, and tenderness, respect, and awe, rather than through the human intellect. But unlike them, he knew that the framework of such an emotional religion can be

so built that it will possess validity and social usefulness only if it is constructed according to the blue prints of science instead of allowing it to evolve at random and under the direction of tradition, superstitious fear, and the will of men and hierarchies profiting from exploitation of the "faithful."

The Ultimate Triumph of the Positivist Point of View. This greatest of the teachings of Comte had failed to make any impression upon the rank and file of the theologians. They had not understood the essence of his system. They were still busy, as we have seen, in controverting it on the incidental issues and principles here or there, as they were able to discern them, while they neglected the heart of his teachings. Their long conditioning to their own beliefs since childhood and their absorption in a closed system of magic and theology blinded them to the cardinal points of Comte's teachings. He understood this. Those who understood him were also aware of the difficulty. They were patient and resigned to the inevitably slow process of the penetration of the scientific viewpoint and method into human thinking about the problems of mankind. That was the utmost they dared hope for, and in this they were not to be disappointed.

It is not necessary to say that Comte and Positivism, as it was formulated by him, were subject to many errors of detail and that many of the constructive remedies he proposed, including his general program for a Religion of Humanity, were erroneous in principle, or in fact. That goes without saying and was inevitable as a consequence of the immaturity of Social Science in his day and of his own limitations as a scientist.

The important thing to note, as we see this movement in perspective, is that (1) here was a new field of science—Social Science—being offered to the world by one of the ablest thinkers of the century, perhaps of all time, and (2) coupled with this Social Science was a strong religious motive for social betterment and reform, with tentative procedures proposed. Together these two offerings constituted, perhaps the greatest event of the nineteenth century, even if we make due allowances for the shortcomings of Comte's system of Positivism.

The theologians who ruled the thought of the century placed themselves squarely in opposition to this current of scientific evolution. For awhile they were able to stop this flood of new ideas. But before the century was over the flood broke over them and washed many of their favorite stop-gap arguments away. What is more to the point, by the end of the century

every one of the general arguments used against Comte's contention for secular reform had been disproven by events and by scientific demonstration. The relative powers of science and theology had been exactly reversed, and there were few regrets.

PART FOUR

The Systematizing Phase of Social Science

The Critical and Systematic Work of George Frederick Holmes in Social Science

The Intellectual Criticism of Comte. In preceding chapters we have described in some detail the emotional attitudes, appreciative and critical, which were evoked by the Comtean system of philosophy in this country. We did not, however, present in equal detail the intellectual content of the criticism of Comte, since our purpose there was mainly to show the emotional effects of the impact of Comte, as revealed in attitudinal rather than in intellectual responses. But we would not be justified in overlooking the intellectual content of the criticisms of Comte, even though it was often invalid; and therefore, before we undertake to present the work of the systematic Social Scientists, in this and in succeeding chapters, it seems necessary to give some attention to this matter.

The Spirit of Criticism of Comte. We turn first to a more detailed account of the manner in which the most noted of the critics of Positivism, namely George Frederick Holmes, reacted to it. To the petty and invidious criticisms levelled at the system by the smaller minds we shall give but little additional attention beyond that accorded in previous chapters. Already we have had enough, and perhaps more than sufficient, of this as an incidental product of the preceding analyses. To the abler and less prejudiced critics and commentators we shall give considerable attention in our discussion of method. Of course we cannot expect to find wholly unbiased estimates of the Positive system anywhere as early as the middle third of the nineteenth century. The prevailing winds of belief and doctrine blew too strongly in other directions in that period. Fairness is not ever wholly a matter of the will to be fair; it is more frequently primarily a matter of breadth of experience and profundity and originality of thought. The United States was not rich in great scientists and philosophic geniuses in the decades of which we shall speak. Yet there were men capable of appreciating new ideas and of treating them with respect. We need not be

surprised, therefore, to find along with the criticisms, just and unjust, which we have been considering, a considerable body of genuine appreciation. Before the period covered in these chapters is closed a new spirit of investigation has developed, in itself largely the result of Positivism, which renders its followers more capable of estimating the theories they have under consideration.

Minor Criticisms of Comte's System. It would be tedious, and perhaps quite unnecessary, to analyze in detail all the very able and penetrating criticisms of Comte's system on an intellectual level which appeared in the United States. We shall, therefore, summarize briefly the commonest arguments used against Comte, devoting more attention to one of the most outstanding critical evaluations of Comte, in the present chapter and then pass on to a consideration of the systematic Social Scientists in the chapters that immediately follow.

One of the commonest arguments—and the least worthy of respect—which were used against Comte was that his system was materialistic and atheistic. His theory of instinct was acutely attacked by at least two critics, and we shall have more to say about their views in the chapter on general method. The idea that mathematics could be applied to social phenomena was also attacked by two commentators, and this criticism, also, we shall consider in a later chapter. Comte's law of three states or stages was repeatedly declared not strictly applicable. His concept of natural laws was almost as metaphysical as the schoolmen's entities, and this fact the critics very ably exposed. They also insisted that there was other than Positive truth; that the Positive method was valid within its own field, but not outside of it. Comte's elimination of psychology from his hierarchy of sciences and his radical behaviorism also came in for pages and pages of refutation. And, finally, Comte's argument against theology on the basis that prediction would be impossible if the world were ruled by a capricious personality, was attacked and refuted on the basis that order and regularity in nature might just as well be the result of a stable personality as of a system of mechanical laws. We must unfortunately confess that Comte's earlier period of insanity was also used as an argument against his system, and that ridicule was heaped upon the *Positive Polity* in an effort to discredit the *Positive Philosophy*.

Major Criticism: G. F. Holmes. With this brief summary of the chief arguments used in criticizing the Comtean system as a background, we

turn now to a more detailed analysis of the critical work of one of the ablest men who wrote in this field, namely George Frederick Holmes.¹ Holmes' series of articles on Comte in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, already referred to, was considered by Comte himself as the best interpretation of his theories by a non-Positivist in any language and in any country. With respect to these articles, John McClintock, editor of the *Methodist Quarterly Review* says, "In private letters to the editor he [Comte] has said, in substance, that they are fairer, fuller, and more thorough than any criticisms of his work that have appeared in Europe. Sir William Hamilton—with whom no living critic on such topics can be compared—has also expressed to us his high sense of their value."²

In the preface to the second volume of the *Politique Positive*, Comte published a letter which he had written to McClintock in February, 1852, with respect to Holmes' series of articles. This letter is somewhat less extravagant than McClintock's statement. He said:³

I have just read a conscientious appreciation of my fundamental work by an eminent adversary. Its errors, though numerous, are unintentional and incidental, and therefore easily subject to correction. This considerate treatment, to which the French press has all too little accustomed me, leads me now to extend to such antagonists my latest personal appeal to the occidental public, an appeal which, furthermore, supplements that of 1848, worthily mentioned by this memorable article.

¹ Holmes was born in Georgetown, British Guiana, in 1820. "Taken to England at an early age, he was educated at Grange School, Bainbridge Holme, Sunderland, and at the University of Durham. Coming to America in 1837, he landed in Canada, but during the following year settled in Virginia and secured a position as instructor in a school. Later he taught in Georgia and South Carolina, and then practised law at Charleston, S.C., in partnership with Colonel William C. Preston. In 1846 he was appointed professor of mathematics and natural science in the Baptist College at Richmond, Virginia, and in the following year was elected to the chair of economy, belles-lettres and history at William and Mary College; but he resigned this position to accept the preferred presidency of the University of Mississippi, which was opened November 6, 1848. On account of illness in his family he resigned at the end of the first session and being himself taken seriously ill and partially blinded as the result of a ride on horseback through the mountains of West Virginia, he spent nine years farming and occasionally writing, making his home with a relative. He was elected in 1857 to the chair of history and literature at the University of Virginia, which position he held until his death" (*The South in the Building of the Nation*, Richmond, Va., Southern Historical Publication Society, XI: 505). He died in 1897. He wrote widely in history, grammar, spelling, reading, including primers, school histories, etc. Holmes also carried on an extensive correspondence with Comte. The extant Holmes-Comte letters are reproduced in Richmond L. Hawkins' study, *Auguste Comte and the United States, 1816-1853*, pp. 99-142.

² "Horace Binney Wallace," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVI (4th series, VI, Jan., 1854), p. 142.

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. xxiii.

It is possible that McClintock referred to another letter, since he mentions more than one. In any event, Comte thought highly of Holmes' criticism, in spite of the numerous errors, from his point of view. Horace Binney Wallace said ⁴ that Holmes' opening appraisals of Comte's book

show that the writer is possessed of a profound, enlightened, and fearless intelligence. The observations on page twenty-one on the moral imbecility of the age,—its sordid and self-idolizing character,—have my full sympathy. The extensive and correct knowledge exhibited in the paper, and the great superiority to the narrow and vicious metaphysics of the time and country, have surprised me with the utmost pleasure. Your note to me gave the impression that you yourself were not the writer; but however that may be, I beg to be allowed to express, through you, and to you—as the fact of authorship may be—my cordial respect and thanks for the contribution to public literature of so able and important a paper.

Holmes himself was a very able man and later, when he was professor of history and literature at the University of Virginia, he wrote a book on *The Science of Society* (1883), which we shall discuss as one of the systematic treatises in Social Science.

Comte's Superiority as a Social Philosopher. Holmes begins his examination of Comte with an apology for the neglect which has been accorded him. He then states that he wishes to make amends for this shabby treatment. He proposes "to exhibit the doctrines of M. Comte, to examine their validity, to acknowledge their occasional and limited truth, and, so far as we may be able to do so, to expose their fallacies, and refute the principles from which we conceive that their errors proceed."⁵ He also points out that Whewell copied largely from Comte, but did not make any acknowledgements of his indebtedness. He then speaks of the premature, fantastic, and irrational reveries of Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Owen. In contrast to Saint-Simon, who was a fanatic, an uneducated and intellectually undisciplined enthusiast, a dupe of his own vanity,⁶

M. Comte is more learned, more sober, more practical, and more profound; but both aimed at the same end, and hoped for its achievement by analogous means. If the one degraded and the other denied religion, they both did so under the delusion that Christianity was effete or false, and proved to be so by the utter decay of its influence, over the lives and actions of men, and by

⁴ From a letter to John McClintock, published in the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXVI (4th series, VI, Jan., 1854), p. 136.

⁵ "Faith and Science—Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, January, 1852), pp. 2-10.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

its apparent inefficiency to remedy those social disorders which they did not perceive had sprung from infidelity of the heart, and from practical disregard of its precepts and solemn ordinances.

Holmes presents Comte's aims at social reconstruction and his general plan of procedure in a very fair, sympathetic fashion. The system, he says, is admirable, although its hypothetical premises are fallacious. He objects to Comte's analysis in many respects, saying, for example, that all three of Comte's stages may exist concurrently, (as Comte himself of course recognized).⁷ Holmes then concludes the first of his series of articles on Positivism with a statement that there can be other than positive or scientific truth, which was one of the most firmly established beliefs of the time, especially among the theologians and metaphysicians.

Comte's Supposed Methodological Errors. The second article makes a very popular, if fallacious, point against Comte with respect to religious belief. Since all peoples have such a belief, he says, and since Comte says we must generalize only phenomena, then we may generalize this universal belief. Holmes declares, "There is a gross inconsistency in this abnegation of the validity of a belief which is attested as one of the fundamental facts of human nature by the whole course of that history on which his whole philosophy is erected, and which is confirmed by the universal experience and observation on which he relies as the instruments by which science is established."⁸

The fallacy here is of course two-fold. In the first place, there is the assumption that universality gives validity to any proposition or practice. This is a contention to which Comte would never have assented, in spite of Holmes' somewhat equivocal statement implying the affirmative. On the contrary, Comte was strongly inclined to avoid all questions of the true and the false in any absolute sense. His principle that science cannot go back of what it finds as the result of objective experimental investigation confirms this point. Science, he said, knew only the coexistence and sequence of phenomena. It did not attempt to enter into the metaphysical question of causes. As to truth, Comte was thoroughly pragmatic and functional. He was concerned with whether an idea or a thing served an adjustment function, not with whether it was metaphysically or theologically

⁷ For example, Comte pointed out that man's thinking in the physical sciences was now fully positive, whereas in the field of social phenomena it was still theological and metaphysical. See the *Positive Philosophy*, translated by Harriet Martineau, I: 6-7.

⁸ "Faith and Science—Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, Apr., 1852), p. 170.

true from the standpoint of an absolute criterion of truth, a concept which was foreign to his relativistic philosophy of science.

The second fallacy in Holmes' argument rests upon his use of the term religion. He does not differentiate religions, of which there are of course many varieties and species. Holmes seems to say that religion is religion and therefore if all peoples have *some* kind of religion this is proof that a Christian theological religion, based on ancient Hebraic theology and magic, must be the true religion. If Holmes could argue in this manner, why should not Comte (aside from his better sense of logic) have contended that the universality of some sort of religion proved the validity of the Religion of Humanity?

A Defense of Metaphysics and of Faith. Holmes next proceeds to discuss and define metaphysics with a naivete which would not do him credit at the present time. Since he was himself a teacher of mathematics, his discussion of the applicability of mathematics to social phenomena, which then follows, is cogent, though fallacious. We shall deal with this discussion in the chapter on statistical method. He then sums up his discussion to this point.⁹

So far, the errors of M. Comte have been found all connected, and springing as ramifications from one central error—the supposition that all knowledge might be embraced within the circle of scientific reasoning. From this fallacy have sprung his rejection of Theology, Logic, and Metaphysics, his distribution of the periods of human history, and the progress of human intellect into three stages, his substitution of Mathematics for the sciences which have been condemned. Having refuted his delusions in this respect we have criticised so far as they require criticism, nearly the whole peculiarities of the Positive Philosophy.

The errors of Comte's system doom it, he thinks, to the same failure as the tower of Babel so far as his ultimate aim is concerned; still it is a perpetual memorial to his greatness. It is the work of the Prince of the Titans. Within its proper sphere, it is splendid. But it is incomplete because it does not recognize the unscientific sphere of human knowledge and belief. Science cannot dispense with recognition of unquestioning faith.¹⁰ In his denial of God and in the negation of the immutable assumptions of religion, Comte has blundered, and this deprives him of the highest crown of intellectual greatness.¹¹

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 197.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 198.

All this of course sounds very quaint and loyal at the present time—loyal to Holmes' traditional conditioning and training, of course, and not to the ideal or method of science. Holmes' own argument may be turned against him. He says that Comte's argument is all of a piece and falls with the failure of any portion. The same is true of Holmes' argument. It is based on the assumption that there is a mystical source of knowledge outside of the methodology of scientific investigation. If this cannot be verified the whole fabric of Holmes' criticism of Comte's method falls in a heap. Holmes also assumes that there is a being greater and wiser than man who directs human affairs, but he offers no proof of this, merely calling upon Comte and others to accept the hypothesis upon faith—unquestioning faith, he says. This is begging the question. But it was easy to beg such a question in the eighteen-fifties, for begging this question was almost equivalent to a command: "Believe these things or be damned—here and hereafter." But such modes of argument have not helped to uphold the value of Holmes' criticism of Comte, which in his own day was so highly regarded. One question assails us at this point: If Holmes' logic was so poor, why should Comte have spoken in praise of these articles? The answer, we believe, will be found in the following paragraphs. Comte was grateful for the unusual insight into his system which Holmes really did show.

Comte's Sociological Theory. Holmes is very appreciative of Comte's sociology. The whole Positive Philosophy is admirable, he thinks, but "no portions of it, in our estimation, exhibit so much depth, comprehension, originality, and acumen as the fourth and sixth volumes in which the application of the historical method to the philosophy of society is developed, and the outlines and conditions of the new science of Sociology are laid down."¹²

In his own work on *The Science of Society*, published almost thirty years later, Holmes gives a somewhat less enthusiastic estimate of Comte's sociological work, but one which is nevertheless still highly appreciative. He says,¹³

The system proposed is vigorous, elaborate, but hasty. It rests upon the Phenomenal Philosophy of Positivism, and contemplates the establishment of the capricious Positive organization. It is throughout saturated with his scheme of Humanitarianism. It is founded on a narrow basis of historical facts, loosely

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹³ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

arranged and insufficiently appreciated. Nevertheless, it is extremely valuable as a first systematic attempt, and for its boldness; but still more as indicating and applying the method appropriate for such investigation. It is distinguished by vastness of conception and breadth of outline. It is enriched with new and valuable observations in regard to the life and action of the societies. Its most eminent service, however, is that it introduces the conception of Law definitely into all the movements of society.

Comte and Philosophic Reconstruction. The third, fourth, and fifth articles deal with the need of a *novo instauratio* and with Comte's right to be considered the Bacon of the nineteenth century. With respect to the need for a new social system, there seems, says Holmes, to be universal agreement: "The last half-century has been singularly prolific of new schemes of philosophy—wide-sweeping and universal in their pretensions; and in new projects of social reform, designed to remodel the whole framework of society, and to induct new and purer forms of organization over the ruins of all existing institutions."¹⁴ Comte's is pre-eminent among these schemes. Holmes considers Comte second only to Bacon and Aristotle as a universal philosopher.

The sixth and final article is on the religious aspects of Comte's system. He promises that he will not use ridicule or sarcasm, although "the temptation to such a procedure is constant and inviting; but in the grave discussion of a vast and ingenious theory, we disdain to use the weapons of guerilla controversy which M. Comte's almost thrusts into our hands."¹⁵ A very sincere analysis of the religion of humanity is given. We shall reserve his criticism of Comte's use of the concept of instinct, which appears here, to a later chapter.

Holmes' Positive Contribution to Social Theory. It is, however, because of Holmes' *Science of Society* that he is entitled especially to consideration as a systematic Social Scientist in this chapter. This book was written some thirty years after the publication of the articles just described. It consisted originally of a series of seventeen lectures which he presented to his class at the University of Virginia, in 1882-1883. He did not call his work Sociology or Social Science because the former was too closely identified with Positivism and evolutionism.¹⁶

¹⁴ "Instauratio Nova—Auguste Comte," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, July, 1852), pp. 330-331.

¹⁵ "The Positive Religion; or, Religion of Humanity," *ibid.*, XXXVI (4th series, VI, July, 1854), pp. 329-330.

¹⁶ *Science of Society* (1883), p. 5.

The term Sociology is for the present objectionable.—It is a hybrid composition. That is a trivial objection. Like the Philosophy of History, it is premature. It is abused by its connection with untenable and hazardous doctrines, and specifically with Positivism and Evolutionism. It is represented and regarded as a consequence of one or the other of these doctrines, and is employed as a support for them. Much less presumptuous pretensions belong to an infant science.

The latter term—Social Science—had been rendered equally inappropriate, he believed, in spite of its seeming suitability. He says,¹⁷

The term Social Science has been rendered as inappropriate as the term Sociology.—It presents itself, at first blush, as suitable and inoffensive. But it has been employed to express the aims of philanthropic and fussy reformers, of a mild type, both in England and in this country. The labors of these associations are directed to the suggestion of improvements in the existing order of things. These purposes are wholly different from an inquiry into the course and procedures of Social Development.

Scope and Content of Holmes' Treatise. The first chapter of this work, *The Science of Society*, which is introductory, deals with the following topics: ¹⁸

Possibility of a Science of Society; Opportunity of a Science of Society; Gradual progress towards a Science of Society; Change in the Conception of History; Philosophies of History are delusive and misleading; The Theory of Society had to be sought from another direction; The result has been the recent schemes of Social Science; The term Sociology is for the present objectionable; Criticism of Comte's Sociology; Another and more systematic scheme has been proposed by Herbert Spencer; Criticism of Spencer's Sociology; the term Social Science has been rendered as inappropriate, as the term Sociology; The subject of the present course of study has been called the Science of Society; the Science of Society or Social Development; Society is a special Organism; Social Life differs from Individual Life; The Science of Society has been divided into two parts; The Logical Method appropriate.

The succeeding chapters take up the following materials: II. Man and His Surroundings; III. Climate, Topography, Soil, Productions; IV. Barbarism and Civilization—The State of Nature; V. Progress and Civilization. The Disease and Decay of Societies; VI. Pre-Historic Archaeology—Pre-Historic Man; VII. Language, Signs, Speech, Writing; VIII. The Arts of Life; Domestic Animals, Industry, Manufactures, Exchange; IX. Marriage and the Family; *Patria Potestas*; Education; X. The Tribe and Tribal Relations.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁸ *Loc. cit.*, Ch. I.

The Gens, The Sept, The Clan; XI. Religion and Funeral Rites. "Animism"; XII. Government and International Relations; XIII. Custom and Law. Primitive Law. Growth of Jurisprudence; XIV. Property, and the Right of Property; XV. Real Estate, and Its Forms. The Common, The Mir, Village Communities, etc.: XVI. Inheritance and Testamentary Disposition; XVII. Slavery and Machinery.

The author is very erudite, as references in Latin, Italian, and other foreign sources indicate. He points out that the early philosophies of history were engendered by the contrast between classical antiquity and the present. The French Revolution changed the world again and produced new philosophies of history, such as Herder's, Schlegel's, and Hegel's. When it was found that the theory of society could not be found in history it was sought in another direction. The wild reform schemes of men like St. Simon, Owen, Proudhon, and such doctrines as communism, internationalism, etc., encouraged inquiries. New discoveries in geography, ethnology, philology, antiquarian lore: all aided by the furnishing of data. The net result has been the recent schemes of Social Science.

The Validity of a Science of Society. Unlike most of the critics of Comtean Positivism, Holmes is thoroughly convinced that a legitimate Science of Society may be constructed apart from the Bible and ecclesiastical tradition and principles. This connection does not, of course, constitute a repudiation of either the Bible or the Church. It merely tacitly includes these sources of truth within a broader category of knowledge and the sources of knowledge, and by doing so it implies (but does not express) an assumption that the truth of the Bible and the authority of the Church are to be considered in the light of all knowledge and wisdom. Thus Holmes' frank recognition of a valid secular origin of Social Science places him among the more advanced and liberal religionists.

Holmes is sure that man has the power to construct for himself a science of society. He says,¹⁹

The course of Humanity, through its ascending phases, is not a series of blind or accidental movements. . . . There is a reason for every change. The Order and the Law must be discerned, that the past and present condition of mankind may be rendered intelligent.

The forces at work, their modes of operation, and the social processes must be carefully studied. Otherwise the present is merely a giddy dance, and the long procession of bygone centuries a meaningless train of phantoms.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Lecture I, p. 1.

To interpret the Ages of Humanity, and their shifting aspects, there must be an intelligent apprehension of the essential motions of Humanity—a doctrine to explain the phenomena of historical changes—a *Science of Society*.

He speaks of two approaches to the possibility of a Science of Society—the possibility of its conception, and the possibility of its construction. A science of society is, he thinks, as logical a conception as that of physics or any other science. He does not believe, as do some of his contemporaries, that man is an entirely different type of being or object so that his behavior cannot be subjected to study and interpretation. Man and his conduct are susceptible of scientific analysis and formulation, and therefore of scientific treatment. In this of course, he is at one with Comte, but not with exactly the same method of looking at the approach to such a science as that held by Comte. As to the possibility of such a science in the present, he has some reservations. He admits the scarcity of dependable data for generalization and the need for much further investigation. He says, "It cannot be readily maintained that our knowledge is as yet sufficiently accurate and full—our intellectual grasp on the multitudinous, interlaced, and varying details firm enough, or our logical perspicacity keen and cool enough, for the creation of the science."²⁰ "But," he adds, "the winds and the rains and the waves have accepted scientific exposition,"²¹ and the implication is that human relations must do the same.

The Need for a Science of Society. Of the desirability of such a science he has no question whatever. The need is indeed great. He says,²²

The needs of the day imperatively demand the just appreciation of the past mutations and coming changes of society.

This is shown by—1. The Revolutionary condition of political speculation and action; 2. The discontented and disturbed state of all populations; 3. The unsettlement and laxity of religious belief and moral principles; 4. The universal agitation and growing anarchy of all classes; 5. The modification or denial of the principles of Political Economy; 6. The unhealthy distribution of the results of industry; 7. The dangers and grievances occasioned by great corporations, accumulated capitals, and overpowering capitalists. Hence Comte declared that he had constructed social science in order to reconcile Order with Progress. It has also been recognized that the anxious thought of the current years is yearning for the establishment of this science.

The prosecution of such a study is further rendered opportune by the multitude of the separate sciences, or parts of science—many of them recent—which

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

relate to social topics and require arrangement and co-ordination. It is also encouraged by the amount of varied and disconnected data, apt for the interpretation of social phenomena and suggestive of social laws. Disconnected details are of little service, and partial sciences are broken and discolored truths.

Until late years the Science of Society was impossible, for want of information, for want of the appropriate logical procedure, for want of recognition of the intimate connection of the separate members, separately treated, of this comprehensive subject.

Such a need warns us that we should not wait for perfection of data and of knowledge, but that we should proceed with the development of the science immediately. His own text—which is nothing more than an abstract of his lectures, summarized in a series of stenographic notes and published by some local printer—is the result of this conviction. Whether his modesty or his fear that his lectures were not sufficiently complete and accurate prevented him from publishing a finished work on this subject there is no evidence at hand. One item of interest in the quotation immediately preceding is the indirect appeal he makes to Comte to sanction his “presumptuous” undertaking, although he does not feel justified (or perhaps safe) in using Comte’s terminology.

Observations on the Plan of Holmes’ Lectures. The second and third lectures are devoted to a rather intensive discussion of the influence of geography, climate, and other physical environmental factors upon human association. In this analysis he goes back to the ancients, including the Bible, Aristotle, Cicero, etc., for his authorities. But he uses modern sources also, although he is rather sparing in citing them. He takes care, however, not to make out man as a mere passive creature of his physical environment, but represents him as reacting effectively back upon these forces. He cites Comte on this point, saying, “Comte has remarked that civilization increases the adaptation of man to all climates and soils, and physical circumstances.”²³

Considerable space is given to the definition of barbarism, civilization, and a state of nature (Lecture IV), and to a discussion of progress and its laws and the diseases and decay of societies (Lecture V). He holds that progress is inevitable. He denies the possibility of human perfectability, but only because he does not wish to set a limit to the progress of mankind, such as would be implied in such a concept. Societies, however, are mortal and are destined ultimately to decay. The body of his lectures consists of what would now be called cultural sociology, thus showing the increasing

²³ *Ibid.*, Lecture II, p. 5.

influence of Spencer and the ethnological school in the thirty years since he wrote the series of lectures partially in praise of Comte. He no longer has as much faith in the philosophy of history method used by Comte as once he manifested.²⁴ He includes a brief survey of prehistoric archaeology and of primitive culture, he discusses language intelligently, the growth of the industrial arts, marriage and the family, primitive social organization, primitive religion, custom and law, and various other similar topics that remind one of Nott and Gliddon, Spencer, Max Müller, L. H. Morgan, Lubbock, Tylor, and Henry Maine, who were evidently his sources.

The last half of the little volume, and notably the fullest of the lectures—so far as stenographic evidence is concerned—treats such subjects as government and international relations, property rights, and inheritance. Here we find another reason for not denominating the volume Sociology, although such content does not debar the title Science of Society. The last (seventeenth) lecture is on Slavery and Machinery, and in this discussion he points out the incompatibility of the two, at least as far as chattel slavery is concerned. He disarms his potential critics by stating near the outset of his lecture: "Slavery, as a Social organ, will be considered without any reference to its propriety or its impropriety; to its justice or its injustice. It will be regarded simply as a Social phenomenon, and as a Social agency."²⁵ This promise he keeps reasonably well in an interesting historical discussion of the institution.

From the standpoint of present standards this little book falls far short of adequacy as a text book in Sociology or the Science of Society. But, judged in the light of its time, it must be reckoned a meritorious performance. Its scope is fairly broad and its assimilation of the researches of his generation is commendable. There is no evidence of originality in it, and the plan of the sociological part has many points of similarity with works in our own day. It followed mainly, but not exclusively, the leadership of Spencer, while the earlier influence of Comte lingers in the general conception of the science and in the author's justification of his temerity in undertaking its production. It is, in fact, the second work to appear in this country, which might legitimately be characterized as a treatise in sociology, the first being the work by Henry Hughes, published in Philadelphia twenty-nine years previously.²⁶

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Lecture I, p. 4.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Lecture XVII, p. 2.

²⁶ L. L. Bernard, "Henry Hughes, First American Sociologist," *Social Forces*, XV: 154-174 (Dec., 1936).

Holmes and Social Reform. It will be noted that Holmes did not lay much stress on social reform. There is, to be sure, a discussion of The Disease and Decay of Societies, in his *Science of Society*, but this is from the angle of the philosophy of history rather than from that of social reform. This slighting of the problems of social reform—so important in early Social Science—is thoroughly characteristic of the theoretical school in Social Science. Theoretical Social Science was primarily interested in formulating the laws which were supposed to govern social phenomena, and was only secondarily if at all concerned with the immediate problems and processes of social reform. The abstract science ideal, in other words, was more emphasized than the immediate social welfare ideal by this branch of Social Science now under consideration.

The Social Science Theories of James O'Connell

An Early American Work. One of the earliest of the theoretical treatises in the field of Social Science in America, if we except the Utopistic and exaggerated quixotism of Albert Brisbane's theoretical works, was the *Vestiges of Civilization*, published anonymously by James O'Connell in 1851.¹ The title is quite obviously an analogue of a very popular work published in England by Robert Chambers in 1844, entitled *Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation*, which had reached its eleventh edition in 1860. The analogy between the two works is carried still further by the fact that Chambers had also published his work anonymously. The anonymity with respect to authorship, however, may perhaps be ascribed in each case to prudential considerations in an age unfriendly to the concept of evolution, in which case it would not be necessary to assume that O'Connell was imitating Chambers in this respect. But it does seem to be quite clear that the title and the viewpoint of Chambers' book were the immediate inspiration to O'Connell to undertake a work using much the same method to cover the field of social evolution as Chambers had used to cover the field of cosmic and organic evolution. O'Connell's title implies a natural history of civilization analogous to the natural history of the earth as set forth by Chambers. This idea was not, however, original with O'Connell. In a very curious pamphlet of 56 pages published as early as 1783, on the *Rudiments of Law and Government, Deduced from the Law of Nature*, the anonymous author had said: "Vestiges of Natural Society are still to be perceived in most villages of civilized nations, and in whole tribes of uncivilized."² It is not necessary to infer that O'Connell had read this pamphlet. The idea of social survivals was already widespread, partly as a result of the new outlook upon progress fostered by the French philoso-

¹ The full title of this work is *Vestiges of Civilization: or, The Aetiology of History, Religious, Aesthetical, Political and Philosophical*.

² *Loc. cit.*, p. vi.

phers of the Enlightenment, and partly as a consequence of the tradition of the golden age among those theologians and metaphysicians who held to a theory of social degeneration.

Influence of Comte on O'Connell. With respect to the influence of Comte on O'Connell, however, there can be no question. O'Connell frankly admits his indebtedness to Comte, whom he considers "the greater Newton, succeeding the great Kepler, of social and universal science,"³ although he does not follow him in every respect.⁴ O'Connell's work, which is in reality a philosophy of history, is, indeed, essentially an American imitation of Comte, with a slight modification of terminology.

O'Connell had carried on a brief correspondence with Comte, but it was soon ended by his tactless and somewhat insolent repudiation of the Religion of Humanity.⁵ But if not actually a disciple of Comte, it is quite clear that at least he felt an intimate kinship with the Positivist movement. That O'Connell was strongly influenced by the theories of Comte is, therefore, quite adequately demonstrated, and this fact was well understood at the time his book appeared. One of his reviewers, for example, referred to the work as "the first-fruit in this country of the *Positive Philosophy* of Auguste Comte."⁶

O'Connell's Concept of Social Science. The *Vestiges of Civilization*, O'Connell tells us, grew out of a paper on Pascal which a quarterly review had asked him to prepare. In analyzing the psychological aspects of the age of Pascal he attempted to assign it to its proper place in evolution. This implied ascertaining the laws of order and progress. When the analytic part of his study was completed, he reversed his procedure and applied the synthetic method, achieving thereby a satisfactory solution with respect to Pascal, namely that he was a combination of superstition and science. The thought then occurred to him that this method was capable of expansion into "*a verification of the social theory by a general induction of History. . . .*"⁷

Part I of the present book is on the Mechanism of Civilization, Part II is on the Aetiology of History, and Part III on the Metaphysical Cycle. In the opinion of O'Connell, a correct theory of civilization should have much

³ *Vestiges of Civilization*, p. 26.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

⁵ For extracts from this correspondence, see R. L. Hawkins, *Auguste Comte and the United States, 1816-1863*, pp. 43-48.

⁶ Unsigned, "Positive Science," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, Jan., 1852), p. 130.

⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. 26.

the same relation to Social Science as demonstrated natural laws in botany or comparative anatomy have to those sciences. It should make possible prediction and the reconstruction of the social forms and processes that are no longer in existence. Just as Cuvier could tell, from a single surviving tooth or bone, the physiological, anatomical, and other characteristics of an animal, its food, habitat, etc.,⁸

even so would equal knowledge (a thing, I doubt not, eventually attainable) of the analogous laws of symmetry and synergy in the social system, enable the historian to tell—not only from any simple art or institution, usage or general opinion of an extant community, but perhaps by inspection of a disinterred utensil or sculptured column of some unrecorded Nineveh,—would enable, I say, to tell the entire social constitution and intellectual condition of the corresponding people. All which would be implied in the short and simple formula—*of fixing the place on the scale of civilization.*

O'Connell himself disclaims any attempt to “construct this scientific scale; . . . to verify the abstract theory by a general induction of human history, and, verified, to apply it to the explanation of civilization,”⁹ since that is a task too enormous for him.

O'Connell classifies civilization into three fundamental divisions: arts, institutions, and systems, corresponding to the aesthetical, the political, and the scientific elements. The aesthetic “type” is nature, consisting of three genera, namely, language, sculpture, and architecture. The political “type” is divinity, with its three genera: religion, government, and education. Finally, under the scientific “type,” which is humanity, he lists Astronomy, Geology, and Sociology. Sociology, in turn, consists of Botany, Biology, and Ethology.¹⁰ Astronomy deals with external nature; geology with man, as explorer of internal nature; and Social Science with both. It can scarcely be said that O'Connell's classification of social phenomena and social development is as clear and as self evident as is the classification of Comte.

Psychological Theory. In Chapter I, entitled “Analysis of the Human Mind,” the author presents an excellent criticism of the faculty psychology current in his day. He says, “I shall not allow myself to fritter down the substantial unity of the mind into a multitude of elements called *faculties*; but which are truly nothing more than the various modes of a single power placed in certain diversities of condition and circumstances.”¹¹ In

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

a similar vein he criticizes phrenology, which "in fact, is but a transformation of the 'entities' into 'organs.'" ¹² It is, he thinks, a pioneer in the study of mind, but not a science itself. "Still less can it pretend to be the science of Society; for it terminates in the destinies of the individual." ¹³ He believes that each part of the brain is but a synergical portion of a single complex organ. ¹⁴ Nevertheless, when he comes to his own theory of the human mind, he turns out to be just as metaphysical as those he criticizes, dividing the mind into nine forms of operation. ¹⁵ These, however, need not concern us here. His theory of motivation is the old hedonistic one, desire for pleasure and aversion to pain being the chief drives. ¹⁶

The most significant part of O'Connell's psychological theory, however, is not his analysis of the individual as such, but his recognition of the social origin of personality which is implied in his emphasis on the organismic nature of society.

An Organismic Theory of Society. In his insistence upon the organismic nature of society O'Connell outdoes even Spencer himself. He objects to Comte's mechanical and physical analogy in calling his work Social Physics, since this does not do justice to the organismic nature of society. ¹⁷ He himself believes Society to be actually a real, living organism. He says, ¹⁸

But is it that Society has a nervous system, a thinking organ in the literal sense, and apart from that of the component individuals? I am forced to answer that the intimation was no poetic comparison, but a logical deduction from the entire tenor of the exposition. . . . It is plain, then, that the social system is a thing as positive, as real, and even as natural in the strictest sense as any one of its constituent elements. It is, too, as intimately and much more exquisitely organized. Not to mention here its finer tissues, are not individuals, classes, communities,—from city to city throughout the most extensive countries, and from country to country even across intervening oceans,—set in motion through the cold commercial nerves of the telegraph, no whit less surely or sensitively than is the physical arm, by the application of fire to the fingers, or than were the locomotive muscles by the panic terror of the ancient shepherds?

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41. Note here and previously the employment of the terms "synergy" and "synergical" more than thirty years before they were used by Lester F. Ward.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 187; again anticipating L. F. Ward.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 180.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 179, 181.

To the objection that the atoms of the social body seem so free, so far apart, he replies that distance is all a matter of relative perspective. The stars in the nebulae are far apart, yet they seem to us like vapor. ". . . All the aggregates of nature are a thing of relation, and most of our human errors a consequence of position." ¹⁹ Thus our individual separateness is an illusion. He adds: "It is then this position that interferes with the recognition of our real condition as mere molecular elements of the social organism. . . . The most absurd part of the illusion, however, is by no means this non-perception of the organic unity of Humanity; it is the usurpation of specific attributes of the whole, by each of the parts." ²⁰

A Theory of Language. Following up this analogy, he makes a very interesting statement, very much in the manner of Cooley himself, as to how society moulds the individual. Says O'Connell, "Man is, therefore, born a talker or a thinker no more than he is born a tailor or theologian. He becomes the latter only by studying in a cloth-shop or a college. But so does he become the former but by being brought up in a society." ²¹ Nor does O'Connell allow us to invoke the fallacy of final causes in order to explain that talking and thinking are necessary in the individual for his preservation. As a matter of fact, he says, preservation of the species goes on better in lower animals who live by instinct. Society, on the other hand, he avers, ²²

could not live an instant without one or both. Its mere existence implies an exercise of reflection; for the selfish individualism of instinct tends to isolate; whereas reflection begets sympathies, and sympathies association. It is Society then, that can, alone, be said to have been born with the attributes specified. I need not insist that it was also born a moralist and politician.

From all this, therefore, I confess I find the conclusion irresistible, that there is a being of a new order to be placed at the head of the scale; a being of which the constituent elements are the mass of human individuals, of which the distinguishing attributes are language, reflection, reason, and whose organic structure is composed of arts, institutions, and sciences. There exists but a single object to which any of these characters belong by nature; that object is the social system, and as I have universalized and personified it under the name of Humanity.

This is, it must be confessed, a rather roundabout way of establishing the social origin and social function of language by means of a biological

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 182, 183.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 184.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 184.

analogy. Cooley and others have achieved the same result more effectively on the basis of a social psychological analysis of the functional development of language.

Protests against Individualistic Theories. Like Comte, O'Connell was critical of the individualistic philosophy and ethics of his day. His organismic theory of society would serve to indicate his point of view in this regard if there were not other evidence. The inability of the average individual to see the abstract and compelling unity of society leads to a number of philosophic errors of an individualistic or anarchical sort. Among these is the overemphasis upon rights to the exclusion of the duties which arise from the organismic nature of society. He says,²³

Hence the ludicrous error in question, and a thousand others from the same source. Such, for instance, is the "philanthropic" mania of our day, which sets the entitled appetites called "rights," of the individual man, above the laws of the organism of which he forms but a passing atom. To these philosophers the man is unified by being encased in a continuous skin, . . . and is equalized, by their animal sympathies with his welfare or his wants; but the finer tissues and aspirations of the social system are still invisible; and being, at the same time, undeniable, irresistible in their effects, society seems a mere engine, accidental or artificial, serving only for the oppression of the lower strata of its own constituents! . . . Meanwhile the State, I repeat, is really no less individual, and even animate, than any of its physical members. It is merely more porous, so to speak, more highly organized. Yet not more the former, than in strict proportion to the relative sizes of the two systems. In the social, however, the idea of unity, which I have ventured to propose, is quite excusably unrecognized, from this supreme abstractness of the organism.

Another individualistic fallacy is the doctrine of the uncaused nature or freedom of the will. He undertakes to show that the will has a purely naturalistic or functional origin and that it came into existence in a social situation—in fact, in a vocational situation—demanding conscious analysis and choice of a course of procedure. It is therefore a social product, as well as a social cause. He says, "The development of the will was reciprocally cause and consequence of the social relations which we saw arise on the foundation of agriculture. These relations require the exercise of calculation and contrivance; the application of means to an end—of which the conscious capability is the entity we name Will."²⁴

A Philosophy of History—The Theory of Cycles. O'Connell's philosophy

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 221–222.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 321.

of history was, as we have already pointed out, essentially an imitation of Comte's. The total evolution of civilization, he says,²⁵

presents three different phases, proceeds upon three distinct bases, is performed in three principal cycles, progressively. It operates, in the first, upon the physical world of Nature; next, upon the moral world of Man; finally, upon the logical world of Relation—the relations subsisting *really* between those two collective substances.

The condition of reality is essential to be noted. For relations are of necessity, the spring of action in all the periods, nothing else being ever accessible to the human understanding. But these relations, as *conceived* in the first and second cycles, are respectively imaginary and imperfect; and it is even through numberless ages of such illusions and such errors, that the human intellect has been educated to *perceive* the true, that is the scientific.

He explains also that by cycle he does not mean a literal cycle, but a progressive one.²⁶

It should also be explained, that the term cycle is not taken here in the literal sense of meaning a period returning into itself. This would obviously be incompatible with the continuity of progression, of which the three sections are represented as the successive results. To follow nature, it is therefore necessary that the movement of revolution be not only reconciled with, but made subservient to, the movement of progression. Not the circle, then, but the cycloid gives the precise image of the acceptance.

The three cycles are the Mythological, the Metaphysical, and the Scientific. These are sometimes called also the Physical, the Ethical, and the Philosophical, or the Objective, the Subjective, and the Systematic. He carries his analysis through the Mythological Cycle and part way through the Metaphysical. Here he has to give up, however, and he ends with a Note to the Reader in which he explains that the effort at compression is too great. There are many more things he had meant to include. "But these may all be soon supplied, should the public deem the writer to have anything of value to communicate."²⁷ Apparently the public did not so deem. The reviews were not friendly, and the public was not yet up to the level of an intelligent and interested consideration of such a work.

The Chronology of the Cycles. Since O'Connell's theory of so-called cycles of the evolution of human thought is offered by him as a substitute for Comte's famous law of three stages, it is of interest to know how and

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

where he places them in the temporal scheme of social evolution, as well as to consider some other items connected with his theory. He states the chronology as follows: "I am willing therefore to include in the first or Mythological Cycle, the aggregate career of humanity down to the advent of the Christian religion. The predominance of the second or Metaphysical Cycle may be conceived as terminating with the seventeenth century of our era. The third or Scientific Cycle must by consequence be considered as only commencing its visible emergence. . . ." ²⁸

In view of the criticism levelled at his supposed anti-Christian or infidel views, imputed to him by his reviewers, it is interesting to note that he closes the dominance of the mythological period or cycle with the advent of Christianity. It would appear that if he had been antagonistic to Christianity as such, rather than critical of the magical and mythological survivals that persisted in the theological and ecclesiastical systems of the day, he would either have extended the mythological period to include Christianity or have ended its dominance with the appearance of the Greek systematic and social philosophers. Perhaps his critics, who believed he was attacking Christianity fundamentally, could not themselves distinguish between the magic and mythology surviving in organized religion on the one hand and the essential social teaching of Jesus and his intelligent followers on the other hand. It is difficult, however, in any case, to understand why the beginning of Christianity should mark the ascendancy of the metaphysical cycle or mode. Granting that its origins are much earlier, as he would admit, its dominance in human thinking must be placed with the great Greek metaphysicians in the fifth century B. C., if he means by dominance its control over the thought of the masters. But if he has in mind its dominance over popular thinking, thereby replacing mythological explanations, it must be placed as late as the end of the nineteenth or the beginning of the twentieth century.

A Theory of Social Control. There are several interesting secondary or incidental sociological theories and observations scattered throughout this work. It is not possible within the limits of our space to give an exposition of all of these, but his theory of the evolution of social controls—which he calls, analogically, a theory of social healing—is worth presenting because, when divested of its peculiar terminology, it is essentially the same as the theory of the development of controls now to be encountered in the socio-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1851, p. 191.

logical treatises that deal with this subject. It also provides a fair sample of the manner in which he exploits his social organismic theory in the general course of his writings. The large number of biological terms and analogies is particularly to be observed in the passages that follow.²⁹

The progression was of course completely similar, in the art of healing the body politic, that is to say, the physical body of Humanity, of Society. The remedies were first Penal; the primitive legislation, a criminal code. See the Gothic codes of the middle ages, without exception; and the laws of all ages and communities in the barbarous state, up to the Ten Commandments and the Twelve Tables inclusive. This, we see, was quite consistent in the Cycle of *Force*.

After came the therapeutic scheme of transportation by banishment, colonization, emigration, etc.; which lingers still the leech and evacuates of our quacks political. This was equally characteristic of the Metaphysical epoch; for the reason of the change was to spare life, for the sake of the *entity* called soul or will. . . .

The succeeding epoch of governmental Alternatives, brought the establishment of manufactories, etc., not only those within prisons, but also those without; which form the natural transition to the Dietetic System. Of this system, which is, accordingly, the social problem of the present day, the *principle* (we now see) is as thus: REASON INSTEAD OF FORCE; DUTIES INSTEAD OF "RIGHTS;" KNOWLEDGE INSTEAD OF FRAUD; EDUCATION INSTEAD OF SUPERSTITION; or to sum up all in a single term, SOCIETY INSTEAD OF MAN; and the corresponding *practice* will be: ABSTINENCE, FORBEARANCE, SELF-DENIAL, IN THE REGULATION both of PROPERTY and POPULATION.

Again he makes clear his exaltation of the importance of society over the individual, of order over freedom, and of duty over gratification. In this he was at one with Comte.

O'Connell's Theory of Oratory. Far from being a sworn enemy of Christianity, O'Connell was himself a contributor to *The Methodist Quarterly Review*. In a review of a French publication on oratory for this journal, he discusses the nature and conditions of eloquence with considerable insight into its social significance, much as one might today analyze the related contemporary theme of propaganda. Thus, for example, he says: "Under the new democracy now opening upon Europe—the democracy of interests and ideas, not of illusory 'rights' and effete forms—eloquence, with the grand armory of science to supply it arguments, will . . . become again, more effectually than of old, perhaps, synonymous with the art of govern-

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 288–289.

ment.”³⁰ This high development of oratory, however, he continues, is dependent upon the maturing of Social Science.³¹

Some Examples of Unfriendly Criticism. Before leaving O’Connell we may present some samples of the criticisms that were levelled against his theories. Although they do not differ greatly from those previously and currently urged against the writings of Comte and his disciples referred to in previous chapters, the personal slant of those here under consideration is sufficiently illuminating to make them interesting to the reader. *The Methodist Quarterly Review*, always alert and responsive to such literature and to such theories, gave his book two separate reviews, neither of which unfortunately was calculated to encourage the author to extend his efforts in the direction of further analysis, and apparently O’Connell lacked that dogged persistence and sense of conviction or of duty which compelled Comte to go ahead with his work regardless of public criticism or praise.

The first of these reviewers taunts the author with a trait of intellectual boldness which he should have praised even while he criticized the content of the theory, if his convictions impelled him so to criticize. He says,³²

The disciple is not only bold enough, like his master Comte, to differ from all previous thinkers, but also to extend the views of the master himself, if not to forsake them in a most important application of the fundamental principles. . . . The task of the book is no less than to constitute a scientific theory (*the* scientific theory its author would say) of universal nature and universal knowledge, by which both are brought under *one and the same law of progressive evolution*.

This critic proceeds to further remarks which, after the lapse of many years, would appear to imply more of a criticism of the reviewer’s philosophy of society and of science than of the views of the man he was criticizing. How little he could have surmised that his own statements, so confidently and dogmatically made in his article, would in the course of time come to be the ones regarded as philosophically and scientifically unsound, while the viewpoint represented by O’Connell would grow in favor among scientists as men became more enlightened. The reviewer continues,³³

The whole scheme . . . is materialistic. . . . On its basis the conception of Deity is a mere generalization of experience—and the last work of the human

³⁰ “Eloquence—Its Various Species, and Their Scientific Classification,” *loc. cit.*, XXX (3rd series, VIII, Oct., 1848), p. 514.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 515.

³² *Loc. cit.*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, Jan., 1852), p. 136.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 142–143.

mind, in clearing its way to *science*, is to get rid of that conception entirely. The idea of a Divine Designer of the universe is but a relic of the superstitious infancy of the human race. . . . The morality of the scheme is, as is quite necessary, the lowest and meanest sensualism. The freedom of the will is a chimaera—the will itself “is a mere effect.” Human *rights* are “entified appetites.” . . . Can that system be *philosophical*, which leads to these results? No—it is the negation of philosophy—it is, in fact, the assertion that philosophy is impossible, for it ignores all the *real* questions of philosophy as out of its sphere. It declares that *all* knowledge is limited to the recognition of phenomena, and to the explanation of merely phenomenal laws. . . . We do not fear any harm to Christianity from the widest application of the Positive Method to the world of *phenomena*. But so miserable is the failure of the grand attempt before us . . . that a sentence or two will suffice to indicate it. . . .

Another reviewer³⁴ compares O'Connell unfavorably with Comte. He states that the book is deliberately infidel in a negative way, although not aggressively so. He further expresses his belief that within the domain of human science and philosophy, all attacks on Christianity can be successfully repelled, including this one. Perhaps, however, his faith in this connection was not quite as strong as his words. It is impossible to ignore the fact that organized religion or theology, if not Christianity itself, was becoming constantly more sensitive to the attacks, implied or definite and direct, of Positivism and kindred philosophies. There was a growing tendency to attempt to meet their criticisms with arguments rather than merely with scorn and indifference, or with name calling.

Summary and Conclusion. There is a tremendous amount of detail and no lack of erudition in O'Connell's *Vestiges of Civilization*, but the style is at times difficult to the point of incomprehensibility. This may be due to the fact that it was written in two months, in a locality where no library was available.³⁵ Or it may be the result of confusion in the author's own mind arising from his having written the book before he had thought it out completely. The divisions of the book, for example, are not logical. Part III, on the Metaphysical Cycle should have been included in Part II. The whole organization is more or less illogical and confused, although the author generally makes clear what he is driving at. The chief importance of the work for our purposes lies in the author's insistence on the organismic nature of society, his theory of cycles in the evolution of human thought, his reiteration of the general Positivist contention that scientific

³⁴ *Ibid.*, XXXIV (4th series, V, Apr., 1853), pp. 213–249.

³⁵ *Vestiges of Civilization*, p. 29. The book was withheld from publication, however, until the references had been verified.

method and scientifically determined controls must be the guiding principles applied to the purposive regulation of a progressive society, and the exaltation of the social welfare above, and as a necessary means to, the individual welfare. While, as his contemporaries recognized, O'Connell was primarily an echo of Comte and Positivism, he was not merely an echo. He had enough originality to develop his own explanatory theories and to find his own illustrative material and, upon occasion, to vary his analyses and arguments. He also possessed sufficient independence to reject the sentimental and ritualistic aspects of Comte's Religion of Humanity at the same time that he agreed with Comte's emphasis upon the primacy of duty and of the social welfare. Of his theory of method we shall have more to say in a later chapter.

Robert S. Hamilton: His Motivation and Social Science Principles

A Duplicate Discovery of "Sociology"? We come now to a most interesting character, one Robert S. Hamilton, of Cincinnati, whose work, if his own record is adequate proof, is an illustration of parallelism in intellectual history. For he had independently coined the term Sociology in 1855.¹

It may be worthy of remark, as a part of the unwritten history of the world of thought, that this word [sociology] is of the author's own *coinage*, though not exclusively. So recently as September, 1855, he consulted an erudite friend as to the propriety and necessity of coining a new word to express the comprehensive ideas involved in his mode of considering the phenomena of Society, and suggested *Socialitics*, *Socialistics*, and *Sociology*. His erudite friend, however, adjudged that neither of these words would be allowable—that such liberties with language were proper enough with the German, but far less admissible in the Anglo-Saxon tongue. The author, notwithstanding, concluded, upon his sole responsibility, to adopt Sociology. He shortly after learned that the word had been already used, and even as the title of a late work, by Mr. George Fitzhugh, of Virginia, entitled, "Sociology for the South." Shortly thereafter he found that it had been freely used in the last, or *eighth* edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, under the title of "Communism," and still more recently, that it had been not less freely used by Comte in his Positive Philosophy, published as far back as 1835. This statement will illustrate how different minds, without any concert of action, but acted upon by like necessities, operating extensively in the same epoch of the world, are often led to the same discoveries or inventions, whether of thoughts or words.

It is, of course, more than likely that Hamilton had seen the word—the Martineau translation of Comte had already appeared in 1853—and had appropriated it unconsciously without realizing it. This might easily happen, especially while his ideas on Social Science were in process of formation or integration and therefore before he felt the need for a word to cover the field of thought upon which he was engaged. In fact, he could scarcely

¹ Leland A. Webster (Pseudonym for Robert S. Hamilton), *Present Status of the Philosophy of Society* (1866), p. 9.

have escaped the word by 1855 if he was at all diligent in reading experimentally and widely in those sources from which he might derive new material for his own synthesis of a Social Science system. It is a matter of common occurrence that researchers make no particular note of fundamental facts in their fields until their frame of reference—"apperceptive mass," the Herbartians used to call it—has been integrated to the point at which it calls for just such building stones in their system. It is scarcely likely that Hamilton's frame of reference or system building had reached such a stage of growth before 1855 (he published his work in 1866) that it called for a covering term or name.

Hamilton's Personality—Resignation. Before we proceed to an analysis of Hamilton's Social Science theories let us turn for a brief examination of the man himself, since his theories seem to be a logical expression of his temperamental makeup.

The personality of the man can be inferred from his rather pathetic bid for the appreciation of posterity, since he knows that his contemporaries will not recognize his achievements. He tells us that he understands the profound apathy and indifference of mankind to themes and efforts such as his, and therefore he indulges in no hopes that his own book will escape the fate of great works generally. He adds,²

It will be doomed to abide the slowly and imperceptibly formed VERDICT OF AGES in which the ideas of the work will be preserved, while the work itself will have passed unobserved out of existence, and the SOUL of his thoughts will live, while its *body* will have perished.

Such is the fate of many of the greatest efforts of man. They are destined to pass into the general circulation of the world's life, like the silent and unrecognized forces of nature, exerting the most momentous influence in the world's destiny without any visible manifestation of their power. . . .

The writer of these pages has not expected reward, or recognition of his labors in any form. For this he has not toiled. To benefit mankind has been the purpose for which he has labored, not to derive any benefit for himself. To confer favors, not to receive them, is the object of his life. He has long known, indeed, that it appertains to one class of men to merit rewards, to another, to receive them.

Against this apparently unjust law he seeks not to declaim, or in anywise to remonstrate. Unworthy would he be to become an exponent of that august Philosophy which he here seeks partially to introduce to the world's heedless attention, were he to do so. For that Philosophy teaches, in all its conclusions, RESIGNATION TO THE LAWS—THE GREAT HIGHER LAWS—from

² *Ibid.*, pp. xiii, xv-xviii,

which there is no appeal, and against which it is useless to declaim—and tends to THE GRAND REPOSE of the world, a repose, not to be marked by general apathy, indifference, or inactivity, but by the absence of those violent revolutions, those disastrous earthquakes of the social world. . . .

The reception of Comte's great work is an illustration of the failure of the greatest products of human thought to secure recognition, continues the author. He himself is little influenced by the desire for fame, honor, or the general esteem of mankind, or profit, for there will be loss rather than profit to him in his work. He may have been influenced by such motives in his youth, but "sobered by experience, suffering, and long-continued self-denial, self-abnegation, as well as by a more thorough appreciation of the vanity and insignificance of human efforts and human hopes, even than that with which he had begun life, he has but little now remaining of that which could sustain any such motives."³

His Object in Writing. He has worked so long that the men he had sought to please are dead, and all who could render him recognition are gone. He is too old to care much for these things now. He says,⁴

It is of but small importance to him, therefore, what may be the immediate reception of these thoughts by the world. Of what avail, indeed, to him, could now be the world's honors, or reproaches—its smiles, or its frowns—its empty rewards, or short-lived penalties? . . .

It is with but little concern that the writer contemplates the profound indifference of the world to his labors, the almost total neglect which most probably awaits this small product of those labors, or the fact that the entire significance of his life and labor seems destined to sink silently and unappreciated, in the course of ages, into the thought and life of the world. For all this he is already prepared. For this he has toiled. To the ultimate good of mankind he has devoted his labors. To the coming ages he commends their result. . . .

Of this much the writer of these pages feels well assured, that the world will eventually be somewhat wiser and better, and, therefore, somewhat happier and more prosperous, in consequence of what he has here written. . . . Unrecognized and unappreciated as his efforts may be, the human race will move forward, a step or two, in the right direction, and towards the highest attainable position for mankind, in consequence of those efforts; for, to this end, it must be observed, the writer had brought to bear, not his own unaided strength alone, but the concurring and concentrated force of many minds.

The sentiment expressed in the last two paragraphs of the quotation above is strongly reminiscent of the philosophy of George Eliot's poem begin-

³ *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. xxi-xxii.

ning, "O, may I join the choir invisible," which was of course derived from the Positive Philosophy of Comte. It was a corollary of the Positive Philosophy that the individual's personality, both mundane and immortal, not only proceeds from the great social whole, but must ultimately return to and be merged with the social whole.

Yet he is not entirely without hope of achieving something worth while through his literary and philosophical efforts as put forth in this treatise. His reward will be in his own mind, his own approbation, the consciousness of having done his duty and fulfilled his mission as far as possible under great difficulties and appalling discouragements. He therefore dismisses the work tranquilly and with indifference, unmoved either by fear of censure or by hope of praise.⁵ When a man makes such a pathetic bid for appreciation we can do no other than accord it to him, if it is at all possible to do so.

The Content of His Work. Let us therefore point out that Hamilton's book contains the first history of social thought published in the United States. Fragmentary sketches of men and their social theories had appeared in various reviews, but no such systematic treatise as the book under consideration had previously seen the light. Also as a theoretical statement of the new trends toward sociology in Social Science, chiefly along the lines marked out previously by Comte, it probably outranks any and all of its predecessors. It is almost unaccountable that this book should have been so completely forgotten until the present. It is by no means an insignificant performance. The following synopsis of the table of contents will give an adequate idea of the plan and subject matter of the book.

Introduction. Importance of clear and definite ideas as to the true ends of a science—an important law of mental evolution hitherto unrecognized—Present status of social philosophy defined in brief—The true ends of the philosophy clearly defined—Identity of the Just and Expedient—The necessity nevertheless of respecting the apparent differences between them—The three existing systems of thought in social philosophy stated and defined. Chapter I. The three existing systems of thought in social philosophy, considered by the Experimental Test or from the Practical Standpoint—Their manifest insufficiency as thus exhibited. Chapter II. The insufficiency of the three existing systems considered by the rational test, or from the theoretical standpoint. Chapter III. General Summary as to the most essential significance of the three systems—Thus still more clearly revealing their essential insufficiency. Chapter IV. The reasons for considering the more advanced ideas of previous think-

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

ers, before proceeding to develop those of the author, which are in entire accordance with those more advanced ideas. Chapter V. Of the method and order to be adopted in considering the new ideas. Chapter VI. The more advanced ideas in social philosophy essentially expressed and critically examined in brief—The seven main propositions that embody these ideas. Chapter VII. A brief retrospect into the wisdom of antiquity—As manifested in Confucius and Solon. Chapter VIII. A critical review of Guizot and Hallam. Chapter IX. The valuable contributions of DeMaistre and Chalmers to the Philosophy of Society critically considered. Chapter X. Sismondi and Mill—Their most essential contributions to the Philosophy of Society brought prominently into view. Chapter XI. Of Cousin and Buckle, and their most essential contribution to social philosophy. Chapter XII. Of Comte and Spencer, and what they have done for the philosophy of society. Chapter XIII. The American contribution to social philosophy briefly considered. Webster, Calhoun, and Henry James particularly noticed. The late great war glanced at, and the lessons it inculcates. Chapter XIV. General summary—The present status of social philosophy more explicitly defined in brief—Its commendable therapeutics—Its imperfect diagnosis—Its Copernican Idea distinctly defined—Its Newtonian Idea suggested rather than defined—Concluding remarks.

How the Work Was Conceived. It appears that some time in the eighteen-forties, Hamilton, "with the buoyancy and hopefulness of youth, little appreciating the arduousness of the enterprise—little deeming that he was *embarking on a voyage for life*, where he expected, at most, but a *twelve months' cruise*"⁶ set about to write "a thorough and, in some respects, exhaustive Inquiry into the causes which determine the Social Condition of Mankind."⁷ After ten years, more or less, in 1855,⁸

the author recommenced his main work, and began to write, or rather to re-write, the Introduction to his "Inquiry into the Causes which determine the Social Condition of Mankind," with a view to a total remodelling of what he had already written thereupon. In a short time it was discovered that this Introduction, comprising essentially a review of the progress of thought in Social Philosophy, would inevitably expand into a treatise fit to be published as a separate work—an appropriate preliminary to the main work, and in many respects its exact counterpart.

As this preliminary work, however, proceeded, amid many difficulties and interruptions, so greatly did it expand in volume and increase in difficulties, that, at the commencement of this, which is properly its Sixth Part, the author began seriously to apprehend that his labor would prove to him interminable, and that death would overtake him before any part even of his merely preliminary

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xx.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. ix-x.

work could be formally presented to the world. He then, in December, 1865, and when these first three chapters only had been written, conceived the idea of publishing this Sixth Part of the entire preliminary work, as a separate publication. For this purpose no part of the entire work appeared so appropriate as this, inasmuch as it recapitulates the substance of the three preceding parts, and contains, beside, many of the most important ideas of the whole work. The idea, therefore, had hardly been conceived before it was adopted.

Plan of the Work in General. The book, then, is only one sixth part of the projected *magnum opus*, as estimated by major divisions, but the author tells us that it actually constitutes one fourth of it. The 1866 edition was published under the pseudonym of Leland A. Webster and bears the title "*Present Status of the Philosophy of Society: a Treatise Designed to Show the Insufficiency of Existing Systems of Thought Concerning the Phenomena of Society, and the Tendencies Toward a Larger System: Being Part of a Series Comprising a Complete Review, Historical and Critical, of the Progress of Thought in Social Philosophy: Which Review Is Itself Intended as A General Introduction to a Complete and Exhaustive Inquiry Into the Causes Which Determine the Social Condition of Mankind; Embodying the Outlines of a Thorough Philosophy of Society, and a Complete Science of Sociology.*" On the title page appears the following verse:

How small, of all that human hearts endure
That part which laws, or kings, can cause or cure!

The first edition was dedicated "To the One in the Million; or, The Elect Few Who Constitute the World of Thought, These pages are respectfully inscribed, with the hope that such may find time occasionally to ponder at least the title page and table of contents. To Statesmen in Particular, and Mankind in General, This Work (with those that are to follow) is Devoutly Dedicated By the Author." He had meant originally to publish his book anonymously, but he read that Mill attributed the failure of a good book to its anonymity, so he changed his mind.⁹

He was unwilling to impair, in any degree, the chances of bringing highly important truths into somewhat more general recognition, by his disinclination to present his name to the world, in connection with a work lying so entirely beyond the sphere of general recognition, and one to which his name could impart no additional interest, but rather the reverse. The apostle of truth should sacrifice all personal considerations, whether in respect to his desire to become known, or to remain unknown. Perhaps, moreover, in abandoning his former purpose of publishing anonymously, he may have been influenced somewhat

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. xix-xx.

by the natural and pardonable desire to leave in the ARCHIVES of science, some brief testimonial that he had lived—a desire entertained, in so far indeed as entertained at all, more for the sake of others, than on his own account.

The Second Edition—Changed Emphases. Now it is interesting to note that the second edition of this work, published in 1873, under the title "*Present Status of Social Science, A Review Historical and Critical, of the Progress of Thought in Social Philosophy*," drops the long explanatory preface of the first edition and the dedications quoted above, and astonishingly enough practically denies the very existence of the first edition, which, as the second-hand book market proves, was fairly widely circulated, at least in Cincinnati. The preface to the 1873 edition is very brief. It reads as follows:

The present work was prepared for publication seven years ago, and submitted to a few eminent critics and others, for consideration. But portions of it, especially some passages bearing on the late American war, being considered too antagonistical to the prevailing opinion, and then highly excited state of public feeling in America, it was deemed advisable to delay its publication for a time.

It is now submitted to the public, with the hope that differences of opinion, between the author and a portion of his readers, on questions of merely transient interest, will not prevent a hearty accord between them, on those that are of permanent and enduring moment.

If the intentions of the author should be carried out, the present work will, in a short time, be followed by another, on "THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF SOCIAL LIFE—EMBODYING THE OUTLINES OF A THOROUGH SOCIAL SCIENCE," that will contain the most condensed expression of the author's own observations and reflections, as this contains the most condensed expression of those of anterior thinkers.

A Comparison. It is interesting to compare the last paragraph of this preface with the "Prospectus" of the 1866 edition in which he says, "The present work . . . if the hopes and expectations of the author be not disappointed, will be followed in a short time, with another, to be entitled 'The True Philosophy of Society,' in which will be embodied the outlines of the new system of thought, in regard to the phenomena of society, which he proposes to submit to the judgment of the world. That will contain the most condensed expression of the author's own reflection, as the present work contains the most condensed expression of those of anterior thinkers."¹⁰ The work projected in 1866 is intended to be a true *Philosophy of*

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.* This prospectus did not appear in all editions.

Society; in 1873, it is planned to be a thorough *Social Science*. This change in emphasis in the projected work, as well as the shift from Social Philosophy to Social Science in the title of the published work, is probably indicative of an increasing popular interest in Social Science as contrasted with a declining interest in philosophy as such. Hamilton himself had no illusions as to the incompleteness of Social Science. He makes this fact perfectly clear in the following passage.¹¹

It need not, then, appear strange that, even at this advanced period of human thought, when so many valuable contributions have been made to Social Science, and when many of its great problems have been under consideration for more than two thousand years, this important science has not yet attained to just, clear, and definite ideas as to its true and proper ends, and that, consequently, it has not yet learned how even to begin its inquiries properly, how to direct its efforts, or systematize its observations. For this is precisely the present condition of Social Science, or as we should more properly say perhaps, of the philosophy of Society. For it is only with very questionable propriety that we can apply the name of Science to a Philosophy as yet so very indeterminate in its reasonings as that which relates to the phenomena of Society.

When we speak of Social Science here, therefore, or, to use its more specific and more scientific title, Sociology, we must be understood to speak prospectively of the science that is to be—of the science that is as yet in its nascent state, and has to be cradled, nay, formed and developed, by a more thorough and sagacious Social Philosophy. . . .

Very obvious, it should appear, that in dealing with the principles of Society, or the principles on which depend, most fundamentally, the welfare of states, and of the individuals composing them, we are dealing with ideas that belong as yet to the domain of Philosophy rather than of Science. Hence it is that, throughout these pages, the terms Social Philosophy and Philosophy of Society, which are obviously identical in import, will be almost universally employed where to some it might appear preferable to use the less forbidding terms, Social Science or Sociology.

From Social Philosophy to Social Science, and Beyond. In order that Social Philosophy might develop into a true Social Science, according to Hamilton, it is necessary for it to ¹²

attain to just, clear and definite ideas as to its true and proper ends. Having clearly discerned those ends it can have no great difficulty in discovering those great fundamental laws to which they directly point our inquiries, and which constitute the last discovery to be made by Social Philosophy, and the last that it needs, in order to consummate its efforts, in the establishment of a com-

¹¹ *The Present Status of Social Science*, pp. 8, 9–10.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

plete system of Social Science, and the identification of that system with the general system of nature' and universal being.

Even more credit is due his insight for being able to foresee the fact that sociology was the ultimate substitute for and successor not only to the Philosophy of Society, but also to Social Science. This prediction was made some twenty years before the actual process of displacement began in earnest. It is also worth observing that Hamilton understood the order of evolution of the disciplines, from Social Philosophy, to Social Science, to sociology. This insight into the order of evolution of the social disciplines was probably due to his increasing contacts with Positivism as a scientific method, as indicated in the second edition of his work.

The Aim of Sociology Is the Establishment of Social Laws. The Positivist or scientific emphases of Social Science are quite clear in Hamilton. It is his manifest desire to advance Social Philosophy through Social Science to sociology by making of the latter definitely a science with truly scientific methods. His notion of what was necessary to be done in this procedure was wholly in keeping with the scientific conceptions of his time. The generally accepted proof that a discipline was a science was that it had been able to develop characteristic laws of its own. This was still the emphasis and test thirty-two years later when Giddings produced his *Elements of Sociology* (1898) and the emphasis had but little declined in importance when in 1905 Ross made a collection of social laws in his *Foundations of Sociology*. Following the analogy of physics, which was the dominant science when in the eighteen-thirties both Comte and Quetelet had endeavored to transform social philosophy into a science under the name of Social Physics, these laws were of course to be stated as far as possible in causal terms. Hence Hamilton declares that the end of sociology ¹³

is the discovery of the fundamental causes which determine the social condition of mankind—*first*, of the depressing causes—secondly, of the countervailing causes. . . .

If, then, we wish to master the science of Sociology—if we wish, in short, to establish a thorough Social Philosophy, adequate to the great work which appertains to it, of perfecting such a science—assuredly we must penetrate to Causes, to the fundamental Laws, which give rise to phenomena, and which have to be counteracted or cooperated with, in order to produce any desired end by human instrumentality. This is necessary not only with reference to the purely scientific end of Social Science, but also in reference to its efficient or practical end. . . .

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 33, 314-315.

This observation reveals the true great want of Social Philosophy in its present state. It is the want of a true and thorough DIAGNOSIS OF CAUSES—a true, thorough, and exhaustive exposition of THE CAUSES WHICH DETERMINE THE SOCIAL CONDITION OF MANKIND.

Again, and elsewhere in this work, he states the proposition even more concisely and pointedly when he declares that “The true and proper ends of Social Philosophy, and its correspondent science, SOCIOLOGY, are, FIRST, to ascertain what are the causes or laws which determine the social condition of mankind; SECONDLY, to ascertain how far, and by what means, can those causes or laws be controlled or modified by human agency—by human intention or effort, purposely and designedly directed to that end.”¹⁴

Hamilton’s Two Fundamental Laws. The nature of these laws was the same as that of physical laws, according to Hamilton.¹⁵

Astronomical science reveals to us two great forces, the CENTRIPETAL and CENTRIFUGAL, from the constant action and reaction of which, or of the antagonism between them, result all sidereal movements. Social science, true social science, not less reveals to us two great forces, precisely equivalent to those of the astronomical realm, if not, indeed, precisely the same forces, transferred from the purely physical realm to the composite realm of physics and psychology combined, from the constant action and reaction of which result all social movements and destiny.

These two laws in Social Science—the Copernican and the Newtonian—are, first, that “man is the true centre of the social universe, and that around him revolves all his social destiny—his wealth, his positive laws, his political institution, his religion, and the general part he plays in the great drama of human existence,”¹⁶ and, the second, that “the causes, or laws, which determine the social condition of mankind, and . . . the causes which determine the social destiny of an individual and a nation—of the humblest individual in the human family and of the most exalted”—are universal and identical.¹⁷ It is the function of Social Science—which the author had hoped to fulfill in a volume entitled *Inquiry into the Causes Which Determine the Social Condition of Mankind*—to discover these laws or causes. But the preliminary work had to be completed first.

The first of the above “laws” is a straightforward statement of the an-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 318.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 322.

thropocentric viewpoint, pointing out that culture is a human product, amenable to human control. This was an important idea to get across to people accustomed to referring everything that happened to the will of God or Providence. It is a statement of the secular as contrasted with the theological outlook. The second "law," as the author recognizes, is merely a suggestion rather than a definition, and somewhat resembles Comte's idea of natural laws. We are also reminded of Brisbane's cosmic law of attraction, or of Carey's law of gravitation to be discussed in a later chapter. Perhaps the most important fact to be emphasized here is that Hamilton believed in the existence of such laws and had hoped to discover them, although in this respect, as he well recognized, he was not original.

The author's aim was, therefore, to accomplish for the philosophy of society what Newton and Copernicus combined had done for sidereal philosophy. It is quite appropriate he says, that in 1866, exactly two centuries after Newton's discoveries, "there should appear a work which first distinctly develops the precisely correlative idea as to the movements of the SOCIAL COSMOS, the universality of the laws of social gravitation, the identity of the causes which determine the social destiny alike of individuals and of nations, and the perfect analogy which subsists between the two great fundamental forces which impel and control alike the Sidereal and the Social universe."¹⁸

Hamilton's Theory of Progress. With respect to the theory of progress, Hamilton differed from both Comte and Spencer, inclining more to a cyclical theory. In fact, he came sufficiently late in the nineteenth century for the unlimited progress theories so optimistically stated by Condorcet and his school at the end of the eighteenth century to have lost much or most of their appeal, while Comte and Spencer were still in large measure under their spell. Also, his temperament again comes forward to dampen any possible enthusiasm he may have had for unlimited progress theories. Perhaps also the reading of many books as a basis for the making of a theory of his own may have done something to discourage him. Anyway, he says,¹⁹

Comte and Spencer, strange to say, have both committed the palpable error, so constantly perpetrated by short-sighted reasoners, in Social Philosophy, of inferring, from the undoubted progress which mankind have made, and from that further progress which they are undoubtedly capable of making, an un-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. viii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 239-240.

limited capacity of progress, or at least a capacity of progress so great as to be utterly subversive of the very laws of human being, or utterly inconsistent with these laws. They have argued as if the course of human progress were steadily forward, and never backward—steadily upward, never downward—steadily on the advance, never on the decline. They have argued, in short, as if every human thing, and every other thing, tended only toward LIFE, nay toward still higher life, never toward death. They have totally ignored, at least for all practical purposes, the law of DEATH, and its antecedent corruption and decline.

They have both totally ignored the idea—if, indeed, they were ever possessed of it—the eminently just ideas, of Cousin, not less than of Fourier, that the life of the individual is the true type of the life of the race—nay, the still larger idea of Fourier exclusively, that this life is the type of every other, of universal life; and that everything, as we see illustrated in the life of the individual, has a beginning, a middle, and an end, in the natural course of its development—individuals, races, worlds, and systems of worlds.

If this be true, as indisputably it is, as that infallible reason, which manifests itself in man, under the instruction it receives from the suggestions of universal analogy, pronounces, with almost mathematical certainty, what becomes of this weak idea of the constant prattlers about “progress”—from which even as great thinkers as Comte and Spencer have proved themselves not to have been emancipated—this idea of unlimited progress, or steadily onward progress in human affairs.

Hamilton’s Theory of Social Regression. After a certain point, continues the author, the progress of the race begins to decline. The insanely dogmatical Fourier gave as the life of the human race 80,000 years. This, thinks Hamilton, leaves quite a bit of time for the attainment of Comte’s final regeneration of humanity, and Spencer’s ultimate adaptation of humanity to its conditions.²⁰ But truly sober minded philosophers will be inclined to believe that we shall never have any greater men than we have already had and that, although “the last Plato, and the last state of civilization, will indeed be found standing upon *higher stilts*, in other words, upon higher knowledge, the real stature, the real character of the man, and of the society, will not be found to have been materially if at all altered thereby.”²¹

In this statement the author shows that he recognized the cumulative nature of culture and the cultural heritage. However, he believes that the same principle of decline applies to nations as to the human race. “Nations, like individuals, must die.”²² Although he elaborates this statement through several pages he does not, as one might legitimately expect from

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 242.

a disciple of Buckle, give any penetrating analysis of the factors involved in social decay, such as, for example, the exhaustion of natural resources or the shift in trade routes or technological changes. He cites cases but he does not analyze in any thorough-going fashion. We must, therefore, conclude that his principle of death or decline of nations and cultures is simply an analogy with human death.

Robert S. Hamilton: His System and Theories of Social Betterment

Relations of the Social Sciences. Hamilton was one of the first of the writers on the social sciences in the United States to raise seriously the question of the relations of the various social sciences. Later on, especially around the turn of the century, this had become an acute problem, agitated particularly by the academic sociologists, who as interlopers had to justify their existence logically in order to validate themselves administratively. In 1889 Professor Richard T. Ely, as will be shown later, made sociology the all-inclusive social science, while he placed economics and other social sciences as subsidiary to sociology. Albion W. Small and other sociologists subsequently argued for the same point of view. At this time, in 1866, Hamilton was already making the same argument and presenting essentially the same classification, except that he substituted sociology's predecessor, Social Science, in place of sociology in assigning the position of dominance. According to Hamilton, therefore, Jurisprudence, Political Economy, Population, Politics (which, "in its largest import, is almost co-extensive with the master science of Sociology"),¹ and Ethnology were subordinate social sciences, or branches of the main trunk of Social Science.²

Hamilton's Original Contribution. His own theoretical contribution to Social Science is in the nature of a synthesis. He states it himself as follows: "The author of the present work may, therefore, lay claim to some credit, for the service he will have rendered to Social Science, by simply collecting together, and laying before the scientific world, in their due logical order, as he now proposes to do, the valuable ideas which have been already expressed, but which have been hitherto only disconnectedly, and in some cases even casually, rather than designedly thrown out by different authorities."³

He finds that there are three systems of social philosophy in vogue,

¹ *The Present Status of Social Science*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 10-12.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

namely: the political, concerned with questions of government and organization; the politico-economical, concerned with the problem of how mankind may be enriched; and the Malthusian, concerned with the problem of preventing over-population. These three systems are, however, insufficient.⁴ His own system is presented in the form of seven propositions or generalizations, as follows:⁵

I. It is not the GOVERNMENT, or, in a larger sense, the ORGANISM of society, that determines the conditions of the people composing such society, but it is rather, the condition of the people in its largest sense, their physical, moral, and intellectual condition, that determines the character of their government, and, in its largest sense, their social organism. Government, the social organism, or framework of society, is the EFFECT, rather than the CAUSE, of the social condition existing under it. Government is the effect—MAN, the CAUSE. Government is the creature—MAN, the CREATOR.

II. MAN is not only the creator of his government, and whatsoever appertains to the framework of his society, but he is also the creator, or architect, of his destiny under that government, and within that society. It is the COLLECTIVE WILL of any class of society that determines its condition in that society, and it is, as it would seem, by an obvious corollary, the COLLECTIVE WILL of the society, or nation, that determines its condition in the great society or family of nations.

III. MAN, and not his government, nor any institution that he has framed; MAN, and not his wealth, nor anything else that he has created, but MAN HIMSELF, is the primary object of consideration, in every scheme for the improvement of society, or the amelioration of the human condition.

It is only by elevating his MORAL and INTELLECTUAL STATUS, or, in other words, by elevating the COLLECTIVE WILL of society, or any given class of society, that any essential or permanent benefit can be conferred on humanity, even in respect to its mere material condition.

IV. It is the NATURAL ENVIRONMENT of man, mainly in respect to climate, soil, and geographical configuration, that primarily determines, to a great extent, if not exclusively or mainly, his real character, and therefore, secondarily, determines the character of his political institutions and social condition.

V. A scarcely less important primary influence than Natural Environment, with all its combined circumstances in determining the character of man and his institutions, is the single influence of RACE, or inherent natural predisposition, intellectual, moral, and animal. But whether RACE is itself the result of the influence of Natural Environment exerted through successive generations, is a question as yet by no means definitively determined, nor even thoroughly or ably discussed.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 34–62.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–38.

VI. The most fundamental laws which govern human society, and control its destinies, are precisely those which are never *written* but which belong to the grand code of the LEX NON SCRIPTA of universal being.

These laws are not less fixed, necessary, and inevitable than those which govern the material universe, although to a far greater extent modifiable and therefore difficult to be estimated. They comprise a part of the immutable laws of nature; and human society is but a part of the framework of universal nature.

The science of SOCIOLOGY is therefore to be regarded as one of the natural sciences, to be studied in connection with all other sciences, physical as well as moral; and as MAN so is SOCIOLOGY, or the science of human society, the apex and crowning point of all other sciences resting for its support on the pedestal of all anterior science.

VII. MAN being the immediate architect of his own fortunes, and controller of his own social destiny, he works best toward that end when least obstructed in his activity, and with the least possible interference on the part of others—the great law being everywhere applicable, subject of course to some important qualifications, that EVERY MAN KNOWS BEST HOW TO ATTEND TO HIS OWN BUSINESS.

Government, therefore, which is the mere creature, servant and instrument of MAN, should have as little to do as possible with his business. Its proper business is simply to afford protection to its rightful MASTER, and legitimate SOVEREIGN—MAN. Its true function is negative, not positive, and consists in the LET-ALONE POLICY, to be observed by itself, and enforced on others. Its legitimate office, most essentially expressed, is to guaranty the largest play to individual activity that may be consistent with the interests of society, that is to say, of individuals in general.

The tendency of all true civilization, of all real progress in humanity, is, accordingly, to give importance to the CITIZEN, and insignificance to the state—to enlarge the MAN, and dwarf the government—to fix attention on the INDIVIDUAL, and withdraw it from the society, or aggregate mass. Its tendency is, in short, toward the ultimate triumph of the INDIVIDUAL over SOCIETY.

These seven propositions, it must readily be discerned, embrace a vast amount and variety of thought, and, in their combined results, go very far toward suggesting the whole outline of a complete Philosophy of Society. The propositions have been here stated, for the most part, in the words of the present writer, and they have been, it is true, somewhat freely *translated*, so to speak, from the various and widely disconnected texts from which they have been rent. They have been, indeed, distilled in the author's own brain, from the products of many widely separated fields of thought. Yet it is believed that they will be found to embody nothing more than is essentially involved, if not distinctly expressed, in the thoughts from which they have been extracted, as may presently appear from the very words of the authors by whom those thoughts have been expressed.

Criticism of Hamilton's Contribution. This system, it must be confessed, is something of a disappointment after the author's prefatory claims, but his feelings about it are quite understandable. His statement of his own hope as to what might be expected from his contribution sounds somewhat bombastic.⁶

If the new system of thought, which it is proposed by the writer of these pages to introduce should be found to harmonize entirely, with the most essential ideas of these eminent authorities, with the greatest thoughts of these great minds—if it should be found to harmonize all their discords, as well as those of less profound thinkers—if it should be found to explain the difficulties which they have left unexplained, to solve the problems which they have left unsolved—if, without contradicting any of their most essential conclusions, but, on the contrary, fully sustaining and carrying forward those conclusions, it yet arrives at still more advanced and comprehensive conclusions—conclusions that embrace the whole range of facts or phenomena demanding consideration, then it must be admitted that it is not without some valid grounds that this system claims to embody, in however rude and imperfect outline, the true *PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA PHILOSOPHIAE SOCIALIS*.

We are reminded here that one is likely to confuse the grandeur of the subject-matter of his thoughts with his own contributions to that subject-matter. Our ideals are usually of a higher order than our actual achievements. Because the behavior of society is unquestionably epic in significance, we are inclined to feel that our conceptions of that behavior are likewise epic in proportions. Hamilton had read so many books on these large subjects, had become so steeped in grand historical movements and significant social factors that it seemed to him that his own system was likewise heroic in structure. He himself was probably disappointed in it when he saw it in black and white and the gloomy preface, from which we have quoted extensively above, may have been an unconscious expression of this disappointment. What he regards as his own contribution is, essentially and in the main simply a more or less schematic re-statement of Buckle, Spencer, and Comte and of the other men he had read. All this he himself recognized and acknowledged.⁷

Hamilton and Social Reform. Such are Hamilton's theoretical or pure-

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

⁷ For his first proposition, as stated on a previous page, the author was indebted to Hume; for the second, to Chalmers; for the third, to Sismondi, Chalmers, and Mill; for the fourth, to Montesquieu, Cousin, and Buckle; for the fifth, to Michelet and Cousin; for the sixth, to DeMaistre, Comte, and Spencer; for the seventh, to Henry James (*ibid.*, pp. 92-118).

science emphases in Social Science. Nothing has been said in the preceding pages regarding the existence of a reform ideal in Hamilton's writings. It is not wholly wanting, but it is so obscured by his theoretical analyses and speculations and by his temperamental pessimism as to be almost unrecognizable. He believes "that he more nearly represents the true Newton of Sociology"⁸ than either Comte or Spencer, since his aim and hopes were simply to explain society, not, like them, to change it. How modern this phraseology sounds to those who are familiar with the current dogma that science analyzes and describes, but does not advise or command. Already the age of descriptive science was nearing its maturity and as yet the period of the application of science to social control was scarcely thought of outside of a few fields, such as medicine. And even in medicine most physicians did not yet believe that medicine should tell people how to live hygienically, but only how to avoid dying or how to get well when their unscientific personal hygiene and society's flouting of the principles of sanitation had reduced them to the verge of dissolution. The period of preventive medicine and of preventive social conduct and morals had as yet scarcely been thought of. To the great mass of mankind freedom to act unwisely or to do wrong was as yet more precious than wise direction in living efficiently and well. The author further summarizes the points of difference with respect to reform between himself and Comte and Spencer as follows:⁹

Comte and Spencer, though more especially the former, aim at the improvement of society—the author of this work aims merely at the improvement of the ideas or knowledge of men in regard to society. They aim at reforming the morals of the world—he at merely reforming the intelligence of the world. They hope, at least, and expect some radical improvement of the morals of the world—being altogether too great philosophers not to perceive that such improvement must come if it come at all, in the natural order of "progress," or "evolution"—that it must come as a "natural growth," as Spencer has so clearly and beautifully shown. The author of this work hardly dares hope for any such improvement, much less expect it. When the religion of Jesus has failed, so sadly failed, what hope is there for man—that he can ever be rendered essentially better than he has heretofore been?

A Pessimistic View of Human Nature. Not only is he temperamentally or constitutionally antagonistic toward social reform activities as such, but he has no faith or hope that reform is possible. Indeed, as one might ex-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

pect from a personality of the type revealed in the quotations already presented, Hamilton is rather pessimistic about the capacity of mankind for really fundamental social improvement. And, interestingly enough, he bases his argument on a theory of human nature which might have been taken verbatim from an old style Presbyterian sermon. It runs as follows: ¹⁰

Men are not governed by their judgments alone, but to a great extent also by their appetites and passions. These repeatedly lead men to do wrong, against their own convictions, nay, their very desires to do right. . . .

Men habitually do wrong against their own interests, and against a certain general desire to do right, and to abstain from the wrongful acts which they habitually practice. What drunkard, gambler, or debaucher, so lost to all sense of right and virtue as not to know that it is not his interest to continue in the practice of those vices which he habitually practices? Yet he continues to practice them, and will continue to do so. If men will thus knowingly do wrong, even to themselves, against their own interests, what hope is there that they can ever be prevented from doing wrong to others, by the mere knowledge that it is their interest not to do so?

There is no hope of it. There is no hope for the eradication of evil from the human constitution, or what to our contracted view so appears. There is no hope for any radical improvement in the human condition. Passion will ever be more potent than reason, and that passion will ever prompt men to do what reason disapproves. It has ever been so. It will ever be so. The past is the true type of the future. There is no fundamental change to be expected in man, or in any race of plants or animals. It is utterly unphilosophical to expect it.

Let all delusive hopes of any great or radical change in the human condition be dismissed from philosophical contemplation. Let no one fondly dream that human life, at least in its terrestrial phase, can ever be rendered essentially different from what it has ever been—a great battle-field of antagonistic principles—a battle-field in which truth and error, good and evil, virtue and vice, happiness and misery, will continue to wrestle together in mortal agony “unto the last syllable of recorded time.”

Confusion of Thought. He goes further still and calls upon science to witness the impropriety of man trying to make the world over. Indeed, he contends, it is presumptuous for scientists to try to change the social system. In support of this view he quotes his idol of physical science as follows: “The Newton of Astronomy did not aim, did not presumptuously aspire to change, in any respect, the system of worlds, but simply to explain it. Scarcely less presumptuous is the attempt of the Social Philosopher to change the system of human society. . . .” ¹¹

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 275–276.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

Such a comparison has of course but little value, and it is scarcely to the credit of Hamilton's intellectual perceptions that he did not recognize this fact. In the first place, mankind could do but little to change the nature of the sidereal universe and that explains why men have not attempted its modification. No doubt, if he could move it and rearrange its constituent elements and processes this would become the chief occupation of the ages. In the second place, man is able by means of the development and application of science to produce very marked changes in human society in a great variety of ways. He has been doing this to the extent of his ability at least ever since there has been any record of his behavior. At first he sought to produce these changes by means of force and violence, and usually as a consequence effected negative or destructive instead of positive and constructive changes. But, as a symbolical science has developed, he has been progressing in the direction of the latter type of control. With the coming of a Social Science in general and of the social sciences in particular he has been striving constantly, and properly, to effect constructive social changes, which he calls social reforms. All this was, as we have seen, clearly recognized and insisted upon by George Frederick Holmes. There is, therefore, no analogy between reorganizing the universe and human society and human character. One is out of the question. The other is an ever advancing possibility and equally an ever growing enterprise. All this even Hamilton recognizes in some measure, as the following passages indicate.¹²

There is . . . this important difference between the system of worlds and the system of human society, that the knowledge of man concerning the former cannot exert any influence whatever upon it, while it may and must have some necessary influence upon the latter. And this is the only ground of hope entertained by the writer of these pages.

In so far as improvement of man's knowledge, concerning the true principles of human society, must exert a necessary influence in modifying their conduct, so far and no farther is there any reliable hope of human improvement. And when it is considered that right knowledge tends to teach men, not only how to do right, but that it is their true interest to do right, considerable hope of improvement from this source may not unreasonably be entertained.

Hamilton's Dependence on Buckle. If we sought no further understanding of Hamilton's point of view it would begin to appear that Hamilton's work could not legitimately be considered as Social Science, in the traditional acceptance of that term, in spite of the title of the second edition,

¹² *ibid.*, p. 275.

since he seems to repudiate the social reform ideal almost entirely. But such is not the case. He *was* definitely interested in social improvement, but, like his great Social Science idol, Buckle, he believed man capable only of intellectual, not of moral, improvement. Perhaps we should not condemn Hamilton too strongly for not being able to see further than Buckle in analyzing one of the latter's fallacies. He says, following the lead of Buckle, "Has not all experience, indeed tended to show that men grow in knowledge, but that, alas, in virtue or true wisdom, they for ever stand still? In this view the author has the entire concurrence of Buckle—a greater thinker than either Comte or Spencer—who regards intellectual progress as the only real progress of which mankind are capable."¹³ The fallacy of course lies in part in supposing that there is some sort of moral entity, instinct, revelation, or otherwise, in man, whereas moral perceptions are merely a function of intellectual perception and therefore moral improvement must wait upon, but not necessarily follow, intellectual improvement. In part, too, the fallacy lies in not perceiving that moral behavior is essentially social and that the mores do change; they have even been known to improve, as judged by the moral standards of the time.

Hamilton's admiration of Buckle and his intellectual achievement was very great. Of this historian of civilization he says,¹⁴

Of all the eminent thinkers who have attempted to educe order out of the chaos of human history, who have endeavored to subordinate facts and events to the ideas which they represent and from which they spring, who have undertaken closely and critically to question history, in order to ascertain, as far as possible what it signifies, and to classify and systematize events according to the ideas which they signify, Henry Thomas Buckle is, beyond all question, the most illustrious and eminently meritorious. Others may have been more learned, others may have been more profound, but none have been, no one has proved himself, at once so learned, so profound, so just, and so practical.

It is Hamilton's opinion that "Buckle never outrages common sense. Though bold and dogmatical, he seldom transcends the bounds of propriety. His only serious fault is his disrespect, almost contempt, for the clergy or priestly order of society."¹⁵

The upshot of all this intellectual maneuvering is that Hamilton's method of social reconstruction is even more roundabout than Comte's. He wishes to improve man's knowledge of society just as Comte wished

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 274.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 215.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

to improve man's social ideas and morals, as a means of social improvement.

Hamilton's Hope for Human Betterment. Thus it is clear that interest in social reform is not wholly absent from Hamilton's writing. It is in fact a deep and fundamental element of his intellectual and emotional make-up. He simply is not the dynamic, enthusiastic type; his temperament is relatively cold and inhibited, hesitant and cautious. Although, by indirection, we may achieve improvement in human conditions, we must not go to the extravagant lengths of men like Godwin and Spencer in predicting this sort of social change. Moreover, it is evident that he believed his own work would ultimately have beneficial effects. In this connection he says, "Of this much the writer of these pages feels well assured, that the world will eventually be somewhat wiser and better, and, therefore, somewhat happier and more prosperous, in consequence of what he has here written. . . ." ¹⁶ And even if the apparent results were small the real results would be no less vital. He says, ¹⁷

Let none, therefore, of the few to whom the existence of these pages may chance ever to become known, argue from their failure to arrest attention, or to exert any manifest influence upon the action or thought of the world, that they have proved of no avail, and that the labors of the author have been in vain. . . . The success of a work is to be estimated by the objects at which it aims. . . . Let no truly great or extensively revolutionary effort in the world of thought expect recognition of the age to which it is immediately addressed. Let it address itself to the coming centuries—TO THE NEXT THOUSAND YEARS. In these it may live. But for the present it may die.

The Method of Human Betterment. As suggested above, Hamilton did not believe it was possible to produce much change for the better in the social system by direct methods of approach. On the contrary he held that social improvement must be brought about indirectly and that such social advance was dependent on a knowledge of social laws and their human control, within such limits as the incomplete powers of man placed upon him. Unfortunately man's study of these laws has been but slight and half-hearted in the past and his application of them to the solution of social problems has not only been relatively ineffectual, but also frequently insincere. He says, ¹⁸

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. xiv-xv.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

So . . . men do study—imperfectly and superficially enough hitherto, to be sure—the laws of social health and disease, and the possibilities of controlling them to some extent, not only with reference to the purely scientific end of understanding those laws, hitherto indeed shamefully neglected, but with a view furthermore to the great practical and efficient end of actually controlling them, to which latter end indeed attention has been hitherto almost exclusively directed, by a sort of blind *empiricism* in social philosophy—by a sort of shameful *quackery*, indeed, which undertakes to treat social disease without any adequate consideration of its true DIAGNOSIS—almost without any regard whatever to the great and vitally important sciences—hitherto almost wholly uncultivated—of SOCIAL PHYSIOLOGY and SOCIAL PATHOLOGY.

The names of the two new social sciences upon which he depends for future social betterment indicate not only his close acquaintance with Spencer's organismic theory, but also with the work of Paul von Lilienfeld, who had begun to publish his theories by this time and whose *Social Pathology* had already appeared. Here, also, as well as elsewhere, Hamilton's sociological terminology is strongly analogical. The analogy is biological in this case, but occasionally the language suggests an analogy with physical science.

Human Control over Social Laws Limited. The degree of human control possible over social laws seemed to Hamilton to be slight. He declares, "If astronomical science discloses to our view laws that human effort cannot control or modify at all, social science reveals to us laws—natural and universal laws—which such effort cannot control or modify, except to a very limited extent."¹⁹ This statement is undoubtedly true, but it does not cover the whole of the situation. If we drop the ponderous concept of social laws and substitute therefor the simpler terms social principles and social facts, it must be admitted, and equally by Hamilton himself, that even in his day much was known about how to improve society in a great many details and also in a considerable number of fields of endeavor at large. What the author did not appear to realize is that we have more knowledge about how to improve society than we make use of. This is particularly true today, and it was also the case, if less conspicuously so, in Hamilton's day.

The Need for Better Diagnosis. Of another fact, a corollary of the one stated above, he is much more clearly aware. He contends, for example, that social therapeutics has advanced empirically far beyond a scientific diagnosis of causes of social ills. He says,²⁰

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 312.

Speaking more particularly, we may say, Social Philosophy is at present in the condition in which medical philosophy, or medical science . . . finds itself when it has attained to a very correct THERAPEUTICS for the treatment of any disease, but is as yet very imperfect in its DIAGNOSIS of the disease. For this is, almost precisely defined, the present *status* of Social Philosophy.

It has attained to a correct THERAPEUTICS for social disease, in so far as it admits, in common with physiological disease, of any remedy; but its DIAGNOSIS of causes is very imperfect, meagre, and wretchedly contracted. Hence, while it has made considerable practical attainments, in short, nearly all it can ever make, it is very backward in its theoretical attainments.

At this point he appears to have missed a significant distinction, that between therapy and prevention. If he had stumbled upon this distinction his whole position could have been rendered much clearer. He would have been able to point out that, while we are able to do much for society in a remedial way because of our knowledge of social laws, principles, and data arrived at through descriptive social science, our greatest need is for the discovery of projective principles and laws in Social Science by means of which we may project or predict sociological principles and behavior and thus prevent the occurrence of untoward and disastrous social happenings. It is this phase of Social Science, of which he bemoans the absence, which he appears really to have had confusedly in mind, if he had only been able to make the distinction. But such a distinction was clearly contrary to his dogma of the passive or descriptive limitations of science based on a physical and sidereal science ideal, and therefore could not be made.

In a measure he sees this distinction of methods and of aims in the study of Social Science, as shown by his statement of the only remedy; "Social Philosophy has already attained to the great practical conclusion that the only sufficient and reliable remedy for social ills in so far indeed as they admit of remedy, is to be found IN THE ELEVATION OF THE MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL STATUS OF MANKIND. . . ." ²¹

Hamilton's Dual Aim. The author's aim, then, is in part to perform for social phenomena what Newton and Copernicus did for physical phenomena. That is the pure science ideal. Its purpose is to understand. It rests on descriptive science. His secondary aim is to improve mankind by the round-about but, to him, the only feasible method, of improving their knowledge. This is the moral or philanthropic ideal. To these two ends he presents a survey of social philosophy up to his time. The former aim is necessarily

²¹ *Ibid.*

preliminary to the latter, but of the two the latter is the more important for social betterment and progress.

Hamilton's Significance. The most important fact with respect to Hamilton's work is not, of course, his original contribution, that is, his seven point system (which was more of a derivation than an original production), but his attempted synthesis of all the social systems up to his time. That a man in the middle west, as long ago as the middle of the last century, should have attempted such a synthesis is rather significant. In fact, it should justify us in awarding Hamilton the credit he craved from posterity and permit us to give him the recognition which his contemporaries withheld from him, perhaps through their own inability to understand his scientific ideals or their importance. His synthesis was fairly well done, since it embraced the more significant contributions to Social Science up to his time, omitting of course the highly optimistic work of Fourier, whom he thoroughly despised. His adjustment and harmonization of variant and conflicting points of view were reasonably effective. The surest criticism that can be made of his work is that he allowed his own temperament and the rising criticism of any endeavor to use knowledge for the improvement of human conditions—a criticism fostered by the evolving pure science ideal—to obscure the possibilities of the proper functions of scientific achievement. These attitudes lend something of a negativistic coloring to his scientific efforts.²²

²² Hamilton wrote also a *Discourse on the Scheme of African Colonization*, 1849.

The Social Science Theories of R. J. Wright: Primitive Groups

Wright's Point of View. The next general treatise on theoretical Social Science, chronologically speaking, is *Principia, or Basis of Social Science, Being a Survey of the Subject from the Moral and Theological, yet Liberal and Progressive Stand-Point* (1875), by R. J. Wright. This rather pretentious and weighty volume is a curious combination of penetrating insight and metaphysical absurdity, in which, however, the former happily predominates over the latter. The first of these traits is illustrated by the author's anticipation of the present day classification of groups into primary and derivative, for, as we shall see presently, he classified groups as "primitive" and "derivative." He also anticipated E. W. Burgess' hypothesis of transition areas in urban growth. He likewise anticipated the theory of functional organization in government. And he also anticipated L. L. Bernard's theory of projective invention. His metaphysical nonsense is illustrated by the magic of numbers by which he justifies his theory of six units.¹ Written in a rather curious style, this book manages to combine flashes of genuine genius with rather naive Utopianism. It is, almost in spite of itself, a significant production.

Wright's Place Among the Social Scientists. In Wright's work both the reform and the scientific ideals are strongly emphasized. It is, therefore, more characteristic and typical of Social Science than any of the preceding treatises so far considered in the present work. Nevertheless, it has many ideas in common with the preceding works, and especially with Hamilton's. The very title of the present work would appear to hark back, as does Hamilton's whole system, to the title of Newton's great work and to his ideal of establishing the fundamental and basic principles of physical science. Wright as well as Hamilton, whose work he had probably read, was attempting to establish the fundamental principles of Social Physics or Social Science. Even his appeal to a sort of numerology in the fixing of

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 85.

social units, to be described later, has its antecedents, rather vaguely perhaps, partly in Newton's dependence upon mathematics and in part in Comte's attempt to establish the proper number of divisions in scientific treatises and their organization on the basis of sevens. Comte himself had an almost superstitious respect for mathematics, which at times became a sort of belief in magic, and it need not be a matter for surprise that the smaller and later imitators of the great mathematician in physics and of the great mathematician in Social Physics or Sociology—Newton and Comte—should have partaken of their respect for the subject even when the imitators lacked an adequate understanding of the field.

Wright's Social Reform Ideal. Wright, himself, a professor of ethics, metaphysics, and church history in a theological school, the Christian Biblical Institute, defended the reform ideal of Social Science against critics who considered it impious, in the following trenchant language: ²

Most religious people seem to think, that Providence will take care of things so well that there is no use for Social Science; yet one of the very ways whereby Providence *does* take care of things, is by teaching of examples. And these examples, it is the special business of Social Science to study and to classify. And some religionists even fling the insinuation against Social Scientists, that they are trying to "help God govern the world." But the same objection lies equally strong, against the followers of every science which has for its direct object to benefit man; and especially against doctors of medicine. And the objection lies much stronger against theologians and churchmen, that **THEY** are trying to help God govern the world. . . . And the fact is, that everybody, so far as he uses his faculties aright, helps God govern the world. And the only pity is, that religionists do not study divine Providence better; so that they would help God *more*, to govern the world.

Wright of course is here attacking that theological laissez faire attitude which corresponded to and paralleled so closely the laissez faire outlook in economic and political theory. The Social Science movement, with its social reform ideal, was one of the major signs of the times that laissez faire had had its heyday and was now on the way out of men's modes of thought. There were abundant traces of it still in Hamilton's rather inconclusive and indecisive admissions that science might be used for the betterment of the world. But here the gage of battle is thrown down defiantly and there is a demand that science be employed for human betterment.

An illustration of the laissez faire attitude Wright is here attacking is

² *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

presented in a somewhat variant form by the arguments of A. P. Peabody, referred to in Chapter VI; where he is quoted as saying that he objected to Fourierism because it sought to replace the agency of God with the agency of man in making the world better.³ It seemed to be Peabody's idea that magic is a better method than direct moral human effort with which to reform the world. He would have men pray to God to produce the reforms they desired, but otherwise do nothing themselves toward making a good world. Surely the "Devil" never used a more deceptive device to keep things as they are, or to make them worse! This, of course, Wright was able to appreciate; hence his attack.

The Preventive Outlook Enters. One of the criticisms we urged against Hamilton's conception of Social Science in the preceding chapter was that he failed adequately to grasp the preventive possibilities and uses of his subject and of science in general. Such a failure cannot be alleged against Wright. This is precisely the point of view with which he is most concerned. He has caught the newer and larger functional conception of the practical utility of science and does not allow himself to be troubled by any imaginary contradictions between a pure and an applied science of society. He is, for example, deeply interested in intelligent legislation for social welfare, but he clearly perceives that most social legislation is ineffective; or worse, because it lacks the guidance of science. The failure of perfectly well-intentioned reform bills, he thinks, indicates the pressing need of a true Social Science.⁴ Such a science, furthermore is necessary to forestall future evils.⁵

And then furthermore, our politicians and statesmen need an enlarged scope of ideas as will set them to guarding against COMING evils, rather than to be forever providing against antiquated and worn-out ones. It is the misfortune of some peoples and of some governments, to be always guarding and fortifying themselves against old dangers, and in fear of a return of exploded errors. . . .

One of the uses of SOCIAL SCIENCE, is to enable us to foresee great revolutions and rebellions; and either to avert them, or to provide means for personal escape or relief, when we cannot influence or prevent them.

Science and Social Reform not Inconsistent. Nor does Wright believe the social reform ideal inconsistent with the scientific ideal. This is be-

³ "The Intellectual Aspect of the Age," *North American Review*, LXIV: 286-287 (Apr., 1847).

⁴ *Principia, or Basis of Social Science*, p. 24.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

cause he is unwilling to accept the world and all that is in it as a predetermined fixed entity. Perhaps the theory of evolution has helped him to recognize the fact that all things, including human social relations, are undergoing change. Here he sees the chance for Social Science to enter into the process of social evolution and by a proper analysis of the facts or processes of the social situation to modify the course of this evolution, at least to some extent. It is curious that in order to defend the theological dogma of free will—a club which all theological fundamentalists were then quite ready to hold over the heads of their progressive opponents—he must show that free will is not inconsistent with social improvement. The issue between him and the orthodox theologians and the orthodox social scientists, both of whom were addicted to *laissez faire* principles, was really whether human intellect had any power with which to achieve results in social reform, or was merely an epiphenomenon. He states the problem as follows: ⁶

There is in the minds of many persons, a lurking doubt of the use of SOCIAL SCIENCE: on the assumption, that the general course of human events is a fixed destiny. But to this we answer: the same objection might be made to the use of means, in other matters of which we may believe the end to be fixed. And a still better answer is, that the objection is an unjustifiable inference from the facts adduced by it. It alleges the uniformity of certain very general facts found in statistical tables. . . . But these facts only prove the doctrine of *chances*; the *law* of our BELIEF, but NOT the CAUSATION of events. . . .

However, true knowledge lessens the power of, and hence lessens the freedom of evil. Thus Social Science benefits mankind by lessening the temptations, and by bettering the conditions.

We affirm that the improvement of humanity is consistent with free will. . . . Even suppose that Social Scientists may not expect to make people religiously better, or even morally better, considered as to their heart or intention; yet they expect, by lessening the powers of temptation around people, to make them ACTUALLY both better and happier.

In this last paragraph we find Hamilton's argument as to the unprogressive character of human morality refuted. Hamilton denied the possibility of moral progress. Wright admits that man may not progress morally, but society may lessen the temptations and obstacles to good conduct and thus, in the preventive manner indicated above, improve itself morally.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 26–27.

How to Use Social Science for Human Betterment. It is not enough merely to demonstrate the fact that Social Science is not impotent for purposes of improving the moral and social and economic conditions of mankind. It is necessary to show what it can do and how to go about accomplishing these ends. Wright makes it clear that he thinks the Social Scientists should work both through legislation and law enforcement on the one hand and through direct effort to improve men and their conditions on the other hand. This latter method he calls voluntary benevolence, and within its scope he would include both the personal work of the minister and the moral and religious missionary and the work of charity in the more material sense. Summarizing the uses of Social Science, Wright says:⁷

In general we may say,—the use of Social Science is to point out how really to benefit mankind by law and voluntary benevolence, instead of by merely well-intentioned but vain and actually injurious attempts; to point out the natural rights and duties of all, and how really to accomplish them. The pursuit of Social Science . . . would tend to the promotion of virtue and health, the prolongation of life, and to the general morality and happiness of mankind.

Wright is sufficiently acute to see that the most effective way in which Social Science serves human improvement is indirect rather than direct. It is not primarily by the direct action of preaching and nourishing, giving relief, or by using force, but by such slower and surer indirect methods as education and enlightenment and legislation and the setting up of normal social conditions and the elimination of abnormal social environments, that the best results are to be obtained for human welfare. Such an indirect approach should be twofold: first, through the leaders; and, second, through the masses themselves by bringing to them a better knowledge of the social mechanics of the world in which they live. He says,⁸

Social Science in its application to the improvement of society, operates in two ways; one, by improving and enlightening the men who lead society; and the other, by enlightening, contenting and keeping in order, the mass of the Individuals of which Society consists, so that the natural laws of society's life have opportunity to develop and produce their results. And the science teaches all men more and more, the impotence of man in self-will, and the necessity of all to wait on Nature more reverently and patiently.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

Even here he seems to find it expedient to throw a sop to the laissez faire fundamentalists and thus to defend himself against a possible charge of irresponsible radicalism. He seems to say, If the reformer waits on the "all things in good time" of Natural Law and does not set himself up as the irresponsible arbiter of the universe, he will come out on the right side of the reform ledger.

The Pure Science Ideal. Our emphasis upon Wright's social reform ideals and his advocacy of the use of science preventively and therefore indirectly to accomplish the ends to which he gives so much attention, should not cause us to forget his equally strong insistence upon the necessity for cultivating a pure science of society also. In fact, it is through this pure form of Social Science that social betterment is indirectly and ultimately to be achieved. As was suggested earlier, Wright finds no antagonism between pure and applied science. Man seeks knowledge of nature and of society in order that he may employ this knowledge (science) in the betterment of himself and his fellows. It is of course necessary to study these general principles of Social Science—as he is himself doing in the book from which we take our illustrative excerpts—but his knowledge must be used, that is, applied. He says: ⁹

That part of Social Science which treats of the fundamental principles of society itself, taken as a distinct part from the principles of the SCIENCE, goes on the assumption, that society, like any other part of nature, has its own rules, its own principles, and its own laws,—a set of higher laws which embrace and over-rule all that governments and governors and individuals do; whether they will, or not. And, to investigate these higher laws, is one of the principal objects of Social Science.

Again, he reinforces his argument by an even more direct and precise statement to the same general effect, in the sentence that follows: "Now the business of Social Science is, to investigate the changes of society by *general* principles, and to hold the results in general formulae, of which all past and present facts are only particular instances." ¹⁰

Wright's Conception of Science. We are reminded at this point that we have been going ahead with the analysis of our author's conception of the service functions of Social Science without pausing to indicate just what he means us to understand by the term science. It must be confessed that

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Wright, as one would naturally expect of a theologically trained thinker, retains a metaphysical and even in a measure a theological conception of science. However, the theological implications, as revealed in the passage below, is more nominal than real. His reference to Providence might, for all he says to the contrary, even be taken to be one of those verbal fictions or felicitous euphemisms that theological professors and ministers indulge themselves in as a hallmark of their profession, a sort of discourse from their guild, when they really mean what everyone else understands by the usual terminology which they thus embellish with their professional stamp. But the metaphysical implications may be assumed to be more deeply rooted. It seems clear from the passage that he believes the scientific principles and laws which he would apply to the improvement of mankind have a genuine metaphysical reality. He apparently believes that they exist in a predetermined universal order or plan and are antecedent to man and are merely uncovered or discovered by him rather than constructed or generalized inductively out of the data which he observes around him. Wright's own statement follows.¹¹

The science of society is the science of the dispensations of Providence. Because, so far as Providence is only general, and is fulfilled by regular laws, and in the order of cause and effect, so far it must be fulfilled by the progress and laws of society, as much as it is fulfilled in this life at all. This is the same thing in effect, as to say that Sociology is the study of the laws of Providence. All history and all Social Science abound with facts illustrative of this idea.

Squaring Science with Theology. Naturally such metaphysical laws could hardly be supposed by a professor of theology to have come into existence of themselves. They must have had a Creator, even if the Creator had none. Consequently Providence (a term which Wright leaves rather vague) is the ultimate source of these pre-existing metaphysical laws which man must seek out and apply to his own benefit. All of this is perfectly understandable and is in conformity with the academic traditions of the time. Only free thinkers like Spencer or Buckle would repudiate such a point of view, and not even they entirely. To be sure, Comte had laid the foundations in the Positivist methodology for its rejection, but he himself seems not to have advanced quite that far in his own thinking, or at least in the expression of his thought.

But the quotation which follows states a much more intimate and con-

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

ventional theological point of view. It even accepts and urges the traditional evangelical conception of a personal supernatural ordering of the affairs of men which almost seems to contradict the author's earlier statements regarding the function of science in promoting human welfare. One might even ask, as doubtless some of his more orthodox and fundamentalist critics did: Why lug in the ponderous machinery of science to do this work of social reform and individual regeneration when one may achieve it much more directly and easily by praying for miracles? The only answer he can make to such a question is his statement that God works through general principles, a point of view which he almost immediately afterwards denies by implication in the passage which follows:¹²

Miraculously or else traditionally Revealed Religion, alone can save society, as well as the Individual. It saves by general principles and general means, which are real causes. These causes are already introduced into human nature, history and society. Nevertheless, God still has a connection with, a personal rule over these causes, and also over persons,—so that the ignoring of God, is rebellion against him, and so, necessarily produces a false philosophy. To ignore God, even in the spontaneous disappearance of evils, is to put stops to the working *Cause* of the spontaneous disappearance, and, therefore, stops to the disappearance itself.

We must not, therefore, be surprised to learn that "Social Science runs nearly parallel to Christianity, and often coincides with it, . . . Social Science doing for society, in most things, what Christianity is doing for the individual."¹³

The Author's Aim. This point of view regarding the nature of science and its close analogy with and allegiance to the teachings of Christianity is further well illustrated in his statement of his purpose in writing his book. It is by no means exclusively an essay in pure science, however much its title might indicate such to be the case. Wright states his aim practically and even evangelically to be "to contribute his mite, towards the Christianization of politics, the promotion of real freedom and progress, and the improvement of society. . . ." ¹⁴ He himself anticipates the possibility that his readers may not take his scientific pretensions any too

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. vii.

seriously. Perhaps he even realizes, or at least suspects, that his attempt to harmonize pure science and revelation—at that time a highly controversial question and one of the leading intellectual sports of that type of academic man who felt strongly the conflict between the old theology and the new science—may not prove to be palatable to most of his readers. Consequently, he expresses the hope “that if the public cannot tolerate these writings, as a work of science, they will, at any rate, tolerate them as a kind of sermons to politicians and statesmen.”¹⁵ Actually the book is a combination of a treatise on society and a plan for a new type of social organization.

The Sources. Wright states his sources—in addition to Comte, Carey, Paley, Spencer (“the King of Social Scientists”), Mulford, J. S. Mill, Fourier, and Guizot—to be the following: the Bible, Appleton’s Cyclopaedia, Wheaton, Ruskin, Tennyson, Guyot, DeTocqueville, F. Cooper, Schleiermacher, McCosh, Ballou, Nordhoff, *The Circular*, and various writers, unspecified, on Communism, Natural Theology, and Theism.¹⁶ This list includes most of the outstanding writers on social subjects of his time and the leading thinkers in this field of the immediately preceding generations, as well as some ephemeral sources. Truly it is a peculiar medley of sources for a supposedly great work on the principles of Social Science. The close juxtaposition of the Bible and Appleton’s Cyclopaedia makes one wonder somewhat as to which provided him with the larger share of data.

He differs from Comte, he tells us, in adding metaphysics to the sciences and in denying that history proves human progress sufficiently to warrant the basing of a Positive Science upon it.¹⁷ Like Holmes, he is writing at a period when science has largely abandoned historical data, but unlike Holmes he turns to contemporaneous political and social data rather than to the facts of primitive life for his materials to be used in generalization. From Spencer he differs, in that Spencer works for secular science whereas he strives for the promotion of religion and scientific statesmanship.¹⁸ His criticism of J. S. Mill is that the latter does not give enough recognition to feeling, and is too commercial in his emphasis.¹⁹ Fourier, he thinks, is almost wild in his analogies and philosophic range, and too

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. x.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. v–vi.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. v.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. v–vi.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. vi.

high in his ideals.²⁰ He differs also from Carey, Paley, and Mulford in various important respects.²¹

Wright's Conception of Social Science. Wright defines Social Science as the "Philosophy of Politics,"²² which to him is essentially the same as sociology. It is now "practically the most general and the most all-embracing of the sciences, including even theology and religion itself."²³ It is the third in rank and grade among the four most general sciences, which are: Theology, Metaphysics, Sociology, and Mathematics.²⁴ (Alas, what would Comte have thought of this!) It is a synthetic science. He continues:²⁵

In this respect, Social Science acts much like Natural Theology. It ranges through all the sciences, culling the general principles of each, digesting and assimilating them to itself. And while it omits not any one of the sciences, from the lowest to the highest; it nevertheless finds *most* of its nutriment in the higher ones, such as Zoology, Anatomy, Physiology, Instinct, Metaphysics, and Morals. And so wide is its range, that it touches all the sciences which earnest men think and feel about, in their deepest and most serious moments.

This position, that sociology is a general science inclusive in effect of all of the social sciences, is quite in keeping with the trend of his time, as was pointed out in the preceding chapter. It was characteristic of Hamilton, as it was of the later sociologists of the universities in the eightennineties. It was also in line with an older tradition still, which went back at least as far as Aristotle and gave its name to the *Politics* of that author. The *Politics* contained everything that might be regarded as pertaining to the social relations of man. Later echoes of this point of view are to be found in the general application of the term *polity* to all problems of political expediency, whether they dealt with matters of law and state or with other types of human relations. It also survived in the term Political Economy, which was conceived as much broader than the later term Economics and as including and even emphasizing problems of political policy or expediency. Like Hamilton also, and such other Social Scientists as had come definitely under the influence of Comte and Positivism, Wright uses the terms Social Science and Sociology as practically synon-

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. v-vi.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

omous. Furthermore, he conceives that the quintessence of all Social Science is Communism.²⁶ Like Hamilton,²⁷ Wright believes that "Social Science is moral in its very nature."²⁸ Wright's bias in giving to instinct the rank of a science was probably due to his familiarity as a teacher of divinity with the Bridgewater Treatises on Natural Theology. One of these²⁹ had been devoted largely to the subject of instinct, which fact might be considered as equivalent to raising that concept to the rank of a science in the minds of the natural theologians.

The Plan of the Principia. The main contribution of Wright's work consists of an analysis and discussion of the six fundamental elements or units, as he saw them, of society, namely the individual, the family, the social circle, the precinct, the nation, and mankind.³⁰ Each of these units he considered a natural person, thus continuing the organismic analogy, although with a lighter emphasis, which we observed in O'Connell and Hamilton, and which was of course at that time at the height of its reputation in Social Science or sociology. They are also instinctive units.³¹ In addition there is a rational or deliberative element, a derivative and super-imposed unit, the corporation.³²

The utopistic character of the book is revealed in the author's special pleading for the organization of society in terms of precincts and corporations, a type of organization which he considers best suited for the attainment of human ends. It is in this discussion that the author makes the distinction between "primitive" and "derivative" groups. The precinct is a local neighborhood group. It is small and develops the primary attitudes. The corporation is a functional group, not local in character, and is not primary but derivative in powers. A society in which precincts were

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

²⁷ (From p. 12.) Hamilton made Sociology essentially Social Ethics, saying ". . . there is but this difference between the two domains of thought [ethics and sociology], that Ethics deal exclusively with the idea of the RIGHT, while Sociology deals alike with the idea of the RIGHT and the EXPEDIENT. In this respect Sociology is a wider domain of thought than Ethics. Nay, all things considered, it is undoubtedly a wider domain. But in respect to the idea of the RIGHT—in so far as that idea is to be especially considered, and that only—Ethics is a far wider domain than Sociology. For Ethics deal with many questions of RIGHT which appertain not at all to Sociology. Sociology concerns itself with the rightfulness of human actions, only in so far as they affect others besides the agent himself" (*Present Status of the Philosophy of Society*, 1866, p. 22). Hamilton, however, emphasized the expedient rather than the right in his development of the subject (*ibid.*, p. 27).

²⁸ *Principia, or Basis of Social Science*, p. 20.

²⁹ *On the History, Habits, and Instincts of Animals*, by the Rev. William Kirby.

³⁰ *Principia, or Basis of Social Science*, pp. 82–83.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

³² *Ibid.*

the governmental units, with corporations chartered for special functions, would be flexible, capable of experimental innovations, adaptable to human needs, and desirable in every way. This, in essence is the theme of Books II and IV of the present work. Book III is concerned with the nation and deals especially with subjects involving the derivative relations between nations. Book V is entitled "Limited Communism."

The Precinct or Neighborhood. Let us now turn to more detailed descriptions of the precinct and the corporation. First, as to the precinct, which he defines as follows: "Precincts are neighborhoods organized into civil governments; they are territories *within* territories; they are parts of a tribe or Nation, and are not self-existent. In other words, Precincts are the organizations of the neighborhood principle, in civil government."³³ The size of precincts should be based on ease of assembly, density of population, and geographical considerations. He continues,³⁴

Precincts should be no larger in territory or population, than would admit of all the adult people, or at least all the voters, meeting conveniently in one assembly. And no larger than would allow the heads of Families as residents, to be generally acquainted with each other, at least by hearsay, yet not so small as to preclude the chances of reasonably furnishing the proper proportion of qualified governmental officials. . . .

The Precincts ought to be small, so that the suborganizations which will arise in each, shall flow out of it voluntarily, and relate to the concerns of each immediate neighborhood itself. . . .

As to the actual size of these Precincts, the most important consideration by far is density of population. The general theory points at from 10,000 to 20,000, as being the highest number that should constitute a Precinct, as this gives from 1,000 to 2,500 adult men or voters to each, which is the highest number that can conveniently meet and consult. . . .

Smallness also secures to each of the people, mutual knowledge of the other, and mutual good feeling, so that government is more practicable, and happiness more complete, all being agreed. . . .

As to the extent of ground or territory to be embraced in a Precinct, it should not be larger than would allow each man, or each voter, to travel by the usual methods to and back from the place of meeting, conveniently in one day. . . .³⁵

As the essential idea of Precinct is neighborhood,—both population and locality must be small enough to admit of the usual feelings of real neighbors. Therefore the word neighbor, in common usage, as it contracts or expands for different localities, is an excellent definitive for the varying size of Precinct.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 156–160.

³⁵ There were of course at the time this book was written no automobiles. The modes of travel the author had in mind must have been by foot, horseback, and carriage.

The relation of this idea of the precinct or neighborhood to the concept of the phalanstery proposed by Fourier and Brisbane would seem to be clear, although the author does not give an account of the sources of his ideas on social organization. Likewise, the large amount of discussion then going on under the leadership of the German scholars, and E. A. Freeman, John Fiske, Henry Adams, Herbert B. Adams, and others, with respect to primitive Teutonic communal organization which eventually evolved into the New England township may have had its effect upon Wright, as we shall see later it did have upon another Social Science writer of this time. The more than probable relationship between these ideas of the precinct or neighborhood and Charles H. Cooley's theory of primary groups will be sufficiently obvious to contemporary sociologists, although Cooley has not specified such a source for his ideas on these matters.

Urban Transition Areas. In his argument for precinct organization Wright has occasion to discuss the problem of cities, and in this connection he foreshadows the Chicago school's theory of transitional areas. He first points out the evils of too great urban expansion. He declares: ³⁶

Another point of decrease of honor and general morality in cities, is reached, when their residents in large numbers become so fashionable or so enfeebled in health, that they must remove their residences to some different and distant parts of the city, from those in which they fulfill their daily occupations. This works badly in several ways. In one way, it has a similar effect to increasing the transient and fluctuating part of the population; it gives each resident so much less time and so much less interest in the neighborhoods, both of his residence and his occupation. Furthermore, some of the best hours of the day are lost in the travel to and fro. The head of the house is absent from his home, when he may be wanted in case of family disputes, and, needed correction of children. The women become more and more given to trifling; the sanctity of marriage is more and more endangered. All the better feelings of family life are more and more interrupted.

Then comes the author's description of a transitional area: ³⁷

Another way in which the increasing size and incidental residence, distant from the places of occupation, does injury, is, that the business districts, after being forsaken as abodes by those who ought to continue near or in them, often become occupied by the lowest classes of society,—in that interim between the time of their being aristocratic enough for residences, and the time of their becoming wanted for grand stores and offices. A large Precinct of this kind, containing the largest portion of the city's wealth, will sometimes be inhabited

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 209–210.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

chiefly by Individuals who have neither property, reputation, nor permanent residence in the locality.

The precinct theory of communal local self government would not apply to such areas. Instead the author proposes another method of dealing with such "fallen districts." They would be considered as rebel precincts and therefore constituted into Reformatory Precincts. Residents of these areas would be confined within them; there would also be prohibition of liquors. Free religious missions would be encouraged. There would be a small prison, and special police arrangements to suit the inhabitants. In brief, the system he proposes amounts to a quarantine system for such districts.³⁸

Necessity for Precinct Organization. Wright makes a strong plea for political and social organization based on precincts. Geography, history, God's variety in creation, the laws of nature, scientific expediency—all these, he says, offer arguments in favor of precinct organization.³⁹ Human nature itself argues for it.⁴⁰

Personal attractions have strength like the chemical forces, so also have home and locality; whereas, the artificial states or districts, and even the Nation itself, have comparatively only the strength of gravitation. Thus it is, that Social Circle and Precinct have, in actual life the strongest power on man naturally, and the first governmental claims upon him that he voluntarily yields to.

Human nature itself makes more account of Precinct than it does of Nation. . . .

Precinct organization also makes possible closer social control over behavior.⁴¹

Under the present scattering system, the number of inhabitants becomes so great, and the Individual person so fluctuating, that the citizens become less and less watchers or critics of one another, whether for preventing wrong doing, or for arresting criminals. Then the criminals can find hiding places in obscure lanes and bye-ways, and under the cover of acquaintances whose occupations are unknown; *then* morality begins to deteriorate, temptations increase, and the powers of counteracting proportionately decrease.

The author describes the relationship of Precincts to the other social units, showing how precinct organization would harmonize the best in all of them. It would provide a common basis for Comte's centralization theory

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 212–213.

³⁹ *Principia, or Basis of Social Science*, pp. 161–172.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 209.

and Spencer's theory of individual freedom.⁴² He answers objections to the system based on the fear of persecution or of secession, on the authority of Scripture, etc.⁴³ And, finally, he shows just how, in his opinion, the precinct principle could be put into effect. If each state should take over the national constitution for its own constitution and make appropriate changes in wording, it could charter precincts whose relation to the states would be similar to the present relation of individual states to the nation.⁴⁴ Or, more directly, the state might simply divide itself up into precincts, granting each one a bill of rights.⁴⁵ In any event, says the author, this problem of chartering precincts by states is incidental to the main theory of precinct organization, which he now leaves to the careful consideration of the reader.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 138, 180.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 185-198.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 219

The Social Science Theories of R. J. Wright: Derivative Groups

The Corporation. Wright's treatment of the corporation falls under his analysis of derivative groups. Corporations, unlike the six instinctive units of society discussed in the preceding chapter, are not obviously natural elements, but they are, none the less, absolutely fundamental to the higher development of society.¹ The contrasts between corporations and the instinctive units are stated as follows: "The Precinct is merely a transformation of the neighborhood-element of the tribe. This element of neighborhood, in the first or migratory condition of tribes, was merely a moving organized Social Circle; but subsequently became localized . . . by change from the migratory to the settled and agricultural condition. But social inequalities arise, even in the migratory condition, hence, even then arise the Social Circles. All governments of Localities come chiefly from the feelings, or the emotive part of our nature. But the Corporations arise from the reasoning faculties, from the suggestions of special works, not undertaken by the tribe as a whole, nor by its rulers. . . ." ²

Then comes the basic difference, namely that the six units are primitive, but the corporation is derivative. He says, "The essence of the great difference, between Corporation and the other Elements, consists chiefly in this; that the strictly called Corporations *derive* their power from the Instinctive and Fundamental Elements of society; or at least act under their control, and are therefore of a derivative or *subordinate* kind; but the other Elements of the Analytics are instinctive ones, and may be called primitive; and can never be entirely displaced." ³

Corporations derive their privileges from the natural units, whereas the precinct owns its privileges inherently. This use of the term derivative is not identical with that introduced by L. L. Bernard to extend and general-

¹ R. J. Wright, *Principia, or Basis of Social Science* (1875), p. 361.

² *Ibid.*, p. 363.

³ *Ibid.*

ize the category of secondary groups generally attributed to C. H. Cooley. The latter employment of the term considers all groups as derivative except those into which the individual is born. Strictly speaking, of course, only the family can be primary in modern life, although primary groups in primitive life might also include the clan and even the tribe or village, when they were intimate local face-to-face groups. Groups other than the family are now to be considered derivative in character, whether one degree removed from the primary group (secondary groups, like the play group or the neighborhood group), or two degrees removed (tertiary), or three degrees removed (quaternary), and so on. The term "derivative," when employed in this sense signifies not the fact of being controlled by the so-called natural or instinctive groups of Wright, referred to in the preceding chapter—deriving their powers from these latter groups—but rather the fact of their distance from these and the degree of transformation and reorganization of the primary and nearly primary groups necessary to render the resulting groups derivative in character. For much the same reason Wright's derivative and Cooley's "larger society," commonly spoken of as secondary groups, cannot be said to be identical, although many traits of similarity between the former and the latter, and between the former and L. L. Bernard's category of derivative groups will be found.

Comparative Advantages of Natural and Corporative Groups. It may be assumed too hastily that the "natural" or "instinctive" groups of Wright are the ones best adapted to man's human nature and to the satisfaction of his natural needs of association. This, however, is not necessarily the case. Although these groups grow up relatively without thought or plan and without very conscious attempts at purposive organization, for that very reason they are not always able to secure the most effective adjustment results in our society. The corporation is, however, often the more efficient type of organization. Wright insists upon this point as follows: "Nevertheless, the Corporation-principle possesses some advantages over the Precinct and Nation; and over their principles and methods of obtaining human rights, and securing human happiness. This Corporation-principle or method, is much more economical, and much less disruptive of the ties of kindred and acquaintance. It allows the parties to continue to reside and intermingle among each other. . . ." ⁴ In other words, while they perform functions at a distance, the Corporations represent conscious, purposive, planned, highly organized action of a non-localized character and is the

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 364.

agent of the natural group within which it arises. It therefore normally has greater efficiency and works more economically. That is why it was established or "derived." Thus the chief value of the corporation consists in the fact that it is a medium of communication and of action for abstract or indirect and non-face-to-face contacts, while the precinct, made up of individuals, families, and social circles, must work at short range. Corporations represent these units at long range instead of turning their business over to the extensive and unwieldy element, the nation. He continues: "Being next in naturalness to Precincts, . . . Corporations . . . are the substitutes. They are also the procurers of many particular rights of the Precinct: Because, they are the NEXT most natural and most spontaneous Element of society, in which it is possible for small bodies of men to organize themselves politically; the Element 'Nation' being entirely too extensive, and also too radically different, to be thought of as a recourse in this connection, or in this era of the world." ⁵

Thus, instead of being antagonistic to each other, the two types of organization, the precinct and the corporation, are mutually complementary. He says, ⁶

While the Precinct-theory provides government for persons who are near to each other, physically or geographically; the Corporation-theory provides government for those who are near to each other metaphysically or morally. And in their fullest development, the Precinct provides companies for Localities; the Corporation provides associations both for metaphysical and moral bases. Thus it is, that the highest and best obtained uses of Precinct, are involved fundamentally in the very idea of the Corporation, and are directly sought for by it.

The Classification of Corporations. Corporations may be classified according to ten criteria and under as many separate categories, as follows: ⁷

First: Classifiable as to their relations to "the Law"; namely, Legal or Virtual. *Second:* Classifiable as to secrecy; namely secret or not secret. *Third:* Classifiable as to monopolization; namely, whether monopoly or not monopoly. *Fourth:* Classifiable as to their relations to personal intercourse; namely whether associations involving sociable intercourse; or companies not involving sociable intercourse. *Fifth:* Classifiable as to the official nature of individuals; whether membership constitutes office, or whether it does not. Those in which membership itself does constitute office, are only *Semi-Corporations*; as for instance, Partnerships and possibly Families. *Sixth:* Classifiable as to their objects in

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 364-365.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 365.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 368. These classifications are discussed in detail on pp. 366-432.

view:—These objects may be divided into Physical or Metaphysical; The Physical may be for Pleasure, or Trade, or Transportation, or Currency. The Metaphysical, might also be called Transcendental, and may be for Morality, or Religion, or Charity, or Education. *Seventh*: Classifiable according to their nature, whether simple or compound. *Eighth*: Classifiable as to the means they may use whether Governmental, or Voluntary, or Mixed. The Governmental may be either for Civil, or for Political objects. The Voluntary may be either for Morals, for Property, or for Person. The mixed may be either for Uniformity, for Obedience, or for Separation. The Mixed mean those which are of a *Semi-Family* nature. *Ninth*: Classifiable as to their relations to, or control over, Localities,—whether embracing or governing their localities, or whether NOT embracing or governing them. This classification is general enough, to embrace the Governmental Corporations, which we treat at length in the Third Main Division; and was the classification formerly adopted by us for them. *Tenth*: Classifiable as to their Governmental and Political nature, namely, whether Governmental, or not.

It is clear from the detailed nature of this classification and the discussion of its categories which follows, that the use and functioning of corporations in modern society had greatly impressed the author. They have grown up as specialized means to social control to do the work that the less intelligently organized and less intellectually motivated natural groups are not equipped to perform. They represent the modern trends toward specialization of function and delegation of authority, or at least of function, which are becoming ever more apparent in our society. It is very interesting that Wright does not picture the corporation as a functioning specialized agent of the nation. Perhaps this is because, for reasons already indicated, he is less aware of the nation than of the precinct or local groups. As we shall see later, he is inclined to minimize the significance of the nation in his scheme of the social order.

An Early Syndicalist Scheme. For our purposes perhaps the most interesting part of the author's discussion deals with the functional nature of corporations. Corporations might be based on trade interests, or moral interests, or political interests. These corporations, constituted on an interest basis, would function as follows: ⁸

Now of the (say) three kinds of Conglomerating Corporations, every Individual would be a member of a set, consisting of one of each kind. And each of these Corporations would have the entire function of enacting, judging and executing laws, in relation to the several subjects proper to them, respectively. Each business Corporation would exercise all the legal functions over its own

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 418–419.

members, in all matters relating to morality; and to all control over property arising out of the just claims of morality, which the membership had agreed to, whether arising from Liquor, or War, or Religion, or Divorce, or other of the moral bases of the society. The third kind of Corporation, namely, the political, would have also its own legitimate function to perform, of providing for the regulation of its own members, and to accomplish the special objects laid down in its basis. But it must be remembered, that sometimes a Corporation of this kind, although based on harmony of political views, is not necessarily adapted nor intended, for *general* civil administration over its own members, who organize themselves thus, but mainly for some *special* political purposes; yet on the basis of *general harmony* of political feeling, and upon the idea that such a harmony is the great basis of the social organization. For such persons, separate Corporations for general political government, are needed, just as much as by the Corporations based on trades, or on morals: and ought to advance to such functions, although beginning only as political clubs.

This hypothetical account of the operation of corporations based on abstract social interests representing major functional groups of the population is nothing less than an early modern proposal to institute what we now call the syndicalist system on a guild basis. In other words, the author proposes that each of the three most important general interests of society, including some subdivisions, should be entrusted with its own self-government, just as the syndicalists have since come to advocate. It should be observed that these three great interests of society—business, morals, politics—do not represent so many separate and distinct groups of individuals, but that the same individual may participate in all of these interests and presumably in each of these phases of self-government. Perhaps this overlapping of participation would serve as a useful safeguard against dividing society into warring factions representing the three types of interests. Of course the plan was not wholly without precedent. The lawyers and the physicians have long set their own standards of membership and technical efficiency, professional conduct, etc. Business has thundered for many decades in its demands to be unregulated by government, and even the New York Stock Exchange has protested, through its former Chairman Richard Whitney, and others, convicted of fraudulent practices, that it is better able to regulate itself than is the government to exercise control over it.

The Problem of Coordination of Interests Neglected. The uncoordinated character of the three interest groups here specified by the author may strike the reader forcibly. While business as now conceived represents the personal profit interest at a high degree of intensity, morality is at the

other extreme of representing the social welfare interest, which is often relatively weak in most persons. The political interest may assimilate to either the profit or the welfare motive, but experience shows that the former motivation exercises an overwhelming control in politics. How corporate self-control can be equally well developed and properly coordinated among these three conflicting fields the author does not explain, and perhaps did not consider.

This, then, is the author's theory of social organization on the primary and derivative levels as he sees them. Precincts, primary in nature, based on locality, close to instinctive human nature; corporations, abstract, derivative, rational, based on common interests rather than locality—these together, when properly balanced and coordinated and harmonized within the state as a whole, are capable of serving human happiness in the most satisfactory manner possible.

The Nation—Its Social Importance. As was suggested above, Wright's predilection for the small and the near-primary groups does not permit him to attach a very great deal of importance to the nation as a social unit. He looks upon it rather as a basis for the discussion of international relations than of intranational processes and problems. These latter he considers for the most part in connection with the analysis of local communities. Regarding the importance and implications of the nation for Social Science he says,⁹

The Nation is the FIFTH Unit or fundamental Element of society, as determined in our Analytics. So much however, is said of this topic by other writers, that comparatively little remains for us. And according to our theory, its proportionate importance is over-estimated by most other writers. In a true analysis, some part of what is usually attributed to it belongs to Mankind, and another part belongs to Precinct, and another to Corporation; so that only a fourth, is its real place. We have Precinct on the one side, Corporation on the other, and Mankind above it. The internal affairs of Nation, we consider mostly under the heads of Precinct and Corporation and "Civil Government"; the higher external affairs we consider partly under the head of Mankind, including Nation as of course *one* of its fundamental elements. Hence, in this article we have comparatively rather to consider the theoretically lower or intermediate affairs, commonly called international law, but in a wider sense than usual.

In his definition of the nation, Wright rejects the unity of race criterion, favors the Ciceronian concept of a body of people bound together in the

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

common exercise of justice,¹⁰ rejects political corporate organization (statehood), international political recognition, internal sovereignty, etc., as criteria and presents a sociological definition of his own as follows:¹¹

In our opinion, a Nation may be defined to be, one of the most spontaneous, natural Elements or Units of human society; a governmental union of Individuals and Precincts, possessing or being distinguished by, most, if not quite all of the following characteristics. (1) One Head or Government. (2) Having the Government continuous, internally and historically, either direct or revolutionary. (3) Being apparently the development from one tribe, by similarity of Language, Customs, Religion, etc.; yet divided into several or many tribes. (4) Inhabiting contiguous Precincts or districts. (5) Having a Special Metaphysical organ or centre of attraction, called patriotism. (6) Having the *real* interests of all the parts, to consist in the maintenance of the national union. (7) Being distinguished from Confederacy or Empire, by having had a spontaneous instead of a deliberate origin. (8) Being distinguished from Precinct or "State," by superiority or sovereignty over the other. (9) Being distinguished from Corporation, by having had an instinctive origin, and by *necessarily* embracing and referring to *all* the inhabitants of a Locality.

Thus it is made clear that the nation is a large group of people, next in size only to humanity as a whole, which exercises some sort of control over the smaller units included within it. What this control is may be gathered from a study of the sanctions of the nation.

The Sanctions of the Nation. The sanctions of the nation are, according to Wright, both law and right, in the Hegelian sense, or Ethics. Speaking first of law as a sanction, Wright says¹²

One of the great works which Social Science has to accomplish, is to analyze into its real elements, what is called "The Law of Nations," and thus to appropriate to each department, its appropriate share. For the custom has been, to collect under this term all the *general* principles of law, and even of human rights, which seem to have no more suitable place in the field of thought. Thus in the Roman law, the phrase, authority, right or law, of Nation (*jus gentium*),—generally was used to express that sense of right which is common to most or to all men, and which is in conformity to common instinct and reason, and which is called by us the law of nature. . . . The absolute law of right, the relative rights of established usage, the law of God, the modifications by voluntary contract, all ought to be somewhat considered, in the treatment of any

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 243.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 222–223.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 220–221.

branch of practical morals, or of applied law; but yet, properly belong to a more general and higher department of thought, than any one of them. Thus also we may take Grotius' sources of international law, and generalize them as the true foundations of all law, namely, nature's law, divine law, custom, and compact: and in both departments, custom and compact may be put together, and again generalized into, "Consent."

It is Wright's purpose to break up this confused and indeterminate conception of the law of nations into three separate branches of study as follows: "One, of the Nation as one of the several Units of Society: The Second, the (higher or real) Law of Nations, that is, that law of nature, which consists of the principles which every civilized Nation is presupposed to hold in common, and to be applicable to affairs within as well as outward of itself: And the Third, what is now called Law of Nations; but which should then simply be called International Law."¹³

This threefold division he follows in his own treatment. The first of these divisions, on the natural laws which govern the functioning of nations as groups, is sociological and will constitute our main concern. The second, dealing with Natural Law conceived as ethics, has sociological implications and will concern us accordingly. The third, however, referring to international law, although properly within the scope of Social Science as this subject was conceived at its period of greatest acceptance, is marginal rather than central to our discussion and we shall therefore not enter into Wright's treatment of it in detail. We shall confine our attention, after a brief consideration of the problems of the ethical sanction of right, to a discussion of the nation as a sociological concept, including problems of its origin, unity, dissolution, its duties and obligations to its members and to mankind. Thus our order of treatment reverses the order in which he has presented the three branches of study above.

The Sanctions of the Nation: Rights. This is essentially a moral, as distinguished from a legal, sanction. In affirming the rights of the nation to separate existence in distinction from legal rights, Wright is also careful to defend the rights of the smaller units. He says,¹⁴

It is generally admitted, that in all their legitimate organizations Mankind have, in their collective capacities, rights which they do not possess as Individuals. This admission seems to be an indistinct anticipation, that society consists of a plurality of Units, each of which has its own peculiar rights. But unfortunately, those writers who have taken this ground in regard to Nations, have too

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-223.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

much ignored the rights of citizens as Individuals and as Families, and of the other Units. These collective rights however, may be analyzed so as to be resolved into only two, namely, one the right of *many* rather than of *one* person, that is to say, the right of numbers; and the other, which is better,—the right of peculiar position or relation of any organization, person, or locality,—which has claim when there is no alternative resource to it, for the maintenance of its rights in question, in any particular case.

Wright quotes Mulford on the equal rights of the individual and the nation and declares that the same equality of right applies also to the family, the precinct, and to mankind.¹⁵ This point he emphasizes as follows: "Every Unit, whether Individual, Family, Social Circle, Precinct, Nation or Mankind, has its own rights, which are inalienable, indefeasible, and indivisible. Therefore in general we may say, the sovereignty of the Nation over the Precincts within, and over relationships to other Nations and Mankind outward, IS LIMITED BOTH BY THE ETERNAL NATURE, AND BY THE INALIENABLE RIGHTS, OF THE UNITS."¹⁶

Yet in cases of conflict of authority between the nation and the precinct, "every Nation has a right to modify and limit the powers of the Precincts within it, so far as called for by its particular genius and mission, and to provide against the special dangers of its own time and position."¹⁷ While "*in principle* the Units are equal, . . . yet in doubtful cases the *practical* decision must be allowed to the superior power."¹⁸ This conclusion is wrung from him reluctantly by the recognition that there must be some strong overhead organization, such as the national state, with power to protect the smaller units and to harmonize their activities. It is surprising that, with his definition and conception of the corporation, he did not conceive of the state (with which, in practice, if not in theory, he is constantly confusing the nation) as a corporation superimposed by the people and by conflicting interests upon the natural social units specifically for these very purposes of coordination and harmonization. Perhaps the reason why he misses this point of view is that he does not consider the state at all in his scheme except in a very incidental way, and because, when he is confusing the nation with the state by assigning by implication to the former the powers of the latter, he continues to think of the nation in its traditional sociological rather than in its political administrative sense.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 225.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 224–225.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

The Mechanics of the Nation. Nations come into existence in essentially the same manner as the smaller units of society. That is,¹⁹

Nations are begotten by three processes; one is, by outgrowth from one family and tribe; another is, by mingling together of elements of a plurality of Nations; and the third is, by direct separation into parts. The first process is the slow and gradual work of ages, and seems to have been nearly confined to antiquity. The second process has occurred only in a few cases, the principal of which are, the ancient English, and the modern citizens of the United States. The third process is like that in Zoology, termed by the physicists, *agamogenesis*.

Nations in a living progression must, ever and anon, be subdivided. This is the same law we saw operating in the case of Precincts, which are the chief types of Nations. The ever increasing population of the world, creates the necessity in both cases. The generation of all new *Local* political bodies, must be by actual spatial subdivision.

Wright attached a good deal of importance to the size of the nation. He believed that, just as precinct should never exceed 30,000 inhabitants, the nation should not have more than 75,000,000 people.²⁰ This maximum size would be attained only under the most favorable conditions as to the character of the population, the qualifications of the suffrage, and local conditions. When population and territories became too large the nation tended to disintegrate.

His discussion of the influence of locality upon national unity shows some ecological insight. He says,²¹

Again, the size of Nations depends not only on population, and political organization; but also on conditions of Locality; and on the relation of population and organization *to* Locality. The larger the total Locality, the less the coherence of the parts. Two kinds of condition of Locality enter into the question. One, is the total space included, namely, the actual number of square miles; for by it, the number of diverse interests and forms are increased, and the possibilities of population, also. Nevertheless, the other condition of Locality is quite as important, namely, the linear distances of the extremes. This is important both for military and civil administration. Whether a country be 1000 miles long and 4000 wide, or whether 2000 miles in each direction, makes no difference in the total content; but it makes a vast difference in its adhesiveness, —the 4000 miles linear distance giving perhaps only one-tenth the cohesiveness.

But the linear condition becomes still more important, when its direction of latitude or longitude is brought into consideration. Because sameness of lati-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 248-249.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

tude, gives sameness of all the natural productions, and therefore produces rivalry in all the departments of industry. But linear direction along lines of longitude, giving differences of latitude, so long as they are on only one side of and not too near to the equator, give differences of all the natural productions. These tend to produce the harmony of industry. Incidentally also, they produce other vastly important harmonies,—namely, the harmonies arising from interchanges for health, and for variety in study and in pleasure. Isothermal lines have nearly the same effects as lines of latitude.

Most students of the question would perhaps be inclined to reverse the conclusions set forth in the second paragraph above, holding that latitudinal extension of peoples produces greater social differences, through the agency of occupational and economic factors, than does longitudinal extension.

National Dissolution. When circumstances decree the necessity of national subdivision, "the principal means for introducing the Christian process of subdividing in peace, order, and friendship, are, firstly, Social Science, and secondly, written constitutions."²² The only way to keep overgrown populations together in a single unit is by expert administration and harmonization of interests. But nothing, he holds, can permanently prevent this subdivision. He says,²³

The only practicable method the writer can see, whereby it is possible to enable Nations, to hold together, with larger populations than are mentioned above, is the adoption of some of the higher Corporation-systems proposed under that head. Possibly, Nations might grow to as much larger size than the foregoing representation of Precincts, admits, as the Precincts were divided into political Corporations of the higher kinds, UNIFORMLY; that is to say, the same number of Corporations, and on the same bases. But the practicable differentiations of such Corporations, seem to be only a limited few; consequently, the principle can only be expected to retard, but not absolutely prevent, national subdivisions.

Duties of the Nation. The duty of the nation to protect its constituent units against invasion and to assist in the harmonization of their interests has been referred to. It is also the duty of the nation "*to progress*; and especially *not* to retrograde. . . . These are duties which it owes alike to all the Individuals, Families, and other internal elements which it contains; as well as to all its surrounding and related Nations."²⁴ Intervention of one nation into the affairs of another in the interest of humanity and progress,

²² *Ibid.*, p. 253.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

as in the suppression of slavery or the extirpation of great vices such as the production and sale of opium, is a duty.²⁵

The interventions of civilized Nations, in the affairs of the uncivilized, and semi-civilized, are justifiable rather upon grounds of the uncivilized tending to retrogression, than upon any other grounds. For, when the less civilized ones come into frequent intercourse with the more civilized, the former lose their barbarian virtues, and retrograde, unless they adopt our higher developments and thus progress. This explains the European interventions in Asiatic affairs, as of Turkey, China, etc., and also in African affairs. The justification is, their aim to check slavery,—to check despotism, now being used chiefly to prop up their failing religions,—and to check their general retrogression towards barbarism.

Such considerations justify more advanced nations in establishing protectorates over more backward countries, as in the case of the European protectorate over Greece, ours over Mexico, or the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. But intervention for purposes of commercial exploitation (as in the case of the Opium War in China), or in behalf of economic imperialism in general, or in support of a balance of power policy, is not defensible. Many cases are presented in support of these principles.²⁶

Even revolution may become a duty which the nation is bound to respect, or even to aid, under certain circumstances, such as the following:²⁷

Whenever the forms of government become so perverted, that they essentially hinder the real *objects*, then rebellion becomes justifiable, if it is expedient. If the rebels have no reasonable ground to think themselves right, and if they are really rebelling for immoral or criminal purposes, then they are simply criminals or rioters. But if the rebels think they have reasonable grounds for their rebellion, then they should be treated as recognized "belligerents."

Mankind: Their Rights and Duties. Very little is said in this book about the sixth social unit, mankind, perhaps because they had no recognizable general social organization in the author's day. They had no legal rights except those that pertained to the smaller social units, and even for the protection of their moral rights they were dependent upon nations. Thus legally and morally, if not physically, mankind as a political unit was largely a fiction; but of course as a social unit it had much greater reality. Yet Wright finds some instances in which he believes it is the right and duty of "mankind" to interfere. For instance, in the case of capitalistic mo-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 229-234.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 247-248.

nopolization and control of production and distribution of commodities to the disadvantage of the masses of the people, the people have the right to protect their interests, preferably by legislation and, significantly, by boycott; but this procedure failing, then by violence. He says, "In such a case, the right of Mankind to intervene cannot be disputed,—if they know not better than by war,—then by war,—if they know better,—then by legislation, and discriminations, laid directly against the offending Nation, its trade, its literature and its emigration." ²⁸

The other illustrative case which he presents sounds as if it had been written today, so apt is it to the problems with which mankind are now faced: "If any Nation should persist in maintaining immense standing armies, after all other Nations wished to disarm,—such persistence would force all the neighboring Nations, either, to continue to maintain all their armies idly, or else to discriminate by legislation, and perhaps finally to use their armies once for all, effectually, on the warlike nuisance whose threatening attitude persisted in retarding the civilization and peace of the world." ²⁹

Opposed to an International State. Wright appears to have looked upon the modern growth of political units in size and extent with a good deal of alarm. This was doubtless due to his confusion of internationalism with imperialism and his doctrinaire conviction that states (nations, he calls them) cannot exceed his maximum limits as stated above. He seems not to have appreciated the effect of new modes of communication and transportation upon the growth of political units, perhaps chiefly because these aids to political aggregation were then new and limited in extent. He appears also to have disapproved of the expansion of political units in advance of the development of a supporting psychological background of group sentiment and idealism, such as is supplied by nationalism, although he does not emphasize this point specifically. And he seems not to have perceived the expansion of these sympathetic attitudes over an ever increasing area of mankind through the agency of ordinary means of communication. He believed that such a spiritual harmony of mankind could be achieved only through the universal acceptance of Christianity. This was the only internationalism which he understood adequately. In this connection he declares, ³⁰

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 234–235.

The rights which [the] Nation once had as the *representative* of Mankind, are passing away to empires and confederacies. But these latter cannot, according to our theory, be permanent, because the next and only Unit above them is Mankind; nor can they eventuate in an organization of Mankind into ONE permanent government; because *that* is the function of Jesus Christ only, for His visible return and reign on earth. And the idea of one confederation of compulsory government for all Nations, previous to His reign, seems to us even more chimerical than the idea of one consolidated *church*; because the church is an organ of only *one* class of interests and feelings, but Civil Government is an organ of all classes of interests and feelings.

Limited Communism. In keeping with this idea that no perfect society can exist on earth, Wright undertakes in Book V to discuss Limited Communism. Perfect or unlimited Communism could exist only in heaven: "Moreover, unlimited Communism is *not* possible, because men's educations, talents, and needs are unequal."³¹ His object in treating the subject of Communism is, he says, "to consider the origin, success, and failure of Communities, by reference to fundamental principles and the nature of things; and to suggest an improved ideal."³² Originally he had planned and written a separate volume on this subject, but for publication purposes he had included a condensation of his treatment, which had been out of season in his first volume.³³ He defines Communism as a form of government, a matter of corporation, which may apply to any natural group or community, but it is clear that he is thinking of it primarily as the government of a local community or precinct. He says, "Communism is not merely nor chiefly a tenure of property, but rather a form of government, for a Corporation or even for a Precinct; in which the highest attainable perfection of human nature, is supposed to be the chief object of the Individual, and is established as the chief object of the society; and only with a view to that object, and so far as consistent with the object, the new tenure of property is introduced."³⁴

The context of his treatment also makes clear his close indebtedness to the Owenite and Fourierite influences for his interest in this subject, although he departs in many ways from these and other theories, mainly in his emphasis upon communist ideals. He specifically repudiates the Parisian

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 441.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 433.

³³ His ideal scheme of publication, which he had not been able to realize, called for several volumes, the last of which was the one on Communism (*ibid.*, p. 57).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

type of Communism which Gambetta had so recently sought to establish in France.³⁵ "Communism of capital is not right," he says, because ³⁶

Human nature is not perfect enough yet; human artificial associations are not permanent enough, to justify persons of wealth or of possessions much above common, to alienate their principal beyond their own control. Parents who have tried it with their own children even, have found its ill effects. Besides, this course presents too many temptations to those who are seeking easy times, of selfishness and self-indulgence, and thus becomes a curse to the Community itself. . . .

Unlimited and absolute Communism of property, would neither be practical nor right, unless that abnormal development, Communism of sex, also could rightfully accompany it. But we cannot admit that.

The Aims of Communism. Wright arranges the motives to Communism according to their degree of legitimacy under the following four desires, that is, for: (1) a higher and perfect life, (2) improved civil government, (3) pecuniary gain, and (4) pleasure.³⁷ "But no Communism which does not, at least, *tend* towards becoming an institution for the promotion of the higher moral life, need be expected to succeed long." ³⁸ Communism has the same objectives as the church, but does not involve a formal profession of religion.³⁹ It calls for "a progressive social organization, whose aim is the identification of church and state, in the love and choice of every Individual," ⁴⁰ involving the performance of all the duties to God and to men.⁴¹ "The object is not to lessen labor, so much as to make it pleasant." ⁴² Wright recognizes the merit of the kindergarten and of the Fourierites in having sought the same objective. It involves "cooperation in all things, instead of competition." Thus, "the essentials of Communism may be summed up in these two; namely, fulfilling duties to our neighbor perfectly; and sufficient agreement as to *what* these duties are, and how its *government* is to be constituted. In other words, the two requirements would be, to be unselfish in spirit, and to be harmonious in principal opinions." ⁴³

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 433-434.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 443.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 434.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 435.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 436.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 435.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 434.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 439.

Communism should repudiate the use of force,⁴⁴ except under such conditions as are specified in the following paragraph.⁴⁵

Strong and clear, but reasonable anti-war principles, ought to be enunciated and adhered to. The following should be announced as the least reasons that could be required, in order to allow war:—(1) that a war be really defensive; (2) that the attack be itself actual, real and violent; (3) that the attack be unjust; (4) that the attack be known to the attackers themselves to be unjust; (5) that no efforts of Christian forbearance or kindness, will avert or terminate the war; (6) that the arguments requiring war in *that case*, are plain and clear beyond reasonable doubt. Nearly all the successful Protestant communes are nonresistants.

Moral suasion, except in cases of necessary self-defence, should be the rule. "Communism is the ideal of Social Science," but "Every man's Social Science must vary, according as his religion varies, and as his highest ideal of morality."⁴⁶

Successful and Unsuccessful Communism. Wright divides successful Communism into three categories. Of that of the United States he says, "We think the *successful* Communes in the *United States*, possessed all three of the following qualifications: namely, they had their religious leader as their communistic leader; their poverty led them to seek chiefly a livelihood; and they had a high sense of honor in the *little* matters of daily life; but those which failed seemed to lack one or another of these elements."⁴⁷ Speaking broadly of Communism in all ages, he continues, "The successful Communities in *every age* of the world, have included *nearly* all the following principles: (1) that the Community-life is to be sought as a means of perfection; (2) that the government of them is to be in the hands of good men; (3) that the governors are supposed to be saints, or to be leading lives of some sort of inspiration, or peculiar consecration."⁴⁸ Consequently he lays down the following general rules for success in Communistic government: "All Communities that can be permanently successful, may be classified into: (1) those in which the principal element is religious reverence; (2) those in which that element is some kind of human reverence; (3) in which it is complete consecration to perfect human duty; and (4) complete consecration to the perfection of *all* duties, human and di-

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 442.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 456.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 438.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

vine.”⁴⁹ He seems to imply that the Owenite and Fourierite colonies failed because they lacked certain of these characteristics.

Foundation Principles of Communism. There is a long section on the foundation principles of Communism,⁵⁰ at the head of which he places benevolence, but we cannot even summarize these twenty-two principles here. He also has a section on the practical precautions that the community must take against the aggression of individuals and officers under Communism.⁵¹ In brief, the principles of Social Science must be the guide to this practical form of government by corporation. It is his hope, as already stated, that his own work, the *Principia*, may become the handbook or guide to future communal enterprises and thus enable them to avoid the failures of past attempts in this direction, which he summarizes at the end of his volume.⁵² Thus Social Science is to him not only a theory of social organization, but also a practical guide to conduct in a type of social organization which, however, he seems not to have understood was losing its dominant role in society. Isolated in his study as he was, he could scarcely catch the most significant trends in social evolution. He appears to have missed almost completely the predominant significance for this development of the industrial revolution.

Other Theoretical Contributions. In the course of the development of his central theme, Wright sets forth a number of subsidiary or supplementary theories that establish his merit as a sociological observer. Among other matters, he points out that the real bonds of society are sex love, acquaintanceship, material or business interests, and education. Other important factors working for social solidarity are the limitations of the habitable earth, which force men into some sort of society or other, and government and laws.⁵³ In the *Natural History of Society*, “the innate feeling of human liberty”⁵⁴ is a centrifugal force. “Another law is the attraction of the sexes.”⁵⁵ Families give rise to social circles, precincts, and corporations. Another law still is the “overwhelming tendency to centralization,”⁵⁶ which seems to exist all over the civilized world.

Like Hamilton, Wright believed that social laws differed somewhat in

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 444-472.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 473-490.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 491-524.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

their operation from physical laws. He says, "The Social Laws in general, operate, not like the physical laws, regardless of men's faith or opinions about them; but to a great extent, they operate like the spiritual and religious laws of conscience; that is, they operate according as men have faith and expectation."⁵⁷ Like Hamilton, also, he believed Social Science more analogous to geology than to other physical sciences. He says, "All works concerning it [Social Science] ought to be compared, *not* with works on Chemistry, or Astronomy, or even Moral Philosophy, or Political Economy; but rather with works on Geology or Metaphysics."⁵⁸

Wright also anticipated the gradient idea which is so much exploited in modern tests and measurements. He presents an Ideal Ballot on which the voter gives by means of preferential voting a grade value to each of the candidates, according to how much he favors each one.⁵⁹ His discussion of projective ideals and norms we shall reserve for a later chapter.

Summary and Conclusions. As we have already indicated, Wright's book is a curious combination of valid insight and mere doctrinaire enthusiasm. It is, in many respects, a blueprint of a Utopia, that is of a society organized on the precinct-corporation or communistic basis. Like the two preceding works discussed in this volume—those of O'Connell and Hamilton—it was part of a projected system which did not materialize. It illustrates quite clearly how Social Science came in some instances to merge into Christian Sociology and similar disciplines. In spite of its limitations, however, the book is an important landmark in the history of Social Science.

Other Work of Wright. In addition to the *Principia*, which we have analyzed in considerable detail, Wright wrote two other more fugitive works which deserve but passing mention. In March, 1866, he projected a periodical, *The Practical Philosopher and True Senator*, which was "designed to be a monthly or quarterly publication devoted to the improvement of Government and Politics, Church, State, and Human Society. Its method of discussing is to be by reverting constantly to general fundamental principles instead of the passions or prejudices of the day, or age, or country."⁶⁰ Apparently only one number of this journal, published in Philadelphia, ever appeared. The author tells us that, before the Civil War,

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. ix. Hamilton had said: "Comte and Spencer, indeed, furnish us rather with disquisitions on the *cosmogony* of society than on *its geology*." (*Present Status of the Philosophy of Society*, 1866, p. 253). This was meant as a criticism of the too great comprehensiveness of these writers.

⁵⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 116.

⁶⁰ *Loc. cit.*, I: 21.

he "had devoted himself mostly to the study of theological and philosophical questions; but, after that outbreak, politics, that he had hitherto considered as, in this country, but little more than party squabbles for place, and words, rose up before him as *the* object to which he desired to devote his time and spare means, if possible."⁶¹ In this journal Wright advocated the restriction of the suffrage to naturalized white citizens and to colored soldiers, the payment of the public debt, amending the method of electing the president, an amendment to allow for export duties, better management of the public lands, and light punishment for the rebellion. He opposed proportional representation in Congress in terms of the number of voters in a state, since that would stimulate states to extend the suffrage to inferior Negroes.⁶² In spite of appeals for support, the journal apparently did not flourish.

Some years later, in January, 1878, Wright read a paper before the Philadelphia Social Science Association on the "Cause and Cure of Hard Times," in which he pointed to inflation, inadequate bases of currency, financial recklessness, misdirected production, and a bad land policy as the causes of hard times, but concluded that "The only *radical* cures for all our evils are scarcely *practicable*, until morality and true Social Science become much more *popular*, than they are at present."⁶³

In this and the four preceding chapters, we have considered four systematic treatises in Social Science. The first—Holmes' *The Science of Society* (1883)—was a general philosophy of society, depending largely upon Comte's Positive Philosophy for its inspiration, although not for its chief content. Another—O'Connell's *Vestiges of Civilization* (1851)—was a philosophy of history, largely an imitation of Comte. The third—Hamilton's *Philosophy of Society* (1866)—was a synthesis of current social theories. And the last—Wright's *Principia* (1875)—was an analysis of social organization, with a plea for a special type of organization. In spite of the fact that the authors of these works speak of them as Social Science, they have little structural resemblance one to another. However, the general patterns of their thought content show perhaps as much similarity as any four general texts in Sociology by as many authors of the present time would manifest. One thing they have in common in a marked degree. All of them obviously are strongly influenced by the theories of Comte, al-

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 6-20.

⁶³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 20.

though in varying degrees all of them take exception to some of the ideas advanced by the great French social philosopher.

It is also to be observed that in all four of these writings on theoretical Social Science the authors tended to subordinate the reform ideal to the pure science ideal, and therefore to bring the subject nearer to the borderline of sociology proper. Another indication of the closer approach of the subject to sociology is to be found in the fact that in all four of the treatises here considered the writers refer to the discipline sometimes as Social Science and sometimes as Sociology. The terms were increasingly on the point of becoming interchangeable. The distinction between the two disciplines, especially in the later works, was by no means clear cut.

Limitations of the Systematizers. It is very rare indeed that any one man or group of men can single-handedly create a new intellectual atmosphere or climate and plant and nurture in it a new system of thought. Not even Roger or Francis Bacon, or Comte, or Darwin, or Spencer was able to do that. Perhaps Aristotle, Bacon, and Comte came nearest to the achievement of such an astounding result.

The writers we have had under consideration here were obviously less able men. They could only stir the soil and mix with it the fructifying elements of occasional items of a new and scientific methodology. The soil with which they had to work and in which they were compelled to sow the seed of the new methodology—borrowed as we have said mainly from Comte and the Positivists and the Neo-Positivists—was predominantly still theological and metaphysical. Such a stony and sterile medium could not, for reasons already set forth, produce a good crop of scientific ideas, especially in Social Science. In the United States, where scholarship was still mainly traditional and classical, copying largely the conservative institutional models of Europe, and where a politically and socially effective, but largely ignorant, frontier population, harassed by the dangers, toils, and unstable conditions of a new land, clung closely to the assurances of an orthodox and even a crude theology, it was not possible to find that warm nurture of a liberal public opinion which would support and multiply the radical scientific and philosophic theories for which these systematizers in Social Science stood. As we have seen, they planned largely and magnificently, if ponderously, in the way of publication, but they could not find a reading public which would finance the publication of their books.

Furthermore, they themselves had been educated in the old system and under the influence of the old ideas. However much their intellects might struggle to be free from the mire of traditionalism and dogma, their feet always remained imbedded in these impediments and their thinking as a consequence could never come to a complete fruition. This was true even of the one among them, George Frederick Holmes, who finally and last of all in point of time, in 1883, achieved the clearest statement of the field of Social Science. This he was able to do because he followed most closely the lead of the concrete investigators and literally seemed to have divested himself of the intellectual red tape of the metaphysicians and the theologians. The less fruitful Social Science systems of the other systematizers failed to achieve a similar clarity and concreteness, because they were cultivated either in a theological or a metaphysical garden, or in one in which both types of stony soil were mingled.

PART FIVE

The Post-Associationist Phase of Social Science

The Warren-Andrews Phase of Social Science: Antecedents and Point of View

The Post-Associationists. In Part V we come to a new school of Social Scientists who cannot be classified properly with any preceding group. Indeed there is some question whether the persons treated in this section can properly be denominated a school. Unquestionably they possess fewer characteristics making for unity than any group we have considered hitherto and possibly fewer than any other group we shall attempt to assemble hereafter. Yet they possess certain traits in common which appear to justify us in grouping them under a single general heading, such as the Post-Associationists, even if we should decide that properly speaking they do not constitute a well defined school of Social Science. That all of the members of this group considered themselves as Social Scientists, after some fashion or other, and held a close personal or intellectual affinity to the leaders of the Social Science movement in general, there appears to be no reasonable doubt. Some of them, like Josiah Warren and Stephen Pearl Andrews, had been personally associated with either the Owenite or the Fourierite Utopist movements, or with both.

It is not easy at this distance to ascertain with such a degree of accuracy as is desirable the details of Warren's views on Association. He left too little in the way of written records to serve as a safe guide in this connection, but it appears that he very probably mixed a considerable amount of Associationist philosophy with his anarchist individualism, as inconsistent as these two points of view might appear on the surface to be. His connection with the Modern Times colony on Long Island would appear to be sufficient warrant for this assumption. It is certain that both Andrews and Lewis Masquerier were strongly predisposed toward Association, although they had developed beyond the early faith in the purely voluntary aspects of this doctrine which characterized the Fourierists. They recognized quite clearly the necessity of an adequate overhead political control and a well

integrated administrative system, as well as careful preliminary investigation and planning. The New York group of Social Scientists of the late eighteen-eighties constituted a medley of opinions ranging from Associationism to Positivism and various doctrines of the Carey school. But they had definitely in common with the other Post-Associationists treated here the common denominator of a strong Utopistic urge and perhaps conviction.

A Transitional Group. In brief, then, all of the writers and thinkers assembled in the present group of Post-Associationists belonged to that order of men who had not yet ceased to believe that the world could be made over for the better if only the right elements of human nature could be put to work and if a suitable environment—whether a small community, a co-operative colony, or a larger well governed society—could be established or requisitioned for the purpose. Most of them apparently thought—or had at some time believed—that this transformation might be made to take place in a single generation. It is this outlook, more than any other, that would appear to justify us in classifying these men as a single group, and perhaps as a school—although they did not in most cases apparently have active contacts with one another—under the general heading of Post-Associationists. They were of course preeminently a transitional group, or at least a group of men in transition as regards their theories. None of them, as far as we have adequate records, began and ended with the same set of social theories, as was the case with most of the men in the preceding schools. They also were transitional in another sense, for they came at the middle of the nineteenth century, when Social Science was evolving from Utopism in social reform and from a priori speculation in science over to hard headed respectability in both these respects. But this group, having been bitten badly by both Utopianism and speculative theorizing and only indifferently educated in the schools for the most part were never able to keep up with the procession. Thus, although transitionalists, they were finally left behind. This last characterization obviously applies less to the New York group of the late eighteen-eighties than to the men who came earlier. The New York group had in a large sense kept up with the procession and made the transition, for they were younger men. But a study of the contents of their journal, *Social Science*, must convince one that they too lagged somewhat behind the Social Science conceptions that were most common in their time and that were to dominate the future development of the movement.

Stephen Pearl Andrews. The first writer, chronologically and logically speaking, in this group of Post-Associationist Social Scientists was a very peculiar character, Stephen Pearl Andrews.¹ He was one of those erratic men, too dynamic and exploratory for their age, perhaps also too brilliant to be profound and dependable as a guide, whose chief social function seems to be that of serving as intellectual antennae, feeling about for new ideas, toying with them, getting the popular mind ready for them, and keeping them alive until more sober and respectable scholars are willing to handle them. Shorthand, spelling reform, a universal language, "Universology"—these were among his numerous accomplishments and transient vocations and avocations. But in spite of his wide diversity of interests, he was not an original thinker,² but was usually under the influence of some foreign system of thought—of Proudhon's, for example, through his friend and associate, Josiah H. Warren, in his earlier years, and of Comte's and of the systematizers of science in his later days.

Andrews' Literary Work. For our purposes Andrews is interesting chiefly because of a book of moderate size which he called *The Science of Society*, consisting of two parts, namely: "The True Constitution of Government in the Sovereignty of the Individual as the Final Development of Protestantism, Democracy, and Socialism" and "Cost the Limit of Price:

¹ Andrews was born in Massachusetts in 1812, but he moved to New Orleans at the age of nineteen, where he studied law and was admitted to the bar. Later, in 1839, he moved to Texas where, within three years, he achieved an important position in the bar. But he was an ardent abolitionist and his anti-slavery activities made him unpopular until, in 1843, after having had his house mobbed, he was obliged to leave. He went to England and tried to raise money there in the form of a loan to Texas so that the state might purchase the slaves. Although he succeeded in interesting Lords Aberdeen and Palmerston, they later dropped him when the Texas Chargé d'Affaires, Ashbel Smith, repudiated him. Meanwhile he had become interested in the Pittman system of shorthand and upon his return to the United States, he opened a school to teach it in Boston. In 1847 he moved to New York and added spelling reform to his list of reforms. He edited two magazines, *Anglo-Saxon* and *Propagandist*. He was a good linguist and stimulated interest in foreign languages in this country, writing a number of French textbooks himself. He invented a universal language, Alwato, long before Esperanto was known. He belonged to a radical group in New York and was among the contributors to Bennett's freethinking *Truth Seeker* and *The Radical*. In his later years he wrote a ponderous volume on *Universology* (1871) which is partly an imitation of Comtean classification of the sciences. He died in 1886. See *Dictionary of American Biography* I: 298. It is of interest to note that Lester F. Ward was also somewhat later much interested in a somewhat similar treatise to that of Andrews' *Universology* (See Emily Palmer Cape, *Lester F. Ward*, 1922, pp. 186-187), but never completed his treatise. It is regrettable that Ward's diaries were destroyed, thus preventing us from knowing whether he became interested in this subject through direct or indirect early contacts with Andrews, or whether his interest grew out of other intellectual contacts, such as with the work of Comte, Haeckel, and the Monists generally.

² "A colossal egoist and sterile pedant," J. T. Trobridge calls him. ("A Reminiscence of the Pantarch, *Independent*, LV: 501, Feb. 26, 1903).

A Scientific Measure of Honesty in Trade, as one of the fundamental principles in the solution of the social problem." Although they are not integrally related, the two parts were published together in New York in 1853 and republished in England.³ It is furthermore important to note that Andrews was primarily an agitator and promoter and reformer of the radical type and only secondarily a literary theorist. He wrote only as opportunity offered or demanded as a means of reaching a wider audience than was possible through his usual mode of direct propaganda by means of personal argument, lectures, and practical demonstration. As we shall see, he acknowledged his indebtedness to the anarchist Josiah Warren; and one of his later associates at the semi-anarchist colony Modern Times on Long Island, Henry Edger, stated that he helped Andrews to clarify his views on social questions for literary publication.⁴

Andrews and Spencer. Although we should not today accord high scientific rank to Andrews' work, it is interesting to note that at least one reviewer did it the honor of considering it together with Spencer's *Social Statics*. This reviewer, in fact, was flattering enough to say that there was so much similarity between the main principles of Spencer's and Andrews' works as to suggest plagiarism, although he conceded that they may both have drawn their ideas from the same source. The reviewer himself believed Proudhon to be the father and founder of doctrines professed by both of these men.⁵ Spencer would undoubtedly have objected strenuously to this attribution of his views to Proudhon if he had read this review. The only thing actually in common between Andrews and Spencer was their strongly individualistic emphasis. But Spencer was not, as Andrews was, a thorough-going anarchist, nor a believer in free love.⁶

Josiah Warren. Very closely associated with Andrews, as we have already indicated, was Josiah Warren, who is called by his biographer "the first

³ The London publisher was C. W. Daniel, Ltd., and the book was republished as late as 1913.

⁴ Henry Edger's unpublished *Journals*, through the courtesy of his son, M. Paul Edger.

⁵ Unsigned, "Spencer's Social Statics," *Quarterly Review of the M. E. Church, South*, X: 186-187 (Apr., 1856).

⁶ Andrews "took the free love side of the question in the famous discussion on Marriage and Divorce between himself and the Hon. Horace Greeley. . . ." (Calvin Blanchard, *Life of Thomas Paine*, 1860, p. 60). Let us pause parenthetically a moment to pay tribute to Greeley who befriended almost every Social Science enthusiast who needed protection. His co-operation with Brisbane we have already dwelt upon. He was also a "chum" of Calvin Blanchard (R. J. Wright, *Principia, or Basis of Social Science*, 1875, p. 328). We shall meet him again when we come to Carey and his school of Social Science, and he was among the first members of the American Social Science Association when it was organized.

American anarchist.”⁷ In the enthusiasm of his youth he had enlisted as one of Robert Owen’s colonists at the experimental settlement at New Harmony, Indiana. The experiment not proving successful, Warren, still filled with enthusiasm for some radical economic solution of the ills of mankind, had gone to nearby Cincinnati in 1827. In this Queen City of the West he had⁸

experimented on his theory of “Equitable Commerce,” by opening a store on a small scale. In 1829, he wound up this experiment, having succeeded in demonstrating to his entire satisfaction, that his theory was practicable. In 1842, he tried the experiment over again in a store at New Harmony, Indiana, for nearly the same length of time, with equal success. Having thus worked out his practical demonstration alone, Mr. W. proceeded to propagate his theory, and to induce his disciples to form Equitable Villages for the more general carrying out of his theory.

Although Warren had begun his career as a disciple of Owen’s Communistic theories, he did not continue in this school of thought and experimentation. It often happens to young and ardent enthusiasts for an idealistic cause that the failure of the enterprise with which their emotions are so closely identified produces a profound emotional reaction and they compensate by giving their allegiance to an opposite line of conduct or system of ideas. This appears to have been substantially the case with Warren. From one of the more dependable commentators on the radical reform enthusiasms and movements of the times we learn⁹ that the

Failure of Communism drove Mr. Warren through a process of socialistic research entirely to the opposite extreme—*ultra individualism*. Thus he was enabled to discover “the true science of society.” In 1846, he published his theory in a Pamphlet, entitled “Equitable Commerce” etc. This work has since been much amplified by the author, at the suggestion of Mr. Stephen Pearl Andrews, who has become a devoted expounder of Mr. Warren’s theory. In 1852, Mr. Warren gave the public another Pamphlet, entitled “Practical Details in Equitable Commerce” etc. Both these works in their present form appear to have been edited by Mr. Andrews, who prefaces each with high commendations.

The Warren-Andrews Experimental Colonies. Accurate information regarding the character of these practical experiments, intended to illustrate

⁷ William Bailie, *Josiah Warren, the First American Anarchist, A Sociological Study*, 1906.

⁸ Adin Ballou, *Practical Christian Socialism: A Conversational Exposition of the True System of Human Society* (1854), p. 621.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 602.

the application of the social-economic theories of Warren to the actual business of living, is difficult to obtain at this distance. Most of the sources, like Henry Edger's pamphlet entitled *Modern Times* (1855), are now very rare and are likely to be biased in considerable degree by the personal reactions and motivations of the writers. Andrews' own brief account of *Modern Times* (the New York colony on Long Island) in his preface to Warren's *Practical Details in Equitable Commerce* (1852) will perhaps serve us as well as any other for the essentials of the plan and purpose of this experiment. He says,¹⁰

We have in the vicinity of New York (and also in Ohio), a trial, and, as we hope, a model village, in a beginning stage of growth, but which has sprung into existence under favoring circumstances, and exhibits much promise of furnishing a successful and practical illustration of the true basis of social life. We have secured between seven and eight hundred acres of land, of medium quality, lying across the track of one of the railroads running from this city, within four miles of the ocean, and about forty distant from New York, and combining in the location a large proportion of advantages for the purposes intended. Upon this domain a rudimental town or city is laid out by alleys, streets, and avenues, dividing the plot into lots of one acre nearly, four of which lots are included between the streets and avenues, forming a square, two of the four being divided from the remaining two by an alley. Each individual is limited in the purchase to not more than three acres, as the object is not agriculture on the large scale, but a town of diversified occupations. The amount of land thus limited is ample for gardening purposes, play and pleasure-grounds, retracy, fresh air, etc. Those who desire to procure farms can do so in the neighborhood of the town. These lands are sold to such persons as are acceptable to some *one* of the first ten purchasers—a precaution of expediency to prevent their being taken up by ignorant immigrants or other persons obviously unfit for such an undertaking, who might be attracted to them merely by their cheapness. The acre lots are sold to the settlers AT COST, that is, in the small quantity at precisely the same price per acre at which the whole tracts are bought from the original holders, who are in no way interested in the movement. They come, including an addition to the acre for the avenues, the assessment for cost of surveying, title, etc., at about *twenty dollars* each. The land is covered by shrubs having thick strong roots, and requires a considerable outlay to clear it and bring it into cultivation; but as that outlay may be made in the labor of the settler, it is not the same thing to those who are destitute, or nearly destitute, of money, as a higher price in cash payment.

Commenting further on the Ohio experimental colony, Andrews continues his remarks as follows:¹¹

¹⁰ Quoted by Adin Ballou, *op. cit.*, pp. 621-622.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 622.

The conditions of settlement at the village in Ohio are somewhat different, owing to price and quantity of land, but the principle is the same. Those who desire the particulars in relation to it, or further information in relation to the New York village, are authorized to address letters of specific inquiry to Josiah Warren, Modern Times, Thompson's Station, Long Island, New York, or to the writer of this Preface, at New York City. They will receive in return a circular containing answers to their inquiries, or a private letter, according to the nature of the information they may desire. After getting such replies, and after an attentive perusal, study, and thorough mastering of the 'Science of Society,' 'Equitable Commerce,' and these 'Practical Details,' we recommend all those who are desirous of removing to an equitable village, first to visit it, and remain long enough on the ground to form the personal acquaintance of those who are already there, to penetrate thoroughly their moral and material means of accomplishing what they propose. It is the peculiarity of our movement, that we assume no responsibilities for each other, and hence we wish all who may see fit to join us, to be thoroughly well informed of every thing which may enable them to act understandingly for themselves, assuming their own burdens.

Some Reactions to These Experiments. As might well be expected, the attitude of the general public toward these practical experiments in the art of communal living was quite varied. They were well advertised in the propaganda literature and platform efforts of the day. The large amount of publicity which they received gave Adin Ballou an altogether too optimistic notion of their success, as indicated by his own remarks regarding them. He says, "As to the number of professed Individual Sovereigns in the two Villages and scattered abroad, I have no authentic information. From all I have read and heard, I should infer that several thousands of persons had embraced the new creed, or at least were strongly inclined to do so. But having no reliable data from which to calculate, I can make no definite statement."¹²

Perhaps Ballou's own very mediocre success with his colony of Fruitlands caused him, by way of compensation, to give too much credit to the rumors regarding the Warren experiments.

That there was great popular interest in these colonies there can be no doubt. They were established in a period of tense emotional excitements and generous idealism regarding social reform. The novels of Dickens and Thackeray had filled the reading public with a spirit of criticism of many of the social and economic absurdities of the age, and the writings of Victor Hugo and Bulwer-Lytton had provoked a pervasive hope for a new and

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 623.

better social order, which was wide-spread among the people. As yet, in spite of the earlier failure of the Fourierite and the Owenite experiments and of the Brook Farm endeavor, the public had not come to be completely disillusioned regarding the experimental colony method of resolving our social entanglements. A great many people corresponded with Warren and Andrews about these colonies. Many expressed a desire to join them. But relatively few actually sold out their belongings elsewhere and cast in their lot with the colonists. At no time did the Modern Times colony pass the bounds of a very moderate village and by 1860 it was visibly on the decline. The colonists did not have sufficient land to maintain them, and the soil was relatively infertile. Also there was much criticism of their heterodox plans of life and practices by the more conventional members of society.

Comte, writing to Henry Edger early in the eighteen-fifties, spoke of the colonists at Modern Times as "voisins égarés," but gave the movement a sort of conditional approval because he understood from Edger's correspondence that it offered the latter an opportunity to propagate the doctrines of Positivism among the colonists.¹³

Andrews' Conception of Social Science. With these types of economic and political theory and their attempted application to the practical processes of community organization and life, however, we are not specifically concerned here. They are of significance primarily because Andrews was convinced that they constituted a Social Science. In support of his contention as to the scientific character of his literary work, Andrews wrote,¹⁴

Believing that these principles will justify the assumption, I have ventured to place at the head of this series of publications as a general title, "The Science of Society."

The propriety of the use of the term "Science," in such a connection, may be questioned by some whom habit has accustomed to apply that term to a much lower range of investigations. If researchers into the habits of beetles and tadpoles, and their localities and conditions of existence, are entitled to the dignified appellation of Science, certainly similar researches into the nature, the wants, the adaptation, and, so to speak, into the true or requisite moral and social habitat of the spiritual animal called Man, must be, if conducted according to the rigid methods of scientific induction from observed facts, equally entitled to that distinction.

The series of works, of which this is the first in order, will not deal in vague

¹³ *Lettres d'Auguste Comte à Henry Edger et à M. John Metcalf*, p. 39.

¹⁴ Stephen Pearl Andrews, *The Science of Society*, No. 1. The True Constitution of Government, 2d ed., 1853, p. vi. This part of the book was originally given as a lecture, in 1851.

aspirations after "the good time coming." They will propound definite principles which demand to be regarded as having all the validity of scientific truths, and which taken in their co-relation with each other, are adequate to the solution of the social problem. If this pretension be made good, the importance of the subject will not be denied. If not well founded, the definiteness of the propositions will be favorable to a speedy and successful refutation.

Andrews' Theory of Social Control. Andrews' theory of science in general and of government is revealed in the following statement from the same source.¹⁵

We point out certain principles in the nature of things which *relate to* the order of human society; in conforming to which mankind will find their affairs harmonically adjusted, and in departing from which they will run into confusion. The knowledge of these principles is science. *It is the same with them as with the principles of Physiology.* We teach them as science. We do not ask that they shall be voted upon or applied under pledges. Man cannot make nor unmake them. . . . Hereupon there is based the claim that these principles constitute in the appropriate and rigid sense THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY. It is the property of science that it does not say "By your leave." It exists whether you will or no. It requires neither compacts, constitutions, nor ballot-boxes. It is objectively true. It exists in principles and truths. If you understand and conform, well; if not woe be unto you. The consequences will fall upon you and scourge you. Hence the government of consequence is itself scientific, which no man-made government is. Men have sought for ages to discover the science of government; and lo! here it is, that men cease totally to attempt to govern each other at all! that they learn to know the consequences of their own acts, and that they arrange their relations with each other upon such a basis of science that the disagreeable consequences shall be assumed by the agent himself.

Comments on These Views. These last few sentences express of course the essentials of the theory of philosophic anarchism as it was then held. Furthermore, they indicate such a subjective point of view as would justify us, as was remarked above, in classifying Andrews with the Associationist school of Social Science—to which his theories are undoubtedly closely allied—if he, like Brisbane, had set forth any definite theory of general social organization or association. Although Andrews emphasized the development of a self-enforcing sense of responsibility for the consequences of his own acts on the part of each individual, he does not make clear to his readers how this feeling is to be inculcated among the members of his society nor how those who fail to develop it or who disregard its dictates are to be prevented from exploiting others who have developed it and

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 2. *Cost the Limit of Price* (Copyright date, 1851), pp. vii–viii.

follow it effectively. Nor does he offer any suggestion as to how such incompletely socialized or recalcitrant individuals may be prevented from destroying that social order which is as necessary to the human welfare and happiness of morally free individuals in a society without institutionalized government as it is in one where such government exists.

Social Science Is Composite. For our purposes the most important chapter in Andrews' work is the first one on "The Nature and Necessity of a Social Science." Here we are told that Political Economy is falling into disrepute as a science, because of its lack of extended scope and humanitarian purpose. The questions with which it concerns itself are now coming to be seen as a part of a wider field of scientific investigation, one connected with the whole system of social life. He further states: "The subject-matter of Political Economy will, therefore, be hereafter embraced in a more comprehensive Social Science, which will treat of all the interests of man growing out of their inter-relations with each other."¹⁶ Ethics, likewise, is open to criticism. It has heretofore taught the necessity of submitting to the demands of a false set of social relations. "The Science of Society teaches, on the other hand, the rectification of those relations themselves."¹⁷ We see exhibited here, then, both of the earmarks of Social Science, the appeal to science as a sanction and the humanitarian ideal. Andrews' *Science of Society* absorbed both ethics and political economy and taught according to his interpretation, "far more exactly the limits of right by defining the true relations of men."¹⁸

Objections to Social Science Answered. There are, however, he tells us, obstacles in the way of rendering the data of social organizations scientific: "It is difficult for men to regard that as purely a question of science which they foresee is a radical reform and revolution as well."¹⁹ As a consequence of this difficulty, social reform has not hitherto been subjected properly to scientific discipline and control. He continues: "The inquiry into social evils and remedies has not been generally viewed in the light of a science at all, and Reform of all sorts has become distasteful to many among the more intellectual portion of the community, for the reason that it has not hitherto assumed a more strictly scientific aspect."²⁰

In addition to these unconvinced intellectuals, there are others who ob-

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

ject to the application of science to social questions. There are, he says, for example, the religionists, "who assume that the moral and social regeneration of mankind is not the sphere of science, but exclusively that of religion—that the only admissible method of societary advancement is by the infusion of the religious sentiment into the hearts of men, and the rectification thereby of the affections of the individual, and through individuals of mankind at large." ²¹

We have, of course, run across this objection all along the course of our study. It was especially evident in the criticisms which the orthodox New England divines levelled against Positivism and Associationism. It was even more dogmatically, if somewhat less insistently, urged by the less intellectually alert and less well informed clergy and laymen of other parts of the country. The belief was still widely held that God spontaneously looked after the material and spiritual welfare of his own and guided them effectively and wisely in choosing their individual conduct with regard to personal morals and social policy through the instrumentality of that innate conscience which he had placed "in the breast" ²² of each of his creatures, the least as well as the greatest. All that was necessary for the individual to do was to submit to this guidance and increase its efficacy through living a life of sympathetic piety and submission to the Lord.

But, Andrews tells us, this is an unphilosophical and suicidal objection to Social Science. We do not need more appeals and fervent prayers to fill us with sympathy for suffering humanity. We have enough of that already. Our deficiency is in respect to corresponding practice in righting social wrongs. Preaching must give way to action, he says, and "aspiration to realization, and amiable but fruitless sympathetic affectations to fundamental investigation and scientific methods. The true preachers of the next age will be the scientific discoverers and the practical organizers of true social relations among men." ²³ These are certainly just words of wisdom which might well be set up as a guide and an admonition to our own time. However inadequately Andrews may have realized in practice his ideal of a solution of the problem of reforming society and of inventing ways and

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²² It is interesting that these defenders of the adequacy of conscience as a guide did not seem to recognize the "head," which was perhaps too intellectual to be a concept for them and too intimately suggestive of science. However, "the breast" may be regarded as a guardian of a higher order than "the bowels," to which the Biblical writers often refer as the source of human guidance. Thus at least the self-constituted "defenders of the Lord" had made an advance from the lower to the higher viscera in establishing their authority, even if they had not progressed as far as the cerebral cortex.

²³ *The Science of Society*, p. 20.

means of removing individual and social ills, it must be granted that his faith in the superior adequacy of impersonal science over sentimental wish and will magic, or attempted manipulation of the supernatural by magical means and methods, was essentially sound. More knowledge and its practical application were the great need.

The Inner Light Objectors. There was, according to Andrews, still another type of opposition to Social Science, which, for lack of a better descriptive term, we may characterize as the Inner Light objection. It undoubtedly grew out of that large branch of radical religious protest against more or less corrupt institutional interference by government and church with the consciences of men in the exercise of religious and ethical duties which was such a prominent aftermath of the Reformation movement. The Puritans and the Quakers and many minor sects were identified with this particular brand of individualistic philosophy.²⁴ This group, or class, of objectors urged that there is a natural disposition in the individual to do what is right in social situations and that therefore we do not have to bother about discovering the laws of a true social order. The absurdity of the theory that one can have an instinctive knowledge of right and wrong in the abstract which will serve to indicate the right course of action in any one of a great variety of social situations is of course much more apparent to present day critics of the instinctivist theories of human behavior than it was to these religious enthusiasts and social idealists of an earlier date.

To persons holding such a view of the adequacy and universality of relatively direct divine guidance through conscience or instinct, there was of course no apparent need for science, which was looked upon as some sort of interference from without, antagonistic to the essential and native dignity of the human soul. In fact, science was still grouped by these people in pretty much the same category with the pronouncements of Catholic Councils and Papal Encyclicals and other declarations of a self-seeking hierarchy, as an implicit denial of the efficiency of conscience and as a humanly made rival of "Holy Writ," whereas each individual soul which enjoyed the gift of Grace had been entrusted with the championship of "the cause of the Lord" in the pursuit of righteousness. All this was scarcely compatible with the general views of Andrews on Social Science. While he was willing to accept the doctrine of an innate, or at least of a functional

²⁴ See Rufus M. Jones, *Mysticism and Democracy in the English Commonwealth* (1932) and *George Fox, Seeker and Friend* (1930); also Luella M. Wright, *The Literary Life of the Early Friends, 1650-1725* (1932) for light on this movement.

conscience, as being compatible with his own more or less anarchistic and individualistic views of self-control, he nevertheless showed himself to be less anarchistic than his Christian critics, for he believed also in the necessity of positive knowledge as a guide. "Science—the rigid, exact, thorough, and inclusive Science of Society—is the only reliable guide to harmonic social relations among men," he said.²⁵ Evidently, in the opinion of Andrews, conscience must be enlightened by reason and by fact. Neither piety, the sentiment of brotherhood, enthusiasm for a good cause, nor rigid (or rigorous) morality, he holds, can substitute for this science or positive knowledge. He went further even and declared that the current Socialist agitations of his time were dangerous unless science should be called in to solve their problems.²⁶

²⁵ Stephen Pearl Andrews, *The Science of Society*, p. 21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

The Warren-Andrews Phase of Social Science: Content and Criticism

The Faith of Andrews in Social Science. So much for the background of this particular branch of theory, which we have found to be so variously connected with the radical idealistic and speculative currents of doctrine overflowing from the eighteenth century social philosophers and the early nineteenth century social revolutionists and Utopists. The theory of Andrews partakes at once of all of the passionate hopefulness of his predecessors regarding the power of mankind to remake society by taking intelligent thought regarding human social problems and it displays a firm belief that mankind are ready and anxious to apply themselves to this constructive task of thinking themselves through their difficulties and oppressions to Utopia and Elysium, once they know the method by which it is to be achieved. Alas! How little he understood the strange inertia of the masses of men who have so persistently through all the ages preferred to delegate to some hero or god the task of putting them out of their social slough of Despond, and who are much more ready to pray than to labor and to moan with their social pains than to cure them by taking intelligent thought as to how to cure them! As to the method by which this social regeneration should be accomplished, Andrews was equally confident. As we shall see in the pages that follow, he looked upon the doctrines of Warren as the true prospectus which should set men free from their past errors and oppressions.

Andrews Takes Warren as His Guide in Social Theory. As to the actual content of Andrews' Social Science, he tacitly admits that he borrowed it almost wholesale from Warren, who wrote but little but who in conversation and otherwise provided him with his general outline. He says,¹

According to Mr. Warren, the following is the problem to be solved in all its several branches: 1. "The proper, legitimate, and just reward of labor. 2. Security of person and property. 3. The greatest practicable amount of free-

¹ Stephen Pearl Andrews, *The Science of Society* (1853), pp. 31-32.

dom to each individual. 4. Economy in the production and uses of wealth. 5. To open the way to each individual for the possession of land, and all other natural wealth. 6. To make the interests of all cooperate with and assist each other, instead of clashing with and counteracting each other. 7. To withdraw the elements of discord, of war, of distrust and repulsion, and to establish a prevailing spirit of peace, order, and social sympathy." And according to him, also, the following Principles are the means of the solution: "I. Individuality. II. Sovereignty of Each Individual. III. Cost the Limit of Price. IV. A circulating Medium, founded on the Cost of Labor. V. Adaptation of the Supply to the Demand."

This outline of Warren's theory of society Andrews declares to be "the most complete *scientific statement* of the problems of human society, and of the fundamental principles of *social science*, which has ever been presented to the world."² This would indeed seem to be high praise, but he grows more eloquent still. He believes it to include all that the reformers of any brand ever aimed at and all that is necessary to complete human felicity, and therefore all that is essential to a complete system of Social Science. It is clear that Andrews is now following the doctrines of Warren as formerly Warren had adopted those of Owen. Andrews concludes his rhapsody with the following evaluation:³

Within the circle of these five principles or efficient powers is found every condition of the complete development of a true social order, or, in other words, a full and perfect solution of the social problem stated above. Is that statement of the problem sufficiently comprehensive? Does it include, either directly or consequentially, all which has ever been aimed at by social reformers of any school, and all which is requisite to the full harmony and beauty of human relations? If that be so, and if the assumption just stated be made good, both by exposition and practical results, then have we at length a theory of society strictly entitled to the appellation of a Science—a movement, precise, definite, and consequential, adequate, on the one hand, to meet the demands of the most exacting intellect, and sufficiently beneficent, on the other, to gratify the desires of the most expansive philanthropy, while in its remoter results it promises to satiate the refined cravings of the most fastidious taste.

After this statement Andrews proceeds to justify his extravagant appraisal of Warren's Social Science by showing how its principles apply not only to trade and commerce, but to all other human relationships as well.

The Cost Principle. The remainder of the book is an exposition of one of the five principles, namely that cost should be the limit of price in a true

² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

social order. To followers of Owen, Saint-Simon, and Fourier, he says, accustomed as they are to beginning with palatial structures and brilliant dreams, the details of rigorous science will be dull and dry. But if they will study the Cost Principle they will find it rich in just the sort of treasure they are seeking. They have failed because their methods were not scientific, but once they understand the present system, they will return to their reforms with renewed zeal, using the Labor Note and the Equitable System of Josiah Warren as their tools.⁴ Fourier's conception of attractive industry is quite right, but it can be achieved by the present system of social organization much more readily than by his phalanx organization.⁵ Security of person and property and the elimination of destructive competition are among the many other benefits to be secured from the new system.⁶ Finally, Andrews concludes, the judicious reader will recognize⁷

that the Cost Principle is wonderfully searching, subtle, and exact—that it marks the line with precision between what is right and what is wrong in the present system, and between what is right and what is wrong in all the proposed systems of Social Reform—that it is eclectic and discriminating—that it combines, in fine, the simplicity of fundamental truth in its primary statement, with that minuteness of application to the ramified details, which entitle it to the appellation of a Universal Principle.

Andrews Essentially a Utopist. It will readily be seen from the preceding quotation that Andrews belonged to the Utopistic system-building type of Social Scientists, a fact to which we have already alluded in another connection. Like Brisbane, he believed that one could "discover" in nature, or rather from an analysis of human nature, a type of social organization based on "harmony" of interests or of motives to which human life ought to conform and could be made to adjust itself. This side of his theory he left comparatively undeveloped in his writings, although it may have been more prominent in his oral arguments and lectures. It is probable that he put into print only those elements of theory which he considered to be new or as yet insufficiently exploited. The "harmony" theory had been treated so exhaustively by Fourier and Brisbane that it must have appeared useless for him to attempt to make additions to it, and it was so well known to all reformers in the eighteen-fifties that it must have seemed equally useless for him to repeat it in his own writings. What was not so well known,

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 157.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 164-165.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

and therefore, in his opinion, demanded emphasis and reiteration, were the theories of Warren by means of which this "harmony" might be achieved. These, therefore, constitute the chief content of Andrews' treatise on Social Science. The production of a comprehensive and systematic treatise on Social Science, which would summarize the old as well as the new contributions to the subject, was perhaps rather too much of a task for a practical social reformer and agitator, such as Andrews was, to undertake.

This explanation of the relative incompleteness of the written theories of Andrews and this assumption of the probable completeness of their oral expression is borne out by many incidental facts. Brisbane and Andrews were well acquainted with each other and often met in New York where both lived in the eighteen-fifties. Many of the colonists at Modern Times were, as Henry Edger shows incidentally in his journals, converts from the Fourierist movement led by Brisbane, and some of them went back to Brisbane after the decline of the Warren-Andrews experiments. They had been attracted to the Modern Times settlement in the hope that the greater economic emphasis and more detailed economic strategy of this colony would remedy some of the visionary defects of the Fourierist experiments. But of course, in the end, they were doomed to disappointment in this respect.

Universology. Andrews himself considered his greatest contribution to be his work on *The Basic Outline of Universology*, which he further described as "An Introduction to the Newly Discovered Science of the Universe, Its Elementary Principles, and the First Status of Their Développement in the Special Sciences." This work made its appearance in 1871, almost two decades after the publication of the work on Social Science already referred to. It marks a development of his interests in the direction of general and abstract principles, and perhaps a retreat from the strain and disappointments of a not too successful life of agitation in behalf of applied social reforms for which men were not yet ready, or which were inherently impracticable.

He preached a series of Scientific Sermons on this subject, to which the public was invited, Sunday mornings, at Degarmo Hall, New York.⁸ It is interesting to note that Andrews was still able at this period to inspire the admiration of "many thoughtful minds"⁹ and some of them hailed his

⁸ D. M. Bennett, editor, in a note in *The Truth Seeker*, Jan., 1874, p. 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*

Universology as a work of the greatest merit.¹⁰ Actually it is a very peculiar book. It contains diagrams of a human figure, very much like those to be encountered in horoscopes, and yet the author shows familiarity with most of the important thinkers of his day. It is in many respects an imitation of Comte's classification of the sciences, but the manner and style are very eccentric.¹¹ He analyzes Comte's system and then in an elaborate Typical

¹⁰ The book was published on the basis of a list of subscribers, who guaranteed the publishing costs. The introduction contains statements by Professor M. A. Clancey, Edward B. Freeland (dated May, 1866), David Hoyle, J. West Nevins, and Augustus F. Boyle. Nevins' statement includes the following evaluation: "The Book is a Scientific Epic, and its effect upon the Future is immeasurable to present apprehension. Herein, as it were, the whole thought of the Past is brought to a Focal Point. All previous Religion, Poetry, and Science, have been converging towards this, as to a centre, whence, now, under the guidance of a definite knowledge of Law, they may, with more direct purpose and prospect, renew their expansion and exertion in the great task of the regeneration of the Race. . . . The Plan of the Book, as a Work of Art, furnishes an admirable illustration of the application and use of the Science it is designed to teach,—a Science based upon the discovery of the Organic Trune Law of Creation, and the Grand Pervading Analogy of Providence. This Triplexity of Nature will be found permeating all the thought of the Past, but only in modern times, and especially in this Volume, has it been directly applied to the uses of Science. . . ." (*Loc. cit.*, pp. xxxiv, xxxii). Freeland has this to say: "A new Scientific Discovery, of immense scope and importance, has recently been completed in New York City. The Science is of such magnitude and character that the discoverer feels justified in bestowing upon it the name of UNIVERSOLOGY, or the Science of the Universe. It is the Science of the Universe, *as a whole*, and of the correlation of its parts and principles. . . . In other words, the discovery is that of a Science, or rather *the Science of Universal Analogy*. . . . It is . . . in one sense, the one and only Science, of which all other Sciences . . . are only twigs or branches. . . . In still another sense, or in addition to all this, it is the introduction of a new Scientific Method and Epoch; the furnishings of a genuine and legitimate method of *Deduction, as a guide for all future scientific investigations, in all Departments whatsoever*; not, however, to the disparagement or exclusion of observation and the continued induction of minor laws" (*ibid.*, p. xxi). Comte, this author continues, did not believe all the phenomena in the universe could be reduced to a single law, however desirable such a procedure might be. However, Andrews has discovered just such a law: "Precisely this law, which Auguste Comte deems it visionary to believe in the possibility of discovering . . . is now matter of actual discovery, and capable of demonstration as any problem of Geometry. . . . The Science of UNIVERSOLOGY is based, then, upon the discovery of the Law of Analogy. . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. xxi, xxiii). *Universology*, Freeland goes on to tell us, is "the complete discovery and *perfect interpretation of the 'purposes of the Deity in creation,'* and the entire unfolding of 'the creative plan of God,' 'not only as expressed in organic forms,' but as involved in every Sphere of Thought and Being in the Universe of Matter and of Mind. . . . Through the portals of this Science we are about entering upon the most tremendous revolution in Science, in Government, in Theology, in Political Economy, in Art, in Practical Life, which the world has ever witnessed" (*ibid.*, p. xxiv). *The Truth Seeker* says: "This work, by one of the ablest thinkers of the age, enters an entire new field of thought, and must be well studied to be fully appreciated. It is truly a rich addition to the literature of advanced thought, aside from its claim to being the exponent of the principles of a new, Universal Science" (I, No. 5, Jan., 1874, p. 12).

¹¹ The following quotations will give the reader some idea of the author's manner and style. "This Basic Societary Distribution of Comte is, however, as above intimated, a distinguishing between certain *very general Aspects* of Society merely,—as if these *were*, or composed the whole Body. It is therefore a Generalized or Discursive Kind of Discrimination, as con-

Table of the Universe, he compares his system with Comte's own system.¹²

A Common Mode of Magic. As strange as may seem this later excursion into the semi-incoherent field of symbolic magic in which Andrews indulged himself, it should be remarked that such modes of thinking and writing were in considerable degree characteristic of the time, especially among theological and mystical writers. It represents the age-old attempt to achieve by the manipulation of words or other symbols what cannot be done by means of solid facts and acts, because these are wanting in sufficient quantity or completeness. Such attempts are the very essence of magic and perhaps all philosophers, when balked in their attempts to solve problems in terms of realistic data, and all reformers, when unable to make their schemes work in practice, are tempted to resort to the magic of symbolic pseudo-logic, unchecked by the rigors of syllogistic rules or by the strict tests of identity of classification in induction. Even the sociologist, Lester F. Ward, inspired no doubt by the German monistic philosophers, dabbled somewhat in the eighteen-seventies in this sort of speculation and actually planned as late as 1911 (two years before his death) to write a book which should cover a somewhat analogous field bearing the rather astonishing title of "Monism, the true Quietism, or, The Continuity of Nature as the Only Faith that can Satisfy the Emancipated Soul."¹³ There is no certainty

trasted with another which is, at least, equally Fundamental, and which is far more Distinctive and Exact. Comte's Discrimination is, in other words, PHILOSOPHOID, or NATUROID, as against this other, which is about to be made from the Universological point of view, and *emphasized*, and *insisted upon*, and which is *specifically SCIENTOID*" (*ibid.*, p. 29). "It is obvious . . . that the Fundamental Elaboration or 'Positive Philosophy' of Comte corresponds—but in part only, however—with what I denominate Cosmology,—the Science of the Great Basic Department or Aspect of Being upon which the domain of Anthropology supervenes" (*ibid.*, p. 29). "Warren, in respect to the series of Sociological Principles here discriminated, is *Scientoid*, *Analytical*, or *Disintegrating*, and truly *Radical*. Comte is *Philosophoid*, *Naturoid*, *Synstatic*, and only *Pseudo-Reconstructive*. . . . Fourier is *Artoid*, *Composite*, *Synthetic*, and profoundly *Reconstructive*. . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 34). "The most fundamental discrimination of Theology is into I. ARBITRISMOLOGY, the Conception of God (or Gods) as an Arbitrary Irresponsible Will (or Wills), from which emanate the *Laws of Being*. . . . II. LOGICISMOLOGY, the Conception of Law, as *The Inherent Necessity of God* (if conceived at all) as the *Administrator* of Law merely . . . and III. APPETOLOGY (Lat. *ad*, TO, and *peto*, TO SEEK), the Doctrine of the Gracious Interblending and Practical Unity, in the Divine Nature, of Authoritative Personality and The Logos or Law-Principle, so united and modulated as to inspire the Sentiment of Charity, or the Love of God shed abroad in the Hearts of Men. . . ." (*ibid.*, pp. 246–247). The whole book is filled with these neologisms, with this pedantic, heavy, and artificial, circumlocutory way of expressing ideas.

¹² For example: "The Objective Method of Comte *coincides* and *corresponds with* what I mean by The Natural Order, and his Subjective Method with what I mean by The Logical Order; but the two sets of terms are, by no means, synonymous, and must not be mistaken for each other." . . . (*ibid.*, p. 21). He then proceeds to show wherein Comte is wrong.

¹³ See Emily Palmer Cape, *op. cit.*, pp. 186–187.

that Ward was in any way indebted to Andrews for his conception of his own universology, but it must be remembered that Ward was careless about listing his sources, although meticulous in recording the development of his ideas;¹⁴ and also it was at about the time at which Ward first took up the study of Social Science in earnest that Andrews produced his work here referred to.

The Nature of Universology. The so-called science of universology itself seems to have been, in the mind of Andrews, a sort of combination of science, metaphysics and mystical magic, including something of the hocus-focus of numerology. An anonymous admirer says of it that it is ¹⁵

a definite Universal Science, embracing the classification of the Sciences, as among themselves, and of all the details within the Special Sciences, as a concatenated evolution from a single set of Primordial Laws and Principles. The Three Principles upon which all others rest and from which they are derived are denominated UNISM, DUISM, and TRINISM, and have a distinct relation to the numbers One, Two, and Three. The whole system, beginning here, in the first and simplest of mathematical discriminations, holds throughout, a mathematical character, making of the Mathematics a middle-ground between Metaphysics and Physical considerations. It is thus, in a sense, a revival, but at the same time, an immense expansion of the Pythagorean doctrine of the Significance of Numbers.

Perhaps the kindest comment to make on this analysis is none at all. Yet one cannot wholly disregard the evident effort of the author to make use of existing knowledge for the purpose of improving human understanding and orientation with respect to the major and more fundamental problems of mankind. Of Andrews' seriousness of purpose and intellectual good faith there can be no doubt. His difficulty was in his lack of fundamental basic training in science and critical discrimination. His enthusiasm outran his powers of selection, and his erudition was greater than his powers of critical assimilation and judgment. He confused and mixed hopelessly some of the finest contributions of Comte and Spencer with a useless metaphysical verbiage, and this in turn with the numerical magic of the Neo-Pythagoreans, which in our time is nothing short of charlatanry. With the result-

¹⁴ See his *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, 6 vols., 1913.

¹⁵ Unsigned statement in *The Truth Seeker*, Jan., 1874, p. 5. This statement was prepared for a forthcoming Encyclopedia (unnamed). The author tells us that Andrews "is quoted as authority, along with COMTE, SPENCER, and HAECKEL, in DR. LOUIS ELSBERG'S recent '*Classification of the Sciences*,' which has in return received the high encomiums of HAECKEL."

ing hodge-podge of logic and mysticism he hoped to solve the major problems of mankind.

The Pantarchy. In addition to this theoretical structure, Andrews also projected a practical organization to put it into actual practice. This organization he called the Pantarchy, "a sort of Universal Institute of Humanity, founded on Science."¹⁶ And, strangely enough, according to a writer in a periodical of the time, "He has already procured a legal charter for a University—'The Normal University of the Pantarchy,' located under Act of Congress at Washington; and is engaged in further elaborating these ideas, and in founding a school of Philosophy and a propaganda based upon them."¹⁷

This undertaking and practical outlook upon the field of universal science, which should serve the cause of the enlightenment and regeneration of mankind, was after the manner of Comte almost to the letter, and his inspiration was undoubtedly based on his study of the writings of the celebrated French philosopher and exponent of Positivism. But such a program was already out of date, if indeed it had ever been timely. At his death Andrews still considered himself "the founder of the most important of all the sciences, Universology, still supposing that the social millennium, for which he had striven in such various ways, was close at hand."¹⁸ Yet he was a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, of the American Ethnological Society, and of the New York Liberal Club.

Andrews depended for moral support and encouragement in the propagation of his views upon an active group of New York radicals and upon others, less radical, whose enquiring minds and romantic enthusiasm for reform made them open minded toward many theories more spectacular than sound. We have already quoted J. T. Trobridge's reference to Andrews in this connection in an early footnote to the preceding chapter. The group of radicals to which Andrews belonged, and among which he was the leader, was a very interesting one. Apparently nothing was too radical for them—anarchism, free love, anything. They were quite anti-theological also. Blanchard and Bennett belonged to this group, and it is probable that the men previously mentioned who wrote the encomiums on Universology were also members of the same group. It would not be at all surprising if

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Dictionary of American Biography*, I: 298.

Greeley were interested in it. The group as a whole would be well worth studying.

Andrews on the Field of Sociology. Although Andrews' thinking was, as we have seen, rather superficial, he had apparently read widely and appreciatively in the field of sociology. He was familiar with the works of Comte and Spencer and the other sociological writers of the times. While still a professed Social Scientist he was quite ready to become a sociologist, which even in the early eighteen-seventies was beginning to serve for many as the preferred characterization of those who aspired to take over the field previously occupied by Social Science. However, the systematic sociologists of the type of Spencer, Letourneau, and Ward, who were rising in the field were not prepared to include under the aegis of sociology all of that varied conglomeration of theory and practice, radical reform, mystical theology, and idealistic metaphysics, which had found a common home under the name of Social Science. As a consequence, the term Social Science rather than sociology held sway for another decade or two, until in fact the stream of Social Science had largely purified itself in the frosty air and more or less persistent sunlight of public opinion. So Andrews also, more interested in Universology and Pantarchy than in sociology as such, merely pauses to define the new science. He says that Sociology¹⁰

includes . . . Politics, or the Science of Government as well as Political and Social Economy and Jurisprudence, and also extends to and includes THE PROPER SCIENCE OF ORGANIZATION, in the highest application of that term. In this latter sense it embraces all of those higher ideas of the Reorganization or the Reconstruction of Society, which constitute the burden of Socialism. It covers the whole ground of Rights and Duties in the Domestic, Industrial, and Civic Aspects of our Relations in Society, in so far as these are not made a special domain either of Morality or Religion.

This generous conception of the wide extent and inclusiveness of the field of sociology was rather in keeping with the spirit of the times. Just as Social Science was regarded as a synthetic and composite science, so also was sociology—which in the eyes of many was considered to be a substitute term for, or a successor to, Social Science—looked upon as embracing all or most of the other social sciences. The teachings of Comte and Spencer, designating sociology as the general science of society to correspond in generality to Physics, Chemistry, Biology, etc., seemed to sanction such an inclusive role for sociology. Even as late as the eighteen-nineties a controversy

¹⁰ *Universology*, p. 6.

raged between sociologists and economists especially over this question and the dispute has not yet disappeared entirely from the academic scene. Richard T. Ely, in his first work on political economy,²⁰ placed economics as a subsidiary social science under the general and inclusive patronage of sociology. This classification continues in the more recent editions of his work, now issued under the joint authorship of Ely and a number of associated economists.

Andrews' Theory of Government. All of Andrews' social theory was closely connected in his mind with the question of practicality, for, at least in his earlier years, he was chiefly interested in reform—reform of human conduct and of collective social adjustments. Later in life he was less concerned with the reform of the social behavior of men and more occupied with the reform of their thinking. In these earlier years, however, every social scheme he advanced had of necessity its recognized or implied reference to a governmental system which would make possible its realization in practice. Nevertheless, Andrews' appeal to government as the instrument for realizing human ideals and aspirations was by no means of a typical or conventional sort. On the contrary, his conception of government was very much of the rational and voluntary kind. He did not believe in rigid institutionalization of government, but in a sort of voluntary cooperation of the individual members of society in the communal pursuit of enlightened self-interest. He was much closer in this respect to anarchism than to either absolutism or constitutionalism, and for traditionalism and authoritarianism in government he had little or no respect.

We may, therefore, summarize Andrews' theory of government by saying that it partook largely of the anarchistic voluntarism, which was advocated by the extreme radicals and largely sanctioned by Fourier and Brisbane, and in no small degree of the prevailing laissez faire doctrines of the bourgeois republicanism of the time, which regarded the best government as the one that governed least. Thus he was by no means original in his governmental theory, but was rather typical of the era in which he lived. He, like the others of his radical school, undoubtedly overestimated the capacity of people for rational self-government and intelligent self-control. This is particularly apparent when one considers the difficulties of applying his labor cost principle, which was borrowed, first by Warren and later through Warren by himself, from the classical economists of the early

²⁰ R. T. Ely, *An Introduction to Political Economy* (New York, 1889), p. 13; also *Outlines of Economics* (New York, 1893), p. 82.

decades of the nineteenth century. Also, his insistence upon substituting equity or justice for force as a ruling principle or sanction in government, while wholly desirable in itself, again makes too large a demand upon both the good will and the intelligence of mankind as human beings were then constituted, or as they now are, for that matter. In spite of all these limitations, however, it is only just to him to point out that he recognized in government a positive as well as a negative function. He says, "I return now to the necessities out of which Government grows. These are in the broadest generalisation: 1, To restrain encroachments; and, 2, To manage the combined interests of mankind."²¹ But his analysis of the positive functions of government is relatively meagre.²²

The Place of Andrews in the Social Science Movement. Although Andrews emphasized a well known contemporary economic principle—"cost the limit of price"—nevertheless he was really in the French tradition of Social Science and tangential to the main line of the economic Social Scientists. He had more in common with the followers of Fourier and of Comte than with the political economists proper. He was more romantic, more buoyantly naive, less close to the details of actual economic organization than the Social Scientists who will occupy most of the chapters of Parts VI and VII. As a matter of fact, it is quite clear that Andrews was not a serious student of political economy at all. He took the only economic views that he expressed with any considerable emphasis over from another person without critical examination or adaptation to his own needs. Furthermore, he adopted his economic theories from a man who was not himself trained in the discipline of political economy but had developed his theory chiefly as the result of his own Utopistic experiences and endeavors. There is no record that Andrews read the standard political economists with that degree of assiduity which we shall discover in the case of those Social Scientists who will be considered later on. Perhaps it may be said that such reading would have been of little use to him even if he had undertaken it seriously, and this doubtless is in a measure true. But at least it might have done something to prevent the failure of *Modern Times* by stimulating him to more adequate planning for the success of the community.

It is pretty clear, apparently, that Andrews, like all true Utopists, was more intrigued with the methods of magic than with the hard work that

²¹ S. P. Andrews, *The Science of Society* (London ed., 1913), p. 41.

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 41-47.

goes along with sound technological and scientific procedures. This estimate of his interests appears to be in large measure confirmed not only by the Modern Times experiment but also by his later attempts at Universology and Numerology. Propagandists and promoters who develop a facile use of language in connection with their objectives have seemingly been prone in all ages to place great reliance upon the magic effects of words. They mistake the enthusiastic emotional response to eloquent pleading for the slow hard pull of physical and moral achievement. They, like the evangelists generally, are apt to think that their task has been accomplished when their enchanting pictures of Utopia and impassioned pleading are met with favorable verbal response, when as a matter of fact their work in earnest has only begun. The gesture of verbal or emotional consent is only the signal that the way is now open for the promoter to assume that practical leadership which may ultimately, if properly and energetically and sincerely pursued with hard work by the leader as well as by his followers, eventuate in complete practical success. There is little to support the view that Andrews was this sort of leader. His belief in the magic power and sufficiency of words was of a pattern very common to his time. This belief in verbal magic was at the basis of many of the failures of Protestant theological preaching unsupported by a strongly institutionalized church organization designed to guide and guard each succeeding step of the convert in his relationship to the practical performance expected of him by his church. It has also been the bane of much of that so-called political democracy in America which expends itself in patriotic oratory and in impassioned lip service to the common welfare but which manifests little interest in the follow-up work that is so necessary to keep the hands of the professional politician out of the public till or to circumvent the public apostasy and wily intrigues of the spoilsmen.

Andrews appears to have read more widely and adaptively in the field of sociology than in that of political economy. But even in sociology, though he was well disposed toward this new term for the discipline, his studies seem to have been but superficial and uncritical. He made no constructive contribution to the subject, either in theory or in practice, and was content to gather under it all the other social disciplines as he had formerly done under the term Social Science. His concept of government, as a practical planning and administrative agency, appears to have been more discerning. He came finally to recognize government as the most adequate agency

for carrying out public reforms. This appears to be in direct contradiction to his almost anarchistic opposition to governmental interference; but the contradiction is perhaps more apparent than real. In one case he is probably speaking of governments as administered by Social Scientists and in the other of government in the hands of ignorant or perverse exploiters.

The Social Science Theories of Lewis Masquerier

Relation of Masquerier to Andrews. In this chapter we shall consider the Social Science theories of another radical with an economic emphasis which in many respects resembles that of Andrews and Warren. Lewis Masquerier appears to have undergone many phases of development similar to those of Andrews and Warren and he seems to have come somewhat under the influence of the latter men. Masquerier lived in Brooklyn through practically all of the period of Andrews' residence in New York and they had many radical acquaintances in common, men and women who associated themselves generally with the reform and protest movements with which Albert Brisbane and Stephen Pearl Andrews had most contact or in which they were recognized leaders. However, Masquerier refers only once to Andrews in his chief work, which will form the basis of our analysis in the present chapter, and then incidentally in a dedication. This fact, however, should not be regarded as an indication that there were no early connections of a direct or indirect sort between him and Andrews. Masquerier's work was thrown together hastily in his old age, when he was practically blind, and there is no attempt in it to give an account of the sources of his ideas, except in the case of those he had received from George Henry Evans. It was not his custom to make citations or acknowledgements, since most of his writings were originally published in the controversial journals and in pamphlets. The internal evidence of influence by Andrews is however quite striking. The interests of the two men appear to parallel each other in several particulars, as will appear in the course of this chapter.

But as similar as are the general patterns of ideas of the two groups of men, they differ very materially in the details of their theories. Masquerier, like Warren and Andrews, belonged essentially in the tradition of the Utopists of the communistic and colonizing type, that is, they were all Post-Associationists, however disillusioned they may have been regarding the

feasibility of Owenite and Fourierite communities in the concrete. But their disillusionment assumed different avenues of escape. While Warren and Andrews sought to introduce an individualistic system of cooperative exchange on the basis of labor-cost within the colony system, Masquerier proposed a somewhat different individualistic variation of the agrarian colony, emphasizing cooperative small holdings as the effective and proper basis of social reform.

Lewis Masquerier. Masquerier led an adventurous and interesting, if not always highly integrated and coordinated, life. He gives an incomplete and imperfect sketch of the first half of it in his work on *Sociology*.¹ He was born of a father of French Huguenot descent and a mother (Sarah Hicklin) of native local stock, at Paris, Kentucky, some time before 1795. His father, who was a native of London, England, was well educated and had been at one time a teacher in a college at Calcutta, but had returned to Europe during the period of the French Revolution and later took part in the revolution for the establishment of the Republic of Haiti. Escaping a massacre there, he made his way to Philadelphia, where he worked for a while on a paper and then migrated to Kentucky before it attained statehood. Later he became a teacher at Georgetown, Lexington, and Paris. He died at the latter place in 1795. Young Lewis was forced to work at an early age and received only a few months of schooling, but read the Catechism, Baxter's *Call to the Unconverted*, the hymn book, the Bible, the only books on which he could lay hands. He learned the printer's trade on the *Western Citizen* of Paris and contributed to it various poetic and other effusions. Later he studied law and was admitted to the bar in Kentucky, but migrated to Quincy, Illinois, to practice his profession. Not finding this occupation congenial, he spent his time in reading interesting literature that came his way and in speculating in lots, which latter occupation afforded him a comfortable living.

He must have read rather fundamental works, for he says of his interests at this time that ²

In 1830 I conceived the idea that there were eleven vowels and twenty-two consonants in the human voice. In 1834 I published it in a pamphlet in St. Louis, Mo. The following year I emigrated to New York city to obtain facilities for the propagation of my phonetic system. I got a font of letters cast to represent it, and published a specimen number of a small dictionary, and prefaced it

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 132-136. See an account of this work as described in this chapter.

² *Ibid.*, p. 135.

with my alphabet and a treatise giving orthography a scientific form, with a specimen of my phonetic spelling, and the old orthography, in split pages opposite each other. It should be a shame to philologists, that they have been copying Quintillian's notions for over two thousand years, that the vowels are the long and short sounds of each other, and that some of the consonants are semi-vowels; while they are all mutes by themselves, and only modify the vowel into rhymes or species.

It is despicable to see how the press teems with works upon language, and vainly suggesting improvements to the alphabet, without perceiving the real nature, number, and distinction between vowels and consonants. Spelling language according to the sound of letters, and marking the accented syllables, would enable nations to read each other's languages, leaving only the meaning of words to be learned, and facilitate their union into a universal language.

In the winter of 1835-1836 he went east and "delivered lectures on social subjects and my phonetic system in Tammany Hall, then went on to Boston, and gave a similar course in Mr. Kneeland's ³ hall. I went then to Bradford, Vt., where I became acquainted with and married Miss Annie Tabor." ⁴ Not finding much encouragement for his views on philology and social questions, he settled in Brooklyn, where ultimately his occupation narrowed down to the printer's trade and he became the owner of a job press which often served radical movements free of charge. But he wrote extensively for the fugitive press and for the *Boston Investigator*. Many of the parts of his book are republications or revisions of these articles and of pamphlets which he had earlier issued from his job press.

Masquerier's "Magnum Opus." His chief work bears the interesting and rather prolix title of

Sociology: or, the Reconstruction of Society, Government, and Property, upon the Principles of Equality, the Perpetuity, and the Individuality of the Private Ownership of Life, Person, Government, Homestead and the Whole Product of Labor, by Organizing all Nations into Townships of Self-Governed Homestead Democracies—Self-Employed in Farming and Mechanism, Giving All the Liberty and Happiness to Be Found on Earth.

This work was published by the author in New York in 1877, when he was over eighty years of age. In his preface he explains that ⁵

This work is principally a republication of a series of articles in prose and verse originally published in the "Boston Investigator" several years ago. I in-

³ Kneeland was a popular radical lecturer on religious, social, and philosophical subjects in Boston at that time.

⁴ *Sociology*, p. 135.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

tended to have rewritten this whole subject of Sociology or the Science of Society. But such is my almost unconquerable habit of procrastination that I have deferred the task until blindness has frightened me into prematurely giving a fragmentary work to the press.

The book has many imperfections of style, due in part no doubt to the author's inability to make corrections and read proof. It is dedicated to two contemporaries who appear to have represented at least major phases of his interests in reform at the time. The dedication reads as follows: "To George Jacob Holyoake, whose life has been spent in advocating the reform of Society, Church, and State; and to Frederick Hollick, M.D., who has devoted his life to the physical culture of Man, the cure of his diseases, and to Social Reform, this work is respectfully dedicated."⁶ This was a period at which the work of Holyoake had become well known in this country and he had been recognized as an influential leader not only in the theory and practice of cooperation but also in liberal religious and social movements both in England and the United States.⁷ Engravings of Masquerier and of George Henry Evans, an outstanding leader in land reform of the time, appear in this volume. His own statements and the internal evidence of the book show that Masquerier's system represents principally a combination of the theories of Fourier, Brisbane, Andrews, Wright, and Evans.

Masquerier's Utopianism. The sub-title of Masquerier's work sufficiently indicates the nature of his system. He wishes to have the earth sub-divided into small homesteads—ten acres per family, he says—thus transforming the whole world into one rural city, beautifully parked, attractively planted, and efficiently governed locally.⁸ Like Fourier's system, and Wright's and Andrews'—like all the Utopistic systems, in fact—it is a lovely day dream. The ugly cities, with their tenements, will be destroyed, leaving only warehouses, foundries, ship-yards and other necessary industrial establishments along sea and river ports where they won't interfere with the idyllic rural existence he envisaged for the larger part of mankind.

Masquerier had been originally a follower of Robert Owen. But when George Henry Evans, who later became the father of the Homestead movement, challenged Owen at his World's Convention in New York, Masquerier came to see that Owen's communism was based on an impracticable

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁷ For a sketch of Frederick Hollick see *ibid.*, p. 131. A more extended account of the work of Holyoake appears on pp. 127-131 of the same work.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 14-15.

theory of land tenure and was therefore erroneous.⁹ He thereafter enlisted in Evans' cause and was very active in it as described below. In 1844 Evans, who had retired to a New Jersey farm upon the collapse of the labor movement in the panic of 1837, returned to New York and called together a group of men, including Masquerier, who¹⁰

then organized ourselves into a band of speakers, held meetings at the parks, and cross streets, up town, so as to catch the attention of workingmen on their return to their homes, with cans in their hands. We held evening meetings, also, in various halls, and finally held them in Croton Hall, corner of Bowery and Division street, for several years. The great portion of the notices of the public meetings were printed gratuitously by John Windt and Lewis Masquerier in their own job-printing offices. All of us aided in getting subscribers and circulating the tracts. Mr. Evans avoided alluding to religious subjects, and confined himself to the secular measures of land reform. At this time Evans wrote a letter to Gerritt Smith, a wealthy land holder in Western New York, who replied in appreciation of the principles. Other advocates now arose in all parts of the Union; G. W. Julian, a member of Congress from Indiana, took the lead in advocating these principles.

Other able advocates now rallied to our standard. There were Messrs. Van Amringe, Bovey, Ransom Smith, J. R. Ingalls, Henry Beeny, William Rowe, Ryctman, and others. Mass-meetings, national and state conventions, were held for the discussion of these principles. Many of all parties met at a convention in Buffalo, in which they put out a platform advocating free soil, free men, free speech, etc. Van Buren, a candidate for President, could not advance to our idea of each human being's natural right to a share of the soil, but would grant the public lands, in consideration of the hardship and privation of settling on them. For several years some of the candidates who pledged themselves to go for our measures, neglected to do so, or but feebly urged them. We thus carried out our threat of nominating a ticket composed of land reformers; we nominated a full national and state ticket, with the exception of President. About six thousand votes were cast for the candidate for Governor in New York State. Our land reform movement stirred up the anti-rent movement in several counties around Albany, where the great Van Rensselaer, who for generations had extorted from the farmers around various articles as rents for use of lands, the titles to which had become obsolete. Mr. Deveyr now established a press in Albany, which he called the "Anti-Renter," and placed himself at the head of the movement; there were two other agitators called "Big and Little Thunder." The renters eventually obtained more favorable terms, and the agitation subsided.

⁹ Lewis Masquerier, *Sketch of the Land Reform Development, and Life of George Henry Evans* (included in *Sociology*, etc., 1877, p. 97).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97.

Quite a number of states passed a homestead exemption law, securing a portion of the estate from debt and sale, but the homestead exemption law, granting a quarter section to every actual settler and cultivator for five years, was never passed until our civil war was commenced. But a law limiting the quantity of land any man may purchase as their own, has never been enacted. But it is the only thorough remedy of land monopoly and tenure.

Masquerier's Plan for a Direct or Pure Democracy. Masquerier was not satisfied to stop with land reform, however. Having perceived the supposed benefits of democratic land ownership he advanced to a closely analogous scheme for the achievement of pure political democracy. Masquerier's primary concern was always with the achievement and maintenance of democratic conditions for the masses of mankind. He was in all respects an ardent partisan and advocate of democracy. It occurred to him therefore that Evans' scheme for democratic land ownership, by which township units would be divided into small holdings grouped around a town hall, a school, and a market centrally located in the township, could be used as the basis for a local government unit in which all the residents of the township would participate directly. The township would thus become a sort of rural city, as he says, and counties and other intermediate political units would be done away with "and townships only be the divisions of a nation," very much, apparently, like the precincts proposed by R. J. Wright in his work *Principia*. The township would contain all of the utilities and resources necessary to comfortable living, including timber lots, grounds for tillage, gardens, orchards, a school, a park for pleasure, a local government house, a community house, religious exercises, and business and professional establishments.¹¹

This idea as here described seems to be a curious combination of the self-sufficiency of the Fourierite phalanstery, of the French village communities of the Vosges mountains, and of the Mexican Ejido. Masquerier was of course well acquainted with Fourier's ideas and may have known something of the French villages, but it is doubtful if he had read anything on the Mexican communal settlements. In his Utopian fervor he fully believed that the attractiveness of these "rural Paradises" would cause the cities, which had been built up by the railroads and the commercial and industrial concentration they had stimulated, to be drained of their population.¹² Here of course is the typical anarchist and ruralist partisanship for simple

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

democratic village life and for an agricultural and handicrafts basis of life—a preference which was strong in the first half of the nineteenth century and which persisted even to the end of the days of William Morris and Peter Kropotkin.

The Main Emphasis. But Masquerier's main emphasis, as we remarked above, was upon the establishment of a pure and direct democracy to replace the present representative system, which he considered to be the political analog of the landlord system of land tenure. He describes how this idea came to him after he had become a follower of Evans' teachings on land reform. He says,¹³

I had no sooner embraced his ideas of man's natural right to his share of the soil, than I generalized the idea of applying the same principle to the properties arising from vascular, muscular, and nervous systems, which are life, motion, and sovereignty. If a share of soil must be owned by each human being, in proper person, so must a share of government be exercised and enjoyed also in person. Thus I struck at the principle that office-holding government is a profound error, whether the offices are hereditary or elective; so that universal suffrage is no more than the universal confirmation of alienated sovereignty. The renting the use of a house from among a parcel of landlords, does not give a title to it any more than the selecting of a candidate from among a number of others, gives them the possession of their sovereignty. For the form of the institutions around them has already alienated them. A delegated and representative republic is, therefore, a chimera, and is only a modification or species of monarchy; officers, then, are persons who live by estates in lands and houses, which should properly belong to those who are landless.

He presented this idea to Evans, who agreed with it in principle, but evidently considered it impracticable. Masquerier speaks of Evans' reception of his direct democracy theories as follows:¹⁴

When I advanced this doctrine in the columns of "Young America," Evans remarked that he thought I was right; that the same principle that he had applied to the soil should be applied to the exercise and enjoyment of the properties of man's body. And that, therefore, officery or office-holding governments must also be abolished as well as landlordism. Still he said he feared the doctrine would repulse the public mind by putting too much before it. He had been ardent in the belief that land reform would take a wild-fire run in the community; but when he saw that "hills peep over hills, and Alps on Alps arise," his ardor seemed to cool.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-98.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

Masquerier's Naivete in Reform. The pertinent fact seems to have been that Evans was a practical reformer rather than a Utopist, or at least was more practical and less Utopistic than Masquerier. The latter apparently never blinked at difficulties and social obstacles such as the unpreparedness of public opinion for a reform, so to speak over night, whether it be the total overhauling of an alphabet and a language, or a system of government, or of land tenure. He expected people to act rationally on the basis of logic in all matters and not to cling emotionally to old practices and traditions and faiths. Furthermore, like all true reformers operating on the basis of intellectual conviction, he expected even the masses who did not read books and who knew little of history, philosophy, or Social Science, to be able to understand the logic of such abstruse political and economic propositions and systems merely from hearing them explained in an address or from reading about them in a magazine article or in a pamphlet. Finally, we may add that subsequent developments have shown clearly that such schemes, both of local political control and of small holdings of ten acres to the family, are wholly incompatible with modern trends in political and economic efficiency and equity in administration and economy in production. It is altogether possible that the cooling of Evans' ardor was in no small measure due to a feeling of discouragement or of despair when he found that he had to rely upon such incorrigible Utopists for the carrying out of his own less radical reforms.

Masquerier Discovers a Weak Spot. However, we would not willingly be misunderstood as implying that Masquerier's demand for a larger degree of local and national government was wholly without merit. He had hit upon a major weakness in our political and social system and he was attempting to rectify it according to the best of his abilities. His solution was not very original, perhaps, for its resemblance to the plans of Owen and Fourier and other radical exponents of local autonomous units or colonies is sufficiently apparent. Nor was it practicable in the light of the trends of the time toward ever greater concentration and interdependence of occupations, of production, and of distribution. Yet the details of his proposed system were well elaborated, and it is interesting to note that there are modern analogies. At the time of this writing there is a ruralist and localist movement of some weight in this country, whose members call themselves Distributists, which advocates essentially the same principles of community self-sufficiency and opposes "finance-capitalism, fascism, and communism" on almost identical grounds with those on which Masquerier opposed the

same economic and political trends. This movement has an organization with a respectable membership and leadership and publishes a magazine called *Free America*. Furthermore, the studies of trade centers by C. J. Galpin, formerly of the University of Wisconsin, well known to rural sociologists, demonstrate that something very distinctly resembling Masquerier's township system actually exists or persists in American rural life.

The Model Constitution. Like Calvin Blanchard, Masquerier drew up a manifesto or prospectus of his political theories in the form of a constitution. He was very fond of making out state papers which would embody his plans for social reforms, and a number of these pseudo state papers, with the names of fictional high government officials attached to them, appear in the book. The present manifesto he called "A Model Constitution: Being an Attempt to Declare the Thorough Principles of Social and Political Science: a New Form of Society and Government, and Adapted to Any State or Nation." ¹⁵

The interesting thing about this model constitution is that it attempts to base government and political and social control, not upon compact or delegation of authority (as other constitutions are based), but upon a principle of Natural Law, or the organic functioning and vital needs of the individual.¹⁶ Thus it involves both a throwback to the old theories of Natural Law, which were so frequently appealed to by the Associationists, and an attempt to make the government of man truly functional and democratic by forcing it to conform to fundamental individual needs and capacities. It is of course a predominantly individualistic scheme and the problem of administration under such a system might easily prove very embarrassing because of the intangibility or indefiniteness of some of the subjective or personal sanctions he sets up, but on the whole it carries a basic conception of functionality in government which challenges attention. The constitution is very general and, since it is brief, it seems desirable for the novelty of its arguments to present it as a whole, except for the omission of some technical details regarding the surveying of the ten acre allotments to cultivators. Although it is adapted primarily to his township system, it is "addressed to the property producers of all nations." It is as follows: ¹⁷

We, the sovereign people of —, assembled in township primary assemblies in proper person and by our own authority, in order to secure and perpetuate

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

¹⁶ Here we seem to have strong evidence of Hollick's influence.

¹⁷ *Sociology*, pp. 85-90.

the thorough principle to each man of his equal, individual and inalienable right to life, person, sovereignty, homestead, and to the whole product of his labor, do hereby establish this constitution for our form of society and government.

Origins of Rights and Wrongs

That the origin of each man's rights, is founded in the necessary and inseparable connection of his organs, sensations, wants and productive powers with each other and with the surrounding world, as well as his ideas and character. That rights, therefore, are not created by conventional compacts and legislative enactments; which can only be valid, when they declare what are the laws of the relations of man's body with the surrounding elements: and that consequently, whatever violates these relations, is the source of wrongs. And that as the laws of the inseparable connection of man with the soil and appurtenant elements have never yet been established, every right is still in a state of universal alienation and monopoly.

Equality—Inequality

That the equality of each man's rights, is founded upon the equalness of his organs, sensations, natural wants and productive powers to those of each other, and upon their equal connection with the surrounding elements; while the inequality of rights is produced by a monopoly of the surrounding elements and personal rights.

Inalienableness—Alienation

That the inalienableness of each man's rights is founded upon the inseparable connection of his organs, wants and productive powers with each other and with the surrounding elements, and that the opposite evil of the alienation of rights, by whatever separates man from the objects of his rights. The three great properties, therefore, of a perfect right are those of equality, individuality, and inalienableness, and those of a perfect wrong are their opposing wrongs of inequality, communism and alienation.

Individuality—Communism

That the individuality of each man's rights is founded upon the separate identity and isolation of his organs, sensations and natural wants from those of another; upon their individual connection with the surrounding elements, and the consequent impossibility of enjoying perfectly the same identical objects; while the opposing evil of a communism of rights and property, destroys their identity or individuality, by merging them into each other.

Personality—Slavery

That each man's rights to personality or to his personal attributes of life, sovereignty, labor, and to his person itself, is the most sacred of rights, and

cannot become the subject of property, cannot be reduced to goods and chattels, as by vicegerency, hire and chattel servitude; therefore, all these forms of slavery shall be forever abolished.

Life—Homicide

That all mankind are endowed, in consequence of the necessity for an equal, individual and inseparable connection of the organs, sensations, natural wants, and productive powers with each other and with the elements, with an equal, isolated and inalienable right to life; that therefore, it shall never be destroyed by the crimes of murder, aggressive war and capital punishment; but only in self-defense and defensive war; that it is the duty of every man to exercise in proper person, the physical life-protecting power, and therefore, it is those at and nearest the locality invaded that shall repel the invaders in self-defense, while continually reinforced, without a hired soldiery.

Sovereignty—Vicegerency

Section 1. That all mankind, having the same organs, sensations, life, natural wants and productive powers, equally, individually and inseparably connected with each other and with the elements, are entitled to an equal, individual and inalienable right to sovereignty; that therefore, it shall never be violated by the great wrong of vicegerency or officery, hereditary or elective.

Sec. 2. That all sane adults of both sexes, in proper person, shall exercise their right of legislation and judicature, by means of township assemblies; so that any person may propose a law accompanied with reasons, to be first discussed in the township assembly, and then published in the state paper. That on any afternoon during the year, the people shall meet in their township halls, to discuss all such published bills, and on the first Monday of November in each year, shall be voted yea or nay, the majority of ballots ascertained at the capital, and the enacted laws proclaimed as in operation the first of January following. That there shall be five secretaries or attorneys in sovereignty, chosen yearly, whose duties shall be to execute the express instructions of the people, each presiding over, and editing one of the five departments or rights in the state press, count the ballots and publish the laws, with no discretionary power, except in the case of emergency, and then subject to be reversed or affirmed by the people. That all title deeds or exchanges, homesteads, all marriages, births and deaths, as well as laws, penalties, news, science and every kind of intelligence, shall be recorded by publication in the state paper, furnished to every family.

Sec. 3. That judicature shall also be exercised by a majority vote of the whole people of the township in which the issue occurs, except by arbitrators in minor cases, and punishment shall in no case extend to the forfeiture of any right, but that of reputation, (which is unavoidable) and inflicted by publication in the state paper, subject to contradiction when innocence is discovered.

Sec. 4. That education shall be acquired during the afternoons, at home and at the township lyceums, through the state paper and other illustrated and phonotypic school-books and cyclopedias, distributed to every family, and treat-

ing upon every department of nature in the order of the rise of each in the scale of being.

Sec. 5. That religion, as well as government, should be exercised and enjoyed by every man in proper person, in the closet or township common church, instead of through the base medium of the vicegerency of a priesthood, living upon benefices, tythes, salaries and contributions; thereby sacrilegiously degrading the religious sentiment to chattels and sectarianism; and thus pure and unadulterated religion, as well as legislation, judicature and education, will prevail among mankind.

Labor Hireage

That, as the producing power of the organs of all mankind at their appropriate employments is the same, and as they are equally, individually and inseparably connected with the soil and appurtenant elements, they are endowed with an equal, individual and inalienable right to their labor, or productive power; that the hiring of labor degrades the qualities or attributes of man's organs to goods or chattels, and mancipation, the body itself; therefore every form of hired and chattel slavery shall be forever abolished, as well as a hired soldiery and an elective government.

Property—Monopoly

That, it is external objects only, the soil and its appurtenant elements, improvements and products, that can become the subject of property, not the personality or body and attributes of man; that each man by the fact of his existence and the equal, individual and inseparable connection of similar organs, such as his lungs with the air, and his stomach with the products of the earth, is entitled to an equal, isolated and inalienable share of the soil and to the whole product of his labor; and that therefore, their alienation and monopoly by every form of landlordry, profit-mongery, and servitude shall be forever abolished.

Homestead—Landlordry

Section 1. That every member of the human race, being equally, individually and inseparably connected by the same organs, natural wants and productive powers with the surrounding elements, is entitled to an equal, individual and inalienable homestead, or as much of the soil as can be used with each one's own labor, so essential to subsistence, existence, and the superstructure of every right; therefore, landlordry and tenure are most heinous wrongs, and shall be thoroughly and forever abolished.

Sec. 2. . . . that the townships shall contain the proportionate number of farmers and mechanics to produce an assortment of the essentials of subsistence, and for equitable exchange according to the time of labor, directly for each other or through a common medium always having the same intrinsic value.

Sec. 3. That the title deeds to homesteads shall be held as equal, individual and inalienable, secure from any liability to alienate, subject only to an equitable exchange for each other or their improvements sold, entitling the vendor to

an unoccupied tract; and that in the general survey of the land, each man shall select the tract on which his house stands, or any he prefers, and relinquish or sell the rest to his landless heirs or other persons.

Products—Profit-mongery

That all persons are entitled to an equal, individual and inalienable right to the whole product of their labor in the form of products or chattels, and that they should be equitably exchanged by means of town marts and carriers, directly for each other or through a common medium having an intrinsic value, instead of through a shopocracy, which intercepts so great a portion of it in passing from the producer to the consumer.

Amendments

This constitution shall be amended in the same manner as it prescribes for the enactment of a law. Its principles, like those of any other science, must be subject to future improvement, and should not become like its predecessors too sacred for investigation.

While the form of this document is political, its content and purpose are clearly economic and sociological.

A Philosophy of History. Masquerier also had his philosophy of history. Trying in this matter, as in all others, to secure a naturalistic basis for his Social Science generalizations, he constructed his theory of human history upon an analogy with the prevailing theory of geological history with its subdivisions into primary, secondary, and tertiary geological formations. The corresponding eras in the social world he describes as follows: "The primary formation or state of humanity in the moral world is that of savagery, or the hunting stage of civilization; that of the secondary stage is that of chattel and feudal slavery; and that of the tertiary formation is that of landlordry, tenure and hireling slavery."¹⁸

A Variant Form of the Philosophy of History. Masquerier was not always consistent in his statement of his theories. His book, consisting mainly of republished papers improperly edited, had not always ironed out conflicting statements. This is particularly true of his philosophy of history. Elsewhere he states the three stages of moral development quite differently from the form just quoted, but still based on the analogy with the three stages of geological history. After asserting that the history of creation is one of gradual development and that "the great paramount law of all laws is that of progress," and that "all other laws become changed or modified by this great sovereign law of the universe; which dissolves only to regener-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

ate, and creates through the process of transformation," he declares that "the moral world also progresses as surely by successive eras of civilization as the physical has by a series of formations."¹⁹ It is his belief that each²⁰

era of the moral world is founded by a few dominant elements and principles, which continue accumulating their effects until they wear themselves out; then new causes and laws grow out of them, and in turn form a new stratum and civilization. Every change in nature is attended with new circumstances; so that she does not monotonously repeat the same series of causes and effects. Were this the case, there could be no progress; neither could error accumulate so as to produce eventually its own destruction.

Hegelian Logic and the Principle of Social Evil. The author has made a peculiar combination of two theories, that of social progress and the principle of evil, which he recognizes and attempts to account for not on theological, but on naturalistic principles. To explain progress in human society, or the moral world as he calls it, he adopts in a somewhat modified form the Hegelian dialectic, but without specifying Hegel as his source. As each era is perfected or completed, he holds, it develops within itself such social strains and tensions as make necessary the appearance of a new and partially antagonistic era, but constructed on a higher progressive level. Many of the old practices which were normal in the preceding era are carried over into the new era where they become evils and oppress mankind. Thus,²¹

The principles of each preceding era become evils in the subsequent one. Thus war, leaguings tribes into nations in the era of barbarism, becomes a greater evil in that of monopoly, where wealth that stimulates art and science, will become in turn a greater evil in the era of equality. The less perfect principles then of each preceding era shape all its institutions and mould the conscience of mankind; so that many of the actions esteemed virtuous in the preceding, become vicious and criminal in the subsequent era.

This is an ingenious method of accounting for social evil, not by attributing it to such neo-theological causes as the personal greed and criminal proclivities of those in power, but to a kink or lag in the logic of the law of progress. This lag produces a by-product of worn out virtues from past eras which become active evils in present eras and clog the wheels of prog-

¹⁹ *Eras of Civilization* (bound with *Sociology*), p. 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

ress until these accumulated and useless obstructions are removed by further progressive social development. Thus, while progress itself produces the evils of society as an evolutionary by-product, the remedy for these evils is simply more progress. It is instructive to note that we have here the fundamentals of the social lag theory approximately thirty years before Simon N. Patten expressed them²² and nearly half a century before W. F. Ogburn put forth his statement of the theory.²³

The Second Statement of the Scheme of History. This brings us to a new and much more detailed and largely different statement of the three moral eras which Masquerier believed to correspond logically, but not in time, to the geological eras. If he had not limited himself to three eras in the social history of mankind he might perhaps have made a much more illuminating analysis of human history. His fondness for analogies based on the established and reputable older physical and biological sciences testified to his desire to found his own Social Science upon similar firm foundations, or at least to give to it the semblance of such respectability; but it ties his hands here as elsewhere unnecessarily. However that may be, he summarizes his analogical statement of human history as follows:²⁴

In the following analysis the eras of civilization, their series of stages, the predominating sentiments of glory, the commencement of monopoly of each right, its restoration and the evil principle of violating each, are classed in the order of their progress.

ERAS	STAGES	SENTIMENTS	RIGHTS	EVILS
1. BARBARISM,	1. Hunting, 2. Herding, 3. Feudalism,	1. Chase, 2. Warfare, 3. Fealty,	1. Sovereignty,	Office, Knight-service.
2. MONOPOLY,	1. Agriculture, 2. Manufacture, 3. Commerce,	1. Power, 2. Rank, 3. Wealth,	1. Domain, 2. Labor, 3. Products,	Tenure, Hire, Profit.
3. EQUALITY,	1. Towns, Peopledoms, 2. Equal use of land, 3. Equitable exchange, Community,	1. Democracy, 2. Landocracy, 3. Laborocracy,	1. Sovereignty restored. 2. Domain, 3. Labor,	do. do.

Man's first form of existence is that of barbarism, and roused only by the leading sentiments of the chase, of war and of fealty, he progresses only through

²² See S. N. Patten, *The New Basis of Civilization*, 1907.

²³ See W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change* (1922), Part IV.

²⁴ *Eras of Civilization*, pp. 2-3.

the hunting, herding and feudal stages, while his inalienable right of sovereignty is usurped by office, fiefs and knight-service. His next form of civilization, is that of monopoly and class, and stimulated by an additional set of sentiments of glory, and of power, rank and wealth, he advances more rapidly through the stages of agriculture, manufacture and commerce, but loses his rights of domain, labor and commencing that of equality, where being ennobled by the governing sentiments of the equal use of the soil and the exercise of labor and democracy by each man in his own proper person, he will advance almost simultaneously to the organization into townships and peopledoms, to the equal use of land, equitable exchange of labor, to community, and to the restoration of all his rights. The division then of the moral as well as the physical world into three great eras with subdivisions, dates from the change of the principles that creates each of them. The evil principle of alienation of rights more by force in the barbarous and by fraud in the monopolizing, marks the bounds of these eras. But the era of equality will be produced by the equal distribution of the materials of the preceding eras, by an entire change of principle.

This principle of the transformation into an era of equality he explains as follows: "The evil principle of the alienation of rights and property, into the hands of non-producers has formed the era of monopoly and left the producing masses in new circumstances so as to develop the era of equality, in a similar manner by which the precipitation of certain elements in the deposition of new strata, leaves the remaining ingredients to assume new properties for the formation of a subsequent and very different stratum." ²⁵

The only evidence Masquerier gives that he anticipates that evils will develop in the Era of Equality is to be found in a passage quoted above, where he predicts that wealth will become "a greater evil in the era of equality." ²⁶

The Method of Social Change Illustrated by Barbarism. Space is lacking for an adequate account of the author's attempt at inductive support of his theory of social evolution through the three eras. He makes use of such facts of history and prehistory as he thinks will validate his contentions as to the modes of change and the release and control of social evils. It may be possible to illustrate his treatment of this aspect of his philosophy of history by quoting the passage in which he details changes that supposedly took place in the era of barbarism. These changes he describes as follows: ²⁷

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

Man, in the infancy of his being, prompted by appetite and the delight of the chase, procures both food and clothing, while he shelters under bowers, projecting rocks and tents. Tribes bound their hunting grounds by rivers and mountains, while their idea of property in the soil is that of so many acres of game. Their inequality consists mostly in sex and all menial employments are performed by the women. They remain in the hunting stage for many ages, until by degrees, game and wild fruits becoming scarce with increase of population, necessity prompts the new sentiment of the cultivation of fruits and the domestication of the most useful and docile animals. Thus they become more permanently fixed to the soil, form some idea of property in it and form the second stage of barbarism. The cultivable soil is naturally claimed by the first occupant and the heath, morass and mountain land is appropriated for common hunting and pasturage. Hence at this stage man has the freehold of the soil, a non-producing aristocracy not being yet sufficiently developed to usurp it through any fraudulent devices.

But owing to the difficulty of keeping the roving herds of different persons and tribes in possession, and their frequent depredations upon those of each other, wars were continually engendered, which, causing the league of tribes in self-defence, formed larger nations and a new stage of barbarism, that of feudality.

The frequent alliance of families and tribes with each other, caused the faithfulness of adherence to be considered a great duty, and its breach a base treachery. The strength of these sentiments became the instrument of the great power of the chiefs, who, dazzling by their eloquence in council and prowess in battle, very easily acquired the government of society. Thus the inalienable right of sovereignty from the ignorance and neglect of the people to prescribe their rule of action in proper person, is usurped by the patriarchs, prophets and chiefs, who soon grow into lords, priests, conquerors and kings, and make civil, religious and military office a species of property. Claiming the sovereignty of the people as their entire prerogative and property, they soon found means to extort tribute from them for the use of it. The vassal was required to take an oath of fealty to adhere strictly to the cause of his lord and to perform knight-service by attending him in court and camp whenever called on, subject to have his lands escheated by non-attendance or flight in battle. Though the people were thus reduced to a state of tenure in sovereignty, yet the reciprocal duty of protection of the vassal was required from the lord, who also became the guardian of his orphans, and thus the vassal was not that degraded being that the tenant is of the modern landlord.

In this era of society, before there could be much inequality of property, it classed into hunters, shepherds, braves and councilors; but none were rendered destitute of the means of subsistence as under the monopoly of the soil at the present period.

This feudal system from the mutual duties of protection and fealty, created strong military hordes, who continually depredated from neighboring nations,

and reduced them to the same system, as the Saxons did in their conquest of England, or as the northern hordes of Europe and Asia overran their southern nations.

The transition to the dawning era of equality he describes in terms of his pet theory of township organization and government. His factual justification for this phase of his historical theory is largely in the account he gives of the land reform movement led by Evans, together with his own additions as described elsewhere in the analysis of his views.

Other Views on Social-Economic Questions. Masquerier passed judgment on many of the social and religious movements and dogmas of his time, estimating them always in the light of his philosophy of history, which he took very seriously. Among other theories of social regeneration he opposes that of communism, for which he would of course substitute his theory of inalienable private property in the form of small holdings.²⁸

But mankind are advancing to more of the principle of individuality or private ownership. And we have been endeavoring to fix upon the thorough principles of a scientific society, as laid down in organized townships. We have shown where the turning point is by urging the small holders of property to hold on until they can make them inalienable or subject to no liability to alienate by any debt, sale, tax, mortgage, wills, communism, etc. We contend that the communism of rights to property is the last phase that has been urged, and that it only completes the more thorough alienation of them. But communism has got its start, and as the natural inference from the communism of goods . . . [leads] to that of the promiscuity of the sexes, . . . [it] is now proving its deleterious consequences. From Babeuf, through St. Simon, Paine, Owen, Blanc, Spencer, up to Proudhon, this error has had its run. But Evans was the first to break up the error and suggest that man has a natural right to a share of the soil and appurtenant elements of water, air, light, etc., and to no more of the soil than each can cultivate. That this coming of a portion of mankind between the bodies of the rest be stopped. That there must be no more of land swallowing land, of money multiplying money without creating any more property.

The advocates of communism contend that they must hold the soil in common, destroy the sentiment of *mine* and *thine*, build a splendid palace, jam all in it, and with a set of managers or superintendents have all carried on like a clock. But with these managers assigning work to the workers, it will resemble a slave plantation. But in our inalienable homestead system all will have the sublime power of self-direction and self-employment, be stimulated to duty by the example of neighbors and an independent vote in the councils of the commune, and in all other things.

²⁸ *Sociology*, pp. 20-21.

This is strong language, but it is no more pointed than that which he applied to "a stultified priestcraft"²⁹ which has, he contends, monopolized man's democratic religious rights for its own selfish ends of power and wealth, or than his criticism of the inequalities of the sexes.³⁰ He was strongly opposed to the free love theories of his day, which were accepted by many of the radical social and economic reformers.³¹ He has also an elaborate classification of rights and wrongs based on his theory of equality and inalienation of property. He holds that the wrongs and social evils arise out of the violation of these basic principles of justice.³²

Freak Interests and Theories. Like Andrews, he coined pedantic neologisms, including "Politicology," which referred to "every thing relating to political and social science, either in its progressive or highest state of improvement."³³ He projected a work which would include Numerology, Matterology, Plasticology, Chromatology, Phonology, Saporology, Odorology, Botany, Zoology, Sociology, etc., "showing the analogues of the senses and the progressive development through inorganized and organized matter."³⁴ Like Andrews, also, he was interested in spelling reform, or phonotypy as he called it, in the remaking of the alphabet, and in the production of a self-pronouncing dictionary of the English language. He evidently possessed some knowledge of philology in several of its phases, and a considerable portion of the latter part of his book is given over to the presentation of fragments and prospectuses of his work in these fields. He includes S. P. Andrews in his dedication to the proposed "New Phonotypic Pronouncing Dictionary," because he and others have made earnest efforts at phonotypic reform, although they have not succeeded. Like both Blanchard and Andrews, as well as most of the other radical reformers of his time, he was strongly anti-theological and even more strongly anti-ecclesiastical, although not anti-religious in the more general sense. Nevertheless, he claimed to be a graduate of the Andover Theological Seminary and a member of the Society for the Diffusion of Christian Knowledge. These claims probably had no other foundation than in his peculiar sense of humor and ridicule.

The Significance of Masquerier. We have not given so much space to

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-32.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 48-50.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 40-48.

³³ "Politicology," included in *Sociology*, etc., p. 13.

³⁴ Advertisement at end of *Sociology*, etc.

Masquerier's theories and plans because we regard them of very great value as guiding principles for social legislation and administration in our day, but because his theories are typical of much of the radical thinking in the Social Science of his time. He was too theoretical and too little regardful of the resistance of public opinion and of the inertia of human intelligence to be a good practical reformer. Nor is it possible to agree wholeheartedly with his speculations and programs. From the standpoint of the validity, the weight, or the magnitude of his theoretical contribution he was perhaps not very important. But as a symptom of his time he is quite significant. He was representative of the best type of personalities among the radical reformers who held forth during the second third of the nineteenth century. Largely by his own efforts at study and reading he had acquired a large fund of more or less dependable knowledge from the fields of the new and rising sciences which he sought to the best of his ability to apply to the solution of the social and ethical and political and economic problems of mankind. He, like some others of his kind, was probably much better informed in this new science than were all but a mere handful of the ministers, priests, politicians, and public officials who undertook to guide the masses of mankind in their thinking and action. If at this distance we can see glaring faults in some of his theories, it is in part because there have been great advances in knowledge since his time. He possessed certain social and intellectual virtues which are indisputable. Among them was his sincere devotion to the cause of an intelligent democracy, which he sought to make a reality. He saw very clearly that the basis of social organization which would be insisted upon in the future could be none other than naturalistic and scientific. He made what contribution he could to this line of development. He possessed a large degree of objectivity and detachment in all of the social reforms he advocated. He did not use his "principles" merely as defenses for his own poorly concealed individualistic self interests, as so often happened in the case of radical protest leaders. He was always constructive and never destructive in his motivation and methods of procedure.

The Late Utopistic Phase of Social Science: The Albert Kimsey Owen Group

The New Point of View. In subsequent chapters we shall see that after the Civil War Social Science tended to become more conservative than it had been in the eighteen-forties and fifties. The adherents of the movement with a bias toward economics began to hope less for the total reconstruction of society in which the unaided laws of nature would bring about the sort of world they desired to see in operation. Increasingly they emphasized, on a rational basis, the need for human social regulation and protective devices. Reform movements tended to become safe and sane in the hands of these more respectable Social Scientists, particularly those who were members of the American Social Science Association. Only the outer fringe of the Social Science movement clung to a vision of a Utopian order of society in which even the poorest would realize something of that measure of equality, fraternity, and liberty which had been heralded by the philosophers of the eighteenth century.

The Utopistic strain in Social Science, however, did not die out completely in the last third of the nineteenth century. We have already referred to Albert Brisbane's renewed propaganda activities in behalf of Associationism in the eighteen-eighties. In the present chapter we are to describe another phase of Social Science which derived its theoretical sanction from Fourier, this time indirectly through one of his more distinguished disciples, M. Godin.¹ Thus, although these Social Scientists appeared in the late eighteen-eighties, they were directly in line with the earlier Utopians. Their great principle of organization was co-operation. They questioned strongly, when they did not openly attack, both the private profit motive and the competitive system. They represented more especially the ethical and the sociological aspects of social analysis and social reform, under the general aegis of Social Science. The classical system of political economy in particular is disavowed by this group. More knowledge of the problems

¹ "Social Science a Growing Science," *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 356 (Feb. 23, 1886).

of distribution and consumption is sought rather than a greater perfection of production. Cooperative colonies are championed. In short, this school of Social Science is, like that of Andrews, of Masquerier, and of Carey, if not like that of Bascom and the American free trade school generally, a protest against the inhumanities sanctioned by the Classical School of political economy.

Albert Kimsey Owen and Integral Co-operation. On its practical side, the new version of Associationism was called "Integral Co-operation," and its inventor and leader was Albert Kimsey Owen.² Owen was not a theoretician, but a practical man, a civil engineer, in fact. But although he had not read Fourier,³ he had arrived at a system of social organization essentially similar to Associationism. As Edward Howland, one of his most devoted disciples, said:⁴

When we remember . . . that Mr. Owen, without ever having read Fourier, and with no knowledge of *Social Solutions* [by M. Godin, a disciple of Fourier],

² Albert Kimsey Owen was probably born about 1845 and died some time after 1916. Born in Chester, Pennsylvania, the son of a Quaker physician, he was educated at Jefferson College. With his father, who was commissioned to take charge of the medical work in the territory of New Mexico, and his brother, he went west in 1863. After the Civil War, in 1866, they visited Europe and the Near East, Albert remaining some 16 months. Upon the return of the last named he became city surveyor of Chester. In 1871 he went to Colorado to do railroad engineering, and the next year he went to Mexico, where he discovered Topolobampo Bay, which was to become the seat of Pacific City, his chief colonization venture. He projected plans for a railroad from Norfolk to Topolobampo. The route he mapped was surveyed by order of General Grant and the House Railroad Committee twice approved Owen's bill, "but the great railroad corporations prevented its passage in either house" (A. K. Owen. *Integral Cooperation*, 1885. Supplement, p. 203). Owen obtained a concession for 2000 miles of railroad from the Mexican government and a subsidy of \$16,000,000. He laid down 100 miles of road east from Topolobampo in 1884-1885 and bent every effort to colonize the area. He was one of the organizers of the Greenback Club of Pennsylvania and delegate to all the conventions of this party. He wrote on women's suffrage, protective tariff, credit, as well as on his favorite subject of cooperation. He helped to organize the Sovereigns of Industry and he belonged to the Knights of Labor. In his later years he turned his interest to auto-highways, publishing plans for their locations and construction. His works, mostly short articles or collections of letters, projects, and pamphlets, include the following: *Integral Cooperation* (1885); *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1891); *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1892); *Pacific City Studies* (1892); *The Credit Foncier Company of Sinaloa, Mexico* (1892); *A Dream of an Ideal City* (1897); *The Problems of the Hour* (1897); *The Guernsey Market House Plan of Payments* (1897); as well as more technical projects and descriptions dealing with railroads and highways.

³ Owen was, however, apparently a widely read man, and he had read St. Simon. A selection of extracts by him, published in *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa* for June 1, 1882, included excerpts from the writings of Rousseau, Jefferson, the Church Fathers, St. Simon, Condillac, Tolstoi, Mazzini, Cavour, Thomas More [*Utopia*], Emerson, and Theodore Roosevelt (*loc. cit.*, pp. 501-504).

⁴ Edward Howland, "An Unexpected Endorsement," *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 528 (June 22, 1886).

by original force of genius thought out for himself the method of organization, which is exactly that proposed by Fourier, and recognized as right by every student of social science who understands it, our confidence in our leader is wonderfully strengthened and we can work with renewed energy at the propaganda of our plan of action, for we are engaged in nothing short of social reorganization.

Owen's system of Integral Cooperation, as described by one of his followers, C. J. Lamb, included all forms of cooperation then current—Godin's methods of production as exemplified at Guise, France, the Rochdale plan of consumer cooperation as invented by the Rochdale pioneers, bonanza or large scale farming as practiced in North Dakota, group health methods as adopted by railroads, similar methods as applied to insurance, cooperative associations of shippers, and the like.⁵ The concrete organization established to carry out the principles of integral cooperation was called the "Credit Foncier." The significance of this name is brought out by Owen in the following passage:⁶

Credit Foncier means credit founded upon home,—from *credit*, to trust or loan, and *foncier*, manor or home. *Credit Foncier* means a credit based upon something fixed and permanent, in contradistinction, to *Credit Mobilier*, which means credit founded upon movable property, such, for instance, as the rolling stock of a railroad, a steamboat, etc. The Credit Foncier Company is organized with a home for each head of a family made a basis for its progress; therefore it is called The Credit Foncier Company. The name signifies a great deal. There cannot be any security long maintained which does not start from the home. Home is the foundation for the family. The family is the mainstay of society. If the families are properly housed and disciplined, the state is secure. The state is simply an aggregation of families and partakes of their strength and virtue, or of their weakness and crime. . . . The Credit Foncier Company, therefore, makes the home the basis for its usefulness, and it guarantees to give employment to every person who is accepted as a member.

Owen's Views on Women and Religion. It will be noted that although Owen favored women's suffrage, his views on questions of sex freedom, domestic relations, religion, and the like, were more conventional than had been those of some of his predecessors of the early nineteenth century. The era of extreme radicalism in such matters as these, extending from approximately 1865 to 1885, was now passing away. The preachings and teachings of Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mary Walker,

⁵ Letter from C. J. Lamb to the Honorable Ira S. Haseltine, published in *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1890), pp. 82-83.

⁶ Albert K. Owen, "Business Methods vs. Political Control," *ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

Victoria C. Woodhull, and others of unconventional convictions, had either been modified in the direction of greater mildness or had become so commonplace that they no longer attracted marked attention. Owen expressed his own personal bias with respect to the relation of the sexes in a letter to one of his followers, Dr. Edwin J. Schellhous. Women, he writes, must not be dependent upon men; there must be mutual interdependence. Women must own their own property, enjoy equality before the law, and have their own jobs. The economic function of woman is that of middle-man.⁷ She sells, tends accounts, manages banking, supervises the cooking and serving of meals; acts as librarian, manages laundries, nurseries, baths, gymnasiums, hospitals, homes for the incapacitated, schools, and amusements.⁸ In spite of these activities, however, it is important that women remain feminine:⁹

The woman should be the idol of society. That society will be the happiest and the best which makes conditions to encourage woman to preserve and to develop her womanly characteristics and her distinctive individuality. . . .

I trust that nothing I have written in this, or in any other private letter, will be construed to mean that I personally commend a Bloomer dress (for other purposes than bathing, riding and exercising), short hair, or any other Amazonian ways for women. The fact is my feelings revolt against a woman who is not strictly a woman in dress, act and language.

The religious creed of Integral Co-operation was expressed by Owen in the following words: "Our religion is to better the physical condition of man, woman and child—to be considerate of all creatures with whom or with which we may be brought in contact—to act toward others as we would desire that they should act toward us—to work, to inquire and to progress."¹⁰ Although freedom of private worship was guaranteed,¹¹ the organization of sects and of churches was forbidden.¹² Religious radicalism was but incidental in Integral Co-operation.

Owen's Economic Radicalism. But in economic matters, this latter-day Utopist and his followers were admittedly radical. The general aims and

⁷ *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1891), p. 119.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 120, 124.

¹⁰ A. K. Owen, "True Religious Liberty," *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 378-379 (Mar. 16, 1886).

¹¹ *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1891), p. 125.

¹² A. K. Owen, "True Religious Liberty," *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 378 (Mar. 16, 1886).

objectives of this phase of the movement—its bill of rights, so to speak—were summarized in a series of antitheses by Owen. He tells us that ¹³

The Credit Foncier Company is an incorporated stock association, unlimited in the number of its members. Its purpose is to carry on diverse occupations. It differs from other incorporated companies, mainly, in being organized to employ only its own members. It cares for those who meet with accident, and guides and assists each member in those employments which he or she selects. . . .

The Credit Foncier Company asks for evolution and not for revolution; for inter-dependence and not for independence; for co-operation and not for communism; for harmony and not for antagonism; for rivalry and not for competition; for equity and not for equality; for liberty and not for license; for employment and not for charity; for the diversification of home industries and not for philanthropy; for utilization and not for waste; for eclecticism and not for dogma; for religion and not for sect; for praying and not for preying; for discussion and not for sermon; for rationalism and not for ritualism; for rights and not for rites; for deeds and not for creeds; for example and not for precept; for law and not for technicality; for order and not for anarchy; for method and not for chance; for general rules and not for class legislation; for corporate business management and not for partisan political control; for State responsibility for every person, at all times and everywhere, and not for municipal irresponsibility for any person, at any time or in any place; and it demands that those interests which are common to and essential for our civilization, and upon which depend the usefulness, happiness and progress of the citizen—the atmosphere, land (its deposits and natural growths), water, light, power, exchange, transportation, construction, sanitation, education, entertainment, insurance, production, distribution, etc., etc.—“be pooled,” in the interest of all the stockholders, and that the private life, property, opinion, and individuality of the citizen be held sacred.

In 1886, Owen, who was a civil engineer by profession, reorganized the Mexican-American Construction Company, to build a railroad and to form agricultural and manufacturing settlements. A charter was taken out in Colorado in September under the title of The Credit Foncier Company, with Owen as chairman, and colonization in Sinaloa began. Owen's plan, “novel, unique, attractive, thorough in its details and, withal so peaceful in all its suggestions, at once found favor with persons who had been studying the questions of our day with a view to better our social and industrial institutions.” ¹⁴

¹³ Albert K. Owen, “Integral Co-Operation—A Business Way to Solve Social Antagonisms,” *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1890), pp. 5-6.

¹⁴ *Social Science*, I: 3 (June 24, 1887).

The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa. Two persons with whom Owen's plan found particular favor and who became his devoted disciples, were Marie and Edward Howland,¹⁵ of Hammonton, New Jersey. Together they published a weekly paper called *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, "devoted specially to the interests of our colonization enterprise, the Credit Foncier of Sinaloa, and generally to the practical solution of the problem of *Integral Co-Operation*." This little paper was analogous to *The Phalanx*, which had been the organ of the Associationist phase of the Social Science movement some forty-odd years earlier. It was largely a propaganda organ, containing news and letters of subscriber-members. During the preparations for the hegira to Mexico in 1886, it kept the colonists informed, advised, encouraged, and maintained their morale. The attitude of Owen's disciples toward their leader, reflected in their letters as published in this paper, gives us some insight into the meaning of the movement for them. Says one of them: "I think he [Owen] is one of the greatest men the world has seen. . . . Albert K. Owen, by revolutionizing industrial methods—the creation and distribution of the necessities of life and the necessities of happiness—will be the grandest representative of the coming era of Co-operation and love."¹⁶ Another believes "Mr. Owen to be one of the grandest men that ever lived and his successful foundation of a government on the principles enunciated in 'Our Covenant' will immortalize his name in the history of nations."¹⁷ Edward Howland tells us that "the more I know of the movement we are in, the more I am lost in wonder and admiration of Owen."¹⁸ And in *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, Owen is referred to as "our beloved leader,"¹⁹ or "our beloved Owen."²⁰ In another journal, to be described presently, Owen is called "able and worthy to take up and practically illustrate the great reforms advocated by Plato, St. Simon, Sir Thomas More,

¹⁵ Howland, a Southerner by birth, had graduated from Harvard and become "a student and ardent admirer of Charles Fourier." He had travelled abroad, been associated with the Grange movement, and worked for the Greenback party. A simple, generous, idealistic sort of man, whose "every pleasure of life" was embittered by "the unhappiness of his fellow creatures," he was captivated by the work of Godin at Guise, France, and by the brilliant prospects of integral cooperation as set forth by Owen. His wife, Marie, shared his enthusiasms, even translating Godin's *Solutions Sociales*, which her husband edited. She was also a member of the board of directors of The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa. (See Marie Howland, "Edward Howland," *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 405-406 (April 6, 1886).

¹⁶ James M. Pryse, "The Old Era of Hating and the New Era of Helping," *ibid.*, I: 473 (May 18, 1886).

¹⁷ Letter from W. G. Sprague to Mrs. Howland, *ibid.*, I: 561 (July 15, 1886).

¹⁸ Letter from Edward Howland to Stephen Young, *ibid.*, I: 393 (Mar. 25, 1886).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I: 305 (Jan. 12, 1886).

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II: 4 (July 28, 1886).

Charles Fourier, Richard [George Jacob?] Holyoake, Robert Dale Owen, and M. Godin; to which Carlyle frequently urged serious attention, and which John Ruskin, Emile Zola, Robert Ingersoll, and Senator Leland Stanford are now recommending as the only safeguards of civilization."²¹

In addition to *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, which was later published in Sinaloa when Marie Howland migrated to the new colony,²² there were other propaganda organs for the movement, including *The Integral Cooperator*, published in Kansas,²³ and *The Puget Sound Weekly Co-operator*.²⁴ Unfortunately, however, these periodicals are not available at the present time.

The Associationist Element in Integral Cooperation. Although Owen himself, as we have already seen, was not a disciple of Fourier, many of his followers were, particularly the Howlands. Marie Howland, for example, pointed to the success of the North American Phalanx as due to its adherence to Fourier's system:²⁵

We of the "Old Guard" of reformers have often declared—often on the strength merely of our faith in principle—that none of the socialistic experiments in this country . . . have ever failed; that they have all succeeded, at least succeeded in many things and so demonstrated the advantage of associative life. Still, so often has it been asserted and reasserted that particular cases were disastrous pecuniary failures, as the North American Phalanx, for example, that most people have accepted it as a fact. . . . The simple fact is that this experiment was a grand success; and were we asked what it was that kept the North American Phalanx together for years; why their home, their business, their political life was so harmoniously conducted, we would unquestionably reply: organization according to the series, as discovered by Charles Fourier, and based on natural laws.

Fourier is often referred to and quoted in *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, and Charles Sears, the last president of the North American Phalanx, was a welcome contributor and adviser.²⁶ At least one colonist—and doubtless others, also—was a former member of Associationist phalanxes,²⁷ and a

²¹ *Social Science*, I: 4 (June 24, 1887).

²² Alvin J. Wilber, "Instructions to Correspondents," *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1891), p. 168.

²³ Referred to by Mr. Wilber in the article cited in the preceding footnote.

²⁴ Referred to in *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 381 (Mar. 16, 1886); II: 4 (July 28, 1886).

²⁵ Editorial in *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, II: 28 (Aug. 10, 1886).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, I: 518 (June 8, 1886); II: 29-30 (Aug. 10, 1886); II: 56 (Aug. 24, 1886).

²⁷ *Ibid.*, I: 551-52 (July 6, 1886).

one-time propagandist for Associationism now turned his efforts to Integral Cooperation.²⁸ Mrs. Howland's description of life as she anticipates it in the new colony sounds very much like Brisbane's picture of life in a phalanx, with its emphasis upon attractive labor, the elimination of competition, scientific organization of the nursery, and the like.²⁹ So far as the Howlands were concerned, there is little doubt that they saw in Integral Cooperation a modern version of Association. And when M. Limousin, editor of the *Revue du Mouvement Social*, attempted to point out how Godin differed from Fourier, the Howlands replied that the difference was legitimate since "the data of social science, as those of any science, must increase and be modified by the increasing experience of mankind. To fully recognize and appreciate this is undoubtedly the most important discovery that social science has gained during this century."³⁰

Colonization Activities. The actual work of colonization³¹ in its early stages, is described in the following passage:³²

The first group of colonists (27) settled at Topolobampo, November 17, '86, accompanied by Mr. E. J. Schellhaus, of California. Mr. Owen went to Sinaloa in December with a company of colonists from Wyoming and Colorado, and again in February, 1887. The pioneers called for were to be one hundred, but there are now in the company's settlements over 30 persons. After six months of many trials, embarrassments and conflicting interests the plan has been fully tested, practically organized in most of its details, and may be said to be a success. Thus "The Credit Foncier Company," becomes the initiative of the most marked movement for the practical manifestation of industrial reforms yet recorded in any country or at any period.

The members of the Association number, at this date, over 5000, and they have pledged themselves in writing, over their own signatures, to devote their lives, and furnish over half a million of dollars to advance the enterprise. Mr. Owen has pledged all his land interests in Sinaloa. . . . It will be seen that this co-operative movement is based on a foundation of sufficient extent and importance to furnish diversity of employment, and give each member of the association agreeable occupations—a factor which Mr. Owen depends upon to secure the harmony essential to individual development and ambition, and to insure the self sustenance and financial strength of the company.

The world has never before had such an example of the union of integral

²⁸ Letter from William H. Muller to E. M. Hussey, reproduced in *Pacific City Studies*, pp. 63-64.

²⁹ *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 516-517 (June 8, 1886).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, I: 356 (Feb. 23, 1886).

³¹ For a description of this colony see Leopold Katscher, "Owen's Topolobampo Colony, Mexico," *American Journal Sociology*, XII: 145-175 (Sept., 1906).

³² *Social Science*, I: 4 (June 24, 1887).

co-operation with business enterprise as is presented in the plans, concessions and writings of Albert K. Owen.

The enthusiasm here displayed betrays the Utopistic bias of the group. The new colony is initiating "the most marked movement for the practical manifestation of industrial reforms yet recorded in any country or at any period." And the emphasis upon agreeable occupations in order to secure harmony reveals the Associationist background of the cooperative movement. The projected government of the cooperative colony at Topolobampo which was to be in the hands of an elected board of ten directors, voted for by the stock-holders, included ten departments, covering finance, public improvements, law, power, police, transportation and communication, labor, agriculture, health, and a "Department of social science, education, amusements and baths."³³

Enthusiasm and Disappointment. By June, 1887, there were, according to Edward Howland, nearly a dozen cooperative colonies in process of organization and the supporters of the movement were "enthusiastic in their belief that the regeneration of industry is yet possible."³⁴ The feeling of consecration which characterized the colonists is illustrated by the following statement by one of their leaders, Dr. E. J. Schellhaus:³⁵

We are engaged in the solution of the greatest problem that ever occupied the attention of man—a problem embracing every interest of humanity. The civilized world is convulsed with conflicting interests. To utilize them and elevate the race is the great work before us, which, when accomplished, will mark the most important era in the world's history. If we demonstrate the theory of social science in the Pacific Colony, we will do more for humanity than all the political systems in the world. Let us realize the importance of the work in which we are engaged and with patience, courage and persistence we cannot fail.

Edward Howland interpreted the movement in a similar way:³⁶

That the idea of a co-operative colony, as a means for escaping the tyranny of the present society, is rapidly spreading throughout this people is evident to any one who notices the indications of social progress. The whole nation is caught in the toils of the money power, and is being rapidly pauperized if it stays where it is.

Its railroads have been gobbled up, and where can a man run to, if he is de-

³³ Albert K. Owen, "Pacific City," *Pacific City Studies* (1892), p. 11.

³⁴ *Social Science*, I: 5 (June 24, 1887).

³⁵ Letter from E. J. Schellhaus to Mr. and Mrs. Howland, *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 407 (Apr. 6, 1886).

³⁶ *Social Science*, I: 5 (June 24, 1887).

sirous of getting out of a society so devoted to competition that even the simplest relation with his fellow man is so poisoned with a chronic itch for profit that he cannot escape its insolent intrusions? . . . Even a victory in this competitive struggle is gained only by such means that it is worse than a moral defeat.

The organization of the money power is so strong and so complete, that there is no other than a social escape from it; and to secure this, is the reason why the establishment of cooperative colonies, is becoming so general. . . . Man is a social animal, and no job of sympathy for the honest and true is ever lost or wasted. These things are indestructible.

This escape-from-reality emphasis was, as in the case of so many earlier experiments, a fatal weakness in the new movement. The actual history of the colony in Sinaloa followed fairly closely the pattern of many of the earlier experiments. Initial enthusiasm of a high order, then disappointment and dissension, aggravated in the present case by famine and drought.⁸⁷

An Illustration of Utopistic Attitudes. It may be permissible to point out in this connection the incorrigibility of Utopistic social idealists. It required great faith, in the first place, after the failure of the Owenite and Fourierite communistic colonies of the first half of the nineteenth century had become well known, to place so much hope in the success of their more recent offspring, the cooperative colonies. That such faith was not justified has been made clear by the subsequent history of cooperation, which has taken the direction not of colonial settlements but more nearly of conventional business associations operating in the midst of traditionally established society. The Integral Cooperators, however, did not admit that the earlier colonies had failed, as we have seen in Mrs. Howland's statement, quoted above. Nor did the actual failure of their own experiment convince them of the failure of their principles. For example, in an interview on May 17, 1892, Owen pointed out that "during the five years we have been on our 400-acre farm, La Logia, we have gathered possibly only about two partial crops," due to droughts.⁸⁸ He points out that there have been a number of deaths

⁸⁷ The history of the colony may be pieced together from the following sources: "The Topolobampo Colony," reproduced from *Harper's Weekly* for July 2, 1887, in *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1890), pp. 130-135; "Topolobampo Colonists," an interview with A. K. Owen, published in *Pacific City Studies* (1892), pp. 55-62; Marie Howland, "To Those Who Inquire About Us," *Integral Cooperation At Work* (1891), pp. 170-171; "An Open Letter from A. K. Owen," published in *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1891), pp. 107-131; *Yorkshire Post* (Leeds), September 18, 1896; *New Order* (Murdoch & Co., London), Nov.-Jan., 1896-97.

⁸⁸ "Topolobampo Colonists," an interview with A. K. Owen, in *Pacific City Studies* (1892), pp. 55-62.

from typhoid fever.³⁹ Yet William H. Muller, a former Associationist, upon reading this interview in Pennsylvania says: "It is a grand, inspiring paper, and gives a most encouraging and hopeful view of the progress of the great enterprise."⁴⁰ And several years later, an English publishing firm, reprinting Owen's *Dream of an Ideal City*, points out that although "the ten years of Topolobampo's chequered history . . . have not yet served to realise the ideal," which Mr. Owen projected, nevertheless this ideal "is not necessarily bound up with the fortunes of Topolobampo."⁴¹ No amount of disappointment, apparently, could daunt the high hopes of true Utopists.

An Estimate of the Work of Owen. While the Topolobampo scheme was essentially Utopistic as viewed in the light of the times, it was not without merit. The ideal of democratic economic cooperation was decidedly in the air and had in considerable measure been validated and justified by the success of the Rochdale cooperators in Great Britain, and by successful cooperation in other European countries. It had been actively popularized by George Jacob Holyoake,⁴² whose works had in the eighteen-eighties a great popularity in the United States. Indeed, Mr. Holyoake had made a strong appeal to radicals generally in this country. He was a professed free-thinker and a radical democrat, as well as a leader of economic cooperation. His personality and theories were exploited in the United States to a degree that may now seem surprising in view of the fact that today he is almost forgotten both here and in England. Owen appears to have been inspired in his cooperative enterprises by both Godin and Holyoake. From the one he lifted the Benthamitic idea of the strong appeal to enlightened self-interest to be exercised through the economic mechanism of profit-sharing; and from the other the sanguine idealism of regenerating society through the medium of democratic self-government, especially in economic relations. This conception of Holyoake had something of the idealism of the philosophic anarchist as well as of the Utopistic socialist of the time. Both philosophies held that modern wide-spread industrialism was creating a society so complex and so ponderous that the average citizen was hopelessly confused by its intricate and abstract prob-

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Letter from William H. Muller to E. M. Hussey, reproduced in *Pacific City Studies* (1892), p. 63.

⁴¹ Publishers' Preface to A. K. Owen's *Dream of an Ideal City*, English edition, 1897, p. 3.

⁴² See his *History of Cooperation in England*, 2 vols., London, 1875-1879; also *The Cooperative Movement Today*, 1891; and *Sixty Years of an Agitator's Life*, 2 vols., 1892.

lems. Holyoake felt strongly their appeal to simplify the life of the average man by a return to rural community life, but on a sound economic organizational basis, and this basis seemed to both Owen and Holyoake to be cooperation. That Owen had other motives, somewhat less idealistic, as well can scarcely be doubted. He was a railroad builder, and he saw the advantage of a prosperous agricultural community at the western terminus of the railroad that was to make a new connection between the Pacific and the cities of the United States.⁴⁸ Thus he sought to combine philanthropy with large scale finance. He was undoubtedly very fortunate in securing the cooperation and aid of the Howells in promoting his cooperative enterprises. Their Utopistic enthusiasm gave just that flavor to his propaganda which was so essential and won for him many enthusiastic friends which his own very ingratiating personality appears to have justified.

The Causes of Failure. The failure of the Topolobampo cooperative enterprise despite so much enthusiastic devotion is not difficult to explain. In the first place, it was located in a foreign country (although at that time very friendly toward foreign economic enterprise) and in a hot and humid climate which could not be otherwise than very trying to people from our middle states. The experiment fell within a period of drought and economic depression which was extremely disastrous to the whole Southwest. The great drought of 1887 crippled the range cattle industry of Texas and ruined the farmers of Kansas and had serious economic and political repercussions throughout this region and the whole of the United States for a decade or more. The colony drew to it wishful thinking enthusiasts rather than hard working colonists determined to succeed in the long run. As a result the colonists did not possess the moral stamina to withstand the temporary discouragements and defeats which, even under the most favorable circumstances, they must have encountered in the initial stages of such an enterprise. Perhaps even the enthusiastic propaganda in support of the scheme had conditioned the colonists to go in search of Eldorado instead of hard work and self-sacrificing endeavor. Not less important in explaining the failure of the scheme was Owen's and the Howells' excessive confidence in the ability of the colonists to appreciate and to practice the obligations as well as the privileges of democracy. The motley group of cooperators here assembled, however idealistic they may have been, had entirely the wrong

⁴⁸ After Owen lost control of this railroad enterprise it was reorganized by the promotor Stillwell as the Kansas City, Mexico and Orient Railway, but his enterprise also failed soon after the first decade of the twentieth century (See his *Cannibals of Finance*). The Santa Fe system has now absorbed that portion of the completed lines within the United States.

outlook upon democracy. They were adventurers in high enterprise who, like most Americans, expected democracy to be self-operating and to make free gifts to them instead of demanding patient, devoted, and intelligent study and self-sacrificing zeal. Theirs was an individualistic instead of a social democratic ideal. Yet the whole scheme as set up by Owen and the Howells called for intelligent and patient experimentation in democratic social self-control and in the difficult art of living together under new and unusual conditions. This the colonists were not prepared to give. This was, of course, one of the chief causes of the failure of the older communistic colonies as well as of this newer colony which was to be based on the co-operatively tempered economic motive of private profit. But the fact that Owen himself had enough faith in such a democratically controlled enterprise is perhaps a sufficient testimonial to his own idealism—if not to his naivete in social matters. Finally, a body blow to the enterprise on its economic side was Owen's inability to complete the railroad across Mexico⁴⁴ and form a junction with the Texas railways running eastward and thus carry the perishable products of the colony to the large city markets. Without such markets their industry was bound to be without successful issue and the colony an economic failure.

⁴⁴ Even yet that part of the line between Hornillos and Sanchez in Mexico has not been completed and the colony has no adequate eastern outlet.

The Late Utopistic Phase of Social Science: A Radical Social Science Journal

The Ideals of the Journal Social Science. Leaving the cooperative colonists in Topolobampo let us return to the Social Science movement as reflected in a journal, *Social Science*, published in New York in 1887. This journal, which is so partial to cooperation as to suggest that it was sponsored by Owen himself, is by no means devoted to as specialized a propaganda as was *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa* or *The Integral Cooperator*. In fact, although the editors of this journal were radical, they held up for themselves an ideal of great impartiality. Like Plato of old—and practically every speculative social philosopher since Plato's time—they sought primarily for justice. They were willing to examine all types of proposals looking toward that end and to accept and propagate those ideas that seemed to them to promise most success in the achievement of their objectives. It was their earnest intention to avoid all prejudices and preconceptions. The motto of this new journal was "Fiat justicia ruat coelum." Their policy of eclecticism in social reform is stated as follows: "SOCIAL SCIENCE is not the champion of any school or system. We acknowledge allegiance to the teachings of no social reformer or philosopher, but aim to study the formulas, ideas, and remedies presented by all; to be eclectic, 'to try all things and hold fast to that which is good.'" ¹

The group of thinkers sponsoring this journal assumed that fair-minded men and women desired the truth rather than to be confirmed in their prejudices. It was their expressed intention, therefore, to cater to this type of person, advocating new ideas as well as old when they could be shown to lead to the truth. They invited the cooperation of all who were interested in their undertaking. They asserted that they already had the encouragement and assistance of a number of the most cultivated men and women of

¹ *Social Science*, I: 8 (June 24, 1887). Compare this statement with A. K. Owen's: "We are eclectics," in "Private Persons and Public Affairs," *Integral Cooperation at Work* (1891), p. 57.

America, all of whom had done profound research in some branch of Social Science, and whose work they promised to present in their columns.²

In the ninth issue the editors re-affirmed their policy of objectivity and impartiality in all causes except that of the discovery of the truth, in the following words:³

The object of SOCIAL SCIENCE is not to directly assist in political reform or action, but to try and ascertain and present true economic principles without fear or favor. We may from time to time offer a few suggestions, and respectfully advance some criticisms, but we will not sustain or oppose any party, as a party.

We believe there is a field for such a journal as SOCIAL SCIENCE and we do not ask support on any other ground than merit. SOCIAL SCIENCE is conducted on business principles and we accept as a test of its usefulness, the public support or demand it can create or discover.

The Point of View of Social Science. The first editorial of this journal proclaims both of the Social Science objectives, namely reform and science:⁴

Our Purpose. *Social Science* is the outgrowth of the deep conviction which we have had for several years, that there ought to be a paper published covering the field designated by its name; the object being to inculcate a reform in the intellectual education of men and women, in a manner conducive to the highest development of both in the world and in society. . . .

In using the word "science" we do not claim to have formulated a system which can properly be called scientific, but rather to predicate our firm conviction that there is a science of the relations of man to man, and that the concerted efforts of earnest men and women are destined to reveal clearly to all, what is now seen perhaps but dimly by a few.

In another paragraph in this explicit and revealing enunciation of their policy, the editors of *Social Science* disclose the fact that they have been touched by the newly publicized doctrine of evolution. It is in effect a statement of a preference for rational evolutionary methods of dealing with social problems over the older revolutionary procedures. No such contrast or preference is stated in the editorial, nor perhaps was it even in the unexpressed conscious thought of the writer; but it is certainly a clear implication of his statement of the contrast of the old outlook and the old methods with the new ones for which his group stands. Change is inevi-

² *Social Science*, I: 8 (June 24, 1887).

³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 8.

⁴ *Social Science*, I: 8 (June 24, 1887).

table in the economic order, what is the next step? The words of the editorial itself are as follows: "While, broadly stated, all human institutions are constantly changing, we feel that the people of the United States are entering upon an epoch which is to be especially distinguished by great activity, both in thought and action, in the realm of the social relations between man and man; an era in which thoughtful people will ask themselves and each other the vital question: 'Is the competitive system the best we can have, or is it, like feudalism, but one of a series in the progress of evolution; and if the latter, what naturally, and therefore wisely, comes next?'"⁵

The Associationist school of Social Science, and not a few of the adherents of other groups, were revolutionary in outlook, if not also intuitionist and aprioristic in their method of arriving at the principles for which they stood. They all used the term science to cover their several fields of thought, though, as we have seen, they were often no more scientific in their methods of procedure or in the body of their thought than the opponents whom they combatted. This new group, similarly, prides itself on the use of rational scientific methods to discover the errors in old doctrines and to formulate new principles to take their place. They believe in the capacity of the human intellect to discover and employ knowledge with which to solve its social problems. The process, by which this development from old and outworn theories and methods of adjustment to the new takes place, is social and intellectual evolution. They were convinced that such an evolutionary development was at that very time in process. They hoped for controlled social change. This point of view is decidedly similar to that expressed by the group of cooperators surrounding A. K. Owen. The chief difference in language between the two groups consisted in the more sober and conventional forms of expression of *Social Science* on the one hand and the more sentimental devotion to the humanitarian aims of the cooperators on the other hand.⁶

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Compare the evolutionary sentiments expressed by *Social Science* with the following statements in *The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*: "We believe in progress. . . . Human development all lies in the line of integral order, strength, beauty, holiness. The millennium of which poets and sages have ever dreamed is not an idle fancy. . . . All things will be possible to the united efforts of the people stimulated by fraternal love and a living faith in the sublime destiny of our planet" (Marie Howland, "The Basis of Our Faith," I: 381, Mar. 16, 1886); "We study the trend of evolution and seek to evolve a better state of society and higher types of individuals" (James M. Pryse, "The Old Era of Hating and the New Era of Helping," I: 473, May 18, 1886).

Reform Sympathies of Social Science. The cover of each issue of *Social Science* carried the picture of some reformer and the corresponding number contained a sketch of this man. We can thus infer the sympathies of the group by the men they chose to publicize in this manner. The man whose portrait graced the cover of the first issue was, not unexpectedly, Albert Kimsey Owen himself. Later numbers contained pictures and sketches of such men as Henry George (1839-1897) whose book *Progress and Poverty* (1879) had first advocated the confiscation by the government of economic rent, in the form of taxation, a policy which came to be known as the Single Tax; Reverend Edward McGlynn (1837-1900), a Roman Catholic priest, whose championing of Henry George's theories had brought him into conflict with the hierarchy of the Church, a conflict eventuating in his excommunication; Ignatius Donnelly (1831-1901), a prominent Populist leader of the Northwest; John Swinton (1829-1901), a friend and admirer of Karl Marx, though not himself a Socialist,⁷ who as journalist had espoused the cause of labor; Henry Carey Baird (1825-1912), nephew and disciple of Henry C. Carey, to be discussed in a later division of this work, and as such a protagonist of tariff protection of American labor; and Laurence Gronlund (1846-1899), Danish by birth, whose book on *The Cooperative Commonwealth* (1884) had been widely read and caused the author to be referred to as the "foremost exponent of collectivism among writers of the English language."⁸ The final number of *Social Science* (Number 18), was made up entirely of portraits and biographical sketches of the men arrested and convicted in connection with the Haymarket Affair. This fact and the sympathy manifested for these men serve to indicate both the radicalism of the journal and the fact that the personnel of the group sponsoring it was not wholly without subjective convictions and preconceptions. That their gallery of pictures and sketches included men of very widely differing programs of reform indicates that they were attempting to carry out their aim of impartiality. But all the men, it will be noted, were reformers of a more or less radical and humanitarian bias.

The Chief Emphases of Social Science. In spite of the catholicity of its

⁷ *Dictionary of American Biography*, XVIII: 252.

⁸ *Ibid.*, VIII: 15. Other works by Gronlund were: *The Coming Revolution: Its Principles* (1878); *Danton in the French Revolution* (1887); *Insufficiency of Henry George's Theory* (1887); *Socialism vs. Tax Reform: An Answer to Henry George* (1887); *Our Destiny, the Influence of Nationalism on Morals and Religion* (1891); *New Economy: A Practicable Solution of the Social Problem* (1898); *Socializing a State* (1898). Socialism, according to Gronlund, was a religion as well as an economic program and in this respect he was in exactly the same tradition as that of the Associationists, as described in earlier chapters.

reform interests and its expressed statement disclaiming espousal of any special doctrine or movement, *Social Science* did show definite partiality for cooperation as an economic system. This is shown not only by the attention paid to the work of Owen in its pages, by the space devoted to encomiums of cooperation by Edward Howland, to Marie Howland's translations of Godin's *Solutions Sociales*, but also by the tone of its editorials.

It is of course impossible for any group of enthusiastic young radicals, who believe in using popular education and discussion, and even propaganda, as means to making their views known, to live strictly up to such a rigorous program of impartiality as that devised by *Social Science* for itself. People who believe in their own ideas cannot treat them wholly objectively. It need not surprise us, therefore, that very soon *Social Science* was taking sides on economic questions, and sometimes without the thoroughgoing preliminary analysis and examination of conflicting arguments which they had promised themselves. The first conviction which they championed, though mild, reveals their bias. They had discovered a fundamental lack of balance—which A. K. Owen himself had pointed out—between two branches of economic theory, and they believed it was to the public interest to have it corrected. It was a lack of balance which in spite of their generous efforts, has by no means disappeared in our own time, perhaps because the profit motive is still dominant in economic life and helps to skew our interest in economic theory in this same direction. The lack of balance that they had discovered rested on the fact that economists gave more attention to production than to consumption. The editors of *Social Science* believed this to be contrary to the public interest and as Social Scientists their own concern was just the opposite to this. The editorial expression of their conviction says:⁹

⁹ *Social Science*, I: 8 (June 24, 1887). Compare the opinion expressed by *Social Science* with the following statement by Owen in a letter to Mrs. Howland, December 10, 1885, in which he pointed out that: "Civilization is dependent upon the solution of two problems: production, distribution. The first treats of products; the second of wages. The one of mechanism; the other of equity. The first three quarters of the nineteenth century have witnessed the solution of the first. Steam, electricity, invention, chemistry, science have been the mediums by which such results have been effected. The last quarter of this century will see solved the second. It will be accomplished by the ways and means of a *Treasury money*, issued for labor rendered upon national works of public necessity. To inaugurate this movement, in keeping with construction, security and intelligence, the Credit Foncier of Sinaloa is proposed. To sustain and advance this as an example for a better life, is the mission, is the life-purpose of your co-worker and friend" (*The Credit Foncier of Sinaloa*, I: 326, Jan. 26, 1886).

We recognize that the world knows far more about production than distribution, about physical science than how to be happy; and we will seek to interest the people in the consideration of the latter, even at the expense of the former. Though suggesting rather than dogmatizing where we are not thoroughly satisfied that we know the truth, we will be constructive in our teachings, adding truth to truth, until the essential elements of an institution or a system are determined, when we will advocate its adoption. We believe that the desire of men and women for a higher social state has its origin in the spiritual nature.

The "Central Idea" of Social Science. More explicit evidence of the editorial bias in favor of cooperation is the declaration, tucked away amidst a reiteration of their impartiality and a new statement of their opposition to the old English classical economics, of what this group held to be the central idea or motivation of Social Science. They considered it to be expressed in the phrase "An injury to one is an injury to all." The whole passage is as follows: "Editorially we will be liberal in spirit, free from dogma, independent and radical, yet teaching by suggestion rather than by assertion; advocating that now rapidly developing science of society, the central idea of which is, that 'an injury to one is an injury to all,' which is destined to replace in all right thinking minds that 'philosophy of despair,' that 'dismal science' of Political Economy, which, with its 'laissez faire,' and 'supply and demand' doctrines, is fast driving civilized nations toward anarchism and nihilism."¹⁰

This is essentially the doctrine of solidarity and of interdependence which later came to play such an important part in the moral sanctions of the newly developing sociology, the successor to Social Science as an integral discipline. It was nearly ten years after this date that Léon Bourgeois produced his distinctive work on *Solidarity*,¹¹ which chrystallized thinking in this aspect of social theory. But the idea was abroad, nevertheless, and it had been caught up by this group of economic radicals in 1887 and made, so to speak, the emblem on their shield.

It is, moreover, worth noting in passing that this integralist or solidarity viewpoint marks the group off sharply from the Andrews and Masquerier type of post-Associationist Social Scientists and from another, earlier, individualistic group of New York Social Scientists, later to be considered. The earlier New York group were strongly opposed to anything that savored of governmental and administrative concentration or of rigorous social con-

¹⁰ *Social Science*, I: 8 (June 24, 1887).

¹¹ *Solidarité* (Paris, 1896): see also *Essai d'une Philosophie de Solidarité* (Paris, 1902).

trol which would interfere with the laissez faire policies which they espoused. While the group now under consideration does not specifically announce its championship of the principle of concentration of administrative power, nevertheless its strong advocacy of solidarity would of necessity predispose it in that general direction. Indeed, the very theory of social control by means of science as a practical program must of necessity presuppose some sort of central administrative organ and decision-making body.

But the most significant implications of this emphasis upon interdependence and solidarity are (1) that it aligns Social Science essentially with what we now call sociology rather than with economics, although this group of writers wrote primarily on economic questions, but with a sociological slant, and (2) it gave to Social Science an essentially ethical sanction. Such a sanction was of course not new to Social Science and was implied in the theories of other contemporaneous groups of Social Scientists, especially in their declarations that human welfare and social reform are the objectives of Social Science. But here the moral sanction is more clearly stated than is generally the case elsewhere.

Bias of Social Science Toward Cooperation and Other Doctrines. We have already referred to the space devoted to Owen and his work in *Social Science*, to Edward Howland's encomiums on cooperation, and to Marie Howland's translation of *Solutions Sociales*. Articles by other contributors show a similar coloring. Thus, for example, in the seventh number of the journal, E. D. Babbitt, in an article entitled "How to Abolish Poverty," confidently asserts that the method to be used is cooperation.¹² Again, a series of articles was begun in the second number of *Social Science* by N.Y.R. on "The Future of Labor; or The New Civilization," whose titles sufficiently indicate the nature of their contents. They are as follows: "Wage Slavery Replaced by Universal Co-operation and Labor Discords by Harmony"; "True Republican Freedom Guaranteed to Every Person, in Every Relation, Political, Industrial and Social"; "The Serial Law"; "Our Political Union; Industrial Competition," etc. The style is metaphysical, however, and the discussion of the "Serial Law" is not altogether lucid.

A natural Fourieristic bias is revealed by Charles Sears, last president of North American Phalanx, in an article on "What Is Socialism?" in the ninth number, in which we learn that Plato, More, Saint-Simon, Comte,

¹² *Loc. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

and Robert Owen reasoned from imperfect data and were therefore arbitrary, but that Fourier discovered the true Divine Social Code.¹³

Apparently *Social Science* favored, in addition to Integral Cooperation, the ownership by the government of railroads and natural resources, civil service reform, and immigration. It seems not to have supported either the single tax or prohibition. The beginnings of a muckraking movement are indicated by two articles in the seventeenth number, namely: "Boodleism," by John G. Drew, and "Votes Bought and Sold by the Thousands," by H. J. Doerr.

The attitude of one of the contributors to *Social Science*, Samuel Leavitt, toward W. G. Sumner and David A. Wells, fellow Social Scientists, is interesting. Sumner, Leavitt tells us, "rapturously toadies to the powers that be,"¹⁴ while Wells has been bought by the money power.¹⁵

Sociology Introduced by Name. Perhaps enough has been said to indicate the general nature and sympathies of the periodical *Social Science*. We may, then, turn to its more specifically Social Science contents. Of the series of articles by T. Ernest Allen, called "Studies in Sociology," which began in the very first issue and continued for at least thirteen numbers, possibly the less said the better, as far as their scientific merits are concerned. However, we shall have occasion to make some comments on them in a later chapter on methods. The following quotation will give the flavor of the series:¹⁶

The highest social state is conceivable only upon the existence of one overshadowing and dominating condition, and that condition is, that the lives of all individuals shall conform to one supreme law which, in its action, produces perfect order and harmony, in all of the relations between human beings. This law is the law of love; the law which Christ came to teach: a law of such vast consequence in sociology, that this science, truly understood, must square with that logical development and application of it, which results from the combined action of high spirituality and intelligence. . . .

In succeeding articles the author proves the objective existence of a spiritual hearing or clairaudience.¹⁷ He teaches us that thought and emotion are forces inhering in atoms of the spirit brain; that the will projects the atoms

¹³ *Loc. cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁴ "The Authorities on Money and Finance," *Social Science*, No. 2, p. 6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ This quotation is from the third article in the series. The sub-title of the article is "Of God—The Holy Spirit—Immortality," *loc. cit.*, No. 3, p. 5.

¹⁷ "The Twelve Senses. Part I.—The Five Spiritual Senses," *loc. cit.*, No. 5, pp. 4-5.

from the spirit brain; and that the direction of the projection is from the positive or active mind toward the negative or passive mind. The law of attraction determines the projection of thought and emotion from one to another. Susceptibility to such projections constitutes the senses of thought and of emotion, etc., etc., etc.¹⁸

It is of course easy to trace these rather peculiar views about the constitution of personality and human relations in society. The "law of love" was one of the pet emphases of President Mark Hopkins of Williams College, who wrote enthusiastically on this subject in a manner not wholly unlike that of the Associationists and other mystical materialists, although in a much more sober vein.¹⁹ John Bascom, a student and later a professor, at Williams also emphasized the law of love.²⁰ At this particular period, therefore, the "law of love" doctrine was fully current and had respectable authority behind it. The less reputable spiritistic doctrines of clairaudience, spirit brain, mental projection, and the like, were also current among the spiritualists and other mystics and "new thought" people who flourished around the middle of the nineteenth century and enjoyed then more of a vogue than they do now. There is little to say about the large amount of space given by the editors of *Social Science* to these articles except to call attention to the intellectual associations that the Social Science movement enjoyed even at this late date on its nether side and to the concessions that its more dependable members and leaders were probably forced to make to marginal groups in order to secure financial support for their journal.

A Reversion to an Infantile Fixation. Much more interesting is a letter, published under the heading of *Correspondence* in the fifth issue, from an old gentleman who signs himself S. T. Udent. He is, he tells us, on the verge of 70, having spent his whole life in an effort to ameliorate the condition of his fellow beings. He wants to help the coming generation. How can he do this? We quote his own comments on this question.²¹

The answer seems ready: "By trying to promulgate a science of society as nearly perfect as the circumstances and conditions of the age will permit."

What, then, is requisite for a perfect natural science? It must be based upon a correct knowledge of the nature of the beings who constitute society. Its arrangements must be such as to provide scope for the legitimate and healthy action, of each and all the forces impelling those beings to action, and it must

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Part II.—"The Transference of Thought and Emotion," No. 7, p. 5.

¹⁹ See, for example, Mark Hopkins, *The Law of Love and Love as Law* (1869).

²⁰ See, for example, *The Goodness of God* (New York, 1901), Part III.

²¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 9.

remove all arbitrary and unnatural restraints upon such activities, which aid in the perversion of their legitimate results.

In the use of the word "legitimate" I have reference to no law save that of nature, that inherent power, which, if unperverted, produces only harmony, beauty and happiness; but which, if perverted in any degree, inevitably produces a corresponding degree of deformity, discord and misery.

The observations and experiences of a lifetime, seconded by the result of the most extensive study of the thoughts and conclusions of others, has satisfied me that all the misery endured by human beings arises from ignorance of man and his relations, or from attempts to force him to act and live in violation of the natural law of his being and his relation to his fellow beings.

It is quite clear that S. T. Udent is also a disciple. His faith in Natural Law and his expressed belief that human interests and impulses may be harmonized without repression or denial classifies him quite clearly with the Fourierites and Associationists, with whom he was probably associated in his youth. Here, then, is an echo from the past, as out of date as the later writings and endeavors of Albert Brisbane to resurrect an interest in the old doctrines of "divine harmony." But these doctrines were out-moded only from the standpoint of the newer findings of a developing social psychology and sociology, then claiming the best energies of a new generation more adequately trained in the results of social science and psychological research. There were still many mystics and semi-mystics who yet hoped to conjure a perfect society out of the Great Magician's hat by some sort of hocus pocus appeal to Natural Law and the harmonization of human impulses which, according to Fourier, having been given man by God could not be evil or useless. The Oneida Community, flourishing at this time, was based very largely upon this doctrine.

However, the newer Social Science was not depending for a solution of the problems of social mal-adjustment solely upon the manipulation of human nature and the harmonization of man's natural impulses, but was turning its attention increasingly to a study of the environment of man and seeking to organize and manipulate it in the interests of social and individual welfare. It was this new trend and insight into the requirements of social reform and social adjustment that had largely destroyed the old Associationist or Fourierist Social Science and replaced it with the economic emphasis upon concrete control of the material environmental processes. But apparently every age has its particular brand of emphasis upon a subjective or individual approach to the solution of adjustment problems. At one time it was mystical religion. In the nineteenth century it was As-

sociationism and kindred mystical doctrines. Today it is psychoanalysis, with its mystical faith and belief that social evils begin in sex perversion or blocking and that remedies must be sought in sexual release. What the approved panacea of the immediate future is to be—whether Aryanism, neo-paganism, or some form of Fascistic strutism—is not yet disclosed.

Social Psychology Emphasized. S. T. Udent, having thus laid down his faith in both the reformistic and the scientific ideals and his belief that a knowledge of the subjectively operating principles which govern human behavior are essential to social welfare, continues as follows: "What more, then, is necessary to the establishment of a perfect 'Social Science' than a thorough elucidation of the inherent forces that impel mankind to action, an accurate classification of those forces and a demonstration of their legitimate sphere of activity."²² In other words, his contention amounts to the belief that an individual social psychology is basic to Social Science, very much as it was assumed to be in Brisbane's system.

In the seventh issue of *Social Science*, this writer analyzes the human mind into propensities and faculties. There are, according to his findings, 24 of the former and 15 of the latter, and all human activities are traceable to them. None of the propensities are evil; all stimulate to necessary functions. There are two classes of propensities, namely, individual and social. These in turn fall into four distinct groups, each containing propensities arranged according to their degrees of elevation in the order of creation. The first group relate to the preservation of life against other orders of beings; the second to the establishment and regulation of family, tribe, clan, society, or state; the third to the preservation of a comfortable existence for an organism which is subject to unfavorable conditions, such as storms, seasons, etc.; and the fourth to the enjoyment of existence. The social propensities fall into four groups also. The first relate to propagation; the second to the establishment and regulation of family, tribe, clan, society, or state; the third to the preservation of order, justice, and harmony in the social condition; and the fourth to the polishing, refining, and humanizing of the social order. All of these are graded from the lowest forms of animal life to the highest, man. The faculties, on the other hand, are divided into three groups, as follows: (1) the perceptive, consisting of nine faculties, (2) the retentive, including four faculties, and (3) the reflective, consisting of two faculties. The general similarities of these classifications to those earlier presented as drawn from Brisbane are evident.

²² *Ibid.*

His conception of the utilization of this classification of propensities and faculties for the purpose of scientific control of society is highly mechanical and artificial. In fact, it reminds one strongly of the type later planned to manipulate human conduct by setting in operation the so-called instincts like so many keys on a typewriter.²³ He says, "Therefore, true social science is the defining of the proper use and limit of exercise, of each and all of the propensities, and so regulating the relations of individuals, that each may give to, and receive from all, just what nature intended and no more."²⁴

The strongly Fourieristic character of this old man's concept of Social Science suggests that he may once have been an Associationist. If, as he says, he was 70 at this time, in 1887, he was in his thirties at the height of the Associationist Social Science movement, and the connection is not altogether improbable. This strongly subjective psychological emphasis is in marked contrast to the major emphasis of most of the economic Social Scientists to be discussed later. It also embodies most of the errors of the older subjective social psychology of Fourier and his antecedents.

A Saner Psychological Approach. Another article, exhibiting also a psychological emphasis, appeared somewhat later. It was by J. K. Ingalls, who had been in close contact with the Associationist movement. He had been connected with *The Harbinger* and later with the *Spirit of the Age*, which had absorbed *The Harbinger*. His article, entitled "Social Science,"²⁵ was mainly about property, but it was introduced by the following statements:²⁶

The science of human society is the most complex and intricate of all the sciences. If science be "exact and classified knowledge," then our subject is yet in a crude stage of development, at least as regards any popular or general acceptance. History and Statistics furnish but vague and meagre data, from which we can formulate any certain and reliable conclusions.

²³ See L. L. Bernard, *Instinct: A Study in Social Psychology* (1924).

²⁴ *Loc. cit.*, p. 7. A similarly subjective psychological bias is revealed by W. M. Boucher, in an article on "Public Spirit as a Measure of Manhood. Part II. Rational and Emotional Charity," in the ninth issue of *Social Science*. He says, "The psychic forces, social forces, impulsive forces, may be, and are to be rationally controlled, as are the physical forces" (*loc. cit.*, p. 7).

²⁵ This paper was read at the opening meeting of a club known as the Social Science Fortnightly, meeting at 64 West Eleventh Street, New York, on October 15, 1887. The magazine *Social Science* extended "its thanks to the artists who so admirably assisted," including Lillian Russell, who sang Tosti's Good Bye. The president of the group was Mrs. L. H. Camp (Notice in *Social Science*, I: 39, Oct. 19, 1887).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

On the very threshold we discover that it is a psychical rather than a physical science; relating to the desires, emotions, intelligence and will of the men and women who make up the aggregate of our human society. It embraces the influence of human motives, and of mind over mind, as well as the effects of environment upon the race.

Social Science, he tells his readers, had been mainly speculative and metaphysical in the past, but it is increasing in accuracy of method and dependability of results. Adam Smith introduced a more exact era.²⁷ "And yet," in spite of his work, "the science of political economy constituting the connecting link between the physical and psychical planes of social science has remained greatly speculative. . . ." Theories of rent, wages, interest, profits, etc., do not explain industry and exchange, he assures us. They explain division of hazard, fraud, and might, but not equity. From this point the author continues with a technical discussion of property. Very probably his psychological emphasis came from his contacts with the earlier Associationist Social Science, but his own handling of the psychological aspects is much more securely based upon a scientific as distinguished from a metaphysical fund of data and ideas.

Terminology. In the first issue of *Social Science* there appeared a brief editorial on the problem of terminology which illustrates the fact that the concepts involved in the Social Science of this school were largely economic. The statement is as follows:²⁸

WANTED. Not only wanted, but greatly Needed.

Brief, but clear, comprehensive and expressive definitions of the leading terms in Politico-Social Economy and Social Science.

Exact terminology is absolutely essential for the correct treatment of any subject, but in none more, if as much so, as in the consideration and discussion of Social-Economic questions.

We therefore invite the readers and correspondents of Social Science to suggest terse definitions of the following terms: Labor. Value. Intrinsic (!) Value. Exchangeable (!) Value. Legal (!) Value. Money. Price. "Currency." (!) Land. Rent. Production. Distribution. Interest. Profit. Capital. Wealth. Civilization. Exchange. Service. "Medium (!) of Exchange." "Economic Rent." "Unearned Increment." Socialism. "Land Values." "Tariff for Revenue Only" (!) "Tariff for Protection" (!). Communism. Individualism. Anarchism. Nihilism. Political Economy. Natural Law. Fact. History. "Standard of Value." "Measure of Value." Capitalist. Laborer. Life. Heredity. Environment. Evolution. Society. The State. Co-operation. Proportional Representation. "The Referendum." Im-

²⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁸ *Loc. cit.*, p. 15.

perative mandate. Government. Tariff. Protection. Free Trade. Tax. Prohibition. License. Suffrage. Citizen.

Let your definitions be brief. . . . Above all else, let them be *correct*. That is, in accordance with the facts.

Scarcely any of these concepts would fall within the sphere of Social Science exclusively. Most of them belong to political economy, history, and political science, as well as to Social Science, if to the last named subject at all. This once more illustrates the confusion in the minds of the adherents of Social Science themselves as to the limits or inclusiveness of their field. Each group of Social Scientists skewed the meaning of the subject in the direction of its own predilections. In this case economic and political terms seem to predominate.

The Lyceum Stage. Before we leave this interesting little journal, let us refer to an intriguing advertisement which appeared in the last number, interesting because it reveals the growing popular concern with Social Science. The advertisement reads: ²⁹

SOCIAL SCIENCE LECTURES. Mr. Nolan-Martin, the well known orator, scientist and journalist, will be prepared with open dates for lectures in New York State, on and after December 15, 1887. For full circulars and prices apply to the editor of SOCIAL SCIENCE, or to A. Nolan-Martin, Box M. Steinway Hall, N. Y.

Mr. Nolan-Martin is duly entered upon the "Star Course," Slayton Lyceum Bureau, Chicago.

Social Science, it appears, had now reached the lyceum stage of development.

Variety of Content of Social Science. We have now completed our synoptic survey of the earlier and more radical phases of Utopistic Social Science. Throughout we have emphasized the paradoxical nature of a science which could produce such strikingly unlike methods and conclusions as those of, say, Brisbane and Andrews. In its most characteristic form Social Science was, like contemporaneous socialistic movements in Europe, essentially a protest against the emerging industrial system and the classical political economy which justified it. The protest took many forms, as we have seen, just as the evils of the industrial system also assumed a considerable variety of aspects. That such divergent systems were taken to be the true Social Science merely indicates that the science, if it may be digni-

²⁹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 16.

fied with this name, was still in the revelation stage so far as method was concerned. A man worked over a limited set of data and when they organized themselves in his mind he emerged from his study to proclaim the principles of a true Social Science. That his results were so different from those of other men did not seem to worry him. In fact, the different schools of Social Science did not seem to be acutely aware of one another's existence.

A Basis of Agreement. In spite of all the differences in the contents of various kinds of early Utopistic Social Science there was a fundamental underlying agreement of emphasis. All the Utopistic Social Scientists believed that there existed, if man could only discover it, a harmonious social system to which man should conform in his social relationships. They wanted the natural social laws to operate. This is characteristically American, for the nineteenth century was the flowering time of rugged individualism. There should be only sufficient government to guarantee the free operation of natural laws. This was, of course, a purely metaphysical conception, similar in its nature to the Platonic conception of the existence and reality of a dominant system of general ideas and to the kindred concept of a Natural Law existing somewhere in the universe and determining the details of human law and conduct. So here, by analogy, we have a surviving belief in an antecedent social system, a sort of Platonic general idea or Natural Law construct, which exists somewhere as a metaphysical reality. The one thing that is necessary in order to secure a perfect society on earth is to locate and define and describe this metaphysically perfect idea or ideal and bring it down to earth and make it a mundane as well as a metaphysical reality. From the time of the early Associationists to the Utopistic New York group who edited and contributed to *Social Science* there are evident many attempts to do this very thing. Some of these attempts, like those of the Associationists, are more metaphysical than the rest. Others, like those of the New York group, are much more realistic.

PART SIX

The Nationalist or Carey School of Social Science

Introduction to the Economic Phase of Social Science

The Movement Thus Far. Having completed the highly Utopistic and the speculative phases of Social Science, we may profitably take a brief glance backward over the development of the Social Science movement down to the point we have reached in preparation for the new emphases we shall have to discuss in this and subsequent chapters.

We have already examined in considerable detail (in Part II) the work of the Associationists or Fourierites, led mainly by Albert Brisbane, and of the Post-Associationists (treated in Part V), who had no centralized leadership but were divided into a number of groups or tendencies, united however under the extensive common denominator of economic and social Utopianism. We have also covered (in Part III) the field of Positivist or Comtist Social Science in this country, which was even more diverse in its various forms of statement and even more on the defensive, because of its covert threat to the old theology and metaphysics, than was the Associationist Social Science theory. Lastly, we have dealt (in Part IV) with the somewhat scattered, but highly significant Systematic Social Science theorists. These were in no small degree inspired fundamentally by the Positivists in their methods of attacking the general problems of Social Science. They might even properly be classified with the Positivists or Comtists as Neo-Positivists, in somewhat the same manner as that in which we have related the Post-Associationists with the Associationists proper.

But the Systematic Social Scientists of the third quarter of the nineteenth century in the United States drew from a considerable variety of sources, not the least important of which were the British general scientists who had in part at least taken their cues from the logic of the sciences principally exploited by Comte. Some of them were indeed Comte's disciples, and therefore, as a connecting link, they bound the Systematic Social Scientists even closer to the Positivist tradition. These men were also largely original in their own light. They had, almost without exception, spent many years,

and in some cases almost a life time, in reading and analyzing and synthesizing their data for a theoretical Social Science. They were a very important group, who influenced the thought of their time. If they failed in the main to produce a valid or lasting system of Social Science methodology, the fault lay primarily in the fact that they were, like Comte, endeavoring to introduce into this country an abstract general social science before there was any concrete basis for it. They had no adequate body of data to support their conclusions such as Spencer drew from ethnology and the later economists, political scientists, and sociologists have drawn from the statistics or concrete cases of everyday life. They were trying to make bricks without straw.

The Associationists sought to achieve administrative reforms mainly through the organization of phalansteries, and the Post-Associationists also leaned heavily upon communal colonies, ideal communities, and cooperative colonies. The group of cooperators led by Albert Kimsey Owen sought to establish a new type of colony but the conditions for its success on an isolated bay on the far away coast of Mexico, were by no means favorable. This modern cooperative colony therefore fared but little better than the communistic colonies of Robert Owen and other Utopian idealists founded more than half a century earlier. The land reform advocates could make little progress in a country where land speculation was one of the chief "get rich quick" grafts available to the professional real estate gamblers. They found it practically impossible to secure the serious attention of legislators. They had an opportunity to learn that land reform is popular only where land is scarce and difficult to obtain. Other related economic reforms had for various reasons as little legislative and administrative success; or even popular acceptance, as far as that is concerned.

The failure of these various economic reform movements was not, however, generally attributed to economic causes, as strange as this may seem. Instead failure was supposed to be the result of a maladroitness of human nature and a lack of wise political insight in planning for the success of the reforms. Nonetheless the objective economic situation, serving as a favorable or an unfavorable conditioning environment, was in reality also a very important factor, although not always adequately recognized in the theory of these schools and movements. In fact, it may be said that it was the perverse economic situation even more than the deficiencies of human nature that wrecked all of the Owenite and Fourieristic attempts to found ideal communities, as well as the Topolobampo experiment and the land

reform movements. This the promoters themselves seem generally to have recognized, but it was not a principle which their theological and metaphysical critics would easily admit.

These critics were as strong for the dominance of human nature as were the early anarchistic radicals themselves, but of course in a much more orthodox fashion. The extreme radicals believed that human nature was basically good and the conservatives considered it to be fundamentally bad. This was the main difference between them, for both took their respective positions in this controversy over human nature primarily because they needed to do so in defense of the two opposing economic and social systems. One theory was Utopian in character, supposedly tending to the profit of a new society yet to be organized; the other, holding to retrogression and degeneration in society, was better adapted to the theological and political and social institutions already in existence. Quite obviously a theology based on original sin and perverted human nature could not flourish in a prosperous world freed from want, oppression, and suffering. It would have nothing to point to in the social order as the fruit of sin. Sin itself was essential to such a theory.

A Brief Glance Forward. But as important as was the theoretical and systematic approach to Social Science, especially in its more magisterial Neo-Positivist phase as distinguished from its highly speculative and a priori Associationist aspect, it would be quite erroneous to suppose that Social Science was predominantly characterized by this theoretical point of view.

As has often been pointed out in these pages, the Social Science movement was always dual, always characterized by both a theoretical and a reformist outlook. Sometimes both points of view were to be found combined in something like equal proportions, as was the case with Associationism. At other times and in other instances the theoretical or pure science ideal predominated, as in the case of the Positivist and systematic theorists. In still other instances the practical reform ideal was dominant over the theoretical, the latter serving merely as a necessary sanction for the former. Such was the case, as we have seen, with the Post-Associationists. Such also we shall find to be in part true in connection with the Nationalist or Carey school and the Neo-Classical group of Social Scientists which we shall next consider, although the practical objectives in both of these schools are covered over with an occulting layer of theory. This strongly practical objective in the two schools of Social Science which we now approach took on

a predominantly economic theoretical coloring as a sanction for the ends which they sought.

The Economic Emphasis Takes the Lead in Social Science. In the two schools of Social Science that we are to consider in Parts VI and VII—the Nationalist and the Neo-Classical—the economic aspect comes definitely to the front and admittedly dominates both the theory and the application of Social Science. It is for this reason that we have reserved the term economic to characterize these two schools of Social Science.

The economic emphasis had not, to be sure, been wanting in the earlier schools. It had been outstanding among the Associationists, and it had been even stronger among the Post-Associationists. The latter, for example, included many practical movements with a decided economic slant, such as the advocates of cooperation and the militant land reformers. But it cannot be said that either of these Social Science schools had been obviously dominated by the economic reform motive. Political and personal and community reforms, culminating in administrative reforms primarily, were at least as important as economic reform in these two earlier schools. The economic element in the Associationist and Post-Associationist and related reform systems was therefore largely hidden from view, although important enough in fact. But the Nationalist or Carey School and the Neo-Classical School of Social Science, now to be discussed, were primarily economic in emphasis.

Nor were the two schools of economic Social Science here discussed without other elements of social theory than the economic, for even economic theory and practice cannot disregard a theory of human nature and a theory of social organization and control. Both of these subsidiary theories we shall find well developed in the chapters that follow, but they were obviously used as sanctions and as justifications for the various economic orders which they undertook to support rather than as central elements in a general system.

The economic systems thus advocated fall into two main groups and the general character of each is indicated by the titles here given to the schools which advocated them and by the description of their philosophies which we shall present.

Economic Science Antecedents. Political economy was already an old and fairly well-established special discipline by the time the discipline Social Science began to flower. Parallel with the French influence, which had inundated this country in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-

turies, there had been a British influence, mainly Scotch in its personnel, equally powerful but less spectacular and less popular and political. Especially in natural theology and in mental and moral philosophy the British influence had been strong through such men as Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Paley, Reid, and Dugald Stewart. It is with the current of thought first introduced by Adam Smith, especially through his *Enquiry Concerning the Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, that the present and following divisions of our book have largely to deal. The controversy also centers around two of his British successors, Malthus and Ricardo, and the theory of economic harmonies of the French economist Bastiat, who outdid Adam Smith in his emphasis upon free trade.

In the two schools now before us we shall find Smith's chief hypotheses both criticized and defended, but it is always around his theories and their elaboration by his classical successors, and in large measure disciples, that the storm consistently rages in the defense of the two opposing systems of economic control advocated by the two schools we are to study. One of these schools of Social Science—Carey's (Part VI)—stands for protectionism and a national economy in general, and therefore opposed much that the classical economists advocated. The other school—the Neo-Classical (Part VII)—is the champion of free trade and laissez faire generally, in the true Adam Smith tradition.

Quasi-Theoretical Character of the Economic Schools. By courtesy we characterize these two schools as theoretical, and we apply this term to the second or Neo-Classical school, discussed in Part VII, more unreservedly than to the first, or Nationalist group, treated in Part VI. This characterization is confessedly somewhat confusing and not wholly justified by the facts, although in a sense inescapable. Both schools had definitely practical and even reformistic objectives, if we may use this term in connection with an endeavor to produce changes in social policy in the interest of minorities as well as of majorities or the masses. The distinctive fact to note here, however, is that the writers on this economic aspect of Social Science sought to realize their practical ends not so much by means of establishing colonies or communities or by directly promoted legislative programs in support of their interests as by means of argument. Their chief and sometimes only weapon or instrument for accomplishing practical social changes was theory. Thus the writings on the economic aspect of Social Science are mainly theoretical in form, although practical in their ultimate emphasis and purpose, which is obviously reformistic. Their theory was never an end

in itself, but always a means to a practical or reform objective. This fact is very clearly illustrated by the bitterness with which some of the Social Scientists in these schools, and especially in the second group of free trade theorists, applied their arguments to practical issues. While the type of theory advanced by these two schools was mainly economic, many psychological and sociological, and even metaphysical, hypotheses constantly appear in their works.

Confusion in the Economic Schools. Despite the fact that both of the economic schools are predominantly theoretical in form and appeal to the sanction of science, it is a motley group of men and theories that constitute the economic phase of Social Science. Both protectionists and free traders of different varieties are to be seen propagandizing under the banner of Social Science. In this respect they remind us of the advocates of cooperation, of land reform, of phalanx organization, of anarchism—all and more—of the earlier Social Science schools with their corresponding theories of social reform, all claiming the title of Social Scientists. Such confusion recalls the telling jibe which one critic of the new discipline made. "It is instructive to notice," he said, "that the Positivists, just as soon as they approach these sciences of mind, morals, human rights, and government, disagree with each other as much as the rest of us unpositive mortals."¹

There was, as a matter of fact, great confusion in the public mind regarding the various social science disciplines. Political philosophy was identified with sociology, and "moral and political economy" were included under politics.² One writer attributes this confusion to the pernicious tendency which political economy displayed in attempting to appropriate the entire field of political theory and practice, as well as to the vagueness of conception of the several fields.³

The fact that the Nationalist or Carey school of Social Science was protectionist in its point of view must not mislead us into believing that it was essentially opposed to laissez faire. In almost every other respect it was a

¹ Unsigned, "Positivism in England," *The Southern Review*, V: 378 (Apr. 1869).

² Unsigned, "Spencer's Social Statics," *Quarterly Review of the M.E. Church, South*, X: 188 (Apr., 1856).

³ *Ibid.* The confusion between sociologists and economists lasted a good many years. As late as 1871, for example, Joseph Wharton asked, "Does the 'laissez faire,' or let alone doctrine, which some sociologists insist upon as the law of nature, and as the correct rule for international trade, inculcate a really sound policy for the guidance of nations in their dealings with each other?" ("International Industrial Competition," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 4, 1871, p. 51). Perhaps the fact that so many of the earlier sociologists came from the field of economics may have caused this confusion.

strong partisan of the laissez faire doctrine, a fact which comes out fully in the theories of its members regarding population and rent.

Nor must we conclude that the Neo-Classical school of Social Science was always consistently pledged to laissez faire merely because they believed in and advocated free trade. They were by no means averse to the state's establishing free trade by means of positive legislation and enforcing it by means of armed opposition against those who sought to establish monopolistic control of any kind over industry. Nor did their espousal of laissez faire extend to the point of making them intolerant of private monopoly and the absolutistic control of industry by the owning and operating classes. They even defended slavery by arms, practiced nullification, and advocated secession when it promoted their interests to do so. They were consistently on the side of strong governmental resistance when it came to defending property—their property in mills and in commerce—against labor and trade union aggressions of any sort.

Here again we have further and telling evidence of our contention that members of both schools were theoretical economic Social Scientists only in form and as a means to a practical end. In a highly complex and interdependent society and a largely literate age when social change and reform were to be accomplished primarily through legislation rather than by force of arms (revolution), or by private and isolated group initiative (ideal colonies), propaganda on the basis of opportune theory had become the most effective means to the practical ends desired.

Nationalistic Social Science as a Revolt against Classical Economic Theory. In the early years of the century Adam Smith had been almost universally accepted in matters pertaining to political economy as well as in that phase of moral philosophy which we now call social psychology. But with the later classicists, and especially with Malthus, and to some extent with Ricardo, early American public opinion could not entirely agree. The rejection of Malthus until practically the end of the nineteenth century by both the capitalistic or industrialist leaders and the socialistic theorists is a commonplace in the history of American economic thought,⁴ as is also Henry C. Carey's reversal of the doctrine of Ricardo.⁵ These two men—Malthus and Ricardo—as commonly interpreted by Carey and his school, following the characterization of Carlyle,⁶ had converted Smith's sanguine

⁴ See, e. g., Lewis H. Haney, *History of Economic Thought* (1911), pp. 511-512.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Thomas Carlyle, *Chartism*, Chapter X.

system into the so-called dismal science of economic hopelessness and despair, personifying a metaphysical doctrine of almost Calvinistic hardness in the concept of "the economic man."

In a certain sense early nineteenth century European Socialism was also a reaction against this dismal and artificial science of the so-called economic man, but this movement, much more fundamentally radical than the opposition under Carey, did not reach this country with any force until long after the theories of the Carey school had attained their fullest flower. Thus the opposition to the Malthusian theories in this country in the middle of the nineteenth century took primarily the form of an increasingly conservative industrialism rather than of a radical demand for a development toward proletarian communal control. Likewise, the movement accepted the now relatively respectable characterization of Social Science instead of the highly suspect name of Socialism, which of itself was then, and still is, sufficient to frighten a nation of rugged individualists into strong repressive measures.

It is, however, worth noting here briefly that both of these economic movements on the political side—the Nationalistic and the Socialistic philosophies—aimed not at laissez faire, as did the classical economic movements against which they were primarily a protest, but at further regimentation and control of the public policies of a country in the interest of what they regarded as greater social efficiency and economic prosperity. They differed essentially in their theories as to how this prosperity might be obtained. The protectionist policy sought to achieve prosperity and efficiency for the masses by making industry and commerce successful at the top, that is in the persons of the owners, and efficient through the improved skill of the workers. Socialism held to the theory that both of these ends could be accomplished more democratically, that is, through the direct action of the proletariat and without the guiding overlordship of the bourgeois industrial and commercial leaders. The greater political acceptance of the former program would seem to show where the American people placed its confidence primarily—in the bourgeois leaders rather than in the masses.

The men of the Carey school protested not only against the "dismal" doctrines of Malthus and Ricardo, but also against the free trade tendencies of Adam Smith. On the other hand, they accepted in the main the implications of the Scotch philosophers as to human nature and the reign of Natural Law. These, it will be seen, were the main theoretical backgrounds of the Nationalist school of Social Science,

Neo-Classical Social Science Hews to the Line. The Neo-Classical Social Scientists, representing the interests of commerce rather than of manufacture, repudiated the protests of both the socialists and the Nationalist School against laissez faire in industry, and sought by all the propaganda devices of which they were masters to realize by political suffrage the main tenets of the classical British school of political economy. Curiously, perhaps naturally, since most of their members were primarily propagandists and pamphleteers rather than genuine Social Scientists, the majority of the members of this free trade laissez faire school followed in the main the leadership of the English school of Cobden in their practical policies. But almost unanimously they took for their theoretical guidance the doctrines of Bastiat as expressed in his *Harmonies Economiques* (1850).

Reaction against the so-called pessimism of the classical school of the Economic Man, and especially against the theories of Ricardo and Malthus, had begun in fact long before the Carey school became a significant factor in this country. We found it as a somewhat obscure element in the Associationist doctrines, and we saw it grow into a well articulated protest among the Post-Associationists. Since these men were not so much political economists as they were anarchists and radical social reformers generally, the remedy they advocated was not protectionism, but a sort of Utopistic socialist policy as set forth in the radical economic and kindred Social Science theories of Josiah Warren, Stephen Pearl Andrews, Louis Masquerier, and other Post-Associationists.

Yet, as we shall see in the discussion of the Carey school, they have much in common with the Nationalist group of Social Scientists. Frequently very similar theories about natural harmony and attraction, and even human nature and Natural Law, are stated by members of the Carey school; and, as we shall indicate at the proper place, it is quite clear that at least one member of this school, William Elder, had been an Associationist before he became a disciple of Carey. Thus the transition between the Post-Associationists and the Nationalist school of Social Science is quite easy and evident. We have not, however, organized the treatment of the Carey school from the standpoint of the relative closeness of its members to the Post-Associationists, but rather in chronological order, thus bringing the chapter on Elder, who in his early days had most in common with the Associationists, last.

The Social Science Theories of Henry C. Carey: Critical Aspects

Carey's Position in Social Science. By the eighteen-fifties, Fourieristic Social Science had fallen into decay, but the tantalizing belief in a social system based on harmony persisted. It was not long, therefore, before various new types of Social Science arose. One of these, embodying this popular belief in harmony, is the subject of this and the chapters immediately following. Its formulator and leading exponent was Henry C. Carey,¹ the first of the bona fide economic Social Scientists and founder of the so-called American school of political economy.

Carey's Social Science may, indeed, be said to be a practically oriented successor to Associationist Social Science in the sense that, like Fourier's system, it was based on a theory of harmony and Natural Law. It was, however, less psychological than Fourier's, and it did not contemplate any revolutionary reorganization of society. Moreover, it made its chief appeal to the facts of economic life rather than to the supposed facts of human nature as borrowed from the Scotch philosophers and transformed by Fourier. Likewise, Carey's argumentative appeal in so far as it has a historical slant, is to economic history rather than to the philosophy of history as exploited by Fourier and Brisbane. Carey's writing is remarkable for its flavor

¹ Henry Charles Carey (1793-1879) was born in Philadelphia, the son of Mathew Carey, a political refugee from Ireland and advocate of protection. He became a partner in his father's book and publishing business in 1817 and read widely, both in connection with his work, and independently. In 1835 he withdrew from business in order to devote his time to writing. His ardent advocacy of protectionism savored of religious conviction and "William Elder, declaring he quoted Carey, is authority for the statement that his conversion to protectionism came like a flash in 1844" (*Dictionary of American Biography*, III: 488). He was a very kindly man and his home became a gathering place for visitors and disciples. His works include: *Essay on the Rate of Wages* (1835); *Principles of Political Economy* (1837-1840); *Commercial Associations in France and England* (1845); *Past, Present and Future* (1848); *Harmony of Interests; Manufacturing and Commercial* (1851), translated into seven European languages and the Japanese; *Slave Trade, Domestic and Foreign* (1853); *Letter to the President* (1858); *Principles of Social Science* (1858-1859); *Unity of Law* (1872) (See *Dictionary of American Biography*, III: 487-489).

of realism, even when his conclusions are open more or less to question. This quality is due primarily to the fact that he sticks pretty close to the present and deals mainly, at least in appearance, with the hard facts of economic reality. By the same token he avoids vague theorizings about human nature and speculative conclusions regarding the probable succession of stages of growth in human society.

Carey's Economic and Social Theory. In essence Carey's Social Science was a polemic against the Ricardo-Malthus type of political economy which, unlike Adam Smith's, treated man solely as an economic being bereft of feelings and sentiments. Carey's thesis was that wealth-getting is properly for man; not man for wealth-getting. Poverty and pauperism were not, as Malthus insisted, the inevitable result of over-population but the result of wrong economic policies. The Ricardian doctrine of rent was false, and the true one was just exactly the reverse of Ricardo's, namely that as civilization progresses better and more fertile lands are cultivated and the returns become greater rather than less. The prime characteristics of man are association (or commerce), individuality, responsibility, and capacity for progress, each of these traits being successively dependent upon the preceding one. Anything that augments and facilitates these characteristics of humanity is socially right; anything that interferes with them is wrong. Association especially should be encouraged. Commerce, considered in its broadest sense, is essentially the same as association, but trade is not. Traders, that is, middlemen, should be minimized as much as possible. By the encouragement of association Carey seems to mean industrialization, or increase in the division of labor. A theory very much like Spencer's theory of progress is here invoked.²

The main objective in Carey's whole system was to show that the same law rules social as well as physical phenomena. If this is true, he contended, it would be absurd to hold that potatoes, turnips, and other means of subsistence increase less rapidly than man. Indeed, one gets the feeling that Carey's insistence on the unity of law in the universe—or the identity of the laws governing physical and social phenomena—was primarily a means of demonstrating the errors of Malthus and Ricardo instead of the result of an unbiased search for the facts in the case.³

² H. C. Carey, *Principles of Social Science* (1858-1859), I: 53.

³ For example, he contends: "'Order' being, however, 'Heaven's first law,' it is difficult to comprehend how such an one as that announced by Mr. Ricardo could follow in its train—and the mere fact that it would be productive of such disorder, would seem to be a sufficient reason for doubting its truth, if not, even, for causing it to be instantly rejected. So, too,

Criticism of the Economic Man Theory of Classical Economics. Carey was a strong critic of the "economic man" theory in political economy, as presented by the classical British economists especially. On this subject he declared,⁴

The law of the composition of forces requires that we should study *all* the causes tending to produce a given effect. That effect is MAN—the man of the past and the present; and the social philosopher who excludes from consideration his feelings and affections, and the intellect with which he has been endowed, makes precisely the same mistake that would be made by the physical one who should look exclusively at gravitation, forgetting heat; and should thence conclude that at no distant day the whole material of which the earth is composed would become a solid mass, plants, animals and men having disappeared. Such is the error of modern political economy, and its effects are seen in the fact that it presents for our consideration a mere brute animal, to find a name for which it desecrates the word "man," recognized by Adam Smith as expressing the idea of a being made in the likeness of its Creator.

Carey detested what seemed to him the inhumanity of the British school, especially as represented by Malthus and Ricardo. "That theory," he says, "was supplied by Messrs. Malthus and Ricardo, who gave us laws of God by help of which to account for famines, pestilences, and slavery, that were but the necessary result of the misconduct of man." He continues: "Such was the origin of that modern political economy which so entirely repudiates the ideas of Adam Smith, and finds in trade the substitute for commerce. Retrograde throughout, it requires that we should at once, and for-

with that of Mr. Malthus, which leads inevitably to the subjection of the many to the will of the few—to centralization and slavery. No such law can, or could, exist. The Creator established none in virtue of which matter was required to take upon itself its highest form, that of man, in a ratio more rapid than that in which it tended to take the lower ones, those of potatoes and turnips, herrings and oysters, required for the sustenance of man. The great Architect of the universe was no blunderer, such as modern political economy would make him. All wise, he was not required to institute different sets of laws for the government of the same matter. All just, he was incapable of instituting any that could be adduced in justification of tyranny and oppression. All merciful, he could make none that would afford a warrant for want of mercy among men towards their fellowmen, such as is now daily exhibited in politico-economical books of high authority" (*ibid.*, p. 232). Also: "If the doctrines taught in the English school are right, then has the Creator made a serious blunder—having established slavery as the ultimate condition of a vast majority of the human race. If, on the contrary, they are wrong, then is freedom the ultimate lot of man, and then are there found throughout the natural laws regulating the social system, the same order, beauty, and harmony of arrangement we see prevailing everywhere else throughout the organic and inorganic world. One of these things is absolutely and universally true, and the other as absolutely and universally false. Either an all-wise Deity has made a mistake, or man has made one, and has invented a theory by help of which to gloss it over" (*ibid.*, p. 463).

⁴ *Ibid.*, I: 30–31.

ever, ignore the existence of an all-wise and all-benevolent Deity, and put our trust in a Being by whom had been instituted great natural laws in virtue of which men should necessarily, and 'regularly, die of want.'"⁵

After excoriating the poor logic which he believes characterizes the teachings of Malthus on the growing scarcity of the means of subsistence resulting from the increase of the human inhabitants of the globe, Carey's indignation at the "economic man" theory rises to white heat in the following passage.⁶

Such being the tendency of all its teaching, it is no matter of surprise that modern English political economy sees in man only an animal that *will* procreate, that *must* be fed, and that *can be made* to work—an instrument to be used by trade; that it repudiates all the distinctive qualities of man, and limits itself to the consideration of those he holds in common with the beast of burden or of prey; that it denies that the Creator meant that every man should find a place at his table, or that there exists any reason why a poor laborer, able and willing to work, should have any more right to be fed than the cotton-spinner has to find a market for his cloth; or that, as the reader has already seen, it assures its students that "labor is a commodity," and that if men *will* marry and have children without having previously made provision for them, it is for them to take their chance—and that "*if we stand between the error and its consequences, we stand between the evil and its cure*—if we intercept the penalty, (where it does not amount to positive death,) we perpetuate the sin."

While this indignation at the central sociological conception of classical British economic theory does credit to Carey's humanitarian sentiments, it scarcely warrants his implied attack upon the Malthusian theory of population, which has much less connection with the theory of the "economic man" than Carey supposed.

Carey's Attack upon Malthus. Carey firmly believed that the theory of the "economic man" rested upon the teachings of Malthus and Ricardo and that the Malthusian theory depended upon the Ricardian theory of rent. Accordingly, he proceeded to demolish these two theories because they stood in the way of a humanitarian and optimistic Social Science. First, he attacks Malthus. He states the well known theory of Malthus (later abandoned by him) that man increases in a geometrical ratio and that his means of subsistence increase only in an arithmetical ratio. Upon this hypothesis he heaps plausible, but useless (because it was no longer maintained by Malthus) ridicule. He points out that the natural increase

⁵ *Ibid.*, I: 468.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I: 470.

of all organisms is in inverse ratio to their evolutionary development and offers illustrations to support this principle. At this point, however, he neglects the actual increase. Malthus, he says, has announced another law which would reverse this natural law! Carey ridicules and deplors this erroneous principle in the following passage:⁷

When, however, we reach the highest condition of which matter is capable, we learn the existence of a new and greater law, in virtue of which man increases in a geometrical ratio, while the increase of herrings, rabbits, oysters, potatoes, turnips, and all other commodities required for his use, is limited to the arithmetical one! Such is the extraordinary law propounded by Mr. Malthus, as existing in reference to the only being on whom has been impressed the desire for association, as necessary for compliance with the sole condition of his existence; the only one, to whom has been given an infinite variety of capacities fitting him for association with his fellow men, and requiring it for their development; and the only one, too, that—having been gifted with the power to distinguish right from wrong, and thus been made responsible for his actions—might with reason have required, that he should be exempt from any law requiring him to make his election between abstinence from that association which, of all others, tends most to the improvement of his head and heart, on one hand, and starvation on the other. Such, however, is the law of population instituted by an all-wise, all-powerful, and all benevolent Creator, in reference to the being made in his own likeness, and gifted with power to control and direct all the forces of nature to his use—and, strange as it appears, no proposition ever offered for consideration has exercised or is now exercising, upon the fortunes of the human race a greater amount of influence.

Carey devotes Chapters XLVI-XLIX of his great work⁸ to a detailed refutation of the Malthusian theory, in which he discusses the historical growth of population in relation to food supply, present potentialities of the food resources of the earth, the possibilities of colonization as an outlet for crowded populations, and the logic of Malthus' law as tested by the facts. It is not possible to go into these arguments in detail. But a few of his leading emphases may be brought into view in order that we may the better understand what was back of his expressed thought.

Carey's Belief in the Bounty of Nature. Living as he did at the period when the great expansion to the west in the United States was getting well under way, it seemed to Carey that our soil and other subsistence resources were practically unlimited. He speaks repeatedly of the divine command to "Increase and multiply, and subdue the earth," with approval. He re-

⁷ *Ibid.*, I: 92-93.

⁸ *Ibid.*, III: 263-367.

gards the counsel of Malthus to use "moral restraint" in reproduction as both ill advised and unnecessary. It was ill advised because what the frontiersmen (American settlers) and the primitive peoples (Indians) needed most was more, not less, population, in order that they might cooperate successfully in overcoming the resistance of nature to bountiful yields.⁹ It was unnecessary, because as culture and plenty increase, as an inevitable result of the operation of the law of progress, "moral restraint" will come automatically as a phase of that culture, as a result of a life on a higher plane.¹⁰ He summarises this optimistic faith in the beneficence of Providence and the natural laws instituted for the progress of man in the following paragraph.¹¹

Happily for man, history tells a story widely different from that of Mr. Malthus. All that is by him depicted as a consequence of increase of numbers, is precisely what we see to have existed in the past, when population was small, and when men could occupy at will either the lands of the hills, or those of the valleys—when no man had property in either—and when none could demand rent; but when all-powerful nature forbade the occupation of the lower and richer lands, and limited the labors of man to those of the poor ones of the hills. Such having been the case, and man having steadily acquired power as the result of that combination which could come only with increase of numbers, it would seem very clear that these theories could be entitled to no consideration whatsoever; unless, indeed, it were possible for us to conclude that the Creator had instituted laws that were to work at one time forward, and at another backward—at one time up, and at another down—while instituting, in relation to all other matter, laws which work so invariably in one direction, that having once determined what it is, man feels himself entirely safe in assuming that such it has been in all the times that are past, and that such it will be in all that are to come.

Carey does not deny that there is poverty and misery in the world. He is not even sure that he knows just what it is due to, although he is willing to assign a large part of it to the wrong teachings of Malthus and Ricardo and the classical economists generally. He is, however, sufficiently orthodox theologically and economically to place responsibility for most of it at the door of the weak and erring individual himself and exonerate the Almighty, although he holds the ruling classes in some measure guilty. He says,¹²

⁹ *Ibid.*, III: 360–362.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, III: 363–364.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I: 467.

¹² *Ibid.*, II: 364–365.

That there is a great deal of vice and misery in the world, is an undoubted fact. What are the causes of its existence, is yet disputed. Equally undetermined is it, as yet, who is responsible for it, and whether it is remediable, or otherwise—Mr. Malthus says, that it is the natural result of a divine, and therefore inevitable, law—the result, as we see, being that of relieving the governing classes of the world from any possible responsibility for the welfare of those below them. Both religion and common sense, however, teach, that the Being who made this wonderful world, in which every part is so perfectly adapted to the production of harmony, could have imposed upon man no law tending to the production of discord; that vice and misery are consequences of human error, and not of divine laws; and that the men who exercise power, and control the societary movement, are responsible for the condition of those around them.

Carey's Attack upon Ricardo. Carey believes that the Malthusian theory of population could not stand without the support of the Ricardian theory of rent, and that if this prop is removed the theory of Malthus will collapse of its own weight.¹³ Therefore he attacks Ricardo's theory. The sociological aspects of this theory are clearly and briefly summarized in the following passage.¹⁴

Commencing the work of cultivation on the richer soils—always those of the valleys—it follows, that as men become more numerous, they must disperse themselves—climbing the hills, or seeking elsewhere valleys whose rich soils remain as yet unappropriated. Dispersion, bringing with it an increased necessity for the services of the soldier, the sailor, and the trader, is accompanied by constant increase in the power of those who have appropriated land to demand payment for its use; and thus is there produced a constant increase in the proportions, and in the importance, of the classes that live by virtue of the exercise of the power of appropriation. Centralization, therefore, grows, and its growth is in the direct ratio of the diminution of the power of man to indulge his natural desire for combination with his fellowmen—and for that development of his faculties which fits him for association and enables him to acquire enlarged control over the wonderful forces of nature. The many, in that case, become from year to year more and more the slaves of nature and of their fellowmen—doing this, too, in virtue of what, if we are to believe Mr. Ricardo and his successors, is a great law, instituted by the Creator for the government of mankind.

This theory of Ricardo calls forth from Carey one of his many impassioned defenses of the justice and beneficence of the Creator. He gives a large portion of the space of the three volumes of his *Social Science* to a refutation of this theory, just as he devotes another large portion of his

¹³ *Ibid.*, I: 93.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I: 231.

space to the refutation of Malthus, as has already been shown. In fact, the chief themes of this book are the refutation of Malthus and Ricardo and his arguments for the encouragement of home industry and local self-sufficiency. For the sake of getting a good start in his refutation of Ricardo he states succinctly the central point of Ricardo's argument as follows.¹⁵

The whole system is based, as the reader will perceive, upon the assertion of the existence of the fact, that, in the commencement of cultivation, when population is small and land consequently abundant, the richest soils—those whose qualities fit them for yielding the largest return to any given quantity of labor—alone are cultivated. This fact exists or it does not. If it has no existence, the system falls to the ground. That it has none, and that it is contrary to the nature of things that it should have had, or can ever have it, it is proposed now to show.

Carey has the great virtue of being concrete and factual. Through a number of pages he reviews the history of North American pioneer settlement to prove his point that the pioneers first occupied the poorer, not the best, lands. He makes his point and concludes:¹⁶

The facts are everywhere the same, and, were it possible to find an apparent exception, it would but prove the rule. For the same reason that the settler builds himself a log-house, to provide shelter while waiting until he can have one of stone, he begins cultivation where he can use his plough, and thus avoid the starvation that would result from endeavoring to do so where he cannot; and where fevers, followed by death, would be the inevitable result of the attempt. In every case on record, in which settlements have been attempted on rich lands, they have either failed totally, or their progress has been slow; and it has been only after repeated efforts that they have thriven:

Then follows a long analysis of settlement in various other parts of the world to support his contention.

Carey Attacks Modern Industrialism and Trade. Carey has many other intellectual grievances against the English School of economists. He blames it for having promoted the growth of international trade, involving the increased use of long haul transportation in ships and on railways, which only increases the cost of goods, when the true prosperity of men is bound up with the cheapening of commodities. This policy has divided the world into agricultural and industrial nations, thus separating producer and consumer by thousands of miles, and consequently adding to the cost to the consumer without benefitting the producer. The ultimate result of this policy also demands the cheapening of raw materials to the point of crush-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I: 106.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I: 117.

ing the producer and raises prices of the finished product so as to put manufactured goods increasingly out of the reach of workers. How like some of the present-day criticism of the spread between producer and consumer prices these strictures of Carey sound! Finally, the whole trend of this policy is to exalt trade above agriculture, whereas agriculture is the true life of the nation.¹⁷ Although he does not say so, Carey had evidently been strongly influenced by the Utopistic colonizers, who sought a perfect rural society far removed from modern industrialism. He does not go all the way with the Utopists, however, but he is by no means wholly assimilated to the new and rising industrial order. He was also doubtless much influenced by the Jeffersonian Physiocratic bias in favor of agrarianism which had exercised some control over social thought in Pennsylvania as well as in the more southern states. He illustrates the evils of separating agricultural production from industry from the example of Jamaica, as follows:¹⁸

The more perfect the power of association and combination, the less is the need of man for machinery required for effecting changes of place, because his exchanges are chiefly made at home—but the greater is his power to obtain that machinery, because combination enables him to obtain command over the great natural forces given for his use. The less his power to maintain commerce, the greater is his dependence on machinery of transportation, and the less his power to obtain it; and that such was the case in the West Indies is shown by the fact, that in the capital of the rich island of Jamaica, Spanish-town, with a population of five thousand, there was not, five years since, to be found a single shop, nor a respectable hotel, nor even a dray-cart; and in the whole island there was not a stage, nor any other mode of regular conveyance, by land or water, except on the little railroad, of fifteen miles, from Kingston to the capital. As a necessary consequence of this state of things, so large a *proportion* of the labor of the community was required for performing the work of transportation within and without the limits of the island, that but a very small *proportion* of it could be given to any other purpose.

It is clear that what Carey desires is a well rounded community development in which all the aspects of life and industry will be adequately represented. He believed, as will be apparent later, that this could best be obtained by means of protectionism. What he did not foresee was that this same protectionism would ultimately constitute one of the chief means for the development of that supremacy of trade and finance and the consequent degradation of the producers of raw materials and foods, which he so strongly opposed.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I: 469.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I: 305.

Carey's Attack on the Capitalist System. Carey asserted that progress has "always been marked by increase in the power of labor over capital," but the English School urged that "labor should be abundant and cheap," like the raw materials for manufacture, in order that this labor might be kept "sufficiently under the control of capital."¹⁹ His chief criticism of the social order in the United States in his day was that labor, which had been free, was becoming enslaved to the holders of capital. He says,²⁰

The more numerous the masters, the worse for both master and servant; in proof of which may be cited the fact that it is within the limits of the American Union, in which it was once proclaimed that "all men were born equal," that the assertion has first been made that "free society has proved an utter failure;" and that the natural condition of a large portion of the human race is that of slavery—involving the separation of husbands from wives, parents from children, and brothers and sisters from each other. Such being the case even here, it is no matter of surprise that to the freest people of Europe we owe the invention of the most oppressive despotism—of that system which, more than any that had preceded it, looked to the enslavement of man—that one, the supporters of which now publicly proclaim that for its maintenance there is required that the further increase of population should be "in the most serviceable—the most laborious—part," as "otherwise it will not be sufficiently at the control of capital and skill"—being precisely the doctrine taught in Carolina by men who hold that "slavery is the corner-stone of our institutions."

Carey looked upon the English free trade policy as a capitalistic scheme for the enrichment of the trading and financial classes at the expense of the working classes in all lands, without any compensating responsibility on the part of the exploiters for the exploited. Speaking of the evil effects of this policy, he says,²¹

It sought to prevent association. It prohibited diversity of employments, and thus forbade the development of mind, and the growth of the power of combination. It reduced the people subject to it to the condition of mere tillers of the soil—while enforcing the exhaustion of the land. All of these phenomena are those which attend the early ages of society—those ages that we denominate barbaric—those in which food is obtained with the greatest difficulty—those in which famines and pestilences abound—and those in which the disease of overpopulation most exists. The system tended towards the reduction of the supply of the necessities of life; and therefore is it that we find in Ireland, India, and Jamaica the most conclusive evidences of the truth of the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I: 469.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I: 410.

²¹ *Ibid.*, I: 468.

doctrines of the English school. It was a retrograde policy, tending to cause a return of society to that state of barbarism from which it had emerged; and therefore was a retrograde theory required to enable those who sought to profit by it, to account for the diseases of which it was itself the cause.

Social Science vs. English Political Economy. Carey's distrust of the English classical economics and his dislike for its principles is given full rein near the end of his third volume, where he contrasts the optimistic teachings of his own brand of Social Science with those of the English School. His own words will best convey his thought.²²

Such is the difference between Social Science, and the doctrines of the Ricardo-Malthusian school—the one holding the rich and strong to a high responsibility, while the other shifts the whole of it to the shoulders of those who, being poor and weak, are unable to defend themselves.

The one inculcates, that the great treasury of nature is practically unlimited in its extent; that there exist great natural laws, in virtue of which, food and other raw materials tend to increase more rapidly than population; that it is the *duty* of the powerful to study and understand those laws; and that if, by reason of failure in the performance of that great duty, vice and misery prevail throughout the world, they, and they alone, must be held accountable therefor.—The other teaches that, by reason of the scarcity of fertile soils, the powers of the earth are perpetually diminishing in the ratio borne by them to the mouths requiring to be fed; that there exist great natural laws, in virtue of which, population tends to increase more rapidly than food; *that it is the duty of the poor, the weak, and the uninstructed, to understand those laws*—failing to do which, the responsibility rests with them, and them alone.

The one holds to a belief in the great law of Christianity, which teaches, that men should do to others, as they would that others should do unto them; that where there are old, blind, lame, or otherwise helpless persons, it is the duty of the strong and the rich to see that they are provided for.—The other teaches, that "charity, in applying itself to the relief of the distressed, does but augment the number of the poor;" that population is superabundant, and that there is no remedy but that of "starving out the surplus;" that marriage is "a luxury" in which . . . "the poor have no right until they have made provision for their expected family;" that "labor is a commodity," and that if poor men *will* marry, and have children, and "we stand between the error and its consequences," which are poverty, wretchedness, and death, "we stand between the evil and its cure"—thus intercepting the penalty, and perpetuating "the sin."

He continues to identify this English school of thought with Malthus and Ricardo, and we may close this part of our presentation of Carey's theories by quoting one of his most biting and malevolent characterizations of the

²² *Ibid.*, III: 365–366.

theories of these two men. "As taught by Messrs. Malthus and Ricardo," he says, "social science has been well described as being 'the philosophy of despair, resting upon an arithmetic of ruin.'" ²³

An Evaluation of Carey's Criticism of Malthus and Ricardo. We have entered thus fully into Carey's criticism of these two English writers because (1) it is primarily a sociological discussion of two of the largest issues of the nineteenth century, one of them being economic and the other biological in character, and (2) because his views on Malthus were so genuinely typical of the optimistic views of most writers on social questions during the greater part of that century and continued to be echoed by his followers to the end of the century. As obviously sincere as was Carey in these criticisms—a statement that cannot be made of all the critics of Malthus—he nevertheless fell into a very common error which is so often the result of sociological myopia. The facts that were nearest his view seemed to him universal facts. Because there was still in the eighteen-fifties an abundance of free land in the United States, at this period he could not conceive that there would ever be a scarcity of land; and because science had multiplied productivity even from poor land by the use of fertilizers, machine cultivation, and cooperation (association), he saw no limit to such achievements in the future. It was the same with his criticisms of the Ricardian theory of rent. If agriculturalists had not then settled the best lands because of danger of disease and the difficulty of clearance, they have long since been occupied, and marginal soils have been cultivated unprofitably to an increasing extent. In other words, the principle of diminishing returns was operating in agriculture quite generally in the United States within fifty years from the time Carey wrote. The point on which he refused to take Malthus seriously and over which he spilled so much sarcastic ink—Malthus' contention that human population tends to increase more rapidly than the means of subsistence—turned out to be true after all. Carey was correct in asserting that there was no such natural tendency. It is the cultural tendency that tripped up Carey and verified Malthus. Man tends, in the absence of preventive or cultural checks, to reproduce at his natural capacity. The food resources, on the other hand, have no chance to increase in competition with uneconomical plants and animals in a man-dominated world, except through the efforts of man himself, and these are limited generally by his needs as well as by adverse conditions of soil, climate and the like. This fact Carey evidently did not know.

²³ *Ibid.*, III: 364.

An Estimate of Carey's Social Theory. Carey's optimistic idealism did him credit as a humanitarian, but it is doubtful if his social theories were on the whole as sound as those he criticized. After all, it is but a poor service to mankind to sanction the production of more stomachs than could be filled by any Social Science control devised by Carey. Of course we must not forget that he was misled by the apparent ease with which a century ago people found improved subsistence merely by moving on to unoccupied land and by exploiting natural resources by means of the new inventions and scientific methods then being produced. He did not foresee the time when the very industrialization and "association" which he advocated as a remedy would do more than anything else to make imminent and inevitable the conditions which Malthus emphasized and which these devices only temporarily served to relieve. The world seemed much larger a century ago than it does today, and more prolific of unmeasured opportunity than in our time.

The Social Science Theories of Henry C. Carey: Constructive Aspect

The Scientific Ideal. We may now pass from the critical to the constructive aspects of Carey's theory of Social Science. He found it necessary to get rid of a large amount of erroneous social science doctrine, as he considered it, before he launched out on his own constructive theory. This elimination process was especially necessary because, before Carey, there had been no first rate contributor to the general field of Social Science in America. Not even the *Treatise on Sociology, Theoretical and Practical* (1854) by Henry Hughes ¹ covered the whole ground. As a consequence North American students of Social Science had depended almost entirely upon the works of the English, Scotch, and French writers in the field of political economy for their guidance. Carey believed these sources were filled with error. He wished to ground his own theories on the bed rock of Natural Law and unquestionable science.

As in most of the other systematic theoretical treatises on Social Science, the scientific ideal in Carey's work is emphasized more strongly than the social welfare ideal, although, as we have just seen, the latter insistence is by no means lacking. As in the other theoretical systems, also, the humanitarian ideal is to be achieved in a more round-about manner than is proposed in the more practical Social Science systems. Carey would achieve social welfare by encouraging the maximum amount of association within nations, but at the same time by erecting protective tariff barriers between nations. Thus he was a thorough nationalist in his theory of economic organization, believing at once in a protective tariff against the goods and productions of other nations, while at the same time he advocated the freest internal commerce, both economic and intellectual.

The Unity and Beneficence of Law. The scientific ideal in Carey's system revolves about his theory of the unity of law. Indeed, he wrote a book

¹ See L. L. Bernard, "Henry Hughes, First American Sociologist," *Social Forces*, XV: 154-174 (Dec., 1936).

with the title *The Unity of Law: as Exhibited in the Relations of Physical, Social, Mental and Moral Science* (1872). As Homan points out, Carey's "fundamental postulate was the unity of the laws of nature,"² which, as we have said, was in itself competent to guarantee the progressive realization of the highest ideals of mankind. What was most necessary in order to secure this highly desirable end was that man should not stand in the way of its realization by interfering with natural processes; he must have the courage to put his destiny in the hands of nature, so to speak, then trust her laws to work out to his benefit. He should do nothing by creating artificial restraints to prevent their normal and expected operation. In this last attitude he was not wholly unlike Rousseau in his thinking, who believed that it was man's interference with Natural Law that had brought on human society all of the misery of the world.³ Carey had not yet got away entirely from this fallacious neo-theological conception of civilization of Rousseau, which, like the speculations of the old theologians, placed the golden age in the past and condemned man for too much interference with the beneficent rule of nature. However, as we have seen, Carey did not hesitate to interfere with natural processes when it fitted in with his practical policies to do so, as is evidenced by his strong support of a protective tariff policy.

A Universal Natural Order. Comte, it will be recalled, had deprecated all attempts to reduce the whole universe to a single law,⁴ but even he had been fascinated by the possibility of analogies between the behavior of physical and social phenomena.⁵ The Associationists, as has been pointed out in an earlier chapter,⁶ reduced social phenomena to the same law of "Attraction" as that which was understood to govern cosmic phenomena. And Carey himself found the analogy between physical and social data too tempting to resist.

His own intellectual history in connection with the theories set forth in his systematic treatise on Social Science throws some light on his motives and his purposes. In 1837, he tells us, he first published his theory of value. It was simple and comprehensive in contrast to previous theories which had been diverse and not unified. "This was one step towards establishing

² Paul T. Homan, "Henry Charles Carey," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, III: 227.

³ J. J. Rousseau, *Discours sur l'Origine et les Fondements de l'Inégalité parmi les Hommes* (1755).

⁴ *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (Martineau translation, 1855), I: 16-17.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II: 537-539.

⁶ See Chapter V.

the universality of natural laws.”⁷ His next great discovery was the law of distribution, which demonstrated the essential harmony of interests between capitalist and laborer as opposed to the current theories which taught just the opposite. Carey nevertheless felt that the fundamental law was still to be discovered, and that until it was arrived at and formulated many social phenomena would have to remain unexplained. He knew that Ricardo’s law was wrong and he finally became convinced—that not only was it wrong, but that it was diametrically opposed to the truth. “The real law . . . was directly the reverse of that propounded by that gentleman.”⁸

This was the fundamental law he needed, and it, too, “was further proof of the universality of natural laws.”⁹ Nevertheless this was not his final law. It was, however, in elaborating his anti-Ricardian theories that he came upon “the great and really fundamental law of the science—the one required for the demonstration of the identity of physical and social laws.”¹⁰ We shall present this law (it really embraced four laws) below.

Carey’s Discovery. His method of arriving at the universal law, as stated in his own words, was as follows.¹¹

While engaged in its [the theory opposed to Ricardo’s postulates] demonstration, the author found himself constantly impelled to the use of physical facts, in illustration of social phenomena, and hence was led to remark the close affinity of physical and social laws. Reflecting upon this, he soon was brought to the expression of the belief, that closer examination would lead to the development of the great fact, that there existed but a single system of laws—those instituted for the government of matter, in the form of clay and sand, proving to be the same by which that matter was governed, when it took the form of man, or of communities of men.

And in his treatise he sets about to prove that this conclusion was right, arguing as follows: “May it not be that the laws of all the earlier and more abstract departments of science will be found to be equally true in reference to the highly concrete and special one which embraces the relations of man in society—and that, therefore, all science will prove to be but one, its parts differing as do the colors of the spectrum, but producing, as does the sun’s rays, undecomposed, one white and bright light? To show that such is the case is the object of the present work.”¹²

⁷ *Principles of Social Science* (1858–1859), I: iii–iv.

⁸ *Ibid.*, I: v.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I: vi.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

Carey's Theory of the Unity of Law Was Outmoded. This emphasis upon the unity of nature and upon the dependence of all aspects of creation (it was too early to say evolution) upon a single monistic principle operating throughout nature and culture was one of the major subjects of contention in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Philosophers and scientists were waking up to the fact that there are not two or three different and unrelated orders of phenomena in the universe: physical, mental, and social. The Duke of Argyll wrote treatises on this general subject¹³ soon after this date, but with a theologico-metaphysical emphasis. We have already seen that Stephen Pearl Andrews caught a glimpse of this unity pervading all phases of phenomena. Haeckel formulated the theory as philosophic monism and most of the great English scientists accepted it, either explicitly or tacitly. Lester F. Ward made it an essential part of his theory of dynamic sociology.¹⁴ Carey, like Brisbane, was among the first American Social Scientists to accept the theory, having developed it in his own way and for his own purposes before the German philosophy of monism was put into its generally recognized form by Haeckel.¹⁵ But Carey's idea of the unity of law or of Natural Law was much more metaphysical and less clearly based on concrete and actual analysis of the phenomena of nature and of their relationships than was that of the monistic philosophers. In fact his concept of the unity of law led him into some serious errors of interpretation of Social Science principles.

This metaphysical notion that there is a single law of nature or a general Natural Law which governs both the behavior of men and the regimentation of physical relationships in the natural world was clearly characteristic of the philosophical thinking of the time in which Carey wrote. Natural Law, as thus conceived, was in reality only an impersonal substitute for a personal divinity ruling the universe with a single will or mentality, a concept which the Greek philosophers of the time of the Sophists, and later, had developed and passed on to their philosophical posterity. As an explanatory theory it had undergone little change by the time of Carey, although Comte by means of his varied scientific analyses and classifications, had done much to discredit the prevailing notion that a single law or principle ruled alike all of the phenomena of the universe. Both Comte

¹³ *The Reign of Law* (1866), and *The Unity of Nature* (1884).

¹⁴ *Dynamic Sociology*, Chs. III-VII.

¹⁵ H. C. Carey, *Principle of Social Science*, I: 23, 199; III: 267.

and the monists (especially Haeckel) were chiefly instrumental in emphasizing the diversity, as well as the relativity and human origin of natural laws, at the same time that they insisted upon their harmonious inter-relationship one with another. The great contribution of the monists was that they harmonized the conception of human laws, embodied in mental and moral science, with physical laws, as developed in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology. However, they never insisted, as Carey did, that all these phenomena were governed by a single law, so to speak, but they recognized as many laws as there were phases and relationships of natural phenomena. They did maintain, however, that all these various laws were in essential harmony and did not contradict or interdict one another. Lester F. Ward, who was both a Comtean and a monist and follower of Haeckel, pushed this work of harmonization further by including the whole range of social phenomena and social science within the monistic harmony predicated by Haeckel.¹⁶ But in so doing he did not fall into the error of Carey, who was in reality metaphysical and actually neo-theological in his thinking, in that he erected the supposed compulsory unity of natural law into a moral imperative not very different from the concept of divine justice which was supposed to emanate from the unity of the mind of God, a unity which must cause him to think and govern his universe as an indivisible whole.

The Law of Association. Beginning with the premise, then, that "the laws of physical science are equally those of social science,"¹⁷ Carey proceeds to state the various social laws in physical terms. We have, thus, a "great law of molecular gravitation"¹⁸ which drives man to association with his fellows. Man is the most helpless of animals by himself; he requires the presence or stimulus of society to become really human. Carey, after developing his argument in essentially social and socio-psychological terms, states his conclusions in physical ones, as follows: "Man tends of necessity to gravitate towards his fellow-man. Of all the animals he is the most gregarious, and the greater the number collected in a given space the greater is the attractive force there exerted, as is seen to have been the case with the great cities of the ancient world, Nineveh and Babylon, Athens and Rome, and as is now seen in regard to Paris and London, Vienna and

¹⁶ See L. F. Ward, *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, II: 64-140.

¹⁷ *The Principles of Social Science*, I: 40.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, I: 42.

Naples, Philadelphia, New York, and Boston. Gravitation is here, as everywhere else in the material world, in the direct ratio of the mass, and in the inverse one of the distance.”¹⁹

If this is the case, continues Carey, why does not the population of the entire globe concentrate in a single spot? The reason is simple—and, we might add, quite in the Associationist tradition. It is, says Carey,²⁰

Because of the existence of the same simple and universal law by means of which is maintained the beautiful order of the system of which our planet forms a part. We are surrounded by bodies of various sizes, and some of these are themselves provided with satellites, each having its local centre of attraction, by means of which its parts are held together. Were it possible that that attractive power could be annihilated, the rings of Saturn, the moons of our earth and of Jupiter, would crumble to pieces and fall inward upon the bodies they now attend, a mass of ruins. So, too, with planets themselves. Small as are the asteroids, each has within itself a local centre of attraction enabling it to preserve its form and substance, despite the superior attraction of the larger bodies by which it is everywhere surrounded. So it is throughout our world. Look where we may we see local centres of attraction towards which men gravitate, some exercising less influence and others more.

This then becomes for Carey the starting point for a little dissertation on the evils of over-centralization which can be overcome only by the existence of separate centers of attraction throughout a country.

The Law of Individuality. Individuality, the second great human quality, is the product of the first, association. Here Carey presents a theory in many respects like Spencer's law of progress, involving the concept of increasing heterogeneity along with greater development. Carey's statement is as follows.²¹

This is as true of societies as it is of the plants and animals. . . . The more imperfect they are—the less the variety of employments, and the less, consequently, the development of intellect—the more do the parts resemble each other, as may readily be seen by any one who will study man in the purely agricultural countries of the earth. The greater the variety of employments—the greater the demand for intellectual effort—the more dissimilar become the parts, and the more perfect becomes the whole. . . . Difference is essential to association. . . .²² It is in variety there is unity, and this is quite as true of the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, I: 42-43.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, I: 43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, I: 53, 57.

²² Compare with C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chapter IX, for a later emphasis of this line of thought with regard to the economy of diversity.

social as it is of the material world. . . . The more perfect the organization of society . . . the higher will be the elevation of man as a whole, and the stronger will be the contrasts among men.

It is interesting to note in passing that Carey anticipated largely, in the same form of thought, the theory of Lester F. Ward with respect to human resources. Carey says: "It is the occasion that makes the man. In every society there exists a vast amount of latent capacity waiting but the opportunity to show itself, and thus it is that in communities in which there is no diversity of employment, the intellectual power is to so great an extent wasted, producing no result."²³

Individuality, then, proceeds in the ratio that association does. And as both are encouraged, progress ensues. Carey's statement is to the effect that, "Individuality thus grows with the growth of the power of association, and prepares the way for further and more perfect combination of action. The more perfectly the local attraction tends to counterbalance that of the centre—the more society tends to conform itself to the laws we see to govern our system of worlds—the more harmonious will be the action of all the parts, and the greater will be the tendency towards voluntary association, and to the maintenance of peace abroad and at home."²⁴

The Law of Responsibility. The third great trait of man, responsibility, is a direct outgrowth of individuality. And here, too, the same celestial laws are at work. This law Carey states as follows: "Responsibility, individuality, and association grow thus together, each helping and helped by the other, and everywhere they are seen to grow in the direct ratio of the approach of social government to the system under which the wonderful harmony of the heavens is maintained."²⁵

The Law of Progress. These laws led Carey finally to a statement of the law of progress. It is his conviction that man has a capacity for progress. Carey's theory of progress is, of course, also couched in terms of physical analogies, as follows:²⁶

Man alone records what he has seen and learned, and man alone profits by the labors of his predecessors. To do this, he requires language, and that he may have that he must have association.

That there may be progress, there must be motion. Motion is itself a result of the incessant decomposition and recomposition of matter, and the work of

²³ H. C. Carey, *op. cit.*, I: 54.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, I: 57.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, I: 60.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, I: 60-61.

association is but the incessant decomposition and recomposition of the various forces of man. . . .

To have motion there must be heat, and the greater the latter, the more rapid will be the former. . . . Social heat results from combination, and that the matter may be produced there must be difference. . . .

The more rapid the consumption of either material or intellectual food, the greater will be the heat that must result, and the more rapid the increase of power to replace the quantity consumed. That consumption may follow closely on production there must be association, and that there cannot be without variety in the modes of employment. . . .

Progress requires motion. Motion comes with heat, and heat results from association. Association brings with it individuality and responsibility, and each aids in the development of the other while profiting by the help received from them.

Relation of these Laws to Social Science. These, then, are the four great laws—association, individuality, responsibility, and progress. They are the same laws “which govern matter in all its forms, whether that of coal, clay, iron, pebble stones, trees, oxen, horses, or men. If true of communities they must be equally true of each and every individual of which they are composed. . . .”²⁷ These four great laws, constitute “the great and really fundamental law of science,”²⁸ as Carey conceived it, and they were the last to be discovered by him. This proves, he says, “that first principles are always last to be discovered.”²⁹

The conclusion which Carey seeks to draw from the preceding statements of his social laws, or perhaps we should say of his four social aspects of his one great law of nature, scarcely seems to be a necessary sequitur. “Social science,” he says, “treats of man in his efforts for the maintenance and improvement of his condition, and may now be defined to be the science of the laws which govern man in his efforts to secure for himself the highest individuality, and the greatest power of association with his fellow-men.”³⁰

Nevertheless, however much difficulty we may have experienced in agreeing with the neo-theological slant and the highly metaphysical statement of his theory of the unity of all law on a material basis, as it applies to the organization and control of society, we can scarcely take exception to his estimate of the scope and application of Social Science. It emphasizes the two

²⁷ *Ibid.*, I: 62.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, I: vi.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, I: vii.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, I: 63.

chief trends that we still recognize as basic to the various social sciences in our own day. We not only conceive of a valid social science or sociology, as well as the special social sciences, as aiming at the promotion of the most efficient and most economical forms and techniques of association and organization; but we also demand that these more objective aspects of organization or measures providing for effective and useful association should likewise promote and allow for the most efficient development of personality. It is a fundamental tenet of social psychology, as well as of sociology and social ethics, that the best types of social organization and the most effective forms of social adjustment are possible only where provision has been made for a reasonable diversity of personality traits and for their training and conditioning in such a way as to make possible the widest feasible division of function and utilization of individual talents in social adjustment situations. Carey seems to have had these requirements reasonably in mind when he characterized the scope and function of Social Science as shown above.

Application of the Law. Now it is very interesting to see how neatly Carey and his school applied this "great and really fundamental law" of Social Science. First of all let us point out that the members of his school were chiefly Pennsylvanians³¹ and that therefore they believed in protective tariffs. They emphasized the nationalist as opposed to the cosmopolitan point of view in political economy, for they were the spokesmen of an industrial state of their day. Carey's whole system is, indeed, an economic tract in favor of "home industries." Let us trace his argument.

Progress and human welfare result when natural laws are followed, since the Creator made these natural laws and made them to operate beneficently for man. Thus, if man allows the freest scope possible to association, which results in individuality and responsibility, the greatest progress and welfare ensue. Carey illustrates this contention in great detail from history and contemporary world conditions. This he calls the study of the Physiology of society.³² When this aspect of his doctrine has been completed he turns to the Pathology of society, to show "what have been the causes of the decline and fall of various communities that have perished; and why it is the rate of progress in those now existing is so widely different."³³ It is a foregone conclusion that the pathology of society is simply

³¹ William Elder, *Questions of the Day: Economic and Social* (1871), pp. 4-5.

³² *Principles of Social Science*, I: 231.

³³ *Ibid.*

legislative interference with natural laws. And especially has Great Britain been guilty of this sin. She has exploited the world by increasing the role of the trader (middle-man), by keeping many parts of the world from developing industries of their own (Ireland and India being two horrible examples), and thus preventing their progress. If all nations were allowed to develop all sorts of industries, instead of being prevented from so doing all would be better off, "for it is in the necessity for effecting changes of place that is found the great obstacle to human improvement, to the development of intellect, to the growth of freedom, and to the increase of commerce."³⁴ The evils in England which produced Malthus' theory of over-population were simply the result of English policy which has encouraged the obstacles to human progress and perpetuated a system which makes an undue proportion of labor go into transportation.

Carey's Theory of Protectionism. We now come to one of the most interesting apparent contradictions in the thinking and logic of Carey, as indeed it is perhaps one of the most unconscious. Having adopted a general theory of laissez faire or of non-interference with the laws and processes of nature, as he conceives them, he now finds himself forced by the exigencies of his politico-social beliefs to a defense of protectionism. If he was aware of any glaring contradiction between this pet political tenet and his general philosophy, his works do not indicate it. He would not interfere with nature in replenishing the human race nor in the utilization of agricultural lands. Let nature take her course and she will resolve any contradictions and conflicts in the working out of her results and all will accrue to the benefit of mankind. Why, then, should man interfere with the processes of production by imposing restrictions upon international trade? This question becomes all the more pertinent when we recall that Carey regarded industrial association as the basic fact or principle of Social Science. It would seem therefore that Carey should have regarded "free trade" as the highest practical expression of his fundamental law or laws of Social Science; but such was not the case. On the contrary, it seemed necessary to restrict and restrain international commerce in order that national commerce should have its fullest development and should in turn stimulate national diversity of industry and productivity to the greatest degree.

The fact is, we shall find that Carey is not wholly inconsistent in his reasoning here, if we but recall that he regarded local centers of association as a phase of the process of natural development. He apparently did not yet

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I: 365.

consider the world as a whole as an adequately functioning unity, although he regarded the controlling system of natural law as itself integral. This contradiction of the concept of the unity of all law and of the disunity of society he did not attempt to resolve logically, if indeed he was in any sense aware of it. Perhaps he was not wholly wrong in failing to consider the world as a whole as one great community in the middle of the nineteenth century. Indeed, our own country was not yet such a unity, as the occurrence of the Civil War shortly after the date of the publication of his book proved. But, of course, Carey's critics could say properly that our national disunity at that time was in part the result of a protective tariff. It may be that the chief limitation upon his outlook at this point was emotional, and that his sentiments were so tied up with the industrial north, and especially with Pennsylvania, that he was more concerned with the application of his principles in this case to this limited area than to the world at large. However that may be, he made the statement of his position on protectionism as logical as the circumstances would permit. As opposed to the British policy of interference with natural laws, as he states it, Carey and his school espoused a policy of protective tariff so that these laws could operate freely, at least at home. Protection would encourage association (diversity of employment, commerce, or, as we would say, diversified industrialization), which in turn, would lead to increased individuality and responsibility, and hence to progress. Thus does Social Science, by an adroit and not too meticulous manipulation of controversial logic, become the hand-maiden of protectionism.

Carey's Social Reform Ideal. The social reform ideal in Carey's system of Social Science thus turns out to be chiefly economic in nature. He contended that if we should encourage a high state of industrialization by means of protective tariffs, social progress would be assured, according to his great and fundamental law of Social Science. This is his theory of social reform on a large and, as it were, a cosmic basis or outlook. There is, in addition, a very subtle and implicit defense of petty social reform of an essentially philanthropic nature implied in Carey's very heated refutation of Malthus. If Malthus were right, then of course all extrinsic systems of social reform were evil, since, because of the increased stimulus they gave to unreflective breeding, they simply augmented the ills they were meant to help, just as, for example, the British poor relief system had done. The only hope for the economic prosperity of the under-privileged, according to Malthus, was limitation of offspring. But industrial societies want large

populations. They are not averse, therefore, to the petty social reforms and philanthropies which make it possible for wage earners to produce large populations on charity rather than on high wages, for ordinarily charity costs the manufacturers less than high wages. Industrialists were among the most ardent in the refutation of Malthus. And Carey spoke for the industrialists.

It should not be supposed that Carey was insincere or that he was deliberately justifying policies which were beneficial to industrialists in contradiction to his own fundamental convictions. His social welfare ideals were of the highest. He sincerely believed that the laws he had discovered were for the best interest of all, that the Creator had made them so as to produce harmony between labor and capital. It was only accidental that these laws were precisely those that justified emerging big business; or, perhaps, merely another illustration of the universally beneficent nature of the general laws of nature made by the Creator and applied to society.

Carey Compared with Other Social Scientists. Although Carey's system, like Fourier's, was based on a theory of inherent natural harmonies in the universe which man should attempt to follow, his philosophy of history was directly opposite to that of Fourier, involving, as we have seen, a theory of continuous progress and rejecting the idea that God would have instituted laws which would operate one way up to a certain point, producing progress, and thereafter in a directly opposite way, producing decay. But just as Fourier's great social principle was Attraction, so Carey's was gravitation (association). The similarities of form and of origin of these theories are sufficiently patent and self-evident. Nevertheless they were very different in tone and emphasis. Fourier's system of Social Science was romantic, Utopistic, partaking of the character of wishful thinking. The Warren-Andrews school of Social Science also belonged, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter, to the same general type of social theory as that of the Associationists in that it, too, was romantic and Utopistic. Carey's system, on the other hand, was a polemic—indeed, a political tract—to justify a policy.

Although Carey belongs among the systematic Social Scientists, since he produced a treatise on the subject, his system was like those discussed in Part IV only in that its social reform ideal was subordinated to the scientific ideal and in that its method of achieving its reform ideal was roundabout. His treatise was far more concrete and factual than any of those analyzed in Part IV. And its emphasis was primarily economic.

In spite of Carey's similarity to the Associationists, however, his outlook was more nearly akin to that of the eclectic Social Scientists, to be considered in Part VIII of the present volume. Indeed, he was a member of the American Social Science Association, whose constituency consisted primarily of the eclectic Social Scientists. In his optimism and in his concept of a harmonious universe, then, Carey belonged to the romantic past; but in his practical orientation, to the future. He was, in brief, transitional.

The Disciples of Carey: Robert Ellis Thompson and E. Peshine Smith

The Carey School. We turn now from the Social Science theories of Henry C. Carey to those of the more outstanding of his disciples.¹ It is not possible to consider all of them, even in moderate detail, but a few of them, either because they developed varied emphases, made relatively new contributions, or occupied places of national prominence, demand some consideration. Chief among these for the independence and seriousness of their contributions were E. Peshine Smith and Robert Ellis Thompson. William Elder was not a less faithful disciple—perhaps he was even more faithful—than these two men, and his contribution was perhaps no less outstanding than theirs. Furthermore, he came to the Carey school from the Associationists. This fact makes of him in some measure a transitional figure and calls for a separate treatment of his theories. Colwell was also an important member of this school in his day and will be treated separately. Horace Greeley was, perhaps, less of a disciple than a patron. That he was profoundly influenced by the ideas of Carey there can be no doubt, just as he was affected by the theories of Fourier and Brisbane in the preceding decades. But Greeley was too tolerant and catholic in his opinions to be tied unreservedly to any set of theories. He promoted all ideas and reforms that he believed would offer any hope of human betterment. He opened his columns to Carey and his disciples, as he did to many other causes; but

¹ The most outstanding members of the Carey School were: Stephen Colwell (*The Ways and Means of Payment*, 1859); E. Peshine Smith (*Manual of Political Economy*, 1853, 1870); Dr. William Elder (*Questions of the Day; Economical and Social*, 1870); and Robert Ellis Thompson (*Social Science and National Economy*, 1875). Horace Greeley (*Essays Designed to Elucidate the Science of Political Economy*, 1870), whom we have met all along the path of the Social Science movement, was also a member of Carey's school. As a matter of fact he allowed Carey, in matters concerning protection, virtually to edit the *New York Tribune* between 1849 and 1875, as earlier he had allowed Brisbane to use this journal to propagate Associationist Social Science. See Robt. E. Thompson, *Social Science and National Economy* (1875), p. 30; also Vernon Louis Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought*, III. *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America, 1860-1920* (1930), p. 108.

undoubtedly he felt a strong attraction for the Carey brand of Social Science. Despite his extensive interest in and promotion of liberal reforms in his day, Greeley was more of an ally of other leaders in Social Science than the originator of an independent branch of this discipline. Consequently no extensive account of his theories is presented here in this brief treatment of the Carey school.

Of the Carey disciples in general, as of their leader, it may be said that they had their feet at least upon fairly solid ground, however much their heads may have been in the clouds. They had a definite and practical economic policy—protectionism—which they wished to establish. They wasted very little time in attempting to reform society as a whole. What little Utopianism survived in most of them had been passed through the mill of the developing industrial system. They had no illusions about an ideal arcadian democracy such as Brisbane, Andrews, and Masquerier had sought to establish. They had heard the wheels of industry hum and the sound had made music in their ears. The limit of their Utopia was a protective tariff for the United States of America. The Carey school of Social Science as we have already noted, thus marked the beginning of a transformation in this subject, especially on its economic side, that was soon to become striking.

Thompson's Fundamental Theories. Although Carey was the first writer of high standing in any of the various fields of Social Science to produce a fundamental treatise on the subject, he was not himself an academic man and he did not give university instruction in the subject. The first to offer an academic course specifically in Social Science was one of the most devoted and loyal of Carey's many loyal followers, Robert Ellis Thompson.²

² Robert Ellis Thompson (1844–1924) was born in Ireland, where he attended the local country school. At the age of 13, in 1857, his family came to Philadelphia. He received the A.B. degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1865, with highest honors. He was ordained a minister in 1873. In the meanwhile he had supplied as minister for churches as far west as Illinois, in 1867–68. He became an instructor in mathematics at the University of Pennsylvania in 1868, but in 1871 he was invited to give the Social Science course, and he was made professor in 1874. He was the first dean of the Wharton School of Finance and Economy (1881–1883). In 1892 he was dropped from the University of Pennsylvania perhaps because of the conflict with younger German-trained economists. He declined the presidency of Lake Forest College and discouraged a movement to make him professor of Christian Sociology at Princeton Theological Seminary. "Thompson represents . . . the unsuccessful struggle of national economic optimists against the rising tide of reformers, mainly socialists, who thought in international terms and preached class cleavage instead of a harmony of economic interests" (*Dictionary of American Biography*, XVIII: 470). In 1894 he became principal of the Central High School of Philadelphia, from which office he retired in 1920. His chief published works are *Social Science and National Economy* (1875), *Hard Times*

In 1866 he introduced a course entitled Social Science at the University of Pennsylvania, and a few years later produced the text book, *Social Science and National Economy*. In 1891 he published a more popular work dealing with some of the leading social problems of the time from a combined Christian and Social Science point of view.³

Thompson⁴ defined Social Science as "That branch of the science of man which treats of man as existing in society, and in relation to his material wants and welfare."⁵ National or political economy is the art of carrying into practice the findings of this science. It is the business of Social Science to discover the natural laws which bring well-being and wealth. He further declared that "there exists . . . for society an economic 'constitution and course of nature'; the nation that complies with its laws attains to material well-being or wealth, and the nation that disobeys them inflicts poverty upon itself as a whole, or upon the mass of its people. To learn what those laws are, is the business of the student of social science; to govern a nation according to them is the business of the statesman and is the *art* of national economy."⁶ Man is a social being, found only in society, he maintained with Aristotle, and therefore the old individualistic approaches—state of nature theories or social contract theories—are in error. Social Science properly "begins with the conception of a social state, not with the study of wealth in the abstract, nor of the individual man and his desires."⁷

Thompson's Relation to Carey. Thompson believed that it was with Carey that national economy became a true science.⁸ Carey had refuted those who had made political economy a "dismal science" and had proved that the natural laws of society were laws of progress and equality of wealth.⁹ Despite Thompson's close agreement in matters of theory with

and What to Learn from Them (pamphlet, 1877), *Elements of Political Economy* (1881), *Protection to Home Industry* (1886), *The Divine Order of Human Society* (1891), *History of the Presbyterian Churches of America* (1895), *Political Economy for High Schools* (1895), *The National Hymn Book of the American Churches* (1893), *The Hand of God in American History* (1902), *Nature, the Mirror of Grace* (1907), *The Historic Episcopate* (1910), *The Apostles as Every Day Men* (1912), *The History of the Dwelling House and Its Future* (1914).

³ R. E. Thompson, *The Divine Order of Human Society* (Philadelphia, 1891).

⁴ See James H. S. Bossard's interesting article on Thompson in the *American Journal of Sociology*, "Robert Ellis Thompson, Pioneer Professor of Social Science," *loc. cit.*, XXXV: 239-249 (Sept., 1929).

⁵ *Social Science and National Economy* (1875), p. 11.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

Carey, he differs from him in three respects, which are perhaps worth noting. In the first place, he seems to be more democratic in his outlook than his master in the discipline. He looks toward a greater degree of equality of opportunity and in the possession and consumption of goods. In fact, his professions are almost like those of the Christian socialists, although his stated methods of achieving his melioristic ends do not differ essentially from those proposed by Carey. In the second place, he goes further than Carey in justifying the ways of God to man. This last relationship he takes out of the category of natural law merely and adds to it an implied ethical motivation which could scarcely be discovered in the colder logic of Carey himself. And, finally, Thompson makes more use of the implications of the rising science of cultural anthropology than was possible to Carey ten years earlier, when this subject had scarcely been given an objective formulation. Thompson states his position with regard to these matters as follows.¹⁰

Where they are allowed to act freely and fully, men rise from poverty, isolation and lawlessness, to wealth, association and national order. The history of human economy is the story of man's transition from the savage's subjection to nature, to the citizen's mastery of her forces; and with every advance the greater advantage is reaped by the most numerous class, that is, the poorest. It thus "vindicates the ways of God to men," and vindicates also the existing framework of our civilization against the destructive criticisms of socialists and communists.

Changing Views in Social Science. Thus Social Science, which was the essence of communism according to Wright, and of anarchism in the opinion of Andrews, is now made to serve as a justification of the status quo, and as a bulwark against radical attacks from socialists and communists. While it now speaks with a fairly conservative tongue in the mouth of Thompson, the voice is that of "Esau" Carey instead of "Jacob" Brisbane. It has evolved from an optimistic reformist plan to reconstitute the world along the lines of a new and revolutionary science of human nature and of Natural Law into an almost equally optimistic promise to remedy all social ills by the good orthodox Republican principles of the protective tariff and the promotion of industrialism—still under the patronage of Natural Law (if not of human nature) and even of a watchful Creator who rules the universe (through the Republican Party, of course) in the interests of his faithful subjects.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

Although Thompson was the only academic Social Scientist of the Carey School, and the only man besides Carey himself in this school to write a treatise bearing the title *Social Science*, there were, as was said above, a number of outstanding publicists whose writings in this field throw considerable light upon the arguments and aspirations of this branch of the general movement. Four of these men are treated in this and the two following chapters. The first of the men to follow Thompson, although not in chronological order, was, like Thompson, rather conservative in his views. But he was fundamentally much the abler of the two, as the following analysis will serve to show.

E. P. Smith a Disciple of Carey. E. Peshine Smith was one of the most enthusiastic disciples of Carey.¹¹ Although Smith's *Manual of Political Economy* (1853) was published before Carey's *Principles of Social Science* (1858-1860), it is thoroughly in the Carey tradition. It may be reasonably supposed that Carey had developed his ideas on Social Science and had disseminated them among his intellectual associates long before the publication of his treatise on this subject. Smith stated his intention of basing his treatise wholly upon physical laws, "and thus to obtain for its conclusions that absolute certainty which belongs to the positive sciences."¹² This appeal to the method of "positive science" seems to indicate some influence from Comte, but his professed intention of avoiding entanglements with the teachings of moral philosophy and his strong condemnation of the classical economists' "grossly material estimation of man, which disregards all that is truly human in his nature, and has brought upon Political Economy, thus worked out, the name of the Dismal Science"¹³ link him closely with the thinking of Carey.

¹¹ Erasmus Peshine Smith (1814-1882) was born in New York City, but moved to Rochester when very young and was educated there. He was graduated from Columbia College in 1832 and entered Harvard Law School, completing the course in 1835. He practiced law in Rochester but was also interested in journalism. In 1850 he became professor of mathematics in the University of Rochester, holding this position until about 1852. The following year he was appointed superintendent of public instruction for the state of New York. In 1857 he became a reporter for the State Court of Appeals. Some nine years later, in 1866, he was appointed commissioner of immigration in Washington, but was almost immediately transferred to the post of examiner of claims. He was adviser to the Mikado of Japan on international relations, an office corresponding roughly to that of Secretary of State in this country, from 1871 to 1876. In this capacity he distinguished himself by breaking up the Chinese coolie trade. He edited various journals such as the *Rochester Democrat*, the *Buffalo Commercial Advertiser*, and the *Washington Intelligence*. (See *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, Vol. XIII, p. 195).

¹² *Loc. cit.*, p. iii.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Indeed, there is stronger evidence of Smith's dependence upon Carey to be found in the former's own words. To Carey he attributes both the content of his leading ideas and his insistence upon the use of inductive observation in the place of the *a priori* reasoning which he clearly attributes to Ricardo and other English economists. On these points Smith said,¹⁴

Mr. Henry C. Carey led the way, in the better method, by his conclusive refutation of the theory of Ricardo in regard to the occupation of land, which, for more than forty years, has been dominant with the English Economists. This fiction was an inference as to a *physical* fact, from "laws of the human mind," and was for that long period accepted as a fact, without a single economist, before Mr. Carey, thinking it worth while to test its accuracy by direct observation. Mr. Carey, by showing that the fact is directly the reverse of the hypothesis of Ricardo, and by establishing the consequences which flow from it, restored harmony to what was before a mass of discordances, and rendered it possible, for the first time, to construct a science out of what was, at best, a mere collection of empirical rules. In addition to the special acknowledgments made to that gentleman in the following pages, it is proper to say, that the author is so thoroughly sensible that he owes whatever his own study of the subject may have effected, to his having been put upon the path and furnished with the clue, in the writings of Mr. Carey, as to be quite indisposed to make pretensions on the score of originality, which, as against others, he might maintain. Upon this point, however, he is reasonably indifferent.

Man's Economy in Relation to Nature and Culture. Smith's insistence upon a systematic inductive methodology will be elsewhere referred to. Here we shall confine our attention to a brief presentation of some of his chief economic ideas in relation to social welfare and social reform. He devoted one chapter (Ch. II) to an account of the formation of soils and the development of cultivation, taking occasion in this connection to refute Malthus' and Ricardo's theory that rent is paid solely for the excess productiveness of superior lands.¹⁵ In a third chapter he postulated two factors in the creation of wealth and the stimulation of human progress. The first of these factors is the contribution of nature; and human progress may be measured by the extent to which the natural agents are made serviceable to man. He illustrates the contribution of nature in the following passage.¹⁶

We see that, in point of fact, men in every civilized society perform little or nothing in the way of work, without being assisted by the natural agents,

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. iii-iv.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 47 ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

such as wood, the motion of water, the expansive power of heat in steam, and, without calling into use, to create the circumstances necessary for the development of these natural powers, a great many mechanical and chemical properties of matter, such as the hardness of steel, the polarity of the magnet, the bleaching quality of chlorine, the velocity of the electric fluid.

But he also recognizes and insists upon the fact that nature is effective as an aid to civilization only to the extent that man has learned to make use of her gifts. He says,¹⁷

Most of these qualities, though existing without human agency in the storehouse of Nature, require artificial combinations to exhibit them, and convert them to economic purposes, as co-workers with human muscle in labor-saving machinery. The number and variety of the agents and qualities that the intellect of a people has discovered, and the extent to which, by mastering their laws, and preparing the necessary conditions for their operation, it has reduced them into service, is the most decisive test of its civilization.

He further elaborates upon the contribution of culture to the productive process as follows: "Man has been defined a tool-making animal. We nowhere see him working without artificial aid. Even the rudest savages possess some simple implements, which they employ in fishing and hunting, in fabricating their raiment and building their huts. It is difficult, indeed, to conceive man as destitute of every kind of implements."¹⁸

Smith's Labor and Population Theories. As these cultural aids increase in the process of production, the cost of utilities declines and the value of labor increases, reaching its maximum with the introduction of machinery. The entrepreneur or capitalist receives increasingly a smaller portion of returns per unit of production and the laborer an increasing proportion.¹⁹ As agriculture is improved and made more scientific, the landlord also receives less in the form of rent and the tenant more of the product of his toil as his share, because his effort becomes more effective in the production process.²⁰ Smith disagreed with Malthus' theory of over-population and maintained, contrary to the opponents of the introduction of machinery, that with proper distribution of labor and of its proceeds the more machinery introduced the larger the population that could be supported and the more prosperous it would be.²¹

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Ch. III.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Ch. IV.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Ch. V.

It is obvious that Smith is here assuming that ideal conditions will prevail with reference to the distribution of the proceeds of productive labor. He appeals to the data of history in support of his theories on these points and discovers that in the long run his principles are supported by the facts. Indeed, he believes that his principles are true natural laws which he and Carey and others have discovered. A further criticism of his theories may be stated to the effect that he does not foresee that there will ultimately be a failure of natural resources and that the principle of diminishing returns will operate in the productive process and negative his hopeful conclusions with regard to the indefinite power of improved machinery and distribution to overcome the operation of Malthus' principle.

The Principle of Division of Labor and Its Implications. Smith of course approves the principle of the division of labor and attributes to its operation the growth of industry and commerce, but he does not go so far as to make it an argument for free trade. In fact, he is of the opinion that local markets are necessary and that too great centralization of trade is an evil. Thus he arrives at a doctrine of protectionism.²² He states his belief that England's advantages from free trade were due wholly to her superiority in cheap fuels, early development of machinery, early and easy access to markets, and to the possession of a colonial system. He contends that these advantages could be overcome by competing countries if they would adopt a protective system to stimulate new inventions and technical skill. He even goes so far as to predict that ultimately England's free trade system and imperialist policy would have to be given up in exchange for a strongly nationalist policy. His argument is as follows: ²³

Russia, France, the States of the Zoll-Verein, and the other countries who adhered to the policy which promotes domestic production, and secures what alone can justly be called free trade—that which accords with human nature and human inclinations—are rapidly advancing in wealth and power. Turkey and Portugal, the nations which, possessing nominal independence, have been most submissive to the British policy, and Ireland, which has been coerced, are the most backward nations of Europe, and have now less power to resist than they had a generation ago. As against these, what are called the natural advantages of England are constantly increasing, while in respect to those who saw that the advantages were artificial, they have constantly diminished and are diminishing. The invention of Mr. Ericsson promises greatly to detract from one advantage which the British Islands have heretofore possessed over sev-

²² *Ibid.*, Ch. VII.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 222-223.

eral of the Continental nations, in the possession of cheap and abundant coal to propel her machinery. If five-sixths of the quantity which has heretofore been necessary to procure a given motive force, can henceforth be dispensed with, the advantage of cheap coal must diminish in the same proportion, and those who are now most hampered by the dearness of fuel, will derive the largest benefit. As they succeed in the effort to combine their materials and food in manufactured fabrics, England will cease to find employment in supplementing them, will be forced to buy materials at a dearer, and sell fabrics at a cheaper price, and at the same time to seek more distant markets for them. The final result must be, to compel her to raise her own food, which she can do more cheaply than it can be procured elsewhere, whenever her rulers become willing to let the labourer have his fair share of it, and to allow him to become that most efficient of all food-growers, the tiller of his own fee-simple land. Retiring from the business of keeping "the great workshop of the world," dismissing the colonies, kept as customers, and the fleets and armies necessary to guard them, she can make a market at home worth more than all that are relinquished, and whose magnitude will measure what those do not, the wealth, prosperity, and happiness of her children. In proportion to the intensity of her struggle against this consummation, will be the misery through which it must be reached.

The Relation of Government to Industry. At the time Smith wrote, political economy had not yet been specialized and sterilized into economics. Consequently, as was the usual custom, his treatise contains a chapter on Government. He limits himself professedly to the economic aspects of government, but his viewpoint is obviously that of the general welfare outlook of Social Science. He regarded political association as the most extended form of all association, and he likewise considered the republican form of government as best fitted to achieve the normal ends of association.²⁴ He defined the purposes of government much more broadly and liberally than was the custom of his time, giving to government not only negative but decidedly positive functions. He said,²⁵

Perhaps the most general expression of the purpose of government is, that it is an agency to promote and facilitate the association of the individuals by whom it is instituted. Defence against foreign aggression; the repression of force and fraud in the intercourse of its constituents; the establishment of uniform systems of weights and measures; the construction of roads, bridges, and canals; the defining of the rights of property, and the remedies for an injury to them; the coinage of money; the postage of letters—all these, and the other offices, in which most governments agree, are plainly subsidiary to the general

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 251.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 254-255.

purpose of promoting association. It would, we think, be impossible to find in the powers of the Federal Government, enumerated in the Constitution, or in the prohibitions to which the States subject themselves by that compact, a single one which is not clearly referable to that object. There are many which transcend the purpose of defence; and the administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State; the relations of its citizens to each other; the defining of what is the subject of property and what is not, and of the modes of its transmission—of crimes and their punishment; almost everything that could grow out of domestic force or fraud, is left to the regulation of the States.

He believed that our government has secured unity of function without tyranny,²⁶ since necessary restraints are self-imposed by the people.²⁷ He places no categorical restrictions upon the power or obligation of the state to undertake any enterprise for the welfare of its citizens. It may even enter into profit-making enterprises in competition with its citizens if it does so for their benefit and if it is proved that it can produce as cheaply as individuals. If it cannot, it has no right to compete in industry or trade, for in such a case it would levy an unjustifiable tax upon the citizenry.²⁸

Summary Relative to Smith. This analysis of the work of Smith shows him to have been by no means a mere echo of Carey, although he received his inspiration and orientation from the latter. Unquestionably he belongs to Carey's school of Social Science; his work shows him to have been widely read in the newer literature of the time—as widely read as Carey—and with much the same social outlook as his master.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 257.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

The Disciples of Carey: Stephen Colwell

Colwell on Commerce. After Carey himself, the most ardent protectionist of his school of Social Science was perhaps Stephen Colwell.¹ Although he wrote mainly on the social aspects of religion and on money and commerce, his economic views were held in very high respect by the other members of the Carey group.² His defense of protectionism permeated almost everything he wrote, including his works on religion and social problems. His most pretentious work was a treatise on money and credit,³ which is no exception to the generalization made in the preceding sentence. He calls attention to the vast importance of exchange of commodities and services in society, an importance which has been greatly augmented with the rapid growth of division of labor in recent times. He says,⁴

In civilized life the industry of men is so largely developed and subdivided, as to involve an incessant exchange of commodities and services. Civilized men require food and clothing of great variety and form, substance and prepara-

¹ Stephen Colwell (1800-1872) was born in Virginia and educated at Jefferson College, Pennsylvania, where he was graduated in 1819. He studied law and was admitted to the bar of Virginia in 1821. He moved to Pittsburgh, however, where he practiced law for ten years. Later he went to Philadelphia, where he became an iron merchant, amassing great wealth, which he devoted "to charitable purposes, to the endowment of professorships, to the encouragement of scientific investigation, and to the collection of a large and valuable library, including a very complete selection of works on his favorite topics of political and social science (*Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, 1915, Vol. I). He was an associate member of the United States Sanitary Commission, and a member of a commission to study the internal revenue system of the United States. He bequeathed his library to the University of Pennsylvania, "with an endowment for a professorship of social science" (*ibid.*). His works include: *New Themes for the Protestant Clergy* (1851); *Charity and the Clergy* (1853); *The South* (1856); *Ways and Means of Commercial Payment* (1858). He also edited List's *Treatise on National Economy*, with notes (1856).

² See Preface to William Elder's *Questions of the Day* and his *Conversations on Political Economy*, and dedication of the latter work.

³ *The Ways and Means of Payment: A Full Analysis of the Credit System, with Its Various Modes of Adjustment* (Philadelphia, 1859).

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

tion. Their dwellings and furniture are equally varied, and demand for their production an equally varied and subdivided industry. Intellectual, moral and religious wants and exigencies engage also a large force of subdivided labor. In this division of labor, there is one large class employed in producing and preparing food; another in producing and preparing raiment; another in building; another in furnishing buildings; and another in the labor of ministering to intellectual, civil, moral and religious wants; each of these large divisions is again subdivided into lesser classes; and these again by innumerable ramifications and divisions, until each person is reached in his separate individuality. The whole labor of society is thus apportioned among all its members in that way which the force of circumstances, and their intelligence, has dictated. In every community, much the larger number of persons are mere laborers, and have only their labor to give in exchange for such of the comforts of life as they may require. In every case, however, whether we regard classes or individuals, a continual series of exchanges is involved.

Such exchanges, he asserts, may be effected with or without money. The significant thing socially is that they should be facilitated and accomplished with security and economy.⁵ "Money, with all its substitutes, is only one of many agents of trade, and, like many others, it is a pure matter of discretion and convenience how far it may be employed."⁶

Welfare of Labor Is Central. Not money, he says, but commerce and productive labor should be the chief objectives of social concern. He adds: "One great point to be secured for these masses, is a simply just compensation for labor, and a fair field for industry and enterprise. This should be the principal aim of legislation in every nation, because it relates to the greatest interest of the largest number."⁷ It is here that the nation's greatest wealth is to be found, and this source of national wealth must be protected. Again, he says, "The grand item in the wealth of every nation is the industry and mechanical skill and practical science of its laboring population. This includes the directing power of its machinery. This wealth should be the primary object of national care and solicitude; not merely for the sake of the magnitude of the annual product, but for the sake of the multitude of the annual producers."⁸

Was Colwell Sincere in His Championship of Labor? It would almost seem from the context as if Colwell were more concerned with the protection of labor than of industry. The following passage certainly testified

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁷ Stephen Colwell, *Politics for American Christians* (Philadelphia, 1852), p. 24.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

to a keen apparent interest in the welfare of the laboring classes, but it also contains a subtle hint as to how the interests of labor are to be protected, that is, through the protection of industry upon which labor is assumed to be dependent. Also, it should perhaps be borne in mind that Colwell is addressing a Christian audience who may be supposed to be more sympathetic with labor than with capital. Colwell's statement follows.⁹

The welfare of this great host of laborers should be the chief consideration; that their efficiency may be raised to the highest point consistent with their advantage, and there sustained; that the rewards of labor may, as far as practicable, be just and regular; that the vast mass of producers may have every possible facility afforded them in the mutual exchange by domestic trade, of their own products at such rates as they may establish among themselves, all seeking that remuneration for labor which their peculiar circumstances may justify. There is certainly a rate of remuneration for labor in every country to which there would be a continual tendency and close approach in the progress of industry, if intervention of disturbing causes were excluded or duly regulated.

But—still addressing the same audience—he goes even further in his defense of labor and its interests. He does not hesitate to say that it has been exploited. He is not as unrestrained in his statements on this point as was William Elder, although possibly he was as radical at heart—for only a radical at that time would have spoken seriously of the exploitation of labor by more advantaged groups. But perhaps he was not as sincere as Elder. It is scarcely possible to determine these points now, but his words—always remembering his audience—are here.¹⁰

The principal feature in the lives of masses of men is labor; they must get their bread by the labor of their hands. This is the inevitable lot of the many; the few will endeavor to escape the more severe tasks imposed by this lot, and some may escape altogether. The agriculturist must provide food for all, the manufacturer and mechanic must provide clothing and lodging for all; the professional man—the man of science must find medical and legal aid, science, skill, and education for all; and thus they are bound in the brotherhood of mutual dependence. But the actual working of this mutual dependence has ever shown that a few men of superior mental power or attainments, or wealth or accidental advantages soon rise to positions of authority and control, which enable them to oppress those beneath them, and to draw to themselves, in various ways, and upon an infinity of pretexts, too large a proportion of the profits of labor.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Colwell's Program for Labor Protection. Not content merely with an analysis or characterization of the position and economic condition of labor, Colwell insists upon a social program for its protection. This he does of course primarily upon economic grounds, but he also recognized the fact that moral and political obligations arise out of considerations of economic welfare in such a connection. His declaration is as follows: "To shield its laborers is then the most important care of a nation; for labor is the most important item in the wealth of a nation, and the care of the laborer is the highest moral as well as political consideration which can claim the attention of a government. It is from this point that all social economy should be developed, all legislation be derived, and all industrial and commercial regulations should be deduced."¹¹

Colwell not only has an analysis of the condition of labor and an admonition for its improvement, but he also presents a program with which to achieve this desired result. This program is not in the nature of the various forms of ameliorative legislation for the improvement of hours, wages, and conditions of labor, which have attracted so much attention in the ninety years following the publication of the statements quoted above. It is pretty certain that the predominantly individualistic and laissez faire viewpoint of the author would have led him to oppose such remedies. Like Carey, and other members of the school, he believed that Natural Law, not legislature-made laws, should take care of all such problems of social and economic maladjustment. In reality he stood for only one form of interference with things as they were and that interference was, in his opinion, merely a method of restoring the operation of Natural Law to its normal working order by dispensing with the interferences set up by false systems of commerce. Thus his remedy for the ills of labor and his proposals for the promotion of economic prosperity are one and the same—protectionism.

Colwell on Protectionism. Perhaps Colwell's best statement of the virtues of the protective system is to be found in a passage from one of his earliest pamphlets.¹² Of the many arguments he has presented in this passage we shall offer only two. He says, for example, that foreign commerce is important chiefly for the "relations it opens up with foreign nations, by which we learn their progress in the arts of industry, comfortable living, and in science." In further support of protectionism he continues.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

¹² Stephen Colwell, *The Relative Position in Our System of Industry of Foreign Commerce, Domestic Protection, and Internal Trade* (Philadelphia, 1850), pp. 10-11. See also p. 3 of the same work.

They say that no population, scattered over a large territory, can import from foreign countries those supplies now deemed requisite for comfortable and respectable living,—such large imports cannot be paid for, and their bulk is too great for distant transportation; that no large scattered population can enjoy amply the comforts and advantages of civilized life, that does not produce at least nine-tenths of its consumption.

Colwell as Peace-Maker. Just one other aspect of his economico-social views may properly claim our attention. This was his attempt as a peace maker to provide economic arguments and assurances to the South early in 1861 when secession was imminent. He reminds the South that the “extraordinary advance in dominion, population, and wealth could never have been made, but under the favoring circumstances of a uniform policy, and continuous peace among the States,” and invokes the constitution as the source of that peace.¹³ He refers to the chief causes of the current heated controversies as Direct Taxation, Internal Improvements, Slavery, Free Trade, Protection to Domestic Industry, and Protection to Foreign Commerce. He admits the seriousness of the existing crisis, but expresses the belief that “there is patriotism, forbearance, intelligence, and discrimination enough to meet and settle, wisely and well, every question to which that subject [slavery] can give rise.”¹⁴ Elsewhere in his pamphlet, however, he does not appear quite as optimistic on this point, and he allows himself to fall into a vein of sarcasm in discussing a speech by Senator Hammond. He writes as follows.¹⁵

“The South,” says the Senator, “would never go to war. It is commerce that breeds war. It is manufactures, that require to be hawked about the world, that give rise to navies and commerce.” What a tranquil, inoffensive people are they of the South! They resort to arms! No: only do as they tell you, hold your tongue, and have no opinion about any thing where Slavery is concerned, and you need not fear their pistols, knives, or canes!—We leave this remarkable opinion or prophecy of the wise Senator to the men of the South who are shouting defiance to the United States, and stand bristling with arms.

Colwell's Advice to the South. This passage is even more important for another reason than that it portrays the humor of Colwell. It reveals the fact that Senator Hammond considered the chief basis of dispute between the North and the South to be, not slavery, but the divergent interests of

¹³ *The Five Cotton States and New York; or, Remarks upon the Social & Economical Aspects of the Southern Political Crisis* (Jan., 1861), p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

an industrialized North demanding protection for its industries—even to the point of creating for them a discriminatory market in the South—and the demand of the South for free trade in order that it might buy its finished products in a cheaper foreign market.¹⁶ Colwell devotes the bulk of his pamphlet¹⁷ to an answer to this challenge. True to the principles of the Carey school, he asserts that it is not commerce, but industry that creates wealth¹⁸ and endeavors to show statistically that the North's superiority in wealth is due to her remarkable industrial development. At a later date another Northern writer, Edward Atkinson, a manufacturer of New England, and also an active member of the Social Science movement, made much the same argument and urged the South to develop manufacturing industries as a way out of her post-war depression.¹⁹ Atkinson had the satisfaction of seeing his advice enthusiastically received and applied. Colwell was not as fortunate.

Colwell on Slavery. Perhaps one of the best tests we can apply to the genuineness of Colwell's humanitarian interests and his professed solicitude for labor is his expressed attitude toward slavery. On this matter he is quite frank. He says, "Slavery as protected by the Constitution of the United States, has more friends in the Northern States than it has in the world beside(s)—friends who would march by the hundred thousand for its protection and defense as it exists under the Constitution."²⁰ To this somewhat impersonal declaration of the attitude of the North he adds his own personal opinion. "Slavery is a great institution. . . . History has fully warned us, that emancipations of slaves on a large scale are hazardous experiments, which, in most cases, have failed in ameliorating the condition of those to whom freedom is given in this manner. No adequate preparation can be made for wholesale emancipation. Slaves set free in large numbers rapidly sink to the condition of criminals and vagabonds."²¹

But he does not leave the matter with this negative comment. He has a question to raise. "This door [of emancipation] being shut, we are led to inquire, whether Slavery is not capable of elevating itself."²² He would

¹⁶ See also Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York, 1929), Ch. XVII, on this matter.

¹⁷ *The Five Cotton States*, etc., pp. 20-46.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁹ Edward Atkinson, *The Development of the Resources of the Southern States* (Boston, 1898); also *The Industrial Progress of the Nation* (New York, 1889).

²⁰ *The Five Cotton States*, etc., p. 6.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²² *Ibid.*

inquire whether the slaves might not work out their own emancipation, whether liberation might not come gradually to superior slaves as a reward for industry, or if some other mode of improving the conditions of the slaves might not be worked out.²³ He ventures the suggestion, somewhat hesitatingly because of the fear of arousing the antagonism of less open minded Southerners, that it is "not only right, but indispensable, that the slave-owners of the South should look at the subject in regard to the future."²⁴ It will not be possible to allow the problem to drift; conditions with regard to slavery will change; foresight is necessary. He says, "If Slavery is to be permanent, as is contemplated by the South, there is the more reason why those concerned, as owners and residents, should give themselves to the earnest study of it as a social institution, destined, before half a century, to deal with twenty millions of slaves. But Slavery cannot be permanent unless the masters can secure freedom of speech and a tranquil life, though surrounded by neighbors who do not appreciate the institution or who may dislike it."²⁵

Necessity of Science for Policy Making. Above all, slavery requires to be studied scientifically as a social institution. Neither the North, the South, nor Europe has an adequate systematic knowledge of it. One of the most interesting things in all of the writings of Stephen Colwell is the passage in which he urges the scientific study of slavery. It shows clearly that he understood the relation of scientific investigation to social legislation and policy making. Regardless of whether one agrees with his personal view of slavery, it establishes the fact that he is entitled to be enrolled among the genuine disciples of Social Science, however crude his research methods may have been. The passage follows.²⁶

It is quite certain that Slavery in the South is not understood and appreciated at the North or in Europe as it should be, and it is scarcely less certain that it is not universally understood at the South as it should be. An institution which so much concerns the interests and welfare of human beings, for this life and the life to come, deserves to be continuously studied. Many able, learned, and valuable works on the subject of Slavery have come to us from the South; we have yet, however, to receive from that quarter a great and authoritative exposition of the institution—not in the shape of a defense, nor of an apology, but of a social exposition, in which Slavery, as it exists at the South, shall be fully and ably presented, in its aspects, historical and actual; in

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 57–58.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 55–56.

its relations with society; the relations of master and servant; the family relations of the negroes, and the various consequences of that relation; the degree and kind of education, religious and otherwise, to be given to the negro, and all that concerns the industrial and economical aspects of the institution, both now and in the future. Slavery deserves a social code of its own, co-extensive with the Slave States. There are many large slaveholders of the South so intelligent, so well-prepared by experience and long reflection, so full of sympathy for the slaves and the desire to do the best for them that can be devised, that, if brought together for conference, they could produce a series of invaluable papers, presenting the whole subject in a form alike important to master and slave, to South and North, and to the whole nation. This might lead to a constitution for Slavery, a slave code for the Slave States, and a uniform social policy respecting the management of slaves. We have scarce ever heard any thing with more interest than the accounts we have received from Southern planters of the social and economical policy pursued on their plantations. A convention, such as we suggest, would bring to the public eye the best results of thousands of well-devised and fairly-tried experiments. Such an assemblage, for such a purpose, would be an honor to the South, an honor to the public institutions of the United States; it would go very far to remove ignorance and unfavorable opinions in the North and in Europe. After such a measure, well carried out, abolitionism could no longer flourish; the occupation would be no longer profitable; its leaders would be under the necessity of seeking employment more consonant with Christian kindness and the peace of Society. And others of the North who now regard Slavery with a distrustful and hopeless feeling, would begin to look upon it as a sure method of elevating the African from savage to civilized life, and to give the master words of cheer, instead of un-dissembled distrust.

Reassurance and Warning to the South. As a final word of reassurance to the South, badly frightened by the John Brown raid and by purported threats to bridle free speech on the slavery issue in the North, he closes his pamphlet with a strong condemnation of John Brown and a warning as to what civil war would mean to the South.²⁷

If there is any ground for the present terror, for the present fear of abolitionists, for that despotic prohibition of free speech now prevailing in portions of the South, which we do not believe, there is good reason for considering some such plan of safety as we propose. We beg the people of the South to believe, that there is not an abolitionist in New England or in New York who would head an insurrection in any part of the Slave States. John Brown and his associates were educated for their crime in Kansas. It was in civil war, the most terrible and demoralizing of all wars, that he and they were prepared for the villainy of Harper's Ferry. If we are now unhappily on the eve of that

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

greatest of human calamities, a civil war, there cannot be a doubt the South will be pierced in a thousand places; and insurrection, with fire and sword, will be carried into thousands upon thousands of homes that were lately happy—homes that might be still among the happiest on earth, but for the treachery of politicians and the treason of men in high places.

Summary Regarding Colwell. Colwell is in many respects more of a puzzle than any of the other members of the Carey school. He was less of a theoretical Social Scientist than they and therefore did not declare his general points of view as clearly. But the chief difficulty of interpretation seems to have been with his motivation in a few instances. For example he states an attitude highly favorable to labor, but his later development of the subject would seem to indicate that possibly he is only using an interest in labor on the part of the ministry subtly to make propaganda in favor of industry. Again, in his advice to the South, it is sometimes difficult to determine whether he is always frankly counseling the southern people in their own interests, as he professes to do, or whether he is in reality using an opportunity to defend the North. Possibly he himself was confused in his motives. It scarcely seems fair to accuse him of intentional hypocrisy. His frequent concern with religious and moral questions may indicate that he was of a sympathetic temperament, while he was at the same time an astute business man and propagandist. Such a combination of qualities might easily render him facile in mixing the two points of view here suggested in a manner not calculated to do harm to his industrial allies.

He was, as we have seen, first of all a protectionist in the same sense as was Carey. But he was also a practical man of affairs in a much more extended sense than Carey. The latter, although not a teacher, was nevertheless largely academic and doctrinaire in his views and in the manner in which he developed them. If Colwell possessed this doctrinaire side to his personality his writings do not reveal the fact. All of these are on live public issues of a considerable variety, showing his wide range of contacts. He was apparently a leader, not wholly unlike Edward Atkinson at a later date, and like the latter he would doubtless have made an excellent public relations counsellor, if there had been such a profession in his day. Yet, although he wrote on practical problems almost exclusively, sentences and paragraphs scattered here and there among his writings show that he clearly appreciated the underlying principles of Social Science and was no novice in its methods.

The Disciples of Carey:

William Elder

The Three Elders. Another disciple of Carey, equally enthusiastic and in some respects even more brilliant and radical in his conception of the field which he sought to cultivate, was William Elder.¹ Like Carey, to whom he recognized great indebtedness, Elder was transitional. In his own intellectual development he passed through three phases. In the eighteen-forties, he was much under the influence of the Associationist School, as we shall see when we discuss his essays written earlier. These were not published until 1854, when they appeared under the romantic title of the first essay in the volume, "The Enchanted Beauty." The views here expressed are radical and optimistic, reformistic, and more or less Utopistic. Later, in the eighteen-fifties and eighteen-sixties, the young lawyer came under the influence of Carey, and this influence is reflected in his book called *Questions of the Day*, published in 1871. Here he is much more sober and restrained and systematic. Toward the close of his life he had studied more carefully the economists of his time, and he practically made the transition from Social Science to political economy, as shown in his volume entitled *Conversations on . . . Political Economy*, which appeared in 1883. This last work was in large measure a revision of the *Questions of the Day*, but showed the influence of Carey to a slighter degree and it was certainly less concerned with conventional Social Science and more with the

¹ William Elder (1806-1885) was born on a farm in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, and spent the first twenty years of his life there. He was educated to be both a doctor of medicine and a lawyer, practicing the first of these professions in Juniata County, Pennsylvania (1833-1838), and the second in Pittsburgh (1842-1845). From 1845 to 1861 he lived in Philadelphia, where he lectured on questions of finance, commerce, taxation, and public wealth, and where he was in charge of the *Liberty Herald* in 1847. From 1861 to 1866 and from 1873 until his death in 1885, he was a statistician in the Treasury Department at Washington. In the interim, 1866 to 1873, he lived in Philadelphia. His works include: *Periscopics* (1854); *The Enchanted Beauty* (1855) (chiefly a reprint of *Periscopics*); *Biography of Elisha Kent Kane* (1857); *Debts and Resources of the United States* (1863); *How Our National Debt Can Be Paid* (1865); *Questions of the Day* (1871); *Memoir of Henry Carey* (1880); *Conversations on Political Economy* (1883) (See *Dictionary of American Biography* VI: 68).

technical political economy of the time. It had in it less material of a sociological character tracing the evolution of economic institutions, also less on population, civilization, association, etc., and omitted entirely the three final chapters of the earlier book on Cooperation. It devoted a correspondingly larger amount of space to the technical aspects of money, banking, and credit. Thus in his life time he was in fact three Elders: one radical and Associationist in tendency, another liberal but nationalistic, and a third, the rather conventional and conservative economist. With this last phase of his development we shall not be concerned in our discussion, but we shall devote an equal amount of space to each of the earlier phases.

Elder's Associationist Phase. Like the Associationists, Elder believed that social institutions must be organized to conform to basic human nature rather than to caprice and that this must be done by means of a Science of Society. He says,²

There must be a Science of Society. Men have a determinate nature. The structure of the human body is the same in the Egyptian Mummy as in the latest born individual of the race. Every age has exhibited virtues and vices substantially the same. And the nations are only so many translations of humanity into different climates and conditions, all meaning the same things in different ways. It is clear that man is the creature of law, and that his freedom does not alter his constitution, however it affects his conduct; and it follows that the relations of men, which shape themselves into Societies and Governments, have also a fixed character, and are not to be invented, but only await discovery by human research. Man has not made himself, and he cannot, in any essential, change himself; his interests and happiness lie in conforming his institutions and conduct to his nature, and so fulfilling the will of the Creator, instead of following his own caprices.

Again speaking in 1848, of a local reform for the relief of the poor, the establishment, in fact, of a dispensary, to which there was some conservative opposition because of the morals of the beneficiaries, he found an opportunity to state a social psychology which was strikingly similar in general background to the basic philosophy of Associationist Social Science. In a romantic and oratorical, not to say evangelical, manner he states his argument as follows,³

Let us look into it bravely. It is not restraints, prospective penalties—repression, that regulates life. Every faculty of humanity is given in reference and adaptation to its object. *Attraction* leads out our actions. Desires, affections,—

² *The Enchanted Beauty, and Other Tales, Essays, and Sketches* (Philadelphia, 1859), p. 274.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 323–324.

our *loves*—constitute our real LIFE; restraints are only negatives—so many nothings. Abraham abandoned his native country on the promise of a *better* one; he offered up his only son in the certainty that he should *receive him* again. It is for the *joy set before him* that any man endures his cross and despises its shame! Human nature, as long as a spark of it remains, will respond to its appropriate stimulus; it will not resist the full play of its natural affinities.

Prayer in the closet—tears at your own comfortable fireside; but, in the highways, in the lanes and alleys, work, work, for the sinning and the suffering. Preach repentance if you will, but in Heaven's name plant a ladder in it on which the wretch can climb out of the slough of despondency.

Elsewhere he declares that "Democracy will never be self-adjusted, nor self-justified, till it has organized institutions in which all its instincts are harmonized in a natural order."⁴

His Concern With Social Reform. In an essay entitled "Association" Elder states his liberal point of view, declaring his openness to correction on all questions of social welfare, his belief in the necessity of making a scientific study of social needs, and in the legitimacy and imperativeness of social reform. His statement that inactivity in the face of abuses is tantamount to a passive support and sanction of those abuses is pointed and has the ring of personal sincerity. Out of the cooperative contributions of many should come a solution that would be a satisfactory remedy for social ills. His declaration of principles is as follows:⁵

We are not of those who reject a theory because some of its most remarkable points seem impracticable, or because it rudely puts us upon the defence of our most cherished opinions. But there is still stronger reason why we would not hastily reject revolutionary novelties—the feeling which we have in common with everybody else, that the system of things in which we live is not so good that it ought to be blindly defended against all change. Stubborn conservatives ought not to forget that their opposition to all proposed reforms really involves them in responsibility for all the evils which they passively maintain. The people of this generation are terribly worried with revolutions and reforms, but they would not be at peace if philanthropy, real and pretended were to desert the earth today. The world is not good enough, nor well enough ordered to ensure comfort and quiet, if all its fanatics were dead. It must be mended, and this felt necessity will ensure every plausible reform a hearing from somebody, and those who accept it will press its claims, whether men will bear or whether they will forbear.

On every side our understanding is challenged to inquire and our hearts

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 294–296.

are courted to act on the vital interests of humanity. All our institutions, religious, civil and economical, are undergoing the boldest and most earnest investigation. Some minds are occupied with questioning particular points in the established order. Of these there are so many sets, each pressing a special reform or a single idea, that our whole inheritance of usages and opinions, creeds and conventionalisms are attacked in detail; and there are others that with a universal sweep, strike boldly at the entire system of society, and put us at once upon the defence of creed and party, position and property. In the hurly-burly of this general war there are doubtless errors and excesses committed by all parties; as well as by conservatists as by the most radical revolutionists.

In the great strife we may, if we will, remain comparatively inactive, but we cannot be indifferent. We do not evade the questions presented, nor escape their effect upon ourselves, by merely declining the open championship of the opinions which we hold. Indeed the refusal to investigate and discuss, only puts us more quietly, but not less positively, into the defence of things as they are, for if I reject all the reforms which solicit my aid, I am supporting the institutions which exist, and the powers that be, as decidedly as if I were doing battle for them in the open field of public controversy. We think there are but few reflecting people who would voluntarily make themselves answerable for the whole system of things as they are. Utopia can't be made so drunk and crazy and wretched as the world we live in, and the prophets and philosophers who propose a new heaven and a new earth meet our wants and necessities so nearly they ought neither to be mobbed nor scorned. If men could be wise and honest and happy, as we are, they might turn up their noses at all innovation, but they are not now exactly in the circumstances to be saucy to any fool or madman that has a higher hope and a more equitable system.

We have a world to put in order, and why not receive proposals and examine the terms of all the world menders who wish to take the contract? Some of them have excellent suggestions to make, and among them all, a good plan may be found.

Criticism of Present-Day Society. It is clear from the above discussion that Elder, at least in these early years of his literary activity, was far from being satisfied with the social order as he found it, even though he did not go as far as the true Associationists in demanding a thoroughgoing revolution. To him the existing government and political economy were no better than a make-shift system of expediency, as the following passage will show.⁶

The system of political economy now in use has happened as a result of experiment, accident, conquest and compromise. Early errors produced permanent evils; revolutions abated their sharpest and most obvious mischiefs, and

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 277.

altered their forms. Necessity taught some truths and philosophy revealed some others; but monstrous grievances have always been tolerated, for the reason of their vested rights, or, the difficulty of overturning them. The notion that society is a matter of compact, and that policy is a system of compromise, has always been present to sanctify abuses and check radical reforms. The eternal right has been ever postponed to the conflicting claims of custom and possession. Government as it is, is only a cunning contexture of cobbled expedencies.

It was difficult for him to muster a great deal of respect for such a system. His indictment sounds not unlike that of Max Nordeau and other radicals a few decades later. He accuses our culture of a deep lesion, a conflict or antagonism, within its own body, which will not adjust or heal. He says,⁷

Above all things, theorists tell us that society arose out of the savage state, in which every man is every other man's enemy, and lies in wait to take his property and life; and yet, they construct their system on the principle of a perpetual antagonism, reduced from the confusion of chance and accident, to the settled order of a regular competition. The whole scheme of our institutions and relations being nothing else than a warfare of interests, under an armistice which is to continue until one or other of the parties makes too much advantage of the rules given it to work by for its own interests; and then the system allows a resort to first principles again, or the employment of force, and revolutions are sanctioned by the very philosophy which upholds government! The prevailing compromise of Pagans and Christianity does not hesitate to teach the duty of obedience to the laws of the State, whatever conscience may say, and at the same time holds, that the people, or any part of the people, who are strong enough, may overturn the lawmaking power, at any expense of life and peace. A system that enjoins both obedience and rebellion, can have no pretence to a philosophical basis, or, to the character of a true thing.

Societies, as they are constituted, allow a million, a thousand, a hundred men, to monopolize the entire soil of the country. They have no science of prevention, and they have no power of cure; and poor-houses and prisons are witnesses of their impotency and of their barbarism. Civilization is a compliment that all nations pay themselves. The Jews, the Romans, the Chinese, have plumed themselves upon it, and why not the European people; and why should it mean more in our case than in theirs?

Democracy and Good Government. He is both hopeful and doubtful about democracy. He thinks that the savagery of the French Revolution so contaminated its supporters that they, like David made barbarian by his many wars, could not erect the temple of democracy and were compelled to

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.

leave the task for a later generation.⁸ He looks upon the *coup* of Napoleon III and the supineness of the people with profound misgivings for the future of democratic self-control.⁹ The conventional view of contemporaneous individualistic democracy that "the world is governed too much" does not find a sympathetic echo in him.¹⁰ The difficulty as he sees it is that it is governed too haphazardly. At present government is an accident; it ought to be a science. He is clearly puzzled by the difficulty of this problem of finding a way by which men may govern themselves intelligently and justly. He asks, "Cannot Democracy find some way of organizing the human family, which will really recognize the natural brotherhood? Can it not find some method of action which will really protect the weak and nurse them too, and that without contradicting one of its fundamental principles by another?"¹¹

He answers his own question in part when he declares that governments must represent all of the people and not merely those who have organized (or captured) power. "Until the institutions of civil society are . . . adjusted to capacities, and fitted for the protection of the interests of all its members, republics, as heretofore, will serve only for the greatest good of the greatest number which they can accommodate of the people concerned in organizing them."¹²

Evils of Competition. Turning from his political to his industrial evaluation of our society, as he saw it at the middle of the last century, we do not find him less militant. It would be difficult to find a more scathing criticism of industrial competition—and in that very age when competition was lauded as the essential life of the *laissez faire* economic system promoted by the classical economists—than that which follows.¹³

Free industrial competition is, in principle, a system of masked fratricide. What it calls a fair chance is the dance of a rough-shod donkey among chickens, with a free fling of his heels at the crippled and haltered nags that occupy the adjoining stalls. That liberty which dissolves society into separate individualism, and turns everybody into the *mêlée* of a deadly antagonism is, in effect, the political system of the savage mixed with the social and industrial economy of civilization. Landlordism and monopoly of wealth, severed from the old

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 279-280.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 271-272.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 289.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-306.

feudal ownership of the laborer, in the end converts those who were once serfs, through the process of emancipation and wages slavery, into public paupers, but not until the free toilers have first converted the wilderness into a garden, and covered the land with palaces, and delivered its mines into the hands of its masters, and then they get leave to perish in their poverty.

So far as the tendency of the system goes, it is a refinement in cruelty for wealth to claim credit for emancipating the body and bones of a man while it keeps its clutches tight upon all the labor they can yield, and at the same time keeps itself disencumbered of the carcass. He that buys the use of a man, buys the man himself and should take care of him—accordingly, a poorhouse support is felt to be the fag end of the wages bargain between wealth and labor. . . .

Society still retains so much of the savage spirit of isolation that families will slink into a cell or kennel in dismal distrust and defiance, rather than club their means, and live together in palaces, the way the households of princes do.

Individualistic Bias. He sees little chance of removing group or class competition, however hopeful he might be with regard to the replacement of competitive conflict between individuals. He says, "The war between wealth and poverty cannot be compromised, for there is nothing in the demands of either that the other can afford to grant, and nothing in their respective wants which can be surrendered."¹⁴ This quotation reveals his individualistic bias, even in the midst of his strong criticism of the evils of the competitive system. In his view the privileges and ends of each party are legitimate in themselves, although he insists upon the fact that partisan class control exists. Thus, he says,¹⁵

Under our system of hostile ownership, the soil, materials, and implements are under the dominion of one party and interest, and wherever the system has become considerably matured, the other party is at its mercy, and must accept such conditions as it has to offer. Against political and religious despotisms, revolutions and rebellions are often successful; but against the money power, never. The law of property, established in the world's conscience, and strong in every man's instincts, sanctions the mischief, and protects the abuse, while it supports the right that lies under them. Men cannot do what they know to be wrong in principle and inconsistent also with the tacit agreement of the social organization. The evil is in the system. It is an organized warfare. Man is armed against his fellow man, and life itself depends upon the struggle, and compels it. The laborer exhibits his sufferings and makes his complaints; the capitalist answers by showing his own necessities, and so justifies his monopolizing acquisitions. In impulse and purpose both are right; in method both are wrong, and equally anxious, uncertain and unhappy.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 303.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 301-302.

Elder's Remedy for Competition. In seeking an escape from the wrongness of the method of which he speaks, he turns to a plan for harmonizing interests which is reminiscent of the old Associationist Social Science doctrines. Like the Associationists, he is not yet ready to condemn unbridled self-interest. The problem is how so to organize society that unrestrained self-interests may be harmonized and made to contribute to the same successful and unitary social whole. His plan he states as follows.¹⁶

The method only is wrong, for exclusive property and differences of taste and necessities are just and natural. But nature is consistent with herself, and no man's interest is in another man's loss, by her constitution. The parties must be reconciled in action as they really are only in interest. The brotherhood of the race stands translated into *partnership* in business. Instead of buying and selling, hating and robbing, each other, give each his equitably adjusted benefit in the mutual product of combined means, skill and toil; inaugurate justice, conform the system of life to the truth of things; and we shall have reciprocity of feeling and mutual guarantees out of our harmonized interests, and all the benefits and blessings of a true commonwealth, industrial and social, as well as political, will result.

It may be difficult, but it cannot be impossible, to organize society naturally. In truth, there is nothing so practicable as the right. Human experience proves that all false systems fail; sound philosophy insures the success of the true. To call the hope of better things visionary, is in effect to preach content with the existing falsehood and evil, and virtually to defend and support them.

Elder's Associationist Views. These views were of course expressed in the eighteen-fifties, at a time when Associationism was still before the liberal public of America. The older he became, the more conventional his ideas on social questions and social reforms grew to be, but he never ceased to be a liberal, and in many respects a radical. He was, for example, much less conventional in his social views than E. Peshine Smith and other recognized members of the Carey school, but he was not more radical than the group of Post-Associationists discussed in Chapters XXIII and XXIV. Of equally radical views on poor law reform,¹⁷ the abolition of capital punishment,¹⁸ and several other social evils and reforms there is scarcely room to speak. However, we may close this brief review of the Associationist phase of a most interesting, although now forgotten, Social Scientist of the preceding century with the following characteristic statement regarding the infliction of the death penalty. He says, "Until society

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 302-303.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-326.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 350-359.

has done its duty to the poor, the ignorant and the profligate, it cannot justly demand the last drop of blood from the wretches who violate its laws."¹⁹ In the abstract his contention can scarcely be controverted. But it might well be asked whether a strict adherence to a principle so obviously individualistic would not in itself prevent the development of either a feeling of social solidarity or an administrative power of sufficient strength to enforce such an ideal standard of social justice as is here demanded. Perhaps few realistically minded persons can share with the author his naive faith that divergent individualistic motives of self interest are capable of that ideal harmonization so devoutly believed in by the disciples of Fourier in the first half of the nineteenth century. That naive faith of course no longer exists, except for a few metaphysical anarchists, who expect this harmony to arise out of an unimpeded human nature itself, and for those theologians who expect it to be imposed upon mankind by the will of the supernatural through some sort of magic or mystical experience.

The Influence of Carey. In *The Questions of the Day*, Elder is already very much under the influence of Carey's school of Social Science. He frankly declares his marked indebtedness to Carey and the other members of his school in the passage which follows.²⁰

Here, however, I am bound to say that my indebtedness to Mr. Carey is so great that only those who are intimately acquainted with his works can duly estimate it. I believe that no future writer upon any of the subjects embraced in the wide field of his studies will be able to do much more, to any purpose, than give his doctrines some required difference of presentment and application.

In like manner, I would acknowledge the heaviest obligations to Frederick List, Alexander Hamilton, and to Stephen Colwell. To Parke Godwin, Esq., I am indebted largely for matter used freely in my second and third introductory chapters; and to Horace Greeley, and the domestic and foreign correspondents of the *Tribune*, for valuable information employed in discussing the current cooperative movements of the time.

Although at this phase of his development Elder was moving from the reformistic viewpoint of his earlier book to the more conservative and specifically economic outlook of his later one, he was still far from a conventional economic viewpoint. He does not wish to write a traditional treatise in the field of political economy, he tells us, because such treatises were

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

²⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 6. The later revision of this book, called *Conversations . . . on Political Economy*, was dedicated to Hamilton, Carey, and Colwell.

then in such bad odor with the public and also because he wished to make his own book as much of a popular guide to public investigation as possible.²¹

Following the Carey point of view, Elder frankly assumes a national and local vantage point, in the treatment of the questions of the day, stating his position as follows:²²

Holding that Political Economy is *National* in its purview and range, as opposed to abstract, general, or cosmopolitan, I am content that my thoughts shall be understood to proceed from so narrow a stand-point of observation; nor would it embarrass me in the least if my doctrines should be pronounced not only American, but even Pennsylvanian, in spirit and inspiration, for I would have them something certain, settled, and actual, rather than the general and universal that comprises everything, and belongs to nothing in particular.

This alignment is, as we have seen in the case of Carey, characteristic of this school of Social Science. It not only indicates a primary concern with American affairs, but it also points to a manifest belief that Social Science principles can be formulated only as the result of concrete, and therefore largely local, inductive observation of data in process.

Elder's Method of Treatment and Principles. The work which we are undertaking to analyze briefly is really of more systematic character than the title, *Questions of the Day*, would seem to indicate. In it the author attempts to set forth a connected and consecutive theory of Social Science, chiefly in its economic aspects. His definition of political economy is in itself decidedly sociological and from the true Social Science point of view. It runs as follows. "Political economy is the theory of human well-being, in its relations with the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. Its subjects are man and those external things which minister to his earthly wants. It is concerned with his mental and moral nature, so far as these are involved in his societary relations, and, with his physical necessities, and those material things which are made to satisfy them."²³

Like others of his school, he held that both Association (or interdependence and solidarity) and Individuality "are . . . reciprocal and corroborative in enhancing each other and in promoting the progress of man, the community, and the race" and are therefore basic principles in political

²¹ *Questions of the Day: Economic and Social* (Philadelphia, 1871), p. 3.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

economy from this point of view.²⁴ Other fundamental principles which he enunciates are "the influence of circumstances upon character and conduct, especially upon the mass of men," and the obligation of the religionist to "study . . . those first principles in the economy of human society which so deeply concern its spiritual welfare."²⁵ Elder's viewpoint is more ethical and religious than Smith's, but scarcely more sociological. He believed firmly that both teachers and governors, and "all who are in anywise responsible for the well-being of their fellow men" should feel responsible for the mastery of the principles of this science.²⁶

Without much discussion of the problem of methodology, he ranges himself on the side of the inductive method and complains of hasty a priori reasoning. He declares that "the study of Political Economy has suffered more from a vicious system of generalization than from any other or all other errors of fact and opinion."²⁷

Theories of Social Evolution. Like Smith, Elder has a theory of the origin of society, but it is less well documented from the literature of the time. Following Fourier in the main, he describes five reputed stages of the evolution of social life and institutions under the headings of Edenism, Savageism, Patriarchalism, Barbarism, and Civilization.²⁸ The first two terms represent alternative theories of the first stage, and he inclines to the Savageism rather than to the Edenism doctrine. He is particularly interested in contrasting barbarism and civilization, which he does schematically in the following table.²⁹

In Barbarism	In Civilization
Ecclesiastical absoluteness governing by divine right.	An appeal to reason admitted in the interpretation of revealed truth.
Literature, impassioned and imaginative.	Literature, logical and philosophical.
Opinions fixed.	Opinion free.
Doctrine indisputable.	Doctrine variable.
Parental and marital rights, absolute.	Parental and marital rights, limited.
Women and children enslaved.	Women and children guarded by municipal law.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-32.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Theory of Race. Elder points out that neither Asia nor Africa has produced an enduring civilization,³⁰ and shows himself decidedly partisan to the Germanic and Celtic peoples.³¹ While he does not believe in the equality of races he does hold that a sort of functional unity of mankind can be secured through a measure of complementary or coadaptive cooperation of "the distinctive characters of the four or five varieties of political and social polities of societies, and of the kindreds and peoples under them. . . . The unity of the families of man is not the unity of likeness or identity, but of diversity and its possible harmonies in that better order, of which they are capable."³² He holds to the theory that each race has its own natural habitat to which it is especially adjusted and adapted. Thus,³³

The various races of men, whatever may have been their origin, or whatever the causes of those differences of character, use and destiny which now exist among them, cannot be confounded in a single class, or covered with a common description without sacrificing all the benefits of philosophic study, and all the useful guides of practical treatment; and, in keeping with this fact, is the corresponding one, that while all the families of men, in the aggregate, or in one category, may be called cosmopolitan, and destined in their adjusted varieties to the inhabitation of the whole earth, no single kindred or people are or can be so, but under a distributive impulse, each grand class has its own assigned locality with special fitting conditions and a special fitness for them.

He is convinced that the races in the United States will adjust to and find their proper loci in the three several climatic zones and the various occupations of the country. Our federal system is especially favorable to such adjustments, making migration and settlement less of a problem here than elsewhere.³⁴

Population and Labor. Elder would not have been a member of the Carey school if he had not taken issue with Ricardo and Malthus and have declared his optimism with regard to America and her future. He uses statistics of agricultural and mechanical production to demonstrate that the increase of wealth is outrunning population growth in England, France, and the United States and that the Malthusian principle does not operate.³⁵ He takes essentially the same position as that taken by Carey and Smith on questions of the distribution of wealth, maintaining that wages

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 31.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Ch. IV.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Chs. V-VII.

have risen much more rapidly than profits—in the ratio of three to one—and also more rapidly than the cost of food, which has remained fairly stationary in recent times. Labor's share has increased in proportion to its productiveness while capital's share has diminished relatively. He furthermore maintains that more liberal wages result in better work on the part of the laborer, a point of view that was exceptional in his day.³⁶ His treatment of Money and Credit (Chs. IX–XI) has little of particular interest for us.

Free Trade and Protection. A total of six chapters are devoted to commerce and the problems of protection and free trade. Elder is only mildly enthusiastic about the virtues of the division of labor and would not push the application of the principle to the point of justifying unlimited free trade. In fact, he holds that unrestricted trade in natural products is fruitful of advantages to both parties only *across*, not within, climates.³⁷ He makes a good deal of use of this idea of climatic conditioning of race and of industry, as we have already observed. He is decidedly critical of the free trade economics of his time, holding that "Political Economy is a theory of productive power, . . . and its dogmas are not universal and unconditional, but subject to conditions and necessary adaptations to the exigencies of nations; or, in other words, . . . a true practical economy is national as opposed to universal. . . . Political Economy is not properly a science, but a remedial and directory system of policy, of expediency, variable with the varieties of the cases and conditions to which it applies."³⁸ Free trade is suited only to those countries especially favored by nature with natural resources and geographical position and climatic conditions.³⁹ He therefore favors protectionism as best adapted to the independence and healthy development of a nation.⁴⁰ Finally, he proceeds to give a history of protection in the various existing nations.⁴¹

Guarantyism. Eighty-four pages, or approximately one-fourth, of *Questions of the Day* are occupied with other constructive programs for social welfare, and are perhaps of more unquestioned value than the six chapters on the control of international trade. The tendency of individualism to give way before association (his mild term for protective policies in the

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Ch. VIII.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Ch. XII.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 174.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Ch. XIII.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Chs. XIV–XV.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Ch. XVI.

government) is noted.⁴² This new tendency he terms guarantyism,⁴³ which carries in it a reflection of the old Fourierian collectivism. Elder, however, is not espousing either paternalism or collectivism, but rather free cooperative endeavor on the part of the citizens. He emphasizes strongly the importance of this new movement. As great as have been the achievements in the arts and sciences in the last one hundred years, he says, not these, but the constructive movements for social welfare and social protection—guarantyism—have been the most distinctive. Societary reformation is the glory of the present age, he says. He lists some of the more important of these reforms. They are to be found in politics, in the organized diffusion of Christian knowledge by Protestants, temperance reform, anti-slavery achievements, public schools, statistics of education, public libraries, the growth of periodicals, charities, the decrease of capital crimes, of corporal punishment, and of imprisonment for debt, the growth of insurance as applied to both individuals and business, and the astounding growth of beneficent societies.⁴⁴ He devotes a chapter (Ch. XIX) to detailing the work of secret societies and fraternal organizations carrying on the work of guarantyism.

Cooperation. But Elder's chief enthusiasm is for cooperation. He divides guaranty associations into three classes: (1) those that organize the social charities, (2) those that economize the expenses of existence, and (3) those that equitably divide the profits of production.⁴⁵ Cooperation comes of course under the third division. He devotes three chapters to this subject of cooperation, treating it more broadly than we do today. In one chapter (Ch. XX) he traces the struggle of labor to free itself from the tyranny of wealth and power throughout European history. In a second chapter he traces the evolution of the cooperative movement proper, including the Rochdale Pioneers, the German cooperative societies, the credit societies, and cooperation in other countries, including England, Spain, and Russia. The third chapter (Ch. XXII) is devoted primarily to the growth of cooperation in the United States, and to arguments for its further development here. Incidentally, in these chapters, he treats the development of labor unions and other associations and the agrarian movements which were beginning to be active in his time. He condemns in the most unmis-

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 251 ff.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, Chs. XVIII-XIX.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, Ch. XVIII.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

takable terms the evils of "lawless competition" and finds its chief remedy in the orderly emulation of cooperation.

Summary regarding William Elder. With Elder the Carey school of Social Science comes to a close. In fact, within his own lifetime Social Science had begun to split into a number of specialized social science disciplines, as will become sufficiently clear in subsequent chapters. Elder had, in the early eighteen-eighties, attached himself especially to one of these, the branch then coming to be known as economics, and had written a work, already noted in this chapter, in this field. Or, perhaps we should better say, he had transformed his volume on Social Science into a treatise in economics by the process of revision already noted. Other Social Scientists were also making a transition from the general discipline Social Science to various specialties. Robert Ellis Thompson, for example, was well on his way toward Biblical Sociology, where he arrived with the publication of his *The Divine Order of Human Society* in 1891. Perhaps the most distinctive thing about William Elder was the fact that his life and his views embraced, as did those of no other Social Scientist, the whole history of Social Science in the United States, beginning with Fourieristic Associationism and ending with the economic and even the eclectic emphasis in Social Science. One cannot read the writings of this interesting man without feeling the charm of his virile personality and believing that he probably had more to offer his time than was absorbed by his contemporaries.

PART SEVEN

The Neo-Classical School of Economic
Social Science

An Early New York Group of Laissez Faire Advocates

Free Trade Appeals to Social Science. There has already been occasion to point out that in the course of its development Social Science has meant all things to different men. In earlier chapters we saw Social Science appealed to as a sanction for a doctrine of subjective social control through human nature as set forth by Albert Brisbane and the Associationists, as a modified doctrine of Anarchism particularly in the teachings of Warren and Andrews, as a sanction for agrarian reform in the case of Masquerier, and as a sanction for a protectionist economic policy by the Carey school. And now, in Part VII, as though to render confusion worse confounded, we are to find Social Science used in defense of free trade. However, these various appeals to the sanction of Social Science by as many contrasting, and sometimes conflicting, interests need not surprise us unduly. As has been made evident before, the nineteenth century was an age of profound and growing respect for science, even in relation to human affairs. Almost all new and insecure and more or less radical doctrines, reforms, and interests, whether economic, political, sociological, ethical, or latterly even religious, sought to increase their appeal to the public by assimilating to themselves the name and prestige of science. As a consequence, it is perfectly understandable that each of these social doctrines here referred to should have sought coverage under the common shelter of the term Social Science.

Two Divisions of the Free Trade School. The advocates of this particular brand of Neo-Classical Social Science, devoting their energies especially to laissez faire doctrines such as free trade and propaganda against labor union activities, were various in character. The school we are dealing with here falls into two major groups apparently without any very close ties between them. First we shall consider an early New York group of crusading amateurs, who had for a time an association and a journal at their disposal. Later we shall present briefly the theories of what we may

call the academic group of free traders, since all but one of those we shall mention—Edward Atkinson—held teaching positions in colleges and universities; and even he had rather definite, if somewhat incidental, connections with academic institutions. This second group of Neo-Classical Social Scientists were much more systematic and perhaps more profound in their treatment of free trade and other aspects of laissez faire than the amateur New York group. It is worth repeating, however, that all of the members of this school, including those from both of the groups mentioned, were essentially propagandists, using their theory not as an end in itself, but as a means to the control of economic processes through legislation and public opinion.

The Place of This School. It was but natural, as was remarked earlier in this work, that the most widely cultivated aspect of Social Science in the United States should be the economic. Not only was this a new country demanding many economic adjustments, but the economic side of life itself presses more closely than any other upon most people and calls forth a more vividly conscious reaction from them. This stronger economic emphasis in Social Science was the case not only in its reform aspects, which would only appear to be natural and expected, but also in the theoretical aspects of Social Science. It is noteworthy that the profound emphasis upon economic principles in Social Science came later than the emphasis upon economic reforms. This was, no doubt, due to the fact that it takes longer for a disciplined theory to arise than for propagandistic reform programs to appear in an improperly adjusted economic situation. With one or two exceptions, outstanding economic theorists did not arise in this country until after the middle of the nineteenth century.

We have had occasion to observe that the reform programs of the earlier Social Scientists became increasingly economic as they developed. The ultimate reform objectives of the Associationist group were economic, although this school of Social Science justified its reform proposals by an appeal to human nature. The Comtean emphasis in Social Science was logical and methodological rather than practical and therefore did not touch the question of practical social reform, economic or otherwise, directly. Yet, the only attempt made to introduce the Positivist Religion of Humanity into this country as an institutional organization—Henry Edger's effort to transform Modern Times into a Positivist colony—had close associations with economic processes. The Post-Associationists inclined very definitely and strikingly toward economic reforms. And the Carey school of Social Sci-

entists dealt primarily with economic reforms and theories. This was the first school of Social Scientists in which economic theory was more emphasized than economic reform. The eclectic school of Social Science, which will be the chief concern of the next following division of our work, were interested in a great many aspects of social reform and theory, of which the economic was one of the more important. The neo-classical group of economic Social Scientists, which is the subject of the present division, were the propaganda theorists par excellence of the Social Science movement. All of the academic members of this group were also members of the American Social Science Association and they continued to affiliate with this Association even after the American Economic Association, to which they owed closer allegiance, was formed in 1885.

The Scope of Our Treatment. It is not possible in this work to give as full attention to the members of this group of economic Social Scientists as they deserve. Limitations of space forbid it and the fact that most of these men had ultimately closer relations with the American Economic Association or the American Sociological Society than with the American Social Science Association, from which they gradually disassociated themselves, perhaps justifies us in the rather sketchy treatment given them here. Neither is it possible for us to consider all of these men, or all of the more outstanding representatives of the group. The two Walkers—Amasa and Francis A.—for example, although economists and Social Scientists of distinction will have to be omitted. The earlier amateur New York group and the five more important professional Social Scientists of whom we do give some account in this and the following chapters were for one reason or another so conspicuous in the Social Science movement that some presentation of their theories is rendered imperative.

We have given the title of Neo-Classical School to this group because we find in its members a marked reaction against the Nationalist school of Carey. Not only have they espoused the free trade theories of Adam Smith and the later representatives of the British classical school as a sort of religion, and as their chief and almost sole article of economic reform, but they have become more laissez faire than the classical economists themselves. They in fact represent in large measure a reversion to the laissez faire doctrines of the British school of the preceding generation. But we shall have more to say of this characteristic orientation in the final chapter of this division.

A Social Science Association. On October 9, 1862, there was founded, in

New York City, The Society for the Advancement of Social Science, an organization of men interested in current economic and political problems. It held regular weekly meetings throughout the winter at No. 12 Union Square.¹ The secretary of this organization was Simon Stern, a young man twenty-three years of age.² The meetings consisted in large part of debates in which the members took part. Thus, for example, some of the subjects of the debates were as follows: "Is the United States Government a Republic?" (debated by Messrs. Stern, Thomas, Smull, Leopold Riess, E. Fezandié, Alexander Delmar, Charles Moran, William P. Lee, William B. Scott, and Dr. Julius Homberger); "Do Not All Taxes and Duties Prejudice Home Industry, and Operate in Favor of Foreign Manufactures and Producers?" (debated by Messrs. Scott, Anderson, Moran, Lee, Isaac C. Kendall, Homberger, Delmar); "Are There Any Circumstances in a Political Body Which May Justify the Temporary Extension of Power Vested by the Community in the Executive?" (debated by Messrs. Homberger, Scott, Moran, Delmar, Fezandié, Smull, Erastus W. Benedict); "What Legislation Should There Be upon the Subject of Insanity?" (debated by Messrs. Homberger, Moran, Smull, Stern, Fezandié, Scott, Riess, Delmar, Dr. Ellsberg); "Can the Precious Metals Be Advantageously Replaced as Money Bases?" (debated by Smull, Lee, Scott, Moran, Homberger, Delmar, Benedict).³

¹ Notice in *New York Social Science Review*, I: 164-165 (Apr., 1865).

² Simon Stern was born in Philadelphia in 1839. He graduated in law from the University of Pennsylvania in 1860, and went to New York to practice. In 1862 he was lecturing on political economy at Cooper Union. He was a member of the staff of the *Commercial Advertiser*, 1863-64. He was one of the founders of the American Free Trade League (1864). He took an active part in the movement to clean up municipal politics, being chosen secretary of a Committee of 70, and drafted the charter which that Committee advocated. In 1876 Governor Samuel J. Tilden appointed him on a commission to devise a plan for the government of cities. In 1879 he was counsel for the New York Board of Trade and Transportation and the Chamber of Commerce in an investigation of abuses in the management of railroads. This resulted in the appointment of a Board of Railway Commissioners for New York. He was also a leader in the movement for the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission; and he even drafted an interstate commerce bill, in conjunction with a committee of the United States Senate. President Cleveland appointed him, in 1885, to examine and report upon the relations of railroads and government in Western Europe. A paper read by him before the American Bar Association on "Slipshod Legislation" led to the appointment of a legislative commission to consider reforms in drafting laws. He died in 1901. His chief writings are: Articles on "Cities," "Legislation," "Monopolies," "Railways," and "Representation" in John J. Lalor's *Cyclopaedia of Political Science and United States History* (1881-83); *Representative Government and Personal Representation* (1870); *Constitutional History and Political Development in the United States* (1862). Biographical data from Appleton's *Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, V: 668. See also John Ford, *The Life and Public Services of Simon Stern* (New York, 1903).

³ Notice in *The New York Social Science Review*, I: 165 (Apr., 1865).

The Social Science Review. When these formal meetings and debates broke up they were continued in more or less informal social discussions at near-by restaurants. One evening four of the members, including Stern and Alexander Delmar,⁴ met at the *Maison Dorée* and decided to publish a journal.⁵ The result was *The Social Science Review*,⁶ further described as "A Quarterly Journal of Political Economy and Statistics," whose first number appeared in January, 1865. Stern and Delmar were the editors. The Conspectus of the review read as follows:⁷

The importance of the subjects to which this publication is devoted requires that they should be represented in the periodical literature of the United States.

At no time in the history of the country has the knowledge and diffusion of the principles of Political Economy been so necessary as now. Engaged in a civil war of great extent, and one which will probably produce many changes in our social and political institutions; and involved in heavy public expenditures which will compel us to carefully study matters of finance and taxation in order to devise revenues and distribute burthens; it has become of the utmost importance that we should, at this period more especially, render ourselves familiar with the natural laws which govern mankind in its social

⁴ Alexander Delmar was born in New York of Spanish and British ancestry, in 1836. His father, Jacques, was for many years an official in the Treasury Department and maintained an active interest in Spanish connections. Alexander was educated in New York private schools and then sent abroad to England and later to Spain, where he studied at the Madrid School of Mines. In London he came under the influence of his uncle, and also of Sir Arthur Helps. "These associations stimulated his interest in history and political economy" (*Dictionary of American Biography*, V: 225). In 1854 he returned to New York, but there were no openings in his profession of mining engineer. He established editorial connections with Hunt's *Merchants' Magazine*, DeBow's *Review*, and the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*. He was director of the United States Bureau of Statistics from 1866 to 1869, but he was criticized and removed. In 1871 he was interested in municipal reform in Brooklyn. He supported Greeley as a member of the Liberal Republican party in 1872, predicting the fall in interest rates. In 1872 also he attended the International Statistical Congress at St. Petersburg. He was mining engineer for the United States Monetary Commission in 1876, in California, where he studied the history of mining in the west. He returned east in 1878 and became clerk to a commission on naval expenditures of the House of Representatives. In 1880 he published a *History of the Precious Metals from the Earliest Times to the Present*. "The influence of new supplies of gold and silver in the progress of civilization had early absorbed his attention; in this book he noted particularly that the search for gold had extended the area and prolonged the establishment of slavery" (*ibid.*). Other works by him are: *The Science of Money* (1885); *Money and Civilization* (1886); *The History of Money in America from the Earliest Times to the Establishment of the Constitution* (1889); *The Worship of Augustus Caesar* (1900); *The Middle Ages Revisited* (1900); *Ancient Britain in the Light of Modern Archaeological Discoveries* (1900); *The Messiah* (1907). He also edited the *Cambridge Encyclopaedia* of esoteric subjects (1899-1906). He died in 1926. Biographical data from *Dictionary of American Biography*, V: 225-226. Other sources: *New York Times*, July 3, 1926; Hamilton Wilcox, *Life of the Hon. Alexander Delmar* (New York, 1898).

⁵ Notice in *The New York Social Science Review*, I: 324 (Oct., 1865).

⁶ After the first number the title was *The New York Social Science Review*.

⁷ This "Conspectus" was printed on the back cover of all issues of the review.

state; and study well the manner of producing, distributing and consuming wealth; so that public opinion and legislation may be in accordance with, and not in contravention of those natural laws.

To trace and examine by the light of science the social evolutions which are constantly transpiring; to critically examine every law having for its object the raising of revenue and the distribution of the burthens of taxation; to discover in what manner our National and State legislation can be improved so as to further the best interests of humanity; to exhibit the ignorance and venality of politicians, and show the futility and mischievous tendency of their measures; will be the special aims and objects of this Review.

The SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW will never degenerate into an advocacy of partisan policy. Its province will be extended not only to our own affairs but to those of all nations; and it will represent the best views on Political Economy, come from what quarter they may. From time to time carefully prepared Statistics will appear in its pages, and every effort will be made to render the work valuable alike to the student of Political Economy and to the practical Legislator.

Influence of The Social Science Review. It was a carefully edited journal and was not lacking in influence. At the end of the first volume the editors stated, perhaps with justifiable pride, that "started with a limited subscription list, made up in the city of New York alone, the Review has come to be extensively read all over the United States and Europe; and it may now fairly be classed among the permanently established periodicals of the day. It numbers among its subscribers some of the most gifted of American authors, scientists, and legislators; and has even made its way to Congress, and been instrumental in directing legislative attention to the faults of our internal revenue system."⁸ The reference in the last sentence has to do with the Amended Revenue Bill presented in the 38th Congress.⁹

The plan of the *Review*, the function it hoped to perform, and the types of persons it endeavored to interest, may be gleaned from the advertisement which appeared at the end of the second and third numbers:¹⁰

This *Review* is projected as a standard work on all Social topics, particularly those embraced under the head of Political Economy; and its pages will be filled with the choicest productions of such eminent Economists as HERBERT SPENCER, JOHN STUART MILL, SCHULZE DELITZSCH, PROFESSOR RAU, etc. To publicists, legislators, editors, teachers, students, bankers, and merchants, such a work must prove invaluable, affording, as it

⁸ Unsigned, "Our First Volume," *New York Social Science Review*, I: 323-324 (Oct., 1865).

⁹ Advertisement, back of second and third numbers, *New York Social Science Review*, 1865.

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*

will, critical reviews of all theories of government, social relations, legislation, finance, and commerce. . . .

To all friends of humanity and science this work commends itself; and as the charms of style and illustration will not be wanting to render it attractive to the general reader, it is confidently believed that it will attain a wide circulation, and lead to more correct views on Social Science and Political Economy than those which now prevail.

Problems of Editing the Review. The difficulties involved in editing such a journal were many and trying, but the worst ones were the lack of available materials in the field of Social Science, the lack of reviewers with the proper viewpoint, and the absence of discriminating criticism.¹¹ On these points the editors said:

The reading public can form no idea of the difficulties with which the Publishers have had to cope. Notwithstanding the vital importance to our people of organized knowledge on the subject of Social Science, but few works pertaining to it are published in this country. Those that come from other countries are very useful to us (and herein they are invaluable,) in the discussion of general principles. Whenever they apply these principles to practical affairs, it is to the affairs of other countries; not to those of our own. Our Editors have, therefore, been obliged mainly to confine themselves to the reviewal of current official documents, relating to the political and social condition of the country. . . .

Not only books for review, but reviewers also, have been difficult to obtain. Among the political economists of the United States, but few are not committed to principles which we cannot fully endorse, and to these few, accordingly, have we been mainly indebted for the matter which has appeared in our pages. They comprise the names of Charles Moran, Esq., Rev. O. B. Frothingham, Dr. Julius Homberger, Henry Harris, Esq., Emile Walter, Esq., and those of the two Editors, Messrs. Delmar, and Stern. . . . We have received contributions enough, it is true, but not of such value in a scientific or literary point of view as would warrant their publication.

Another source of difficulty to the Publishers has been in the absence of appreciative and discriminating criticisms from the press. Such notices as have been given to our work, and so far as numbers are concerned we have no cause to complain, were, for the most part, mere advertising notices, or else contained silly charges against, or gross and uncalled for personal attacks upon, the Editors. Sometimes, worse still, they were written in a tone of jocular approval, or of absurd panegyric. . . .

To disseminate the truths of Social Science—that science which is the sum of all the sciences—was a task not undertaken without misgivings, nor to be performed without difficulty. The soil was very barren—is still very barren—

¹¹ Unsigned, "Our First Volume," *New York Social Science Review*, I: 322-324 (Oct., 1865).

and the fruit we would cultivate will not grow until it is planted in the richest mould.

Theoretical Leanings of the Review. Although the *Review* had promised not to degenerate into an advocacy of partisan policy, its leanings were strongly Jeffersonian. Thus, for example, it states its position on the subject of centralization of governmental powers in the following words: "Principles which lead to the centralization of the powers of government and to increased restraint, we cannot support—for these lead to social degeneration; to social poverty, to social annihilation."¹² And, although one contributor thought highly of Abraham Lincoln, he felt this great man had been lacking in Social Science training, as his protective and centralizing tendencies indicated. The writer added: "Guided by his strong good sense, Mr. Lincoln groped his way through many difficult situations with safety, but he must have sadly felt the want of more thorough training in social science. Many of his political convictions were anti-scientific. He was a protectionist. He was a centralizationist."¹³

Spencer and Mill, but especially Spencer, were the idols of this group of Social Scientists. Simon Stern attempts a comparison of the two intellectual leaders, saying: "While Spencer is the bolder reasoner, and perhaps the greater genius, Mill's high social position and practical turn of thought enabled him to exercise a greater influence."¹⁴ No issue passed without some tribute to Spencer, in the form of an article, a review, or a reference. The first issue contained an unsigned article on Spencer which consists of one long eulogy after another. At this early date, 1865, Spencer had not yet achieved the widespread recognition which came a decade or two later, and the author points out that Spencer is unpopular because he attacks evils without fear. He adds:¹⁵

But, at last, despite neglect and misinterpretation, the genius of Spencer has a vista opened for it; and the rays of its light break through the mist which, for twenty-odd years, has prevented the world from enjoying its beneficent rays. Thanks to a few progressive thinkers of Europe—thanks to a few enlightened men of this country (more especially Professor Youmans), Spencer's name is now known, his talents are recognized, his merits are being acknowledged, and his works are being read and studied. It is, perhaps, idle

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 322.

¹³ E. P., "Abraham Lincoln," *New York Social Science Review*, I: 310 (July, 1865).

¹⁴ Review of Mill's *Essays*, *New York Social Science Review*, I: 161 (Apr., 1865).

¹⁵ Unsigned, "Herbert Spencer," *New York Social Science Review*, I: 70, 78, 80-81 (Jan., 1865). This article was probably by Stern.

to hope that Spencer will ever become a popular author, but he is fast becoming a well-understood and appreciated thinker. His direct influence will, in all probability, be restricted to a circle composed of a few thinking men in the community, but that suffices; as, from that circle, will be reflected . . . upon the outside world the light of his ideas. . . . Spencerean philosophy will permeate and penetrate the world of thought; and, eventually, to the extent of the truths which he has taught, will influence human conduct.

Spencer's *Social Statics* was written to illustrate the conditions essential to human happiness. We do not think that we are asserting too much when we say, that, from this work, will date modern Social Science; as it holds the same relation to the indefinite speculations that were called Social Science anterior to its publication, that Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" holds to that which was called Political Economy, prior to 1776. . . .

Had Spencer written nothing but his Essay on Progress, its Law and Cause, Over-Legislation, Railway Morals and Railway Policy, and Representative Governments, he would have been entitled to be ranked among the most gifted men of the age. . . .

When we consider Spencer's few defects and many merits, we are compelled to acknowledge that he is one of the most influential thinkers of the world. He belongs to those men of the age who stand as much above the average of the old school of scientists and theologians, as their science is broader and their theological opinions loftier. . . .

We cannot commend Mr. Youmans too highly for introducing this philosopher and publicist to American readers. . . .

Their Emphasis upon Science. In common with all Social Scientists so far discussed, this New York group believed thoroughly in the scientific character of their discipline. The natural laws which govern social relations were, in their opinion, as amenable to scientific discovery as any other type of natural law. Simon Stern traces the history of this idea in an article on "The Progress of Social Science." He says, in part,¹⁶

Social Science, meaning thereby that branch of knowledge which is occupied with the elucidation of the natural laws that govern man in a social state, is of all sciences the most modern. Political Economy, a department of Social Science, though itself as a distinct branch of study but a century old, had first to make gigantic strides and advances, before the conviction forced itself upon the minds of thinking men, that man, as well as all else in creation, is governed by natural laws which impel him irresistibly forward in his march of progress; and that the progressive civilization of mankind is not a mere accidental phenomenon, but the necessary result of the forces which are at work in nature. To trace the history of ideas for the past fifty years in Social Science it is necessary to cast a birdseye view upon the historical progress of political econ-

¹⁶ *New York Social Science Review*, I: 97-98, 102, 108, 108-9 (Apr., 1865).

omy, and its gradual development into something higher and better, than the mere study of the laws that govern the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. . . .

Up to the time when Quesnay wrote, it had never entered the minds of any class of thinkers that there were natural laws which governed and controlled the action of man in a social state. . . .

The basis of this work [Bastiat's *Harmonies Economiques*¹⁷] is the theory, then novel and original with Bastiat, but now accepted by all economists of merit the world over, that all the really legitimate interests of man are harmonious. That natural laws control as well the action of man as the rest of the domain of nature, and that legislation is, as a general rule, a mere hindrance and impediment to the full, free, and harmonious operation of these natural laws. Bastiat's work has served to tear down the arbitrary limits of the science, and extend its domain into that of Social Science. . . .

Herbert Spencer's works and merits as an economist and philosopher upon social questions, we have treated of in our last number. He has made political economy the groundwork for a thoroughly scientific and logical treatise upon Sociology. His Social Statics is a philosophy of human progress, and illustrates the conditions essential to human happiness. Liberty is the alpha and omega of this philosophy. . . .

Here, also, we have an incidental emphasis upon the inclusive character of Social Science, such as we saw above in the statements of Stephen Pearl Andrews. According to the views of Stern, and perhaps of the New York group as a whole, political economy was a subdivision of Social Science, and especially so since it had expanded its interests and contents to cover the wider social interests of mankind. Under the leadership of John Stuart Mill, political economy had broken with the classical tradition and had become socialized. These men of the New York group of Social Science theorists are quite ready to consider both Mill and Spencer among the Social Science fraternity.

This confusion regarding the true limits of Social Science, quite naturally, was never resolved. A commentator on current literature,¹⁸ writing in 1875, lists under the heading of Social Science, along with Hamilton's *Social Science*, such works as Henry, *Considerations on Some of the Elements of Social Welfare*, Mrs. King, *Social Evils: Their Causes and Cure*, W. Logan, *The Great Social Evils*, C. L. Brace, *Dangerous Classes of New*

¹⁷ There was some controversy as to the priority of claims to this harmony doctrine as between Carey and Bastiat. We need not enter into the details of it here. See Henry C. Carey, *Principles of Social Science* (1858-59), I: p. iii, also Robert Ellis Thompson, *Social Science and National Economy* (1875), p. 30.

¹⁸ G. A. F. Van Rhyn, *What and How to Read* (D. Appleton, New York, 1875), pp. 178-179.

York, Rogers, *Social Welfare*, About, *Social Economy*, and Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*. That all of these works properly belong under the general heading of social science, or, in some cases at least of social reform, there can be no question. But it is equally clear that, according to the criterion of inclusiveness which we have adopted for this volume, some of them could not be listed under the more limited category of the special discipline of "Social Science."

The Social Reform Emphasis. The reform ideal was also emphasized by this New York group. Thus an unsigned article tells us that whatever may be our destiny after this life, "we positively know, that, on earth, man has to fill a destiny, a duty, a mission. These are clearly defined; they consist of the amelioration of the individual, and of the amelioration of the human species. The science which illustrates the laws of this triple mission, we call Social Science."¹⁹

Simon Stern, himself a graduate in law from the University of Pennsylvania, proposed that law schools should have ten chairs, including one on Social Science and Political Economy and one on the Philosophy of History and Comparative Statistics, so that every graduate from such a school would be a legal reformer as well as a lawyer. He said,²⁰

Those who know what gigantic strides have been made of late years by political economy and social science, who knows what these sciences teach, will comprehend how important it is for every one to understand the true relations of capital and labor, to understand the true distinction between monopoly and freedom, and such will perceive that the education of a lawyer is of necessity incomplete and vicious, if he rest ignorant of those fundamental principles of political economy which, were he cognizant of them, might enable him to trace the consequences of laws, and to perceive their beneficial or deleterious social influences. By reason of the teachings of these sciences and the lessons to be derived from the philosophy of history, every student, graduated at such a college, would be more or less of a legal reformer. He would understand the law not only as it is, but as it should be; and would, at all events, comprehend the direction that reformatory measures should take, and the end to be had in view in constitutional, legislative, and legal reforms so as to promote the object of all human efforts—human happiness.

Education and Public Service. The need for training in the principles of Social Science as a preparation for public service is also strongly emphasized by this group of writers. The application of Social Science to legislation,

¹⁹ Unsigned, "The Limits of Political Economy," *New York Social Science Review*, I: 93 (Jan., 1865).

²⁰ Simon Stern, "Law and Lawyers in the United States," *ibid.*, I: 246-247 (July, 1865).

according to this group, was becoming a pressing necessity. Thus, Stern says,²¹

We are so practical a people that all social theories were hitherto looked upon with disfavor and distrust; a distrust evidenced by the fact that our National Councils do not contain a man guilty of a knowledge of Political Economy or Social Science. The time, however, has arrived when empiricism will no longer accomplish our ends. . . . We are called upon to solve questions of greater importance and higher meaning than has fallen to the lot of any Nation upon the face of the earth. . . . The much decried and little understood scientist whose general principles can alone aid us in solving these riddles has risen somewhat in the estimate of the American Nation, and ere long a change must and will take place in the character of the men who shall be called upon to represent us in Congress and the State Legislatures. The transition period is at hand.

It is particularly interesting to note that this group saw so clearly the importance of training in Social Science, and especially on the side of political economy and national policy, as an aid to the public legislator and administrator. Since more of this class of men came from the law schools of the country than from any other one source, it seemed important to them that this training should be included in the law schools. This of course is exactly the procedure that obtains in European law schools, and especially in those where the tradition of the Roman law is dominant. It is recognized there and in Latin American countries that every law student is likely at some time to be a public servant as well as an advocate before the bar and he is trained in subjects of general culture and public policy as well as in the law. It is only in such countries as the United States, where the practice of the law has become a private and highly exploitive and individualistic profession, that the public service obligations of the lawyer have been forgotten and ignored and the teaching of law has been narrowed or confined merely to (1) the exposition of the law as such, (2) instruction in how to find the law, and (3) how to manipulate it most efficiently in behalf of the personal interests of the client. It is a truly remarkable proposal, coming from one of the New York group of Social Scientists in the eighteenthies, that training in law should be socialized and reformed in the direction of public service and social reconstruction. We probably see here the influence of Delmar, who was educated in part in Spain, where the Social Science emphasis in law training obtained and where courses in economics,

²¹ Simon Stern, in a review of Draper's *Civil Policy in America*, *ibid.*, I: 371, 372 (Oct., 1865).

the philosophy of law, and other social sciences were a part of the legal training prescribed.

Essential Principles Basic to Social Science. Thus, different as was this group from any other so far studied, they had in common with all other Social Scientists both the scientific and the reform ideals. It cannot be too much emphasized that these were the basic tenets of the Social Science movement wherever we find it or any of its adherents. It will not be amiss to repeat here the assertion that the movement was, in whatever form it took at different stages of its development, the product of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment's optimism with regard to the significance of science for the human race. It was to be the instrument of social progress quite as much as of industrial, medical, or any other form of progress. In fact, the Social Science movement understood social progress to be a synthesis of all forms of progress whatever, and for this very reason Social Science was always largely a synthetic subject. Yet it had its various groups and patterns, some of which emphasized one aspect of progress, while others dealt with another. Thus the Associationists sought to achieve social progress through the subjective channels of freeing the human impulses and instinctive drives. The Comteans and speculative Social Scientists generally looked for the best results to come through the perfection of scientific method and a philosophy of inductive science. The economic group in Social Science were especially intent upon working through economic factors and processes. But all were basically devoted to the belief that science, in whatever form and however employed, must be depended upon to regenerate the world of human affairs too long clouded and confused by superstition, ignorance, and exploitive interests. Along with their firm belief in the regenerative powers of science—and of Social Science specifically—went the kindred conviction that science must be used for the good of mankind. These Social Scientists scarcely realized, as we now know only too well, that science can be exploited to the detriment of social welfare through warfare and waste as well as for social improvement. Such a *possible* employment of science was unthinkable to those who fostered the Social Science movement. They were unequivocally and ardently devoted to reform.

The Review Fails. *The Social Science Review*, which was really the organ of the local New York group, had started out bravely, as we have seen, but it did not weather the many storms that confronted it. In 1866 Delmar went to Washington to the Bureau of Statistics and the journal did not

long survive the absence of the leading spirit that had animated it. It is doubtful if a magazine that was compelled to appeal to so varied a clientele could possibly succeed. Of the variety of its contents the editors said: "The student will find in the pages of the REVIEW the most advanced theories of Social Science; the legislator will find these theories applied to the prevailing state of affairs; and the commercial classes, bankers, underwriters, shareholders, manufacturers, merchants, jobbers, brokers and shippers, to the every day operation of business. The statistical department will keep pace with the latest researches; and the reviews and book notices will receive their full share of attention."²² Furthermore only very exceptional business men endowed with genuine intellectual interests could be expected to subscribe to a journal with so large a theoretical content. Students, on the other hand, were likely to demand more academic consideration of the theories presented than the practical-minded editors from the professional ranks were likely to give them. Moreover, the number of students who were at that time accustomed to read largely in current journals and reviews was exceedingly small. University instruction still followed rather slavishly some standard text book and made little use of current discussion of contemporaneous social questions.

In Advance of Its Time. Discussion of social questions was by no means lacking, but it was still generally of the Socratic or dialectical type rather than in the nature of an inductive examination of facts. Logic, and largely syllogistic deductive logic at that, usually counted for more than fundamental and rich information in the conventional educational process. It was supposed to be the function of the good teacher and of the efficient class room to train the youth in the art of spinning theories into fine threads and of twisting these into strong cords capable of hanging an opponent, or of knitting the strands of argument into nets which would bag the unwary. Argument was for the sake of defending a thesis, of supporting an ism or a faction, not necessarily of discovering the truth. In fact, there was extant in academic circles no great degree of faith in the powers of intellect to discover or create new truth. Truth was ancient and it inhered in the doctrines to which the reasoner had been bred, of which faith his college was an exponent. The task assigned was not to discover new truth but to acquire facility in convincing the erring (those who belonged to another religion, party, or philosophy) of the greater values of one's own dogmas. How could such a journal as the *Social Science Review* appeal to the spon-

²² Unsigned, "Our First Volume," *New York Social Science Review*, I: 324 (Oct., 1865).

sors of such academic twaddle as this, encouraged by the traditional academic chairs? The Social Science courses in the colleges were still so few that they could offer very little encouragement to such a publication; and it is doubtful if one professor in a score would allow himself to be caught reading anything so modern. Dependence for subscribers must rest primarily upon the handful of serious young professional men in the city of New York and in nearby metropolitan centers. Business men might have their curiosity aroused occasionally by such a journal, but they were not of the type that could be expected to give much sustained attention to it. Moreover, the day of specialized journals was at hand, and within the next decade or two, they were to be supplied.

Significance of the Early New York Group. In spite of its failure, the *New York Social Science Review* must however be recognized as a most interesting expression of the views and emphases of the New York group of Social Scientists which flourished in the eighteen-sixties. Their chief concern was with economic processes that might be manipulated in the interests of wholesome social reform. Secondly they were occupied with the political implications of their advocated economic controls and reforms, and with the problem of educating citizens, and especially public servants, in the basic social sciences which could be used for social betterment. Their emphasis upon the inclusion of statistics in the training of future public servants is an especial evidence of the farsightedness and soundness of their outlook upon the problems of social control.

Like Wright, Warren, Andrews, and Carey, they were opposed to centralization in governmental organization and administration. This doctrinal attitude may perhaps be attributable to a number of considerations. During the Civil War Delmar had manifested a rabid sympathy with the South and he had not fully recovered from his leanings in this direction at the time of his New York activities. It was of course conventional for young radicals—and most of the members of his group were undoubtedly considered as such at the time—to oppose any sort of governmental concentration, especially since the development of the new industrialism had not as yet reached such a stage that great economic malefactors and exploiters had begun seriously to escape governmental regulation and control under the aegis of the doctrines of states' rights. Most of these men had apparently been bred in the Jeffersonian tradition and perhaps also they were more strongly affected by the anarchistic theories and subjectivistic psychology of the old Associationist Social Science than is easily apparent

within the limits of their economic doctrines and discussion. Being practical professional men, for the most part, they probably had less to say in philosophic defense of such theories than they really believed.

Unlike Carey, on the other hand, they were anti-protectionist, a fact which probably goes back in part to Delmar's earlier English contacts at a period when free trade was in the ascendant in that country. Stern also, and perhaps more or less independently, had become, and remained to the end of his career, a convinced advocate of freedom of international commerce. This is all the more surprising because of his training at the University of Pennsylvania, which was more or less under the influence of Carey in the matter of protectionism. But, as we have already pointed out, a truly cosmopolitan interpretation of Carey's doctrines of association of necessity leads to the espousal of the doctrine of free trade rather than that of protectionism. Like all Social Scientists these men believed their theories were based on a truly scientific method, and they were devoted to social reform, especially on the economic side.

The Social Science Theories of Bascom, Perry, and Wells

John Bascom, The Pioneer of the School. The first outstanding theorist of the neo-classical or laissez faire school in the United States was John Bascom,¹ a distinguished Social Scientist in his day. His chief work in the field (1859) antedates by some six or seven years that of the New York school of amateurs described in the preceding chapter. But rather than separate him from the academic group to which he properly belongs, his theories are here presented after those of the New York group. Yet Bascom was not closely associated with any of the members of the academic group except Perry, whom we shall consider next after Bascom. He worked early and for the most part alone on his economic Social Science theories. Later in life, when the other members of his group were most active, he had turned his attention, not wholly away from Social Science, but from the

¹ John Bascom (1827-1911) was born in Genoa, New York, the son of a minister. He was graduated in 1849 from Williams College, where he had distinguished himself in mathematics. He taught school for a year and then studied law for eight months in a lawyer's office, but found legalism too uncongenial for his moral nature. He entered Auburn Theological Seminary in 1851, where he was much influenced by Laurens Hickok, professor of theology. In 1852 he became a tutor in rhetoric and oratory at Williams, but in 1854 resumed his theological studies at Andover Theological Seminary. In 1855 he returned to Williams as professor of rhetoric and oratory, where he remained until 1874, when he was called to the presidency of the University of Wisconsin. In 1887, because of difficulty with one of the regents, accentuated by his own advocacy of prohibition, Bascom resigned from the presidency of Wisconsin and returned to Williams, accepting a position as lecturer in sociology. In 1891 he was made professor of political science. He remained until 1903, when he resigned to devote himself to writing and public service. His works include: *Political Economy*, 1859, "written before Bascom's faith in technical political economy had been weakened by knowledge of the broader field of sociology" (*Dictionary of American Biography*, II: 32); *Aesthetics, or the Science of Beauty*, 1862; *Philosophy of Rhetoric*, 1866; "The Natural Theology of Social Science" (*Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1867-1869); *Principles of Psychology*, 1869, revised as *Science of Mind*, 1881; *Science, Philosophy, and Religion*, 1871; *Philosophy of English Literature*, 1874; *Philosophy of Religion*, 1876; *Ethics, or Science of Duty*, 1879; *Natural Theology*, 1880; *Problems in Philosophy*, 1885; *Sociology*, 1887; *The New Theology*, 1891; *Historical Interpretation of Philosophy*, 1893; *Social Theory*, 1895; *Evolution and Religion*, 1897; *Things Learned by Living*, 1913 (*Dictionary of American Biography*, II: 32-33).

economic aspect to the ethical, the religious, and the sociological emphases. He and W. G. Sumner, alone of all the members of this school, developed from Social Science into sociology.² The other members, while they also remained Social Scientists, continued in the economic pattern and sooner or later became members of the American Economic Association. Sumner, during the period under discussion in this and the following chapters, was primarily an economist and only secondarily a sociologist. His transference of major interest from economics to sociology did not occur until about 1900.

Bascom's Point of View. Bascom's theory of economic Social Science is expressed most clearly in his *Political Economy*, published in 1859, contemporaneously with Henry C. Carey's *Principles of Social Science*. In this work Bascom frankly espouses the a priori point of view as to method. He says, "A science of wealth is secured, not by an effort to enumerate and trace in their effects all the influences at work in its production, consumption, and transfer, but only those which, by their prominence and might, give direction and law to the whole movement."³ It is clear that he believes that there are general laws governing the field of economic Social Science and, curiously enough, like the Associationists, he finds them in human nature, and not, like the school of Carey, in nature itself. These universal basic laws, according to Bascom, are three in number and are as follows: (1) the desire for wealth, or the enjoyments which wealth mediates, (2) the desire for ease, and (3) the desire for present as opposed to future gratification.⁴ With these three laws in mind we are able to construct the whole of economic Social Science. The method is logical rather than experimental.⁵ Facts of economic life are important, but they are confirmatory rather than generative in character. For example, he declares:⁶

Political Economy has to do with facts, but it has first to do with existing causes of a known character, and mentally traceable in their results. The verification of this logical process is the broad explanation which it is able to furnish to past and present facts. Facts do not give a law to, but find their law in, the impulses of our nature; and this law may be reached by tracing the impulse and looking to the facts for our verification; and, sometimes, by in-

² See his *Sociology* (New York, 1887).

³ *Political Economy*, p. 9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

ductively uniting the facts in a law, and looking to our known impulses for its explanation.

Thus in theory Bascom reduces Social Science essentially to a set of pigeon holes into which he seeks to cast the facts of economic life as he finds them. But of what use is this pigeon hole classification? It is not living, but dead, science at the best. He cannot make policy or solve problems with it. The best he can do with it is to disregard it when he has work to do, and that is exactly what he does, as we shall see.

Bascom's Motivation. The fact is that Bascom is himself, perhaps unconsciously, influenced by environmental considerations or facts in taking this point of view and not by either of the three motives which he lists above. As a good neo-classicist he wishes to find a logical basis for the defense of his point of view against the Nationalistic arguments of the Carey school. He is defending the thesis that economic processes and laws are uniformly the same everywhere and that the arguments of the Carey school for the validity of different economic policies varying according to time, place, and circumstances are invalid. Thus he falls into a metaphysical absolutism well illustrated in the following passage: "Political Economy is not a science varying with climate and country. There is not an English and an American Political Economy distinct from each other, and, in a measure, the reverse of each other. The forces of human nature, the agents of production, the arithmetic of gains, are the same everywhere, and lead to the same principles of economic action."⁷ This passage sounds like a direct reply to Carey's own arguments.

Bascom also has another motive, which sets him apart from the various moralistic schools of Social Science, such as the Associationists, Post-Associationists, and Careyites, and places him definitely in the pure science school, in so far as economic Social Science is concerned. He wishes to divorce ethical motivation and the desire for social welfare (government aims) completely from economic theory. This attitude of course marks his intellectual relationship with the classical theory of the economic man which was so offensive to the members of the Carey school and in fact all the other preceding reform schools. However, this insistence of Bascom is also nothing more than a bit of sterile theorizing, for he too is interested in ethics and social reform, and he makes a place for them in his wider Social Science theory and deals with them extensively, as we shall see. For he in-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

cludes not only political economy in his Social Science, but also two other aspects of social theory and policy—morals and government. Thus, he says,⁸

All that Political Economy has to say in reference to any course of action is, profitable, unprofitable. Much that is immediately and ultimately unprofitable, it may be well should be done; but we have for it no economic inducement. Much that is immediately profitable,—and may be ultimately so, using the word in its restricted sense,—is to be foregone, for an ethical injunction may overrule it. Government has other interests before it besides those of production, interests which may often modify, may sometimes set aside, these last. Political Economy needs only to be careful, to present a true table of profits and losses, and to value correctly the action of government in these respects.

It seems clear that ethics and government constitute the policy making and political economy the theory making aspects of Social Science. The two aspects are closely related and correlated.

Bascom on Social Justice. The ethical and social welfare viewpoints are strong in Bascom in spite of his doctrinaire theories of economic motivation. He was strongly opposed to usury laws, believing that they gave an opportunity for exploitation as well as that they were contrary to the competitive principles of price making.⁹ Protectionism is not only in opposition to natural laws of competitive markets,¹⁰ but it is also a form of economic exploitation.¹¹ He is interested in the welfare of the working classes and believes that industry should provide for a high standard of living and welfare for them:¹²

It especially behooves industry to provide for her own workmen, and to enlarge their share of the commodities produced by their diligence. The state of production is dependent on the skill, intelligence, and social position of its laborers. The higher and the more universal the enjoyments which fall to their lot, the more free, efficient, and successful, will be their industrial efforts. A wise industry must provide for its own. The highest social state, which is the highest productive state, scatters its rewards and inducements among the bulk of men; trying to raise here the tone of sentiment and of life, and to bear up community in its masses to a higher platform. It devotes its leading energies to the kind of production whose commodities meet the necessities and decencies of ordinary life. It multiplies in amount, in variety, in excellency, in beauty,

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 110–117.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 93, 104–105.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

and reduces in price all such products, and places within the reach of the diligent a life of comforts and enjoyments.

Bascom believes that the prosperous have strong moral obligations toward those who are not.¹³ He seeks to prove that one of the chief obstacles to the prosperity of the masses is the absorption of large portions of their labor in the sterile production of luxuries for the well-to-do.¹⁴ Pauperism, in his opinion, has three types of causes and the remedies are different in each of these. Pauperism which results from economic factors over which there is no definite control, such as famines, floods, etc., should be relieved at once, and by public agencies if necessary.¹⁵ When it arises from the carelessness, luxury, or oppressions of the well-to-do classes, it is their problem and they should meet it,¹⁶ but he does not say how they are to be made to do so. If poverty results from the irresponsibility and improvidence of the masses themselves, the only remedy is to quicken them morally and intellectually through education and perhaps religious appeal.¹⁷ It is worthy of remark, however, that although Bascom discusses wages, his treatment is almost wholly from a sterile classical standpoint and he has no suggestion as to how wages can be made adequate to the needs of wage earners.¹⁸

Bascom on Population. Nowhere else does Bascom show his reaction against the Carey school more strikingly than in his treatment of population. He accepts Malthus' point of view and cites the history of colonization in America to show that unchecked population increase normally outruns food supply.¹⁹ To this he adds the argument of diminishing returns in agriculture²⁰ and he also supports the theory of marginal productivity of Ricardo.²¹ He argues trenchantly in favor of the operation of the preventive in place of the positive checks to population. The latter belong to the reign of savagery and ignorance, while the former make possible the progress of civilization. Speaking of the preventive check, he says, "This check belongs to all high states of society, anticipates and overcomes the evil without serious inconvenience, and applies itself, more and more perfectly, with each step of advance. Savage life, by its deficiencies and vices,

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 134-135.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 141-142.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 139, 141.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 178-203.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-120.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 123-124.

creates a barrier, and hurls itself against it, long before the resources of a single country or continent have been discovered, much less exhausted. Enlightened life, with wise forecast, anticipates and arranges its action, in reference to the real limit, before it reaches it.”²² He further makes the point that social welfare is not to be measured by the size of the population but by the standard of living which a people are able to achieve. The standard of living depends on the skill and knowledge of the people and these in turn upon a margin above the bare necessities of articles to be consumed. Such conditions, he believes, ultimately depend upon keeping the population within bounds. Thus,²³

It is not necessary, for a true social state, that the population of the globe should be indefinitely increased, but of the highest importance that commodities, in their relation to laborers, should so increase; that industry should have more and more to bestow on her retinue; that production should show itself able, at every point, to promise and confer additional rewards on additional skill. All social progression is based upon a possession of the decencies and luxuries of life—its external manifestations; and, through the instruments of literature, science, and religion, which it furnishes, it is the necessary precursor of all broad and high attainments. It is then a question, not exclusively of economic, but of social interest, how far production can supply the needful basis and instrument of all higher progress.

The Natural Theology of Social Science. The transition from the strictly economic point of view in Social Science to a more inclusive concept, in the case of Bascom, is illustrated by his work on *The Natural Theology of Social Science*, which appeared in a series of articles in *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1867–1869. In this work, Bascom extends the old natural theology arguments for the existence of God from the realm of the physical sciences into the realm of the social sciences. He is, in this respect, reiterating the old argument of Mandeville, Adam Smith, and the natural law school of economists generally, to the effect that even seeming vices in individuals may have beneficent long time results for society as a whole. Thus, “among the most calculable and definite of the forces that play upon man, resting back upon self-love alone, basing its calculations upon the single axiom of production, that each man desires the most with the least labor, this desire of wealth is capable of becoming a chief force in promoting civilization. . . .”²⁴ Being a theologically trained thinker he could not as a

²² *Ibid.*, p. 126.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

²⁴ *Loc. cit.*, XXV: 22 (Jan., 1868).

political economist disregard the higher motivations of religion, but he remained a true apologist for the moral excellence of the new industrial order in his insistence that "as a subordinate desire the love of wealth is essential to the health of the soul."²⁵

It required great subtlety and casuistry to find the principles of natural theology applying even in poverty; to use it, in fact as an evidence of God's existence. But Bascom was equal to the task. The poor deserve to be poor. He says,²⁶

As long as the staple with which Providence has to deal in the races of men is ignorance and indolence interstratified with sin,—stupidity made heavy, solid, opaque, and gritty with a wicked will, the unpliant and stubborn mass can only be broken and ground and reformed by the strongest and harshest of machinery. Unpitying poverty, absolute and severe want, must be allowed to force action, to sharpen instincts, to strengthen the will. War and pestilence must winnow the feeble races, lest they swarm in vile, unprofitable life. . . . Such a state is scarcely a moral one; physical forces have sway, and death is of little moment if it plays into a higher life. . . . Mere life and naked life is nothing. God allows us to feed constantly upon it to teach us its subordination. Not in stolid maintenance, not in hopeless pause, not as mere cunning mechanism, is it sacred and heaven-cherished; but in its upward tendencies, in that growth by which it is more and higher than all about it, and may be infinitely greater than it now is. Hence that which is best in it, low as this may be, has the field, is trained into statelier growth. Such has been the plan foreshadowed from the beginning. The vast losses of the process in human society spring from the worthlessness of the material, the low range of motives at work, and thus belong to that debased state of transgression which makes other instrumentalities ineffectual and transcendental.

That tenderness of life which we meet in natural theology confronts us again here. It argues against the mercy of God from the simple presence of suffering. It isolates the naked fact of pain, and . . . refuses to contemplate the sweep, grandeur, and high character of the plan which includes it,—which, with the weight and splendor of its ultimate attainments sinks out of sight this rugged, angular stone of the foundations. It forgets that we must sacrifice the whole, or accept its parts. . . .

When in any race the germ of growth is found; when intelligence meets with reward, and is quickened by the reward with which it meets . . . we at once discover the possibility and the play of higher motives, the setting in of new social forces producing, to the eye at least, better results. Thought and activity become the recognized means of success. . . . We have now a government of self-interest . . . which finds an adequate motive for industry in the good to be gained. . . .

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 659–662 (Oct., 1868).

Those more susceptible of intellectual excitement, more ambitious of success, come at once and . . . fully under the forces which secure material progress. . . . The lower classes, in the meantime, relatively little quickened by the new incitements, still press and punish each other with competition in the labor-market overcrowded with the proffers of mere brute strength. The loitering, unambitious poor still reserve for themselves the lash of necessity.

This, briefly, was the nineteenth century justification for poverty. The poor are inferior and must be sacrificed in the great winnowing process of evolution. Furthermore their poverty is their own fault, since they breed too rapidly. But back of all of this is a definite plan. God designed it so. Malthus and Darwin here become the two great pillars in the natural theology of Social Science.

Bascom saw a real harmony of interests between capital and labor, but argued that this harmony "will not reveal itself, or become very potent in controlling the action of men, till late in the progress of society."²⁷ Wages are the result of natural forces and neither strikes nor legislation can do any real good.²⁸ Bascom also found "God's government . . . clearly revealed in the laws of trade."²⁹ These laws demand obedience, and in spite of seeming evidence to the contrary, "there is . . . the possibility of perfect concurrence between principles of exchange and those of morals. Nay, more, the one, resting on discriminating selfishness, tends to prepare the way for the sympathy and philanthropy of the other, resting on love."³⁰

When we enter the field of consumption, we are no longer within the province of political economy, but have entered the realm of social and moral interest.³¹ Now we find that "the ignorant and improvident are, in God's economy, the wards of the intelligent and thrifty"³² and hence ostentatious luxuries, which withdraw wealth from production, are bad. But in the field of consumption, as in that of political economy proper, there is a parallelism between self-love and love, and when this is adequately recognized, that is, when religious forces of love come to temper self-love, class strife will disappear.³³

Comment on Bascom. Such are the Social Science theories of the first outstanding representative of the Neo-Classical school. In spite of his doc-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 675.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 679-683.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, XXVI: 140 (Jan., 1869).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-141.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 422 (July, 1869).

³² *Ibid.*, p. 431.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 439-440.

trinaire isolation of theory from policy and sterile dependence upon general laws of human nature for a guiding principle in his social theory, he manages to arrive, on the basis of a resort to an appeal to social policy, at some worthwhile conclusions regarding several of the outstanding social problems of his time. The most curious thing about his treatment, however, is that he divorces theory from practice and as a consequence is compelled to resort to outside motivations—moral and religious and humanitarian—for the validation of the worthwhile things he wishes to support. This sort of wandering in a theoretical maze is characteristic of the metaphysical backgrounds that characterized the Classical and Neo-Classical schools.

Perry and His Point of View. Arthur Latham Perry³⁴ was another Williams College professor whose economic Social Science theories call for notice here. He was less able than Bascom, but more strictly an economist and less of a philosopher, and for these reasons had a wider practical influence in the councils of Social Science. He was much taken with the natural theology point of view which emphasized design in nature and in human affairs. He was convinced that "Society is God's handiwork,"³⁵ and that it was a providential arrangement that human society in general and economic enterprise in particular should be a necessity. He says, "Society and exchange are, under God's ordination, matters of necessity, if men are to rise in a scale of comforts perceptibly above the brutes."³⁶ Like Bascom, he divorces economic theory from ethical obligation. Its relation to ethics is purely incidental, due to the fact that the moral is usually also the economically expedient. He says,³⁷

As a science, it does and must discuss and decide all questions upon economical grounds alone. As a science, it has no concern with questions of moral

³⁴ Arthur Latham Perry (1830–1905) was born at Lyme, New Hampshire, the posthumous son of a minister, and his earliest years were spent in extreme poverty. He attended the local village school and also the Thetford, Vermont, Academy. He taught school for several years and in 1848 entered Williams College. "In his sophomore year he discovered John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, upon which he battered, and which became, he said, the subsoil of his intellectual growth" (*Dictionary American Biography*, XIV: 482). He graduated in 1852 and taught in Washington for a year, but was then recalled to Williams to tutor in political economy and history. He later became professor of these subjects, and also of German. In 1891 he retired. Aside from the influence of Mill, noted above, he was greatly influenced by Bastiat's *Harmonies of Political Economy*, to which he was introduced by Amasa Walker. He was an ardent free trader, delivering 200 addresses under the auspices of the American Free Trade League, debating with Greeley on the subject, and being elected to membership in the Cobden Club of Great Britain. His works include: *Elements of Political Economy*, 1865; *An Introduction to Political Economy*, 1877; *Principles of Political Economy*, 1891 (*Dictionary of American Biography*, XIV: 482–483).

³⁵ *Political Economy* (New York, Scribner's Sons, 1883), p. 109.

³⁶ *Elements of Political Economy* (New York, Charles Scribner & Co., 1865), p. 29.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

right. If it favors morality, it does so because morality favors production. It favors honesty because honesty favors exchange. It puts the seal of the market upon all the virtues. It condemns slavery, not because slavery is morally wrong, but because it is economically ruinous. Moral science appeals only to an enlightened conscience, and certain conduct is approved because it is right, and for no other reason. Political Economy appeals only to an enlightened selfishness, and exchanges are made because they are mutually advantageous, and for no other reason. Each of the two sciences, therefore, has a distinct basis and sphere of its own. The grounds of Economy and morals are independent and incommensurable.

This pronouncement, however, is just a theoretical write-up and nothing more. Few Social Scientists of his time were more moralistic and partisan in their actual views. Unlike the general run of the Neo-Classicists he agrees with Carlyle's characterization of the classical economists. Speaking of political economy before the American Social Science Association at Boston in 1868 he characterizes it as "dismal indeed, if the Ricardo law of rent, and the Malthus law of population be fundamental principles of it."³⁸ On the other hand, his advocacy of free trade and his opposition to protectionism were spirited, to say the least.³⁹

It gives me pure and deep pleasure to state in this presence, on this October day, that the tendency of thought and action, scientific and popular, in all the world, is indubitably, decidedly, and irrevocably towards FREE TRADE.

By free trade I mean, what everybody means, a trade on which low duties are laid in the interest of legitimate taxation only.

It is an old trick of the devil to cover up a wicked thing with a good word. A masterpiece of this sort of accursed deceit is under the word "Protection."

He was as thoroughly convinced of the natural harmony of human interests as were the Associationists. All that was necessary to make this harmony of interests a reality was that society should obey the natural laws of production and exchange. Then there would be no conflict between consumer and producer, laborer and capitalist, farmer and financier.⁴⁰

Perry on Agrarian Problems. This statement was made to a group of midwestern farmers at Omaha in 1874, before a group of Granger and other agrarian agitators against the railroads and middle men of that period. In view of the acuteness of the situation, it seems strange that he did not declare the nature of these natural laws that would solve the con-

³⁸ "Recent Phases of Thought in Political Economy," *loc. cit.*, p. 5.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴⁰ *The Foes of the Farmers*, Address at Omaha, 1874, p. 4.

troversty in dispute, except to advocate free trade. The chief emphasis in his address to the enraged farmers is, on the contrary, upon what seems to be almost purely opportunistic measures. He agrees with the farmers that they are miserably exploited economically, but he has more to say about the lawyers than the capitalists in this connection. For example, he says that while the lawyers number only 40,000 and the farmers constitute half the population of the United States, 100 of the former have more power than 6,000,000 of the latter.⁴¹ He lays this situation to the political ineptitude of the farmers. His remedial advice is as follows:⁴²

Party spirit has been particularly injurious to the farmers of this country, because they have ranged themselves pretty evenly in both of the two political parties, and the two parts have thus completely neutralized each other. The interests of the farmers have had no weight in either of the political parties, simply because the farmers themselves stood over against each other in two opposing camps. Thus the farmers, as such, lost all weight and influence in political affairs. They are to be congratulated and applauded that the mass of them have made up their minds to act no longer with the old political parties, or with any other parties in fact, for the present. Let them adhere to this determination; the country will be all the better for it. Let them avoid entangling alliances, and snap their fingers at the caucus. Let them act as a unit in accordance with their own deliberate conviction of their own interests; for their true interests are also the true interests of the whole country.

In an article on "Farmers and the Tariff" he makes this same advice even more pointed. He says,⁴³

A word to the wise is sufficient. If the farmers see what their true interests are in these premises, let them act accordingly. A few rustic words in the ear of the candidates for Congress in their respective districts would do the business effectually, and once done it would stay done. Whether the farmers see it or not, it remains a fact—that they are the ass that bears most of the burden, and eats least of the hay, of "protection."

Comment on Perry. Here once more we have a pointed example of the divorcement of theory and practice which was so often characteristic of this school. The detachment of political economy from ethics seems to have been a device by which the writers, usually good theologically minded men, could swap horses in the middle of a stream without hurting their consciences. When they were resisting an appeal for human sympathy for

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴³ *Loc. cit.*, *Jour. Amer. Agricultural Association*, I: 80 (July, 1881).

the oppressed they could take the language of political economy. If they were defending an interest with which they were personally identified they knew how to talk common sense.

The Place of Wells in the School. David Ames Wells ⁴⁴ had many points in common with Perry, but he had also a much wider practical experience and a much better scientific training. As a young man he had been a textbook writer in the physical sciences, and stray copies of these volumes may still be seen in the second hand stores. Perhaps his better knowledge of scientific method made him less dogmatic regarding the field of economic Social Science than either Bascom or Perry, for he was much more tolerant of the naturalistic and reformistic points of view, but perhaps at the same time more inductively scientific than either of these. Like all the rest of his school he was an ardent advocate of free trade policies and did much propaganda work in its behalf in this country. He was also a firm believer in the value of the work done by the American Social Science Association and continued to be one of its most active supporters long after other economists had dropped by the wayside. In one of his papers before that Association he referred humorously to the opinion the public was supposed to hold of these doctrinaires who met to discuss the social problems of the country and doctor its ills.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ David Ames Wells (1828-1898) was born in Springfield, Massachusetts, and graduated from Williams College in 1847. He was employed for a short time by the *Springfield Republican* in 1848, but he returned to school, studying under Agassiz at the Lawrence Scientific School at Cambridge, where he graduated in 1851. In 1850 he began, with George Bliss, the *Annual of Scientific Discovery*, continuing it until 1866. During this time he also made important improvements in textile manufacturing processes. He was a partner in the G. P. Putnam publishing house in 1857-1858. In 1865 he was made chairman of the National Revenue Commission, and the following year the position of Special Commissioner of Revenue was created specially for him. He travelled in Europe in 1867. In 1870 his position as Special Commissioner of Revenue was abolished and he became chairman of the New York State Tax Commission. He was adviser to both presidents Garfield and Cleveland. In 1875 he became interested in the financial organization of railroads, and in 1878 was made a member of the Board of Arbitration of Associated Railways. He was actively interested in politics, although an unsuccessful candidate for Congress from Connecticut in 1876 and 1890. His writings include, in addition to compilations in chemistry (1858), geology (1861), and natural philosophy (1863), the following: *Our Burden and Our Strength*, 1864; *Reports of the Special Commissioner of the Revenue*, 1866-1869; *Local Taxation*, 1871; *Relation of the Government to the Telegraph*, 1873; *True Story of the Leaden Statuary*, 1874; *Cremation Theory of Specie Resumption*, 1875; *Robinson Crusoe's Money*, 1876; *The Silver Question*, 1877; *Why We Trade and How We Trade*, 1878; *Our Merchant Marine*, 1882; *A Primer of Tariff Reform*, 1884; *Practical Economics*, 1885; *Recent Economic Changes*, 1889; *Theory and Practice of Taxation*, 1900 (*Dictionary of American Biography*, XIX: 637-638).

⁴⁵ "Influence of the Production and Distribution of Wealth on Social Development," *Journal of Social Science*, VIII: 9 (May, 1876).

The Higher Function of Social Science. In the same paper he came to the defense of Social Science by pointing out how it not only contributed directly to the solution of economic and other social questions, but also the manner in which it aided indirectly in solving social problems by inculcating a more subtle understanding of human relationships basic to moral and religious progress. In this connection he says,⁴⁶

And there is yet one other thing which society is also beginning to find out and that is, that all these questions relating to the production and distribution of wealth, and the avoidance on the part of society of waste, and the economizing of expenditure, affect an infinitely higher class of interests than those measurable by dollars and cents; and that the laws underlying and controlling economic progress are either identical with the laws underlying and controlling intellectual, moral, and religious progress, or at least are so far similar and closely connected as to be mutually interdependent. And we hold furthermore, that it is mainly from a lack of perception and appreciation of this truth, especially by those to whom the mission of making men better is particularly intrusted, that so much of the work undertaken in these latter days by philanthropic and religious associations has been like seed sown upon stony ground, productive of but little benefit.

He states the belief that material progress is not the proper social end in itself, but that "a larger life is the one thing essential" and is "the ultimate issue and end of all our effort." It is, he says, in fact "the consummation of all social progress, the crowning glory of all Christian civilization; the aspiration of a future state of existence."⁴⁷ Applying the principle to the practical solution of the more concrete problems of this life, he declares: "But on this earth, and while we continue in the flesh, in order that there may be a larger life, there must be an exemption from such servitude of toil as precludes leisure; and, in order that there may be more leisure with less want, there must be greater abundance; and, in order that there *can* be greater abundance, there must be larger production, more economical using, and a more equitable distribution."⁴⁸

The Maldistribution of Wealth. Wells states very clearly the moral right of the masses to a fair distribution of the products of industry, one which will allow them to enjoy the higher life and enable them to raise their moral and intellectual status. But just as clearly and as honestly he recog-

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

nizes and admits the fact that at present the masses do not enjoy the fruits of such an equitable distribution. His explanation of this defect in social justice is very neat and illuminating. It is as follows.⁴⁹

In the first stage of society, property can hardly be said to exist at all, or it exists in common. In the second stage, individual rights appear; but property is to a great extent held and transferred by force, and the generally accepted principle governing its distribution is, *that might confers right*. As society has progressed, however, the reign of violence and lawlessness has gradually diminished, until now the acquisition and retention of property has come to depend on superiority of intellect, quickness of perception, skill in adaptation,—the cunning and the quick being arrayed against the ignorant and the slow,—while the principle which has come to be the generally accepted basis of all commercial, industrial, and financial transactions, is succinctly expressed by the coarse and selfish proverb, “Every man for himself, and the Devil take the hindermost.” And if we consider these terms as symbolical, and for the word “Devil” substitute absence of abundance,—want, misery, and privation; and for the word “hindermost,” the masses, who constitute the bulk of every densely populated community,—then it must be admitted, that the Devil thus far has been eminently successful.

The Cure for this Maldistribution. The time when such a misfit in social justice can go unchallenged has passed, according to Wells. He thinks that the better disposed and finer types of the ruling classes have developed a genuine sympathy for and interest in the masses. Others of the well-to-do will soon learn that for their own safety they cannot afford longer to practice injustice. Thus,⁵⁰

The governing and controlling influences of society—meaning thereby the rich, the well-to-do and the most intelligent classes—have for a considerable time found out one thing of importance, and are beginning to find out another thing of even greater significance.

The thing which they have found out is, that it is not for the interest of any portion of society, regarded simply from the point of view of individual selfishness, and not in accordance with the religion of Christ and humanity, to allow the Devil to take anywhere, or to any extent, the hindermost, and the thing which they are beginning to find out is, that the hindermost, who constitute, in this struggle for the acquirement and retention of property, the masses, are becoming fast conscious of their power and influence, and are determined of themselves, that they will not, if they can help it, be captured by this devil of civilization; and, if obliged to succumb to him, may, like the communists of

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

Paris, endeavor to draw down with them the whole fabric of society into one common vortex of destruction.

Out of the first of these discoveries have come schools, hospitals, churches, sanitary and social reforms, the spirit and the power of charity, and all brotherly kindness; out of the second, strikes, trades-unions, the crystallizing antagonism of labor against capital, the spirit and the teachings of socialism, the practice of communism.

The well disposed have learned the value of social service, that it is better to prevent disease and degeneracy, immorality and crime than to allow such things to exist and contaminate society as a whole.⁵¹ He also urges social reform before the violent methods of compelling it now common in Europe are imported into the United States.⁵² He seems to believe that this whole question of social justice might be solved even more effectively by applying the general method of free trade.⁵³

Weak on Preventive Methods. Wells speaks so feelingly of the need for social justice and analyzes so clearly and frankly the conditions and causes of the prevailing social injustice that one looks with eagerness for some intelligent preventive proposals that might lead to the avoidance of the development of future evils. But here he is to be disappointed. Like the older physicians, whose emphasis was upon cure rather than prevention, he is quite willing to provide an abundance of hospitals, prisons and reformatories, and charity, but he has little insight into what can be done concretely to prevent the forming of human derelicts and the development of abnormal social and economic conditions. To be sure he urges the better elements of society to be sympathetic and understanding, and this is good as far as it goes. He threatens the worse exploiting elements with reprisals from the outraged masses, but almost immediately he expresses his strong disapproval of retaliation and points out how much better off the working classes are in America than in Europe anyway.⁵⁴ His parting solution for this question seems to be work and laissez faire—work for the masses and freedom from restraint (including the trade) for the classes.⁵⁵ All of which reminds one how utterly impossible it is for a doctrinaire theoretician, even with the best intentions, to lift himself by his own theoretical boot straps.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

⁵² *Ibid.*, pp. 11-14.

⁵³ "A Modern Financial Utopia," *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1874; *Practical Economics* (1885), pp. 1-20; *Freer Trade Essential to Future National Prosperity and Development* (1882), p. 12.

⁵⁴ *Journal of Social Science*, No. 8, 1876, p. 21.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

The Social Science Theories of Edward Atkinson

Atkinson and His Point of View. Edward Atkinson¹ was not an academic man, but a business man. In fact, he was secretary and public relations expert, lobbyist, etc., for the New England cotton manufacturers. In him laissez faire conservatism reached a very high pitch. It is difficult to ascertain from his published writings to what extent his interest in Social Science arose from a genuine concern for public welfare and sympathy with those who could not plan and speak for themselves and to what extent it was due to his function as a public relations councillor to New England cotton manufacturers. He seems to have missed few opportunities to speak before public gatherings or to write for the public press in defense of laissez faire doctrine. He addressed workingmen's guilds, ministerial associations, student audiences and organizations, meetings of journalists, study clubs, public welfare organizations, in fact any gathering that played a part in the formation of public opinion. It is noteworthy that he achieved a surprising degree of solidity, if not always of profundity, in his arguments, and he carried around with him masses of statistics and a wealth of logic with which to reenforce his appeals to emotion. He could be patriotic, religious, or humanitarian upon occasion, and with a good deal of earnest-

¹ Edward Atkinson (1827-1905) was born in Brookline, Massachusetts. He was educated in private schools in Brookline and Boston, but went to work at the age of 15, doing chores of varying degrees of difficulty and responsibility for a Boston textile commission house. In 1848 he had advanced to more important duties and became the treasurer of several textile manufacturing companies. In the eighteen-eighties he was interested in factory mutual insurance, and helped to establish the Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company. He invented the Aladdin oven, as a result of his interest in nutrition. In 1887 he was appointed to President Cleveland's commission on bi-metalism in Europe. He foresaw and approved of the development of cotton textile manufactures in the South. His works include: *Cheap Cotton by Free Labor*, 1861; *Our National Domain*, 1879; *Labor and Capital Allies not Enemies*, 1880; *Railroads of the United States*, 1880; *Cotton Manufactures of the United States*, 1880; *What Is a Bank?* 1881; *The Railway and the Farm*, 1881; *Distribution of Products*, 1885; *The Industrial Progress of the Nation*, 1890; *The Science of Nutrition*, 1896; *Facts and Figures, the Basis of Economic Science*, 1904. He also edited the *Anti-Imperialist*, 1899-1900 (*Dictionary of American Biography*, I: 406-407).

ness. No implication that he lacked sincerity is intended, for he was probably as sincere as most public men. His ideas and arguments had grown even more out of experience and observation than out of reading, for he was a very busy man. Yet he was well read in the theory of free trade and laissez faire and in national policy generally as it affected the manufacturing interests. However, he was not overburdened with the doctrinaire logic of the pure theorists, a fact which probably rendered him an acceptable writer and speaker to the man of average learning. In one thing he was unquestionably sincere, without reservations, whatever may have been his underlying motivation, and that was his strenuous opposition to war and imperialism. If these attitudes are difficult to reconcile with the New England manufacturing interests, it must be recognized that they were very common in that part of the country and were shared by his companion spirit, William Graham Sumner. Perhaps the explanation is that the New England cotton mills required free trade as a means of keeping the price of their raw materials down, while they had a ready market for their finished product at home.

Atkinson's Motivation. Throughout his career Atkinson seems to have been very self conscious about his alignment on the side of capital as against labor. Perhaps his peculiar position rendered him thus sensitive, and certainly his consciousness of his position enabled him frequently to present the case of his entrepreneurs much more effectively than could have been possible otherwise. He was, however, sometimes almost apologetic for this point of view and felt the need to explain it. He attributed it to a phrase from Bastiat's *Harmonies of Political Economy*, which had greatly impressed him and which had, he thought, given him a clearer insight into the phenomena of wages. The phrase which had thus impressed him was: "In proportion to the increase of capital, the absolute share of the total product falling to the capitalist is augmented, but his relative share is diminished; while on the contrary, the share of the laborer is increased both absolutely and relatively."²

It was David A. Wells who rescued him from an early tendency to look upon political economy, after the manner of Carlyle, as a dismal science and completed his conversion to the doctrine of free trade, especially as it affected the production of cotton.³ He kept up a close contact with Wells throughout the latter's life. The Social Science creed which he early adopted

² Edward Atkinson, *The Distribution of Products* (1885), pp. 23-24.

³ Edward Atkinson, *Facts and Figures* (1904), p. 63.

and held with "profound conviction" also suggests a close intellectual kinship with Wells. This creed consisted of six points: (1) the object of life is the development of character and capacity in the individual; the means to this end is the arduous struggle for existence; (2) the chief factors in production must be mind and character; (3) mental and material forces, correlated by a higher law, must lead to abundance and to a just distribution of goods; (4) material welfare depends primarily on individual intelligence and all commerce is a mutual service between the parties engaged in it; (5) whenever men and nations realize their interdependence, peace and order and industry will become the common practice; and, (6) although man's ability to consume is limited, his powers of production are practically unlimited.⁴

Here, as in the case of Wells, is discernible an emphasis upon design in nature and natural law as well as upon the importance of character and skill to the neglect of environmental factors. His faith in the close connection between *laissez faire* and an inherent harmony of economic interests is also strikingly indicated. This belief grew into a doctrine of social interdependence from which he deduced the principle that the interests of capital and labor are closely supplementary, if not identical,⁵ and that the same was true of the interests of races.⁶

Atkinson on the Standard of Living. Like Perry, Atkinson departed from the general run of his school in repudiating Malthus' principle of population.⁷ He had no doubt but that there was enough for everybody in the world. Both production and distribution were adequate to take care of every man, woman, and child in the civilized world.⁸ In order to prove that the methods of distribution of products were fair and just, he makes a hypothetical analysis of the income of a family of six, coming to the conclusion that in New England or the Middle States the father and one child working would receive an aggregate wage of \$1250 a year, or an average of \$208.33 per capita annually or 57 cents each day.⁹ This he is satisfied should be ample to take care of the reasonable needs of a family. But nowhere does he mention the fact, which he must have known, that such an income was

⁴ *The Industrial Progress of the Nation* (1890), pp. iii-iv.

⁵ *The Distribution of Products*, p. 73.

⁶ *The Race Problem: Its Possible Solution* (pamphlet, 1901), pp. 1-2.

⁷ *The Distribution of Products*, pp. 15-16.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

⁹ *The Industrial Progress of the Nation*, p. 241.

far in excess of that actually received by workingmen's families in the eighteen-eighties, when his estimates were made. It is of course possible that he compensated for this omission with the belief, which he in common with others of his school undoubtedly held, that those who failed to receive such wages did so because of defects of character, intelligence, or industry and skill.

Atkinson is convinced also that various forms of waste existing in our society limit the amount of goods available for distribution.¹⁰ The causes of waste include inadequate facilities for transportation, such as railways and ships, international jealousies, laws restricting manufacture and trade, ignorance and lack of capacity among people which impede mutual service,¹¹ strikes and labor troubles. He lays especial emphasis upon the personal waste due to ignorance and incapacity as the cause of want in the midst of plenty both in Europe and the United States. If this waste could be eliminated we would have enough wealth to support all our poor in luxury. If we gave it to them as charity, however, we would only pauperize them.¹² We would, apparently, merely be subsidizing their incapacity.

Atkinson on Social Justice. Like Wells, Atkinson emphasizes the importance of knowledge as a means to successful social adjustment. He holds that the education of the masses is obviously inadequate, thus indicating also that he believed in a more progressive and socialized type of education.¹³ He accuses the common people of the fallacious belief that "there is a very large sum of money set off somewhere, and perhaps concealed and enjoyed by a few, of which the many have been in some way deprived in a wrongful or unjust manner."¹⁴ He denies this, but does not mention or answer the more pertinent complaint of labor that the capitalists take an unjust share of the product of industry in the form of profits and spend it. He expresses the belief that the portion that labor does not receive was created not by labor, but by the superior brains and education and industry of the entrepreneur.¹⁵ It is only fitting that intelligent labor should have its appropriate share of the product.¹⁶ He goes farther and has a friendly word

¹⁰ *The Distribution of Products*, p. 20.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 21.

¹³ *Facts and Figures*, p. 117.

¹⁴ *Addresses upon the Labor Question: I. To the Workingmen of Providence, R. I.* (1886), p. 6.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

for the luxury and waste of the rich on the childish ground that these expenditures make profitable employment for the workers.¹⁷ Nearly thirty years earlier John Bascom, as we have seen, had penetrated the fallacy of this argument and exposed it in his *Political Economy*.

Atkinson's antagonism toward the repressed and depressed classes for attempting to improve their lot by means suggestive of violence or coercion of the dominant classes is even more marked than that of Wells. Perhaps such violence was more feared by him. From Russia's struggle with nihilism, Vienna's martial law, Paris' experience with the commune, England's disguised socialism as a means of dealing with Irish destitution, Atkinson draws the conclusion that the struggle for existence has become acute among the masses, and that since want knows no law, a new Reign of Terror is by no means impossible. Europe dare not disband her armies.¹⁸ If a Marxian socialist had pointed out to Atkinson the class-conflict theory of the state implicit in this view, Atkinson would doubtless have repudiated it.

Atkinson on the Causes of Poverty. As before suggested, Atkinson finds the causes of poverty primarily within the personalities of the poor themselves, and not in their circumstances. There is, he says, always plenty of skilled work to be done, but the common laborer cannot do it and therefore he is not entitled to a share of existing goods. Neither legislation nor force can solve this problem, for neither wealth nor welfare can be imposed from the outside. The only real help is self-help. Individual intelligence and integrity, protected by an adequate system of justice, alone can guarantee permanent prosperity. Utopistic as this may seem, he concludes, the development of science tends to promote such an end, however remote its realization may be.¹⁹ If the abundant employment opportunities which Atkinson posited were an actuality, there might be a good deal of truth in his conclusions. But the very poverty which he attributes to ignorance and lack of capacity is often the root of the individual's inadequacy. It is a vicious circle which no particularistic explanation can gloss over.

For Malthus' contention that one of the major causes of poverty is overpopulation Atkinson seems to have no use whatever. Perhaps he takes this attitude the more willingly, even if unconsciously, because the application of the remedy proposed by Malthus would limit the labor supply of the

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁸ *The Distribution of Products*, pp. 16-17.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

cotton mills and thus force a rise in the wages paid to the workers. For a man with Atkinson's views on charity and social legislation to combat the theory of Malthus on the grounds that it invalidates humanitarian measures is indeed ironical. There is no evidence that Atkinson interested himself in the social work aspects of the work of the American Social Science Association, to which he belonged. Yet he uses ad hoc arguments like stating that improved sewerage systems which save the lives of children, pure water and improved housing for the poor, sanitary science, and the like are worse than useless if Malthus' theory is correct.²⁰

Atkinson on Unwelcome Social Reforms. Atkinson, like Wells, was strongly opposed to the use of legislation in the interest of the working classes. He saw no need for economic legislation, except to establish "sound money," free trade, and free "moveable" property that might migrate from fear of taxation. All of these objections clearly favor the interests of his employers. He had studied Roman history to some effect (it was then the practice to prophesy our future in terms of the Roman past) and had found that nothing achieved by this Roman civilization except her literature and art, her roads, and her law had survived. Both the roads and the law had served commerce long after the Roman empire had passed away.²¹ This fact was to him sufficient evidence that legislative reforms should work exclusively for the stabilization and promotion of commerce. Labor legislation might easily destroy this stability and prosperity. He was also very active in his opposition to the single tax proposed by Henry George.²²

He was likewise opposed to the spread of cooperation, doubting whether there were any economies in it in excess of those of private business.²³ Profit sharing also appealed to him as inadvisable and as an improper method of securing harmony between the worker and the employer.²⁴ His opposition to protectionism was of course strong. He saw no danger from the competition of foreign pauper labor, since our superior science, skill and machinery would more than offset such a danger.²⁵ He apparently did not see that this appeal to the superiority of our labor might in some degree invalidate his theory to the effect that the causes of poverty inhere in the inefficiency of labor. He favored reciprocity as a movement in the direction of free

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

²¹ *The Industrial Progress of the Nation*, p. 220.

²² *Journal of Social Science*, XXVII: 122 ff. (Oct., 1890).

²³ *The Industrial Progress of the Nation*, pp. 229-230.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 230-231.

²⁵ *Facts and Figures*, pp. 7-8.

trade.²⁶ Legislation in favor of an expansion of the currency for the relief of the west was anathema.²⁷ He was doubtful about the wisdom of prohibition.²⁸

Reforms He Favored. Atkinson was strongly in favor of civil service reform.²⁹ He believed that slavery had been both an economic and a political blunder.³⁰ He argued persuasively for the equal education of the Negroes.³¹ He approved the establishment of agricultural colleges on the basis of the Morrill Act and believed that here was a legal precedent which might open the way to the intervention of the federal government in support of an effective program for Negro education in the South.

His opposition to war and imperialism was, as we have already remarked, one of the most sincere and public spirited elements in his social motivation. He compares the amounts of public funds expended and the public interest taken in war with that devoted in each case to education as follows.³²

A nation to whom it is now proposed to appropriate \$100,000,000 for the construction of armored battleships which the invention of "Maximite" and the submarine boat have already condemned to be put away as useless for any defensive purpose, and for which there can be no offensive purpose that can be justified, may surely be asked to provide for a true and righteous method of defending the nation from the virus of ignorance and illiteracy. While we are wasting the substance of the people in a misdirected effort to carry the gospel and the school-book at the point of the bayonet among the people of a far distant land, we are neglecting the ignorant and the poor within the limits of our own country to our shame and utter discredit. The true standing army and defensive force of this country is the corps of teachers in the common schools, over 420,000 in number. Let us increase that army and construct the school buildings, which are more effective for our defence than any fortifications or batteries of big guns can ever be.

He came out strongly against the expansion policies of the United States government in 1899 and for some time published a periodical called *The Anti-Imperialist*, which collected and presented much information in favor of his views. He also published several statistical studies on the cost of war, intending to prove that it was not economically profitable even to nations

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.

²⁷ *The Industrial Progress of the Nation*, pp. 236-237.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 281-282.

³¹ *The Race Problem*, p. 8.

³² *Ibid.*

committed to an imperialist policy. He believed that ultimately war would kill itself off by means of its own destructiveness and frightfulness,³³ but a quicker and more effective method of ending war was by the establishment of free trade, which would remove the chief cause of such struggles—international economic competition.³⁴

Comment on Atkinson. Atkinson was, with the exception of Sumner,

The Social Science Theories of William Graham Sumner

Sumner. The most distinguished member of the Neo-Classical School of economic Social Science was William Graham Sumner,¹ who became Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale in 1872 and was Professor of the Science of Society at the same institution at the time of his death in 1910. He was never quite reconciled to the new name of the chief inheritor of Social Science, although he used the term sociology from time to time. Perhaps his deep conservatism reacted against the term sociology on two grounds: (1) because it was a hybrid, being derived from both the Latin and the Greek, and (2) because it was still in his day too much associated with "soft theory" and the sentimentalism of uncritical reformers. Several of his conservative contemporaries made quite an issue of the hybrid character of the term, showing perhaps a greater concern with its philology

¹ William Graham Sumner (1840-1910), was born in Paterson, New Jersey, son of an English immigrant artisan. The family moved about when Sumner was a child but finally settled at Hartford, Connecticut, where his father became employed in the railroad repair shops. Sumner entered Yale in 1859 and graduated in 1863. With the aid of friends, he went abroad for further study at Geneva, Göttingen, and Oxford. He returned to Yale as tutor in 1866. In 1869 he became assistant to Dr. E. A. Washburn, rector of Calvary Church, New York, and was ordained a priest. He helped to establish and edit a liberal journal, *The Living Church*. Three years later, 1872, he was elected to the chair in Political and Social Science at Yale, where he remained until his death. He was one of the most effective and popular teachers of his time, and it was through his efforts very largely that the curriculum at Yale University was modernized and broadened. "That social conditions can be improved he firmly believed, but such improvement can come, he was convinced, only by scientific procedure carried on by thoroughly informed individuals" (*Dictionary of American Biography*, XVIII: 218). His works include: *A History of American Currency*, 1874; *American Finance*, 1875; *Andrew Jackson as a Public Man*, 1882; *Collected Essays on Political and Social Science*, 1885; *Alexander Hamilton*, 1890; *The Financiers and Finances of the American Revolution*, 1891; *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, 1883; *A History of Banking in the United States*, 1896; *Folkways*, 1907; *War and Other Essays*, 1911; *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, 1913; *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, 1914; *The Forgotten Man and Other Essays*, 1919; *Selected Essays of William Graham Sumner*, 1924; *The Science of Society* (with A. G. Keller), 1927 (*Dictionary of American Biography*, XVIII: 217-219). For a fuller account of Sumner's theories see L. L. Bernard, "The Social Science Theories of William Graham Sumner," *Social Forces*, XIX: 153-175 (1940).

than with its sociological content. On the second point, his reaction to reform was pretty much that of his great master, Herbert Spencer, although Spencer adopted the term sociology without troubling himself about philology. Spencer knew neither philology nor Latin and Greek, but he did know English and wrote a beautiful style. Sumner was better able to follow Spencer's ideas than to match his style. He gained great distinction as a teacher at Yale during the last two decades of the century. He was also nationally known for his public controversies over protectionism, sound money and imperialism. The last ten years of his life were spent in rather quiet, but arduous and patient research in the field of sociology.

Sumner's Individualism. Sumner attained a unique fame as a strong individualist who, not unlike his intellectual master Herbert Spencer, opposed government interference in both personal and public affairs almost to the extreme limit. He deplored the "fashion of the time," which he declared to be "to run to government boards, commissions, and inspectors to set right everything which is wrong. No experience seems to damp the faith of our public in these instrumentalities."² He says that there are two fallacies used to justify this constant resort to governmental interference. One is that competition does not work perfectly and the other is that government can solve the problems which individuals fail to take care of.³ He reminds his readers that governments are made up of individuals and that if one individual can't solve his problems and throws the burden of their solution upon government he is simply asking others to bear his own burdens, which is unfair. He does not seem to recognize that such problem solving by government might take the form of a species of cooperation and division of labor, in which there would be an exchange of problem solving or of other services, and that all classes might gain by such an interchange. As a matter of fact he tacitly recognizes that certain classes have always solved the public problems of others, that is, have governed them, whether well or ill, while these others have made a return contribution in taxes and personal services.

We cannot, of course, expect consistency in the arguments of any of the members of the Neo-Classical school, who appeal to the principle of *laissez faire*, for they almost universally seek to apply the principle only to the class they represent and to deny it, however unconsciously, to other competing classes. But it is possible to state the point of view of the men of

² *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* (Harper & Bros., 1883), p. 97.

³ *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 177.

this group. Sumner's individualism was extreme, as the following passage serves to show.⁴

In general, there is no man who is honest and industrious who cannot put himself in a way to maintain himself and his family, misfortune apart, in a condition of substantial comfort. We have any amount of reckless assertion to the contrary; it is asserted that the wages-class is in misery, and suffers from a great number of grievances; but no statement of this kind has ever been made in terms which could be subjected to examination.

Some Contradictions in Sumner. We find Sumner lined up against many reforms of his time, such as the Interstate Commerce Act to regulate the railroads,⁵ the whole gamut of cheap money legislation,⁶ the bill to tax oleomargarine as a butter substitute (declaring that oleomargarine met adequately all the needs supplied by butter),⁷ and prohibition, which he considered to be an invasion of personal liberty.⁸ Yet he strongly opposed the secession of the South⁹ and also wrote an essay definitely approving the growth toward centralization and organization in the national government of the United States, of which the following is a sample statement.¹⁰

When we gather together the observations we have made, showing the advance of the entire social organization from the colonial settlement up to the present time, in all its branches—the industrial system, the relation of classes, the land system, the civil organization, and the organization of political institutions and liberty—we see that it has been a life-process, a growth-process, which our society had to go through just as inevitably as an infant after birth must go on to the stages of growth and experience which belong to all human beings as such.

In numerous other instances Sumner recognized a general principle, but applied it unequally to different groups, a practice that was by no means uncommon on the part of members of this group. For instance, he declared himself strongly opposed to the growth of pressure groups in American politics and looked forward with misgivings to the time when popular clamor might control legislatures and force them into legislative programs that smacked of paternalism.¹¹ Most of the ills of mankind were due to the

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 170. Reprinted with permission of the publisher, Yale University Press.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 177–182, 189.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 186 ff.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 187–188.

⁸ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, pp. 132–133.

⁹ *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 328.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 331. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 185–186.

violation of natural laws, and paternalism sought to set aside the operation of natural law and substitute therefor unsound human laws.¹² He admits that other ills are "due to the malice of men, and to the imperfections or errors of civil institutions. These ills are an object of agitation, and a subject of discussion. The former class of ills [those due to the violation of natural laws] is to be met only by manly effort and energy; the latter may be corrected by associated effort."¹³ His book, *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, and many essays are devoted to an exposition of the evil of trying to shun the effects of the first sort of ills, but practically nothing can be found in the way of advice as to how to remedy the second type of ills.

Sumner's Motivation. It is important in the case of all of the men in the Neo-Classical group to understand their motivation, for otherwise it is impossible to comprehend adequately their points of view. Sumner was quite well aware of his conservatism, although he rationalized it on the ground that he was seeking to preserve the accumulated achievements of civilization, which he conceived to be attacked by the radical new demands of labor and the proletariat generally.¹⁴ From his thoroughly bourgeois point of view property and accumulated wealth were the symbols and embodiment of this precious heritage of culture.¹⁵ He was loath in the concrete to assign any of the evils of society to wealth and its abuses, although he would admit such a cause in general.¹⁶ His favorite charge was always against the incompetence, ignorance, and self-seeking of the working classes. Apparently he could not see the greater self-seeking of those who so ruthlessly exploited these classes. Nor could this man who was so passionately committed to the doctrine that no one should take from another see the contradiction he was guilty of in making his chief argument in support of this view rest on the desirability of preserving the past contributions of human effort to present day social welfare.

This blind spot in Sumner may seem strange when it is remembered that he came out of a working man's family and that he himself had a hard economic struggle in his childhood and youth. But his father before him, although poor, had been strongly confirmed in his bourgeois principles, a pious person of exemplary conventional morals and habits, detesting the spendthrift practices and sloth of fellow workingmen. The younger Sum-

¹² *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, p. 19.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

¹⁴ *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 207.

¹⁵ *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, pp. 337-353.

¹⁶ *War and Other Essays*, pp. 201, 203, 207.

ner had also been aided by the well-to-do in getting an education, a favor for which he was ever grateful, but a favor which was clearly opposed to his individualistic principle of the duty of self-sufficiency, and for which apparently he never made a money return. While still young and impressionable he had read a Sunday School work on the virtues of self-dependence and later he had imbibed in full faith the ultra bourgeois principles of political economy as set forth by Harriet Martineau. His spiritual adviser, furthermore, the Rev. Elias R. Beadle, apparently held the same highly individualistic social philosophy. At this period especially the social creed of the Calvinistic church, with which Sumner was affiliated, in so far as it had progressed beyond the views of the primitive society in which it was first formulated, was little more than an appendix to English classical laissez faire economics. Surrounded almost completely by such strong bourgeois influences in the formative period of his youth—for Sumner seems to have had no radical books or associates in the town of Hartford, Connecticut—his outlook and sympathies were so strongly integrated on a conservative model that he was never able afterwards to revise them to any considerable extent, except to adopt two of the conventional practices common to the bourgeois themselves—smoking and occasional imbibition of alcoholic liquors. Later in life he gave up smoking.¹⁷

Sumner's Attitudes on Radical Doctrines. In the light of these facts it should be easy to predict Sumner's attitudes toward radical social philosophies. His notion of Socialism seems to have been peculiarly circumscribed. He says of it: "If there are any ethical propositions which may be accepted as reasonably established, the following are among the number: to every one his own; that responsibility should be equal to liberty; that rights and duties are correlative; and that those should reap the consequences who have set in action the causes. The socialistic and semi-socialistic propositions which are before the public are immoral in that they all sin against these ethical principles."¹⁸ It is altogether possible that he had dismissed the whole question of socialism without making himself concretely familiar with its various administrative and social welfare proposals. He appears indeed to have confused it largely with the Social Democratic movement in Germany, for he says: "Herein lies the curse of socialistic schemes when viewed from the side of the supposed beneficiary—they are

¹⁷ For an excellent account of the factors forming Sumner's character and outlook on life see Harris E. Starr, *William Graham Sumner*, 1925.

¹⁸ *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 193.

a bait to defraud him of his liberty. I do not see how the German accident and workman's insurance can fail to act as a law of settlement, thereby, under a pretense of offering the workman security, robbing him of his best chance of improving his position."¹⁹ If he accused the Socialists of restraining liberty he criticized the Anarchists for stretching the doctrine of liberty into ungoverned license.²⁰ His own idea of liberty was that each man should be "guaranteed the use of all his powers exclusively for his own welfare."²¹ Here again we find him expressing an article of faith that is in direct contradiction to the major contention noted in the preceding topic, that radicalism must be opposed because it attacks man's accumulated social capital which is held by the chief guardians of society, its intellectual and economic leaders. It is clear whose freedom Sumner wished to protect.

Sumner's Theory of Social Justice. Yet, like Wells, as noted in our discussion above, Sumner was consistent in pushing his doctrine of *laissez faire* to the limit of allowing the working men to defend their interests. They should be allowed to organize in labor unions and to use the weapon of strikes to secure what they considered to be their rights.²² There is this difference, however, in that he limits the rights of labor to a private self defense; they must not use the state to enforce their demands. Industry on the other hand should be guarded by the state against interference. Also, labor and the individual generally must remember that rights embody correlative obligations.²³

Although Sumner gives little emphasis to the point in doctrine, he recognizes the positive right to social justice. He even admits that "there is a plain tendency of all civilized governments toward plutocracy."²⁴ This being the case, "If a man comes forward with any grievance against the order of society so far as this is shaped by human agency, he must have patient hearing and full redress; but if he addresses a demand to society for relief from the hardships of life, he asks simply that somebody else should get his living for him. In that case he ought to be left to find out his error from hard experience."²⁵ Society must go even further than to hear

¹⁹ *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 127. Reprinted with permission of the publisher, Yale University Press.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 119-120.

²¹ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, p. 34.

²² *War and Other Essays*, pp. 242-243.

²³ *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, pp. 159-170.

²⁴ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, p. 104.

²⁵ *Selected Essays in Political and Social Science*, p. 85. Reprinted with permission of the publisher, Yale University Press,

the complaint of injustice. It should organize to correct it. Thus, "We each owe it to the other to guarantee mutually the chance to earn, to possess, to learn, to marry, etc., etc., against any interference which would prevent the exercise of those rights by a person who wishes to prosecute and enjoy them in peace for the pursuit of happiness. If we generalize this, it means that All-of-us ought to guarantee rights to each of us." ²⁶ Even the state may be used for such defense of individual rights,²⁷ but it must not be invoked for the promotion of private ends.²⁸

Sumner on Social Reforms. Sumner clearly did not conceive of the state as a proper instrument for the promotion of constructive social reforms. The state was for him, as in the traditions of the laissez faire philosophy generally, primarily an institution for defense. Believing strongly as he did in the traditional family system, he would, however grudgingly, make one exception here. He says, "I maintain (1) that the part of our social code and social creed which wants re-examination and reconstruction is that which relates to marriage and the family; and (2) that, if there is to be any state regulation at all, the place where it ought to begin is with marriage and the family." ²⁹ Another case in which he was willing to use the state was in the prevention of war and militarism, which he hated thoroughly.³⁰

Social reform, in so far as Sumner approved of it at all, should be a matter of private cooperative endeavor carried on by men who made use of the findings of science. Science itself "is colorless and impersonal. . . . The moral deductions as to what one ought to do are to be drawn by the reason and conscience of the individual man who is instructed in science." ³¹ He was early a strong advocate of the development of a sane Sociology as a source of just such dependable scientific information.³² But for the misapplication of sociological remedies he had no tolerance, declaring that ³³

The amateur social doctors are like the amateur physicians—they always begin with the question of *remedies*, and they go at this without any diagnosis or any knowledge of the anatomy or physiology of society. They never have any doubt of the efficacy of their remedies. They never take account of any ulterior effect which may be apprehended from the remedy itself. It generally

²⁶ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, p. 164.

²⁷ *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 364.

²⁸ *The Forgotten Man and Other Essays*, p. 23.

²⁹ *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, pp. 93-94.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 3, 63-64; also *War and Other Essays*, p. 349.

³¹ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, pp. 159-160.

³² *Selected Essays in Political and Social Science*, pp. 36, 87, 89.

³³ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, pp. 116-117.

troubles them not a whit that their remedy implies a complete reconstruction of society, or even a reconstitution of human nature. Against all such social quackery the obvious injunction to the quacks is, to mind their own business.

In general he looks upon social reformers as trouble makers who stir up class conflict. He divides them into two classes: (1) those who feel it to be their duty to solve the problems of the poor, and (2) those who, having failed themselves to make a success of life, are inspired to settle the problems of society for others.³⁴

Sumner on Revolution and Social Classes. Like others of this school, Sumner appears to have had considerable fear of revolution by the dissatisfied masses. He appears to have judged the rightness of revolution in terms of the interests it served. He apparently approved the "great revolution . . . at the end of the last century . . . in which the bourgeoisie wrested political power from the nobles."³⁵ He thinks the proletariat have learned from this revolution how to make one of their own and are getting ready for it. This new revolutionary party "finds its recruits where it can get them—among the discontented, the hot headed, the ill balanced, the ambitious, those who have nothing to lose, the flatterers of rising power, and other such persons who naturally gravitate toward a revolutionary party."³⁶ He adds: "All the forces which gave the bourgeoisie the victory over the nobles are working in favor of the proletariat."³⁷ He advises the proletariat strongly against any such action, saying, "Now the plan of plundering each other produces nothing. It only wastes."³⁸ "We may be sure," he says, "that the only possible good for society must come of evolution and not of revolution."³⁹ The poor he regards as more class conscious than the rich. He says, "Those who have neither capital nor land unquestionably have a closer class interest than landlords or capitalists."⁴⁰ However, he reassures himself with the thought that "men who are low, and are falling, do not revolt; it is men who, although they may be low, are rising, who revolt."⁴¹ Since the American working class was rising this reflection was perhaps not a sufficient source of comfort to him.

Yet Sumner agreed with Karl Marx that the class and industrial strug-

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³⁵ *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 163.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

³⁸ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, p. 144.

³⁹ *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 207.

⁴⁰ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, p. 139.

⁴¹ *The Challenge of Facts and Other Essays*, p. 139.

gles were tending to eliminate the middle class. He says, "It is the tendency of all social burdens to crush out the middle class, and to force the society into an organization of only two classes, one at each social extreme."⁴² The rich can bear these burdens, he says, and the poor can usually avoid them, but the middle class cannot escape them and are crushed.⁴³ He must have been thinking of taxes. But if he had lived in the time of the senatorial investigations of income tax evasions he would have learned that the rich are even better evaders than the poor.

Sumner on Population and Poverty. Sumner, unlike some of his theoretical associates, recognized the truth of the Malthusian principle of population and criticized its opponents for their failure to look behind the temporary interruption of the operation of the principle in frontier America to the fundamental applicability of the theory.⁴⁴ But he does not see this pressure of population on the food supply as an evil. He says, "It is when the social pressure due to an unfavorable ratio of population to land becomes intense that the social forces develop increased activity. Division of labor, exchange, higher social organization, emigration, advance in the arts, spring from the necessity of contending against the harsher conditions of existence which are continually reproduced as the population surpasses the means of existence on any given status."⁴⁵ This increased activity, he believes, results in social progress. "This competition draws out the highest achievements. It makes the advantages of capital, education, talent, skill, and training tell to the utmost."⁴⁶ Such a statement would seem to place him also in the class of Utopists, for how can this be so except where there is an abundance of unexploited resources? And what assurances did he have that always and everywhere there would be such?

It is noteworthy that Sumner's social philosophy did not permit him to look upon this pressure of population upon resources as a cause of poverty. Poverty is the fault of the poor. The vast majority of mankind have always been poor. "Only a small fraction of the human race have as yet, by thousands of years of struggle, been partially emancipated from poverty, ignorance and brutishness,"⁴⁷ while, "at present, poverty is [still] correlated with ignorance, vice and misfortune."⁴⁸ He may have been a Utopist about

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 70.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁴ *Selected Essays in Political and Social Science*, pp. 88-89.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

⁴⁷ *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, p. 71.

⁴⁸ *Earth Hunger and Other Essays*, p. 229.

progress, but he certainly was not one about the abolition of poverty. He says of efforts toward such an end that ⁴⁹

There is a sense in which it may be said that it is easy to provide a precept for the abolition of poverty. Let every man be sober, industrious, prudent, and wise, and bring up his children to be so likewise, and poverty will be abolished in a few generations. If it is answered that men, with the best intentions, cannot fulfill this precept, because they make innocent mistakes, and fall into errors in judgment, then the demand is changed, and we are not asked for a means of abolishing poverty, but for a means of abolishing human error. If it be objected, again, that sober, industrious, and prudent men meet with misfortune, then the demand is for a means of abolishing misfortune.

And to this he adds the statement that the true method of abolishing poverty "is by working against ignorance, vice, and misfortune." ⁵⁰

Comment on Sumner. Little additional comment on Sumner is necessary. His extreme individualism and conservatism have already been indicated. Like all of the members of his school he was highly partisan in his viewpoint, but he more than most of the others. He was undoubtedly correct in insisting upon the importance of character, skill, and intelligence as aids to an effective adjustment to life problems, but his failure to see that the personal causes of poverty and misfortune—important as they were—had been overbalanced by the larger institutional causes in an age which was already far advanced in a derivative organization of society, where individuals were relatively powerless, can but convict him of a defective analysis of the social trends and accomplishments of his time. One of the most characteristic facts about Sumner as a Neo-Classical Social Scientist was his almost total lack of originality and genius. He was one of the best examples of the doctrine of meticulous thoroughness and industry which he preached. He made up for his lack of brilliancy in hard work, persistence, and dogmatic insistence.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 230. Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 229.

General Character of Economic Social Science of the Neo-Classical Type

The Early Outlook of Political Economy. Previous to the middle of the nineteenth century political economy was perhaps to be regarded more as a point of view than as a definite academic discipline. This certainly is the significance which should be accorded to it in connection with the writers on economic Social Science that were reviewed in Parts VI and VII of the present volume. All of these, including even Carey, E. Peshine Smith, Greeley, Bascom, Thompson, and Perry—all of whom wrote more or less formal treatises on Political Economy—as well as those who wrote specifically in the field of Social Science on economic questions, were much more interested in setting forth an integrated and logical point of view which would help to shape, perhaps to dominate, public opinion and public policy, than they were in creating an academic discipline.

All of them, without exception, were propagandists and promoters of partisan points of view. They spoke of political economy as a science, but in the same sense as that in which they looked upon Social Science as scientific. They were less concerned with a methodology of working with data and of generalizing principles in this field than they were with distinguishing the body of principles to which they now gave adherence for their own particular ends. Indeed, they were not always particular to distinguish their economic principles from mere metaphysical and theological doctrines.

Ordinarily they used whatever tools came readily to hand, including those borrowed from metaphysics and theology as well as political economy, for their propaganda purposes. But at the same time they included all of these principles, dogmas, and so-called laws which they had thus brought together under either the name of political economy or that of Social Science, as happened best to fit their particular needs. Both of these social sciences—the special and the general—were beginning to have prestige—perhaps more with public men and reformers, and certainly with

scientists—than either theology or metaphysics had. Although both theology and metaphysics disciplined their soldiers rigorously, repaired their defenses, and threw their shells of anathema and ridicule regularly into the camp of the enemy, everybody, and all factions, including their own partisans, were beginning to doubt their ability to hold indefinitely the key positions in human thought.

The Persisting Tie-up with Theology and Metaphysics. But, as we have remarked before, political economy and economic Social Science had not been able to detach themselves fully from theology and metaphysics. This inability was due in part to the conventional education of the men who professed the new disciplines and partly to the fact that most of them hesitated to widen too greatly the breach between themselves and the older disciplines. They knew only too well the vindictiveness of the metaphysicians and the odium theologicum. Nevertheless, while the economic Social Scientists retained much of the content of the older dogmas and doctrines, such was the prestige of the term science that they wished to attach this advantage to their own social philosophies and economic points of view. As a matter of fact, their sanctions were frequently metaphysical and even theological, and their methods of handling their data and of drawing their generalizations were often highly metaphysical. They used the deductive method and the process of reasoning by analogy perhaps more often than they employed inductive processes. And their appeal to the witness and sanction of Natural Law—itself a metaphysical concept—was almost constant.

Moreover, let us repeat emphatically, the interest of the early Social Scientists in particular, and of the early political economists in general, was in most cases much more propagandistic than systematic and methodological. These fields of intellectual interest were to be sure not without their methodological appeal and their systematic scientific practice, but these points of view were on the whole decidedly secondary. The early political economies, like the early writings in Social Science, had been produced in much the same way in which Addison and Steele and Samuel Johnson had written their moral and social essays a century before. They were the product of shrewd observation, coupled with some knowledge of history and a point of view more or less skillfully manipulated by logic.

The Public Origins of Political Economy. The significance and validity of this characterization of early political economy is the more easily perceived when we reflect upon the origin of this field of knowledge and the

use made of it in the early stages of its development. Albion W. Small,¹ and other historians of the social sciences also, have pointed out the close connection of political economy with statecraft and political policy-making in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Germany. The same was equally, if not more, characteristic of it in France and in other countries. In France, Mercantilist and Physiocratic doctrines grew up in close contact with state commercial and agricultural and industrial policies. Economic theories, therefore, in so far as they were inductively arrived at, were intimately allied with the experiments and experiences of the leaders in statecraft.

Adam Smith's great work, *An Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations* was, for example, professedly an inquiry into the public policies and the social and natural conditions which make some nations wealthy and others poor. Smith was not writing a text book which he hoped would be adopted by a considerable number of universities and thus bring in a much needed addition to his income; but, on the contrary, he had set his genius to work to produce a huge political pamphlet in the hope of educating and propagandizing thinking people—not excluding men of government—into adopting the public policies which he advocated. If he had lived to see the use made of his work for academic instruction and its appraisal as a scientific treatise he might have been surprised. Most of the other treatises on political economy, whether general or special, produced before the middle of the nineteenth century, were also more in the nature of political pamphlets intended for the general reader than meticulously constructed text books designed as systematic treatises for the use of students in universities. The use these writers made of scientific method was as much for prestige purposes as it was due to a love of science for its greater efficiency in producing dependable results.

The Influence of Universities and Colleges. It was the growth of political economy as a university study, to supplement the old classical and mathematical studies, that gradually transformed it from the character of the political pamphlet into that of the systematic scientific treatise. Especially after the second decade of the nineteenth century did this new trend toward systematic analysis of economic data and the logical synthesis of principles become manifest. The works of McCulloch, James Mill, Ricardo, Say, John Stuart Mill, Senior, and other later writers in the field, show pro-

¹ *The Cameralists*, University of Chicago Press, 1909.

gressive developments away from pamphleteering over toward academic treatises.

But with the change of emphasis upon method and purpose there was, during the first half of the nineteenth century, little change of emphasis upon subject matter. It is more difficult to produce a new field of data than a new method of handling old data. Even the most systematic and formal works on political economy continued to be discussions of political policy or the proper course to be pursued in the making of public programs. Practically all the discussions in these works were from the standpoint of what kinds of property holding, commercial policy, industrial and agricultural production, population growth, taxation, business management, and the like, were best calculated to produce a prosperous and powerful national unit. This emphasis has been clearly observable in the treatises on economic Social Science which have already been analyzed in these pages. As a matter of fact, there was no great distinction of emphasis between the old political economy viewed from this national welfare standpoint and the economic Social Science which we have been discussing. Both had the same general end in view. The two treatises by Carey, one on Political Economy and the other on Social Science, serve well to illustrate this contention.

The Ethical Origins of Political Economy. Political Economy began to have a separate existence as a recognized field of study only late in the eighteenth century and did not make much headway in this direction until late in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, when treatises bearing the name in their titles appeared and chairs whose titles contained the words Political Economy began to be established in the American Colleges. It was not until about the middle of this century that political economy can be said to have become well established as a separate academic discipline. This fact does not, of course, signify that men were wholly unfamiliar with the subject matter of political economy previous to the early decades of the nineteenth century or that no instruction in any of its principles was offered in the institutions devoted to higher education. We have already seen that it was an active theme of discussion before this date through political pamphlets and in official governmental circles, and perhaps among those concerned with commerce and industry at large. It also had its place in the systematic treatises, although not an extended one and not as a separate and independent subject.

In the old treatises on *Jus Naturae*, or Natural Law, and in the more re-

cent ones derived from this older discipline, Moral Philosophy, there had long been chapters or sections devoted to the more pressing problems of economic relations and policy. These had embraced not only such general questions as commerce, money, taxation, and industry, but they had also dealt with the more intimate sociological problems of the relation of master and servant, the rewards of labor, slavery, property, and economic opportunity. Thus early political economy on its systematic side was in reality an outgrowth of Natural Law and Moral Philosophy. In this respect it was not different from the other social sciences,² or from general Social Science itself.

It is also to be noted that the moral philosophy emphasis in early political economy was of close kin to the political emphasis. Simon N. Patten has thrown some light upon this intimate relation between morals and political economy in his *Development of English Thought* (1899). He divides modern English thought into three periods: (1) that dominated by Calvinism and represented particularly by Hobbes, Locke, and Newton; (2) the age dominated by the moralists, in which Mandeville, Hume, and Adam Smith were the representative thinkers; and (3) the period of the economists proper, in which Malthus, Mill, and Darwin (whom Patten regards as primarily an economist) were the outstanding representatives. Thus Patten clearly conceives of morals as developing out of and freeing itself from theology, but at the same time becoming colored by economic considerations in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

In the nineteenth century an ethical political economy, perhaps under the influence of the Industrial Revolution, assumed the lead over theoretical ethics in the estimation of the public as a whole. The two emphases—political and ethical—were closely supplementary rather than antagonistic. Both aimed at the discovery of the best social and political policies in economic matters. The one emphasized the social and ethical primarily and the political secondarily; the other the political primarily and the social and ethical only secondarily. The one was largely academic and philosophic in character, and the other was mainly practical in its nature and emphases.

The Anti-Ethical and Anti-Reformist Protest. The very term political economy signified this emphasis upon public affairs rather than upon private profit and management, which the term economics now indicates to us. But there were even in this early period, and especially after 1850, pro-

² See article on the social sciences as disciplines in the United States, *The Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, I: 324-349.

tests by almost all of the more scientific political economists against this close connection of political economy with ethics. Men like E. Peshine Smith, John Bascom, and William Graham Sumner were insistent that the subject must be treated objectively as a science and not as a technology dominated by ethical policy. They forgot the origins of political economy as a system of propagandistic arguments and technological instrumentalities, considered as valuable solely to support a public policy sanctioned either by morals or by national or group interest. It probably never would have come into existence except to render this interested service.

But, once it had been born and had been accepted into academic and scientific circles, it was now endeavoring to work out an independent career for itself as a science with a responsible objective and an unintimidated method of its own. It was still willing to be of service to individuals or the state, but more in the capacity of a consultant than in that of a subaltern. This was the ideal which its more thoughtful adherents held for it. But this ideal was by no means as yet fully realized by the men we have treated in Parts VI and VII. They were too closely tied up in their own interests and emotions with social and political and economic programs to be truly objective in their thinking or in their methods of writing political economy.

Effect of the Industrial Revolution upon Political Economy. Paradoxical as it may seem, it was the industrial revolution that hastened the independent development of political economy in general, and of economic Social Science in particular, into academic disciplines and ultimately placed each in some form or other in the curriculum of every educational institution. This influence of the Industrial Revolution was first exerted upon political economy, since it was the more concrete and tangible and the less philosophic of the two sciences. The Industrial Revolution was itself primarily economic and its rapid development in the latter half of the eighteenth century and in the early part of the nineteenth made strong demands upon political economy in two somewhat divergent, but fundamentally supplementary, respects.

In the first place, a vastly larger number of persons came to be interested in economic questions and issues. Formerly only statesmen and the commercial and financial leaders had been deeply, or at least immediately and obviously, concerned with these questions. Now, however, the great masses of the workers in the industries, and even the citizens at large, also came to recognize that they had a vital stake in the determination and control of economic policies of both industry and the state. The growth of the indus-

trial revolution made the average worker wiser with respect to the facts and principles of political economy.

This knowledge of the new science, now so necessary to an understanding of the industrial regime under which people lived and labored, could be provided only by means of instruction in the subject. This represented an indirect effect of the industrial revolution upon political economy. While the masses of the laborers did not go to college, their teachers and leaders frequently did, and it was upon these teachers and leaders that the masses had to depend for their instruction in political economy. School teachers, lyceum speakers, newspaper and magazine writers, ministers, labor leaders, agitators, political candidates, leaders of discussion groups, the more literate and intelligent workers themselves, dispensed this knowledge of political economy to the masses in greater or less degree and with more or less accuracy and insight.

But these leaders were in turn dependent upon two sources for the knowledge which they undertook to dispense—upon the treatises in political economy and upon the college courses in this subject. The colleges were forced to turn aside somewhat from their preoccupation with the classics and to meet the rapidly growing popular demand for instruction in this new subject of such pressing significance for popular enlightenment and for the intelligent determination of public policy.

The Effect of General Enlightenment. The growth of enlightenment and literacy among the masses, and the expansion of the policy of popular education, also hastened the introduction of political economy into the colleges and universities. The demands for systematic and logical instruction in the educational institutions largely set the pattern for the treatises in the subject. They became constantly more logical and systematic. In fact, they were rendered systematic more rapidly than they were made scientific or inductive in their methodological approach. This was, of course, the result of the academic demand for a lessening of the controversial emphasis and for an increase upon the side of objective analysis and synthesis. In the absence of an adequate supply of data impartially selected and inductively generalized, the writers of the treatises frequently fell back upon an a priori method of collecting their facts and of generalizing their principles. This method was all the more acceptable to these early political economists because they were always publicists writing from the standpoint of preconceived notions and in defense of favorite policies. Despite the struggle of

the more objective political economists to free themselves from ethical and partisan biases, there was not as yet a profession of scientists in political economy who investigated the facts of economic life without preconceptions and who formulated a science of political economy without partisan theories to defend. This achievement was made only after the founding of the American Economic Association in 1885, if indeed it has ever been adequately consummated.

Thus the Industrial Revolution had a remarkably stimulating effect, both directly and indirectly, upon the growth of systematic treatises in political economy, but it did not at first produce objectively scientific and unbiased investigations in this field. The works of the writers on economic Social Science which we have just finished analyzing offer abundant proofs of this contention. Especially in the matter of protectionism and free trade, in the theory of population, in the attribution of poverty to Natural Law and success to skill and persistence, and in the views of the political economists on the limits of productivity and their disregard of the principles of diminishing returns, they illustrate the evils of systematization without adequate data and objectivity as a device to hide a bias.

Evaluation of the Nationalist Approach to Social Science. The economic Social Scientists of the Carey school were among the strongest and most insistent critics of the English classical economists that we have had. In much of this criticism they were, of course, correct. Their exposure of the fallacy of the economic man concept and their criticism of the wages fund theory in its more absolutist aspects were pretty close approaches to models of economic analysis. Much more strongly influenced by the growing spirit of social and economic evolution as applied to economic processes, they were able early to detect many of the now obvious errors of the classical economists. But, influenced as they were by the eighteenth century hopefulness with regard to the supposedly unlimited powers of science to overcome all natural and human obstacles to social progress and by a strong nationalistic feeling, they went much too far in discarding the warnings of Malthus regarding the dangers of overpopulation and of Ricardo with respect to diminishing returns in agricultural productivity. Also, in the first flush of their enthusiasm for the benefits of industrial development and independence, they overestimated the national advantages of a protective policy. Although all of them appear to have been opposed to plutocratic exploitation of the masses and to have been genuinely interested in

the economic and social welfare of the people as a whole, they were unable to foresee the future evil effects of the protective system in these very respects.

Rise of the Neo-Classical Emphasis in Social Science. In fact, contemporaneous with the nationalist or Carey school of Social Scientists, and at least not more than ten or fifteen years later in their development, was the Neo-Classical economic emphasis in Social Science. If we suppose that, roughly speaking, the Carey or Nationalist school extended from about 1850 to 1880, it will be equally proper to set the temporal range of the Neo-Classical school from approximately 1860 to 1890, or perhaps in a few cases to extend it to 1900. This Neo-Classical school arose in part as a reaction against the nationalist school. This fact is easily discernible from the writings of its earliest advocates, who took issue especially with the excessive optimism and protectionist views of Carey and his followers. But this new school of economic Social Scientists was more particularly the product of the further maturing of the Industrial Revolution. If the United States had been dominantly agricultural and rural in its interests before the Civil War, it became increasingly industrialized and urbanized after this great dividing point in our history. The war itself, partly through its emphasis upon new agricultural inventions, its increased mechanization of transport, and especially through the concentration of manufacture and finance to which it had given rise, had contributed much toward this new trend in our national life. But the main factor was the growing power of capital which now as never before was applied to the exploitation of natural resources and the building up of vast financial systems subsisting on virtual monopolies.

Explanation of the Neo-Classical Viewpoint in Social Science. This change toward a vast system of industrialization and commercialization, capped by a great extension of the financial powers, changed almost completely the dominant emphasis in American life. National welfare and the interests of the masses came to be less and less the ruling motivation for the specialists in political economy and in economic Social Science. The desire for wealth and the individual possession of economic power rapidly came to characterize the minds not only of the masters of finance and industry, but also the masses of the people themselves. No longer was social idealism, such as that which characterized the Associationist and the radical economic schools, significant in the determination of public policy. The reform spirit, instead of being the symbol of the finest types of citizenship,

came to be all but outlawed and was no longer respectable in the eighteen-seventies, eighties, and nineties. Those who looked first to the public welfare and demanded economic and social reforms in the interest of the masses were lampooned and caricatured as long haired dreamers, with disordered mentalities or with criminal tendencies. They were called anarchists and socialists, which were then the equivalent terms of disapproval for the "bolshevik" and "communist" of our time.

As a consequence, there was a gradual diminution of interest in social welfare among the Social Scientists of the Neo-Classical economic type. In John Bascom, the first of the new school, and in Perry it is still measurably strong. But it weakens notably in such men as D. A. Wells, the Walkers, and Edward Atkinson. In Sumner it has disappeared almost entirely. These later men have been caught in the philosophic net of the struggle for wealth and economic power. Their thinking has become institutionalized increasingly along Neo-Classical economic lines. They can no longer see the human individual because of the interference exerted by the abstract and generalized economic process. Or, if they do behold him, it is as an obstruction to the smooth working of the economic mechanism which is now their goal. Without realizing it, they have come to set up institutionalized economic processes in the place of human values. Social reform in the old democratic sense of the eighteen-forties to sixties has become anathema to these new exponents of Social Science. Sumner's *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other* is both the Bible and the Catechism of this new order of thinking.

The New Economics. Political economy was itself undergoing a rapid change in this period between 1870 and 1890. The old significance of the term—the economy or welfare of the nation—was giving way to a new meaning. The new emphasis is not national, but is upon the market—the economy of exchange. To this is of course added the economics of production. The problems of the distribution of wealth are for the time being all but forgotten, in so far as the shares of the workers and consumers are concerned. Business has replaced the nation in the purview of this rapidly developing science. The concept of profits has blotted out or dimmed that of social welfare. Recognition of the interests of the wealthy classes has almost obliterated that of the masses. As a consequence, it changes its name from Political Economy to Economics, and almost immediately this new science of the market and of production—of business—grows by leaps and bounds. Courses multiply from a maximum of two to the institution in

the early eighteen-eighties to five and ten and even twenty in the eighteen-nineties, and to many more in the succeeding decades.

The Decline of Economic Social Science. Coincident with this transformation of a national welfare political economy into an economics of business, a complementary development was occurring in economic Social Science. The change in its emphasis from men to wealth and from reform to the justification of economic exploitation has already been noted. But with this change from a humanitarian to an institutionalized economic interest the reason for an economic Social Science itself disappeared. The traditions of Social Science were reformistic and humanitarian. The new economics was becoming constantly less so.

The result was that the economic Social Scientists split into two groups and both gradually withdrew from active participation within the official Social Science movement. Only a few middle-rollers, persons with axes to grind, and conventional economic idealists remained to see this phase of the movement die down. The more radical elements joined with the rising socialist movement and disdained Social Science and its successor, Sociology. The more conservative element, on the one hand, and the more systematic academic representatives, on the other hand, formed the American Economic Association in 1885 and one by one they ceased to attend or withdrew from the American Social Science Association, which itself ceased to exist soon after the turn of the century.

The men whose theories are analyzed in Part VII are among those who maintained a relationship longest with the Social Science movement, although this connection was frequently haphazard and intermittent. Some of these men taught both economics and Social Science in the same courses. Perry's course at Williams College, for example, long bore the double title of economics and social science. Francis A. Walker perhaps made the transition most definitely, in form at least, from Social Science to economics, within the period here covered, and D. A. Wells and Sumner only less so. These last, together with Edward Atkinson, may be regarded as retaining the form if not the spirit, of Social Science as long as they dealt with economic questions. All of the men treated in this division were at some time or other active members of the American Social Science Association and most or all of them held official positions in it in its early history.

Motivation of the Neo-Classical School. In addition to the factors already enumerated as producing the Neo-Classical School of Social Scientists, three motivations should be singled out especially for mention. These

were highly conscious considerations that operated to produce the writings and teachings of this group of economic Social Scientists. One of these motivations has already been referred to briefly. It was the strong antagonism all of the members of this new school felt—and the earlier members were particularly conscious of it—for the excessively optimistic and highly propagandistic theories of the nationalist school of Carey and his disciples.

Coming into existence, approximately a decade after the nationalist school had got into full swing, this new or Neo-Classical School sounded the alarm to return to “sound economic principles.” It called for a partial reversion to the essential teachings of Adam Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo. It opposed in particular an ethical-national welfare interpretation of political economy, which for all of its appeal to the principles of Natural Law and an occasional nominal repudiation of ethical considerations, as in Peshine Smith, had been the distinctive feature of the Carey School. In this way the neo-classicals reasserted the old “economic man” dogma, which became now a sanction and a forerunner of the new emphasis upon political economy as the science of wealth and of individual profits. They also sought frequently to counteract the criticisms directed by the nationalist school against the Malthusian theory of population and the Ricardian doctrines of rent and diminishing returns. But this new school was most of all concerned to refute the protectionist theories of the Carey School. Whatever other points of attack may or may not be found in the theories of these men individually, this one is always present and to the fore.

The second conscious motivating force was closely related to this one of opposition or rebuttal to the nationalist school. In fact, it was this second motivation that in large measure crystallized and made effective the first. Bastiat had published his *Harmonies Economiques* in 1850 and it had been translated into English in 1860.³ This work was a rationalization of the classical economic doctrines largely on a psycho-social basis, and furthermore it had made use of the prevailing concepts of harmony and design involved in the natural theology of the Bridgewater school, with especial reference to economic phenomena.⁴ Thus its doctrine of natural harmony under the aegis of Natural Law became the Bible and creed of the *laissez faire* spirit which had grown up under the new commercialism and indus-

³ The preface to the American edition was written by Horace White, a disciple of the Carey school, thus illustrating the contention made above that although the Carey school was protectionist it was not always opposed to *laissez faire*.

⁴ This argument from design appears in the treatises on political economy of Bascom, Perry, and other members of the Neo-Classical School.

trialism of the nineteenth century and was seeking for a theoretical champion. This championship was realized in full measure in Bastiat's work. Like all of the Bridgewater and other treatises on natural theology, it was conceived and executed in the true aprioristic spirit, and it could therefore have full freedom to make the facts of economic life fit the theory of a natural order which was the paradise of the entrepreneur, if not of the worker.

This treatise was to the new commercialism what Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* had been to the new industrialism of the eighteenth century, but it was conceived along much narrower and less generous lines. It was as much an apology for the reigning commercial and financial interests and for the supremacy of the private profit motive as the *Wealth of Nations* had been for a wider internationalism and humanitarianism. The ethical motive was gone out of the *Harmonies Economiques* entirely and its tribute to national welfare was merely lip service. It was concerned with how men became rich or richer by means of an appropriate and helpful public policy supposedly based on Natural Law, while Adam Smith's work sought to answer the question of how nations may be made prosperous. The effect of this work by Bastiat was to resuscitate the doctrines, both good and bad, of the classical economists and to counteract the teachings of the Nationalist School which had gained such headway in the preceding decade or two. The members of the Neo-Classical School, from Bascom to Sumner, were thoroughly familiar with this work and, especially in the first decades after its appearance, were much influenced and heartened by it in their attacks upon the doctrines of the Nationalist School. Many of their arguments against protectionism and for free trade were taken more or less bodily from it.

The third motivation was perhaps as fully conscious as the other two, but it was on the whole rather obscure. All of these men were by habit of thought and by their traditional connections strongly opposed to the Associationist radical economic and social doctrines. Practically all of the members of the Neo-Classical School had, if not orthodox, at least highly conventional religious connections and could not have accepted any of the Associationist theories of social reform. They were almost Philistine in their mores and middle class conventionality. Even the title of Bastiat's book, emphasizing as it did—but from another and more conventional angle—the harmonies of nature must have shocked the Neo-Classical people because of its suggestion of the divine harmonies of the unregulated passions sponsored by the followers of Fourier. If these men say little di-

rectly in opposition to the Associationist doctrines and much against those of the Carey school, it is because the former had already been largely replaced by the latter. The immediate enemy was the nationalist theories of the Carey school, and here the Neo-Classicals, stimulated by the reading of Bastiat, centered their attack. But undoubtedly the memory of the vagaries and excesses of the Associationists had added its less immediate stimulus also.

PART EIGHT

The American Social Science Association

Founding of the American Social Science Association

The Founders. The American Social Science Association, to which most of the men and women who contributed to Social Science as a discipline in the latter part of the nineteenth century belonged, did not initiate the Social Science Movement. It came into existence only after the movement had become fairly well matured and standardized. As we have already seen, the movement itself was imported in a form none too scientific from Europe and it was at once highly speculative in theory and intended to be highly practical in the application of this theory. It was nearly a generation later, after various transformations in the original Social Science Movement led by Brisbane and his associates had occurred, that the American Social Science Association was formed by a group of men much more conservative in temper and, for the most part, much better grounded in the principles of science. These men had seen the Utopistic experiments fail and had reaped the advantages of nearly a full generation of development in the social sciences. They were prepared to abandon the mere theorizing and Utopianism in the form of communal colonies and to undertake to develop a sound social theory on the basis of which they might undertake practicable legislation and other reform movements within the limits of the social structure as it then existed.

In other words, the men who formed the American Social Science Association were not revolutionists, bent on a radical transformation of the then existing social order, or upon returning to a more primitive social order (as the colonizers were). They accepted the present social system in its main outlines as it actually existed. They were good Republicans or Democrats and very rarely Anarchists, Socialists, Single Taxers, or otherwise members of radical political protest groups. They believed that they could secure all they wished to attain in the way of social reform within the present form of government and even by working through the existing political parties upon occasion, but more frequently through the processes

of education and private reform organizations. It is the story of this relatively conservative movement and of its activities that we wish now to enter upon.

Significance of the American Social Science Association. The history of the American Social Science Association illustrates a very important trend in the development of the discipline we are studying. Beginning as a catch-all organization, intended to bring together for study and discussion all those interested in any of the social disciplines—history, political science, economics, social reform, education, jurisprudence—this Association, at first a unit, gradually resulted in a specialization of interests which culminated in the splitting off from the mother organization of specialized organizations in these various fields. Thus the concept of an integrated Social Science embracing all the special social sciences gave way to centrifugal forces which broke up the composite science into separate disciplines.

This peculiarity of the history of the Social Science Association was indeed but naturally to be expected. The Association was not of a spontaneous growth as were the constituent disciplines which it commandeered and as had been the earlier Utopian movements which first masqueraded under the name of Social Science. It was an administrative movement, synthetic rather than expansive in character, and therefore essentially artificial. While the phases of the movement that preceded it were the products of the spontaneous proliferation of individual thinkers and of the efforts of individual leaders to establish communal colonies by means of which to realize in practice the principles set forth in speculative theory, the present phase of the movement was quite different. It represented a cooperative attempt on the part of a considerable group of more or less conventional thinkers to organize themselves consciously and purposively and primarily for a concerted intellectual attack upon the problems of human welfare and secondarily for the realization of this welfare in various types of reform, both official and non-official.

Thus it was decidedly a movement "engineered" from the top and consciously directed. Furthermore it was undertaken—as indeed such a synthetic movement could only be undertaken—at a time when the separate and special social sciences were already achieving a very considerable development. As a consequence, it was not possible to fuse these several sciences into one single Social Science. Each of them was already developing too much individuality and becoming too widely differentiated and too

largely proliferated in details and procedures to be merged with all the others. It was possible to do no more than to draw upon them for such data and leaders as were necessary for the promotion of the specific ends that the American Social Science Association had in view. Thus loosely tied together, it was inevitable that the Association should disintegrate as soon as the special contributing social sciences learned from it to perform similar functions for themselves. But it rendered one great service to all of them. It taught them to organize and to work administratively and co-operatively, as well as individually, within their own ranks.

The History of a Conflict of Ideals. The history of the American Social Science Association is interesting also because it enables us to watch, as if under laboratory lenses, the processes which at last split the two dominant, but somewhat competing, ideals which had been fundamental in Social Science, and finally segregated them into different disciplines. The social reform ideal, harnessed now to prosaic and concrete problems of charity and philanthropy, delinquency and dependency, instead of to efforts at Utopistic reconstructions of society, was finally separated from the other disciplines and became the disciplines of social work, social legislation, and various other social welfare disciplines. The scientific ideal, freed from practical applications, gradually emerged as economics, sociology, and political science, and the American Economic Association, the American Sociological Society, and the American Political Science Association became the child and the grand-children of the American Social Science Association, the latter two tracing their filiation through the American Economic Association. Sociology is still sensitive about its ancestry, at least in some quarters, although economics and political science appear to have forgotten theirs. Some sociologists resent very much any imputation of a social reform ideal in their science. They profess science for science's sake. And social work is equally sensitive, in some quarters, at least, about its ancestral association with sociology, a subject which seems to some social workers much too theoretical and far too removed from the actual facts of life to be of any practical utility. Economics and political science, on the other hand, do not appear to be troubled about either historic or present day conflicts between pure science and reform ideals. They are ready and willing to undertake either type of work as it falls to their lot and to allow the purists and the prigs to do the exclaiming and moralizing against exclaiming and moralizing in the Social Science disciplines.

Causes of the Organization. The main precipitating factors in the organ-

ization of the American Social Science Association are relatively easy to trace. The Irish immigration of the eighteen-forties had been of such proportions and of such a character as literally to swamp the various relief agencies of the country. Says a historian, "The extreme poverty of many of the immigrants and their inability to settle themselves promptly in their new surroundings created a serious problem for all the seaboard towns where they congregated. In 1832 the South Boston Almshouse held only 340 natives as against 613 immigrants. In the same year the Free Dispensary in Boston treated 854 Americans and 1331 immigrants, of whom 1234 were Irish, 72 English, and only 25 of other nationalities. Four years later, of the 866 paupers in the Boston House of Refuge, 516 were foreigners."¹

The problem of the immigrant was met in a number of ways. Commons and his school have shown the reaction of labor to it.² The Know-Nothing party was another method of meeting the problem, adopted by the politically minded.³ But no attitudinal or emotional behavior could solve the complex of social problems precipitated by all those public charges, each with his or her own specific and pressing difficulties and needs, filling the almshouses, dispensaries, and houses of refuge. Something concrete and immediate had to be done about them. This necessity led not immediately to the establishment of the American Social Science Association, but to a series of administrative steps and devices, some of which took the form of executive and policy making bodies. It was the policy forming associations that ultimately produced, for their aid and benefit, the general scientific association bearing the name here mentioned. It was in reality at first a general forum for the discussion of the problems which arose in these policy forming bodies. We shall therefore give some account of one or more of these policy making and administrative organizations which brought about the American Social Science Association.

Massachusetts Takes the First Step. In 1851, Massachusetts created a Board of Alien Commissioners which was designed "to superintend the execution of all laws in relation to the introduction of aliens into the Commonwealth, and the support of State paupers therein."⁴ It was this Board,

¹ James Truslow Adams, *New England in the Republic, 1778-1850* (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1926), p. 334. (Reprinted by permission of the publishers).

² John R. Commons, *Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (1910), Vol. VIII, pp. 281 ff.

³ Edward Channing, *A History of the United States*, Vol. VI (1927), pp. 125 ff.

⁴ Board of State Charities of Massachusetts, *Third Annual Report* (1867), p. xxi.

which, some fourteen or fifteen years later, became the nucleus of the American Social Science Association. It continued in operation as constituted for over a decade, presumably with satisfactory results. But it was only one among many agencies in the field of relief, and in 1861, when Governor Andrew entered upon his work as chief executive of Massachusetts, he was distressed at the anarchical condition of charity work in the state. He called upon Samuel Gridley Howe, the "Nestor and Achilles of American charities," to use a phrase coined by F. B. Sanborn, for advice in reorganizing the whole relief system. Dr. Howe's daughter, commenting upon the situation as it then existed, says,⁵

Up to the year 1860, the Charities of Massachusetts had stood apart from one another, each managed by its own board of inspection, and practically apart from the State. This condition of things distressed the methodical mind of Governor Andrew.

As early as 1860 he had come to the conclusion that all penal reformatory and sanitary institutions should be under the supervision of a single board, with a competent secretary.

Absorbing though the war was, the Governor was not the man to let it interfere with the tasks of peace. In Dec. 1862, he wrote to my father [Howe] as follows:

"I wish you would, some early day this week, place on paper for my edification your views in reference to general and systematic improvements in our method of public charities."

Howe's Plan. Howe's reply to this appeal for advice illustrates clearly and decisively the wide divergence in viewpoint and outlook between this new phase of Social Science and those phases which had preceded it. He wrote as follows: ⁶

It seems to me that what we want is, *first*, a "knowledge of the fact." The statistics now gathered and published by the Secretary of State are valuable as far as they go, but they do not go far enough. The migratory habit of our pauper population, and the great facility of travel render it difficult to show conclusively the result of different modes of treating paupers and pauperism in different sections; but I think they might be shown, and they would prove, as was the case in England, that while in some districts pauperism is encouraged, cultivated as it were, and made rank and rampant, in others it is discouraged, cut down and almost rooted out.

Second, a board or central commission whose duty it shall be to collect and

⁵ Laura E. Richards (ed.), *The Journals and Letters of Samuel Gridley Howe* (1903), II: 508-509. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, D. Appleton-Century Co.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 510-512.

diffuse knowledge, to prevent abuses, to protect the rights of paupers, and to establish as far as may be a uniform and wise system of treatment of pauperism over the Commonwealth. . . .

The fact that our State paupers are mostly foreigners does not justify our violation of the plain principles which should underlie all establishments for the support and maintenance of the poor, but on the contrary should make us adhere to them more strongly.

We have this foreign element among us; we cannot get rid of it if we would; and we should strive to fuse it into our common nationality as fast as possible.

Old and New Methods Contrasted. The outstanding elements in this program are, it is quite obvious, in direct contrast with those of the preceding schools of Social Science which we have considered. It is a program, first of all, of facing the world as it actually is, not as it ought to be. These paupers are here—foreign or native—and something must be done about them. The Associationists would banish pauperism by a new social organization. So would Wright and Andrews and the other Utopistic Social Scientists. Carey, Stern, Delmar, Sumner, and others of the later schools would let natural social laws which lead to social harmony take care of poverty. Howe has no such illusions. He would merely try to discourage, cut down, or if possible, root out, the evil by a system of treating it in society as it is now organized. Where he could not eliminate the problem he would administer and legislate with reference to the fact in the manner best calculated to promote the welfare of the poor and at the same time do no harm to society as a whole. It is a much more practical and concrete viewpoint, though, it must be confessed, a much less romantically attractive one than that proposed by the Utopistic Social Scientists.

The next most outstanding contrast lies in Howe's strong emphasis upon a "knowledge of the fact." The other Social Scientists had given lip service to this "knowledge of the fact," but when it came down to actual grubbing for the facts, they were much more likely to substitute ingenious day-dreams about the nature of human nature, or else they ransacked history to illustrate their preconceived points of view. Even those who made quite a fetish of statistics—Carey and the Stern-Delmar group—used facts to illustrate their preconceptions rather than as a means to arriving at an inductive point of view. In contrast with all this, the very dull day-by-day facts on which sciences are ultimately built were strongly emphasized by the practical or eclectic Social Scientists, especially as indispensable bases of social reform. We shall run across this predilection of theirs again and again. The Utopistic Social Scientists, although they insisted that their

systems constituted a Social Science, in actual fact began with a world ready-made according to first principles. They were, to be sure, experimental in the sense that they undertook to put their theories into practice, but they claimed the title of science long before they tried out the experiments in fact. Howe's recommendations, on the other hand, are actually for experimentation. If we only had the facts, he says, we could tell by the results of various systems, which was best calculated to bring about the results we are aiming at.

A Piecemeal Method of Reform. Howe's program, finally, is a piecemeal one. It deals with a specific social problem, not social organization in general. Just as the Philadelphia laborer could see very little connection between a phalanx in the wilds of Pennsylvania and his very concrete problems at home,⁷ just so a practical minded reformer in Boston probably could see little connection between such a phalanx and the existence of institutions full of paupers. When the Associationists and kindred Utopistic reformers failed, the other methods of accomplishing their aims—labor organizations, practical Social Science, among them—were given a clear field. To this day the American mind is suspicious of wholesale attempts at reform. The New Deal was in the piece-meal tradition rather than in the grand-scale reconstructive tradition of earlier Social Science, and foreign critics have pointed out the lack of a comprehensive philosophy back of it. But large scale social reconstruction is not congenial to the present American temper.

The Basic Problem of Procedure. There were other contrasts between this and earlier phases of Social Science, but these three are the most important: that is, one emphasized strongly a basic knowledge of the facts in the case, whereas the earlier schools did not; one accepted the world as it existed and attempted to reform it, whereas most of the other schemes withdrew from the world and attempted to begin all over again on a new plan; and as a corollary to this, one was piecemeal, attacking each problem by itself and in turn, whereas the other plans were organic, systematic, attempting to solve all problems by one clean sweep.

Doubtless there is much to be said for the organic systematic reformation of society as a whole. Those who advocate this procedure by preference point out that the concrete piecemeal reformers do not know where they are going and never get there, that sooner or later they end up either in a

⁷ H. F. Hoagland, in John R. Commons and others, *History of Labour in the United States* (1921), p. 506.

blind alley or in some political camp, where their aim and purpose, and even their idealism, are betrayed or sabotaged. The great difficulty with the attempt to prosecute social reform in an organic way, that is, all along the front at the same time, is that it is very difficult to know where to begin and to make any effective attack. If the approach is concrete and specific, this sort of attack is likely to degenerate into the piecemeal type of reform and the movement sooner or later will find itself broken up into a number of minor and more or less isolated attempts at social reform of different social values and with different degrees of effectiveness in leadership. If, on the other hand, the general organic reform aims exclusively at effecting a change in human nature and in social organization while it leaves the details of individual adjustment to take care of themselves as a consequence of the more general changes and readjustments that are to be brought about, a vast amount of sound learning and very expert generalship, on the part of the masses as well as of the leaders, is required for the task. There would already have to be in existence a Social Science far in advance of anything visible in the nineteenth century, and the leaders would have to be far superior to any we have encountered so far. The theory of human nature of the Associationists and the plans of social organization of the Comtean and of the economic groups were almost ridiculously inadequate for such a purpose.

Possibly we are now moving in the direction of adequate social sciences which will enable us projectively to invent ⁸ a new form of society and to plan a new type of human nature which will accomplish the general reform of society, and the consequent specific adjustments of individuals to their environments, which we desire. There are those who believe that Russia has already entered upon such a general and specific reform program. There are others, however, who are equally convinced of the contrary. Perhaps the only final test is experimental, to be judged from the results. Possibly the only feasible method of social reform is a combination of the concrete individual and the general organic approaches, in which the elimination of specific evils is aimed at immediately and a sound general theory of human nature and of social organization—or at least one as sound as it is possible at any particular time to construct—is used to guide the specific attempts at reform and to keep them from losing their orientation and from being perverted to selfish and partisan ends. Both procedures require sound

⁸ L. L. Bernard, "Invention and Social Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX: 1-32 (July, 1923).

knowledge as a basis for operation. Howe's insistence upon adequate information meant in practice pretty much this sort of preparation. Although he did not specifically insist in his communication to Governor Andrew upon a sound general Social Science as a necessary background for social reform and for dealing with concrete problems of individual and social maladjustments, what we know of him otherwise would indicate that he always had such a point of view in mind. Certainly his method was working as inevitably in this direction as it was tending in the direction of an ultimate Social Science association.

The Massachusetts Board of State Charities. Governor Andrew took Howe's recommendations seriously, and in 1863 the Massachusetts Board of State Charities was created to succeed the Board of Alien Commissioners, whose duties now devolved upon the newly constituted board. Its functions included (1) investigation and supervision, (2) recommendation, and (3) execution. This was the first board of its kind in the country, and the precursor of all the rest. The motives which led to its creation were set forth in 1866 as follows:⁹

It began to be seen that if there could be some agency to collect all the valuable facts learned by the observation and experience of the many able and honest men who were acting without concert at various points, and to compare the results obtained in various institutions at home and abroad, valuable knowledge might be obtained which would tend to promote economy, to prevent mistakes, to rectify errors, and, in a word, increase the good results of so much effort by making all pull in one direction toward one common end. . . .

Above all, it was seen that such an agency might consider carefully the causes which create such great numbers of dependents; might ascertain the social conditions which affect these numbers; and when those conditions are such as can be modified by legislation, appeal to the legislature; when they are such as can be modified only by the people, than appeal to the intelligence and moral sense of the people.

Although the chief motive, economy of administration, may have been a very practical and utilitarian one, it is significant that research and reform played such very important roles, actually, as aids to and as results of administrative practice.

The first members of the newly created board were: Nathan Allen, Otis Norcross, Robert T. Davis, Edward Earle, H. B. Wheelwright, F. B. Sanborn, and, added early in 1864, Theodore Metcalf and Joseph C. Blaisdell. Of these, Norcross and Davis resigned during the first year, in 1864, but

⁹ Board of State Charities of Massachusetts, *Second Annual Report* (1866), pp. xii-xiii.

Howe, old as he was, was added in November of that year.¹⁰ This was an important group of men, for it was they who, in August, 1865, issued the circular calling a meeting to take place at Boston in October, "in which certain subjects were specified as proper to be considered by the 'Social Science League.'" ¹¹

Source of the Movement: The British Association. Let us now leave the American scene and trace the British Social Science Association, since it was this latter which inspired and served as model for its American counterpart. The results and problems of the Industrial Revolution came earlier and were more apparent in England than in the rest of the world because it was there that industrialization first began on a large scale under the stimulus of British foreign trade. And since England was a pioneer in this field she had no previously prepared method of meeting the socio-economic evils that were to follow. A current comment makes this fact clear: ¹²

The creation of riches proved an easier task than their equitable distribution. The countryside still shudders at the memory of the hungry forties; but the plight of many of the workers in the industrial towns which sprang up like mushrooms was no better. Professor Clapham assures us that their condition was not quite so bad as it has been painted by the Hammonds and other investigators, but there is plenty of evidence that masses of the population, of both sexes and of all ages, were hideously overworked and underfed. The birthrate rose by leaps and bounds during the first half of the century, and the deathrate was increased by the herding of the industrial armies in the slums. Foresight is among the rarest of human qualities, and the country, absorbed in the production of wealth, allowed a condition of affairs to arise which disgraced the richest nation in Europe. Byron had declared in the House of Lords that even in Turkey he had never witnessed such scenes of squalid degradation as in the land of his birth. Engels' grim survey of the working classes in 1844 suggested that the situation was as bad as ever, and Karl Marx based his *Capital* mainly on the experience of England.

Aims of the Movement in England. It was to the remedying of this type of evils that British Social Science devoted itself. Robert Owen's experiments in industrial management, the Rochdale pioneer experiment in cooperation, Maurice's establishment of the Working Men's College, Chadwick's campaign for public health—these were among the specific move-

¹⁰ Board of State Charities of Massachusetts, *First Annual Report* (1864), pp. iv-v.

¹¹ F. B. Sanborn, "The Work of Social Science, Past and Present," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 8, 1876, p. 25.

¹² F. J. C. Hearnshaw (ed.), *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age* (London, George G. Harrap Co., Ltd., 1933), p. 16.

ments which attempted to deal with the problems of a newly industrialized society. Not grandiose schemes for building society anew, from the foundations up, but remedies for the evils of the existing system were the concern of these men.¹³ Not the French Enlightenment, in short, but British liberalism, provided the philosophy of the British Social Science Movement. Burke had ¹⁴

struck a much-needed blow at the doctrinaire ideology of the French Revolution; but his gospel of continuity was twisted into a defence of abuses and vested interests. It was the glory of Bentham's ingenious mind to challenge the dead hand of the past, to assert the claim of living men to happiness and well-being. When the elder Utilitarians and their political disciples, such as Brougham, had helped to disperse the reactionary mist which had gathered in the wake of the French Revolution it was the task of the younger Mill to expound the philosophy of the Liberal age inaugurated by the Reform Bill.

Launching the British Movement. It was this same Brougham, indeed, who was the rallying point for the organization which "was set on foot by an almost spontaneous effort of the social reformers scattered through the whole country," ¹⁵ and it was under his leadership that the movement was organized into the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science in 1857.¹⁶ In 1856 it had been suggested to Lord Brougham that he should organize all those interested in the improvement of the people and give them an opportunity to study social economics as a great whole. It was suggested that the actual experience of social reformers be given emphasis as well as a *priori* reasoning. The familiar belief that social knowledge has as much unity as physical was reaffirmed. "Are the moral laws of the universe, promulgated by the same Divine Legislator, less uniform, less simple, and less sure" ¹⁷ than physical laws? No, was the answer, of course. All social reform and knowledge were intimately interconnected.

With this characteristic assertion of both the reform and the scientific ideals, the new association was launched, holding its first meetings in Birmingham, under the presidency of Lord Brougham. The *Transactions* were duly published in a large volume containing 110 papers, distributed

¹³ With the possible exception of Owen who, as we have already seen, did attempt to found a new social system in America.

¹⁴ F. J. C. Hearnshaw, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹⁵ *Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science*, 1858 (1859), p. xxvii.

¹⁶ *Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science*, 1857 (1858), pp. xxi-xxii.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xxii.

as follows: 7 were "General and Introductory" (63 pages); 16 were on "Jurisprudence and Amendment of Law" (49 pages), 24 on "Education" (140 pages); 17 on "Punishment and Reformation" (85 pages); 24 on "Public Health" (158 pages); and 22 on "Social Economy" (163 pages). It was characteristic that these meetings were opened by a special service in St. Philip's Church to acknowledge human fallibility and the necessity of Divine aid. At the second annual meeting, held a year later, 666 members and 891 associates attended; 7 addresses and 173 papers were read. The new organization was unquestionably a success and more stringent rules had to be adopted to keep it within bounds.¹⁸

The permanence of the Association is secured; but the measure of its future success, and of its public utility, must depend on the course of its policy—in other words, on the wisdom and energy, and it may not be amiss to add, the subordination and self-denial exhibited by its members. The vast increase of business, which threatens to overflow the limited period—and it must always remain limited—of the annual session, will compel a much more methodical arrangement, and a much stricter discipline in its conduct, than was thought at first necessary or desirable.

Standardizing the Movement. The warm enthusiasm based on individual experience and local facts is all very well for early stages of a serious scientific movement, but it must give way to organization and matured results of inquiry in the end, if anything of permanent value is to be accomplished. Therefore the work of the Association had to be more systematized. The following suggestions were made with this end in view.¹⁹

1. An important part of our work must always consist in the collection of local statistics, and in recording the social progress made in various parts of the kingdom. This will some day, it is hoped, be amply provided for by the establishment of local standing committees, similar to the committee now in existence at Liverpool, each reporting annually to the parent body. But as the formation of such committees must be a work of time, it is much to be desired that our members in various towns should endeavour to unite in furnishing the Association with accounts of the social condition of their neighbourhood, of any efforts made for its improvement, and the results.

2. Papers on the practical details relating to social questions should be as concise as possible, should be confined to facts, and should avoid, as far as may be, the enunciation of general principles, and of philosophical theories and reflections.

3. It is, no doubt, desirable that a certain number of papers should be con-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. xxvi–xxvii.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. xxvii–xxviii.

tributed containing deductions from generalized facts, and dealing with the more abstract philosophy of Social Science, but those members who are capable and desirous of serving the Association in this way would most effectually promote the objects it has in view by turning their attention to subjects which have already come under its consideration, so that the facts and opinions recorded in successive years may be woven into a whole, and the true principles which should guide social improvement be educed by scientific comparison.

Influence of the Movement. The annual *Transactions* of this organization were widely influential and the British Social Science Association, eminently solid, practical, and concrete, became the model for similar organizations in Europe and America. An *Association internationale pour le progrès des Sciences Sociales*, a French Social Science Association, and a local *Boston Social Science Association* were soon established. At the first international congress of Social Science, held at Brussels in 1862, representatives from various European countries and also from the United States were present. The international organization, like the British one, had five departments, but the titles were a little different, viz.: Comparative Legislation, Education, Art and Literature, Charities and Public Health, and Political Economy.²⁰

Mrs. Dall and the Boston Movement. It is the local Boston association which is of most interest for our purposes. Prominent in this organization was Mrs. Caroline Healey Dall,²¹ who had been in communication with the secretary and assistant secretary of the British association,²² and it was no doubt through this contact that the idea was conceived of organizing a similar association in the United States. It was the Boston Social Science Association which, therefore, probably through Mrs. Dall, instigated the

²⁰ Henry Villard, "Historical Sketch of Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 1, 1869, p. 6.

²¹ Mrs. Dall was born in Boston in 1822. Her father was well to do and the culture of her home was genuine, if provincial, according to the *Dictionary of American Biography* (Vol. V, p. 5). She was privately educated and when the family fortunes ebbed she went to Miss English's School for Young Ladies, in Georgetown, D. C., as vice-principal. She married Charles Henry Appleton Dall, in 1844. "Reform of every kind was dear to Mrs. Dall's heart" (*ibid.*) but especially was she interested in equal educational and economic rights for women. She lectured on this subject indefatigably in pulpit and platform. She consciously modelled her life on that of Margaret Fuller, though she lacked the latter's exceptional ability. Her husband became a foreign missionary, visiting his family only every five years. For a while Mrs. Dall edited a woman's rights magazine, *Una*, in Boston. Among her numerous writings were *Woman's Right to Labor* (1860), *Woman's Rights under the Law* (1861), *The College, The Market, and the Court*, or *Woman's Relation to Education, Labor and Law* (1867). She died in 1912.

²² American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address, and List of Members*, etc. (1865), p. 13.

issuance of the circular by the Massachusetts Board of State Charities which convened the meeting to organize the American association. Mrs. Dall was very active in promoting the American association and in formulating the constitution which was presented for the approval of the members at the first meetings, and was herself one of the directors of the organization from the beginning.

Need for a National Association. The suggestions of the local Social Science group fell on fertile ground, for the Massachusetts Board of State Charities had found, in the two years since it had been organized, that it was greatly handicapped by lack of necessary information regarding the problems it had to handle. The data that were available were scattered and unorganized. The people interested in gathering such information were located apart from each other and without adequate means of communication and cooperation, and they were unorganized. Speaking on this point, F. B. Sanborn says,²³

It was this scarcity of material for the investigation of social questions, indeed, which suggested to the founders of this Association the importance of bringing together in this way the persons interested in the development of civilization here, and in setting forth its results, and its unsolved problems, for the information and guidance of each other. However the conception of such a society as ours originated,—and I fancy it was obtained from the earlier society of the same name in England, . . . —the idea was communicated in practical form to the American public by my colleagues of the Massachusetts Board of State Charities, in August, 1865. The Board . . . had found since October, 1863, when it was established, that the general information it sought in regard to the topics of Poverty, Industry, Insanity, Pauperism, Crime, and Disease were very hard to obtain, because there was no common centre, to which such facts would naturally be drawn.

The Circular of Call. The circular which the Massachusetts Board of State Charities issued, August 2, 1865, was signed by Nathan Allen, Edward Earle, H. B. Wheelwright, F. B. Sanborn, Theodore Metcalf, J. C. Blaisdell, and S. G. Howe. The circular itself read as follows:²⁴

Our attention has lately been called to the importance of some organization in the United States, both local and national, whose object shall be the discussion of those questions relating to the Sanitary Condition of the People, the Relief, Employment, and Education of the Poor, the Prevention of Crime, the

²³ F. B. Sanborn, "Aids in the Study of Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 29, 1892, pp. 49-50.

²⁴ American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address, and List of Members*, etc. (1865), pp. 10-11.

Amelioration of the Criminal Law, the Discipline of Prisons, the Remedial Treatment of the Insane, and those numerous matters of statistical and philanthropist interest which are included under the general head of "Social Science." An association for the consideration of these questions has existed in Great Britain for several years, including among its members many of the most eminent philanthropists and statistical writers of that country. Its published proceedings have been of great service to England and to the world.

Some gentlemen of this city, during the present year, have taken steps to organize such a society for Massachusetts, and will hold a public meeting here on the first Wednesday of October, 1865, at 10 o'clock, A. M., at which the general objects of such an organization will be announced, and papers will be read on special topics. We are so thoroughly convinced of the value of such an organization, that, at the request of the gentlemen interested, we take the liberty of inviting you to be present at that time, and to give us the benefit of your counsel as to the proposed work of the Social Science League.

It has been suggested that a local society should be established in every State in which there shall be sufficient interest taken, and that these societies shall all be represented, annually, in a National Convention of the League, the Proceedings of which shall be published along with such contributions from the local societies as may be selected.

If unable to attend the proposed meeting, would you be so good as to favor us with your views, by letter, concerning this plan, and in general, in regard to the whole subject, in which, from your known reputation you are believed to take an interest?

The Response. This call was answered by about 300 people who met October 4, 1865, and organized the American Association for the Promotion of Social Science.²⁵ Dr. Edward Jarvis, representing the local Social Science association, which had requested the calling of the meeting, presided at the first session, as Chairman of a Committee of Arrangements. A report by this committee was read by Dr. James C. White, in which the general purpose of the proposed association was sketched, and upon the motion of Dr. Jarvis that a society be organized along these lines, the movement was put into action.

The constitution, which had been previously prepared by the local association, was then read by Dr. Sanborn and acted upon article by article. Article I had read, "This Society shall be called the Association for Social Science," but Mrs. Dall's motion that the words "the promotion of" be inserted after "for" was carried, making the name of the organization The Association for the Promotion of Social Science.

Local or National? Then there arose the question as to whether the

²⁵ F. B. Sanborn, "The Work of 25 Years," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 27, 1893, p. xli.

proposed society should be local, regional, or national in character, a problem that was, as we shall presently see, to be raised again and again. Mr. Strong, of New York, raised the question. Jarvis replied that the local committee had considered this very problem but had decided to report the name as it stood, "leaving it for the meeting to decide whether it should be a Massachusetts, or a New England, or an American Association."²⁶ A "spirited" discussion followed in which Dr. Palmer of Michigan, Judge Russell of Boston, and Mr. F. A. Barnard of New York, among others, took part. Finally Barnard moved that the word "American" be inserted before "Association," and the article thus amended was adopted. But the problem was by no means settled by this action, nor, indeed was it ever finally settled. When the meeting had already passed on the whole constitution, "further discussion arose upon the question of making the association a State or a National body, and a motion to reconsider the adoption of the Constitution, in order to reopen the subject was negatived, 21 to 27."²⁷

Although the title of the association remained American, it was in fact always distinctly an eastern, if not a New England, organization until the end. Indeed, the constitution provided that the meetings of the American Social Science Association were to be held at Boston. The account continues: "A warm discussion . . . took place in regard to holding the regular meetings in Boston. . . . A motion was made by Mr. Jackson that the next meeting be held in Boston, and that subsequent meetings shall be held where designated by the executive committee."²⁸ But this motion was lost. The article was adopted with Boston designated as the regular place of meeting of the association. This impossible provision was later modified so that meetings were held at Philadelphia, New York, and finally regularly at Saratoga Springs.

The Field of Interests. Article II, of the Constitution, which originally stated that the association would give special attention to pauperism, was modified before adoption by striking out the word "special." Mr. George B. Emerson wished to have a special department instituted for the study of crime prevention and the reformation of criminals, but this was opposed as needless by Mrs. Dall and Amasa Walker. Emerson withdrew his motion, but Dr. Palmer of Michigan renewed it. When it was again opposed he also withdrew the motion, so that no such department was created. But

²⁶ American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address, and List of Members*, etc. (1865), p. 26.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

that there really was need for this department of study is testified by the organization some five years later of the National Prison Association, under the leadership of Dr. E. C. Wines. The American Social Science Association would probably have done well to make separate provision for this specialty instead of assimilating it to the department of jurisprudence, where it became more nearly formal penology than sociological criminology.

The organizational set-up as it was finally accepted, consisted of four departments: Education, Public Health, Social Economy, and Jurisprudence. The contents of each of these fields were laid down rather specifically, as follows:²⁹

1. Under the Department of Education will come every thing relating to the interests of Public Schools, Universities, and Colleges; to Reformatory, Adult, and Evening Schools; to Instruction in the useful Arts; to Systems of Apprenticeship, to Lyceums, Pulpits, and the formation of Societies for the purposes of Public Instruction. In this department will be debated also all questions relating to Classical, Linguistic, and Scientific Studies, in their proportion to what is called an English Education; and the bearing of the publication of National and Patriotic Memorials upon Popular Culture.

2. Upon the Department relating to Public Health, a very large proportion of the popular interest will naturally be fixed. All Sanitary and Hygienic matters will come before it; and what the Sanitary Commission has learned in the last four years will be made available, through its action, to the people at large. The subjects of Epidemics, of the origin and spread of Cholera, Yellow Fever, and Eruptive Diseases, will be legitimately discussed here. It will consider all questions of Increase of Population, Vaccination, Ventilation of Public and Private Buildings, Drainage, Houses for the Poor, the Management of Cemeteries, Public Baths, Parks, and Public Gardens, Places of Recreation, the Management of Hospitals and Insane Asylums, the Adulteration of Food and Drugs, all questions relating to the Duration of Human Life, Sanitary Regulations of the Army and Navy, and all matters of popular interest connected with medical science. We shall look to our ablest physicians and surgeons for contributions to this department.

3. Under the head of Social Economy, we shall consider Pauperism, *actual* rather than legal, and the relation and the responsibilities of the gifted and educated classes toward the weak, the witless and the ignorant. We shall endeavor to make useful inquiries into the causes of Human Failure, and the Duties devolving upon Human Success. We shall consider the hours of Labor, the relation of Employers and Employed; the Employment of Women by itself considered; the relation of Idleness to Female Crime, Prostitution and Intemperance; Work-houses; Public Libraries and Museums; Savings Banks and Dispensaries. Here,

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16.

too, will be discussed National Debt; the subjects of Tariff and Taxation; the Habits of Trade; the Quality of our Manufactures; the Control of Markets; the Monopolies in the Sale of Food, or the Production of articles of common use; the Value of gold; and all questions connected with the Currency.

4. In the Department of Jurisprudence we aim to consider, first, the absolute science of Right; and, second, the Amendment of laws. This department should be the final resort of the other three; for when the laws of Education, of Public Health, and Social Economy, are fully ascertained, the law of the land should recognize and define them all. Under this head will be considered all questions of the justice, the expediency, and the results of existing statutes, including their administration and interpretation, and especially their bearing on Suffrage, Property, Privilege, Debt, Crime, and Pauperism. Here, then, will come up the vexed questions of Prison Discipline and Capital Punishment.

Applying Natural Law to Social Control. It is interesting to note that once the "natural" laws of education, public health, and social economy were known they were to be formulated by the jurisprudence department in such a manner as to become the actual laws of the land. This concept of law as the incorporation of scientific truths has itself a most interesting history, but one into which we cannot go in detail at this point. In an earlier chapter we have spoken of the various forms of opposition that formerly existed to the concept and existence of a body of science which should serve as a human instrument for social control to replace the supposed immediate personal supervision exercised by Divinity over human affairs. This idea of the formulation of specific laws under the guidance of science for social control was an inevitable next step in the development of a secular theory of social control.

But the idea that scientific law—whether "natural" or human—could be translated or transformed into civil law and thus be made to control human action in social situations is as new as, or newer than, the concept of secular science itself. It is also a most valuable concept, and we venture to believe that upon its diffusion and universal acceptance among men depends the achievement of the future welfare of the human race. It is highly significant that the founders of the American Social Science Association had come to understand and to accept this idea of the nature and function of law or jurisprudence as a translation of scientific fact into law, even if they did not quite understand the secular nature of scientific law itself.

The Work of the Social Science Associations

Growth of Interest in Social Science. It was an enthusiastic group which answered the call to form the new association and the eagerness of their response illustrates how the intellectual wind of the times was blowing. Social Science was becoming fashionable.¹ Books on education, health, jurisprudence, and political and social economy were pouring from the presses of Europe and America. Indeed "literature of this sort is fast taking the place of those treatises on theology and those volumes of ecclesiastical polemics which are still numerous, but are giving way to systems, essays, manuals, and illustrations of Social Science, which have little to do with heaven or hell, but aim to make this pitiful little globe of ours a better place for us while we inhabit its crust."²

This statement merely corroborates what we have already had occasion to remark in earlier chapters, namely that Social Science was a substitute religion for those whom the ferocious and moss-grown old New England theology had alienated from more conservative churches. No longer was New England content with original sin as an explanation of social ills. Careful investigation of underlying social causes was coming to be recognized as of equal importance with the study of personal disorganization. Personal disorganization itself, although still recognized and indeed insisted upon, was not any longer to be traced back by intelligent people to a bit of indigestible fruit offered to a woman by a subtle serpentine flatterer in the Garden of Eden, and assumed to have transmitted its evil effects even to the present generation by a process of heredity for which no warrant could be found in the contemporary science of the day. These adherents of Social Science might still believe in instincts—and other reputed forms of

¹ Thus one of Louisa May Alcott's heroines, to prove that she is not merely a gilded butterfly, turns to Buckle, Mill, and Social Science Reports. See *Silver Pitchers* (1876), p. 71.

² F. B. Sanborn, "Aids in the Study of Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 29, 1892, p. 56.

heredity of cultural traits which have since been displaced by further scientific analysis—but they could not stomach the priestly dogma of the inheritance of magical sin, which was itself repugnant to modern intelligence as both a nonsensical and an immoral belief on the one hand and as a libel on the intelligence and goodness of God on the other hand.

The wide-spread interest in social matters was so great as to elicit the surprise of William Strong, who in 1870 said, "I have been surprised to learn how largely the educated mind of the world has recently turned its attention away from what we denominate the abstract, or the physical and natural sciences, and devoted it to the cultivation of those sciences that relate to the condition and development of social progress."³

Influence of the Civil War. It was, of course, the problems left by the Civil War that had most to do with the rapidly growing practical interest in Social Science in this country at this time. As Sanborn pointed out,⁴

The year 1865 was a marked era in the revival and prosecution of those studies and the promotion of those practical interests which constitute the theory and the practice or application of what it has been agreed to style Social Science. . . . The problems presented in 1865, following the close of the Civil War . . . were more numerous, novel, and difficult than any existing here since the first great reorganization of order and liberty . . . from 1776 to 1789. . . . All minor questions of suffrage, finance, jurisprudence, social economy, and social order came then before the people and before our Association, to be debated and, if possible, settled peaceably, under new institutions.

The tasks *were* great, but the enthusiasm of the early members of the association was equal to them.

Mill's Advice. John Stuart Mill had anticipated the moral eagerness that would result after the Civil War and had advised the association to make full use of it while it lasted, for it would inevitably disappear sooner or later—unfortunately a prophetic statement. In a letter dated 1870, he said,⁵

What you say about the new start which the mind of America has been led to make by her long and arduous struggle, is exactly what I foresaw from almost the very beginning. I wrote in January, 1862, and often said in the years following, that, if the war lasted long enough, it would very likely regenerate the American people, and I have been seeing more and more clearly since it closed, that to a considerable extent it has really done so, and in particular, that reason and right feeling on any public subject has a better chance of being favor-

³ "The Study of Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 4, 1871, p. 6.

⁴ "History of the American Social Science Association," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 46, 1909, pp. 2-3.

⁵ Reprinted in the *Journal of Social Science*, No. 5, 1874, p. 138.

ably listened to, and of finding the national mind open to comprehend it, than at any previous time in American history. This great benefit will probably last out the generation which fought in the war; and all depends on making the utmost use of it, for good purposes, before the national mind has time to get crusted over with any fresh set of prejudices as nations so quickly do.

Success and Failure. In view of what was actually accomplished, or was possible of accomplishment, there is something almost pathetic in the enthusiasm and faith of the early members. Such high-hearted zeal was bound to be disappointed, or at least dampened, in the arduous grind of application to actual tasks. The reaction which Mill had foreseen did actually come with the passing of some of the original members. For example, in 1880, Sanborn comments, "I cannot deny that the gradual removal by death of those with whom we have been accustomed to meet on these occasions, has very sensibly affected my own heart. Without being less interested, as I trust, in what we have to do, are we not conscious of weakened courage and diminished enthusiasm for these labors, as those to whom we have looked for encouragement and fraternity are, one by one, stricken down at our side. Within the month of December two of our companions in former years,—Mrs. Parkman and Dr. Wines,—have died. . . ." ⁶ Even earlier, in 1872–1873, "the practical discontinuance of the Association was favored by many members, by reason of the difficulties attending its work," ⁷ but it rallied and was continued, although the original warmth and eagerness were gone. Sanborn again comments, ⁸

When our original members . . . revert in mind to the enthusiastic meeting in October, 1865, at which our Association was formed, they will perhaps remember with a certain regret, as I do, the warmth and eagerness with which we then launched for the voyage, and anticipated noble results from our venture. . . . We felt ourselves in 1865 to be literally "Heirs of all the ages, in the foremost file of Time;" and there was little that we did not fancy ourselves capable of achieving. I fear we must confess now that we rather overestimated our powers; perhaps even it must be said, as Washington said in the . . . gloomy period which followed the successes of the first American Revolution, "We have thought too well of human nature." . . .

But if our opportunity as disciples and missionaries of social science appeared (as it certainly did) more attractive years ago, than it now appears, the need of our labors was never greater than in this very era of stagnation and corruption.

⁶ F. B. Sanborn, "The General Secretary's Report," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. xii.

⁷ F. B. Sanborn in an Obituary notice in the *Journal of Social Science*, No. 12, 1880, p. x.

⁸ F. B. Sanborn, "The Work of Social Science, Past and Present," *ibid.*, No. 8, 1876, pp. 23–24.

The Differentiation Process. If crusading zeal and fervor declined with the passing of the first generation and the accession of new members to the Association, however, specialized interest among its members in the various social science disciplines did not lessen. A great centrifugal movement was inaugurated in 1874 when the department of Social Economy gave rise to the National Conference of Charities and Correction.

The contents of the Social Economy department, as outlined by Mrs. Dall,⁹ proved a bit too comprehensive in actual practice. As a result, in 1874, this department was split into two independent divisions, namely, Trade and Finance, and Social Economy in a somewhat narrower sense. In this latter department some of the materials originally assigned to Education, Health, and Jurisprudence were taken over for discussion. It was this newly organized department which, in the same year, 1874, proceeded to organize the National Conference of Charities and Correction.¹⁰

It will readily be seen that the newly organized American Social Science Association was really a comprehensive group containing all the social sciences. Social Science, that is, was now conceived by this Association as a synthetic discipline, embracing all the special social sciences such as economics, political science, law and jurisprudence, social problems and social reform, education, public health in its social aspects, etc. And it is easy to understand why each of these departments came later to integrate itself independently into a specialized organization of its own.

In 1884, the American Historical Association was formed in connection with the American Social Science Association,¹¹ and a year later, in 1885, the American Economic Association first saw the light under the same auspices. The National Prison Association had been organized in the matrix of the mother organization by Dr. Wines in 1870.¹² Thus the energy and enthusiasm of new members were gradually drained from the parent organization and turned into more specialized channels. In this sense the decline of the American Social Science Association in interest and power does not represent failure, but a successful issue of its undertakings. It merely turned over to daughter associations those tasks that had become too difficult for it to handle unaided. The growing complexity of its prob-

⁹ F. B. Sanborn, "Report of the Department of Social Economy," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. 86.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹¹ *Journal of Social Science*, No. 19, 1885, pp. v, vi.

¹² F. B. Sanborn, "Report of the Department of Social Economy," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. 89.

lems had called for specialization of treatment and this call had resulted in the organization of subsidiary study and reform bodies which soon became independent. The parent organization, however, remained as a coordinating and synthesizing body, but the real interest of later members was in their own specialized professional bodies, which had been developed out of the parent organization.

Distribution of Membership and Officers. It was not only specializations within the parent body but also the development of subsidiary and even rival Social Science organizations in other parts of the country that detracted from concerted enthusiasm within it and weakened its unity. It is perhaps inevitable in a country as large as ours that national organizations should tend to break up into local or sectional bodies. The American Social Science Association never became a truly national organization, in spite of its intention to do so. We have already seen that in its origin it was distinctly a New England, or at least, an eastern organization. The circular calling the first meeting was issued by Bostonians. The first meeting was held in Boston. The constitution provided that all future meetings should be held in Boston. The people who answered the call were largely from New England.¹³ The membership remained overwhelmingly eastern in character. Thus, in 1878, approximately 36.5 percent of the members were from Massachusetts and about 31 percent from New York. Out of 441 members, 40 were from Connecticut, 13 from Ohio, 12 from Michigan, 11 from Rhode Island, 9 each from Pennsylvania and Illinois, 8 each from Missouri and the District of Columbia, 5 each from Vermont and California, 4 each from Wisconsin and Maryland, 3 each from New Jersey, Iowa, and Nebraska, 2 each from Canada and Indiana, and one each from Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Utah. In 1880 about 32 percent were from Massachusetts and about 27 percent from New York. Out of 423 members at this time, 39 were from Ohio, 38 from Connecticut, 11 each from Michigan and the District of Columbia, 10 from Missouri, 9 each from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, 5 from Vermont, 4 each from New Jersey and Illinois, 3 each from Wisconsin, Nebraska, and Maryland, 2 from Texas, and one each from Alabama, California, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, South Carolina, and Honolulu.

In the assignment of officers, some effort was undoubtedly made to dis-

¹³ F. B. Sanborn, "The Work of Social Science, Past and Present," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 8, 1876, p. 25.

tribute them geographically as much as possible. Of the 11 vice presidents, for example, in 1876, only one was from Massachusetts. Two were from New York, and one each from Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Maryland, Missouri, and Virginia. In 1880-1881, 4 vice presidents were from New York, 3 from Massachusetts, and one each from Ohio, South Carolina, the District of Columbia, Michigan, Missouri, and Wyoming. In 1882-1883, New York and Massachusetts furnished 3, each, the District of Columbia and Missouri each 2, Ohio, Connecticut, Michigan, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, each provided one vice president. From 1881 to 1893 of the 200 vice presidents (not all different men) who held office, 44 were from New York, 31 from Massachusetts, 34 from the District of Columbia, 19 from Ohio, 18 from Missouri, 16 from Connecticut, 12 from Michigan, 10 from Maryland, 5 from South Carolina, 4 each from Rhode Island and Mississippi, 2 from Louisiana, and one from Virginia. It was during the late eighteen-eighties and early eighteen-nineties that Massachusetts began to drop behind other localities in the number of vice presidents furnished. New York, however, retained its lead in this respect. The distribution of Directors during the same period was: out of 116, 38 came from New York, 33 from Massachusetts, 19 from Pennsylvania, 13 from Connecticut, 4 from Ohio, 2 each from Virginia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Indiana, and one from the District of Columbia.

Fluctuating Fortunes. The size of the American Social Science Association fluctuated from year to year. It began with a membership of about 150. By 1869 the number of members had increased to nearly 600. In 1872 it had fallen to fewer than 200. By 1880 it was back to between three and four hundred.¹⁴ Some of the local associations now had more members than the national organization.¹⁵ The causes of this marked fluctuation in membership is difficult at this distance in time to ascertain. Perhaps zeal in seeking new members was not constant. Doubtless also there were jealousies and rivalries in the organization and the programs and issues were not always equally interesting. The establishment of competing associations was also apparently one of the important factors in this connection.

It had, in fact, been part of the original plan, incorporated in the constitution, to encourage local Social Science organizations throughout North America. Thus, article XIII read: "Whenever other associations shall be formed in other parts of North America, it shall be the policy of this Asso-

¹⁴ F. B. Sanborn, Report of the General Secretary, *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. vi.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

ciation to cooperate with them so far as practicable. For this purpose, the Executive Committee is empowered to call a convention of these associations, or to send delegates to such a convention." Local associations did grow up gradually and some of these achieved considerable success and importance.

The Philadelphia Association. One of these local associations was the Philadelphia Social Science Association. In 1891 it came under the patronage of the University of Pennsylvania as the Philadelphia Academy of Political and Social Science and soon eclipsed the parent organization altogether, and it remains to this day a prosperous organization under the name of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. This association, organized November 17, 1869, was by all odds the most important of the local organizations, with the possible exception of the Boston group which had fostered the meeting that organized the American Social Science Association. The Philadelphia Social Science Association was originally instituted as a local branch of the American Association for the Advancement of Social Science and, in the words of a member, "the utmost harmony and the most generous cooperation have marked the relations of the two bodies."¹⁶ It was modelled after the parent body "with great fidelity," in the hope that their example would "be pursued with equal industry and success in other cities of the Union, where similar local branches have been or may be set on foot."¹⁷ The initial membership did not exceed 180, and the financial burden was felt to be rather heavy by the remaining members when 20 of the group were reported to have resigned, moved away, or died. But, with the frequently expressed approval of the national association, it carried on a vigorous program of meetings and publication. The earliest meetings were reported in the *Penn Monthly Magazine*, some in the *Journal of Social Science*, and others (1871-1889) in the *Philadelphia Social Science Association Papers*. In the first year of its existence, this local association had Professor McIlvaine of Princeton deliver a series of lectures on Social Science at the University of Pennsylvania. At the succeeding annual meetings from three to seven or eight papers of first rate quality were read. The practical influence of this association was, however, equivocal. Its *Annual Report* for the year 1873 tells us that¹⁸

¹⁶ J. G. Rosegarten, in note in *Journal of Social Science*, No. 5, p. 204 (1874).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Reprinted in pamphlet by John Stockton-Hough, "On the Relative Influence of City and Country Life, on Mortality, Health, Fecundity, Longevity and Mortality," from the *Penn Monthly* for Jan., 1874, p. 35.

the useful results of these meetings may be traced in the action of the Legislature on questions of taxation, of the Constitutional Convention in various matters introduced into the new constitution, and in the fact that at the last election in that body for a guardian of the poor, Dr. Ray, in spite of his distinguished reputation as a man of scientific attainments, and of his free devotion of time and labor to the cause of the poor, and especially of the lunatics in the Philadelphia almshouse, was not reelected. His paper before this association no doubt contributed largely to such a result.

What specifically was the offense given in Dr. Ray's paper, or whether he approved or disapproved of the paper, the writer does not say.

In 1873 a report was accepted by which this Philadelphia Social Science Association should have joint quarters with the *Penn Monthly*, at 506 Walnut Street. The purpose was to allow for the collection of documents and papers, which previously had not been feasible. It was also stated that this change would make possible a permanent secretary and that the various departments could do their work much better with such headquarters. Mr. Henry Galbraith Ward was suggested as a good person for the secretaryship.¹⁹

Promotional Work. Encouraged, perhaps, by the success of the Philadelphia branch association, the Executive Committee of the national association, in the meeting of April 1st, 1874, undertook to formulate a plan for the uniform establishment and operation of local associations. In May it laid before the general meeting the following plan: ". . . that it does not seem practicable to bring all organizations for the promotion of Social Science, existing or to be established, to the same precise form and model; but that such as are willing to become auxiliary to the Association shall be designated as of three main classes, namely: (1) Branch Associations, similar to that at Philadelphia, (2) Local Departments, like the Boston Department of Health, and (3) Corresponding Committees. . . ." ²⁰ The central idea of this statement was that henceforth an important part of the parent organization's function was to consist in the formation of these local organizations "in different parts of the country, through which the parent association can reach more readily the sources of information and of influence in each locality," ²¹ while at the same time the local associations were to be allowed a great deal of autonomy with regard to their forms of organiza-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²⁰ Unsigned, "The American Social Science Association," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 6, 1874, p. 2.

²¹ *Ibid.*

tion and programs, in conformity with the demands of their local problems and the limitations of their respective resources.

Already at that time local associations existed, had existed, or were in process of organization in Boston, Quincy, New York, New Haven, Detroit, St. Louis, Chicago, San Francisco, and Galveston.²² Besides these urban branches, state organizations were being established in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Iowa, and Wisconsin, and some years later (1878) in Illinois and Indiana. The two last mentioned, together with the New York State Charities Aid Association, which Sanborn considered "practically a social science body, limited in its work to the questions treated by our two Departments of Health and Social Economy,"²³ were managed by women and were more constantly active than the national association itself.²⁴

The Indiana Association. Unfortunately documentary information on most of these local organizations is lacking. If they published transactions or proceedings they are unknown or lost. We do, however, have data on the Social Science Association of Indiana. Its fourth annual meeting was held at Indianapolis, June, 1882. The motto on the back of its *Proceedings* states: "In Social Science we deal with an object whose beginning is here, but whose end is in eternity."²⁵ A notice, in the form of a letter "To Our Friends in the State" tells us something of the history and background of this group. It is as follows:²⁶

It is important that you should be informed of the change made, at the last annual meeting, in the constitution of the Association and the character of its work.

Hitherto it has undertaken to hold monthly meetings and to engage in practical work of charity and reform, chiefly at the capital. It has been found that this plan gave the Association the appearance of a local society, and the frequent meetings practically prevented the members in distant parts of the State from taking an active part in the affairs of the Association.

In order to make it truly a State organization, and extend its membership and influence as widely as possible, the constitution now provides for but one meeting a year, which may be held at different points in the State. It is hoped that this arrangement will secure the co-operation of many individuals who could not afford the time and expense to attend more frequent meetings.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ G. B. Sanborn, Report of the General Secretary, *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. vi.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Loc. cit.*

²⁶ *Proceedings and Papers of the Social Science Association of Indiana*, Fourth Annual Meeting, 1882, p. 3.

The other change adopted commits all *local work* to the auxiliaries and makes it the special object of the State body to secure, at the annual meetings, carefully prepared papers and able discussions on the important questions of the day in the different departments of social science. And as the best means of influencing public opinion, the Association will hereafter publish and circulate, as far as its treasury will allow, the papers which are considered to be of permanent value.

The Association is very desirous that auxiliaries should be formed in all the leading towns of the State. An efficient one now exists in Indianapolis. . . . We hope the reports of auxiliaries will, in the future, become a feature of the publications of the State organization.

The local or auxiliary body in Indianapolis, referred to in the last paragraph above, had been organized in October, 1881, for practical work in the city. The members finally decided to devote their efforts "to assist the children of the poor to rise above the evil influences of poverty,"²⁷ and therefore they took the name of Children's Aid Society. The members of this organization describe their work as follows:²⁸

From the officers of the Charity Organization Society were received from week to week the names of families asking relief. These families were assigned to different members of the Society for friendly visiting, with the especial purpose of learning the condition of their little children. In this way more than two hundred visits were made during the winter. In many instances children who were staying at home were returned to school, by furnishing shoes or other articles of clothing, which it was not possible for the parent to supply. Employment was sought and obtained for the older boys and girls. At the Christmas season the children were remembered with timely gifts. Many a hard-working, discouraged mother took encouragement, from the knowledge that some one took an interest in her children.

During the month of June, 1882, the Children's Aid Society, in cooperation with the Kindergarten Association, agreed upon a basis of union in the specific work of establishing free kindergartens for the children of the poor.

The first kindergarten was opened on the 10th of July. . . .

The teachers have made themselves the friends not only of the children, but of the families from which they come. . . .

On the 30th day of October a second free kindergarten was opened in another part of the city. . . . The present membership of the Children's Aid Society is about 30.

Its Aims and Interests. The Social Science Association of Indiana consisted of four departments: Philanthropy, Domestic Science, Education, Art and Literature. Its object was "to receive and present, practical methods

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

for improving the mental, moral and physical condition of Society, and to secure, as far as possible, united effort toward the highest civilization of humanity." ²⁹ It wished very much to be state-wide in scope, and at the fourth annual meeting the president attempted to correct the misapprehension of some that the Association was local. He said, "The object is rather to bring together from all parts of the State those who are interested in the great topics of the day, moral, social and educational, for free interchange of thought. In order to influence public opinion as widely as possible, it is proposed to publish, for general circulation, the proceedings of the Association, and the more valuable papers read before it." ³⁰

Apparently, then, this was originally a philanthropic organization, with monthly meetings. It was probably largely charity-conscious in outlook, and the local Indianapolis auxiliary certainly was. The papers read at the fourth annual meeting were largely on education, but the subject was treated in a concrete and practical rather than in a large or theoretical way. There was no attempt to define Social Science, as there was at most of the meetings of the national organization. The only mention of Social Science occurs in a paper by Mrs. A. H. Carrier on Co-Education, in which she says that "every interest of social science demands as thorough a culture for women as for men." ³¹ There is no mention of other Social Science organizations nor of the national movement, although the local association was undoubtedly stimulated by them. The Indiana Association thus appears to have been thoroughly practical in its aims and methods and to have given very little attention to the general or theoretical aspects of Social Science.

Relation of Local to National Associations. Apparently there had been some fear in the national organization that these regional or local associations would weaken the parent body. But Sanborn reassured those who had this fear that "they will be found to strengthen it [the national association] by giving us more members, a firmer hold on the people of the whole country, and a larger audience for what we may have to say and publish." ³² He cites the case of the Philadelphia association, which had half as many members as the national organization, and which supplied the parent organization with its publications and circulated those of the national association. He urges, therefore, that the establishing of local

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

³² "The Work of Social Science, Past and Present," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 8, 1876, p. 36.

departments and associations be encouraged wherever they could be formed.

Theoretically, Sanborn was undoubtedly correct in his contention that local associations should prove to be a support and give encouragement to the national association, by offering a community of thought and a larger body of readers for their publications. But it is by no means certain that such was the actual result. The aims and interests of the various local associations were frequently so diverse and so slightly related that in many cases they probably subtracted membership from the national organization rather than added to that body. Also, by encouraging specialization of interests more rapidly than membership increased, they may have withdrawn some members from the national organization who might otherwise have remained with it, had there been no local group available nor any other organization dealing with their own primary concerns. Also, we must recognize the fact that as yet the number of persons interested in the broader problems of Social Science was rather small and that absorption in local problems, since it was more marked than interest in national social problems, undoubtedly worked to the disadvantage of the national association. Consequently it is very probable that some persons, with mainly local interests, who had joined the national association, in the hope of securing local guidance, withdrew and aligned themselves with local bodies when these were founded. The fluctuations of membership in the national organization noted above might seem to support some of these hypotheses.

Varieties of Local Associations. Naturally enough the local organizations differed widely in scope and aim. In 1870, Florence Kelley helped to organize a Social Science Club at Cornell University³³ and we may be quite sure that this group was markedly different from, say, the Social Science Association of Indiana. And both were undoubtedly very different from the political and Social Science Department of the Albany Institute, formed in 1872, "in the hope of securing some prominence for the objects of the American Social Science Association."³⁴ This last named group was far more theoretical than most of the other local bodies. For example, a paper on the history of Social Science was read by a Mr. H. A. Homes and there was another on Spencer's twelve articles on the difficulties of the study of Sociology. The Wisconsin Academy of Sciences,

³³ *The Nation*, CXXXIV: 243 (Mar. 2, 1932).

³⁴ H. A. H., notice in *Journal of Social Science*, No. 5, 1874, p. 205.

Arts, and Letters, about the same time (1872), created a Department of Social Science, at the instigation of J. W. Hoyt. Its members were instrumental in the founding of the State Board of Charities and, as a department, it "produced a considerable number of original papers of much scientific and practical value."³⁵

The Western Social Science Association. Most interesting of all the local organizations, however, was that formed at Chicago, because it illustrates so vividly the sectionalism inherent in almost any sort of national organization in this country. J. W. Hoyt describes the situation that produced the Chicago organization as follows:³⁶

Next comes the question whether it would not be well, once in a while, to hold a general meeting at some point *nearer the geographical centre of population*, than Boston, or even Philadelphia. As yet, we have but few members located west of the Atlantic States; whereas, the Association is designed to be *American*, and should therefore have many members in all parts of the country. . . .

With all due respect to the able, self-sacrificing, and truly noble men who organized and have since directed the affairs of the Association, I feel bound to say that there is less than a just appreciation of what the West and South could do for it, if once really enlisted, and of the means requisite to their hearty co-operation. The distribution of officers is a step in the right direction, but it needs to be followed by others, if we would *nationalize* the organization, and make it a great moral power. For myself, I can truly say that I know neither East nor West, North nor South,—that the ends we seek to accomplish, in themselves purely and solely considered, hold the supreme place in my thoughts and desires. But I am not on this account blind to the fact that both sectional pride and party prejudice are positive forces, which it is often much easier to conquer by a skillful flank movement than by either a siege or a direct charge with the bayonet. "The Western Social Science Association," organized at Chicago some five years ago, originated in the desire of a number of good men to promote the advancement of Social Science, coupled with some dissatisfaction with what they considered the too narrow or sectional policy of the American Association. They said, in substance, "The so-called *American* Association is in fact a New England, or at least an Eastern, Society, and so let us form a Western Association."

Such an organization was formed, and, for a little time, promised to accomplish much good. My desire was that it should be placed in intimate relations with the American Association, and I labored to that end, as Mr. Villard will recollect. At present, the work of the Western Social Science Association is in

³⁵ J. W. Hoyt, Letter to the American Social Science Association, in *Journal of Social Science*, No. 7, 1874, p. 378.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

abeyance; but its members, with very few exceptions, if any, have not been drawn into the fold of the parent society.

This Western Social Science Association had five departments: Finance, Law, Health, Education, and Fine Arts.³⁷ Unfortunately neither the John Crerar nor the Chicago Public Library has any record of the transactions of this organization.³⁸ The leaders of this group, while it lasted, were Sidney Myers, cashier of the Merchants', Farmers' and Mechanics' Saving Bank (1866-70), Reverend Henry C. Kinney, Pastor of the Church of the Atonement (1870-73), and Edward F. Adams, of the firm of A. E. Andrews and Company.³⁹ Hoyt himself was assistant librarian of the Chicago Historical Society in 1866.⁴⁰

Conclusion. So much, then, for the skeletal or organizational history of the American Social Science Association and its associate and subsidiary organizations. There were other Social Science groups, as we have had occasion to point out in earlier chapters, and a Social Science Congress, was held in Cincinnati in 1878.⁴¹ A Social Science Association was in existence in Toledo in 1903.⁴² The American Social Science Association, however, was the best organized and had the most distinguished personnel of all of these groups. For our purposes it is significant to point out that such groups, largely of a philanthropic and charitable nature, but partly also of a theoretical character, were springing up in all parts of the country to consider questions of Social Science import. Social Science was becoming popular even with the man on the street.

³⁷ R. J. Wright, *Principia, or Basis of Social Science* (1875), p. 53.

³⁸ Personal letters from the librarians.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ A paper on "American Coinage and Currency," by Durbin Ward was read at this Congress. It is the only record available of such a congress.

⁴² A paper on "The Evolution of Suffrage: the Remedy for the Evils of the Present Rudimentary Suffrage," by F. J. Scott, was read at this club. It is the only record available of such a club.

The Struggle of the Association for a Clarification of Its Objectives

Conflict of Motives in Social Science. We have already indicated the fact that the two Social Science ideals—those aiming at reform and those emphasizing pure science—did not dwell in peace with one another in the American Social Science Association. Some of the Social Scientists wished to stress the reform ideal, whereas others were more interested in the scientific ideal.

It was, no doubt, in part this inability to satisfy all factions that led to the splitting off of the more specialized groups. The National Conference of Charities and Correction, for example, was primarily interested in concrete reforms and charity measures. Those who were most absorbed in this phase of reform did not care particularly to hear papers on the more abstract phases of Social Science largely to the exclusion of the discussion of concrete problems and applications, and therefore they organized an association of their own. The economists, on the other hand, assuming separate existence as the American Economic Association in 1885, while still interested in social welfare were more concerned with theoretical considerations.¹ And the sociologists, who split off as the American Sociological Society from the economists' group a generation later (in 1905), were also more theoretically inclined than the National Conference of Charities and Correction, which in turn became more practical still as the National Conference of Social Work.

¹ E. W. Bemis, in discussing the formation of the American Economic Association, pointed out that "a growing number of the most scholarly investigators" refused "to recognize as all-embracing those old theories of the English economists which exalt selfishness, and insist that the greatest progress is secured only when the freest competition prevails," and they were now seeking "to study what *is* and also what changes are practicable to bring about what ought to be" (quoted by F. B. Sanborn, "The Social Sciences, Their Growth and Future," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, p. 6.) Sanborn comments on this as follows: "Methinks this expresses very well what our association has been doing in its broader field and with more miscellaneous activity, for the last twenty years. To learn patiently what *is*—to promote diligently what *should be*,—this is the double duty of all the social sciences. . . ." (*ibid.*)

Synthesis and Differentiation. Another reason for the inability of the American Social Science Association to formulate its objectives in a manner to satisfy all its members lay in the fact that even among those who wished to emphasize the scientific ideal, differentiation into the several social disciplines was already marked. This specialization of the social sciences had been well under way, in fact, when the general discipline Social Science made its appearance in the first half of the nineteenth century. The fact is that there was need of a double process of integration of social knowledge on the one hand, as a basis for a general and organic viewpoint in the treatment of problems of maladjustment, such as was referred to above, and also need for differentiation and specialization of knowledge, on the other hand, as a basis for a more exact and efficient handling of these individual and related types of cases that called for social readjustment. It is perhaps possible to maintain that the unified or organic viewpoint appeared before differentiation, but it would be difficult to demonstrate that this early organic integration of viewpoint was the result of synthesis. Long before there was any science of human affairs there was a body of tradition for dealing with human relationships. This tradition was at first known as revealed knowledge or precept, or, later, simply as revelation, because it was supposed to have emanated from supernatural sources.

But as this knowledge became secularized, and as philosophers rather than priests became its guardians and revisers and added to its store, it passed out of the category of revelation into that of Natural Law without losing its dominant character as a body of tradition. But in time this Natural Law grew in volume so largely and changed its content so rapidly that it could no longer be regarded merely as tradition. Somewhere along this process of secularization and of de-traditionalization the content of the lore bearing upon human affairs began to take over the characterization of science, in common with other bodies of knowledge which were being cultivated and extended for the sake of their usefulness to man.

The Urge Toward Unity of Conception. For a long time, during the period beginning with the Greek philosophers and extending to the Renaissance, law was practically the only human science. Theology was still a body of revelation or congealed tradition and had not yet come to be classified under Natural Law. History was a literary discipline rather than a science. Even rhetoric, of which the ancients made so much, was

perhaps more to be classified as a literary than as a scientific discipline, although it was undoubtedly approaching the latter status. Logic was definitely a science within the acceptance of the term then in use, but, like mathematics, it could scarcely yet be regarded as predominantly a human science. Civil law was undoubtedly a human science and was relatively well developed. International law also began to enter the category of science after the time of Grotius. Natural Law was inclusive of both natural and human science. That part of Natural Law which applied to human relations began in the period of the Renaissance, and in some cases earlier, to break up into politics (after the model of Aristotle), political economy (the Mercantilist and the Physiocratic doctrines), moral philosophy (at first an analysis of the decalog and later a speculative ethical and social subject). These disciplines, and especially politics, political economy (originally a subdivision of politics), and moral philosophy, had begun to be differentiated into a number of subsidiary disciplines and near-disciplines, such as public and constitutional law, political ethics, money and credit, tariffs and taxation, administration, family relations, dependency and delinquency, immigration, education, statistics, when the general Social Science movement began to be organized. It was the confusing complexity of these more or less systematic approaches to social problems and the variety of viewpoints that led the sponsors of the Social Science Association to seek some integrated unitary body of knowledge to guide them in solving human problems.

This urge towards unity of conception and of viewpoint was undoubtedly a legitimate trend, but knowledge grew more rapidly than its assimilation and integration could take place and the many diverse interests within the movement could not be harmonized adequately and rapidly. As a consequence, the attempt of the Association to establish a unified Social Science failed as such, but its endeavors at an organic conception of the social adjustment process undoubtedly stimulated the rapid differentiation and development of the specialized social sciences after 1875, a movement which is still going on with undiminished vigor. The synthetic trend of the general Social Science movement was lost temporarily, but it reincarnated itself in what came to be known increasingly as sociology after 1890. The demand for unity of viewpoint grew parallel with the need for specialization of analysis and treatment. The fact that Comte's rather than Fourier's term finally won title to this synthetic and orienting movement was perhaps due as much to the unambiguity of the former—Social

Science as a specific discipline being so easily confused with the social sciences considered collectively—as much as to the greater soundness and profundity of Comte's point of view. In the earlier chapters of this book it was our task to trace in considerable detail this transitional process, both as to the name and as to the content of the discipline we are here studying. But it is proper now to remark that whatever the origins of the discipline, both Social Science and sociology long ago ceased to be dominated by the two unique personalities who gave these subjects their names.

In the present chapter we shall trace the conflict of the two Social Science ideals as revealed in the various formulations of the purpose, aim, and objectives of the American Social Science Association, and in the following chapter, as shown in the various definitions of Social Science itself. It will be noted that whether the reform or the scientific ideal was emphasized in the aims of the Association, there was almost universal agreement as to the necessity for an integrated attack on the problems of living in an industrialized society.

Professed Objectives of the Association. The original constitution, as finally adopted, pronounced the objects of the American Social Science Association to be ²

to aid the development of Social Science, and to guide the public mind to the best practical means of promoting the Amendment of Laws, the Advancement of Education, the Prevention and Repression of Crime, the Reformation of Criminals, and the progress of Public Morality, the adoption of Sanitary Regulations, and the diffusion of sound principles on the Questions of Economy, Trade, and Finance. It will give attention to Pauperism and the topics related thereto; including the responsibility of the well-endowed and successful, and the wise and educated, the honest and respectable, for the failures of others. It will aim to bring together the various societies and individuals now interested in these objects, for the purpose of obtaining by discussion the real elements of Truth; by which doubts are removed, conflicting opinions harmonized, and a common ground afforded for treating wisely the great social problems of the day.

Further, with regard to cooperative effort and service on the part of those interested in social reform and betterment, this statement declares: ³

The persons composing it [the American Social Science Association] are expected to meet together, to read papers and pursue discussions, and to seek the assistance of those who have a practical acquaintance with reform, as well as that of purely abstract reasoners.

² American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address, and List of Members*, etc. (1866), p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

They are to collect all facts, diffuse all knowledge, and stimulate all inquiry, which have a bearing on social welfare. It has long since been shown, that the man of science who confines himself to a specialty, who does not, at the very least, conquer the underlying principles of other branches of scientific inquiry, is necessarily misled, and cannot avoid frequent mistakes. To have any perception of the perspective of his subject, he must see it in its relation to other subjects. Something like this is true of those who investigate the necessities of society. If they associate themselves together, they have the advantage of each other's knowledge; they do not misunderstand their own relative positions; and they insure an economy of time, labor, and money.

It was recognized by those who formed the Association that so many persons necessarily representing so many different points of view must needs exercise forbearance with respect to each other. Consequently, with regard to the matter of tolerance, we find the following statement: "We would offer the widest hospitality to individual convictions, and to untried theories, provided only that such convictions and theories are the fruit of a serious purpose and an industrious life. To entertain the vagaries of the indolent would be at once undignified and unprofitable."⁴

Education, Promotion, Coordination. These statements would appear to indicate that the function of the organization was to be largely educative, as well as promotive, in the field of Social Science. It wished, furthermore, to obviate the difficulties of over-specialization and to keep Social Science a synthetic discipline. Apparently the above statements were not unequivocal. Thus the Executive Committee, in its report of November, 1865, in order to clear up the uncertainty as to the precise nature of the aims and functions of the Association, stated that "This Association proposes to afford, to all persons interested in human improvement, an opportunity to consider social economics as a whole."⁵

In addition, in its earliest years, it seems, the American Social Science Association was expected to furnish legislatures with data basic to social reform. Thus, with respect to poverty, Sanborn says in 1865:⁶

Although *Poverty* must always exist, yet *Pauperism* need not; and I look with great expectation to the investigations of the newly formed Social Science Association for light to guide our legislators in their efforts to reduce the burdens and alleviate the miseries of Pauperism. Such Associations in European countries have done and are doing signal service, and the opportunities in America are far greater. Viewing the matter thus, I have given the little aid which I

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ *Second Annual Report*, Massachusetts Board State Charities, p. 213.

could to such associations, and would recommend the subject to you, Gentlemen, and to the Legislature. Hereafter may our lawgivers have the opportunity, as in Europe, of calling upon the wisdom and the accumulated experience of persons who have made the welfare of their fellow men a special and long pursued study.

Research and Coordination. In contrast to this practical ideal, the abstract or scientific ideal, that is, research and generalization, is stressed by Samuel Eliot in his Second Annual Presidential Address in 1867.⁷ The Association, he tells us,⁸

was intended to collect the data of separate efforts, and so to group them, and the inferences to be drawn from them, that the general principles might be evolved, and the work of Social Science, wherever it was going on, might be directed and harmonized to the common welfare.

Of all sciences, Social Science may be pronounced the most in need of general organization. The Science of Society, or of the Social Relations, pleads by its very name for associated, rather than individual exertions in its behalf. All its departments, material or moral, Health, Trade, Economy, Education, Jurisprudence or Government, stand in need of combined action, and of action under the guidance of general laws. To further this action is the great object of our Association. It offers itself as a central agency, through which fresh information may be gained, fresh interest aroused, and fresh opportunities of concerted exertion provided. As it does all this, it will be working out social principles, and framing a social code, by means of which Social Science will make such advances as it has hitherto unavailingly contemplated.

Emphasis of this coordinating function reappears again and again in various statements, both official and private. It is not altogether unlikely that the future historian of the social sciences in this country, writing with a perspective of, say, another hundred years, will find that the contemporary Social Science Research Council is but the logical successor to this particular phase of the work of the American Social Science Association, performing in a manner consonant with the age a very similar function.

One item which might be assumed to give support to this interpretation is the fact that there was a strong movement in the Social Science Research Council, coming to a head in 1932, to bring the various independent social science associations of this country into closer coordination with one another and with the Council under the general overhead supervision of the Council administration. This movement failed very largely because

⁷ American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address, and List of Members* (1866), p. 67.

⁸ *Ibid.*

(1) some of the independent associations entertained doubts as to whether there would be a sufficient general comprehension on the part of the Council's administration of the fields, aims, needs and methods of all the separate social sciences to render such a movement harmoniously feasible, and (2) it was generally feared that such a movement was premature and that it might operate to check the normal tendency toward expansion in research within the respective fields of the several social sciences rather than encourage them in undertaking a growth marked especially by experimentation and reorientation. It was recognized, however, that there was a real need for coordination of results, for cooperative planning, and for mutual aid, at the same time that the greatest possible freedom was given to initiative in the respective social science disciplines.

The Reform Motive. But the reform function continued to be stressed. In a written circular dated November 30, 1869, at New York, and signed, among others, by C. L. Brace, I. T. Newberry, Theodore M. Dwight, Henry Holt, and O. B. Frothingham, members of the local committee of the American Social Science Association, we read that "The association aims to ensure the healthy progress of society and the state by promoting the careful study and judicious practical treatment of all questions relating to social economy. Its more specific objects include reforms in the Civil and Diplomatic Service, in the management of public and private charities, and of penal and reformatory institutions, and improvements in public education and in sanitary regulations. The Association endeavors to enlist in its ranks thoughtful and public spirited men of every calling."⁹

Mill, in a letter dated January 26, 1870, wrote to the association that it would "do immense service if it makes itself an organ for stimulating the desire and obtaining the means of the highest possible education."¹⁰ But, says George William Curtis, four years later, the aims of the Association¹¹

are very practical. It seeks to build a platform upon which an honest and able inquiry can be conducted as to the best methods of advancing in every way the great interests of society. While solitary thinkers everywhere are studying and meditating the great problems of economy and trade and finance, sanitary questions, pauperism and crime, the progress of education, the amendment of laws, the extension of a loftier international comity, the improvement of political methods, and all similar themes, each student's research being a single ray of light, this Society would bring all those scattered rays to a focus, and so illu-

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Published in *Journal of Social Science*, No. 5, 1874, p. 138.

¹¹ Opening Address, *ibid.*, No. 6, 1874, p. 33.

minate the path of national progress and true glory while in its degree it cheers mankind.

Variant Viewpoints. F. B. Sanborn believed that the diffusion of knowledge was one of the most important functions of Social Science, and that coordination of those interested in research and practical work was one of the most significant services to be rendered by the American Social Science Association. He declared: "In this infinite variety of need and opportunity for research and for practical work, the special place of the American Social Science Association is that of uniting all and communicating with all who may be willing to do so. It does not assume to direct, scarcely to advise or recommend, but to bring those who are striving for the same end into friendly relations with each other, and to furnish a common centre from which influence may radiate, and in which union may be found."¹²

However, an unsigned article in the same year, 1874, stated that the function of the Association was that of research and education, not direct reform.¹³

It is not chiefly as the advocate of measures to be carried, that the American Social Science Association appears before the public. Its duty is rather to furnish a laboratory for investigations, an arena for discussions, a registry for facts and experiments, a bureau for questions and answers, in regard to the multiform matters coming under observation in our five present departments or sections. . . . It has therefore been one of the main objects of the Executive Committee, carrying forward the work already begun, to put themselves in communication during the current year with as many organized bodies and individual inquirers as possible, and to obtain from them existing facts concerning the application of Social Science in any of these departments.

Again, an anonymous statement in 1880 declares the object of the Association to be "to encourage the study of the various relations, social and political, of man in modern life; to facilitate personal intercourse and interchange of ideas between individuals interested in promoting educational, financial, sanitary, charitable, and other social reforms and progress; and promptly to make known to the public all theoretical or practical results which may flow from such studies or investigations."¹⁴

This proposed theoretical and informational objective did not, however, satisfy everyone. Elizabeth Boynton Harbert, president of the Illinois So-

¹² F. B. Sanborn, "The Work of Social Science in the United States," *ibid.*, No. 6, 1874, p. 44.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁴ Unsigned, "The American Social Science Association," *ibid.*, No. 12, Part I, 1880, p. 166.

cial Science Association (probably a State Conference of Charities and Correction, in fact) held its proper function to be propaganda and motivation toward reform. In a letter to F. B. Sanborn she said: "Experience demonstrates to me that the pioneer work of the Social Scientist is to arouse the people to the suffering and oppression, the starvation and crime which are the direct results of the *bad methods* now universally employed. . . ." ¹⁵ This quite practical opinion as to the function of the Social Scientist did not, in her opinion, preclude an educational objective as well. She continues: "Can we work in any more effective way, at present, than by educating the children in regard to their duties as citizens, and the questions they will be called upon to decide? Cannot the American Social Science Association set in motion influences that will secure the preparation of some manuals of instruction, which can be introduced as text-books in our public schools? And is it not possible to organize a bureau of facts and statistics, which, by some systematized method, can be set afloat in our popular and influential journals?" ¹⁶

President Gilman's Statement of Objectives. Almost diametrically opposed to this practical, reformistic function was that advocated by President Daniel C. Gilman of Johns Hopkins University, in his opening address at the September, 1880, meetings. He presented the theoretical emphasis from an angle more in keeping with the natural science point of view. To him the scientific or research ideal was more important than the reformistic aim. He pointed out that the purpose of the Association was not the promotion of reform, nor was its object charity. Its proper function was rather the promotion of science, the determination of principles and laws. He says: "To those who say there is no social science, the answer is there soon will be, for some of the ablest intellects in the world are now applying to the study of social phenomena, the same industry in collecting facts, the same patience in weighing them, the same methods of analysis and synthesis which have been employed with effect in geology, zoology, and biology, in anthropology, ethnology and psychology. To those who say that social science can never be complete, the answer is that no science is complete." ¹⁷ He goes on to say that Social Science must study the conditions which tended to make a perfect state of society where "each is for all and all is for each," and it must discover the laws of cooperation by means of

¹⁵ Published in the *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. 103.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 12, 1880, pp. xxii-xxiii.

which every individual may secure his highest development. It must organize plans of investigation and research. He recommended reports on the progress of the different departments, with reviews of the literature. He also felt the Association ought to initiate research projects, suggesting themes, appointing, inviting, and even financing persons to prosecute research projects.¹⁸ This again sounds very much like the expressed objectives of the Social Science Research Council fifty years later.

It is interesting also to note in this connection that when the Russell Sage Foundation was established in the first decade of the twentieth century its governing board asked leading social scientists throughout the country to indicate their conception as to the proper orientation and work of the new Foundation. Overwhelmingly these advisers indicated their conviction that the work of the Foundation should be primarily that of research and the diffusion of knowledge regarding human society and its adjustment problems. As everyone knows, the Russell Sage Foundation has adhered rather closely to this program as thus indicated. Possibly the life and services of the American Social Science Association might have been considerably prolonged if it had followed the advice of President Gilman. However, such a program could not have achieved its greatest efficiency without adequate funds and these might not have been as easily procurable then as now.

Even Gilman, however, made it clear that the more practical and reformistic viewpoints were not to be neglected. He continued:¹⁹

To begin with, all those subjects which pertain to the physical well-being of the community must be considered, and this includes not merely sanitary regulations . . . but freedom to exchange the products of one region for those of another. Next, morality or social order deserves consideration—the conditions of society which are favorable to temperance, chastity, honesty, frugality, industry, and quiet. Intellectual culture and the study of all the agencies which promote mental power next demand attention—our systems of education, direct and indirect, high and low. Finance comes next. Though the sanitary, the moral and the pedagogical laws are understood, if the finances of a community are crooked, nothing will go straight. . . . Sound legislation based upon wise jurisprudence must also be secured, and with good written laws must come good customs and usages.

It is a wide field, we must acknowledge, which the Association aims to cultivate, but if ever it shall be subdued it will be an earthly paradise—an enchanted ground.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. xxiii.

This, of course, is simply a statement of the work of the various departments of the organization. The Utopistic final statement, however, sounds almost as if uttered by a person in the romantic French tradition.

Educational Objectives. During the eighteen-eighties, the educational program seems to have received more stress than other functions. Professor Peirce of Harvard University conceived of the American Social Science Association as ideally "*A university for the people*,—combining those who can contribute anything original in social science into a temporary academical senate, to meet for some weeks in a given place and debate questions with each other, as well as to give out information for the public." ²⁰ He had, in fact, in 1878, presented a comprehensive plan for connecting the Association with some university, but the plan was at that time considered premature.

By 1888 the chief object of the Association was apparently conceived by Sanborn to be that of promoting academic recognition of the Social Sciences. This was at the period of his brief connection with Cornell University, where, at the invitation of President Andrew D. White, he had charge of a course in Social Science. He states: "It is by the introduction of systematic teaching of the social sciences in the lyceums, colleges, and universities of America that the objects of our Association are hereafter to be best promoted." ²¹

Practical Achievements. It was apparently felt by some of the members that the Association ought to justify its existence by concrete performance. There may have been criticism of its apparent inactivity. At any rate, in 1880, Sanborn in his report as general secretary, felt obliged to summarize what had been actually accomplished in the first fifteen years of the Association's existence, and the account is quite formidable.²²

Our Association, acting as a whole, or through committees, or by its individual members, is responsible since 1865, for what has been done in the United States, for civil service reform; for the organization of public charity on a better basis in many of the States; for the establishment on this side of the ocean of schools which teach the deaf to be no longer dumb; for improvements in the census and statistical work in general; for introducing nurses' training schools; for planting the germ of the Boston Art Museum, one of the best in America; for creating many State boards of health, and finally, the national board ap-

²⁰ F. B. Sanborn, in obituary notice of Benjamin Peirce, *ibid.*, No. 12, 1880, p. xi.

²¹ F. B. Sanborn, "The Opportunities of America," *ibid.*, No. 24, 1888, p. 61.

²² *Ibid.*, No. 11, 1880, pp. vi-vii.

pointed last spring; for maintaining a sound policy in regard to the currency and the national debt; for keeping up a wholesome agitation of the prison-discipline question, and organizing several new reformatory prisons, particularly those in New York, Massachusetts and Indiana; for enlightening the people in regard to the curability, classification and best treatment of the insane; and for many acts of good legislation in the several States which our Association has promoted.

In brief, as he elsewhere states fifteen years later, "We have steadily sought those modifications of the existing order, and the correction of present evils and abuses, which tend most to the good of society as a whole."²³

It should be said, however, that the Association as such, in its formal aspect, did not do these things. Sanborn's statement should really be interpreted to mean that all these reformistic activities were undertaken by men who were also members of the American Social Science Association. In the field of actual accomplishment its great service as an organization was performed perhaps not by the promotion of any concrete social reforms but by the fostering of the spirit of science in relation to social problems, by serving, as Sanborn says, "as a *creche*, or day-nursery, in whose care the intellectual parents of promising movements may leave their infants until they are able to go alone,"²⁴ by developing an esprit de corps among thinkers interested in Social Science, by giving those interested in specialized social sciences an opportunity to get together and, finally, to organize associations of their own. For it must not be forgotten that it was in the matrix of the American Social Science Association that the specialized social science organizations evolved.

²³ F. B. Sanborn, "Society and Socialism," *ibid.*, No. 19, 1885, p. 7.

²⁴ F. B. Sanborn, "The Commonwealth of Social Science," *ibid.*, No. 19, 1885, p. 7.

The Effort of the Association to Define and Integrate the Field of Social Science

The Growth of Definition. One of the many results of the formation of the American Social Science Association was that it forced an attempt at a systematic definition of the field of Social Science. Originally the advocates of Associationism had adopted the term Social Science with very little attempt to define it. In an age when the term science possessed major prestige they adopted this appellation as a matter of course to cover the content of their speculations and their ideals. Since they were dealing with social problems instead of with physical or chemical problems, they united the two words and claimed for their subject matter the classification of Social Science, just as the physicist (or natural philosopher, as he was then called) renamed his subject matter Physical Science. The term Social Science persisted through the years, in spite of a changing content in the subject matter and in the viewpoint of the leaders of thought in the field. While the advocates of the Positivist point of view did seek more carefully to define their field, systematic attempts in this direction were relatively infrequent until the time of the formation of the Association as described in the preceding chapters. With the establishment of the American Social Science Association this effort began in earnest, relating itself closely to the functions of the organization and its various derivatives as described in the preceding chapter.

Confusion of Definition. It was not only in the varying and conflicting conceptions as to what the function or the objectives of a Social Science organization should be, that we see how uneasily the reformistic and the scientific ideals lay together in the minds of Social Scientists. We find the same contradictory confusion in the various definitions of Social Science itself. Indeed, the methodological disputes among the sociologists of the eighteen-nineties take on a more understandable aspect when we see them in the perspective afforded by the history of Social Science, its forerunner. We have already seen Social Science conceived variously as Fourier's system

of social organization, as a philosophy of history, as a philosophy of social reform, as a protest against classical economics, as a theory of cooperation, of anarchism, etc. The practical, or eclectic, aspect of Social Science was no less undecided as to what constituted its proper subject matter. The American Social Science Association in its undifferentiated state, up to approximately 1870, before the centrifugal forces which produced the more specialized organizations began to operate, represented numerous viewpoints. Even after the specialized associations were formed, Social Science remained as a residue, and, although it still flourished for many years, it was never able to state the scope of its subject matter in any satisfactory manner.

Search for the Common Denominator. The members of the Association did not themselves, apparently, understand what was the common denominator of all their varied interests, ranging as these did from charity administration to civil service reform. But the very fact that the Association was organized indicates that there was such a common denominator, for otherwise there would have been no bond to hold these interests together.

The common denominator of all the different interests involved, seen from our perspective, was a common conviction that social problems, whatever their nature, should be attacked and treated scientifically. It was this general conviction that gave unity to an organization with such heterogeneous interests as public health, for example, and tariff legislation. The practical phase of Social Science as represented by the American Social Science Association, like other aspects of the Social Science movement, represented a bridge from the theological and metaphysical to the scientific stage of social thought, never entirely freeing itself from vestiges of theological and metaphysical conceptions, but aiming consistently at the application of science to social problems of all types and kinds.

Uncertainty as to Content. We may trace the uncertainty as to proper content or subject matter in the minds of the members in their own words as they tried at various times to define their discipline and to find a logical coherence in it. Was it a science? Was it a theoretical discipline? Or a practical one? How was it related to philanthropy and to reform? To its subdivisions? What was its function? Was it a separate discipline with a field of its own, or was it a coordinating agency? What was its province? What were its data? How was it related to sociology? To political economy? These and other questions arose and had to be answered. The fol-

lowing statements represent some of the more important of the answers offered, presented chronologically in order to illustrate the change and fluctuation in viewpoint that took place as new and specialized organizations split off from the parent body, leaving it with fewer and fewer functions of its own.

The Practical Emphasis. The earliest orientation was, naturally, in view of the close connection between the Association and the Massachusetts Board of State Charities, definitely philanthropic and reformistic. Samuel Eliot in 1866 defined Social Science as "emphatically a science of reform."¹ Greeley's definition of Social Science, in 1869, as "the diffusion of knowledge, virtue and happiness,"² illustrates the same general tendency, but with more emphasis upon the old Utopistic belief in the self-direction of individuals in their search for perfection and happiness.

Synthetic Viewpoint. But, running parallel to this practical, reformistic conception of Social Science, there was a more theoretical stream which emphasized the scientific ideal, and especially the synthetic nature of the science. Thus in the Address of the Executive Committee of the American Social Science Association, signed by Rogers, we read that the term Social Science now familiar to philanthropists everywhere was given universal celebrity by the British Social Science Association. He declared that, "Uncertain to whom we may ascribe the happy generalization by which all the subjects of human inquiry that specially concern the institutions of society are classed together under the name of *Social Science*, we have reason to accept this name as the most appropriate yet invented."³ And again, Rogers, in his "Address of Welcome" at the second general meeting of the Association in December, 1865, beginning with the statement that society was a product of the social instincts of man, pointed out that it had a growth like that of an organic being. And "out of this comes Social Science, which refers not only to the particular branches of science which interest us, but also to the whole range of human knowledge."⁴

The synthetic nature of the science was again strongly emphasized in the first number of the *Journal of Social Science* in 1869, in the following words: "Social Science, or the Science of Society, treats of man as a social

¹ American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address, and List of Members* (1866), p. 74.

² Quoted by F. B. Sanborn, in his report of the General Secretary, *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. viii.

³ American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address and List of Members* (1866), p. 74.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

being. It fulfils its functions just as other sciences fulfil theirs, by collecting facts, applying principles, and reaching the general laws which govern the social relations. Its character as a Science need not be questioned. The subjects it embraces, Education, Health, Economy, and Jurisprudence, are confessedly susceptible of scientific treatment, and what is true of the parts is equally true of the whole.”⁵

In the following passage the same author defends this synthetic character of Social Science, maintaining that its breadth and variety of subject matter guarantee a richness and completeness of viewpoint which assure the adequacy and correctness of its conclusions.⁶

Its range is broad, too broad, we are sometimes told, to be thoroughly grasped. In minds accustomed to a specific pursuit, or fixed upon a definite object, it is apt to excite distrust. But its comprehensiveness is really an advantage. It is a safeguard against narrowness of opinion or exertion. It prevents the possibility of considering any single interest as exclusive; it discloses the connection of different lines of thought and action, and unites the branches of inquiry, instead of leaving them severed, each from the other, to the injury of all. . . . The real trouble seems to be, not that Social Science has proposed too much, but that it has accomplished too little, and the real remedy is not in narrowing, but in thoroughly cultivating the field.

In the last sentence the author touches upon a very vital consideration in the success of the movement. Its adherents had talked much. Theory had been rampant at its meetings. Some of its leaders had, as we saw above, achieved remarkable legislative and reform results. But as a movement it was still largely on paper and had not yet entered very actively into the life of the nation under its own individual and corporate name.

Not a Radical Movement. What the author has next to say would seem to indicate that there was a good deal of fear on the part of the more conservative elements in the population and of the vested interests generally that this was another radical social and political movement, tied up closely with the radical and subversive isms of which they were so obviously afraid. He now proceeds to show that Social Science must not be confused with Socialism, with Radicalism, nor even with Philanthropy.⁷

At the same time the movement in this science is to be carefully distinguished from some other movements, with which it is apt to be confounded. Social Science is not Socialism. The latter deals with Society destructively, pulling down

⁵ “Introductory Note,” *loc. cit.*, p. 1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

rather than building up, and reducing the higher grade to the lower, instead of raising the lower to the higher. The former, by a reverse process, seeks to uplift whatever is low, and indeed whatever is already high, by placing both on a firmer foundation, and rearing them in larger and loftier proportions. It is essentially constructive, and aims at strengthening, rather than undermining, the constitution of society. Again, Social Science is not Radicalism in the common sense. The latter goes to the root of things, with a determination to uproot them, while the former gives to the fibres beneath the soil, a firmer hold upon it, by freeing them from obstructions, and quickening their growth in breadth and depth. It is essentially conservative, not of the evil, but of the good which society contains, and which can be developed only by gentle and discriminating treatment. Social Science differs also from Philanthropy. This takes things as they appear, handles them as they require at the moment, acts from impulse, that may or may not last, and seeks for the remedy rather than the prevention, of ills which under this management often return in greater strength than before. But Social Science does not confine its observations to phenomena, or its efforts to the treatment of momentary symptoms. It acts from convictions based upon careful enquiry, as well as enduring principle. It goes behind effect to the cause, and tries to prevent, even more than to relieve, the errors existing among men.

History of the Movement Reviewed. One of the most common, if not the most usual, methods at this period of defining and clarifying a movement was to present its history, written and interpreted of course from the standpoint of the conception of its significance as held by the author or speaker. This was the age in particular of historical interpretation. In order to give reassurance to his less liberal capitalistic friends, one of the wealthier active members of the Association undertook to convince them that this was not a mere upstart irresponsible movement fostered by scatterbrains, but a very sane organization made up of respectable scientists performing a very necessary social function. Accordingly, in 1869, Henry Villard outlined the history and nature of Social Science as follows:⁸

The Science of Society is not of recent origin. It may be said to be as old as the various branches of human thought and research, the fruits of which it seeks to gather and apply for the common benefit of mankind. But although its elements have previously existed in the sciences of Jurisprudence, Education, Political Economy, and Public Health, and have been cultivated in societies organized to carry out particular investigations and reforms, it has grown into a distinct division of knowledge only during the present generation. To our age, so remarkable for humane tendencies, and to men of the race, which has ever proved its preeminent fitness to lead in great practical reforms, it was re-

⁸ "Historical Sketch of Social Science," *ibid.*, p. 5.

served to raise Social Science to the dignity of a special scientific pursuit, the high aim of which is the discovery and application of the immutable laws governing man in his social relations.

In this statement we see both the scientific and the reform ideal represented, that is, the contention that Social Science must discover and apply the immutable social laws. In this last sentence is a suggestion of the concept of Natural Law, to which we have already referred in accounting for the growth of Social Science. Immutable laws are, in effect, Natural Laws, which are the governing principles of the secular universe, just as God was accounted the personal governor of the universe in that era of thought when men were supposed to be ruled by revelation.

The Economic Planning View. To Lorin Blodget, of the Philadelphia Social Science Association, on the other hand, the province of Social Science appeared to be largely that of economic planning. Blodget included under the wealth-producing powers of a society all that we should call culture, that is, "the entire list of attainments capable of record and of preservation."⁹ This concept threw a different light on the subject of industrial and political economy, enlarging and simplifying their fields. Blodget states the point of view as follows: "A new class of productive powers appears, and new accumulations properly to be described as wealth; and this enlarged discussion is, in my judgment, the special province of organizations devoted to the promotion of Social Science. . . . It is, I cannot doubt, one of the high duties of Social Science to canvass these sources of production, these agencies of wealth on one side, and of loss and poverty on the other; and to consider all that may relate to their origin and control."¹⁰

Quite evidently the movement for the conservation of resources, natural and human and social, of which we have heard so much in the last generation, was already under way. Thoughtful men, interested in the future welfare of the nation more than in its present exploitation, were beginning to think of some method by which our great natural heritage could be preserved and perhaps even improved. This of course meant economic and social planning.

The Organic View. One of the most important efforts in the eclectic phase of the Social Science movement to define Social Science from a more theoretical point of view was that of William Strong, made in 1870. The scientific ideal is strongly emphasized in this effort, but the applicational

⁹ "Waste of Existing Social System," *ibid.*, No. 4, 1871, p. 8.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 9, 17-18.

or reform element is not neglected. We shall present this statement in some detail, since it constitutes an important landmark in the development of the movement.¹¹

The intelligent mind of the country has hardly awakened to a full apprehension of what is meant by Social Science. And I apprehend a similar remark might be made respecting the cultivated intellect of the Old World, though perhaps with less fitness. Scholars understand when we speak of the science of mathematics, of astronomy, or physics generally, or when we speak of the science of law, or theology, or medicine; but when we talk of a science that selects human society as its subject, and includes in its departments all that affects society for good or ill, we seem to many like those that dream. It is remarkable that in the classification which the celebrated French philosopher, Auguste Comte made, only a few years since, of what, in his opinion, are all possible departments of human knowledge, he included what he denominated "Sociology," not as an existing science, but as something that might, in a distant hereafter, be developed into a department of knowledge. And it may be doubted whether even Comte had any larger conception of it than as a possible science of historical social progress.

Yet, if it be considered what society is, and what it must necessarily ever be, its adaptedness to scientific investigation must become apparent—as apparent as is the fitness of the human intellect to be a subject of science. It must be perceived that it has regions almost boundless open for explorers, filled with mines of knowledge deeply interesting, the value of which it is impossible to overestimate. It must also be seen that the knowledge to be acquired in studying such a subject is much more than food for curious speculation, that it is essential to the best interests of mankind. The most superficial observation discloses that society is much more than an aggregate of human beings brought into juxtaposition. It is an organism, and an organism that may well be said to have life.

With many of the phenomena of its existence we are familiar. We know that it has its habits, as deeply seated and as potential as are the habits of individual man. It has also its diseases,—some chronic and others occasional—all needing the application of appropriate remedies. It has its opinions, more or less sound, by which its action is guided as truly as if they were laws; multitudes of them having the acknowledged force of law. It has, also various forms of civil organization. Now it is with this living organism, with these habits, diseases, opinions, capabilities, and everything that acts upon social happiness and development; with all that has been discovered or that yet may be known, which tends to elevate and advance human society, that Social Science has to do.

It is impossible to look at such a science, even superficially, without being impressed by the immensity of the territory which it sends its votaries to explore. What is there in human history or in human experience,—what is there in

¹¹ William Strong, "The Study of Social Science," *ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

human capability, that does not bear upon the condition of social life? And how greatly are the interests and the character of a community often affected by causes outside of itself? The thorough student of the science must, at the outset of his investigation, acquaint himself with the phenomena of its existence, and with the true explanations of these phenomena,—with everything that appears to constitute or characterize its life.

One notes here the use of the organismic view of society, then current in the writings of Lilienfeld, Schaeffle, and Spencer, as a justification for a general Social Science. If society as a whole can be considered as a single, giant, living organism, must we not also have a general organic science to correspond? Yet the intricacy and complexity of this organism implies a corresponding intricacy and complexity of the analogous Social Science that almost frightens Strong. Indeed, it seems to have troubled many of the adherents of the movement, who withdrew into smaller specialized associations where they could better grasp the range of their problems and work out theoretical or practical solutions for them. They wished to be under less pressure to be all-wise and all-cognizant of a growing universe of conditioning facts which might influence the validity of their theory and the utility of the results aimed at.

The Relativity Factor. More distressing still was the fact that this complex social organism—sufficiently difficult to analyze and understand in itself—was never twice the same. The fact that social data were forever changing brought to light a new and immense problem to be grappled with. It required cooperative effort and the synthesis of many types of research. The author's realization of the relative and changing character of the data to be dealt with and his anxiety with regard to a suitable methodology are set forth in the following passage from the same address.¹²

Such an acquaintance cannot be secured without the aid of much more than his [the student's] own observation. The tendency of social life is, in many particulars, to change. . . . Everywhere, owing to causes known or unknown, human society is ever undergoing changes for better or for worse, certainly no one can doubt that such is the fact in this country. There are now social diseases among us—chronic diseases, which, within the memory of living men, had no existence, or if they existed were only occasional. This is not the result of accident. These diseases have not come into being without causes that may be known.

There are habits of society which former generations had not—habits that control social action, and deeply affect the general welfare. Something has given birth to them. There are opinions of modern origin, which are accepted as

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

axioms, and which direct irresistibly much of the conduct of modern society. There are laws, the dictates of supposed recent necessities, or the offspring of new theories, which have greatly modified relative rights, and which are constantly moulding and changing human society.

In most of our States a law making power once each year enters upon the work of introducing what it deems to be salutary changes. Some of these may be improvements, but many of them are rash experiments, devised without any thorough knowledge of social life, and sometimes begetting greater evils than those they were intended to remove. But whether wise or injudicious is not now the question I am considering. Whether the one or the other, they are changes.

These dynamic factors making for change must be studied both in their historical operation and in their present setting in order to generalize soundly and avoid the pitfalls of aprioristic theorizing. Says Strong: "To the study of historical progress and development the student of this science must add careful and minute observation. He must thoroughly know the facts: what it is that constitutes human society as it now exists, what influences it feels, what evils afflict it, what obstacles stand in the way of its upward progress. It is then, and then only that he is prepared to apply correct principles to the facts, a knowledge of which he has acquired. Nothing is more unsafe than theorizing without accurate knowledge of facts; nothing is more fruitless."¹³ As illustrations of this theorizing without accurate knowledge he presents the case of Locke's constitution for the Carolinas and the evils of socialism with its destructive consequences.¹⁴

The Specific Approach. More specifically, as regards various subdivisions of Social Science, Strong points out concrete problems that require solution. For example in education there are numerous problems, such as, What type of education should we give in our public schools? To what extent should this education be compulsory? What relation has common-school education to law, to government, to social health and morals? Then there are problems connected with pauperism. He says,¹⁵

Then how numerous are the evils that afflict society as such. They meet us on every hand. Their effects are everywhere visible. It is not, however to be conceded that they are incurable. Yet before any successful attempt can be made to eradicate them their causes must be known, and appropriate remedies must be devised. Social Science has yet to make large advances in this direction. Take for illustration the subject of pauperism. . . . What are its causes? We know in individual cases. We know what personal and social vices tend to it, what mis-

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

fortunes may induce it, but there are larger and more general causes behind all these that have not yet been discovered. How is pauperism to be treated? How is it in the mass to be prevented?

Of at least equal importance are the numerous problems of the social function of labor, of the relations of labor and capital, and of the relations of both to communities. Again he says,¹⁶

So, too, there are vices flourishing in society, paralyzing its energies, which, if thoroughly investigated and understood might be effectually suppressed. Much is also yet to be learned of the economics of social life. How is labor to accomplish the greatest possible results? How is it to be conducted in harmony with intellectual, moral, and physical advancement? What are the proper relations of labor and capital? Closely connected with them and all other kindred subjects is a consideration of the laws that bind together and control all social organisms. Whether these are the best that can be devised is a question yet to be answered, and answered in view of the present condition, the need and the possibilities of communities. It is plain, therefore, that the field open for exploration is broad enough for the largest ambition, and varied enough for every taste.

Present Inchoate Condition of Social Science. Having thus presented both the general and the concrete problems of the new science, Strong himself confesses that as yet the whole province has not been integrated into a coherent whole. It is still in the same inchoate condition that law was in during the eighteenth century, when separate departments or divisions had been established, but the general coherence which made them all branches of one organic whole was not yet perceived. Similarly, in Social Science separate branches are developed without as yet any widespread understanding of the organic science as a whole to which they belong. He continues,¹⁷

New explorers are constantly entering the field, supplied with the acquisitions of their predecessors. It is true that each has labored singly, and it has not always been perceived how closely related the numerous departments of the science are to each other. This relationship we shall see more and more clearly as we advance. The science is now in a condition very similar to that of our common law in the latter part of the last century.

Most of the branches of the law had been studied, valuable treatises had been written respecting many of its titles; but their common relationship was not fully perceived. Then it was discovered that they were all parts of one system, which would be incomplete if any one were absent. I doubt not the time will come when it will be seen that the investigations now in progress into social

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

habits, diseases, or opinions, into popular education, political economy, public health, or jurisprudence, however widely apart they may seem to be, are still kindred to each other; that they are all making contributions to the same treasury, and building a science conservative of all that is now good in social life, elevating communities to a higher standard of conduct and achievement, repressing the evils which now exist, securing the more easy attainment of human sustenance, adding stability to the rights of labor and of property, stimulating a healthy individual ambition, promoting a pure morality, and conducive in every way to the general welfare. Such is what this Association proposes to itself, and such, I think, are the well-founded promises it holds forth.

Significance of Strong's Analysis. This statement by Strong is important because it attempted to see Social Science not only as a synthetic science, but also because it recognized clearly the organic nature of the growth of all sciences, and the perfectly natural evolution of Social Science. Strong saw that sciences arise around concrete adjustment problems, that their provinces are not revealed entities.¹⁸ He was confident that just as Linnaeus and Bichat almost a century earlier had integrated a science of life—biology—out of various previously disparate disciplines, similarly future students would be able to integrate a science of society—Social Science—out of the disciplines that as yet remained seemingly unrelated.¹⁹ In his opinion, the various special concrete studies should be continued—in education, social economy, social pathology, etc.—until at length the whole field of Social Science would emerge, inductively, as law had done earlier, or as mathematics, biology, or physics, for that matter, had also done. It is a viewpoint still logically valid and fresh in spite of the fact that contemporaneous developments were then in a different direction. The special disciplines, such as economics and political science, for example, did not develop during the next fifty years as parts of a general science of society, that is, as contributory to a general Social Science, but as separate sciences of wealth and of government. But the newer trends indicate that the viewpoint represented by Strong may yet prevail. The impress of the sociological outlook upon all the social sciences may yet transform them to such a degree as to render them actually specialized sciences of society and contributors to a general Social Science, as Strong suggests.

Trends toward Fulfillment. Strong's analysis and prediction of the synthetic methods of Social Science are, in fact, now having a somewhat be-

¹⁸ See L. L. Bernard, "The Limits of the Social Sciences and Their Determinants," *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Method*, XXVI: 430-438 (Aug. 1, 1929).

¹⁹ For an elaboration of this point see Ogburn and Goldenweiser, *The Social Sciences* (1927), "Sociology and Psychology," pp. 346-368.

lated illustration. Within the last two decades there has been a marked rapprochement among the various social sciences. In the first place, they have reached the stage of development in which their fields and problems have begun to overlap, with the result that it is not always possible to determine to which science a particular field of investigation belongs. In the second place, as their methodologies have been perfected, they are discovered to be essentially the same in the larger outlines, but to differ primarily in details to correspond to the particular problems upon which the investigators are engaged. Every problem has, in a limited sense, its own methodology, but its individuality does not depend primarily upon whether it is attacked as a problem in sociology, economics, political science, or otherwise. The character of the methodology is determined by the end sought by the investigation and by the materials to be worked with and their social setting, rather than by the somewhat artificial and arbitrary location of the problem in one social science rather than another. In the third place, the social sciences are again becoming socially conscious. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were largely so, but in the period of industrial expansion and maturation after the Civil War, the social sciences came to be used increasingly for purposes of partisan or class support and apology. It was at this time that political economy became economics, with whatever sinister implication this fact may carry. Early in the twentieth century economics threatened to become the theory of business enterprise, and it has not yet been freed from this danger. But on the whole the social sciences are moving toward an organic social welfare conception of their functions that tends to bring them back into a degree of comity and unity which may again give to them collectively the general title of Social Science.

The present overlapping of the social sciences, both as to problems and as to subject matter may help to bring this result about. It is our contention, as elsewhere stated, that the field of a functional social science is determined by the nature of its problems.²⁰ It is only necessary for all of the social sciences to come to see their central problem as that of understanding the workings of society in order to make a contribution to its improvement—to drop the present primary emphasis upon technique, regardless of social purpose—in order to throw all of these sciences into a parallel orientation with reference to the problem of social betterment in the larger sense. Once this is accomplished, there will grow up almost automatically a sort of

²⁰ L. L. Bernard, *The Fields and Methods of Sociology* (1934), Part I, Ch. I.

perceived unity among the social sciences not very unlike that which the Social Science movement sought to give to them and which sociology in the eighteen-nineties and in the first decade of the twentieth century sought to lead them to.²¹

Causes of Divergence of the Social Sciences. The radical growing divergence of the social sciences in the period, roughly speaking, lying between 1890 and 1930 was due largely to their primary emphasis upon technique to the minimization of their social objective or purpose. They studied social technology and scientific technique historically and in the present. Emphasis upon methodology in research grew by leaps and bounds. The applications of mathematics to social science generalization, in the form of statistics and standardization of formulas, became the test of the validity of social laws and principles. All of this was valuable and necessary.

But it had the undesirable effect of crowding out of the minds of the public and of most social scientists emphasis upon the all important objectives for which technique and methodologies exist. The same sort of thing was going on in the field of educational science, which was rapidly undergoing reorganization in this period. Methods of learning and of teaching (educational psychology) were emphasized almost to the point of exclusion of the determination of what should be taught (educational sociology), with the result that it might be said of many educational theorists that they did not care what was taught if only the teaching was done well. Apparently the attention of human beings cannot encompass two major interests at the same time. Technique was behind-hand and it needed to be brought up to date in order to make it meet the demands of a machine age. Content and objectives dropped out of view for the time being, but it is bound again to claim attention. For after all, perfection in technique is useless unless the result achieved by such masterly workmanship is worth having. Today we note a rapidly growing tendency to question the utility of the various social sciences and to ask what purpose and whose ends they serve. Unless the answer can be that they serve the ends of social welfare, ultimately they will fail to secure public approval and will be forced to reorient themselves. This recurring emphasis justifies again the characteristic outlook of Social Science, and of early sociology.

In any event, and in the light of subsequent developments, Strong's statement remains one of the most important made in the eclectic phase of the Social Science movement.

²¹ See Albion W. Small, *The Meaning of Social Science* (1910).

The Efforts of the Association toward Reorientation and Rehabilitation

The Confused Eighteen-Seventies. The eighteen-seventies, as we have noted, marked a period of avowed bewilderment as to the nature and definition of Social Science. Thus within less than a decade the movement which had started off so hopefully in 1865 found itself assaulted by a multitude of doubts as to its legitimate orientation and function. It is true that part of its enthusiasm had resulted from that desperate attempt at social reorganization which commonly follows a war, and especially a successful war. The tremendous moral urge generated and employed in the war is now left without regular employment. As a consequence, it must find other outlets for its energies, since they cannot at once be redistributed and absorbed in the ordinary occupations of peace time society. Some of the moral motivation, now that slavery had been abolished and the safety of the Union assured, had been applied to social reform. But the inevitable post-war depression coming in the eighteen-seventies had in a large measure weakened the confidence of the general public, and even of some of the specialists, in social reform. Or, at least, it had shifted the objective from social reform in general to economic reforms in particular. The people had become more economic minded.

Membership in the Association fell off for a time, although it increased again later on. In a similar manner, there was confusion as to what were the proper objectives of the Association and of Social Science in general, and as to the best methods to be used in pursuing these ends. This growing confusion we have seen portrayed in the preceding chapters. In the present chapter we shall follow the struggle of the loyal members of the Association to reorient and rehabilitate the subject. The efforts of Strong, already described, to find a synthetic reorientation for the discipline, which would bring all viewpoints into harmonious cooperation really marks the beginning of this movement.

But Strong's confidence in the emergence ultimately of a Social Science,

referred to in the preceding chapter, was either not generally shared or not yet understood. If understood, it was not heeded. The prevailing social forces were opposed to it. It was a period of rapid differentiation in industry and the professions. Consequently there was need of a corresponding rapid differentiation of the scientific disciplines to provide the industries and the professions with new knowledge and new methods with which to meet their rapidly expanding and differentiating tasks and problems. This was, therefore, a period of the differentiation, rather than of the synthesis, of science. This distinction was, perhaps, not clearly understood at the time. There was lacking sufficient perspective to make the process of intellectual evolution stand out clearly. But we can now see what was actually happening to render Strong's arguments unavailing. Various and conflicting other definitions of the field were offered in a desperate attempt at orientation and reorientation of the subject, until by the end of the decade it was admitted regretfully that as yet the term science which had been so confidently applied to the discipline in the earlier years could not be used appropriately in connection with the work actually being done in the field known as Social Science. Yet the attempt at reorientation and redefinition was not abandoned.

Sanborn Tries His Hand. In 1874 Sanborn, for example, confessed himself unable to define Social Science at all.¹ He said,

Do not expect me to define the phrase, however, even negatively, by stating what Social Science is not. I have never seen or heard of a person who could concisely define what it is we call social science, or state wherein it differs from other branches of human knowledge. It seems, indeed, to be neither a science or an art, but a mingling of the two, or of fifty sciences and arts, which all find a place in it. Whatever concerns mankind in their social, rather than in their individual relations, belongs to this comprehensive abstraction, and social science shades off easily and imperceptibly into metaphysics on one side, philanthropy on another, political economy on a third, and so round the whole circle of human inquiry.

Sanborn was, however, of the opinion that, although he could not define Social Science, he could state fairly adequately the duties and functions of the Social Scientists. He emphasized especially the collection of facts and their use in social betterment. His statement was as follows: ²

To avail ourselves of the experience of other countries, without imagining that it strictly applies to our own conditions, is the first duty of an American

¹ "The Work of Social Science in the United States," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 6, 1874, p. 36.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

student of social science. In order to do this, of course we must know what our own condition is; and to those who have not had their attention drawn to the matter, it will be surprising to learn how little we know in America of the actual circumstances of the people. . . . [The census is wholly inadequate, but] even the meagre, contradictory, and misleading vital statistics gathered once in ten years by the Census Bureau of Washington become of some value in the absence of others; and the same may be said of many other portions of the decennial reports. But it should be the first effort of all students of social science to make these reports annual, as they are in some European countries, and to promote in each State the inquiries and statistical returns which alone can give a high value to the national census-taking and its published results. . . . Next to the collection of facts comes the dissemination of principles and the practical application of them to the condition of things revealed by statistics. This is the more attractive work and the nobler; but it is less indispensable than the humbler task of the census-taker and the statistician. Rather, perhaps, should it be spoken of as more inevitable; for ideas can no more be avoided than can the change of seasons. . . . Hence, I place as first and most important the collection of facts; next in order comes the combination and application of them.

This is the straightforward statement of the double function of Social Science—knowledge and its application to the solution of problems—as Sanborn saw it at this particular time. Get the facts and then apply them, was his criterion. As was always the case with Sanborn, the pure-science aspect of knowledge was subordinate to the applied aspect. This slant, however, was not peculiar to him, but characterized the eclectic phase of Social Science as a whole.

Two Biologists Speak. Apparently, however, the synthetic outlook on Social Science did not satisfy some of the more analytically minded members, especially those trained in the methods of natural science. Thus Louis Agassiz said in 1874 that “we ought forever to discard rambling addresses and discourses on topics involving human nature in its totality. The Academy of Sciences, in Paris, assumed its commanding authority from the day they excluded discussions upon the system of the Universe. We might well follow their example,—have people speak and write of what they do know, and not of what they feel or believe.”³

Thus were the system-builders sharply put in their place.

In the same year, 1874, Alfred L. Carroll voiced the rising confusion with regard to the field of Social Science when he presented hygiene to the attention of the Association. He said, “I need make no apology for urging

³ Letter to the American Social Science Association, published in *Journal of Social Science*, No. 7, 1874, p. 375.

before the Social Science Association the too long neglected claims of hygiene, to rank as one of the most important branches of sociological culture. Social Science, as I understand it, embraces the systematic study of these elements of human welfare which an old nursery rhyme groups together, as the result of early going to bed and early rising. . . ."⁴ Social Science was, it would appear, according to this author, in brief, the systematic study of the condition which made man healthy, wealthy, and wise.

Curtis Reassures. In 1874 George William Curtis was not quite so confident as Strong had been some years earlier of the ultimate emergence of a Social Science, but nevertheless he believed that such a science was possible. He declared, "I . . . should be very happy if I could answer your question [as to what Social Science is] in a word or in a phrase. If I say that by social science we mean the science of society, you will truly reply that I move without advancing; nor, indeed, could I assert that the relations of social phenomena, modified as they perpetually are by the human will, and by almost incalculable conditions, have been reduced to the laws of an exact science, or ever could be."⁵ This more guarded statement is perhaps the result of current criticisms as to the application of science to social affairs.

Sanborn Appeals to History. In Sanborn's sketch of the history of Social Science, including Vico, Adam Smith, and Comte, we may discover his new orientation with regard to Social Science in 1878. The sketch follows.⁶

It is not until the early part of the eighteenth century that we begin to discern the elements of what is now known as Social Science, separating themselves by a process akin to crystallization, and, like that, giving birth to fantastic forms, regular and irregular,—from the thick and turbid solution in which politics, practical ethics, economics, etc., found themselves between the period of Hobbes and that of Comte. The philosopher of most insight in this direction during the early part of that period was Giovanni Battisti Vico, a Neapolitan, born in 1668, and dying in 1744. The philosopher of the most acute and useful practical discernment, for our purposes, was the Scotchman, Adam Smith. . . . Between Vico and Smith came those ingenious men, the French Economists or Physiocrats, from whom, especially from Quesnay and Turgot, Smith borrowed many hints. . . .

Then came Adam Smith, with his patient and comprehensive genius, and the foundations of social science were laid by him, deeply bedded in the mortar of commercial interests.

This was a hundred years ago. Midway of the century that has intervened

⁴ "Hygiene in Schools and Colleges," *ibid.*, p. 266.

⁵ Opening Address, *ibid.*, No. 6, 1874, p. 33.

⁶ "Social Science in Theory and in Practice," *ibid.*, No. 9, 1878, pp. 2-4.

there arose the ambitious and methodical system of Comte, a medley of great truths and great errors, but aiming to methodize and co-ordinate all that can be known of human life in society, and, in fact, contributing largely to the firm establishment of the new science,—which, however, has already outgrown the limits assigned for it by the French thinker. What he sought to bind in a sheaf, so as to be grasped by the single hand, has again fallen apart, and spreads itself luxuriantly on every side.

It would appear from the review just quoted that Sanborn at this time conceived Social Science as embracing the philosophy of history, political economy, and sociology. He recognized also the seeming impossibility of ever integrating a special organic Social Science out of such elements, for the sheaves insisted on falling apart. Only a few years earlier, indeed, the National Conference of Charities and Correction had split off, and only a few years later the historians and the political economists were to erect associations of their own. The centrifugal forces at that stage of the history of the social sciences were becoming much stronger than the centripetal.

The Neo-Hegelian Interpretation. Preoccupation with the more theoretical aspects of Social Science in the attempt at reorientation reached its highest point in 1879 with W. T. Harris' statement of the method of study in Social Science. Harris himself was very much under the influence of the German transcendental school of thought and his definition of the scope and contents of Social Science reflects this abstract background. But even he, as the selection that follows will show, could not conceive of Social Science as existing for any other purpose than the improvement of human welfare. He says,⁷

Science is related to two worlds—so to speak—the world of Nature and the world of Man. The world of Nature, as the world of time and space, includes not only the mineral, the plant and the brute, but also Man as an animal,—Man as possessing a body. The world of Man as distinguished from Nature includes the world of *institutions*—the family, civil society, and the State. Institutions form the instrumentality whereby Man elevates himself above the mere animal—the brute.

Social Science deals with Man, and with man *not* as a brute, but as a being that lifts himself out of mere nature into a spiritual world—into a world of institutions. . . .

Through institutions Man collects the labors of each and every individual into one vast storehouse—the market of the world—thence he distributes to each one his share, his own production enriched by a share in the productions of the entire race. This is the case not merely in material productions—food,

⁷ "The Method of Study in Social Science," *ibid.*, No. 9, 1879, pp. 28-31.

clothing and shelter,—but in spiritual products. It preserves and aggregates the individual experience of the entire human race, and distributes it to the individuals, without dividing it. . . .

While the method of the sciences of nature devotes itself to the history of the process in which it finds natural things involved, on the other hand the method of Social Science has for study both the history of society and also its ideal. . . .

Social Science finds the acorn-germ of human history in the savage of the newly-born child; it traces the origin of society in rudimentary phases, such as the manifestation of gregarious instincts in some of the animals; the acorn and the sapling are there, but the full grown tree is not yet a realization in history. . . .

Through all civil history, perhaps, one can find a principle of progress, but it is no complete cycle, like the process of the seasons or the life of the plant.

Instead of interpreting the present by the past, we interpret both the present and the past by the future—by the ideal of freedom and Rational Life towards which human history approaches as a goal. In Social Science we deal with an object whose beginning is here but whose end is in eternity. We explain each and every phase of his past and present by its relation to the realization of his ideal. Each and every institution of man exists for the sake of his freedom, or in order that each individual may become self-knowing and self-realizing; in order that each particular individual may ascend into the life of the species by participation; in order that each human being, born as an animal, with a minimum of intellect as an infant, may, by his own self-activity, create within himself the ideas which form the stock of realized wisdom, accumulated from the experience of the human race, and moreover, may shape his life by the moral standard which this aggregated experience has defined as necessary for the life and health of society. . . .

The ascent of the individual into the species,—which is not a loss of individuality, but a deepening of individuality to personality,—is the unique phenomenon found in Social Science. It is the difference between Man and Nature. . . .

This is Education. Hence the province of investigation assigned to this, our Department, is the central one in Social Science.

Education is the process of finding and realizing in the individual man his higher self. Man's self exists in a *series of selves* ascending above him, each one a higher revelation of his absolute ideal. Thus the family, and the State, as well as the various other institutions within civil society, form the higher selves of the individual. By education he learns to become a conscious member of these selves, and find his true being in them. To know one's self, means to know society—to know not only the particular self which I am, but my universal self, realized above me in a series of vast colossal forms.

The progress of man in civilization is measured by the perfection of his institutions. But the perfection of the institutions themselves is to be measured by the degree to which they make possible the participation of the individual man in the results of the social whole—by the degree that the individual is enabled to sum within himself the experience of the race. The greater the participation,

the more the citizen becomes a "law unto himself," and the more the social organization becomes a free product of the will of the individual, and the less mechanical restraint from without.

With this in view as the ideal of society, we have the means of comprehending and remedying imperfections that we may discover in society.

The Significance of Harris' Statement. This statement represents the high-water mark in the theoretical stream of Social Science in its eclectic or rehabilitating phase. According to Harris' viewpoint, Social Science deals with the super-organic, that is, the world of institutions. It deals not only with the history of society, but also with its goals. It is, in short, a telic science. It is interested in the origin of human society, especially in its instinctive bases. Harris, being a follower of Hegel, was very much of a philosopher of history, and so it is not strange that he found a principle of progress in civil history, even though such a principle was not as fixed as that determining the seasons. Social Science as a philosophy of history interprets both the present and the past telically, that is, in relation to an ideal. Institutions are to be measured in terms of their contribution to the development of selves. The socializing process by which human beings acquire human nature, become personalities instead of mere individualities, is the unique phenomenon of Social Science. Since this process is one of education, this becomes the central element in the field of Social Science. When social organization has reached such a degree of perfection that the social controls are exercised within individuals, rather than imposed upon them from without, we shall have a society based on the free wills of citizens, rather than a mechanically ordered one. This is the goal to work for, and using this as a measuring rod we can learn to understand and remedy existing defects in society.

Social Science, then, is a social psychology of the Baldwin-Cooley-McDougall type, as well as a philosophy of history more or less of the Hegelian type, in terms of a hierarchy of selves. This is indeed a far cry from the practical philanthropic viewpoint of 1865, but it has in common with all definitions of Social Science a strong emphasis on telic control. Harris was as much interested as anyone in remedying the imperfections of society. His approach was different, but his general orientation was the same. It was this social-improvement bias, indeed, that justified him in assuming the name Social Science for his psychology and philosophy of society. It was this viewpoint that made him a Social Scientist.

Harris and Lester F. Ward. The student of the history of sociology will

at once recognize the close general similarity between the point of view as expressed by Harris and that set forth by Lester F. Ward as the central theme of his *Dynamic Sociology* (1883). Indeed, it might almost be a summary of the arguments of that book. Unfortunately, Ward has left us no adequate account of the antecedents of his thought, but we can scarcely suppose that there were no antecedents. The fact that Ward preferred to use the term Sociology rather than Social Science to cover the contents of his writing and felt himself more closely allied to the great leaders of sociological thought, Comte and Spencer, rather than to a relatively obscure contemporary, or to his intellectual master, Hegel, would not necessarily have prevented him from seizing upon a pattern of thought that was especially congenial to him, even though he may not have been sufficiently aware of its source to cause him to make specific acknowledgement of it. And, besides, Ward was probably thinking along a track largely parallel to that of Harris, as a result of which he may have felt no great degree of indebtedness to Harris. However, it is still quite possible that this point of view was influential in crystallizing his own. For it is at this time, as he tells us,⁸ that he abandoned his first voluminous work on education and recast his thought in the form of *Dynamic Sociology*.

Causes of the Shift to the Theoretical. The right-about face from philanthropy to a theoretical Social Science during the eighteen-seventies was due to a number of factors. We have already emphasized the widespread recognition of the need of a new orientation as a means to rehabilitation on the part of the members of the American Social Science Association. Also, it must be noted that the splitting off of the National Prison Association, the National Conference of Charities and Correction, the American Public Health Association, and the Association for the Protection of the Insane and the Prevention of Insanity, took away several of the applied aspects of the Association's program and left the more theoretical aspects of the original program of Social Science for the general Association. Thus as the temper of the public in general became more practical and more technically reformistic, as evidenced by the formation of these several separate societies for scientific social reconstruction, the American Social Science Association was left, by default as it were and by secession, to drift in the opposite direction.

This fact of the shift of emphasis resulting from the splitting off of these bodies from the older Association is indicated concretely by Sanborn

⁸ *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, 1913, III: 149-168.

himself. The difference in viewpoints between the work of the National Conference of Charities and the American Social Science Association was expressed by Sanborn in the following passage: "We naturally discuss the same subjects, to a certain extent, in these two gatherings—yet this becomes each year less and less needful, and the time will perhaps come when the two series of publications will in no respect cover the same ground. The questions that we consider here are less national and local than those discussed in the Conference of Charities—becoming oftentimes (as this year) international in their bearing and tendencies."⁹

As yet the theoretical viewpoints had not been segregated into separate organizations; that was a development of the eighteen-eighties, when the American Historical Society and the American Economic Association were organized. But during the eighteen-seventies the American Social Science Association was still the only general professional organization to which people interested in the theoretical aspects of the social disciplines could belong. It was a sort of blanket organization covering the theory of all the social disciplines. In this sense, Social Science was again shown to be all things to all men. It was philosophy of history to those interested in philosophy of history; political economy to those interested in political economy; jurisprudence to those interested in jurisprudence; and so on.

The Segregation of Political Science. A good illustration of the somewhat delayed break-up of the theoretical aspect of Social Science is to be found in the case of political science. The centrifugal process by which specialized theoretical social disciplines were detaching themselves from an integral Social Science to become independent social sciences—which we have seen illustrated in the secession of the historians and economists from the American Social Science Association—had its effect on political science also, although more slowly. Political scientists, although they did not organize themselves into a society until a quarter of a century later, were likewise beginning to segregate themselves from the general Social Science movement during the eighteen-eighties. Indeed, it is doubtful if they were ever as closely identified with its official organization, The American Social Science Association, as were the sociologists, economists, and reformers, in spite of the fact that such distinguished members of their guild as Francis Lieber and E. J. James had affiliated with the Association. However schools and departments in colleges and universities frequently bore the title Political and Social Science, or Social and Political Science, and apparently there

⁹ Report of the General Secretary, *Journal of Social Science*, No. 16, 1882, p. 13.

was some confusion as to the relationship of the terms political and social in these titles. Thus, Munroe Smith, of Columbia University, in the introduction to the newly established *Political Science Quarterly*, March, 1886, says:¹⁰

The term "political science" is greatly in need of definition. Technical terms should have a limited and exact meaning; but this particular term is used vaguely, not by the laity alone but by professed experts. These speak sometimes of a "political science" at other times of a plurality of "political sciences." Again, the sciences which are commonly described as "political" are often designated as "social"; and besides the various "social sciences" there appears to be a "social science."

A more exact use of these terms is certainly desirable. . . .

Social Science, in the broadest sense, deals with all the relations of man in society; more precisely, with all the relations that result from man's social life. It may be questioned whether it is proper to speak of a social science. We certainly have no general social science in the sense in which we have particular social sciences. In politics, in economics, in law and in language, we are able to some extent to trace phenomena to their causes, to group facts under rules and rules under principles. But the laws which underlie man's social life as a whole have not been grasped and formulated. Social Science or sociology, if we use the term, is therefore simply a convenient general expression for a plurality of social sciences. But social science is used in another and a narrower sense. The various social sciences do not cover the entire field of man's social life. There are portions of that field—e. g., movement of population, vice and crime—which lie beyond the domain of the older and better-defined sciences; in which the preliminary work of exploration has only recently been undertaken; and in which little has been accomplished beyond the collection of data by statistical observations. For lack of a more definite term¹¹ social science is used in a restrictive sense to describe these newly-entered domains of investigation.

By gradually stripping the more specialized theoretical fields from the general Social Science, nothing was left to it, according to this view, except the fields of population and morals. Population was the speciality of Munroe Smith's brother, Richmond Mayo Smith, who held the chair of Social Science at Columbia University through the late eighteen-eighties and the eighteen-nineties. It is particularly interesting to note the beginnings of this movement to separate political from social science as outlined above by Munroe Smith. As he points out in this passage, there had been a particu-

¹⁰ *Loc. cit.*, I: 1-8.

¹¹ In a footnote the author, Munroe Smith, continues: "For the science of population the Germans are beginning to use the word *Demologie*. This new science, strictly speaking, lies only in part within the circle of the social sciences; in part it reaches out into natural science, i. e., biology."

larly close academic connection between the two fields, as is evidenced by the titles of university departments, although probably not many political scientists had affiliated themselves with the American Social Science Association. Because the general run of political scientists were concerned especially with constitutional history and public law, they had affiliated more particularly with the legal fraternity, and later with the historical association, when it was formed in 1884. Only those political scientists with an ethical bent, like Lieber and James (already mentioned), felt a close affinity for Social Science. The association of Social Science and political science in the university departmental organization had been largely an administrative device of placing together two late comers in the field of academic instruction which could be handled by one and the same person and for which there was as yet no extended demand among the students. Sometimes the term "social science" in the department titles meant nothing more than the grouping of all the other social sciences together with political science.

The Results of the Withdrawal of the Theoretical Disciplines. The withdrawal of political science from the general field of Social Science, as sketched above, was not particularly different from the segregation of history and economics, except that it was less formal and somewhat less obvious, for reasons already stated. But when the various secessions of the theoretical social sciences had finally been accomplished, by the middle or end of the eighteen-eighties, Social Science as represented by the organized Association took another slump, even more marked than that which had occurred in the eighteen-seventies, when the practical and reform disciplines for the most part withdrew. It was about the same time—the movement became observable on a national scale in 1889¹²—that the remaining theoretical preoccupation of the Social Science group began to segregate itself academically under the title of sociology. Courses and departments of sociology soon began to replace those of Social Science, as will be made concretely evident in a later chapter. These were the body blows from which the old discipline, Social Science, never recovered. The attempt at a theoretical synthesis of the social sciences was too great a task for the equipment of the men who had undertaken it. The trend was for the time being in the opposite direction.

Sociology, as the most immediate successor of Social Science, was ac-

¹² See L. L. Bernard, "Some Historical and Recent Trends of Sociology in the United States," *Southwestern Political Science Quarterly*, IX: 264-293 (Dec., 1928).

cused of the same grandiose temerity as Social Science was guilty of, in undertaking such a synthesis. Nevertheless, it survived the gauntlet of the protesting other social sciences who valued their separate freedom and independence. The ability of sociology to escape the unfriendly onslaughts of economics, history, and even political science, which were bent upon further differentiation instead of synthesis, during its early evangelistic history in the eighteen-nineties, was the result of two circumstances in the main. One of these was the fact that many of the abler men in the several social sciences recognized the need for such a synthesis, although they might doubt the capacity of the sociologists, as they had doubted that of the Social Scientists, to perform the work of synthesis adequately.¹³ Perhaps they also resented the contention on the part of some of the sociologists, like Small, who seemed to regard this synthesis as the chief function of the sociologists and of sociology. It looked too much like the arrogation of a general administrative function over all the other social sciences by sociology, of a sort of high-priestly function for the sociologists in the grand manner of Auguste Comte, whose pretensions in this respect were still remembered.

But the chief reason why sociology survived as an academic discipline, when Social Science as represented by the national Association could only decline, was that for many years it stuck to its academic last and left grandiose promotion schemes to the various propaganda organizations. It was for the most part content to serve humbly by developing the neglected and minor aspects of the social sciences in the college curricula. Thus it gained the reputation academically of being a sort of catch-all, but it thrived reasonably under such a dispensation. Fortunately for sociology this was a period of great expansion of the universities (1900-1930) in which there was room for every discipline to make headway. If the new discipline had fallen upon lean years in its early youth it would undoubtedly have found survival difficult and its growth would have been badly stunted.

The effect of so many withdrawals of theoretical disciplines from the Social Science Association, however, was disastrous for that body. It continued to decline. Its only recourse now, with its theory support passing away, was to hark back to the practical and reformistic interests. Anyway, the leaders of the movement were better equipped for this line of rehabilitation than for theoretical synthesis, in spite of all their efforts in that direction.

¹³ A. W. Small's *The Meaning of Social Science* is very largely an attempt at a vindication of this task for the sociologists and of their ability to perform it.

The Swing Back to the Practical. Although as late as 1881 Harris stated that Social Science was gradually concentrating on family nurture,¹⁴ the eighteen-eighties mark in general a swing back to a more practical conception of the task of Social Science, a trend which we can trace in the words of Sanborn, who as secretary of the American Social Science Association, was probably the strongest single integrating factor in this decade when the more theoretical aspect of Social Science—history and economics and to a less degree, political science—began to split off from the parent organization.

By 1880 there had been time to gain a perspective on the history of the organization, and to see what changes had been taking place in viewpoint and orientation. Sanborn remarks upon the change from the philanthropic or reformistic to the more theoretical emphasis, but confesses that as yet the work being done in the field of Social Science cannot be designated by the title of science.¹⁵

Those who remember the call, issued by the Massachusetts Board of State Charities in August, 1865, for the first meeting of our Association, in Boston, will no doubt recollect that it dwelt mainly on the philanthropic side of Social Science, with some slight reference to its statistical aspect. Perhaps it has been too much the fashion, both here and in England, to regard our new science as but another form of philanthropy. Horace Greeley, at our Albany meeting in 1869, spoke of Social Science as "the diffusion of knowledge, virtue and happiness." This definition does not please the French and English patentees of that recent metaphysical invention which they call "Sociology;" nor does it satisfy the exact student of science, who has been taught to divorce his wishes and his aspirations from his perceptions, while he is investigating nature. To many of these scientific men the possibility of a *social* science is not demonstrated, and if it were, they would draw a broad distinction between such a science and philanthropy. Their business is, they say, to see things as they are, not as they might be or ought to be. . . .

An American writer says, "The great test of true science is the possibility of successful prediction, and its most perfect illustration is that given by astronomy. . . ." "Science," he adds, "has invaded the domain of human society so little, as yet, that in most of the branches relating to law and government, prediction is not thought of, except in an empirical way, as a forecast of things likely to happen in the future, from what has happened in the past." It is probable that this writer leaves too much out of view what we call ethics or moral science, which proceeds by strict deductions, if not by intuition, and which has

¹⁴ "The Education of the Family, and the Education of the School," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 15, 1881, p. 4.

¹⁵ Report of the General Secretary, *ibid.*, No. 11, 1880, pp. vii-viii.

much to do with the science of society. Still, for the present, we must admit that the term "science" cannot be applied to our pursuits, in the same sense that it describes the researches of the geologist, the chemist and the astronomer.

The swing away from the theoretical is even more marked, as evidenced by Sanborn's paper of the next year, 1881, where he says: "But the helping hand—the practical sense and administrative skill of public officials, high and low, of those men (and of late years women) who administer important private trusts—are of great service to social science, which, by its very nature rushes to an application, and will not longer abide, like speculative philosophy, in the light air and confused limbo of theory. We are pupils in such a school as that of Mr. Squeers, where the first class in hydraulics daily took a turn at the pump." ¹⁶

A New Orientation. In contrast to his earlier statement of 1874 on the work of Social Science, Sanborn now presents a far more active and a much less theoretical program for the discipline. The threefold task of Social Science is now educational, administrative, and agitative.¹⁷ From this point of view, Social Science becomes frankly a technique of social reform, more practical than theoretical, scientific, or academic. It was, indeed, a difficult problem to keep the various conflicting interests—practical, reformistic and theoretical-scientific—in harmony. Thus, as Sanborn said in 1882,¹⁸

It is often a difficult matter to steer the course of our Association between the Charibdis of theory and the Scylla of practical application—the demand being constant on both sides—for a stricter philosophy of social science, and for a more immediate every-day use of the principles and measures approved by social science. . . . It is necessary, sometimes, to stimulate or even shock the public mind by announcement of general principles, at variance, as such principles must be, with the general practice. At other times it is even more necessary to neglect theory, however logical, and attend to practice, however imperfect.

Apparently the secession so to speak of those interested in the more academic phases of Social Science and their separate organization as historians and economists withdrew some of the sources of conflict, although as late as 1891, Andrew D. White suggested "that in future, efforts be especially made to secure papers—from men in active contact with the greater lines of business in the country, and especially with the management of banks, railways, express companies, forwarding companies, in-

¹⁶ "The Three-Fold Task of Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 14, 1881, p. 31.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

¹⁸ Report of the General Secretary, *ibid.*, No. 16, 1882, p. 13.

surance companies, and the like. In saying this, I do not at all discourage the presentation of theory. . . ." ¹⁹

Federalism Replaces Organic Unity. After the secession of the theoretical disciplines a new viewpoint entered in. Social Science was now, according to Sanborn, simply the theory and practice of human welfare as developed by all of the social sciences. He said, "Social Science . . . as we have often had occasion to notice, is not one science, but all sciences in one application, —that is, as they bear upon the welfare of men in their social confederacy." ²⁰ Again, in 1890, he tells us: ²¹

It is to discover and amend what is wrong in the habitual life of men that social science applies itself most usefully,—not to promulgate broad theories or insist on ambitious panaceas for every human ill, but to consider the ailment and apply the remedy patiently and repeatedly, as a mother heals the hurts of her children. Social Science, the daughter and the mother of civilization, finds in this paradoxical genealogy nothing more paradoxical than herself; at once the result and the cause of profound instrumentalities working to alleviate human misery and exalt human life above the material necessities out of which its wretchedness and its exaltation mysteriously flow.

The note of Emersonian mysticism is strong in this definition, it will be noted, reflecting Sanborn's discipleship of Emerson's philosophy. Two years later Social Science was a "federation of sciences." ²²

Even the title of this federation of sciences—this syndicate of philosophy, economics, philanthropy, ethics, and natural science—is the invention of our century, and was quite unknown to those pioneers of social science, Vico, the Italian, who invented the philosophy of history, Adam Smith, the Scotchman, who invented political economy, as we understand it, and Franklin, the American (greatest of the three), who put social science upon the plainest practical footing, while opening to mankind the broadest theatre for its demonstration, by joining with Washington and Jefferson in laying the foundation of the American Republic. Our awkward name covers an infinitude of indispensable things, most of which have been brought to light in our country.

In these later statements, it is to be noted, the term social science is more frequently than ever written in lower case letters and is no longer considered as a proper name attached to a discipline. Indeed, as Sanborn implies, social science is becoming a generic term, even to the Social Scientists

¹⁹ "Instruction in Social Science," *ibid.*, No. 28, 1891, p. 6.

²⁰ F. B. Sanborn, "The Pleasures of Social Science," *ibid.*, No. 18, 1884, p. 19.

²¹ "The Work of Twenty-Five Years," *ibid.*, No. 27, 1890, pp. xlv–xlvi.

²² F. B. Sanborn, "Social Science in the Nineteenth Century," *ibid.*, No. 30, 1892, p. 1.

themselves, including all of the social sciences. The differentiation of the work of the Association into several specialized social sciences is having its inevitable effect. Many of its adherents are giving up the attempt to establish an organic and unitary Social Science and are reconciling themselves to the hope of securing a common principle of unity among the social sciences in terms of their common purpose, that of promoting the social welfare. But even this common element of motivation toward human betterment was to be lost in the following decades because of the shift of the interests of these disciplines in the direction of technique, to which we have already referred above, and the consequent higher value put upon the expansion of the content and method than upon the social results in terms of welfare that might be achieved through the use of the science as a tool.

Social Science Is for Human Use. The repudiation, or at least the neglect, of the humanitarian ideal of Social Science which characterized the seceding theoretical Social Scientists, drew forth a protest from John Eaton, who believed that science was for man, not man for science. He quotes President J. Peter Lesley, of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, in this connection as follows: ²³

Let the warning cry fill the air of scientific associations, from meeting to meeting, that science is our means, not our end. Self culture, man's culture, is the only real and noble aim of life. . . . Every successful study of the laws of the world we inhabit inevitably brings about a more intelligent and victorious conflict with the material evils of life, encouraging thoughtfulness, discouraging superstition, exposing the folly of vice and putting the multitudes of human society on a fairer and friendlier footing with one another. The arts of philanthropy are therefore, as direct an outcome of science, as the lighting of the public streets or the warming of our homes.

Then, in his own words, Eaton continues: "Is science for man or man for science, and can there be any good for science that is not good for man? Indeed, is there any good in science that is not measured by its benefits to mankind? How else can the value of its qualities be determined? And yet how often scientific men will have almost infinite patience in watching a mosquito or an ant to learn its ways, and no patience whatever if they are asked to make the results of their researches useful to the world." ²⁴

This protest was, of course, to no avail. The social sciences were becoming ends in themselves, whereas formerly they had been means to ends.

²³ "Word on the Scientific Method in the Common Affairs of Life," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, p. xv.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Small was almost the only one left in 1910 to cry out against this trend toward the submergence of social ends which utilized science as means.²⁵ The days of the Social Science Association were clearly numbered. It could now claim for itself no more important function than that of a federative delegate assembly from disciplines which did not even care to send representatives. Its members were self-elected and they were no longer truly representative of the great social science disciplines that had grown up from the body of the mother Association.

²⁵ See Albion W. Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, 1910.

The End of the American Social Science Association

The Final Phase. We have now come to the final chapter in the history of the American Social Science Association. This history represents a long, if not an always valiant, struggle on the part of men of greater than ordinary vision to establish a unified science of society which could and would see all human problems in their relationships and make an effort to solve these problems as unified wholes. The need was obvious and the effort to meet this need was undoubtedly a worthy one. We have seen how the struggle was carried on with varying degrees of success. It has also been possible to point out some of the tactical errors of the leaders in this movement as well as many of the difficulties against which they had to contend. It is not necessary to go into detail here regarding these difficulties. Perhaps there was no other issue possible to this movement than the one which finally eventuated. It remains to describe in the present chapter the final events in the history of the Association. In the following chapters it will be our task to give an account of a somewhat similar rise and decline of Social Science as an academic discipline. After that we have only to deal with the methodological theories and practices of Social Science.

Declining Interest in the Association. With the continued specialization and splitting off of separate disciplines, interest in the general discipline of Social Science declined. Just as philanthropic and reform organizations had split off in the eighteen-seventies, and history and economics in the eighteen-eighties, so in the eighteen-nineties sociology was beginning to segregate itself as an independent discipline, first in the universities and colleges and later within the American Economic Association, until it finally organized an independent society of its own in 1905. Similarly, other disciplines like political science, education, public law, labor legislation, agricultural economics, etc., integrated themselves and organized independent societies of their own. In spite of this disintegrating process, however, men like Andrew D. White still believed that there was room

for a general Social Science as well as for the specialties.¹ In 1891, the Philadelphia Social Science organization, which had been originally a subordinate branch of the American Social Science Association, came under the academic patronage of the University of Pennsylvania and became the American Academy of Political and Social Science, whose *Annals* were a formidable rival to the *Journal of Social Science* itself. This rivalry was apparently sensed in 1891 by White, who hoped nevertheless that both organizations could function together. He declared:²

Among subjects for congratulation, I also name the establishment at Philadelphia of the Academy for the Promotion of Social Science. It comes, properly indeed, in this twenty-fifth year of our corporate existence. So far from being injurious to the work of this Association, it ought to be, and can easily be made, most helpful to it. The function of the new organization will doubtless be to promote the most exact scientific study of all subjects in the great field. Ours will doubtless be, while presenting such studies and investigations, to bring them to bear more fully upon a larger public. Both organizations should go hand in hand, each supplementing the work of the other.

The hopeful prediction, however, failed to be realized. The American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia not only grew more rapidly and outstripped the American Social Science Association, but it had also changed its original designation as a Social Science association by admitting the term Political Science as coordinate with Social Science.

The Demise of the Association. Finally, in 1909, there seemed no longer any function left for the American Social Science Association to perform. The two following statements, respecting the original province of the Association as conceived in 1865 and the final decay of the organization in 1909, present by vivid contrast the whole course of the history of this phase of Social Science. It will be noted that John H. Finley still hoped, as late as 1909, that Social Science might find a place among the sciences as a correlating discipline. The triumphant optimism of the early days of the Association is illustrated by the statement below, which is by Sanborn.³

The scope of our aims and studies in 1865, when we embarked, with the confidence of inexperience, on the wide ocean of Social Science, was almost as broad and vague as that which the ancients denominated under the term "wisdom." We had taken all knowledge to be our province, like Bacon, and only limited its extent by the proviso that it should concern mankind in their social relations.

¹ "Instruction in Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 28, 1891, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

³ "Society and Socialism," *ibid.*, No. 33, 1895, pp. 20-21.

But to what branch of knowledge, which region of research, does not that condition apply? Astronomy and the study of the fourth dimension are found to have a direct bearing on human society. We are men, like the old Greek father in Terence, and nothing that concerns men is out of our province. Such, at least, was our early undertaking.

And then, fourteen years later, came the valedictory, by John H. Finley:⁴

I asked for the American Social Science Association the privilege and honor of representation at this great associational festival,—not that I desired its President to be heard on any of the social, economic, or political questions of the day, but because I wished the noteworthy service of this most venerable and distinguished institution to have filial remembrance; for she is now the mother, the enfeebled mother, I regret to say, grandmother, or aunt, of most, if not of all, of the associations now existent in the territory where once she dwelt alone in her omniscient interest. She sits in old age, impoverished by the very activity, the highly specialized and splendid activity, of her learned and scientific children, grandchildren, nephews, and nieces, who have so intensively cultivated each its field of the once wide-stretching territory that nothing is left to her except to live of their fruits and in her own memories. I will not believe that she has not yet years before her of usefulness,—perhaps in correlating all these knowledges here represented, the Presidents of these various descendant societies sitting at her council.

Another Attempt at Integration. Before we leave the story of the American Social Science Association, and of its unsuccessful attempt to integrate the field of Social Science, we may digress long enough to point out that in the eighteen-nineties another group of men, members this time of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, made a similar valiant effort to carry on the old Social Science tradition, that is, an integrated attack on the problems of society by means of science.

In 1894, Mr. James A. Skilton, of New York, read a paper before Section I—Economic Science and Statistics⁵—of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, entitled "The Science of Society:—Has the Time

⁴ Opening Address, *ibid.*, No. 46, 1909, p. 1.

⁵ The Section on Economic Science and Statistics was formally established in 1881 and began functioning the next year. Heretofore the subject matter had been dealt with in Section A, on Mathematics and Physics (Ezekiel B. Elliott, "The Section of Economic Science and Statistics: Its Scope and Its Limits," *Proceedings American Association for the Advancement of Science*, XXXII: 445, Aug., 1883). The Section had studied "a vast extent of special subjects relating to man, his nature, his possessions, and his surroundings of all kinds, including facts tending to show the condition and changing condition of communities, races, individuals, and interests" (*ibid.*, p. 447). The point was that "an early and continuous knowledge of the condition and changes of condition of a community . . . may tend greatly to its welfare" (*ibid.*).

Arrived for the Formation of a Complete and Fully Organized Section of Sociology by the Association?" The answer to this question was apparently in the affirmative, for the next year the name of Section I became Social and Economic Science, with the intended emphasis very largely on the Social Science aspect. The chairman, or vice-president, of the new section, Mr. B. E. Fernow, of Washington, indeed doubted the propriety of even including Economic Science in the title, since "at least since this Section I was formed, if not before, it has been recognized, that political economy or economics was only a branch of a larger science, the science of the social biology of man."⁶ He then continues with a statement of the essential interdependence of all phases of Social Science:⁷

. . . Social biology . . . [can] not be satisfactorily developed for any length of time without reference to, and without an equal development of, all the other branches of the system. Hence to be abreast with the times, at least in classification and nomenclature, we should rechristen this section to be the section of Social Science, which to my mind would assign it its proper place in the concourse of sciences represented in the Association. Social Science would then have to determine the forces and laws and to explain the phenomena of social life and, finally, as applied social science, to direct the development of the political, economic, commercial and social intercourse of man; these four aspects of social life being all-inclusive and at the same time so differentiated as to admit of their more or less separate study and largely—never entirely—independent development.

The characteristic ear-marks of Social Science—reform and science—are clearly brought out in the paper of Mr. William R. Lazenby, chairman of the new section, in 1895, as well as the integrated approach which this group was attempting to apply. He says, "Inasmuch as the stated object no less than the true function of the American Association is to promote the advancement of *all science*, including the science of society, it was in duty bound to aid and assist all desirable reforms, to the end that the progress of modern society, by the application of scientific principles and methods, might be advanced, and its perpetuity insured."⁸ The author proceeds next to discuss reform and science, concluding with a statement of his own faith in the existence of a true Social Science.

Failure of the Attempt. This effort to revive and stabilize Social Science

⁶ B. E. Fernow, "The Providential Functions of Government with Special Reference to Natural Resources," *ibid.*, XLIV: 326 (Aug.-Sept., 1895).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ William R. Lazenby, "Horticulture and Health," *ibid.*, XLV: 219-220 (Aug., 1896).

through the American Association for the Advancement of Science was no more successful than the various other attempts, but it does illustrate a fact easily apparent to the student of the history of the Social Science movement: the workers in the older and more exact sciences were always more kindly disposed to a general Social Science than the various specialized social scientists themselves. The formation of the American Social Science Association was, as we have seen, in no small degree due to these more exact scientists who possessed humanitarian or social interests.

The reasons for the failure of the attempt to establish an active Social Science section in the American Association for the Advancement of Science are perhaps more numerous than can be recorded here. One of these is undoubtedly the fact that various specialized social science associations which claimed the major allegiance of workers in these fields had already been organized before this attempt was made. Another is the fact that until very recently the terms of admission to membership in the American Association for the Advancement of Science have been such as to exclude those persons most likely to be interested in such a section. As a consequence the programs of this section of the American Association for the Advancement of Science have been made up for the most part of men largely outside the field who have had favorite theories to air or by stray members of other associations who for some reason, perhaps proximity to the meeting place, have been attracted to the sessions. In recent years an effort has been made by the American Association for the Advancement of Science to interest members of various social science associations in the program of Section K, and these attempts have been not wholly without success. But the resulting programs are made up of papers on social science in the generic sense rather than in the signification of Social Science as an inclusive discipline. The old meaning of Social Science, as treated in this volume is all but forgotten by modern social scientists.

Résumé of Trends. What, then, *was* Social Science in this, its eclectic phase? In 1865 it was an undifferentiated discipline embracing all aspects of social life, with a marked social welfare bias, and with an equally marked emphasis on the application of the method of science to social problems. To its more practical disciples, it was an applied science with strong emphasis on philanthropy. To its more theoretical adherents it was an abstract or synthetic science. Thus doubly oriented, it embraced widely varying interests and attracted men of different fields, each of whom conceived Social Science according to his own line of interests.

Originally the partially specialized disciplines, such as political science, political economy, moral philosophy, public health, philanthropy, penology, jurisprudence, education, immigration, the family, etc., were conceived as integral parts of the synthetic discipline of Social Science or Science of Society. But as the problems of these specialized disciplines became increasingly complex, and as their work of investigation was carried on with ever greater exactness and detail, they split off with Social Science and developed as independently organized sciences. Thus, in the end, Social Science as such was compelled to give up its claim to all-inclusiveness and sought merely to be a coordinating science, counteracting the distorting tendencies of too specialized approaches to social problems and the forgetfulness of social welfare that resulted from the several disciplines becoming ends in themselves.

Although the American Social Science Association as such died in 1909, the need for its function did not then cease. For almost twenty years the centrifugal tendency among the specialized social disciplines went on unabated until finally it was recognized that the advantages of specialization involved numerous disadvantages also. The organization of the Social Science Research Council is one of the several indications that there is a trend back to the old Social Science ideal of organic unity and coordination. It serves somewhat, as did the old Social Science organization, as a coordinating mechanism whereby the necessarily one-sided approaches of the various specialized disciplines may be in part counteracted. Various research foundations, like the Russell Sage Foundation, and research institutes in social science, like those at the Universities of North Carolina and at Virginia, and the inclusive Institute of Human Relations at Yale University, constitute further evidence of the same sort of trend in coordination. The various so-called orientation courses in the schools and colleges indicate a similar trend back to the early Social Science emphasis upon unity. It is also becoming increasingly difficult to allocate research problems and even courses in universities and colleges to the several social sciences individually, so marked has the overlapping of the various social science disciplines become. Not infrequently, perhaps commonly, an actual social problem which must be treated administratively or from the standpoint of investigation is recognized as falling within the spheres of two or more of the social sciences and therefore as calling for cooperative treatment or prosecution from as many different angles and by a similar distribution or association of experts. It has even been suggested that the in-

dependence of the several departments of the social sciences as they now exist in the universities should be abolished and some sort of integrated group administration be substituted. Such a plan would probably be adopted if it were not for the jealousies of the representatives of such several departments, on the one hand, and for the high degree of specialization of many of the men in the departments, on the other hand, which prevents them from possessing a sufficiently wide grasp of the whole field of social science to enable them to be wise and fair administrators over the group of social sciences as a whole. Other signs of, and factors making for, such a trend have also been cited in this chapter and need not be repeated here. It would seem, therefore, that the Social Science movement, in its eclectic aspect, which was begun in 1865, and which was momentarily interrupted after 1909, might resume its course once more, re-integrating and re-synthesizing the disciplines which split off from it during the first decades of its existence. The disintegrating period, roughly speaking, extending from 1865 to 1909 may, in the ultimate perspective of history, find its counterpart in the period of attempted reintegration beginning around about 1925

PART NINE

Social Science in the Schools and Colleges

The Academic Phase of Social Science: Preliminary Developments

In the preceding chapters we have traced the curve of development of the eclectic phase of the Social Science movement as it was represented by the American Social Science Association. We saw it come into being after the Civil War, watched it rise in the late eighteen-sixties and early eighteen-seventies, saw it reach its zenith only to decline once more as specialized disciplines, practical and theoretical, broke away from the general Social Science discipline. In the work of some of the economists who were also nominally Social Scientists, or at least members of the Association, we saw the complete collapse of Social Science as the reform or humanitarian ideal was repudiated and the theoretical aspect exalted.

During this same period, that is, during the last third of the nineteenth century a parallel and analogous, although not identical, development was taking place in the academic phase of Social Science. In the present division of this volume, therefore, we shall describe in some detail the curve of the rise and decline in Social Science as a college and university subject, tracing the new discipline from its early beginnings to its final assimilation by sociology and other social sciences.

The New Educational Outlook. The last years of the nineteenth century witnessed a tremendous agitation in the academic world for the introduction into schools and colleges of courses dealing with current social problems. The only comparable period in social science curriculum projection was that of the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century. At this earlier period the proposed social science curricula centered about the new problems of national independence, largely political and economic in nature. It was at this time that the numerous plans were drawn up for a national university with provision for the study of concrete legal, political, and administrative problems. Jefferson's plans for the University of Virginia reflect this general interest in the academic study of national questions. At the end of the nineteenth century, however, in ad-

dition to increasingly complex economic, legal, and political problems, there was emerging a bewilderingly complex set of social problems which could no longer be understood on the basis of common experience or settled on the basis of common sense. The Social Science curricula now projected, therefore, made room for the study of these questions.

Academic Aspirations of Social Science. We have already seen that by the late eighteen-eighties, F. B. Sanborn, the secretary of the American Social Science Association, had come to look upon the introduction of courses in Social Science into universities and colleges as the most important function of the Association. So far as the students were concerned this was not a difficult task. Social Science was a course eagerly sought by students, perhaps as a relief from the remote academic subjects which still constituted the main contents of college curricula. It was a subject that touched home. Sanborn described the situation in 1885 as follows: "I regard the introduction of definite instruction in the social sciences as a whole, into so many American universities as both the result and the extension of our work in this Association. The zeal with which such instruction is sought, wherever it is offered, sufficiently indicates the need of it, and also that the time has arrived when it can be given with broader scope and for more practical uses than ever before."¹

Of course both of these factors—the agitation of the American Social Science Association and the enthusiasm of the students for the subject—played an important role in the introduction of Social Science into the schools and colleges. But equally important was the fact that, due to the increasing urbanization and industrialization of American life, scores of new social and industrial problems were arising in this country. Pauperism, which in earlier community life could be treated on a primary-group level, by means of direct friendly relief and encouragement, was now seen in the abstract perspective of a derivatively organized world. Institutionalized relief had become necessary on a large scale. Public health could no longer be left to private medical care; sanitation was a public concern. Capital and labor were now abstract forces, not concrete individuals whose problems could be settled on a primary group basis of personal bargaining. Government also was becoming increasingly complex and intricate. Indeed, all social life was showing the effects of the industrial revolution. It was organized more and more on an abstract, derivative basis. No longer

¹ F. B. Sanborn, "The Social Sciences, Their Growth and Future," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, p. 12.

could its problems be understood in terms of primary groups and attitudes. Good and generous motives did not suffice to make good citizens. Knowledge of social problems in a derivatively organized world was also requisite.² The schools and colleges would have to meet this need for knowledge or fail utterly in their functional adjustment to modern life. Curricula would have to be completely overhauled to make room for the pressing problems of the day. Reorganization of courses, introduction of new ones—in short, a total re-vamping of higher education—was required.

The College Curriculum. In the earlier years of the century there had been one prescribed course for all college students. Later they were allowed a choice between the Classical Course and the Latin Course. About the middle of the century, with the growing agitation for the application of science to all the arts of life,³ Scientific and English Courses were introduced as alternatives to the Classical and Latin Courses. Usually the only difference between these new courses and the Classical Course was the substitution of a science or two for Latin and Greek. Even the Science Course nearly always prescribed Latin, but omitted Greek. The subjects were, however, strictly prescribed and fixed, as in the Classical Course. But with the expansion of the curriculum the voluntary or elective system was gradually introduced, since many more courses were now available than simply the earlier prescribed ones. In most colleges a combination of required and elective systems was used. The first two years were usually prescribed, but a limited choice was allowed in the last two or at least in the senior year.

The listing of these various types of curricula became so complicated that in the eighteen-seventies and eighties courses began to be listed in departments, with specifications as to whether they were required or elective, rather than in fixed curricula. The old traditional senior courses in mental and moral science became organized as Departments of Mental and Moral Philosophy, of Political Science, History, etc. As the number of students increased and as new teachers were added, the lists of courses expanded accordingly, thus allowing some personal preference on the part of the instructors as to the courses which they taught, as well as of the students as to the courses which they took. The internal organization of the colleges was, therefore, prepared for the assimilation of the new Social Science

² L. L. Bernard, "The Conflict between Primary Group Attitudes and Derivative Group Ideals in Modern Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLI: 611-623 (Mar., 1936).

³ The Morrill Act, establishing the land-grant colleges—the first publicly supported agricultural colleges in this country—illustrates this trend.

courses, which both students and current social conditions demanded, by the time these courses were formulated.

The First Courses in Social Science. The members of the American Social Science Association did not themselves know the actual extent of the teaching of Social Science in schools and colleges. Sanborn in 1885 summarized briefly the history of the introduction of Social Science courses as he knew it, as follows: ⁴

Perhaps the earliest example of this systematic teaching of social science in American colleges and universities was in a Massachusetts college not far off (at Williamstown) where Professor Perry, in connection with his speciality of political economy, has for twenty years given more time to the generalizations of social science than most college instructors. Next to Williams College, in point of time, has been the university of Michigan, so far as I know; for there several departments of social science have been dealt with by lectures for the past four years. Dr. Edward S. Dunster (whom I remember at Harvard college thirty years ago), has given two lectures a week for half the university year at Ann Arbor to the discussion of the more direct social problems, such as Popular Education, the Labor Question, the Burdens and the Prevention of Pauperism, the Punishment of Crime, etc. Professor V. C. Vaughan at the same university has been lecturing during the same four years on sanitary science, including a discussion of food, water supply, clothing, heating and ventilation, healthy homes, etc. His first class in 1881 consisted of four students with some few citizens of Ann Arbor; his class last year contained 112 students. At Harvard university Professor F. G. Peabody, a clergyman, commenced systematic instruction in social science last year to a class finally consisting of 50 students. . . . Another clergyman, Reverend S. W. Dike, of Royalton, Vt., a well-known member of our association, has also introduced social science in the past year at the Andover theological seminary, where he gave six lectures on "The Family, with Special Reference to Social Problems." The subject was treated from the moralist's point of view, with some regard to doctrinal theology; and this course was perhaps the first on such topics ever held in a divinity school.

A third clergyman, Reverend R. E. Thompson, of Philadelphia, better known as an author and a professor in the University of Pennsylvania, has for some years been lecturing at that university, on those themes of social science which are closest connected with political economy, on which Professor Thompson is an authority for his school of opinion.

Incompleteness of Sanborn's Account. This sketch is wholly inadequate as a picture of the actual progress of Social Science in schools and colleges up to that time. As a matter of fact, Social Science had been creeping into

⁴ "The Social Sciences, Their Growth and Future," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, pp. 7-8.

college curricula for almost thirty years. Out of a sample of 231 colleges whose catalogues were examined in great detail, 83 or 36 percent mentioned work in Social Science some time or other between 1859 and 1915. However, this does not mean that other colleges did not give courses covering essentially the same material. Practically every college that made any pretensions to a complete curriculum, for example, had a course on Social Problems, or Social or Practical or Applied or Christian Ethics. There were many philosophy of history and history of civilization courses. But in the present study no course has been claimed for Social Science which was not specifically designated as such by the teacher or by some other person describing its contents. We are here interested in the concept of Social Science and therefore we may legitimately disregard courses which, though identical in content with Social Science courses, did not take over the name.

Credit for the first course in Social Science in this country actually belongs to Oberlin College rather than to Williams College, as is frequently asserted. For several years before Perry introduced his course at Williams in 1865, Oberlin had been offering "Lectures on Social and Political Science" in the senior year (1858-1871). Nor is mention made in Sanborn's account of the Department of Political and Social Science established at Yale in 1872, nor of Sanborn's own work at Cornell beginning in 1884, nor of Social Science in the smaller colleges. His sketch indicates, however, what he considered to be the most important developments in the subject up to the date of his writing (1886) and illustrates how little the men immersed in the movement actually knew of its extent. We shall supply the omissions of Sanborn's account later on in the present chapter.

Development of Social Science at Harvard. It is interesting to catch inside glimpses of the motives which led to the introduction of these new Social Science courses, of their contents, and of their reception. Of the Oberlin course, unfortunately, we know nothing, except its name and the fact that it was instituted. On the other hand, Sanborn secured personal statements from both F. G. Peabody and R. E. Thompson, which, together with his own statement and that of Andrew D. White, constitute excellent and probably representative case pictures of the process by which Social Science burst into college curricula at a later date. Peabody, whose approach was by way of ethics, described his own course and its reception as follows: ⁵

I was led to my subject by a somewhat different road from most of those who deal with it. As a teacher of ethics I became aware of the chasm which exists

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-8.

between such abstract study and the practical application of moral ideals; and it seemed to me possible to approach the theory of ethics inductively through the analyses of great moral movements, which could be easily characterized and from which principles could be deduced. I studied thus with my class the problems of Charity, Divorce, the Indians, the Labor Question, Intemperance, with results of surprising interest. My class, under our elective method, grew from ten to fifty and was made up from five departments of the university. Each student made written reports of personal observation of some institution of charity or reform; and from these data thus collected I endeavored in each case to draw out the ethical principles involved. The results of the examination showed that the students felt a living interest in the subjects treated; and I think they will be more public-spirited as citizens and more discreet as reformers by even this slight opportunity for research. There is in this department a new opportunity in university instruction. With us it has been quite without precedent. It summons the young men who have been imbued with the principles of political economy and of philosophy to the practical application of those studies. It ought to do what college work rarely does—bring a young man's studies near to the problems of an American's life. What you say of the conflict with *laissez-faire* economics is precisely that which, under each head of my discussion, I have tried to make clear; and it is refreshing to see that young men are quick to see the insufficiency of that school.

Various Approaches at Harvard. It is interesting to note that this course of Peabody's was not called Social Science in the college catalogue.⁶ It appeared in the Divinity School under the title of Practical Ethics (1881), later as Practical Ethics of Social Reform, and again as The Ethics of the Social Question. In 1895 Peabody listed a Sociological Seminary (subject for 1895-96, "The Christian Doctrine of the Social Order"), and in the following year both his ethics course and his seminar were listed together under a Social Questions Department. Thus, significantly, what Sanborn considered Social Science was called Practical Ethics, indicating the strongly normative character of the subject at Harvard at this time. Harvard, indeed, had a long and honorable history of ethical teaching with a social slant. As early as 1843, Lieber's *Political Ethics* was an elective in philosophy in the college and a course on Christian Ethics was listed in the Divinity School. By 1845 Lieber's *Political Ethics* was the text used in a required senior course, and although it was dropped in 1846 in the college, it was retained in the Law School. In 1852 the Divinity School added Practical Divinity, which may have been much like Peabody's later course, although we have no way of

⁶ Neither was Perry's course at Williams College listed as Social Science, but under the generic title of political economy or history. Yet as Sanborn points out, it specifically and definitely emphasized Social Science and the teacher so stated to his pupils and others.

knowing. Peabody's course was, therefore, not altogether an innovation in ethical teaching at Harvard.

On the more theoretical side Harvard students were introduced to Social Science of the Comtean type as early as 1857 when Mill's *Logic*, which as we have already seen was considered by some American scholars as merely an introduction to the Positive Philosophy, was used as a text in senior philosophy courses. It was dropped two years later (to be resumed in 1881), but apparently in the interim the students were expected to know something about Comtean philosophy, for in 1867 one of the three subjects for the Bowdoin prize was "The Present Prospects of the Positive Philosophy." In 1870, John Fiske lectured on the Positive Philosophy, at a time when he himself was imbued with the possibilities of the new science.

Nor was the economic phase of Social Science lacking at Harvard. In 1876, Carey's *Social Science* (McKean's condensation) was one of the texts used in Advanced Political Economy. And it is interesting to note that in 1890 the Political Economy Department added a separate course on Social Questions.

Social Science at Pennsylvania. This economic approach, rather than the ethical one of Peabody, was the one used by Robert Ellis Thompson at the University of Pennsylvania, and by many others in smaller schools and colleges. Like Peabody's course, however, the one offered by Thompson was tremendously popular. Describing his procedure, Thompson said: "I change every year the ground traversed, so as to keep the subjects fresh to myself. I generally take up the living questions in political economy, and give my lectures as footnotes to the newspapers. But I also include more general topics of social science,—such as Communism, Socialism, Organization of Charity, Prison Discipline, the Elevation of the Working Classes, the Temperance Problem, Public Education. My lectures are open to the public, and in some years I have quite a considerable attendance. One year I had to adjourn my class to the college chapel." ⁷ Thompson's book, *Social Science and National Economy* (1875), was widely used as a text. It was as we have seen, quite in the Carey Social Science tradition. In this volume Thompson defines Social Science as "that branch of the science of man which treats of man as existing in society and in relation to his material wants and welfare." ⁸ Political economy was the corresponding art.

⁷ F. B. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 8-9. For an interesting account of Thompson's work at Pennsylvania see J. H. S. Bossard, "Robert Ellis Thompson, Pioneer Professor in Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXV: 239-249 (Sept., 1929).

⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 11.

Social Science at Cornell University. At Cornell, White and Sanborn, like Peabody at Harvard, came to Social Science by way of Social Problems, but with a technological rather than a purely ethical slant. Andrew D. White, who had been influenced by Spencer in his organization of Cornell University,⁹ described how he came to invite Sanborn to teach Social Science at Cornell as follows:¹⁰

During the four . . . years previous to 1869, as a member of the Senate of the State of New York, I had had frequent occasion to regret want of knowledge in various departments of Social Science, not only in myself, but in most, if not in all, of my colleagues. As a member of the Committee on Municipal Affairs in that body, I was called to look carefully into the organization of various institutions—charitable, penal, and educational; and in open Senate I had not infrequently to take part in earnest discussion regarding the establishment and maintenance of such institutions, intended to meet the needs of a State embracing not far from five millions of inhabitants. . . .

This experience showed me that in the establishment and maintenance of such institutions, while injury is frequently done by local, political, or sectarian bias on the part of the legislators, the present injury, after all, is generally wrought by their ignorance of fundamental theory and of approved practice.

It was in view of this experience that I welcomed the early meetings of this Association. The papers read by Henry Villard, Goldwin Smith, and others who then came together in the little room at Albany, threw a new light upon the whole subject. Therefore it was that, at a very early day in the history of Cornell University, I urged my fellow-Trustees to establish a department, or at least a lectureship, which should do something toward training up young men for future usefulness in these fields, giving them a better knowledge of such subjects than legislators generally possess. My hope was that some of these young men, during their after career,—in the pulpit, through the press, on boards of educational and charitable institutions, Village Boards, County Boards, in City Councils, State and National Legislatures,—would turn their knowledge thus acquired to good account as regards the development and maintenance of State and local institutions for charity, correction, and education.

As soon as the funds of Cornell University permitted, this plan was carried out; and Mr. F. B. Sanborn, the first Secretary of the Massachusetts State Board of Charities, was called to give the instruction required. In sketching out my plan to Mr. Sanborn, I had suggested, first, courses of lectures which should acquaint students with the problems to be solved, and with the best solutions of them yet obtained at home and abroad; and, next, I proposed that there should be something analogous to laboratory practice,—that is, that, under the guidance of the Professor, the students should visit the local and State institutions, especially those of a penal and charitable character, study them with care, report upon

⁹ A. D. White, "Instruction in Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 28, 1891, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-3.

them, and discuss their reports in the classroom. Such investigations, study, report, and discussion would, I thought, interest them in such subjects, would lead them to observe carefully, to think upon their observations correctly, to discuss them earnestly, and to treasure up the fruit of such observation, thought, and discussion for after use. The result did not disappoint me. I need hardly say that Professor Sanborn improved upon my crude suggestions, developed them fruitfully, builded far better than I knew, and made the instruction a thorough success. A large class of thoughtful young men came to his lectures. Cornell University is fortunately situated as regards the practical study of the problems involved; it was easy for his classes to visit with him, not only such local institutions as the neighboring County Jail and County Poorhouse, but also a large number of State institutions in the vicinity of the University, among them the State Prison at Auburn, the Penitentiary at Syracuse, the State Reformatory at Elmira, the House of Refuge (now the Industrial School) at Rochester, and the State Asylums for the insane at Utica and Ovid. The reports made and the discussions held on these were admirable.

The coming into the University Law Faculty of Professor Collin, so well known by his admirable work at the Elmira Reformatory, and so thoroughly equipped by his connection with State legislation at Albany, led to his appointment to the position formerly held by Professor Sanborn; and the instruction is still going on with results calculated to inspire hope in every well-wisher of our race.

This simple statement is made because it indicates, better than an elaborate argument can do, what part our leading Universities and Colleges can take in the evolution of Social Science, and especially in its relations to penal and charitable work. The whole result of this experiment strengthens my hope that men thus trained in the Universities of the various States may go forth into positions of influence, and especially into our legislative bodies, local, State and National, to improve our old charitable and penal institutions and methods, and organize new ones.

This account by President White affords a very illuminating insight into the nature of the necessity which gave rise to Social Science courses in schools and colleges. Social problems had to be handled some way or other. As a legislator White saw this clearly. The need for scientific data with respect to proper ways of meeting these problems struck him forcibly. He was determined, therefore, that young men at Cornell should have such data available.

Sanborn's Account of His Course. We may get an idea of the concrete nature of the course at Cornell from Sanborn's own detailed description of it, which is as follows: ¹¹

¹¹ "The Social Sciences, Their Growth and Future," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, pp. 9-11.

For several years past President White had been proposing to me a course of lectures on social science, in some of its many applications, to be given at the university which . . . owes its marked success and rapid growth to his wise, persistent and patient direction. . . . I had said to him that, while I distrusted my own fitness for the task, I would undertake it, so soon as he would indicate definitely what course of instruction would be suited to the young men and women under his charge at Ithaca. It seemed best to him, in 1884, to begin the new department neither with ethics nor economics nor with what is broadly termed sociology, but with practical lectures on the treatment of the public dependents,—the insane, the poor, the vicious and the criminals of an American state—illustrated and enforced by visits to the larger establishments in the "Empire state" of New York, several of which lay in easy proximity to Cornell university. Such a course did not exclude, but rather required exact definitions of these different classes among the great mass of the dependent and dangerous persons for or against whom society must provide; and I endeavored to base these definitions, not on an assumed metaphysical state of mind in the abstract man, but on the actual state and circumstances of many thousands of such persons who had come under my notice in some twenty years' contact with them. An experience of this kind naturally leads one to generalize, not without deduction, but on the whole inductively, and with a regard to the probable rather than the inferred or hypothetical result of what might be done concerning the classes in question. Such generalizations I threw into the form of introductory lectures, tracing historically the methods of dealing with crime, pauperism, insanity, preventable disease, public vice, etc., and showing how these evils and therefore the mode of meeting them had been affected by the changing conditions of modern civilization. I purposely avoided most of the doctrinary points about which writers have been disputing for centuries, except as these seemed to have been settled by the consent of mankind. But of course it was not possible to avoid meeting the chimera of non-interference by government. My hearers were instructed so far as thirty lectures and visits to prisons, asylums and poorhouses could do so, that civilization itself is an affair of restraint and mutuality of help among individuals; that where self-restraint fails, this help consists in actual restraint by others; that the manifold forms of restraint and assistance, which good parents exercise toward their children, must also be exercised by the virtuous community toward its weak, vicious and rebellious members who are to the majority as children are to parents; and that the experience of mankind fully justified this view of social ethics. Of course I pointed out that individualism must be respected and cherished,—that there was a hurtful as well as a helpful paternalism, and that experience,—not bald axioms and doctrinaire precepts—must be the guide of mankind, as it commonly had been. I therefore preferred that those who heard me should form their own opinions from observation rather than indoctrination; that they should not "run of a notion" as our New England grandfathers used to say, but should look into every case as it came up, and apply the tests of fallacy according to common morality and common sense.

Such being the plan and the course being in a two-fold sense *experimental*, we were compelled to diverge from a strictly logical path by the visits which we made to the public establishments. Thus early in the series of lectures an opportunity offered to visit Mr. Brockway's remarkable reformatory prison at Elmira—which in itself is a social science university—so that I turned aside, after a general view of the social sciences and their manifold application in a single lecture, to give three upon Crime, Punishment and Prison Discipline. The most useful of these, no doubt, was that conference which we held in the Elmira reformatory, in the very presence of the class whose character and conduct we were studying. Few of those students who made the visit are likely to forget the impression then received. . . .

We then passed along, by two general lectures on Public Education, Public Health, and some economic aspects of social science, to the consideration of public poverty, to prepare our minds for a visit to the county poorhouse. This was followed by a few lectures on Insanity and its Treatment, historically considered, in anticipation of a visit to the largest collection of insane persons in the United States—the Willard asylum on Seneca lake—where we spent a whole day, and were thus enabled to examine thoroughly the economy of a great and well-managed public establishment. Subsequently, and in the light of practical observations already made, we took up again, for more thorough discussion, the problems of public charity, of crime and insanity, the education and reformation of poor and vicious children, the management of prison labor, etc., closing the course with a visit to the old-fashioned state prison at Auburn, where we found the convict industries demoralized by the absurd agitation against convict labor. In this tentative course of instruction, with a miscellaneous class of students, numbering from forty to sixty, it was not possible to be systematic in the sequence of topics and order of visits, which we called our "laboratory work." . . . I was agreeably surprised, as all who lecture on these subjects seem to be, with the warm interest manifested, and progress made by most of the class. Special works of study and reference were given out to them; they were required to write essays on topics involving research and their acquirements were tested by oral examinations.

Sanborn's Later Teaching. Sanborn's academic work in Social Science was not limited to Cornell. A few years later, in 1887, he gave a series of four lectures at the Boston University School of Medicine which, apparently, were quite stimulating to the medical profession. The content of these lectures was as follows: ¹²

First lecture. "I. Who, and how many, the Dependent and Delinquent Classes are. 1. The physically defective, including the blind, the deaf-mute, the idiotic, the congenitally disfigured, the crippled, etc. 2. The mentally or morally abnormal, including the insane, the inebriate, and unbalanced or 'cranky' class,

¹² From *Journal of Social Science*, No. 28, 1891, pp. 20-22.

etc. 3. The unfortunate, and therefore dependent, including widows and orphan children, and old and infirm, strangers in the country, persons thrown out of work or suddenly deprived of means by fire, flood, or other calamity. 4. The sick, with those dependent on them. 5. The vicious, including persons habitually intemperate, prostitutes, vagrants, petty thieves, young offenders, etc.,—with the families of such, or persons who depend on them more or less. 6. The criminal class including those who suddenly or habitually commit crime, and are either in prison or are living in the community, and may at any time be arrested for crime,—with those dependent on them and often involved in their crimes. 7. The actual inmates of such public establishments as prisons, almshouses, hospitals for the sick, the insane, etc., schools for the blind, deaf, and idiotic, asylums for special classes, such as old men and women, soldiers, sailors, orphans, etc. 8. Estimated number of these classes. II. General and Special Duties toward the Classes Named. 1. Duty of the State as representing the whole community. 2. Duty of the public in its individual capacity. 3. Duty of the professions, and especially the medical. III. The Health of the Community and of Individuals as an Agent in Producing the Dependent Classes. 1. Sanitary conditions and ordinary sickness. 2. Contagious diseases and epidemics. 3. Insanity and its causes. 4. Maternity and diseases of vice. IV. Anomalous Position of the Medical Profession in regard to Disease and Vice." *Second Lecture*. "V. The true Character of a Public Establishment for a Dependent Class. 1. Its relation to the State and the public treasury. 2. The admission and detention of its inmates. 3. Their sanitary condition and treatment. 4. Their visitation and inspection by individuals or committees. 5. Professional and general criticism upon the management of an establishment. 6. Its direct educational value to the medical profession. VI. Hospitals for the Sick and the Insane. 1. These two classes unreasonably separated in medical education. 2. Insanity a specialty, but also involving the most general considerations. 3. Insanity in general practice. 4. Clinical instruction as necessary in regard to insanity as to surgery or ordinary disease. 5. The Westborough Hospital as related to the Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital and Boston University School of Medicine. VII. Almshouses of the State or the Municipalities. 1. Indoor and outdoor relief. 2. An almshouse necessarily a hospital in some degree. 3. Outdoor relief and dispensary practice. 4. The Massachusetts system of outdoor relief. 5. The regulation and visitation of almshouses. 6. The almshouse at Tewksbury and its history. 7. The city almshouses of Boston." *Third Lecture*. "VIII. Maternity Hospitals and the Care of Young Children. 1. The need of maternity hospitals in cities, and the evils to be guarded against. 2. Infanticide and the desertion of children. 3. The Massachusetts system of care for motherless infants. 4. What may be done by physicians in this matter. 5. The disposal of 'children of the State.' IX. Truant Children and Juvenile Offenders. 1. Vagrancy among children and grown persons. 2. Truant schools and local or private reformatories. 3. State reformatories. 4. The family system for reforming young offenders." *Fourth Lecture*. "X. Prisons and their Inmates. 1. The convicts themselves. 2. Their families and dependents. 3. Discharged prisoners. XI. General remarks on the whole subject."

Of this syllabus Andrew D. White said, "This document . . . should . . . be brought out of our archives, republished, circulated, and made the basis of university work."¹³

Sylvester F. Scovel, in 1888, in an article on "The Value of a Liberal Education Antecedent to the Study of Medicine," likewise discussed the value of Social Science to the medical profession and of the medical profession to Social Science. Among other things he said:¹⁴

As to social science there can be no controversy. Who shall be interested in and influential about that corner-stone of social organization—the family—if not the one we significantly call the family physician? He is the true Social Scientist. Society can never be what it must be without an army of liberally educated, broad-minded, and large hearted physicians . . . What reform is there, really such, which the physicians could not carry if they would. Political science goes with social, because one cannot conceive under our skies of any man willing to be anything less than a man and a citizen. Who shall be penologists if not the doctors? . . . There is the Drink-curse. Who can tell us so well the testimony of heredity against it, or unfold the philosophy of a vicious appetite, or demonstrate a poisoned stomach so well, as the physician.

Edmund J. James' Plan. The importance of a knowledge of Social Science to professional men in other fields also was emphasized by Edmund J. James, of the University of Pennsylvania, in an address before the Philadelphia Social Science Association in 1885. He pointed out the need of a School of Political and Historical Science to serve prospective teachers, journalists, lawyers, business men, and citizens. The curriculum which he proposed included political economy, "the science which treats of the relations of man in society to the physical world about him, and of the conditions which determine the production and distribution of material wealth";¹⁵ Social Science, "that wider branch which discusses all the social forces and institutions which affect the material and moral well-being of society";¹⁶ constitutional and administrative law; and history. There should also be, he contended, courses in methods of historical and economic investigation. Such a school would train men for the various commissions for the study of railroads, the Indians, taxation, city government, etc.¹⁷ It is interesting to note that in James' outline of a proposed course, under required Political Economy are listed: Civil Government, Logic, English,

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 25, 1888, pp. 51-52.

¹⁵ *Instruction in Political and Social Science* (1885), p. 12.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

Modern History. Under Sociology are listed Administration, and American History. Under Logic and Morals are listed: Ancient History, Roman Law, General Jurisprudence, Accounting, Commercial Law, Commercial History and Geography. Under Finance we find: Economic History, Constitutional History, International Law, Pedagogics, History of Commercial Law, Practice in Reporting and Editorial writing, Mercantile Practice and Management of Property. The logic of these sub-categories is not altogether clear to us at this distance. The titles of the several individual subjects are, however, wholly clear and comprehensible. James' scheme found its fulfillment, in part at least, in the Wharton School of Finance and Economy, as we shall see later. James himself subsequently occupied the position of president of Northwestern University and of the University of Illinois, and in these institutions he was able to realize some of his ideals with regard to Social Science instruction in the preparation of young men for careers in public service.

Andrew D. White's Plan. Andrew D. White, whose interest in the promotion of Social Science was unflagging,¹⁸ himself worked out an interesting plan for the furthering of academic work in Social Science. His proposals and arguments were as follows:¹⁹

First, I would advocate the establishment, in the higher institutions of learning throughout the country, of courses of instruction in all the five main divisions of Social Science recognized by this Association [Education, Public Health, Jurisprudence, Social Economy, Finance]. Especially should there be instruction as to the best dealings of towns, counties, States, and the nation, with pauperism, crime, inebriety, and other vices, lunacy in its various degrees, the organization and maintenance of Health Boards and hospitals, general sanitary measures, and the like. Already there has been collected in this country, as in other countries, a large body of literature which would serve as nutriment for such courses. Already the field has been surveyed and blocked out with the utmost care by the reports above referred to. In looking back over the quarter of a century during which this Association has been at work, no thinking man can fail to be struck with the great number of subjects on which it has thrown light by special investigations, broad generalizations, or acute thought. Many of these have a very

¹⁸ White bemoaned the fact that Greeley's early proposal for the diffusion of scientific knowledge by means of little popular tracts had never matured. The reason was, he thought, that "there has not been until recently any adequate agency for the training up of men to write such treatises, to popularize the results obtained by experts and special investigators, through the daily and weekly press and through such tractates as those which Mr. Greeley suggested. . . ." ("Instruction in Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 28, 1891, p. 17.)

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

direct bearing on the most important problems of today,—problems, indeed, which are likely to press upon us for many years longer. To a large extent these admirable papers now lie slumbering in our archives, but such departments as these I now advocate would make them a living agency for good. The professor in these departments would bring them out, study them, modify them, supplement them, and bring them to bear on the best minds of the country. To say nothing of the wide, general results for good, such agencies would greatly increase the future efficiency of this Association; they would attract a large number of active-minded young men into its membership, provide researches for it, and take part in its discussions. Such young men would bring to it valuable practical knowledge; they would come to it from boards of Village Trustees, from boards of County Supervisors, from the governing bodies of various charities, and from many executive and legislative positions. My hope, then, is that this Association will make some special effort to promote the establishment of such departments in our leading institutions of learning.

Here I would say a word regarding the admirable tractate of the Reverend John Graham Brooks, regarding special schools for the study of the science of charity. The good results accomplished abroad, as he shows us, and the good which might be accomplished at home, are undeniable. The value—nay, the necessity of such instruction he enforced with great power. But I would suggest to him and to others that such schools can only be made most effective when they are organized in connection with great institutions which bring together the active-minded young men of the country,—the men who are to become the future managers of public institutions, and the future benefactors of humanity.

Again, the attention of men of wealth should be called more and more to the importance of endowing such departments of instruction in our Universities, and especially Professorships or Lectureships, with provision for the publication of results. . . .

The endowment for a Professorship or Lectureship should be sufficient to provide a salary large enough to secure the best talent and experience, enough to warrant some first-rate man in this field in devoting the necessary time to investigation as well as instruction. . . .

I think that the appointment in each case should be for a definite term, say three or five years, leaving it to the trustees of the institutions to which the endowment is given to re-elect the Professor or not, as they shall see fit at the end of his term.

White's plan also included the endowment of fellowships and premiums in Social Science by those who were unable to give larger sums.

Professor Peirce's Plan. Before we leave the subject of proposals and plans for the extension of Social Science instruction we should pay passing respects to a unique experiment in the history of American education, namely, the Concord School of Philosophy, and the events that led up to its

establishment. In 1878 Professor Peirce,²⁰ the distinguished mathematician of Harvard University, had proposed a rather informal institute in Social Science to be held annually at some suitably located university. Sanborn reports the proposal as follows: ²¹

Professor Peirce . . . proposed that a beginning should be made by connecting with some existing university in the United States the educational work of the American Social Science Association, which he thought should meet once or twice a year for a session of three or four weeks. At this session, which should be an extension of such meetings as the present annual one, he wished to bring together the persons in the United States best qualified to read papers and to join in debates on the multifarious phases of social science, taking up these questions as occasion served, and as the condition of the country required. The experts thus brought together should form a *senatus academicus*, not for the purpose of conferring degrees and shaping systems of instruction, but to instruct one another as well as the less advanced students who should listen to them. During the rest of the year, at this one chosen university, a regular professor of social science, who might also be the secretary of the association, was to correspond with its members and carry on the work of his department among the regular students, much as the ordinary college professor now does. The chosen university should undertake to publish at its own expense the papers and discussions of the occasional conferences, and perhaps, meet the cost of the meetings.

When, however, the plan was discussed at the meetings of the American Social Science Association, it was concluded that there was no university in existence with all the requisites for carrying out the proposals, that is, with satisfactory geographic location, permanent endowment, sufficiently broad educational views, etc.²² The plan was therefore shelved for the time being.

The Concord School. The idea was not entirely lost, however. It suggested great possibilities to Sanborn, who with Peirce's cooperation, inaugurated the Concord School of Philosophy where, presumably many of the

²⁰ Professor Peirce (1809-1880) "was not one of the original members of the American Social Science Association when organized in 1865, but he joined it in 1868 or early in 1869, and for three years gave close attention to the Department of Education, of which he was chairman from 1869 to 1872. At the time, in 1872-1873, when the virtual discontinuance of the Association was favored by many members, by reason of the difficulties attending its work, Professor Peirce was one of those who most earnestly urged its continuance; and it was mainly owing to his remarks and those of Professor Agassiz, at one of the public meetings in Boston, that the Association remained in activity during the years of panic and political change that followed the reelection of General Grant in 1872" *ibid.*, No. 12, 1880, pp. X-XI.

²¹ F. B. Sanborn, "The Threefold Aspect of Social Science in America," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 14, 1881, p. 26.

²² *Ibid.*

Social Science topics dear to the hearts of both Sanborn and Peirce were actively discussed. Great things were expected. As Sanborn himself states it,²³

The project of Professor Peirce, above described, opened in the imagination of your Secretary a vista, which seemed to indicate the natural and best form of instruction. I therefore took occasion, early in the year 1879, to lay the scheme of the Concord School before Professor Peirce, and to inquire of him whether in its field of thought it might not avail itself of the same stimulus that had been found so effective of old at Bologna, at Padua, at Salamanca, and at Paris, in the enthusiastic period of university education. Here, indeed, was to be no broad university, but the frank conference on special questions, which seemed to be the secret of the middle-age enthusiasm and success. Professor Peirce recognized the opportunity thus afforded, entered heartily into the details of the Concord plan, suggested certain measures of a practical nature and the names of certain lecturers; what was better still, he gave his own name to an undertaking concerning which men far younger than he were skeptical, both as to its feasibility first and its utility afterwards. He lived to see it moderately successful, and it has gained, since his death, a firmer hold on its province of instruction, and fully established its right to exist.

Unfortunately the Concord School of Philosophy, having established its legitimacy, did not survive any considerable length of time nor have any significant influence in extending Social Science teaching in the United States. It was, however, indicative of the spontaneous movement taking place on several fronts of the academic camp. The bewildering complexities of an urban, industrial society were assailing the academic citadels, bombarding them with problems. Sooner or later the universities were going to have to assume their responsibilities toward the analysis and administration of this difficult society. Indeed, a beginning had already been made.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

The Academic Phase of Social Science: The Work Is Established

Early Confusion in the Subject. Beginning in the late eighteen-fifties, but especially in the late eighteen-sixties, and acquiring increased momentum in the eighteen-seventies, courses in Social Science had been introduced into various schools and colleges. Details as to the introduction of these courses will be set forth presently. The content of the courses was apparently as diverse in character as the interests of their respective teachers. The confusion as to the nature of Social Science which was noted in earlier chapters in connection with the professed aims of the American Social Science Association and in the conflicting definitions of the subject matter of the discipline, was again reflected in the varying descriptions of courses bearing the title Social Science through this period. Social Science was political economy, the philosophy of history, anthropology, jurisdisprudence, social ethics, social problems, or charity, in the different schools into which it was introduced, according as the special interests of the teachers might dictate.

A Model Course. Perhaps as a result of this chaotic condition, the American Social Science Association appointed, in 1885, a committee consisting of Francis Wayland of Brown University, Edmund J. James of Pennsylvania, and F. B. Sanborn of Cornell, to draw up a standardized course in Social Science. This they did, presenting their results in due time in a report on "Topics Proposed for Lecturers and Conferences on Social Science: University and College Lectures."¹ This report, in all its elaborate detail is herewith reproduced, in order that it may be compared with the actual courses, as we shall present them shortly.

I. Department of Public Education

1. The Relation of Government to Education

a. Schools an essential part of State Policy

¹ *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1885, pp. 13-21.

- b. Primary Education to be undertaken by the Public
- c. Limits of Public Common-School Education; with the argument for and against its extension
- d. Religious and secular Instruction
- e. Special and High Schools under the Patronage of the State
- f. Education of the Poor, the Neglected, and the Vicious
- g. Relation of the State to Higher Education, Liberal, Technical or Professional
- h. Academies and other Learned Societies
- 2. The Course and Object of Education
 - a. Physical, Mental, and Moral Training
 - b. The Study of Nature and of Language
 - c. Mathematical Studies and Pure Science
 - d. Applied and Developed Science
 - e. History and Philosophy
 - f. The Family, the Church, and the State
- 3. Institutions of Education
 - a. The Kindergarten and Its Equivalents
 - b. The Governess, the Tutor, and the Private School
 - c. The Common-School of America
 - d. Co-education of the Sexes
 - e. High Schools, Colleges, and Professional Schools
- 4. Pedagogy as a Social Science
 - a. The Teacher's place in the Community and in History
 - b. Teaching by Men and by Women
 - c. Instruction Scientifically Considered
 - d. The Order of Development in Systematic Education
 - e. Conversation and Conference as a Method of Education
 - f. The Lecture System in its Professional and its Popular Aspect
 - g. Libraries and Newspapers
- 5. Moral Education as a Social Result
(These Educational topics may be extended indefinitely.)

II. Public Health

- 1. Sanitation in the Broad Sense
 - a. Why Governments must regulate Sanitary Conditions
 - b. The effect of Dense or Sparse Population on Public Health
 - c. Hereditary Influences—Longevity and Transmission
 - d. Earth, Air and Water as Sanitary Agents
 - e. The Prevailing Unsanitary Conditions
 - f. Preventives and Remedies
- 2. Birth, Marriage and Death
 - a. Vital Statistics defined and illustrated
 - b. Records of Parentage, Nationality, Diseases, etc.
 - c. Infancy and Infant Mortality

- d. Marriage Laws and Divorce in Relation to Health
- e. Poverty and Sanitation in Cities
- 3. General and Specific Diseases
 - a. The Nature and Origin of Disease
 - b. Recent Theories of Germs, of Bacteria, of Contagion, etc.
 - c. Relationship of one Disease to Another
 - d. Small-Pox as a Typical Disease—its Past and its Future
 - e. Insanity and its Causes
 - f. The Diseases of Degeneracy and Vice
- 4. Sanitary Necessities
 - a. Ventilation of Structures, and Aeration of Soils and Waters
 - b. Varying Climatic Needs
 - c. House-Building and House-Warming
 - d. Drainage and Water-Supply
 - e. Sunlight, Rain and Wind
 - f. The Removal of Offensive Substances; Burial and Cremation
 - g. Hospitals and Dispensaries
- 5. Relation of the Medical Profession to the Public
 - a. The Learned Professions all exist for the Public Good
 - b. Peculiar Relations between Physicians and Families
 - c. The Attitude of Physicians, as a Class, to the State and to Individuals
 - d. Anomalous Position of Physicians in respect to Diseases of Vice
(This also can be extended indefinitely for Medical Schools.)

III. Finance and Political Economy .

- 1. Relation of the State to Economic Questions
 - a. The Doctrine of Laissez-Faire, and its Consequences
 - b. The Right of Taxation, and the corresponding Duty of Government
 - c. Questions of Currency and Coinage
 - d. The Regulation of Useful Trade and Commerce
 - e. The Suppression or Licensing of Hurtful Trades
 - f. The Collection of Revenue Practically Considered
 - g. Expenditure by the State, its Limits and Methods
 - h. Appointments, Salaries, and Pensions
- 2. National, State, and Local Debt
 - a. Origin and History of National Debts
 - b. Their Effect on War and Peace
 - c. Borrowing Power of a People
 - d. The Localization of Public Debt; its Payment or Repudiation
 - e. Debt as a Basis for Currency and Banking
 - f. Public Property and Its Disposal
 - g. Recent Socialistic Theories. State Socialism
- 3. The Right of Property, Individual and Corporate
 - a. Foundation and Uses of Individual Property
 - b. Communism, Historically Considered

- c. Corporate Property a form of Communism
- d. The State as a great Corporation
- e. The Perpetuation of Individual and Corporate Property
- f. Land Tenure and Privilege
- g. Ownership of Land and Home as a Social Anchor
- 4. Labor and Wages
 - a. The Malthusian Doctrine of Production and Population
 - b. Over-Production and Under-Population, the Rule, not the Exception
 - c. The Wage-Fund Theory
 - d. The Cooperation of Capital and Labor
 - e. State Regulation of Income and Profits
 - f. The Hours of Labor, and Restrictions on Employment
 - g. No Conflict between Capital and Labor, but between Employer and Employed
- 5. Railroad and Machinery in Relation to Labor
 - a. Production and Distribution
 - b. Producing Machinery must be accompanied by Distributing Machinery
 - c. The Railroad the greatest Distributing Machine of Man's Invention
 - d. The Steamship Accessory to the Railroad
 - e. The Mobilization of Labor
 - f. Pauperism regarded as a Congestion of Labor
 - g. The Value and Reward of Organizers of Labor
- 6. The Problems of Pauperism Economically Considered
 - a. Natural and Artificial Pauperism
 - b. Excessive Pauperism an Artificial Product
 - c. The Circulation of Labor a Remedy for the Congestion of Labor
 - d. The Banquet of Life a Collation, or an Exclusive Feast?
- 7. Banking, Landlords, Rent, and Interest
 - a. Shepherds the first Bankers, then Slave-Masters, then Landlords
 - b. Usury and Rent Interchangeable Terms
 - c. The Landlord a Lender, the Tenant a Borrower. English Theory of Rent
 - d. Modern Banking and its Problems
 - e. The State as Landlord and Banker
 - f. The Relation of Currency to Banking
- 8. Value, Exchange, Money
 - a. The Metaphysics of Value
 - b. Social Life an Infinity of Exchanges
 - c. Money and the Medium of Exchange
 - d. The Value of Money
 - e. Credit the Child and the Father of Value
 - f. Stocks, Debentures, and other apparatus of Value

- g. The Puzzle of Monometallism and Paper Money
(And so on *ad infinitum*)

IV. Social and Domestic Economy

1. Two Aspects of Economic Questions—one looking towards Wealth, the other towards Welfare
 - a. Welfare is the Moral Aspect of Wealth
 - b. Social Prosperity and Sordid Wealth
 - c. Social Economy reconciles Wealth and Want
 - d. All Wealth Comparative; Sordid Wealth Self-Destructive
 - e. Is Free Expenditure by the Rich desirable or otherwise?
 - f. The Golden Rule as an Economic Maxim
 - g. The Social Whole is greater than the Sum of all its Parts
 - h. The Ethics of the Modern Industrial Corporation
2. Civilization and the Social Whole
 - a. Religion unites individuals; Civilization unites Communities
 - b. The Individual exists by the Community
 - c. Civil Life Contrasted with Social Life
 - d. What Classes and Social Distinctions are natural and proper?
 - e. War as an Integrator and Disintegrator of Society
 - f. Industrial Civilization replaces War and Competition
 - g. Democracy and Christianity the last results of Civilization
3. In Social Economy the Mass of the People are to be Considered
 - a. History and Biography a Record of Exceptions
 - b. Exceptional Wealth and Aggregate Welfare
 - c. The Housing and Clothing of the People
 - d. The Savings of the People
 - e. Employment and Amusement of the People
 - f. Vice as an Employment or an Amusement
 - g. Woman's Place in Social Economy
4. Financial Aspects of Social Economy
 - a. Labor and Leisure
 - b. Wages, Savings-Banks, Benefit Societies, etc.
 - c. Life and Accident Insurance
 - d. Migration and Immigration as affecting Labor
 - e. The Labor of Women and Children
 - f. Trades Unions Socially Considered
5. Art in Education and Amusement
 - a. The Necessity for Recreation
 - b. Popular Amusements Economically Considered
 - c. Art as a Bread-Winner
 - d. Museums, Theatres, Picture Galleries, and Concert Rooms
 - e. Music and Dancing
 - f. Parks, Water-Parks, and Ice-Amusements
6. Domestic Economy

- a. The House as a Workshop
- b. Cooperation in Housekeeping
- c. Economy in the Choice and Preparation of Food
- d. Education and Apprenticeship of Children
- e. Socialism as affecting the Family
- 7. Holidays and Observances
 - a. The Place of Religion in Social Economy
 - b. Sabbaths and Sundays
 - c. National Festivals
 - d. Preachers and Public Orators, Actors, Singers, etc., in Social Life
 - e. Cooperation of all Classes in Religious and Social Life

V. Department of Jurisprudence

- 1. Law in Ancient and in Modern Times
 - a. The Ultimate Sanctions of Law
 - b. Historical Development of Laws and Governments
 - c. Law in Popular Governments
 - d. The Stable and the Changeable Portions of Law
 - e. The Modern Legislature
 - f. The Modern Court with its Jury
- 2. The Penal Law
 - a. Crime Defined;—Punishment
 - b. Methods and Places of Punishment
 - c. Prison Discipline
 - d. Reformation as an Object of Legal Enactment
 - e. Pardons and Conditional Remissions
 - f. Appointment of Judges and Prosecuting Officers, Prison Wardens, etc.
- 3. Legislation and Vice
 - a. The Temperance Question from the Legal Standpoint
 - b. Prohibition and License
 - c. The Regulation of Vice by Government
 - d. Police Problems
 - e. The Revenues of Indulgence as State Property
- 4. The Amendment of Laws
 - a. Constitutions, Written and Unwritten
 - b. Statutes and Local Ordinances
 - c. Decrees and Summary Orders of Courts, Governors and Generals
 - d. Law-Amendment changes the Ukase into an Ordinance, then a Statute, finally a Constitution
 - e. The Amendment of Existing Laws and Constitutions
 - f. Parliamentary Lawyers and Judicial Legislators
- 5. The Administration of Law
 - a. Courts and their Machinery
 - b. Military, Ecclesiastical and Civil Administration

- c. The Daily Administration of Law—Official Persons
- d. The Enforcement and Penalties of Law—Appeals, Decisions, Execution
- e. The Extreme Penalty of the Law—Conquest and the Death Penalty
- f. The Conflict of Laws in different States
- 6. Legal Education
 - a. Origin of Lawyers as a Class
 - b. In Ancient and Mediaeval Times, no special Advocates or Prosecutors
 - c. The Government as Prosecutor
 - d. The Lawyer a State Official, like the Priest
 - e. Law-Studies in General, and for all Professions
- 7. The Relation of Jurisprudence to Modern Civilizations
 - a. Legal Aspects of the Family; Marriage and Divorce, Inheritance, etc.
 - b. Legal Aspects of Public Education
 - c. Legal Aspects of Public Health
 - d. Legal Aspects of Trade and Finance
 - e. The Laws of War and Neutrality
 - f. International Courts
 - g. Formal and Ethical Law; the Golden Rule

Comments on the Model Course. This, then, was the ideal course in Social Science, as leaders in that field understood it, in 1886. From the point of view of sociology, as it subsequently developed, it is interesting to note how the various subject matters were allocated. All of the material in the first section would no doubt today be considered as part of Educational Sociology, or of more specialized and technical aspects of Education proper. Of the second section, the parts dealing with Birth, Marriage, and Death, that is, Vital Statistics or Demography, are definitely sociological. We no longer treat them primarily from the point of view of public health, but we are still and perhaps increasingly interested in demographic phenomena, especially in connection with the ecological phases of sociology. Sanitation and disease, with the various problems they involve, are now relegated to specialized courses in social problems, whereas the more technical aspects of public health have become questions of medicine and sanitary engineering. With respect to the third section, on Finance and Political Economy, it is interesting to note that both Labor and Pauperism were considered as essentially economic questions. Since then, as in preceding subject-matters, the less technical aspects of Labor have been studied by sociologists, psychologists, social psychologists, and personnel workers, while the more specifically technical aspects have remained in the hands of economists,

scientific management theorists, and others interested in the production side of economics. Pauperism as such is no longer considered part of the subject-matter of economics, but has gravitated largely into a new technological department called Social Work. Courses on the distribution of wealth are now offered in departments of economics, but pauperism as a special study in relation to social adjustment has been taken over by the sociologists.

In the fourth section, on Social and Domestic Economy, the social aspects of Labor are considered (paragraph 4), leisure-time activities are discussed, and the normative aspects of wealth emphasized. Some of the statements are provocative. For example: "The Social Whole is greater than the Sum of all its Parts." Was this a lingering remnant of the Hegelian oversoul theory? Or was it a statement of the current organismic theory? Another item is "War as an Integrator, and Disintegrator of Society." Was this contrast meant to cover the various contemporary conflict theories of social organization, such as those of Gumpłowicz? "Industrial Civilization replaces War and Competition," is undoubtedly a reflection of Spencer's theory of the essential incompatibility of industrialism and militarism. Most of those subjects would now be regarded as sociological.

In connection with the section on Jurisprudence, it is instructive to observe that penology was viewed as a legal problem, much as it was at the same time in Italy and France, where the Positive School of penology was dominant, and from which we were then taking most of our ideas. Crime, in brief, was regarded almost entirely as a problem for law administrators, rather than as a matter for psychiatrists, economists, educationists, and sociologists to study and solve. Today courses on criminology pay relatively little attention to the legal and penal aspects of crime and increasingly more attention to the subtler and less formal aspects of the problem, especially to the personality and background of the criminal himself. The legal aspects of crime are left largely to courses in the law school. Social work, however, has taken over much of the interest of Social Science, as here indicated, in the legal aspects of crime and delinquency. This is especially true in connection with the juvenile court and in courses dealing with Child Welfare, Probation and Parole, and reformatory methods in general. But even Social Work has been backward in developing this field, leaving it largely still to courses on criminology in departments of sociology.

A Possible Generalization regarding Succession of Subject Matters. Possibly we might be justified, from the above data and observations, in draw-

ing the tentative conclusion that as sociology emerged as a separate college discipline it took over from Social Science the non-technical, the informal, the subtler and more psychological aspects of its problems, and especially that it appropriated the subject-matter designated as Social Economy in the Model Course.

It is interesting in this connection to note a statement made by Mrs. Talbot to the effect that the subjects of punishment and reform were unformulated, still in a state of empiricism, with no generally recognized fundamental principles. Yet these subjects, according to Tolman, were the only distinctively sociological contents of Social Science. It has been interestingly argued by some of the critics of sociology that this discipline harbors and nurtures disciplines in their unformulated stage and that as soon as they become definitely organized they tend to split off as independent subjects.²

Results of the Campaign for Social Science Courses. According to Tolman, "the crusade of the American Social Science Association to secure the introduction of social science into the universities," which culminated in the appointment of the committee which presented the above report, "brought forth good results."³ Their efforts, he tells us, were "intended to intimate to the academic world that social science deserved a place in the curriculum, and to indicate the character of instruction that should be given in this field."⁴

We may, however, question Tolman's conclusion. No doubt this report did stimulate the growth of courses in Social Science to some extent, but we have seen that such courses were already being introduced with a growing momentum into the schools and colleges of the country. An examination of Figure 1 (p. 637) will show that the distribution of new courses in this subject is quite normal in nature. There is no unexpected spurt in the years following 1885. The modal period is, to be sure, in the decade 1885-95, but we do not need to attribute this to the promotional work of the Association. The introduction of Social Science courses would no doubt have followed much the same curve without it.

With respect to the standardization of Social Science courses, the Association's work was even less unequivocally successful. The courses that

² F. L. Tolman, "The Study of Sociology in the Institutions of Learning in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, VIII: 800 (May, 1902). In this connection see also L. L. Bernard, "The Limits of the Social Sciences and Their Determinants," *Journal of Philosophy*, XXVI: 430-438 (Aug. 1, 1929).

³ F. L. Tolman, *op. cit.*, p. 800.

⁴ *Ibid.*

were actually given were by no means necessarily patterned after the model that the Committee recommended. To be sure, the model course was so comprehensive and catholic in scope that almost any course which contained any social-science materials at all might plausibly call itself Social Science. As a matter of fact there was a great deal of confusion as to the exact nature of Social Science as applied to college courses, just as there was within the American Social Science Association itself. It was, as we shall see, not infrequently confused with the rising theoretical discipline of sociology.




FIGURE 1. NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS ADDING SOCIAL SCIENCE TO THEIR CURRICULA, 1858-1913, BY DECADES. (Total number of institutions in sample studied, 231; number with Social Science courses, 83.)

The Practice at Yale: Sumner's Work. At Yale, for instance, for a number of years there were parallel courses in the Arts College under Sumner and in the Divinity School under Arthur Fairbanks and later under W. F. Blackman. Sumner's early work might possibly be characterized as sociology; that of the Divinity School, certainly as Social Science. But the distinction was not always so clear to outsiders, nor, for that matter, to Sumner himself, as the following definition of Sociology testifies:⁵

Sociology is the science of life in society; it investigates the forces which come into action wherever a human society exists. Its practical utility consists in deriving the rules of right social living from the facts and laws which prevail by nature in the constitution and functions of society. At this moment our knowledge of social science is behind the demands which existing social questions make upon

⁵ Quoted by F. B. Sanborn, "The Social Sciences. Their Growth and Future," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, pp. 6-7.

us. It is to the science of society, which will derive true conceptions from the facts and laws of the social order, studied without prejudice or bias of any sort, that we must look for the correct answer to those questions.




FIGURE 2. NUMBER OF INSTITUTIONS ADDING SOCIAL SCIENCE OF SPECIFIED NATURE TO THEIR CURRICULA, BY DECADES
(See p. 667)

Here sociology and Social Science were apparently considered to be synonymous. In the content of his course, Sumner followed very closely the pattern set by Spencer, including of course his emphasis upon the data drawn from primitive peoples and the institutions of early society. But Sumner

himself, it seems, was never entirely satisfied with either Sociology or Social Science as a designation for the science of society or, as he later called it, Societology. And he least of all wanted his science confused with social problems courses. Sumner, as is generally known, became Professor of Political and Social Science at Yale in 1872. His courses in Political and Social Science the following year were based on Mill's *Political Economy*, Lieber's *Civil Liberty*,⁶ and Woolsey's *International Law*. In 1875 it was announced that Sumner would "instruct in Constitutional Law, with lectures on the History of Politics and Finance in the United States; also, in Sociology." Sumner called this latter course Sociology until 1887 when it became Anthropology. The following year, 1888, it was changed to Social Science, but in 1895 it was again changed, this time to The Science of Society. In 1899, in addition to Anthropology, Sumner listed a course in Systematic Societology in the Graduate School. In 1900 it was again Science of Society and it apparently remained under this title thereafter.

Of the course in anthropology, the title of which he changed to Social Science, he says, "[it is] a very elementary course in the structure of society, and the origin and laws of development of civilization, on the basis of prehistoric science, ethnology, and archaeology. The topics will be illustrated by plates from the whole literature of Anthropology, and by visits to the Museum."⁷ Then he adds, significantly, that "the course will be occupied entirely with positive information and scientific method, and will not take up any of the subjects of criticism and speculation popularly connected with 'Social Science.'" Again in 1896, in order to distinguish his work from the Social Science course in the Divinity School, he says of the Science of Society: "This course is strictly academical both in subject and method, and does not take up topics popularly classed under 'Social Science.'"

Work in the Yale Divinity School. Parallel to Sumner's courses in the College of Liberal Arts was the work of Fairbanks and later of Blackman in the Divinity School. It was in 1892 that Dr. Fairbanks first listed History of Social Ethics in both the College (Department of Psychology, Ethics, and Philosophy) and the Divinity School. In addition he taught a variety of other courses in the Divinity School, including in 1893 a course on Social Problems. This latter course is described as follows:⁸

⁶ Lieber's works had been recently edited by ex-president Woolsey, of Yale, whose course work Sumner had come to take over. It was but natural that he should at first probably offer the same work that Woolsey had himself given.

⁷ See published list of courses, 1887.

⁸ See published list of courses for 1893.

The aim of the course is to trace in history the causes of present difficulties, and to criticise the efforts that have been made to deal with these difficulties. Some of the topics are as follows: I. The Social Organism, different modes of social activity, and the stimuli which produce this activity. Different types of social aggregates. The relation of the individual to the social organism. II. The history of Labor in England and America, with special reference to the origin of the present industrial classes and the present industrial difficulties. Socialism; its theory of the state, and its economic analyses. III. Pauperism and Crime. The causes of pauperism, and the history of charity and poor-relief. The criminal classes; punishment and recovery of criminals; the prevention of crime.

The next year, 1894, this course was taught by William F. Blackman in the Divinity School, and by 1895 it was called Social Science. In 1896-1897 Blackman's courses included Christian Ethics, Sociology as related to Christian Ethics, and American Social Problems, such as socialism, communism, anarchism, the ethics of party government, Civil Service reform, races and immigration, the modern city, the wage-system, employer-employed relationships, social classes, crime, commercial ethics, the Church as a social influence, city missions, and university settlements. And by 1900 Blackman's department was called Christian Ethics and Sociology. Blackman left the next year and the department was called Christian Sociology until 1910. Thereafter it was supplanted by a Department of Pastoral Service, a Department of Social Service, and various other related departments.

Significance of the Confusion at Yale. This brief résumé of the situation at Yale is presented to illustrate the confusion with respect to Social Science and the emerging discipline of sociology in the last years of the nineteenth century. The abstract, scientific ideal in the old discipline was being segregated into the new subject of sociology; while the old social reform ideal was being incorporated into courses on social problems. In the transitional period, while this segregation and redistribution were taking place, it was not yet definitely established which title was to be assigned to which discipline. Thus at one time Sumner's theoretical course was called Social Science, while the practical course in the Divinity School was being called Sociology. It was not until well into the twentieth century that the allocation of titles was definitely established, the term Sociology being increasingly applied to the theoretical discipline and various titles, such as Practical Sociology, Applied Sociology, and Social Problems, to the practical side of the old Social Science material.

Social Science Work at Columbia. Social Science at Columbia, under Richmond Mayo-Smith, was closely related to the new science of demog-

raphy or vital statistics. At least Smith himself handled the subject mainly from that standpoint, and his books (*Statistics and Sociology*, 1895, and *Statistics and Economics*, 1899) were written from the standpoint of the statistical and demographic approaches to social problems. But the conception of Social Science at Columbia in the late eighteen-eighties and the early eighteen-nineties was broader than this and included, at least tentatively, the subject of sociology itself, as the following quotation from the Columbia college catalogue will show:⁹

C. STATISTICS AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

1. Statistical science: Methods and results.—This course is intended to furnish a basis for social science by supplementing the historical, legal, and economic knowledge already gained by such a knowledge of social phenomena as can be gained only by statistical observation. Under the head of statistics of population are considered: race and ethnological distinctions, nationality, density, city and country, sex, age, occupation, religion, education, births, deaths, marriages, mortality tables, emigration, etc. Under economic statistics: land, production of food, raw materials, labor, wages, capital, means of transportation, shipping, prices, etc. Under the head of moral statistics are considered: statistics of suicide, vice, crime of all kinds, causes of crime, condition of criminals, repression of crime, penalties and effect of penalties, etc. Finally are considered the method of statistical observation, the value of results obtained, the doctrine of free will, and the possibility of discovering social laws. Two hours a week. Professor Mayo-Smith.

2. Communistic and socialistic theories. . . .

3. Sociology.—The courses of sociology, of which several are expected to be given will be announced later.

When the promised courses in sociology arrived they were segregated into a separate department or chair, but under the general division of Social Science, where they remained until the present day.

The Courses at Leland Stanford. Leland Stanford University in 1891-1892 listed among the courses from which the work of the Department of Economics and Social Science of the following year would be selected, a course on Social Science, with special reference to Public Charities and the Management of Penal Institutions. Amos G. Warner, who wrote a widely used text book entitled *American Charities* (1895) was a member of the departmental faculty beginning in 1892. He had joined the Stanford faculty from Johns Hopkins University, where he had been trained in that institution's brilliant late eighteen-eighties, when Albion W. Small, Frank

⁹ Quoted by Albion W. Small, "Fifty Years of Sociology in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXI: 744-745 (May, 1916).

W. Blackmar, E. A. Ross, and others were students, and Herbert C. Adams, Richard T. Ely, and E. W. Bemis were among the teachers of Social Science there.

The Work at Johns Hopkins. Johns Hopkins University, which Small credits with creating a new leaven in university curricula,¹⁰ was presided over by President Daniel Coit Gilman, to whose views we have already repeatedly referred in preceding chapters. This university had, from its inception, laid considerable stress on the social science disciplines, especially political science, political economy, and history. In describing its work in 1887, the Department of History and Politics, under the leadership of Herbert B. Adams, states as one of its aims that of giving "advanced instruction in history, economics, historical and comparative jurisprudence, historical criticism, methods of research, historiography, politics, administration, social science, and statistics for graduates. . . ." ¹¹ Interestingly enough, among the courses listed in this department we find E. R. L. Gould giving "occasional short courses of practical lectures upon concrete problems of Social Science, and upon Economic and Social Statistics with illustrations by graphical methods." ¹² In 1890 the lectures on Social Science were given by Amos G. Warner, who at that time laid special emphasis on labor problems. However, much of the content which in other schools was often taught under the general title of Social Science was here given by various other departments, including Psychology and Pedagogics, and in public lecture courses. In 1891 the announcement for the Department of History and Politics informs us that "For several years the scientific researches of graduate students have been more especially in fields of American institutional and economic history. There is now a growing tendency to extend inquiries into the broader domain of comparative politics and economics, social science, and education."

In a sense, the joint seminar for graduate students in the social sciences at Johns Hopkins University, carried on under the administration of President Gilman and Dr. Herbert B. Adams for so many years toward the end of the eighteen-eighties and participated in by all instructors and graduate students in the several social sciences, might be called a seminar in Social Science. It was given this joint character partly because of the small number of graduate students, as judged by present day standards, but

¹⁰ A. W. Small, *op. cit.*, p. 730.

¹¹ *Loc. cit.*

¹² *Loc. cit.*

primarily because both President Gilman and Dr. Adams considered all of the social sciences as constituting together an essential Social Science unity. They desired, therefore, that all of their graduate students should be exposed to all points of view and to all angles of instruction in the social sciences.

Later Courses at Johns Hopkins. For the year 1892-1893, arrangements had been made for six introductory lectures in Social Science by President Gilman. Gould was to give fifty lectures on Current Social Problems in Europe, to be followed the next year by his course on Social Science and Statistics. Warner was to lecture on Charities and their administration, while William T. Harris was scheduled to lecture on the Philosophy of Education and James MacAlister on the History of Education. Describing the work of 1892-1893, in Political Economy and Social Science, the Department of History and Politics informs us that Professor Gould was scheduled to lecture on social economics and statistics over a three year period, covering:¹³

(1) Existing social legislation in the principal countries of Europe, from the comparative point of view and with reference to underlying principles and present problems; (2) Statistics, embracing an analytical statement of the activities of individuals and of industrial and social organs, together with comparative standards of existence in their relation to economic competition; (3) Growth of social institutions, with particular attention to the family and its modern environment, together with the social problems of large cities; (4) Ten public lectures on "The life of European workingmen compared with that of American workingmen."

By 1896 this course was called Social Economics or Municipal Sociology. In 1897 Gould was no longer listed as offering courses, while Sidney Sherwood presented a graduate course on Economic Sociology. In 1900 Adams was deceased and the departmental title was changed to History, Politics, and Economics. Under the sub-title of Economics and Social Science we find a large number of economics courses, but Social Science has now become simply Charities and Corrections with the explanation that "Dr. Jeffrey R. Brackett, Chairman of the Board of Charities and Corrections of Baltimore, gives a course of lectures and conferences on Public Aid, Charity and Correction. The work affords a practical as well as a theoretical introduction to these important public questions." By 1901 the term Social Science had dropped out completely from the descriptive matter of the

¹³ *Loc. cit.*

catalog, although the same course of lectures on charities and correction was still given in the Department of Political Economy.

Variations in Content. Here we see a very interesting development in the evolution of Social Science. At first Social Science was apparently closely related to Statistics, as Mayo-Smith had developed it at Columbia. Under Warner, it was pretty much a labor problems course; and under Brackett it was simply philanthropy, more or less as Sanborn conceived it. With the clarification of the academic division of labor which was taking place at the beginning of the twentieth century the title Social Science was dropped altogether.

The Academic Phase: Social Science in the Smaller Institutions

Early Confusion as to Content. We have had occasion to observe the great variety of interpretations of the proper content of the subject called Social Science in the larger and more highly standardized educational institutions of the country and also in that stronghold of authority regarding the field, the American Social Science Association. It may be easily imagined that the differences of opinion on this matter were not less marked among the smaller and the newer colleges. Such differences actually did exist, as the present chapter will readily demonstrate. In earlier chapters we have shown that one of the major directions in which Social Science was developed before the establishment of the American Economic Association as a separate scientific body was that of economic problems. A brilliant succession of writers and teachers had, as we have shown, emphasized this trend especially in the four decades of the eighteen-fifties to the eighteen-nineties. The same trend was of course to be found in the colleges. Thus, in 1866, the year after Perry is said to have introduced Social Science at Williams, there was listed at Lawrence College (Appleton, Wisconsin), a course on Social Science in which Wayland's *Political Economy* was the text.

The Trend at the University of Illinois. From the earliest inception of the University provision, at least on paper, was made at the University of Illinois for instruction in Social Science. In November, 1867, the Committee on Faculty and Course of Study reported to the Board of Trustees of this new university a plan for a course of study which included, among many other subjects, that of Social Science. In an earlier report, made in May, 1867, this committee had suggested six departments, one of which was General Science and Literature. This department was scheduled to include a course in History and Social Science. The Committee recommended the establishment of fifteen professorships, one of which was in History and

Social Science. At this period the University of Illinois was little more than a small land grant college established under the provisions of the Morrill Act passed earlier in the eighteen-sixties. In fact, the University had been established primarily for the purpose of conforming to this Act and of obtaining the grant of lands and other federal aid which would flow from this procedure.

It is perhaps worth while to pause at this point to note how the men responsible for the making of the curricula in these new land grant colleges felt called upon to justify the less practical and more general subjects of instruction which they proposed. These colleges had, of course, been established for the purpose of teaching agriculture and the mechanic arts, but competent instructors in these subjects could not always be found, especially since the demand for such men had been so suddenly increased. But there was probably also some sense of guilt back of the rather elaborate apologies of the curriculum makers. The administrators had been trained for the most part in the old line cultural subjects and they believed thoroughly in their educative value. Often they looked upon such a large expansion of the merely "practical subjects" with a good deal of misgiving as tending to cheapen the educative process. Furthermore, here was, in a considerable number of states, the first opportunity that had presented itself for the establishment of a state college or university to compete with the private institutions of higher learning. They could not easily resist the strong temptation to make these state institutions comparable in the instruction offered with their rivals for academic favor. Thus we find the faculty of the University of Illinois in the very beginning apologizing for the inclusion of the mental, moral, and social subjects, in the following words. "The philosophical and speculative sciences, embracing mental and moral philosophy, and historical and social science, address themselves to minds already well matured, and powerfully exercise the reflective faculties. . . . Mental and Moral Philosophy, Logic, History, Political Economy, Civil Polity, and Constitutional Law, will all properly enter into the course as philosophical and speculative studies, and because of their high practical values."¹

The Department of History and Social Science in 1868 listed five history courses, three political science courses, political economy, and a course in

¹ *Report of Committee on Courses of Study and Faculty for the Illinois Industrial University, May, 1867, pp. 53, 55.*

the history of civilization, which included an "analysis of historical forces and phenomena." The general description of the department in 1871 is as follows: "The studies in this department are designed to afford a general view of the history of mankind, and of the phenomena of the social organization and progress of the race. They will also embrace the history of the Arts and Sciences, of Civilization, the principles of polity and law, the philosophy of history, and the principles of political economy and constitutional law." Essentially the same organization persisted until 1891, indicating that at the University of Illinois, Social Science was closely assimilated to the philosophy of history approach, just as at Lawrence and Williams Colleges it was decidedly economic in viewpoint.

The Ethical Approach at Princeton. At the Princeton Theological Seminary a Department of Christian Ethics and Apologetics was established in 1871. The first year of this department's existence it listed chiefly apologetics courses, but, it announced that "It is proposed to add next year an Ethical course, discussing Christian Ethics theoretically, historically, and in their living connection with various branches of Social Science, together with the moral and practical relations of Christianity to civilization, thus illustrating and vindicating Christianity on its ethical side."² The teacher of this department was Charles A. Aiken. By 1894, and possibly earlier, the course was called Christian Ethics and Christian Sociology. Here, then, as at the Harvard Divinity School under Peabody, we see illustrated the ethical approach to Social Science.

Arkansas Copies Michigan and Illinois. In the very first year of its existence, 1872, the University of Arkansas listed Social Science among its senior courses. The Executive Committee, reporting on plans for the permanent organization of the University, felt called upon to justify the less immediately practical subjects, as in the case of other land-grant colleges. They pointed out that the land grant laws permitted the teaching of scientific and classical studies such as those taught in ordinary colleges, including, among other academic subjects, Social Science. In subtly justifying these subjects the Committee stated that "Man is something more than the artisan, and . . . manhood has duties and interests other than those of the workshop and the farm. Education must fit for society and citizenship as well as for science and industry. The educated agriculturist and mechanic will not infrequently be called to serve in senate chambers, guber-

² Published description of courses,

natorial chairs, etc., and will need an education broader and better than the simple knowledge of his art.”³ Since this University was modelled after Illinois and Michigan,⁴ it is not surprising to find that the Executive Committee proposed a course in History and Social Science.

Where the Economic Emphasis Is Important. In 1873, the senior year at Gettysburg College included lectures on Political and Social Science, in the Department of English Language and Literature. Lacking any concrete description of this course it is difficult to determine just what its content was, especially since there were separate courses on Political Economy, Constitution of the United States, and History of Civilization. Smith College, also in the senior year, 1875, listed Social and Domestic Science, but there is no way of determining just what was meant by this title. The Agricultural College of Boston University (at Amherst) listed, in 1875, a course in Social Science based on the writings of Carey, Bastiat, Perry, and Walker—clearly the political economy branch of Social Science. The senior year at Penn College (Iowa) in 1876 included a course on Social Science and Political Economy, presumably also of the economic type of Social Science.

The Work at Iowa State College. In the same year, 1876, another Iowa college, the State Agricultural College at Ames, was offering post-graduate work in Social Science. Here, too, as at Amherst and Penn College, the approach was by way of political economy, for when the course in Political Economy was described some years later, in 1878, it was called a division of Social Science in which “the laws of labor . . . the principles of capital, money, foreign trade, tariff, taxation, and all the influences that quicken or retard exchange,” are taught. “The student,” continues the description, “thus gains a thorough acquaintance with the scientific data that underlie and regulate industry. He becomes intelligent, moreover, in all questions of public policy respecting which there is such a wide diversity of opinion.” At the same time a course in sociology is listed and described as comprising “the data of the science, namely, the feelings, ideas, and wants of man, the primitive condition of the human race—its superstitions, er-

³ Report of the Executive Committee (1873), p. 159.

⁴ The Report of a Committee appointed “for the purpose of visiting the Agricultural and Industrial Universities of Illinois and Michigan to inquire into the method of conducting and discipline of the same; also, to secure architectural plans, specifications, etc., of buildings” was published along with “Communications from Officers of the Colleges of the above-named States” in 1873.

roneous beliefs, and the impulses by which savage tribes struggled up into civilized nations. A brief account will also be given of the origin and growth of government, law, science, religion, industry, and art. The object sought is simply to lay the foundation for future acquisitions."

Some years later (in 1884), however, Political Economy and Social Science appeared in two different departments, one entitled Department of Mathematics, Political Economy and Commercial Law, and the other called Department of Psychology, Social Science and Applied Rhetoric. In the latter department the courses were Psychology, Sociology, and Applied Rhetoric, indicating that by now Social Science had become Sociology. The approach was historical and therefore this course belongs to the philosophy of history type of Social Science. The descriptive statement says that sociology "includes the systematic study of the many forces whose development constitutes the progress of the human race. It embraces . . . a careful survey of the growth of governments from early despotisms to the later republics. It discloses the progress of the sciences, the arts, and the industries, from their crude beginning to their present vast magnitudes. It traces, in short, all those movements by which civilization advances and the world gets on."

We need only compare this statement with the one that follows under the title of the History of Civilization (1887) in order to see to what degree the terms Sociology, Social Science, and the History of Civilization were confused in this institution. The History of Civilization course, 1887, was described as

The study of those forces which promote civilization. . . . One of the main objects sought . . . is to gain a clear knowledge of the origin and progress up to the present time, of the practical sciences, arts and industries previously studied and practiced in the different industrial departments of the college. In this way it will be seen that the study of the History of Civilization is in full harmony with the industrial courses and that the student can hardly attain the complete mastery of his specialty until he knows its history as one of the civilizing forces.

The attempt is also made to give a clear, yet concise, history of the origin and growth of government, religion, science, language, education, industry and mechanic arts; in short, to scrutinize rapidly the forces, both natural and supernatural, by means of which the primitive savage was, as the centuries passed, metamorphosed into the civilized man.

Texts and references included Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, Tylor's *Early History of Mankind*, Lubbock's *Origin of Civilization*, Spencer's *Princi-*

ples of Sociology, and Buckle's *History of Civilization*. Here again we see the college administration justifying the inclusion in an agricultural college of courses not strictly technological in character.

The Approach at Rutgers College and Elsewhere. In the same year (1876) in which Social Science was introduced into the State College of Iowa at Ames, another college, this time in the east, namely Rutgers, offered post graduate work in Political and Social Science, including advanced Political Economy, Constitutional History and Jurisprudence of the United States, History of the English Constitution, and Elements of Roman Law. We infer that the Social Science in the title of the department referred chiefly to the work in Political Economy, since the other courses were definitely of the character of political science.

Bowdoin College in 1877 was using Thompson's *Social Science and National Economy* as a text in Political Economy, indicating the economic character of Social Science taught there. At the University of the Pacific in 1878, in the department of Political and Social Science, were listed courses bearing the titles Political Economy, Political Science, Guizot's *History of Civilization*, Draper's *Intellectual Development of Europe*, Buckle, and Woolsey's *International Law*. Presumably this indicates a philosophy of history approach to Social Science, since the non-historical titles refer more specifically to Political Economy and Political Science, assigning by a process of elimination the historical titles to the field specified for Social Science. In 1895, however, Social Science had become "Theory of Sociology; a Study of the Structure of Society," and the authors of the texts indicated were Small and Vincent, Patten, Ward, Giddings and McDonald.⁵ Two years later, in 1897, the course dropped Social Science as a title entirely and became simply Principles of Sociology, based on Giddings' *Principles*. At Adrian College, as early as 1878, the work in Political Science and English Literature had specified "Political or Social Science," but here the subject was sociology rather than Social Science proper when it finally emerged as a separate course in 1881.

At Upper Iowa, in 1879, Lieber's *Political Ethics*, and a course in Political Economy, were listed under Social Science, while International Law and the History of Civilization came under the general heading of Political Science. In 1893 the departmental title became Political and Social Science. In 1901 it dropped Lieber and substituted a course in Sociology.

⁵ Arthur MacDonald had written at this time *Criminology* (1892); *Abnormal Man* (1893); *Abnormal Woman* (1895). Which of these books was used is not specified.

Probably the approach here was a combination of the ethical and the economic.

Courses in the Early Eighteen-Eighties. Wabash College in 1880 offered a course with the title of Social Science and Logic under the general departmental heading of Religious Instruction and Philosophy. The description stated that "the leading text book on Political Economy is Thompson, and Bowen in Logic. . . ." Here again, then, the approach was through political economy. In 1880 the Reverend George Lewis Westgate became professor of Political and Social Science at Wesleyan University (Middletown, Connecticut); and under the general title of Political and Social Science were listed Cooley's *Constitutional Law in the United States*, Perry's *Elements of Political Economy*, and Woolsey's *International Law*. Since obviously Cooley and Woolsey were "Political Science," the inference is that Perry constituted the "Social Science." This was, of course, the economic phase of the subject. At Andover Theological Seminary, Mrs. Valeria G. Stone had endowed a chair on the Relations of Christianity to Science, and in 1879 the Rev. John P. Gulliver was inaugurated to fill it. In 1880 his work included "Christianity in its relations to Political and Social Science." In the junior year there was also, among other things, a discussion of Positivism.

At Wellesley, Alice E. Freeman, who had been Professor of History since 1879, became Professor of Political Science in 1883. The work in political science included, according to the bulletin statement, Lectures on Primitive Societies, Growth of States, Forms of Government, Development of Constitutional Government, Relation of Government to Society, Growth of Law, Rise and Progress of International Law, Political and Social Institutions, and also, finally, discussion of important questions in Social Science.

In 1884, the former department of Mental and Moral Philosophy at Iowa Wesleyan College was changed to Mental and Moral Philosophy and Social Science. It listed the regulation courses in philosophy, including Political Economy, but no separate course in Social Science. The following year the texts in the department of Philosophy and Social Science included Lieber's *Civil Liberty*, Townsend's *Civil Government*, Robinson's *Elementary Law*, and Laughlin's edition of Mill's *Political Economy*. Here it appears that the term Social Science was used as a generic term to include all the social sciences. The interesting relationship between Lieber's *Political Ethics*, which we have already noted in other schools, and Social

Science is illustrated by the description of the course in Political Ethics, based on Lieber, in 1890. It states: "This study involves the consideration of a great variety of social problems growing out of the complex constitution of modern society. It deals with the fundamental principles of social organization and the rights and obligations of citizenship."

Courses in the Later Eighteen-Eighties. Baker College (Kansas) by 1885, and possibly earlier, listed "Social Science—Political Economy," in the sophomore year. In the normal department the course was called "Social Science—Civil Government." No doubt Social Science was here used in the generic sense. In 1886 the Chair of Political Science at New York University included Political Economy, Constitutional Law, and International Law, based on Fawcett, Pomeroy, and Woolsey respectively. In addition, "Frequent reference is made to works on law, history and social science; and large opportunities are allowed for free discussion of the popularly-mooted questions in political and social economics." The exact nature of this reference to Social Science is not altogether clear. Perhaps it means that Social Science was conceived in the problem sense. Some years later, in 1899, the School of Pedagogy, in its description of a course on Sociology in Relation to Education, mentioned as among the chief topics studied, "The need of a social science," and here it is evident that Social Science is being identified with Sociology.

At the University of Wooster the department of Political Science in 1886 became the department of Logic, Political and Social Science, and in the following year it added a course on Social Science as well as one in Practical (civil and social) Ethics. In 1889 it added Sociology, and by 1894 the title of the department was History, Morals and Sociology. The implication is that here Social Science was approached through the ethical or normative phase of the subject and later merged with the new theoretical discipline of Sociology. At Macalester College in 1886 the fourth year courses included Social Science, under which title was listed the History of Civilization, based on Guizot, and Sociology. Here both the philosophy-of-history approach to Social Science and also the inclusion of Social Science with sociology are illustrated. In 1887, John B. Stetson University listed Social Science for both terms of the senior year, the first half of the year being devoted to Political Economy and the second to the Science of Politics. In 1890 the second term of Social Science was on the Science of Ethics, instead of Politics. Of course Social Science was here used in the generic sense and was not Social Science as a separate discipline. At the West

Virginia University by 1887, Political Economy "and the discussion of leading practical questions in social science" were listed in the English department.

By 1888, and possibly earlier, Allegheny College had a department of Philosophy and Social Science which included Mental Philosophy, Logic, History of Philosophy, Constitution of the United States, Social and National Economy, Aesthetics, Moral Philosophy, International Law, Municipal Law, and the Science of Language. Social Science was either a generic term here, covering all the social science disciplines, or else the departmental title referred to the course on Social and National Economy and indicated an economic approach to the subject.

Homer Folks and Social Science. The Albion College *Yearbook* for 1888-1889 states that there is a ⁶

broad field for colleges to occupy in which they come closer to the daily life, and hear the heart-throbbings of the public. We speak of the problems of Political Science, Social Science, and Social Reform. These problems should receive special attention if the college would do for the public all the work which may reasonably be demanded of it. And problems of this nature should be pursued not simply by the perusal of a text book, or by listening to formal lectures, but by exhaustive research, the studying of the questions involved, from all sides.

The department of History, Politics and Economics listed no specifically Social Science course, but there was a "research class" which discussed such problems as "The Process by Which Reform Movements Involving Political Action Are Carried to a Successful Issue under Popular Governments," "How Do Reform Movements Grow?," "How Reforms Grow—Illustrated in the Great English Movements," and "How Reform Movements Grow, Considered a Priori." The chapter in the *Yearbook* which describes this work was written by Homer Folks, who later became a national figure in the general field of Social Work. It is interesting to see here expressed his very advanced views regarding the function and content of college education in this field.

An Unusual Succession of Courses. There was a department of Political and Social Science at Lake Forest College as early as 1889, but no specific Social Science course. In 1893, the department of Political and Social Science listed courses in Political Science and History, in Economics, and in Sociology. The latter included The Village Community, Kinship and Marriage, Principles of Sociology, Social Theory, Theory of the State,

⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 108.

Science of Law, Ethics, and Criminology. After a checkered history, Sociology was dropped in 1896. It was not until 1910 that the department of Political and Social Science added Social Problems, based on Peabody,⁷ and not until 1911 that it listed Social Science Principles, based on Wright's *Practical Sociology*. This was something of an anachronism and the development here shows a reversal of the usual trend in most colleges. Thus Social Science was really Sociology in the eighteen-nineties, but as such dropped out of the curriculum. When most schools were dropping Social Science, it returned to Lake Forest as practical sociology. This is simply a belated case illustrating the confusion typical of the late nineteenth century.

By 1889 Bucknell College was also giving lectures on Social Science to seniors. They were given by Enoch Perrine, the professor of Rhetoric and Literature. This alliance between Social Science and letters represented a practice which we have already seen to exist in a number of other schools. By 1897 there was a department of Economics and Social Science in this college which included courses in sociology. The approach was probably economic.

Social Science Work in 1890. By 1890, and possibly earlier, Alma College had a department of Social and Political Science. Note the reversal of the usual order of the words in the title. The courses listed in this department were Political Economy, International Law, and the History of Civilization. The philosophy of history aspect of Social Science is clearly indicated, for in 1893 the "Social" is dropped from the departmental title and with it the course on the History of Civilization. In 1890 Ohio Wesleyan had a graduate course in Economical and Social Science based on Thompson's *Social Science and National Economy*, Sumner's *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, Sumner's *Essays in Political and Social Science*, Bascom's *Socialism* (was his *Sociology* meant?), Toynbee's *Industrial Revolution*, Ely's *Labor Movement in America*, etc. As the title of the course, as well as the nature of the books used, indicates, this was predominantly the economic phase of Social Science. Goucher College in the same year, 1890, stated that students must take one year each of mathematics, natural science, "Political and Social Science," etc., but these Social Science courses were nowhere specified. In 1893, Thaddeus P. Thomas, who later took his Ph.D. degree at Johns Hopkins (in 1895), became instructor in history and called his department History and Sociology. The Sociology empha-

⁷ *The Approach to the Social Question* (1909).

sized economic and ethical factors in society. When the conventional course based on Warner's *American Charities* was introduced in 1896 it was not called Social Science or Practical Sociology or Applied Sociology, but Economics and Charity. Philanthropy at that time was still being considered in its larger economic aspects.

Social Science at Amherst. At Amherst, as at a number of other schools already mentioned, Social Science was essentially ethical in content, with applications to politics, based on Lieber's *Political Ethics*. The course, introduced in 1891, was given by the President, Merrill Edwards Gates, in the second term of the senior year. Its title included Political Ethics—Duties of Citizenship—Social Science. As described in the list of subjects in the bulletin of that year,

This course deals with the theory of the State, the origin and authority of law, the nature and the limits of sovereignty in a democratic republic, the ethical principles which govern the relations of the citizen to his fellow-citizens and to the State, the duties of citizenship in general, and of citizenship in the United States in particular. It includes a comprehensive survey of the trend of thought, of public opinion, and of positive legislation, in the advancing civilization of the world.

The aim of the course is, by the philosophic study of the social and political relations of the individual to his fellow-citizens and to the State, to promote that moral thoughtfulness on these subjects which is the strongest element in true patriotism. . . .

Supplementary courses of lectures upon Social Science and upon social and political reform are given during the year by the President of the College, by specialists from other institutions, and by men who are prominent for their practical knowledge as well as for their theoretic study of the questions and measures on which they write and speak.

These special lecturers for 1891-1892 included John B. Clark, whose subject was "Social Reform and Natural Law," and the Reverend Samuel W. Dike, Lecturer on "Sociology and the Family." In addition, the third term of Political Economy was devoted to problems of labor, socialism, social reform, immigration, etc., which subjects, in some schools, were designated as Social Science, and in others as Social Problems. In the philosophy department Mill and Spencer and, incidentally, Positivism were dealt with.

At Otterbein College in 1891 there was a department of Political Economy and Social Science. The text in Social Science was Rae's *Contemporary Socialism*, so that the course must have been largely economic in scope.

Summary and Conclusions. It is interesting to note the almost constant growth in the number of institutions adding Social Science to their curricula each decade. Both the decades of the eighteen-seventies and the eighteen-eighties were rich in the trends in this direction. The years 1890 and 1891 were banner years in this respect. It is clear, as might have been expected, that the economic emphasis was by far the strongest in these courses, but the philosophy of history, the ethical (political ethics especially), and even the ethnological emphases were observable. After the beginning of the eighteen-eighties the tendency for the Social Science courses to merge into sociology is outstanding, and by the beginning of the eighteen-nineties it had become more marked. However, as we shall observe in the following chapter, Social Science preserved its independent identity fairly well throughout the eighteen-nineties. There were no separate departments devoted exclusively to Social Science in any of these decades. Usually only one course was offered in any institution. This limitation of the work need not surprise anyone, for it was not until late in the eighteen-eighties that any institution had more than two courses even in political economy, when Harvard established a department of economics listing several courses. When Social Science reached the independent departmental stage in the early eighteen-nineties it had already largely embarked upon its transformation into sociology.

It is not, however, strictly accurate to speak of the transformation of Social Science into sociology alone. Sociology was merely the subject into which Social Science was most commonly merged or reorganized. Social Science had its effect also upon political science and economics. For example, it contributed such courses as Labor Problems, Socialism, and Social Legislation to the latter field. Its effect upon political science was even more pervasive, because it introduced a new note into that field. The practical or applied aspects of that subject, emphasizing the ethical and applied problems of government, rather than merely constitutional history and public law, created a new type of political science. This outlook and emphasis was owing largely to the influence of Lieber's *Political Ethics* and was introduced into political science by such men as Edmund J. James

The Academic Phase: The Trend toward Sociology

When Does Social Science Become Sociology? It is indeed difficult to know at what point to locate a definite trend toward sociology in the field of Social Science. Throughout the latter part of this volume such a movement has been in some degree observable. We have seen that in a considerable number of instances the writers and teachers of Social Science used the term more or less interchangeably with sociology. This confusion with sociology was to be observed also in connection with such other subjects as the history of civilization, social problems, social economy, political ethics and occasionally some other disciplines, although perhaps in less marked degree. But late in the eighteen-eighties the frequent identification of Social Science with sociology was so noticeable as to be rather striking. However it was not yet the general rule, as it became in the eighteen-nineties. Since it is not possible definitely to draw the line of transformation of the one subject into the other it seems best to take the year 1891 as the point at which the balance between Social Science and sociology begins to be made definitely, and Brown University as a typical case. This was one year before the establishment of the first full department of sociology at the University of Chicago. Brown University also illustrates clearly the case of Social Science coming to be recognized as sociology, while the old title was retained into the twentieth century.

Social Science at Brown University. At Brown University a Department of History, Political and Social Science was launched in 1891, listing ten history courses, four political science courses, and three Social Science courses. The latter were: The Principles of Sociology and the Development of Primitive Civilization, and two other courses in Modern Social Problems, including charity, penology, criminology, the history of punishments, marriage, divorce, temperance, education, labor movements, Indians, social legislation, and municipal government. George Grafton Wilson was the teacher. There had been public lectures on these subjects in

1889-1890, by men like the Reverend John G. Brooks, on Social and Economic Reform, its History and Present Application; Francis Wayland, on Prison Reform; F. H. Taussig, on Workingmen's Insurance, Compulsory and Voluntary; the Rev. Edward Everett Hale, on The Charitable Work of the State. It may have been the popularity of these lectures which led to the establishment of systematic courses in this subject-matter. In 1895, the courses in History were organized into an independent department; and the remaining department was henceforth known as Political and Social Science. Professor J. Q. Dealey was placed in charge of this work when Professor Wilson accepted a chair in International Law in Harvard University. Henceforth Social Science at Brown University became in reality sociology, although the term Social Science was long retained in the department title. It is interesting to note that Columbia University has retained Social Science in its department title even down to the present time.

Courses Introduced in 1892. Swarthmore added William I. Hull to its staff in 1892 as Associate Professor of Political Economy and Social Science. His courses included one on Social Problems, dealing with charity, penology, women wage-earners, labor of children in factories, and the settlement idea. This was, of course, the traditional social problems approach. It is interesting to note that the Department of History and Political Science in describing its aims states that its work, "in connection with that of Political Economy and Social Science, is designed to furnish information that is necessary for intelligent citizenship, and to provide a valuable preliminary training for those who intend to engage in the law, in journalism, in business, or in the public service." At Elon College, in North Carolina, where Social Science was a graduate elective as early as 1892, the clear-cut distinctions between the theoretical and the applied aspects of Social Science were clearly stated in describing the work in the School of Political and Social Science in 1894.

Of this School there are two branches, the one political and economic, the other social and ethical. The course of study and instruction in the first will relate (1) To the beginning and development of "the state," institutional and constitutional, and (2) to questions of economy with which "the state" and the individuals forming the state have to deal, such as, generally speaking, Production, Transportation, Exchange, Consumption, and then more specifically questions of Finance—the Tariff, Banking, Taxation, Coinage, etc., etc.

The course of study in the second will be social rather than economic, ethical, rather than financial. Here it will be endeavored to bring the student face to face

with the social condition and moral status of the community, state, and nation. The aim of the course is to be practical. The method of proceeding is scientific.

The varied phases of Charity, Labor and Labor Organizations, Socialism, Communism, Anarchism, Trades Unions, Cooperation, Profit Sharing, Prison and Prison Population, Prohibition, Local Option, High License, the Drink Problem, etc., etc.,—these and kindred subjects are those scientifically and systematically dealt with, studied and investigated in this course.

The texts included Wilson's *The State*, Walker's *Advanced Political Economy*, Ruskin's *Unto This Last*, Carlyle's *Past and Present*, Sumner's *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, Kingsley's *Alton Locke*, Schaeffle's *Quintessence of Socialism*, Sedley Taylor's *Profit Sharing*, and Ely's *French and German Socialism*. Here Social Science in both its ethical and its problems aspect was clearly emphasized.

Social Science at Vassar College. When Herbert Elmer Mills came to Vassar in 1890 as Associate Professor of History and Economics, he offered an advanced course in Economics, "designed for students who look forward to special study in this subject, to journalism, to active work among the poorer classes, or to the administration of local charities." The course traced modern industrial society and in the light of this development it sought "to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the attempts made to better the conditions of the poor. . . ." Although ostensibly in economics, this course obviously belonged essentially to Social Science. It was not until 1892, however, that he offered his course in Social Science proper. The work is described as follows:

A study of some of the prominent social problems, as the family and divorce, pauperism, condition of the poor in great cities, charities, insanity, crime, modern prison science, immigration, workingmen's insurance, savings institutions. Visits will be made to various charitable and correctional institutions, of which there is a considerable variety within easy access of the College. The formal and informal lectures by those in charge of the institutions visited have been very instructive.

This is clearly the Sanborn type of problems approach. By 1894, however, the description shows a slightly more theoretical angle, it is as follows:

Sociological bearings of natural selection, heredity, environment, free will; physical, physiological, moral and social causes of abnormality; statistics of the causes of pauperism, history of the English poor laws; principles that should direct charity; private relief, charity organization, public relief, almshouses, old age pensions and workingmen's insurance: relief for the unemployed including labor colonies and the tramp problem; dependent children; relief of the sick; insanity; statistics of the causes of crime; criminal anthropology; prevention of crime; principles that should govern the treatment of offenders; delinquent chil-

drren; reformatories; prison methods, cumulative sentence; the family and divorce.

Visits to institutions are retained, as before. This transition from Social Science of the Sanborn type to the more or less practical sociology approach corresponded to a change in the title of the department. Formerly it had been simply Economics. In 1893, it became Economics and Sociology. Among the lectures of the year 1893-1894, was one by Professor Davis R. Dewey on Principles of Social Reform. In 1898 the Social Science course became Charities and Corrections:

Courses Established in 1893. At Grand Island College, Nebraska, although actual instruction as yet went only through the sophomore year, Social Science was listed in 1893 as one of the senior courses; but it was not described. In 1897, when the content of courses was made known for the first time, this course was no longer called Social Science, but Sociology, and the description read in part as follows: "Relation to other Sciences, Province of Sociology, Social Psychology, The Family, Rural and Urban Life." However, in 1899, it was again called Social Science and the text was Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*. The same description was retained. This case illustrates once more the confusion with respect to Social Science and sociology at the end of the century.

The same thing is shown by the work at Dartmouth College at this time. In 1893, David C. Wells became Professor of Social Science. There were two Social Science courses in the Department of Political and Social Science and History. They were described in the catalogue as: "Social Science. Anthropology; Historical and Comparative Study of Man in Societies," based on Tylor's *Anthropology*; and "Social Science. Sociology: Analysis of Social Phenomena among Civilized Nations. Present Social Problems." The following year Wells changed the description of his courses somewhat and added a third course as follows: "Social Science. Applied Sociology: Statistics; Present Social Problems; Socialism." Evidently the three courses in anthropology, sociology, and social problems were regarded as together constituting one year's work in Social Science, much as had been the case with Sumner's three terms of work in political science, sociology, and political economy at Yale nearly twenty years before. Here we have a combination of the philosophy of history approach, now become Anthropology, and the social problems approach.

Again, in 1893, Beloit College had a Political and Social Science Department which listed courses in constitutional law, international law, eco-

nomics, and a course called Sociology, which was really a course in social problems. Here we see once more the confusion of Social Science with sociology, Social Science being conceived in terms of the course in social problems. The distinction between Social Science and sociology becomes increasingly hazy.

Some Kansas and Nebraska Colleges, 1894. The growing confusion between Social Science and sociology is further illustrated by the courses introduced in three colleges in 1894. Thus at Kansas Wesleyan, under the general category of Social Science is listed Ethics, and also Sociology. The description of the course in sociology states: "In relation to Ethics, this study is directed to an application of the principles there discovered and formulated to the practical problems of society. The social institutions, the family, village, state, and interdependency of classes are considered."

At Midland College (Kansas) Social Science was described as follows: "This course embraces a systematic study of the origin and scope of Sociology, and a scientific exposition of the natural history of society, and the social anatomy, social physiology and social pathology, and social psychology." The text, needless to add, after reading this description, was Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*. The new Department of Political and Social Science at York College (Nebraska) listed Sociology, "in which the present constitution of human society is studied with reference to its origin, its value, its evils, and their remedies." Here we have a mixture of the anthropological, the ethical, the philosophic, and the social problems approaches. The Department of History and Civics of Southwest Kansas College in 1894 pointed out that the preparatory work in History and Civil Government was supplemented in the college by further study of History, Political Economy, Sociology, Constitutional Law, Political Ethics, History of Civilization, etc. "For the further study of History and Political Science," it continues, "opportunity is offered in the Seminary which will meet once a week. By this method the study of Political and Social Science may be continued the third and fourth terms of the Junior year." No doubt the Social Science here mentioned referred to the course or section in Sociology, and perhaps also to the History of Civilization and Political Ethics. The next year the title of the Department became History and Social Science and the courses were listed under the two divisions of History and Sociology separately. The latter courses were: General Sociology, Social Philosophy, Social Ethics, Social Evolution, Criminal Sociology, Punishment and Reformation, Scientific Philanthropy, Heredity

and Environment as Social Forces, The Social Significance of Education, The Labor Movement in America. The last three subjects, the student is told, might be changed upon request to other important social problems, as, for example, Sociology of the Bible, the Sabbath Question, the Saloon, the Social Evil. Here the amalgamation of theoretical and problems courses into Social Science is clear. Such a large display of courses—on paper at least—in what was essentially a small college at so early a date may cause some surprise. However, it must be recalled that in the eighteen-nineties the denominational colleges were still competing with the struggling state universities (so soon to outdistance the denominational institutions). Frank W. Blackmar had already begun the development of one of the largest early departments of sociology some four or five years earlier at the state University of Kansas. Other state universities had also begun to press hard the small church schools in the competitive offering of courses and in the struggle for students.

In 1894, Morgan College (colored), of Baltimore, added a course of eight lectures on Social Science, but the contents are not indicated.

Courses in 1895 and 1896. Baldwin-Wallace College (Ohio) in 1895 introduced Social Science, based on Warner's *American Charities*, in the Department of Philosophy. In this same year, Hobart College (New York) added an elective lecture course on the "chief problems of Social Science."

The description of courses in the Political and Social Science department at Ripon College (Wisconsin) in 1896-1897 is very revealing. It runs as follows:

For the benefit of those who desire to see the facts and principles of Political Economy in their true perspective a course in general Sociology is provided as an elective in the winter term of the Senior year. Bascom's *Social Theory* is used as a guide, but the effort is, so far as time will allow, to examine the more important literature of the subject. Students are encouraged to investigate and report to the class the workings of various charitable and penal institutions and recent organized efforts toward social amelioration.

Here, then, it is the theoretical sociological and the applied problems approach combined which is used. It should be noted how frequently now, in the fading out of Social Science as a separate discipline, it is used as a synonym for sociology. In Parsons College (Fairfield, Iowa), the Department of Political and Social Science in 1896 listed two courses in economics and one in sociology, based on Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*, and Strong's *New Era*. In the same year, Trinity College

(North Carolina), now Duke University, announced for 1897-1898 an elective in economics called Elements of Political and Social Science. This course was not listed the following year, but in 1899 a course in sociology was added, and by 1902 sociology was listed under the Economics and Social Science sub-division of the History and Political Science Department. Kalamazoo College in 1897 listed Sociology, Economics, and International Law under the general division of Social and Political Science. The description of the sociology course indicates that it was a theoretical, not a problems course. Bates College (Maine) in the same year, and possibly earlier, listed two economics courses and a course in Social Science in the Department of Economics and Sociology, reversing the usual procedure of listing Sociology under a departmental title of Social Science, and thus affording further evidence that Social Science was merging into the subject of sociology. The course itself was "a study of the principles of Sociology, together with living social problems; the Family; Immigration; Pauperism; Charities; Crime; Socialism."

In 1896, LaGrange College (LaGrange, Missouri) had pointed out the importance of Political Science in a statement in its annual catalogue, as follows:

No subject is of more importance to the intelligent American citizen than Political Science. Questions of charity, finance, sociology and economy are daily presented, and the ablest statesmen have failed to give a solution which meets the wants of the masses. In view of this no one questions the propriety of studying the underlying principles of Civil Government, and questions of policy in making an application of the same.

Obviously sociology was here considered an applied aspect of political science. In 1898 this college listed Political and Social Science in the Department of Philosophy. The following year, however, the titles were changed to Political Science and Sociology respectively. In the Department of History, Economics and Sociology at Kansas City University in 1898 the Social Problems course was described as an "introduction to the General Principles of Social Science, including historical and critical views of various Theories and Ideals of Society and the State." In spite of its title, then, this seems to have been a rather theoretical course, perhaps primarily in the field of political sociology.

When, in 1899, Bellevue College (Nebraska) listed Political and Social Science, it was stated that present social and political problems as well as constitutional and philosophical conditions of government were discussed.

The following year this department, Political and Social Science, listed History of Civilization and Sociology. The catalogue statement pointed out that "these courses introduce the student to the study of institutions and of society. The former as historical precedes and prepares for the latter as contemporary." The philosophy of history approach is thus clearly indicated, as well as the contemporary confusion of Social Science with sociology. At Berea College (Kentucky) Sociology had been introduced in 1898 in the Department of Political Science, and the next year the title of the department was changed to Political and Social Science. The Sociology text used was Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*. The course included "lectures on the advantages and duties connected with society."

Courses Introduced in 1900. The Social Science courses at Juniata College (Pennsylvania) in 1900 included Economics, Sociological Theory (based on Giddings' *Elements of Sociology* and Fairbanks' *Introduction to Sociology*) and Practical Sociology (based on Henderson's *Social Elements*, Wright's *Practical Sociology*, and Warner's *American Charities*). It was not until 1904 that the title of the department was changed to the generic term Social Sciences. The new title indicated that the old synthetic concept of Social Science had vanished as far as this institution was concerned and that the federation of a group of social sciences had taken its place.

At Central Wesleyan College (Missouri) the Economics Department in 1900 listed a course called Socialism, which dealt with the "History and Principles of Social Science." This, however, may well have been a typographical error, for in 1902, the course was called "Sociology—History and Principles of Social Science," and the title of the department was stated as Economics and Sociology. At any rate, it is one more illustration of the growing practice of identifying Social Science with sociology, as was also the case at Hanover College (Indiana), where Sociology was added to the senior year curriculum in 1900, but was called Social Science when listed among the departmental courses.

Courses Introduced from 1902 to 1906. The course at Baylor College in 1902, based on Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*, was called Social Science. Not until 1905 was it changed to Sociology. Colby College illustrates an interesting trend. Albion W. Small had introduced Sociology in 1889 in the form approximately of Christian Sociology. This course was taken over by the new president in 1894, but

remained pretty much the same in its content. Then, in 1903, a new description was substituted, as follows:

The course will consist of a brief survey of the genesis and status of Social Science including an epitome of the arguments of Comte and Spencer; a critical valuation of the established social sciences, Politics, Economics, and Ethics; a discussion of social theory, developing the essentially dynamic nature of the controlling concept of social philosophy, and finally, a presentation of modern methods of effective social amelioration.

Here Social Science and sociology are apparently synonymous. Both names refer to a synthetic discipline which includes the other social sciences. The welfare ideal is present as well as the scientific one. From the description of the course one might infer that the text book used was Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society*. At the Jesuit College, St. John's, in Toledo, Social Science was added in 1904. The descriptive statement of this course included the following: "Origin of Socialism; Liberalism, Growth of Industrialism, Karl Marx, Engels, Lassalle, Fluerschein, Henry George, Herbert Spencer, Scientific basis of socialism, its economic impracticability, incompatibility with Christianity and the doctrines of the Catholic Church."

At Clark University in 1904 there was a Department of Economics, Political and Social Science, under which courses in government, economics, and sociology were listed. Here, then, also sociology and Social Science were identical in the minds of the teaching staff. Montana State College, which had listed sociology from its very beginning, in 1893, in 1906 placed this course in a Department of Political and Social Science, along with another course called Constitution of the United States. Here the portion of the departmental title designated as Social Science evidently referred to the sociology course. This fact is simply one more illustration of the identification of the two disciplines.

Courses Introduced from 1906 to 1913. In 1909, Henry Kendall College, Oklahoma, later the University of Tulsa, listed under the Department of Political and Social Science an Elementary and an Advanced Sociology course, both based on the two works of Giddings. In the following year the title of the department was changed to Political and Social Sciences, indicating, as in the case at Juniata College, that the concept of a synthetic Social Science was disappearing from the college curriculum.

Daniel Baker College (Brownwood, Texas) by 1910, and possibly ear-

lier, listed two courses, one based on Bryce and one on Bullock, under a departmental title of Political and Social Science. The texts are not specified other than by the names of their authors. Here Social Science was apparently applied to Economics, since the Bryce course was called Political Science. In 1919 the Department of Social Science listed four economics courses. The following year the department was denominated by the general term Social Sciences and added a course on Sociology. Evidently Social Sciences as a term is here to be taken as a generic rather than as a specific characterization.

It is interesting to note how belatedly Thompson's *Social Science and National Economy* was used in the Jesuit colleges. It was first mentioned at Spring Hill (Alabama) in 1909 and at Loyola (New Orleans) in 1911. In both cases it was taught along with Deva's *Political Economy* and Laughlin's *Political Economy*.

In 1912, Georgetown College (Kentucky), listed a course in Social Science in its Department of Political Science and Economics. The aim of the course was "to give a general outline of the development of modern social and domestic institutions and to indicate the proper relations of the individual to society. Special attention will be given to the study of modern social problems such as charity, crime, intemperance, immigration, and the race question." The anachronistic title of this course was changed the following year to Sociology and Social Problems.

The Department of Social Science at Lincoln Memorial University (Tennessee), which Stuart A. Queen introduced in 1913, retained its title until 1929, although it became increasingly sociological in its content after 1916. After 1913 apparently no new courses under the old term Social Science were introduced into the colleges of the country. Henceforth sociology is the descriptive term generally used.

Inductions from the Data, and Conclusions. What does all this mass of detailed information mean? Can we trace any trends, discover any general pattern in it? Statistical treatment of such material is very difficult, for a number of reasons. It is evident that what we have been tracing is really a name, Social Science, which meant almost all things to many men—and some women. There was no single and specific discipline called Social Science, recognizable to everyone, but there was a name generally known as such. This term signified one thing in one place, and something else in another place. Nevertheless there was coherence in the seeming chaos. If we make a frequency distribution of the first mentionings of Social Science

in college catalogues according to years from 1858 to 1915, we get the distribution shown on page 637. It is not far from normal, showing a model frequency in the decade 1885-1895. This was the hey-day of the new discipline in its academic phase. After that it became increasingly merged into the new discipline of Sociology.

Now if we analyze the qualitative aspects of the units in this distribution, a very interesting pattern emerges. Taking the descriptions of the courses where they are given, and omitting cases where no description is available, we may classify the various Social Science courses according to the type of approach emphasized. If more than one approach is signified, the course must be classified under all types. We have, then, the economic, the social problems,¹ and the philosophy of history,² approaches. In addition we have cases where Social Science was confused with sociology, and also cases in which it was used in the generic sense, to cover all the special social sciences. If we make frequency distributions of each of these approaches, according to the year of their first mentioning in college catalogues, we get the interesting results shown on page 638. The peak for the economic approach came in the decade 1875-1885, and that for the problems approach in the decade 1885-1895. The decade from 1895 to 1905 was one of confusion with sociology, that is of increasing mergence of Social Science with sociology. The decade 1885-1895, which we saw was the high point for the number of introductions of Social Science, also marked the peak for the philosophy of history emphasis, although this phase of treatment of the subject is minor as compared with the social problems approach. It was also in this decade that Social Science was most frequently used in a generic sense, to cover all the social sciences. We might, then, say in a general way that academic Social Science, beginning with a predominantly economic emphasis, came to specialize more and more on social problems, and finally merged with sociology and at last disappeared as a separate discipline.

Summary regarding Contents of Social Science. We have now completed a bird's eye view of the most important phases of the Social Science movement in the United States and of its reception as an academic subject in the colleges and universities of the country. We have paid most attention to the reform ideal of Social Science as conceived by the persons and or-

¹ This includes the ethico-social, the charities and correction, and the reform emphases also.

² This includes the anthropological and history of civilization approaches, since, as we have seen, anthropology was one of the successors of the philosophy of history emphasis.

ganizations interested in promoting it. In the chapters immediately following we shall deal with the scientific aspect, that is, the methodological procedures advocated or employed by adherents of the Social Science movement. Before turning to a discussion of the scientific aspect of the movement, it may be well to summarize the outstanding points with respect to the social reform ideal.

There were, as we have seen, two basic types of reformistic ideals operating in this movement. One of these was in the French tradition of the enlightenment, romantic, and Utopistic. It proposed a total reconstruction of society from the foundations up. It was revolutionary, radical. It began with an analysis of human nature as it was supposed to be and of the social evils which repressed and distorted it. Thence it worked up by deductive logic to a social system which its advocates believed would be consistent, efficient, and just. The other type of reformistic ideal, on the other hand, was in the British liberal tradition. Here was no romantic hope for a completely renovated society. This reform ideal was stolid, sober, realistic. It conceived its work in terms of social and economic legislation, of prison reform, public health, care of the insane, and other such concrete problems and programs. To the romantic reformers, however, this was mere "patch work" performed on a frame essentially rotten.

These two types of reform idealism have by no means passed away. They remain today essentially as they have been since the French Revolution, with this difference perhaps, that their sponsors are no longer as naively hopeful of quick results. Socialists, communists, and other idealistic groups of social reformers still adhere to the former, that is, to the total reconstruction ideal. They see no hope in the petty patches that more pedestrian reformers apply here and there to a seemingly tottering system. More conservative groups, on the other hand, consider these total reconstruction idealists as harebrained radicals, as "Reds" or "Unamerican." As a matter of fact, they are just as American in their traditions as the conservatives. One might even argue that they were more American, since the first fifty years of our nineteenth century history were filled with experimental attempts to establish social systems along totally different lines from those of existing societies.

But however different the reform ideal might be in the various phases of Social Science, all of these Social Science reformers were agreed as to the necessity of employing science as their guide. No matter how Social Science was conceived—as Fourieristic Associationism, as Comtean Sociol-

ogy, as some species of unilateral economic control, or simply as philanthropy—the one characteristic trait common to all conceptions was the aspiration to become a science. No matter what else was meant by the term, it always included this idea of the scientific approach to the study of problems and their solution. We shall, therefore, in the remaining divisions of this volume turn to a consideration of this aspect of Social Science, describing the various efforts to develop for it a scientific working methodology with which to produce the practical results desired. These anticipated results were, of course, a body of dependable knowledge to be known as Social Science and the application of this knowledge to the reconstruction of society, either piecemeal or as a whole.

PART TEN

The General Methodological Aspects of
Social Science

The Problem of Method in Social Science: Earlier Theories

Orientation. Although there was, as we have already seen, almost perfect unanimity among the Social Scientists regarding the necessity of applying the methods of science to their discipline, there was no more agreement as to the nature of science and scientific method than there was as to the type of social reform that was desirable. This variation in viewpoint was due to many causes, but to two in particular, among others. (1) The concept of science, as was pointed out in an earlier chapter of this work, changes like any other concept. (2) Lip-service was frequently accorded to science by those who had no real understanding of what science meant. This fact will become increasingly evident as we proceed with our analysis of the methodology of Social Science. In the following pages we shall attempt to trace the evolution of the methodologies employed or advocated by the various Social Scientists in this country from the time of Brisbane to the period of the rapid decline of the discipline, pointing out their variations at successive stages of development. It seems opportune to arrange these methodological transformations under the following major categories: I. Associationist Methodology; II. The Positivist Methodology; III. Methodology of the Economic School; IV. The Projective Method; V. The Natural Science Viewpoint. Of course these general types of method, which refer more to schools than to separate and distinct methodological techniques as such fall into a great many subdivisions to conform to the men who employed the methods and the circumstances under which they were used.

Associationist Social Science—Brisbane's Methods. Our first approach is through the methods employed by Brisbane and his Associationist Social Science group. Very little is said on the subject of method in Brisbane's *Social Destiny of Man*. We are told that Fourier "discovered" Association,¹ that we ought to investigate the passions, and that we ought to ex-

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. iv.

periment to test our results.² In this case, the term investigation evidently signifies to the author some sort of verbal and logical analysis of the emotions aided by subjective evidence. Likewise, Brisbane's concept of experimentation is obviously not one of the laboratory, but of trying out programs of social organization and control in real life practice. Aside from these more or less casual and indefinite remarks, and the implied belief in revelation which Brisbane manifests,³ there is no discussion of method in the concrete. The following statement by Brisbane comprises the main elements of his method, as he conceived it at this early date:⁴

Man must first obtain a knowledge of his nature, of the law which regulates his passions, to organize a true society; and this law he must discover by his own observation and investigation, precisely as he has to discover those which regulate the solar system, to obtain a knowledge of its mechanism:—for the human mind comprehends none of nature's laws intuitively and without labor. A definite and unvarying law regulates the action of the passions; if it be not discovered and applied to them, they receive a false development, producing as many disorders as they are capable of harmonies. . . .

The passions are to society, what wheels and springs are to a machine; we must know the uses and applications of the first to construct the latter. During the period man is ignorant of his own nature and the social mechanism adapted to it, incoherence and suffering are his lot; science during this time is occupied with metaphysical questions respecting the conscience, generation of ideas, etc. As soon as it leaves this narrow sphere, and goes into a thorough study of the passions and their tendencies, it is easy to see clearly in social matters. This study has been prevented by the inveterate prejudice respecting the depravity of human nature, which has turned the minds of men from this primary object of investigations; believing the passions depraved, they did not suspect that a vast problem of social harmony was connected with them. . . . Fourier followed a different route; setting aside all philosophical and other prejudices on this subject, proceeding on the principle of *Absolute doubt* of pre-existing scientific doctrines, and following an entirely opposite direction; he commenced a study of the passions, of their harmonies and tendencies; instead of condemning our nature, he interrogated nature with respect to her laws; and the result was a discovery of the great regulating principles of her activity. . . .

Possessing, through Fourier, the theory of the passions and that of a true social organization, we should proceed to test it by a practical trial; we should found an agricultural Association and see whether agricultural, manufacturing and household occupations, organized in Groups and Series could not be ren-

² *Ibid.*, pp. 175-176.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 471.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 174-176.

dered attractive. If the experiment succeeded, the greatest and most gigantic of social problems would be solved.

The Appeal to Natural Law. Brisbane does not tell us how Fourier "discovered" the laws of attraction. Presumably Fourier simply "interrogated" nature. Some years later, however, in a communication to the *Circular*,⁵ Brisbane is a little more specific in his treatment of the problem of method, and here he defends deduction as a scientific method. His comparison of the work of Fourier and Comte is particularly interesting. While it is true, as Brisbane points out, that both men appealed in the last analysis to Natural Law, he apparently did not perceive the fact that Comte's attempt to predict the future of social organization from historical data was inductive rather than deductive. Brisbane says,⁶

Fourier and Comte were the only minds that undertook to base Social Science on, and to deduce it from, universal laws, having their source in the infallible wisdom of the universe. Comte . . . deduces his plan of the Social Order of the future from the historical past. . . . Fourier, at the outset of his labors, conceived the necessity of discovering the laws of order and harmony in the universe—Nature's plan and theory of organization—and of deducing from them the *Science of Social Organization*. Leaving aside all secondary considerations, he set about this great work. The discovery of the laws of order and organization in creation was his great end. The deduction of a Social Order from them was an accessory work. He claims to have succeeded; and claims for his plan of social organization no value outside of its conformity to Nature's laws. "I have no theory of my own," he says in a hundred places; "I DEDUCE. If I have deduced erroneously, let others establish the true deduction."

Social Science is a vast and complex science; it cannot be discovered and constituted by the aid of empirical observation and reasoning; the *Inductive method* can not do its work here. The laws of order and organization in nature must be discovered, and from them the science must be deduced. In astronomy, in order to solve its higher and more abstruse problems, it is necessary to deduce from one of the great laws of Nature; namely, that of gravitation. It is more necessary still in the case of the involved problems of Social Science.

Now the merit of Fourier consists in having seen clearly this great truth; in having sought carefully to discover Nature's laws of organization; and in having deduced from them with the greatest patience and fidelity the organization of the Social System which he has elaborated. His organization of Industry and of Education are master-pieces of deductive thought.

If Fourier has failed, if he has not discovered the laws of natural organization;

⁵ This communication is reproduced in John Humphrey Noyes, *History of American Socialisms* (1870), pp. 658-664. The quotations here presented are from this source.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 661-663.

or has not deduced rightly from them, he has opened the way and pointed out the true path; he has shown *what must be done*, and furnished invaluable examples of the mode in which deduction must take place in Social organization. He has shown how the human mind is to create a Social Science and effect the Social Reconstruction to which this science is to lead.

Brisbane then points out that Fourier was the Kepler of the new science. "Possessing, like Kepler, a vast and bold genius, he has, by far-reaching intuition and close and analytic thought, discovered some of the fundamental principles of Social Science, enough to place it on a scientific foundation, and to constitute it regularly, as did Kepler in astronomy."⁷ To Comte he assigns a lesser rank; he is the Tycho Brahe of Social Science, learned and patient, but not original.

Criticism of Brisbane's Method. It will readily be seen that Brisbane had no real conception of the nature of science. By the time this communication was published (perhaps in the late eighteen-sixties), the errors in Brisbane's conception of scientific method had long since been thoroughly exposed by Comte, by Spencer, and by the whole group of British scientists of the nineteenth century. John Humphrey Noyes, therefore, found it very easy to point out the fallacies in it. And his refutation is as good as any we could now make. First, he presents from Youmans' ⁸ *New Chemistry* a statement on the nature of scientific method, that is, observation, experiment, and induction. If Youmans is right, then Fourier is wrong, he continues. And he is convinced that Fourier is wrong. He says,⁹

We frankly avow that we are at issue with Mr. Brisbane on the main point that he makes for his master. We do not believe that cogitation without experiment is the right way to a true social theory. With us induction is first; deduction second; and verification by facts or the logic of events, always and everywhere the supreme check on both. . . .

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 663.

⁸ Youmans was among the most ardent propagandizers of the new science in this country, and one of the most effective agents in popularizing Spencer. He began publishing the *Popular Science Monthly* largely to present Spencer's *Study of Sociology* to American readers, but also as a medium for the publication of the choicest results of the English scientific movement then in full flower and to encourage the development of a similar spirit of scientific investigation in this country. In these endeavors he had the full and enthusiastic cooperation of the young Appleton brothers then succeeding to the management of their father's publishing business. One of these brothers, W. W. Appleton, spent much time in England, becoming acquainted with leading British scientists and arranging for the American publication of their works.

⁹ *History of American Socialisms* (1870), p. 667.

But Mr. Brisbane thinks that social science is exceptional in its nature, too "vast and complex" to get help from observation and experiment. All science is vast and complex, reaching out into the unfathomable; but social science lies nearest home and most open to observation and experiment.

There is little more to be said. Brisbane's theory of method was pre-scientific. It was both metaphysical and theological. It posited (after the model of Plato) the external social system, existing somewhere in the universe, which man could "discover." He did not see what we have pointed out in an earlier chapter, that man creates his sciences out of his experience, as projections of the logic of his data of observation and experiment; and that he does not "discover" them.¹⁰ Brisbane wished to have the prestige of the title *science* because it was fashionable for all disciplines to aspire to scientific status. But he did not understand what science meant in his own time and social environment.

Positivist Methodology: Comte the Initiator of Modern Methodology. It was Comte who first clearly stated the nature of science and of scientific method, as a preliminary to extending this new method into the field of social phenomena. His American critics did not always agree that he had succeeded, but at any rate he shocked the American mind into a realization of the methodological problems involved in science. The discussions which he provoked are by no means out of date today. The terminology has changed, but the problems remain much the same. For example, American critics of Comte pointed out, as we shall presently show, that there was a place for non-scientific as well as for scientific knowledge. Today the same thing is repeated even by sociologists like Lundberg,¹¹ Park (following Sombart),¹² and Ogburn.¹³ Professor Ellwood has even written a book on sociological methodology¹⁴ to justify this point of view, which has been made the subject of an article by one of the authors of this work defending the scientific methodology and point of view.¹⁵

The critics of Comte spoke of "faith" or "belief" as opposed to and often

¹⁰ L. L. Bernard, "The Objective Viewpoint in Sociology," *American Jour. Sociol.* XXV: 298-325 (Nov., 1919); "Invention and Social Progress," *ibid.*, XXIX: 1-33 (July, 1923).

¹¹ George A. Lundberg, "Is Sociology too Scientific?" *Sociologus*, IX: 298-319.

¹² Robert E. Park, in a review of Werner Sombart's *Die Drei Nationökonomien*, in *Amer. Jour. Sociology*, XXXVI: 1071-1077 (May, 1931).

¹³ W. F. Ogburn, "Limitations of Statistics," *ibid.*, XL: 12-20 (July, 1934).

¹⁴ Charles A. Ellwood, *Methods of Sociology: A Critical Study* (Durham, N.C., 1933).

¹⁵ L. L. Bernard, "The Great Controversy: or, Both Heterodoxy and Orthodoxy in Sociology Unmasked," *Social Forces*, XIV: 64-72 (October, 1935).

superior to "reason." Some of our present writers make a similar contrast, using the expressions "understanding" and "knowledge,"¹⁶ or, more accurately, "attitudinal localization" and "symbolic localization."¹⁷ The role of historical data, of statistical data, the legitimacy of behaviorism—these are among the methodological problems of sociology that began in one form or another with Comte and that persist into our own day. The natural science character of sociology is no more vehemently urged by Lundberg, Bain, and other modern sociologists than it was in this earlier day by, say, Hamilton¹⁸ and other Comtists. There is some talk of first, second, and third generations among modern sociologists¹⁹ with respect to an understanding of and methods of handling these problems, as though Small, Giddings, and the sociologists of the eighteen-nineties were the first in this country to deal with these methodological problems. This reveals a lack of historical perspective on the part of those making such observations. The so-called third generation of sociologists emphasizing the importance of a rigorously scientific methodology are really no newer than Comte. Their general premises and arguments are almost identical with his. They are in many respects as characteristically nineteenth century as the so-called first generation of sociological and Social Science thinkers were, in spite of the fact that they know more concrete procedures in the methodology of investigation and generalization.

Comte's Notion of Science: the Response. Comte, it will be recalled, restricted science to the field of phenomena, or, more accurately, to the co-existences and sequences of phenomena. He denied the whole theory of the demonstrability of first or final causes and held that man must restrict his inquiries to human limitations. The Infinite, deity, ultimate purposes—these Comte ignored as subjects for investigation. Spencer also took essentially the same position in his *First Principles*. Man could never probe such problems or solve them and therefore it was useless and fruitless to worry about them. An American follower of Comte and Spencer, J. W. Draper, restated the point of view very clearly. He said, "The mind can produce no certain knowledge from its internal resources alone. It is un-

¹⁶ W. F. Ogburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15, 18-19.

¹⁷ L. L. Bernard, "The Evolution of Social Consciousness and of the Social Sciences," *Psychological Review*, XXXIX: 147-164 (Mar., 1932).

¹⁸ See Leland A. Webster (Pseud. for Hamilton), *Present Status of the Philosophy of Society* (New York, 1866), pp. 2, 5, 6, 8, 10, 12, 75, 76, 322, etc.

¹⁹ Ellsworth Faris, review of C. A. Ellwood's *Methods in Sociology*, in *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIX: 686-689 (Mar., 1934). See also Ellwood's reply to this review, *ibid.*, XL: 138-140 (July, 1934).

philosophical to enquire into first causes; we must deal only with phenomena. Above all, we must never forget that man cannot ascertain absolute truth, and that the final result of human inquiry into the matter is, that we are incapable of perfect knowledge; that, even if the truth be in our possession, we cannot be sure of it." ²⁰

Comte and Spencer systematized the philosophy which Huxley named agnosticism, but which their American critics called "nescience." Of course all this early work of Comte was a direct challenge to theologically trained Americans since it repudiated what they considered the most important field of inquiry in the world, "the ways of God to man." They either did not understand that Comte's substitution of the ways of nature to man was an attempt to secure a method of statement of the problem of human adjustment which would eliminate arbitrary and personal factors, and thus reduce the unmeasurable and unpredictable elements in the problem; or, if they did understand his motive and method in this respect, they were too closely bound by tradition and dogma to the theological point of view to appreciate its value and to accept it. Friendly or unfriendly, they seemed determined to salvage theology from Comte's onslaughts.

Comte on Psychology and Theology. We shall present here some of the more cogent American reactions, both hostile and appreciative, to Comte's methodological principles. Note especially the defense of consciousness by Comte's critics, which they appear to consider a sort of personal entity, the successor of the spirits that once dwelt in man and, according to popular belief, directed his behavior. Comte rejected contemporaneous mystical psychology and denied the validity of the introspective method. He substituted in the place of the metaphysical psychology or "soulology" of his time what we should call physiological psychology or neurology on the one hand and the objective record of man's intellectual achievements on the other. This behaviorism was, as has been pointed out above, too much even for Mill, not to mention more orthodoxly trained Americans.

Conspicuous also was their rebellion against the Comtean scientific concept of natural laws as something else than God's system of chains and pulleys by which he worked the mechanism of the universe, as set forth in the reigning Natural Theology. Orthodox Americans could not bear to

²⁰ *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1875), p. 25. The modern counterpart of the viewpoint expressed by Comte and Spencer, referred to above, is known as "operationalism," which holds that problems for whose solution no method can be devised are really meaningless. See P. W. Bridgman's *Logic of Modern Physics* (1927), p. 31.

live in a world without a Deity. It was too terrifying. They could accept the idea of social laws as natural laws; indeed they insisted upon it. But such laws had to be governed by God and made warmly human.²¹

The law of three stages, which implied that theology would ultimately give way to science as an explanatory and ordering principle in every realm where science could be applied, was rejected by the theological critics on the puerile and irrelevant ground that all three stages of explanation could exist at the same time and in the same fields of thought. Of course the fact that Comte had himself recognized this fact²² did not prevent them from believing that they had triumphantly disposed of the truth of the law. Let us, however, turn to the words of the critics themselves.

Presbyterians to the Defense of Introspective Psychology: Atwater. First, let us consider the response to Comte's rejection of metaphysical psychology, that is, the reception of his behaviorism by his critics. Here we find almost universal dissent, sometimes virulent (as with the Presbyterians) and sometimes urbane, but always definite and positive. Thus, Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater, from whom we have already quoted extensively in an earlier chapter, has this to say of Comte's theory:²³ "Knowledge of the human mind . . . also is interdicted as abnormal in its character, and treacherous in its results. It is 'out of the question to make an intellectual observation of intellectual processes. . . .'" Comte forbids us, continues Atwater, to inspect our inner nature. At this date it may be impossible to decide whether Atwater was so carried away by his emotions that he could not fairly state Comte's point of view or whether he was too ignorant of the matter in hand to grasp its significance. The fallacy of Comte's arguments, he contends, is exceeded only by his audacity in presenting them. As a matter of fact, Atwater continues,²⁴

Every exercise of the human mind is an exercise of consciousness, in which we not only know or feel, or desire, or purpose, but also *know that we thus know, feel, desire, and purpose*. To deny the power of knowing our own

²¹ Bacon had instituted scientific method as the proper procedure in the study of physical facts. Men could believe in a good physical world, so no problem of why God allowed evil arose to trouble them. But in the social realm difficulties confronted them when men had to admit that society (social ordering through custom) was natural, and yet there was evil in it. That was why Comte's application of scientific method to social facts was such a problem. (See in this connection, Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the 18th Century*, pp. 66 ff.).

²² *The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (tr. by H. Martineau, 1853) I: 6, 15.

²³ Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, XXVIII: 68 (Jan., 1856).

²⁴ *Ibid.*

thoughts and cognitions, is to deny the power of knowing anything. We may be in doubt of other things; we may even doubt whether our consciousness does not bear false witness to a falsehood. But that of which we can never be in doubt, is that we are conscious of what we are conscious. If anything can be inspected or studied, it is this.

It is only fair to Atwater and his "psychology" to remember that he wrote when "mental science" was still highly intellectualistic and little more than a phase of Aristotelian systematic logic. It is easy to see how modern behavioristic psychology, of which Comte is one of the chief forerunners, makes this statement of the universality of focal consciousness seem ridiculous.

Atwater further complains that Comte charges that after thousands of years nothing in psychology is satisfactorily established. How about the general agreement that men have with regard to the power of sensation, external perception, memory, association, conception, judgment, imagination, ratiocination? he counters. Comte further says (Atwater reminds us) that the phenomena of mind can be studied statically only through anatomy and physiology, and dynamically through an examination of the exercise and results of the intellectual powers of the human race, which is the object of the Positive Philosophy. No wonder, he says, that Comte eulogized Gall so much. And then comes a statement by Atwater that might have been made by a modern theological opponent of behaviorism: "But in answer to such gross materialism so dogmatically propounded, we venture to assert that were one to dissect skulls all his days, and spend his life among the tombs, and were he shut out from all view of his own consciousness, he would never get the first glimpse of any mental property, faculty, or exercise. No truth is more evident than that, if we can not gain a knowledge of the mind from consciousness, we can gain it nowhere. . . ." ²⁵

Further Presbyterian Zeal. Another Presbyterian attacks Comtean behaviorism, not, however, with any real arguments but with satire and epithets. He says, "In the Positive Philosophy, it [psychology] is made part of the general subject, known as Biology, one chapter under this division being allotted to 'Intellectual and Moral, or (and we beg the reader to mark how the materialistic tendency shows itself in the language), *cerebral* functions.'" ²⁶ Comte, he continues, is very supercilious in his attitude

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 70.

²⁶ Unsigned, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *Southern Presbyterian Review*, IX: 211 (Oct., 1855).

toward psychology. His denial of consciousness is fundamental and renders impossible any discussion with metaphysicians, and removes the basis of all intellectual philosophy. The writer goes on to say that "Positive Philosophy ignores consciousness as the source of any definite knowledge, and holds that 'interior observation' is an impossibility and an absurdity."²⁷ Nevertheless, he continues, Comte still treats of man's intellectual functions, which, however, for him are synonymous with cerebral ones. He substitutes phrenology for psychology and metaphysics. He is a materialist and only his scientific achievements and powers of analysis save him from the crudities and nonsense of the travelling phrenologist.²⁸

Still another author, probably Dr. Dabney, points out the impossibility of any science existing without a basic psychology.²⁹

But we assert, that it is simply impossible that any man can construct any other branch of knowledge, without having a science of psychology and logic of his own. . . . We urge farther, that the uniformity of man's convictions concerning *phenomena* and experimental conclusions thereupon, obviously implies a certain uniformity in the doctrines of this common psychology. For, whenever one accepts a given process of "positive" proof, as valid, this is only because he has accepted that function of the mind as valid, by which he apprehends that proof. Unless he has learned to trust the mental power therein exercised, he cannot trust the conclusion.

The Positivist, continues the critic, has a psychology, just like anyone else, even though he repudiates it, ostensibly. It is, however, sensualistic psychology like that of Hume, Hartley, and Priestly.³⁰

The Baptists Lend a Hand. Baptist reasoning was similar to that of the Presbyterians. Thus Augustus H. Strong, writing in the *Baptist Quarterly*, argues that the Comtean postulate that mind lies wholly out of reach of direct observation is one of the fundamental errors of Positivism. It contradicts the consciousness of man. I can know myself. I have knowledge of my mental stages by memory. To deny consciousness is to declare that I know nothing.³¹

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 212.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 214. It is true that Comte gave some credence to the investigations of Gall and other "phrenologists" of the time, but his critics misinterpret him in this respect because they cannot distinguish sound neurological and physiological studies from the pseudo-science of phrenology, as Comte could and did in the main.

²⁹ Unsigned, "Positivism in England," *Southern Review*, V: 357 (Apr., 1869).

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 358. Time has of course confirmed the type of psychology which Dabney here condemns.

³¹ "Philosophy and Religion," *loc. cit.*, II: 404 (Oct., 1868).

for I have the same evidence for the existence of my own mental states, that I have for the existence of outward phenomena. The mind is just as open to inspection as the world around me. The same rule that excludes as invalid my knowledge of myself, must exclude as invalid my knowledge of matter. . . . Comte seems quite unaware that the same scythe with which he mows down the psychologists, cuts off his own legs also. For how can science be built up of the phenomena of matter? Observation of facts is not science. The mere grouping of facts is not science. Science is a thing of the mind and not of matter only. . . . The very idea of unity by which we classify facts, must come to us from the unity of our own self-consciousness.

Precisely this same argument is presented by Rev. J. H. Allen in the *Christian Examiner*. He tells us that Comte's rejection of the data of consciousness vitiates his conception of each physical science.³²

Of course Comte did not reject the data of consciousness. His whole system is based upon the use he makes of the data collected and organized by consciousness and presented by it for purposes of further organization and control. The fallacy in the argument of these critics is that they confuse understanding and analysis of one's consciousness with analysis and understanding of one's behavior. The behaviorist, like everyone else, studies his own behavior, just as he studies events external to himself, but he does not suppose that observation of his overt behavior is identical with a subjective analysis of his consciousness. These critics failed to define their terms and therefore confused the issues involved. In the light of this correction, it is easy, therefore, to see that O. W. Wright has missed the issue when he asks, "What is it that predicts, that verifies, that thinks out a method, that discovers the laws constituting a science? Something there is that observes, that takes cognizance of facts, that knows, etc. Even Mr. Lewes is aware that method is not self-sustaining, that positive science does not construct itself." ³³

Now it is interesting to note that modern behaviorists use these same arguments, but in reversed order, in defense of their own viewpoints. Lashley, for example, points out that if we accept the methods of the physical sciences as valid, then there are no more, or no different, assumptions involved in behavioristic psychology than in the physical sciences.³⁴ But a

³² "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *loc. cit.*, L (4th series, XV, Mar., 1851), p. 368.

³³ "Lewes' Biographical History of Philosophy," *New Englander*, XVI: 543 (Aug., 1858).

³⁴ Karl H. Lashley, "Behaviorism and Consciousness," *Psychological Review*, XXX: 343 (Sept., 1923). It should perhaps be noted here that since this chapter was originally written some of the former critics of behaviorism have sought, under the aegis of the related theory of operationism, to come to terms with the bogey by streamlining the theories of behavior-

detailed comparison of Lashley's arguments with those of the Comtean critics would take us beyond the scope of this chapter. The fact is, we may add however, that we observe our own behavior, so far as we are able, and respond to it in the redirection of that behavior, in exactly the same way in which we observe and respond to the behavior of any other object, animate or inanimate.

Knowledge vs. Faith, or Wishful Thinking. Closely identified with Comtean behaviorism was the Comtean postulate that science is concerned only with phenomena and not with first or final causes. To this methodological point of view the reply was made that if science is thus restricted to a limited province, we must leave room for other, non-scientific knowledge. The terms used for this assumed dichotomy of knowledge were faith and reason, or belief and knowledge, or some other similar contrast of terminology. As we have indicated above, this division of knowledge into scientific and non-scientific still persists in our thinking. We do not, however, make the distinction on a theological basis, as did the critics of Comtean doctrine. To them there was a legitimate sphere for science; but there was also a legitimate sphere for theology and for its accompanying reassuring faith. Thus the calm, dispassionate, and just *Christian Examiner* points out:³⁵

Science has completely driven off the officious interference of theology. It has vindicated its own mental independence, and its own sufficient basis. Henceforth, we shall hear of no such platitudes as the specially religious character of this or that science, or the ignorant marvel and reproach of religious men at the undevoutness of scientific men. The two departments of thought are likely to stand hereafter by their independent principles and their separate evidence. We think it is best they should. The processes of science were long enough cumbered with theological prejudices; and we have not to wonder if theology is now and then sued for arrears. It is useless to deny or overlook the evident fact, that, in the present condition of things, theology would be the worse sufferer in an open conflict. She need not supplicate for mercy; but she should calmly and patiently abide by her own ground. It may be, that for the guiding of the general thought, for hints of ethical doctrines, for maxims and grounds of intellectual certainty, for the conditions of substantial well-being and social order, we must go first to the principles and methods of natural science, understood in its magnificent breadth and compass, as here defined. But theology can afford to yield gracefully, where she once ruled triumphantly. Knowledge and Faith will still

ism into behavioristics. For a cogent analysis of the relationship of behaviorism and operationism, with a bibliography of the literature, see S. S. Stevens, "Psychology and the Science of Science," *Psychol. Bull.*, XXXVI: 221-263 (Apr., 1939).

³⁵ J. H. Allen, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *loc. cit.*, L (4th series, XV, Mar., 1851), pp. 201-202.

as ever divide the broad firmament of thought. Knowledge comprehends that which is within the visible horizon; Faith apprehends that which is beyond. The circle of the first may widen, and the boundaries of the other will be more remote. But nothing can effectually be lost or diminished from the Infinite. And Religion, as the inspiration of Thought, the soul of Goodness, and the light of Life, will hold its own.

Let science have phenomena, in other words; but faith will cover what science cannot, the realm of wishful thinking. Not all knowledge needs to be scientific, another critic points out. There is a great deal of unscientific truth in the world. Is it to be ignored? ³⁶ And are we not able to look behind law, to the authority on which it depends? ³⁷ Science may use the positive method on phenomena, but the constancy of the laws which they obey does not repudiate Providence, as Comte insists. "Science may adopt its positive philosophy's methods, and thus eliminate error from its results, but even scientific minds with all their prepossessions in favor of invariable laws, will easily discern that constant interposition to change them is not at all essential to the idea of a constant and ever-working Providence." ³⁸

Holmes' Criticism. George Frederick Holmes' statement is very much in the vein of Allen's, already quoted. He believes there is room for both scientific knowledge and religious belief. He says,³⁹

M. Comte has . . . committed a gross philosophical and pernicious error in asserting (as a retort upon the theologians of every age) the absolute incompatibility of science and religion, and therefore denying the latter; but he has been driven into this untenable and lamentable position by refuting, from the opposite metaphysical extreme, the fallacy of those who would utterly dis sever and disassociate the laws of man's moral and intellectual nature. . . . M. Comte, as the representative of the Positive school, regards all our science as nothing more than the coordination of observed facts by theories expressed under the form of definite laws; which laws, however, indicate merely the co-existence, antecedence, or sequence of phenomena. Hence, the object of science and systematic philosophy must be to lay down rigorously these laws, which are to be received as the formal links of observed correlation,⁴⁰ but are not to be received as the series of genetic causation. With this, science has nothing to do. The regular

³⁶ Unsigned, "Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, VI: 329 (Sept., 1857).

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 329.

³⁹ "Philosophy and Faith," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIII (4th series, III, Apr., 1851), pp. 209, 211-212, 214.

⁴⁰ Note the use of the term "correlation" at this early date. Dr. Helen M. Walker, in her history of statistics, states that the term was first used in the present day technical sense in 1888 (*Studies in the History of Statistical Method*, 1929, p. 106).

recurrence of the phenomena, in all departments of observation, is a preliminary assumption requisite to the constitution of a body of science; but this assumption daily receives new confirmation as our knowledge expands. So far we agree with M. Comte; and think that he has rendered valuable service to the cause of science by laying down stringently and precisely the barrier which it cannot hope to pass. We limit our agreement, however, merely to strict systematic science and philosophy; for his explanation indicates truly these limits, but without touching the fundamental doctrines on which they rest. Beyond these confines, however, lies the vague region of things cognizable, though neither explicable nor comprehensible, because they constitute the original, underivative cognitions of the human mind, and the basis of all possible reasoning. . . . We differ widely from Comte, for he would attempt to exclude from both science and practice the recognition of anything in the facts which we observe, or are conscious of, beyond the phenomena themselves. But we have shown . . . that even in the recognition of phenomena there is a process involved, which cannot be phenomenal, whatever else it may be.

In a subsequent article in the same series, Holmes again states:⁴¹

It is a vain effort to endeavor to reduce all knowledge to a single precise and unvarying form. . . . To attempt . . . to restrict the sphere of human belief, and to limit the circle of valid knowledge merely to that which has attained, or is capable of attaining, a scientific or positive form, is the fallacy of mistaking a part for the whole, and is equally erroneous as to suppose, because some truths must be received by faith and are incapable of demonstration, that therefore all must be so. Both errors spring from the same defective view; the former is the error of M. Comte; the latter, that of narrow-minded theology which generates an hostility between science and religion, by utterly denying the independent validity of scientific reasoning, and has led, as a consequence of the same fundamental sophism, to Comte's utter negation of religion itself, and his repetition of the assumption of his adversaries, that science and religion are incompatible with each other.

Belief and Projective Thinking. Another appreciative critic makes a clear-cut distinction between knowing and believing, allowing to science the first and to religion (meaning theology, of course) the second of these methods of satisfying intellectual curiosity.⁴²

Comte is right . . . in assuming that we can *know* nothing out of the sphere of our sensitive life, or, in other words, which does not come through our phenomenal organization. . . . But he is wrong in the inference, that we cannot properly *believe* what we do not know. The intelligible does not exhaust the

⁴¹ "Faith and Science,—Comte's Positive Philosophy," *op. cit.*, XXXIV (4th series, IV, Jan., 1852), pp. 32–33.

⁴² Unsigned, "Comte's Philosophy," *Putnam's Monthly Magazine*, III:624–625 (June, 1854).

real. . . . We *know* sensible facts, and their relations, but we *believe* truths or propositions which transcend those facts. . . . The question of philosophy . . . does not . . . refer to the validity of our knowledge . . . but to the validity of our beliefs. . . . He is quite right in considering the relations of phenomenal nature, the facts furnished to us by the senses, and digested by reason, as the place of the beginning of the sciences; but he is wrong in restricting thought or belief to this natural sphere. . . . Science begins with the sensible sphere, because it is the letter and text of truth, but it ascends from that, by its rational processes, to the mental or spiritual sphere, which is the ground of meaning of the former, giving it existence and reality. Science is nature no longer seen by the eyes, but by reason. Let it be observed, however, that in ascending from the senses, as we have termed it, we do not recede or separate from nature; we do not run away into a ghostland of abstraction, but we simply look through nature's superficial aspects or integuments, into its realities, or rather its rationalities, into its substances and ends, which constitute it, make it consistent and significant, and show it to be a glorious mirror of our own souls.

He goes on to say that if science does not go beyond the threshold of phenomena, it misses the best part; for phenomena themselves are dead and passive, but they contain inner worlds of rational, civil, moral, and spiritual truth.⁴³

Evaluation of the Criticisms. This is, of course, a very metaphysical and mystical way of stating an essential truth. Mere sensory perception does not in itself, except in the simplest and most direct adjustment situations, give us the most valuable knowledge we have of the environment to which we must make our adjustments and of the means to adjustment at our disposal. Such a limitation of knowledge would bar us from that whole field of statistical generalization which has become so indispensable to the conduct of modern society and of modern life. It would also bar us from dependence upon all other types of generalizations drawn from historical, anthropological and other data of record or of observation too wide for concrete sensory perception. It would also cast out of court the whole realm of projective invention,⁴⁴ by means of which we create new facts and phenomena in the laboratory by processes of constructive imagination. Finally, it would deny the validity of ideals, which are also a phase of projective invention, and by means of which we are constantly creating a new moral and social world for the benefit of mankind.

If, in criticizing the philosophy of Comte, the theologians had clearly

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp. 625-626.

⁴⁴ L. L. Bernard, "Invention and Social Progress," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX: 1-33 (July, 1923).

stated these points, without metaphysical wool gathering, and if they had been content to rest their case here, we should have had no quarrel with them. Neither would Comte have had, for he recognized all of these forms of fact and truth, was in fact a strong partisan of them. But, when the theologians attempted to go beyond projective generalization and invention on the sound basis of induction from known facts and slip over a bogus coin of wishful thinking—a favorite and soothing phantasy—in the name of verifiable logical induction or deduction, their opponents had a right to call a halt and to ask for some display of ordinary intelligence or of that candor and common honesty which their religion professed to make so much of. If they wished to hypothecate theological dogmas in the name of science, surely they could not in all truth refuse to abide by the rules of dependable generalization. To reject such a discipline of their creed was to confess an unwillingness to abide by common rules. Their quarrel, under such circumstances, was not with Comte, but with the very rules of sound hypothecation and generalization. One cannot make a thing true merely by wishing it to be so. It would have been better for them to accept the distinctions of the two fields set down by Holmes. Let a man believe what he wishes, so long as he is willing to assume responsibility for his beliefs. But positive knowledge is, as Comte said, either a tested sensory perception or a generalization inductively determined from a sufficient body of such perceptions.

The Problem of Method in Social Science: Theories of the Economic Social Scientists

The Methodology of the Economic School: Carey's Theory of Method. When we leave the methodological discussions of the American critics of Comte and turn to those of the Economic Social Scientists we find in the writings of Henry C. Carey one of the most thoroughgoing analyses of the general problems of method. In Chapter I of his *Principles of Social Science*, entitled "Of Science and Its Methods," Carey insists upon the universality—and also upon the divinity—of natural laws. He attacks the narrow analytic approach in political economy which had produced the monstrous concept of the economic man. He goes even further and presents a theory of the development of the sciences in general which is directly opposite to that of Comte's. And, finally, he sets forth a theory of the relations of the sciences among themselves.

Logic and mathematics, Carey says, are instruments of science, but not sciences in themselves. Science consists of the answer to this question: "What . . . are the laws instituted by the Creator for the government of matter?"¹ Of course Carey believes that man discovers these laws, not that he invents them. Quoting with approval one of the theological writers, he declares, "Man can *invent* nothing in science or religion but falsehood, and all the truths that he *discovers* are but facts or laws that have emanated from the Creator."² Again he says, "Social science, as taught in some of the colleges of this country and of Europe, is now on a level with the chemical science of the early part of the last century; and there it will remain so long as its teachers shall continue to look inwards to their own minds and *invent* theories, instead of looking outwards to the great laboratory of the world for the collection of facts with a view to the *discovery* of laws."³

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 11.

² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

In contrast with Comte's theory of the increasing abstractness and generality of the sciences of latest development, Carey states that "In physics, as has everywhere been the case, the more abstract and general has, in its development, taken precedence of that which is concrete and special."⁴ This point of view he further elaborates in connection with a discussion of Social Science. Instead of agreeing with Comte that Social Science (sociology) is the most general and abstract of the sciences, he contends that it is the most concrete and specific of all of the disciplines. Thus he declares that "In the progress of knowledge we find ourselves gradually passing from the compound to the simple; from that which is abstruse and difficult to that which is plain and easily learned. . . . Of all others, social science is the most concrete and special—the most dependent on the earlier and more abstract departments of science—the one in which the facts are most difficult of collection and analysis—and therefore the last that makes its appearance on the stage."⁵

The Ordering of the Sciences. After quoting extensively from Comte on the development of the various other sciences basic to Social Science, Carey reaffirms his main thesis, namely the universality of natural laws and their equal applicability to inanimate and animate, even human, objects and systems. "It is," he says, "scarcely possible to study these facts without arriving at a belief in the universality of the laws governing matter, whatever form that matter may take, whether aggregated in the form of systems of mountains, or in that of vast communities of men."⁶

By way of illustration of this general point of view Carey presents a rather difficult schema of the relationships of the sciences, in the form of a tree.⁷ Under the surface of the earth the main trunk is labeled "Matter," by which he means to indicate the sciences of material phenomena, and it branches off into various roots, such as Animal Life, Vegetable Life, Attraction, Divisibility, Inertia, Impenetrability, Mechanical Forces, and Chemical Forces. Above the surface of the earth the trunk is called Man, thus indicating the divisions of the several sciences. This aerial trunk branches off into Physics, Organology, Social Science (in turn branching into Jurisprudence and Political Economy), Psychology, Intuition, and Inspiration. Each of these major science divisions is, of course, subdivided

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 31–32, 37.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁷ *Ibid.*, facing p. 21.

into smaller branches. The logic of this classification is not altogether coherent, but it seemed to satisfy Carey's conception of science.

Carey's arrangement of Social Science in this schema would seem to indicate something of a generic conception, although in his work on the *Principles of Social Science*, he treats it as a specific science. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that he conceives of Social Science as being synthetic but special in type. His use of the terms "Attraction," "Organology," "Intuition," and "Inspiration" reveals his intellectual kinship not only with the Associationists, but also with the phrenologists and the metaphysicians and theologians. Indeed, it must be admitted that Carey's understanding and analyses are much less able in the fields of psychology and the logic or methodology of science than in the field of economic phenomena. Even in his day the metaphysical concepts of "attraction" and "intuition" were scarcely any longer respectable among men with scientific pretensions. The term "inspiration," as he used it in a non-theological sense, was closely akin to intuition and was not in good standing psychologically.

The Telic Character of Science. Science, thinks Carey, is telic, a method of getting control over matter. To this end it seeks to discover natural laws. This teleological character of science, as Carey sees it, is, however, not metaphysical but positive. That is, it grows out of the prevision of men who are seeking consciously to manipulate their world, both material and social. This positive human conception of teleology is somewhat at variance with his truly metaphysical idea of the preexistent character of Natural Law, which he believes must be discovered or uncovered in nature rather than invented or made by man. Such laws he considers to have been constructed or divinely instituted according to some teleological ordering of nature which man can infer only from a process of analysis and discovery. Thus he declares that "Man seeks to obtain power over matter, and therefore is it that he desires to obtain a knowledge of the laws that have been instituted for its government. To become the subject of law it is required that there should be a regular and uniform succession of causes and effects, the nature of which may be expressed in several propositions—so that when we observe the former we may be enabled to predict the latter, or when the latter are observed we may safely assume the former to have pre-existed." ⁸

Carey's Theory of the Development of Science. Carey's insight into the

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

method by which mankind have come to appreciate the causal character of phenomena and the unity underlying the relationships of these phenomena is better than his insight into the origin of the laws of these phenomena. Here he expresses a peculiarly modern notion of the origins of human interpretation of natural events, one which would doubtless have been acceptable to Comte himself. Carey thinks that to early man, before data had accumulated, every event seemed fortuitous and imaginary deities were invented to explain natural phenomena. But this theological interpretation of dynamic nature does not persist indefinitely, for "With time . . . the regular succession of effects and causes comes to be understood, and with every stage of the progress, theory tends to pass away, yielding place to knowledge—and with the latter comes the power of man to direct the forces of nature to his service. With each such stage he obtains new evidence of the universality of natural laws."⁹

Speaking of the methods of arriving at workable postulates, Carey points out that both analysis and synthesis are necessary in science. The two processes, although supplementary, are nevertheless methodologically distinct. He recognizes the fact, which is not always apprehended with sufficient clarity, that in the refined methods of science crude phenomena and total situations cannot be taken as wholes to the best advantage in arriving at scientific laws and principles. It is first necessary to break situations up into their concrete constituent elements or interchangeable units and then reorganize them symbolically into more ideal logical units or laws and principles. This is the process of analysis and synthesis. While Carey may not have grasped all these implications, he necessarily comprehended the simple logic of the process as a whole. He asks,¹⁰

Because we pursue the method of analysis, are we necessarily precluded from that of synthesis? By no means. The one, however, is the indispensable preparation for the other. It was by the careful observation of particular facts that Le Verrier was led to the grand generalization that a new and unobserved planet was bound to exist, and in a certain part of the heavens, and there it was almost at once discovered. To careful analysis of various earths it was due that Davy was led to the announcement of the great fact that all earths have metallic bases. . . . The two methods were well described by Goethe, when he said that synthesis and analysis were "the systole and diastole of human thought," and that they were to him "like a second breathing process—never separated, ever pulsating."

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

The function, or area, of each of these two methods is, however, definitely distinct. "It is the details of life around us that we need to study, commencing by analysis and proceeding to synthesis, as does the chemist when he resolves the piece of granite into atoms, and thus acquires the secret of the composition of the mass."¹¹ Carey does not appear, however, clearly to have grasped the fact that the primary significance of analysis is theoretical rather than practical; that is, that the function of analysis is, as was remarked above, to provide a refined basis of raw material out of which theoretical or symbolical entities in the form of ideal or hypothetical laws and principles can be constructed by the method of projective invention. This, rather than the better practical manipulation of things, is the chief significance and measure of utility of analysis and synthesis.

Obstacles to Social Science. The further science progresses, argues Carey, the more apparent it becomes that it is a unitary whole, and that the methods of its study must be one.¹² As yet, however, Social Science may scarcely be said to exist; scarcely any of its generalizations are universally accepted.¹³ The reasons for this condition of affairs in Social Science are not difficult to find. This discipline depends on all the previous sciences, for one thing, and must await their development. Furthermore it deals with the feelings, passions, and prejudices of men. It affects their interests. "Of all [the sciences] too," he says, "it is the only one that affects the interests of men, their feelings, passions, prejudices, and therefore the one in which it is most difficult to find men collating facts with the sole view to deduce from them the knowledge they are calculated to afford."¹⁴ In addition to these handicaps, Social Science is opposed by vested interests. Carey's analysis of the privileged and partisan forces arrayed against freedom of thought and investigation in Social Science is one of the frankest and most penetrating which occur in the literature. It is summarized briefly in the following passage.¹⁵

Treating, as it does, of the relations between man and man, it has everywhere to meet the objection of those who seek the enjoyment of power and privilege at the cost of their fellow-men. The sovereign holds in small respect the science that would teach his subjects to doubt the propriety of his exercise of power by the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

grace of God. The soldier cannot believe in one that looks to the annihilation of his trade, nor can the monopolist readily be made to believe in the advantages of competition. The politician lives by managing the affairs of others, and he has small desire to see the people taught the proper management of their own concerns. All these men profit by teaching falsehood, and therefore frown upon those who would desire to teach the truth. The landlord believes in one doctrine and his tenant in another, while the payer of wages looks at all questions from a point of sight directly the opposite of the one occupied by him to whom the wages are paid.

It is no matter for wonder, therefore, that Social Science does not make greater headway, with all these difficulties and enemies to contend with.

Natural Law Holds a Brief. Carey's ideas relative to the use of mathematics and his views on historical method will be referred to in chapters on these respective concrete methods. Here we are concerned only with general considerations with respect to method. His chief contention in this field is that natural laws are universal, that the identical laws which operate in the field of physics and chemistry operate also in the realm of Social Science. Just as Attraction was Fourier's great universal principle, so Association is Carey's. However, Carey's insistence upon the universality of natural law sometimes sounds like special pleading. He has a case to argue, a point to make. He has to prove that Malthus and Ricardo are wrong. This, indeed, is the main purpose of his system, and he can make his point in a manner satisfactory to his own system of thought, only by showing that their system of political economy is contrary to an orderly set or system of natural laws. The following passage illustrates his logic in this connection.¹⁶

If the doctrines taught in the English school are right, then has the Creator made a serious blunder—having established slavery as the ultimate condition of a vast majority of the human race. If, on the contrary, they were wrong, then is freedom the ultimate lot of man, and then are there found throughout the natural laws regulating the social system, the same order, beauty, and harmony of arrangement we see prevailing everywhere through the organic and inorganic world. One of these things is absolutely and universally true, and the other as absolutely and universally false. Either an all-wise Deity has made a mistake, or man has made one, and has invented a theory by help of which to gloss it over.

This type of reasoning may not be as obvious to the modern mind as it was to Carey, but the language and the form serve to illustrate the peculiar preconceptions and outlook of this early Social Scientist. The

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

theological and metaphysical notions of science, conceived as a pronouncement of divinity and as an integral and preexisting verbalized order of nature as here revealed in the words of Carey, are typical of a great many Social Scientists of this group as well as of the two preceding schools of Social Science, the Associationists and the Positivists or Comteans. The insistence that there exists somewhere in the universe a beautiful, harmonious system of natural laws, created by a Deity, was characteristic not only of Carey but of many others of the time, and it has not altogether disappeared today. It was the extension of this system of natural laws to social phenomena, whereas it had previously been applied only to the natural (inorganic and lower organic) worlds, which constituted one of the most important, or at least outstanding, contentions and contributions of the early Social Scientists.

Comte had shown that social data were amenable to scientific treatment. This was a fundamental tenet in Carey's system also. In general he agreed with Comte; in concrete details he differed. The general impression derived from reading Carey's methodological discussions is of an extraordinarily able, but relatively untrained, mind attacking with much vigor a problem that had intrigued it, in order to justify a prepossession, utilizing in the effort the intellectual concepts or tools that conventional theory had placed within its reach.

Thompson Follows Carey. Thompson's discussion of general problems of method in Social Science adds little to Carey's. He speaks with approval of the method of his master, claiming for it the great merit of inductive generalization, so far as the general principles of Social Science are concerned, and further maintaining that the specific principles of the science are deduced from these general principles. Thus we have the curious spectacle of the specific content of a theory of Social Science deduced from general laws inductively established—provided, of course, we can accept Thompson's account of Carey's method. Carey, he tells us,¹⁷

instead of giving us a mass of empirical rules and maxims such as we find in the writings of the mercantile school, or a mass of fine-spun speculations that stand in no vital relation to the practice and life of nations, as is done by the school of the Economists, . . . presents a body of economic teaching, that rests on a few great and simple principles or conceptions, drawn by actual observation from life itself, yet nowhere incapable of direct application to any practical question. These principles are the laws that govern the constitution and course of na-

¹⁷ Robert Ellis Thompson, *Social Science and National Economy* (1875), pp. 29-30.

ture in things economical. They are at once the laws of human nature, and of that external nature, in harmony with which man was created.

Their discovery . . . shows that these natural laws are laws of progress towards wealth and the equality of wealth. Where they are allowed to act freely and fully, men rise from poverty, isolation and lawlessness, to wealth, association and national order. . . . It thus "vindicates the ways of God to men," and vindicates also the existing framework of our civilization against the destructive criticisms of socialists and communists.

Thompson's Insight. Thompson, like Carey, was interested in demonstrating the errors of the English Classical school of economists, and in proving the superiority of the American and the German schools. Not only in conclusions, he says, do these schools differ, but in basic method also. Making proper allowance for the fact that he overestimates the inductive character of American and German methods, his is one of the best brief criticisms with which we are familiar of the English Classical school of economists in comparison with their two chief rival schools. The fact that Thompson could make his criticism so pointedly and revealingly proves him to have been a man thoroughly cognizant of the major trends in Social Science during his time. He says,¹⁸

The difference is one of *method* also. The English school adopt the deductive method of the mathematical sciences, and reason down from assumed first principles to the specific facts. They claim that the necessary data for this are already at hand, in the known characteristics and tendencies of human nature, the avarice and the desire of progress, which control and direct the economic conduct of great masses of men. They leave all other elements out of account as inconstant, while they regard these as constant. . . .

The American and German schools apply the inductive method of observation and generalization, which has produced such brilliant results in the natural sciences. They begin with a wide study of the actual working of economical forces, and endeavor to reason upward from the mass of complicated facts to the general laws that underlie and govern all. They begin by recognizing the existence of an actual constitution and course of nature, instead of seeking to devise an artificial one on assumed principles.

The general idea here expressed is, of course, a good one, namely that the proper method of science is, as Carey had also indicated, to begin with the immediate details about one. The difficulty with the early Social Scientists, however, was that they did not have adequate objective procedures for getting the detailed information they needed in proper

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

sampling sizes. They sought data, in spite of themselves, not as scientists but as investigators or lawyers, for a purpose.

Thompson on a Science of Man. We have already had occasion in this work to emphasize the fact that many persons—and especially the theologians—in the nineteenth century denied the possibility of applying the principles of scientific procedure to the control of human society and deplored attempts in this direction. Speaking as theological partisans of revelation, they maintained that only Deity possessed the insight or even the right to look upon man and his destiny as organic wholes and to formulate explanatory analyses and rules for the guidance of human activities. In the face of this attitude, Thompson—himself an ordained minister—makes an earnest defense of the possibility of constructing a science of man in reply to critics of this type who claim that no such science is possible. He says,¹⁹

It has been objected by some that there can be no such thing as a science of man. "Science," they say, "deals only with things whose actions and reactions can be foretold, after we have mastered the general laws by which they are governed. The test of science, as Comte says, is the power of prediction. There is a science of Chemistry, because there is a possibility of foretelling what compound will be produced by the union of any two elements or known compounds. But man is not governed by laws of that sort; he is a being possessed of affections and a will, which often act in the most arbitrary way,—in a way that no one can foresee or predict."

This objection expresses a truth which can never be left out of sight. If we ignore it we shall miss the conditions under which man's material welfare is to be achieved. Men can never be put to a good use of any sort, while they are regarded or treated as *things*. To do so will be to keep them poor, as well as to degrade them morally; for the best work and the wisest economy can be got out of them only by bringing their free will into play in the desirable direction.

But the possibility of constructing a science of man does not rest upon the power to foresee the line of action that each individual man will pursue. Man lives in a world which his will did not create, and whose "constitution and course of nature" he cannot change. If he act in violation of its laws, he must take the penalty. . . . There exists equally for society an economic "constitution and course of nature"; the nation that complies with its laws attains to material well-being or wealth, and the nation that disobeys them inflicts poverty upon itself as a whole, or upon the mass of its people. To learn what those laws are, is the business of the student of social science; to govern a nation ac-

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

According to them is the business of the statesman, and is the art of national economy.

The premise of this justification of a science of man is not, of course, scientific. It is based on the assumption of the existence of a natural social order whose laws Social Science discovers. But in accepting this premise as valid, Thompson is simply following the current of contemporary thought. The invalidity of his premise does not, however, render untrue his conclusion. He might have argued more securely that man can generalize or project a set of working hypotheses for the ordering and control of human adjustments in the interest or support of an ideal and that he can cause these hypotheses to work fairly successfully in the service of his social aim or purpose. Where public policy operates, even haltingly, upon the basis of such hypotheses, we may properly claim the existence of a science. If the hypotheses work out well in application, we regard them as constituting a fairly accurate science. If they work out poorly in application, we think they constitute an inexact science; and if very poorly indeed, no science at all. It is quite clear that the hypotheses of physical science give better results in practice than do those of the social sciences, but this fact would scarcely justify us in denying the title of science to the sociological and other social science hypotheses. It would rather lead us to say that the physical sciences are, generally speaking, more exact than the social; and this is exactly what we do say. It must, moreover, be admitted that, whoever made the laws and regardless of whether the wills of men are free or conditioned, it is still possible to analyze the events and processes of nature and of human nature and to establish general principles or hypotheses for the interpretation of these processes, and also for their guidance in so far as it is within the power of men to guide them. And this is of course what Thompson's assertion amounted to.

Peshine Smith on the Possibility of Social Laws. Another member of the Carey School of Social Science, E. Peshine Smith, raises a question similar to that propounded by Thompson regarding the possibility of a human Social Science and answers it similarly, but in greater detail as to the conditions under which a Social Science (he uses the term Political Economy to cover essentially the same field) may be established. Like Carey, Smith understands the object of scientific laws to be the control of nature: "To investigate the laws which explain man's attainment, through association, of enlarged power over matter in all its forms, and

the development of his intellectual and moral faculties, in virtue of that power, is the object of Political Economy.”²⁰ He also states the fundamental conditions for the establishment of scientific laws in a manner similar to that of Carey in this connection, saying that “Those things and events are said to be the subjects of law, between which there is a regular and uniform mode of succession, the nature of which may be expressed in one or more general propositions; so that when we observe the things or events which stand in the relation of antecedent, we are enabled to predict those which will be consequent. The collection and methodical arrangement of those laws, make the science of the subject to which they relate.”²¹ Passing then to the problem of establishing the specific laws of Political Economy (or Social Science), he asks, “Is it possible to construct a science of Political Economy? In other words, are there laws grounded in the constitution of things and of man, fixed and invariable successions of effects determined by the causes which precede them,—regulating the progress of men in association with each other, in extending their dominion over matter and their concurrent improvement in intellect and morals?—and are these laws discoverable?”²² He answers this question in part by calling attention to the fact that already there is such a science in existence, while others who deny this fact nevertheless expect to see such a science developed in the future.²³

Smith does not, however, fail to recognize the difficulties in the way of establishing a genuine Social Science (or of Political Economy). These he states as follows:²⁴

It is doubtless true, that greater difficulty may be anticipated in forming a science of Political Economy, than in subjects of a less complex character. It involves the relations between man, endowed with reason and will—combined in associations where the reason and will of one conflict with those of another—and the world of physical nature, wherein what of instinct and will exist are subordinate to human dominion. The objects whose relations we have to examine are heterogeneous, and in one of them there is the apparent source of perplexity, that *will*, by its very nature, rejects law which is founded on the notion of a necessary succession of events. The objects—man and the natural world—have each its own distinct system of laws, both operating at one and the same

²⁰ E. Peshine Smith, *A Manual of Political Economy* (1860), p. 12. (First Ed., 1852. The term Social Science had not yet been adopted by the economists in 1852.)

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

time, co-operating in full force; neither superseding the other, for this would be opposed to the distinctive idea of a law, but producing results by their combined action.

This problem of the interference of will with the establishment of a Social Science does not discourage Smith any more than it did Thompson, and on the whole his arguments are more cogent and convincing than those of the latter. There would seem to be a slight contradiction between his view that the natural and the human worlds are governed by distinct sets of laws and Carey's assertion that all scientific law is one and the same essentially. But this contradiction largely disappears in his later assertion that the two types of laws are functionally integrated in that the laws of physical science are preliminary and essential to the understanding and the operation of social laws in the conquest and control of nature.²⁵

Social Laws Apply to Collective Phenomena. In one respect especially does Smith make a decided advance over the other members of the Carey school in his conception of social laws. He sees clearly—as the Associationists and their forebears, the Scotch philosophers and Fourier, did not—that the laws and principles of Social Science cannot be constructed merely by means of an analysis of human nature, important as that analysis is when considered as supplementary to the establishment of a science of society. On this point he is very clear.²⁶

If we undertook to deduce the laws of human nature from their manifestations in the action of a single individual, it would end in failure, because no two individuals, to say nothing of original diversities of constitution, are surrounded by the same circumstances. What concerns us, however, in Political Economy, is the conduct of men associated in communities—a conduct springing not from individual will or peculiarities, but from those which characterize the greater part of their members. It has been found by experience that irregularities, taken in sufficient masses, tend to become regular, and susceptible of strict ascertainment and calculation. Nothing is more uncertain, for example, than the period which an individual of a given age will live. Few things, however, are more certain than that, of one hundred thousand new-born infants indiscriminately taken in England and Wales, about fifteen thousand die in the first year, about five thousand more in the second; that something more than a quarter of the whole number will have perished before the expiration of the fifth year, and about one-half only will survive their fortieth year. Upon data obtained from the registration of births and deaths upon a large scale,

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-18.

mathematicians are enabled to construct tables of mortality, which give the probable number of years that any considerable number of persons of a given age will live, in the aggregate, with such precision as to afford a safe basis for the operations of Life Insurance Companies. Nor is this regularity confined to phenomena, which, like death, are so far independent of the human will as to be certain to happen at some time.

Drawing on Quetelet's findings, he goes on, in a way to suggest the writings of Buckle of nearly a decade later, to state that other types of human behavior definitely within the realm of human choice, such as the seasonal occurrence of marriages and of crime, are subject to a similar regularity and therefore to statistical generalization.²⁷

The general conclusion which Smith draws from these facts is one of the most fundamental of Social Science. He declares that the laws of society are laws of collective behavior or phenomena, not of individual behavior.²⁸

By observing such facts we may be led to conclude, that such indeterminate causes as arbitrary individual volition produce next to no effect in modifying social phenomena—they occasion individual oscillations, on one side and the other, of a common mid-point, which neutralize each other, and leave the combined action of society what it would be if no such partial perturbations existed. The progress of intelligence, subordinating passion to reason, obviously tends to substitute certainty for doubt in regard to the conduct of communities, to make the private will and the social will correspond, and to reconcile the highest degree of individual freedom with the highest degree of mutual aid and mutual dependence—aid from each other and from Nature, won by conscious and cheerful obedience to the laws of human nature and physical nature.

This way of looking at the regularity of collective behavior represents a decided advance over the older point of view which considered every human act not classifiable as an "act of God" as the result of an individual act of will. It also makes possible, as Smith endeavors to show, the construction of a true science of society expressed in the form of social laws, principles, and formulas. However, it does not, as Smith apparently thought, mark a distinct cleavage between the natural and the social sciences. Those physical laws which are not merely the description of the behavior of a specific object in nature—and such laws are extremely rare—are also generalizations of a large number of specific phenomena. Genetic laws, laws of sidereal and other cosmic movement, or even of

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

the disintegration of atoms, appear to be as much collective generalizations as are the death and the birth rates, or the laws of the distribution of marriage and the occurrence of crime mentioned above.

Comment on the Methodological Theory of the Carey School. Space limitations render it inadvisable to go further into an analysis of the general methodological theories of this school. Indeed, their chief emphases have already been brought out here. They are to the effect that a science of society is just as possible as any of the physical sciences, although, for reasons stated, more difficult to achieve. The assumed interference of will with the regularity and the predictability of human social phenomena does not negative the possibility of such a science, for the statistics of human behavior show the occurrence of collective regularities which equalize and neutralize individual variations of conduct. The necessary conclusion, therefore, is that Social Science is the result of the generalization of collective behavior and not of the analysis and description of individual human nature or of individual conduct. Practically all of these Social Scientists are still under the influence of the Platonic conception of Natural Law, which conceives of social and other scientific laws as a part of the universal or cosmic system rather than as the products of man's attempts to look phenomena into perspective through the methods of statistical or other forms of generalization. Therefore, in their opinion, laws are discovered, not made. As yet the implications of statistical science had not reached such general currency and recognition as to make the latter interpretation dominant. Some of the members of the school regarded these laws as the direct product of divine creation, while others had more metaphysical notions of their origins. But all agreed that they existed and that a Social Science depended upon their discovery or generalization.

The Neo-Classical school of Economic Social Scientists made no additions to a theory of methodology worthy of note. In fact, they had much less interest in this phase of Social Science than did the members of the Carey school.

The Problem of Method in Social Science: Later Theories

Orientation. The discussions of method recorded in the preceding chapters may be said to be in the spirit of the classical period of Social Science, although the objectives of this classical Social Science were often directly opposed to those of the classical economists whom the Social Scientists wished to contravert. The theories of methodology of the early Social Scientists had clearly grown out of the thinking of the eighteenth century revision of the world from a theological to a metaphysical order, but now they were being again transformed by the nineteenth century revision of the world from a metaphysical to a naturalistic order. The influence of nineteenth century British and German natural science methods upon the economic Social Scientists is as evident as was the influence of the French philosophy of the eighteenth century upon the Associationist Social Scientists.

We may now turn to the later developments of general methodology in Social Science, in which we may expect, in part at least, to discover the impact of Positivism or the Comtean logic upon the handling of the large and complicated masses of data which were being brought to light through the agency of accumulations of historical, anthropological and ethnological, and statistical materials. We are now reaching the period in which a confusing and otherwise disconcerting array of data must be looked into shape by means of some sort of methodological logic. The new obvious solution to this problem of bringing order out of methodological chaos was the development of the projective or abstract inventive method of thinking. But it did not appear spontaneously. It came with great effort and travail. We shall now proceed to trace its development.

The Projective Method: Allen's Version. In the second issue of the magazine *Social Science*, July 13, 1887, T. Ernest Allen presented the second of his series of "Studies in Sociology." It was entitled "Preliminary Con-

siderations—About Method.” Like Carey, he used the analogy of chemistry in describing the functions of analysis and synthesis.¹

And now, a few words about method. A chemist decomposes water into two gasses, applies appropriate tests, discovers that they are the elements oxygen and hydrogen, and finds their proportion by weight and volume. What method can he follow to demonstrate to a certainty that his analysis is correct? The synthetic method; by reversing the operation of analysis; by making a volume of oxygen and of hydrogen, mixing them in the proportion by weight or volume discovered by analysis, exploding them to produce water, and finally observing that no residual gas remains, and that the weight of water produced just equals the combined weights of oxygen and hydrogen used. This procedure science esteems conclusive. Synthesis proves analysis as multiplication does division.

But Allen’s most interesting contribution to the discussion of method is his statement of what one of the authors of this work has for more than two decades characterized as the projective method,² and which von Wiese has called the ideal-typical method.

Wright, as we shall show presently, had also, at least tentatively and briefly, described this procedure; so also had Hegel, although he did not comprehend its true function and significance. Says Allen,³

The nature of man is the supreme fact of sociology, and the ultimate elements of society are the individual men and women composing the race. Two methods of study are possible; first to generalize laws from the social phenomena of the past and present, and, second, to postulate an ideal man, and to derive sociological laws and social institutions from his nature. We shall adopt the latter. It will be said that the result will be only a more or less complete statement of utopian ideas so distantly related to every-day life as to be of little or no practical value. But this is not true. The ideal society furnishes us with a pole star by which we may shape the course of social evolution so far as it lies in our power to influence a process guided by a love and wisdom far superior to those of man. It supplies us with a model, and while it is impossible to carry the human race to so lofty a plane at one leap, we are provided with a standard of judgment, and can then see that in proportion as the social relations and institutions of any age partake of the essence characterizing this ideal, are they elevated and responsive to man’s higher nature. To restate the case, the method which is destined to be of most value, in the development of higher social states, consists in studying the nature of the ideal man and in elaborating therefrom a social state adapted to his nature and supplying the conditions for a complete

¹ *Loc. cit.*, p. 4.

² L. L. Bernard, “Invention and Social Progress,” *American Journal of Sociology*, XXIX: 1–33 (July, 1923). See also his *Introduction to Sociology*, 1942, Ch. XXVII.

³ T. E. Allen, *loc. cit.*, p. 4.

and harmonious exercise of all of his faculties and functions. After this has been done we are prepared to take up, successively, three other problems: first, to study society as it is today—the result of the action and reaction of the natures of men, as they now are, upon each other; second, to define the social system which, through the law of evolution, must immediately follow the competitive system; and, third, to formulate and apply the practical agencies which can lead the people from the present to the higher system. When this new social state has been attained, then, by repetitions of this three-fold cycle, the race will gradually progress towards the ideal social state. As two points determine the position of a line in space, so does the statement of social conditions 'as they are to-day, and of an ideal society, present to our view the pathway over which the race is destined to travel in that grand development called social evolution.

In other words, the best method in sociology, according to Allen, is one in which on the basis of present facts we project an ideal social state and then judge actual conditions according to the degree to which they approach this ideal.

Merits and Defects of Allen's Method. This is a method employed from the time of the Utopians to the present, and with increasing accuracy and success. If complete knowledge of the conditions of a successful adjustment of man to his environments, both natural and cultural, were possible it would be a perfect method. In any case, it is the method most essential to social progress in the large. Our quarrel is not so much with Allen's general statement of method as a social ideal as it is with the author's view of how to achieve it. Here it is thoroughly subjective and does not advance beyond Socrates and Plato who believed that the good man makes the good state. So he does, or would, if we could only find out how to make the good man without first making the good state. We suspect that Allen, like Socrates and Plato, knew all about this method and that it was no other than that hoary principle, sister to perpetual motion, of having men pull themselves up spiritually by their intellectual and emotional boot straps. That, like revelation and some other things, is a lost art. We are now forced to depend upon some sort of interchange of forces and pressures—or rather, as the behaviorist would state it, interchange of stimuli and responses—between the individual and his environments, natural and cultural.⁴ We need not be surprised, however, at Allen's resort to the subjective method of achieving a good society. It is the procedure insisted upon by practically all of the historic religions, by the idealistic philosophers, and, strangely enough, by the

⁴ L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology* (1926), Ch. 6.

professional politicians and by those capitalistic leaders of our civilization who detest the very mention of objective social reform.

Wright's Projective Method. Among the theoretical Social Scientists, R. J. Wright presented an almost identical statement on method. In discussing experimentation as a method for Social Science, the details of which we shall give below, he reviews the function of (a) historical ideals and (b) prospective ideals as follows:⁵

(a) *Historical Ideals.* Imaginary and ideal original states of society, are experiments of some kind, on our own minds, and are efforts to reach the great archetypes within our own minds, are latent activities on the basis of an inward type theory; so that, among the data for Social Science, and among the scientific means of improving it, may be mentioned this inevitable tendency of the human mind, to imagine peculiar states of society in its most simplified forms:—Thus, the church-hypothesis, of one original pair for all Mankind, and they created in a state of moral and intellectual perfection:—Also, the opposite hypothesis, that Mankind were originally a set of barbarians, but little if any, superior to unreasoning animals. Each of these opposite hypotheses answers to explain different phenomena of society. The church-hypothesis explains the laws of the moral nature of individual man; whilst the barbarian hypothesis serves to explain the scientific, social, and governmental progress of Mankind as a race or as a whole. Then, again, imaginary conditions of society, and imaginary positions of Individuals may be conceived; and these may serve to show the superior worth of man and life, above all fashions and property and earthly distinctions. They also help us to form a judgment as to what are the strongest passions of human nature. The principle is just like the great advice, to do unto others as we would have they should do unto us: it is an experiment upon our own moral consciousness.

(b) *Prospective Ideals.* This sort of reasoning is the foundation of ideals for the future of human society; and thus, of *hopes* for society, and thus becomes a guide of struggles for the improvement of Mankind. But imaginary states are, in main, necessary to the pursuit of any study, in a truly analytical method; for the subsequent re-integration that is necessary to form science, cannot follow without ideals as to mental aim.

Nor is *our* ideal to be supposed to be a reach at absolute perfection. On the contrary, it is an ideal modified so as to come within the writer's ideas of present human possibilities. And it is by no means supposed to be the end of all progress or of all ideals, on this subject. As for its scientific value as an aid to study, we hope to place our ideal at least in the same category, as Plato's Republic, More's Utopia, Fourier's Association, and Ballou's True System of Human Society; and that is not saying very much for either of them.

⁵ *Principia, or Basis of Social Science* (1875), pp. 46-48.

Experimentation. Wright observes that there are two great methods in Social Science, namely observation and experimentation. In the next following chapter we shall consider the first of these, which turns out to be history. Here we shall deal only with Wright's discussion of experimentation. Interestingly enough, he uses the experimental method as a sort of special plea for his precinct form of social organization, already described in an earlier chapter. Since social experimentation is an important factor in Social Science and in progress, any type of social organization which expedites social experimentation is, he thinks, to be encouraged. The precinct organization of society would make such experimentation feasible. His discussion which is as follows, is very interesting.⁶

Experiment

If Social Science is ever to become a real science, experiments must be encouraged in it, as really as in all the other sciences. But almost the only experiments of any thoroughness we have of late years are communistic, except a few experiments on some peculiar methods of settling unoccupied lands. Our precinct system affords much the best basis for experiment. . . .

The next best kind of experiments are well organized voluntary corporations, as for instance, the moral communes. These ought to be encouraged by law. . . .

In all sciences we must keep in mind the conditions. And one of the conditions of any desirable social experiment for a free people is, of course, that the persons who enter upon it should do so VOLUNTARILY, and from real conviction. Otherwise it is no experiment of the natural workings of free or desirable society; but it is a mere experiment in tyranny, in corruption, or in punishment. . . .

In regard to the use of experiments, we may observe that they give, not merely a balance of contradictory arguments, when some great and good principle or plan is found to succeed in some one or more cases, but not at all in others. On the contrary, wherever a great and good principle or plan has triumphantly succeeded, even only once, it is a sure proof that the principle or plan is PRACTICABLE FOR HUMAN NATURE. And thus, every new attainment is the advancement to a new position by the vanguard of improvement. In other words, a principle established for one, is established for all. Mankind, some of them at least, are improving, and are gradually becoming fit for better and better social conditions. And the exact amount of this fitness, is entirely too complicated an answer, to be obtained by any theoretical or *a priori* argument. The next total resultant of the many conflicting and variable forces, acting from time to time, can only be ascertainable by trial itself.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

And what, after all, is the history of any nation, and of its laws and wars and government? what but a series of experiments, now with one object and now with another, yet having scarcely any more of the scientific conditions of a USEFUL experiment, than an eclipse or an earthquake.

This is the era of political experiment all over the world, and this fact probably shows one of the final causes for the division of Mankind into nations or races, namely, the better to compel them to try different series of disconnected experiments, as to the structure and laws of society.

Social Experimentation. Again, he writes on social experimentation, this time from the sociological angle, as follows:⁷

Sociological Experiment

The absolute necessity for Sociological experiment, in order to the improvement of society, has already been sufficiently spoken of. . . . Therefore, the most that could be done here, is briefly to point out that our Precinct system affords one of the finest possible fields, and the very first practicable one, for the trial of such experiments.

The Precinct-principle opens the way for true and voluntary sociological experiments. If one Precinct commits errors, it will soon suffer the natural consequences thereof and others can avoid the error. If one discovers or invents or introduces any good, others can freely follow. . . .

These understood principles will soon work themselves fully into results, and show their true character. Only thus can the science of society become much improved. Neither good nor evil can be made plain to the minds of the people in general, otherwise than by allowing systems to work out into light, their own natural and true results.

It is, of course, scarcely necessary to comment on the fact that the type of sociological "experiment" proposed here by Wright is not scientific in the true sense at all. Conditions are not rigorously controlled, variables are not specifically and precisely defined, and they are not measured in objective units. In a general practical sense, to be sure, the various precinct ventures might be called social experiments. But it would be a very insecure Social Science that based its generalizations on such experiments, however valuable they might be in actual practice.

O'Connell's General Statement. O'Connell, who was in many respects the ablest of the theoretical Social Scientists, has a very interesting but almost impossibly difficult discussion of method. It was no doubt all very clear and definite in his own mind, but the reader is likely to become somewhat confused by his abstractness of style. The following statements

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-172.

include the essentials of his methodological discussions, but by no means all of the details and ramifications.⁸

Reflection having come to address itself to the laws of force or latent action, must proceed by *observation*, in the philosophical sense of this term; that is to say, by actively remarking or searching for the same phenomenon as placed in different circumstances by nature herself. But Abstraction, which inducts the elements of physical Mixture, cannot wait to find them accessible spontaneously; it must make them so by *force*, of which it has just obtained the secret; it must employ instruments to take them actually or virtually asunder; and so this species of induction might be termed *instrumentation*. From the elements thus attained, generalization, studying Structure, seeks to recompose or generate (for this is the original import) the structural relations to be "unravelling." This systematic trial to reproduce the forms of nature would properly be Induction by *experimentation*. It is needless to add a word to show this second triad of methods to be collectively and characteristically Analytic.

Induction passes finally to the field of organical science. In the hands of Reason it is applied to the phenomena of growth, that is to say, progressive transformation; and having mastered, in the preceding period, the various modes of structure, with their elements and laws of formation individually, it could put a number of those forms together by a series of inferences, so as to reproduce and thus resolve the fluctuations of the living object: this induction from a juxtaposition of principles to particulars, would, from its reputed inversion, be naturally named *DEduction*. Next, of course, the inference is from a juxtaposition of individuals to a serial unification of principles; Induction, at this task which is the object of Comparison and of which the subject is animal Life, would be the very modern method named *Classification*. . . . To sum up, then, we find the universal method of Induction, in leading the human mind throughout the labyrinth of nature, would accomplish the whole route by three systematic surveys, with just as many similar and subordinate stages to each, which are severally signalized in the following table:

Logical (System)	Enumeration	: Analogy	: Syllogism;
Analytic	" Observation	: Instrumentation	: Experimentation;
Synthetic	" Deduction	: Classification	: Taxonomy. ⁹

Clearly O'Connell was partial to the synthetic approach to Social Science, which, as he sees it, includes projection or projective social invention. It unifies and makes coherent the seemingly chaotic data which analysis offers. He continues, "According as the sciences become, as they do supremely towards the end of the scale, at once most Complex in their phenomena, and so most Special in their aspects, and consequently most Abstract in their methods, the operation of Synthesis, which puts the

⁸ *Vestiges of Civilization* (1852), pp. 118, 119.

⁹ In another place "taxonomy" is replaced by "science" (*ibid.*, p. 162).

finishing hand to all science, becomes progressively conspicuous in the results. The destined results, it is well known, are to give abstract or ideal unity to the multifarious elements explored preparatively by Analysis."¹⁰

Synthesis vs. Analysis. Again, the absurdities of the analytic method, when depended upon exclusively, are pointed out in another, very difficult, passage by O'Connell, as follows:¹¹

The modes of classifying man . . . are quite disgraceful to the state of Science. For to cut him up into two or three beings, animal, moral, rational etc., is scholastic or mystical nonsense. So arbitrary a procedure would be hooted as absurd in the study of any other object in the universe; for in all, the study is mainly concerned with the conditions of integrity in which they have been presented by nature. The complexity of these conditions is not unravelled by coarse division; which, in this case, would oblige to continue the partition of the human species into vegetable, chemical, mechanical, geometrical. The analysis results spontaneously from the elimination of a proper scale, which reserves to each succeeding class but its differential character. Now this is found in man to be the law, I name ethology, meaning the property of modifying the various instincts according to usage. By this he is clearly demarkated from the co-terminous class of animals, and in the normal mode of *graduation*—by a distinction of mere degree. But then there remained other gradations, superior to individual man, and apparently so diverse as to be commonly thought incongruous; there were mental processes, there were social institutions, there were scientific systems. How then were these residual grades to be reduced within the scale, and still leave man his prescriptive position of pre-eminence? The difficulty had but one alternative, either by multiplying the natures of the subject, or merging the degrees of the phenomena.

The first of these alternatives, he concludes, is absurd; the second leads to the necessary adoption of the social organism concept. Induction may operate on number, on quantity, and on figurational relations. It may operate by means of sensation, of memory, or of imagination. The results are enumeration, analogy, or a compound of the two. Thus, he declares that "Induction, . . . directed by Sensation upon Number, would necessarily be simply enumeration of like instances. Directed by Memory upon Quantity, the process would be analogy, or inference from association, by examples. Induction, by Imagination applied to relations of Figure, would be a compound of the two preceding modes reversed; it would be an inference of particular cases from formulized analogies or axioms. . . ." ¹²

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 117.

Results of O'Connell's Methodology. The net result of O'Connell's abstract analysis of method, as applied to Social Science, is to make of it a philosophy of history (consisting of the three stages of cycles—mythological, metaphysical, and scientific) and to make of society itself a social organism. Thus he combines the essentials of Comte and Spencer in this particular respect. We have already dwelt on this latter emphasis upon the organismic concept in an earlier chapter; we shall refer to the former in the following chapter. O'Connell's grasp of method is good, but his expression of it is extremely abstract and hard to understand. His was, it is needless to add, not an influential treatise in the field of Social Science.

The Natural Science Viewpoint: Hamilton's Statement. Hamilton, the last of the systematic Social Scientists whom we shall discuss here in connection with the general problem of method, believed that the method of a science is dependent upon the aims or ends of the science. Consequently he defines science in terms of method, as the following statement will serve to show. He says, "The only difference . . . between the scientific treatment of a subject and the unscientific—the vulgar, or, so-called, popular mode of treating it—consists in [the fact that] the method and order which prevail in the one, are wanting in the other—in the fact that the facts and ideas of the former are methodically arranged, or systematized, while those of the latter are loosely and disconnectedly thrown together. Science is but the classification of knowledge, or systematization of thought."¹³ Once the science had formulated its objectives in a clear cut manner, he continues, the problem of method would be half solved.¹⁴

When a science has really discovered how to begin its work, how properly to direct and conduct its inquiries *ab initio*—which it can never do until it has attained to just, clear and definite ideas as to its true and proper ends, and which it discovers only at the moment it attains to such ideas—it is already far advanced. . . .

SOCIAL SCIENCE . . . has not yet attained to just, clear, and definite ideas as to its true and proper ends, and . . . consequently, it has not yet learned how even to begin its inquiries properly, how to direct its efforts, or systematize its observations.

Although far more advanced, relatively, in particular ideas, than sidereal philosophy before the time of Newton, it (Social Philosophy) scarcely less needs the PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA PHILOSOPHIAE SOCIALIS, or rather

¹³ *Present Status of the Philosophy of Society* (1866), p. 75.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 2, 8, 10.

the PRINCIPIA PRIMA. It needs these primary principles, which have not as yet been attained, to instruct it how rightly to direct its inquiries—how properly to begin its legitimate work.

Social Science, therefore, cannot get an adequate understanding of its proper methods until it has clearly delimited its proper ends. What are these ends? Hamilton answers this question of ends as follows: "They are, FIRST, to ascertain what are the causes or laws which determine the social condition of mankind; SECONDLY, to ascertain how far, and by what means, can those causes or laws be controlled or modified by human agency—by human intention or effort, and purposely and designedly directed to that end."¹⁵

All Means to Ends Are Natural. Hamilton next makes a distinction between voluntary and involuntary human agencies, the latter belonging to the realm of Physics, the former to Psychology. He says, "It is to be borne in mind, that an important distinction is ever to be taken between involuntary and merely *instinctive* human agency, and that which is voluntary and *rational*. The former belongs exclusively to the realm of nature, or pure PHYSICS; the latter alone to MAN, properly so understood, or the realm of PSYCHOLOGY."¹⁶ Both types of agencies are, however, strictly natural phenomena, for there is no basic distinction between man and nature. This point Hamilton emphasizes as follows:¹⁷

The one, in other words, we may say, appertains to the *primary* and simple laws of nature; the other, to the *secondary* and more complex laws of nature. For all is comprehended in Universal Nature. There is no valid distinction—no scientific, no truly philosophical distinction to be taken between MAN and NATURE.

Such is, in brief, the Newtonian idea of astronomy—one of its simplest illustrations. The Newtonian idea of Sociology is precisely analogous. It asserts the universality of the causes, or laws, which determine the social condition of mankind, and the consequent identity of the causes which determine the social destiny of an individual and a nation—of the humblest individual in the human family and of the most exalted—of the pauper as well as the millionaire—of the laborer as well as of the capitalist—of the peasant not less than the prince.

No one, not even the most radical of modern behavioristic sociologists, is more insistent than Hamilton was on the natural-science status of So-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

cial Science. Indeed, this has been pointed out already in an earlier chapter. Like all the other Social Scientists of his day he was interested in seeking the natural laws which govern social phenomena. What he conceived these laws to be, summarized in his seven principles, the reader may remember from our discussion in an earlier chapter.

The Eclectic Group—Variations in Methodology. Turning to the problem of general method as considered by the eclectic Social Scientists, or members of the American Social Science Association, we find, as we might naturally expect from the diversity of their backgrounds, a wide difference of opinion among them as to the nature of the methodological processes. Some, like F. B. Sanborn, remained basically theological in spite of their lip-service to the ideal of science, and to these men, revelation as well as observation was a valid method of arriving at the facts of Social Science. Practically all of the eclectic group retained the metaphysical notion of natural laws of social phenomena waiting to be "discovered" by man, although we are not always told concretely just how to discover them. But there were others, like Curtis and Strong, who had reached a positive stage in their thinking. They saw Social Science laws as human generalizations of historical and contemporaneous data. We shall take up these various methodological points of view in order in the pages that follow, beginning with the exposition of Sanborn's views.

Natural Social Science Theologically Sanctioned: Sanborn's Viewpoint. Sanborn did not pretend that Social Science was, or even would ever be, as precise and exact as the physical sciences. Nevertheless he believed that all scientific method was essentially the same. He declared: "The methods of acquiring all human knowledge are essentially the same, though the matter investigated prescribes its own form of inquiry. The conduct of a nation in a grave political crisis is not to be calculated like the elements of an eclipse; yet it may be foreseen within certain limits; and so, too, with the lesser problems that Social Science has to consider."¹⁸ Sanborn, however, warned against too close analogy between Social and natural science, just as he did against too precipitous submission of Social Science conclusions to practical test. On another occasion he wrote,¹⁹

Much, very much, remains for the methodical and judicious direction of these studies,—the whole outline and classification of the social sciences is still to be defined and prudently maintained. They need to be guarded, on the one

¹⁸ Report of the General Secretary, in *Journal of Social Science*, No. 11, 1880, p. viii.

¹⁹ "The Social Sciences. Their Growth and Future," *ibid.*, No. 21, 1886, p. 12.

hand, from those who would push their analogy with exact science, and with the natural sciences which are not exact, too far, and thus hasten into generalization and prediction for which the facts of human nature afford no warrant. On the other hand, they need not be protected from those persons of a more practical turn, who would submit all the applications of social science to the tests of an immediate and shifting expedience, and from those also who too hopefully and philanthropically rush to conclusions which the experience of mankind has not yet justified.

Apparently, in spite of the common agreement as to the necessity of making the new discipline a real science, there was a difference of opinion as to the nature of that science. Just as definitions of the discipline varied from quite theoretical to quite practical ones, so also, in the field of method the same divergence of opinion prevailed.

The methods of acquiring knowledge common to all science, referred to by Sanborn in the passage quoted above, are observation and inference—but always, apparently, with a theological bias. He says, "To 'know men's natures in the flower,' by a scientific prediction, is what we aspire to. . . . We must proceed by the slow methods of observation and inference, guided always by a faith that teaches us the wisdom, the permanence and the goodness of the power by whom the natural and the supernatural order of the Universe is established and forever continued."²⁰

Most striking in this connection, however, is the following vindication of revelation:²¹

We thus return at the close of our session, to that which was the beginning of Social Science,—the revelation of God to man through institutions and precepts, now hallowed by age and venerable even in misapprehension and error.

For we cannot too often consider and repeat that the origin of every science, preeminently of the social sciences, is divine; that these fruits of man's wisdom, whether ripe or unripe, fall to us from a celestial tree, and do not spring up by chance, or in the course of rude nature from the earth on which we tread.

S. G. Howe's Statement. Apparently the philanthropists among the Social Scientists rather generally held to these theological sanctions of Social Science. This is perhaps not surprising, since in these early days those interested in philanthropy often had close connections with the ministry. Some of them were themselves ministers, while nearly all philanthropic

²⁰ "The Commonwealth of Social Science," *ibid.*, No. 19, 1885, p. 10.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

reformers were compelled to depend primarily upon the ministry and religious communicants to secure the adoption and execution of their reform policies. Almost twenty years earlier than the statements quoted above Sanborn had been on the Massachusetts Board of State Charities, which, in one of its *Reports* (1886), written by S. G. Howe, had pointed out that the members of the board "have dwelt upon the importance of knowing and obeying all the natural laws, because they are ordained by our beneficent God and Father, to bind together by bonds of mutual interest and affection all the children of His great human family; and to prepare them here, for His good will and pleasure hereafter." ²²

Here we have epitomized the theological conception, not only of natural laws, but of science itself. Revelation is the original source of science; all science is divine in origin. It is very doubtful if such a strikingly theological viewpoint was characteristic of most of the members of the American Social Science Association, but it must have struck a sympathetic chord in the minds of Howe's readers; otherwise they would not have accepted his leadership so complacently. Nor would they have consistently retained Sanborn, who spoke the same language, as Secretary of their organization, if this language had not had meaning for them. We may, however, assume that with some of the listeners at any rate this theological sanction to Social Science was simply a lot of comfortable verbiage. The words were familiar; the members of the Association had heard them from infancy. To accept them as verbalizations did not necessarily imply belief in them as realistic facts and principles.

The Natural Law Sanction. Similar references to "natural laws," pre-existing in a metaphysical nature, abound in the published writings of the Social Scientists of the eclectic type, as we have already seen. So they did also in the works of most of the other Social Scientists. John Eaton, for example, refers to these "natural laws" as rigorously determinative of all our relations. Eaton declares that we "discover" them by experience. He continues, as follows: "These truths have their modes, methods, and laws, of action, and their discovery is preeminently the work of science. These laws are in use and around us; we use them and must abide by them whether we will or no. They determine our plans, pleasures, our disease and health, the rewards of our industry or the punishment of our sins. Childhood is called shortsighted because it cannot see them; age is

²² *Loc. cit.*, p. cxvii.

described as wise because it has gained from its own experience, or that of others, a knowledge of their action. . . ." ²³

Edward Atkinson also speaks of the "natural laws which govern the actions of men in the conduct of the processes of industry." ²⁴ Even Sumner himself, who saw so clearly how ethics and philosophy and science are human creations, nevertheless believed that there existed universal natural laws which man must discover. He says, ²⁵

That these social and economic circumstances are subject to universal natural laws which we cannot alter, seems to be a strange doctrine which people are slow to understand. That there is anything here to be wrought out by study and investigation, or by scientific process, is not popularly believed or understood. Those, then, who do not look upon the problem as governed by any natural, universal, and inevitable laws, set to work to invent some plan for convertible bond redemption, or for mixing up bonds, greenbacks, and bank notes in some new way, and believe that they have solved the problem. . . . On the other hand, those who believe that there are financial laws which are imperative as the laws of mechanics, must consider it their chief business to find out what these laws are, and when these laws are found they have just the same authority as any other laws which govern our existence in this world. We must obey them, and we can only hope for physical prosperity by obeying them, just as we attain health only by obeying the laws of health.

The "study and investigation" of which Sumner speaks referred in his own case to the manipulation of historical and anthropological data primarily. Although he emphasized "positive information and scientific method," as we saw when discussing his courses at Yale, he does not elaborate specific methods of study and investigation.

Social Science a Human Generalization. Among the eclectic Social Scientists there were some men who saw that scientific laws were the product of human generalization and that experiment and observation were required to secure the data to be generalized. George William Curtis, for example, represents this point of view. "Undoubtedly, as Mr. Herbert Spencer says," he tells us, "so far as the phenomena of society can be generalized, and interpretation can be based upon this generalization, so far there can be a science." ²⁶ It is to be noted that Curtis, unlike Strong,

²³ "A Word on the Scientific Method in the Common Affairs of Life," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, p. ix.

²⁴ "What Makes the Rate of Wages?" *ibid.*, No. 19, 1885, p. 97.

²⁵ "American Finance," *ibid.*, No. 6, 1874, p. 183. See also his definition of sociology previously quoted.

²⁶ Opening Address before American Social Science Association, *Journal of Social Science*, No. 6, 1876, p. 33.

as indicated in a previous chapter, here appeals to the authority of Spencer, rather than to that of Comte, since Spencer had already largely replaced Comte in the American mind as the chief Social Science authority. However, the Positivist interpretation of method was essentially the same.

The extensive analysis of William Strong's point of view, presented in an earlier chapter, illustrates the fact that he too had a clear-cut notion of the nature of science and of the way sciences develop. There were, it will be recalled, no theological sanctions, no metaphysical natural laws, expressed or implied in his discussion of methodology. Instead there was a straight-forward statement of the applicability of science to social phenomena and a consideration of the possibilities of the new science.²⁷ The concrete methods advocated by Strong were "careful and minute observation . . . [of] human society as it now exists,"²⁸ as well as the historical method. Daniel C. Gilman likewise urged Social Science students "to the careful ascertainment of facts by experiment and observation, and then to reflection upon these facts, until laws were discovered from which, again, rules and methods of management might safely be deduced."²⁹

Summary. So much, then, for the general methodological discussions of the Social Scientists. We may now summarize the outstanding trends briefly. However much the Social Scientists may have disagreed with one another as to the content of their science—and that they disagreed to the extent of absurdity we have already seen—they were all of the opinion that Social Science was a natural science and that society was governed by natural laws. Practically all of them, regardless of how they conceived their discipline, believed in the objective existence of the natural social laws which it was the function of Social Science to "discover." They might disagree as to the nature of these laws, since, as yet there had been no generally accepted attempt to specify and classify them, but almost no one disputed their actual existence. Some maintained that they were the product of God thinking out loud, so to speak; others that they were the logic of mechanical forces; and still others that they were identical with physical laws. Brisbane, for example, following Fourier, saw them in terms of cosmic or astronomical laws, specifically the law of attraction. O'Connell, on the other hand, believed them to be more

²⁷ "The Study of Social Science," *ibid.*, No. 4, 1871, pp. 1-7.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

²⁹ Opening Address of the 1880 meetings of the American Social Science Association, *ibid.*, No. 12, 1880, p. xxiii.

biological in nature. Hamilton leaned towards physics and geology, and Wright and Masquerier to geology. Carey saw the same laws in social as in physical phenomena, especially those of gravitation, or association, as they manifested themselves in social data. Bascom also was inclined to see in the operation of self-love a force analogous to gravitation. To Sanborn the natural social laws were the products of divine revelation, many of which had already appeared in the Bible. E. C. Wines took a similar position.³⁰

The Next Steps. With the existence of objective social laws thus agreed upon, the next problem for our consideration is how, concretely, did they expect to "discover" the laws which they were so confident existed. Where should one look to find them? Two sources of data presented themselves, historical and contemporaneous facts.³¹ We shall, therefore, in the following chapters turn to a consideration of the historical and the statistical methods as they were developed in the United States, and especially by the Social Scientists.

³⁰ Enoch Cobb Wines, *Commentaries on the Laws of the Ancient Hebrews: with an Introductory Essay on Civil Society and Government*. (New York: G. P. Putnam & Co., 1853), pp. 17-18.

³¹ Comte himself, it will be remembered, listed as means of investigation: (1) observation; (2) experiment; (3) comparison (a) with inferior animals, (b) of co-existing states of society, (c) of consecutive states; and, ultimately, (4) the historical method (*Positive Philosophy*, Martineau translation, 1853, II: 95-110). Comte was partial to the historical method, which he considered to be his own peculiar contribution to Social Physics or Sociology.

PART ELEVEN

The Historical Method and Social Science

The Philosophy of History and Social Science: Antecedents

The Three-Fold Source of Social Science Data. Social Science grew up on three legs,¹ although the Social Scientists themselves were usually acutely aware of only two of these; and, moreover, it was not until Social Science as a discipline was well advanced in its development that it formally recognized the supplementary importance of these two. The three legs—or sources—of Social Science were history, ethnology (a term that has now been merged in the main into anthropology), and the statistics of contemporaneous events. History as a source of Social Science data had long been recognized, and statistics was of increasing importance throughout the period here under consideration. Only ethnology remained largely unrecognized as a contributing source, although it was probably better adapted to the function than statistics. This disregard of ethnological data by the Social Scientists was due to the fact that few, if any, of them were concerned with ethnological problems. Even W. G. Sumner, who closed his career working in his field, had not begun to employ data drawn from primitive life and society until the Social Science movement had passed its prime. Although Herbert Spencer was, as we have seen, one of the chief inspirers of the theoretical Social Scientists of the United States, they did not to any considerable extent follow his lead in generalizing from the facts of primitive life. Rather they used Comte's historical and logical methods instead, when they did not, as in the early days, resort to purely aprioristic speculation. Despite the fact that they lived in a country in which the Indians were constantly active and easily to be seen, the facts of Indian life and social organization appeared to them so remote from current reality that they disregarded them as bases of generalization. Accordingly, when in 1874 Sumner attempted to set forth the bases of Social Science, he mentioned only two of these,

¹ L. L. Bernard, "The Development of Methods in Sociology," *The Monist*, XXXVIII: 292-320 (Apr., 1928).

as follows: "History,—which is nothing but a record of the operations of human nature, and of the experience of men under the conditions of human life,—together with statistical information, constitute our chief means of solving financial problems. The field of our skill lies in interpreting and generalizing laws from the facts before us, and not in inventing schemes which take no account of facts."² History and statistics, in other words, are to furnish the data for the solution of our financial and, he might as well have added, of our social problems.

An Early American Statement of the Historical Method. We are in this chapter chiefly interested in the background of the development of the historical method in Social Science and of its employment of historical data for purposes of Social Science generalization. The historical emphasis had long preceded that upon the statistical method. The idea of a science of society based on historical data had, in fact, long since become familiar to American scholars who had kept abreast of European currents of thought. We have already referred to John Adams' interest in such a science. And by the end of the first quarter of the nineteenth century social generalizations from history were common enough to evoke the following statement from Jared Sparks, the historian:³

It has grown to be a favorite occupation with scholars and politicians to watch the progress of society and governments, arts and institutions, to talk of the influence of one on another, and of their combined effect on the human character, and to contemplate the changes and grand achievements, which are to mark the features of coming ages. The mind has taken this direction in modern times. Three centuries ago, who tasked himself to dream or inquire what should be the state of the world at this day? Who traced existing principles to ultimate results, or predicted from new discoveries in science, or a new step in political advancement, what mysteries of nature would be revealed, or what magnificent political fabrics would be reared at any future period? The art of printing arose as a second sun on the world; it spread the light of intellect and truth, and recorded the progress of knowledge on pages open to the inspection of mankind. The acquirements of genius, and the discoveries of accidents have been preserved; data have thus been accumulated; experiments have been tried and their results noted, and each link in the chain, in any state of its increase, may be seen by itself, and compared with the others. Hence it is, that the past affords some insight into the future; there is uniformity in nature, and the machinery which moves society is at different times similarly affected by

² W. G. Sumner, "American Finance," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 6, 1874, p. 183.

³ Jared Sparks, review of Charles J. Ingersoll's *Communication on the Improvement of Government*, in *North American Review*, XX: 227 (1825).

similar causes. This is the foundation of the prophetic tendency, which the speculations of thinking men are taking at the present day.

Two of the points mentioned in this quotation from Sparks deserve special emphasis here. The statement that "the past affords some insight into the future" is his justification for the study of history. His other statement that "there is uniformity in nature, and the machinery which moves society is at different times similarly affected by similar causes" is the basis for his faith in a historical methodology. It is on the foundation of such a faith that the advocates of the historical method hoped a science of society could be erected.

The Sources of Sparks' Ideas. The ideas here expressed show clearly the influence of Condorcet who, it will be remembered, in his *Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humain* (1793), sketched nine periods of human development, the eighth of which had begun with the invention of printing, and the ninth in 1789 with the French Revolution. According to Condorcet, progress was illimitable, and he did not hesitate to predict a time of both moral and physical perfection on earth, when even death itself would be conquered. Sparks' statement may also be the result of the influence of Godwin's almost equally optimistic view.⁴ As editor of the *North American Review*,⁵ Sparks was undoubtedly familiar with all the major philosophers of history up to his time, and it is interesting to have his testimony as to the direction of thought in his day.

Ibn Khaldun, Vico, Herder, and Guizot, among others, had already prepared the minds of American scholars for the idea of a science of society based on historical data before Comte entered upon the scene. Herder reached America through the French translation of Edgar Quinet,⁶ published in 1827, but not noticed in the *North American Review* until 1833. On the basis of his study of this book, J. Chapman, the reviewer, tells us that⁷

The object of history . . . is not merely the recording of facts. Its most interesting purpose, in the view which we have taken of it, is to represent man in his gradual march from barbarism to civilization, from civilization to refinement. Its great utility is, to trace the principles, which are governing, and which

⁴ See "Godwin on Malthus," *North American Review*, Vol. VI, n.s., pp. 289-319 (1822).

⁵ Sparks also held the first independent chair in history in this country, the McLean chair at Harvard, which he occupied first in 1839.

⁶ *Idées sur la Philosophie de l'Histoire de l'Humanité*, 3 vols.

⁷ J. Chapman, "The Progress of Society," *loc. cit.*, XXXVI: 419 (1833).

have always governed him;—to keep in view the end to which he has always been tending, and to point to us the steps by which he has approached it. To do its duty faithfully,—to array itself in its most attractive garb, and to act within its most enlarged sphere,—history should beat down the artificial boundaries, which separate nation from nation,—the American from the European,—the European from the Asiatic. It should treat man,—whatever his situation, whatever his character, in whatever age he may have lived,—as one great family, though of many members,—originating in the same source—operated upon by the same principles,—pressing forward towards the same end.

This view of history as an organic rather than as a nationalistic growth is, of course, quite in the philosophic tradition, as is also the belief that man is everywhere and at all times operated upon by uniform and discoverable laws of development. The outline of Herder's *Ideen*, incidentally, sounds very much like a modern text book for an orientation course, beginning as it does with the stars and ending with human society. The minds of men were thus for a long time becoming accustomed to the encyclopedic sweep of such philosophic systems as finally appeared under the names of Comte and Spencer.

The Influence of Vico and Montesquieu. Vico, probably inaccessible in the original Italian to most American scholars, was not introduced into this country until Cousin's praise of the *Scienza Nuova* and Michelet's abridgement attracted the attention of the public toward him. Cousin's work on philosophy⁸ was however a widely read book, especially as a college text, and his recommendation carried weight. In 1834 therefore a review of Vico's *Principi d'una Scienza Nuova* (6th edition, 1816), by A. H. Everett appeared in the *North American Review* under the title of "Progress and Limits of Social Improvement."⁹ Here again we find the same insistence on the function of history in arriving at the generalized principles which govern society. A reaction against the old moral philosophy or moral science approach is also indicated. The speculative moral philosophy treatment of Social Science problems, most fully developed by the Scotch philosophers, was, as we have previously had occasion to remark, a modification of the old Natural Law approach of the Greek and Roman philosophers and of the mediaeval Catholic church theologians and metaphysicians. In being transformed into moral philos-

⁸ Victor Cousin, *Course of the History of Modern Philosophy*, tr. by O. W. Wright, 2 vols., Edinburgh, 1832.

⁹ A. H. Everett, "Progress and Limits of Social Improvement," *loc. cit.*, XXXVIII: 502-538 (1834).

ophy it had become slightly more realistic and attentive to the actual facts of life, but it still remained primarily speculative. The philosophy of history approach to the formulation of Social Science generalizations, which had been initiated by Vico and which was now being substituted for the moral philosophy approach, sought to render Social Science generalization less speculative. For example the reviewer referred to above tells us that "Our libraries are overrun with works upon the manner in which nations *ought* to be governed; but there are scarcely any upon the principles that *in fact* regulate their progress, and determine their condition, including the forms of their governments, at the different periods of their history." ¹⁰

This protest sounds curiously modern; it is the contention insisted upon by the experimentalist as over against the metaphysician in Social Science. Vico, continues Everett, tried to give us such principles but failed. Montesquieu had in turn borrowed from Vico, with what success we know from his *Esprit des Lois*, a book which was much read and used as a text book in its translated form in the United States. A Social Science based on the historical method could not therefore appear strange to men familiar with Vico and Montesquieu.

The Influence of Guizot. The orientation with respect to history which Guizot gave to his readers may be illustrated by the conclusions that H. C. Murphy drew from Guizot's *Cours d'Histoire Moderne* (1829).¹¹

History may be defined to be the science of human nature, as shown in a full, correct, and philosophical account of the experiments which have been tried upon humanity ever since its first existence. We say *science*, because it has principles of its own, evolved by a correct mode of reasoning from well determined facts. Modern history is particularly entitled to this character; it differs from the ancient in that it is more philosophical, that it looks into the constitution and very soul of society, that it regards man more as a social being than as a mere individual one, and that it examines the nature of commercial relations, —a vital subject concerning the improvement and well being of men, but which had no interest for the ancients.

He even lists a number of principles of history as a science in this article.¹²

Although Guizot thought poorly of Comte, both were in the same

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, footnote, pp. 513–514.

¹¹ H. C. Murphy, "The Philosophy of History," *North American Review*, XXXIX: 36 (1834).

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

tradition, that of the philosophy of history. Those who read Guizot might not become Social Scientists, but at least the idea would not be foreign to them. And the readers of Guizot were legion. The enormous influence of Guizot in America has been commented upon by H. B. Adams.¹³ Edward Everett as early as 1840 pointed out the same interesting fact of his influence in this country.¹⁴ The emphasis upon commercial history, and upon the value of history for commerce, referred to by Murphy in the excerpt quoted above, was perhaps due largely to the influence of Heeren, who had been the teacher of Bancroft, Sparks, and other American historical students in Germany as well as to the rising importance of business itself.

Emphasis upon Commercial History. The history of commerce and the importance of commerce in the history of civilization became, indeed, an important subject for historical discussion and writing around about 1840 and several articles on these subjects appeared in Hunt's *Merchant's Magazine* alone.¹⁵ In one of these articles,¹⁶ the cyclical theory of progress is rejected, and the author maintains that it was commerce that triumphed at Waterloo. In another article, published in the same year (1839) in Hazard's *United States Commercial and Statistical Register*,¹⁷ William Rawle, Esq. declared that commerce, "which more than any other pursuit enters into the social relations of men, must necessarily exercise a paramount influence over their actions and condition. In an extended sense, this preeminent distinction belongs to commerce."¹⁸ Rawle then gives a history of commerce and its influence on various civilizations. It will be noted that the *Communist Manifesto*, which appeared in 1848, had an analogous interpretation of history with a stress on technology, however, rather than on commerce.

The importance of what we would now call social science content in the education of business men is pointed out in an unsigned review of Tytler's *Universal History*.¹⁹

¹³ Herbert B. Adams, *The Study of History in American Colleges and Universities* (1887). See also L. L. Bernard, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, I: 329.

¹⁴ Edward Everett, "Guizot's Washington," *North American Review*, LI: 69 (1840).

¹⁵ See, e. g., Daniel D. Barnard, "Commerce as Connected with the Progress of Civilization," *The Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review*, I: 11-28 (1839); E. C. Ward, "The History of Navigation," *ibid.*, pp. 306-316; E. W. Stoughton, "The Progress and Influence of Commerce in Europe," *ibid.*, pp. 451-467.

¹⁶ D. D. Barnard, *op. cit.*,

¹⁷ "On the 'Influence of Commerce,'" *loc. cit.*, I: 5-12.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

¹⁹ *Merchant's Magazine*, etc., III: 163 (1840).

In speaking of history we would take this occasion to remark that, as a study, it cannot be too highly recommended nor is there, we are confident, any class of persons to whom this study is more important than to merchants. To be thoroughly accomplished in their profession, they should have an extensive and accurate knowledge of men—of their character, their conduct under given circumstances, and the motives by which they are ordinarily actuated—of the different states of society under which they are found to exist, their different laws, customs, habits, etc.; and how is this full and perfect knowledge to be obtained, but by consulting the ample records of history?

"The Social Influence of Trade," "Progress of American Commerce," "Venetian Commerce," "The Commercial History of France," "Influence of Commerce in the Affairs of the World," were some of the other articles that appeared in this interesting magazine edited by Freeman Hunt, thus showing the decidedly new trend history was taking at this time.

The Emphasis upon Social History in General. The influence of Guizot, Heeren, and other current historians is further indicated by the words of an anonymous reviewer in Hunt's *Merchant's Magazine* in 1840, who contends for the importance of social history in the following words.²⁰

A marked improvement should be impressed upon historic writing. What is its object? Not merely to give dry data of prominent political events, the bombardment of a city, or the execution of a treaty, but an accurate, full, and glowing picture of the times of which it treats, running down from the leading political events that control the destinies of nations, to those nicer shades of circumstances which give a form and coloring to society. If history were to blend these pictures with chronological data, we think it would be invested with greater value.

In the South a similar interest in the social philosophy of history was being manifested at this time. Thus Henry Dickson, a physician interested in philosophy, writing on the difficulties in the way of historians, quotes with approval Ibn Khaldun's theory of history which is, of course, in spite of the early date at which this Arabian author wrote, essentially a social science theory, emphasizing especially the influence of climate and geography upon human society.²¹

History is nothing else than the picture of human society; that is: of the life of men in this world, and of all the forms and accidents with which the nature of this society may be affected;—as the savage state, civilization; the bonds which unite the members of social aggregations; the domination of men over

²⁰ *Loc. cit.*, III: 536 (1840).

²¹ S. Henry Dickson, "Essay on the Difficulties in the Way of the Historian," *Southern Literary Messenger*, XII (Part 1): 105 (1846).

one another, obtained by force; the formation of sects and empires, which spring from these causes, and their various shades of difference; the professions among which men are divided to gain their livelihood; the sciences, the arts,—in short, all the varied circumstances which affect human society in consequence of its very nature.

Passages like this were bound to leave an impression on sympathetic readers and pave the way for the idea of a science of society based on history.

The Problem of Method in Historical Generalization. In brief, the value of historical data as the basis for the production of generalizations about society was widely recognized. But there was by no means unanimity as to the method of handling these data. To some, they were to be treated inductively and critically. The following statement illustrates the viewpoint of the proponents of induction, including analysis and synthesis.²²

The age, it is said, has become "historical." It is gathering up the fruits of the past history of the race. It is not content with brushing away the dust from old monuments, retracing half-effaced inscriptions, gazing at mere facts—the outward, visible life of humanity. It deals with analysis—keen, searching analysis. It has grown philosophical. It is looking at the significance of facts rather than at facts themselves—at their revelations of the interior life of thought and feeling. It collects, arranges, compares, only to get at the hidden meaning or principle. It treats the past as the chemist treats the substances subjected to his examination. It applies tests, it uses the crucible, till it is made to yield up its subtlest spirit or essence. . . . The historian now condenses, generalizes, lays open elementary laws.

The Theological Point of View. This inductive and critical approach to the historical method was not shared by the more theologically minded, who still found a completely satisfying philosophy of history in revealed Scriptures, even when they admitted the importance of historical data. The following passage, with its metaphysical and theological implications, will serve as a good example of this point of view.²³

The successful efforts of the human mind to ascertain principles, and introduce order into other departments of inquiry, should teach us not to despair, or doubt, or treat scornfully sincere and earnest attempts elsewhere. Those who think that the great fundamental law of history is to be discovered, if discov-

²² A. L., "Religious Life of England," *Christian Examiner*, XL (n.s., V), pp. 284-285 (1846).

²³ Unsigned, "The Philosophy of History," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXIV (n.s., II): 383-390 (1842).

ered at all, by a logical inference from mere passive induction, may well despair, for nothing lies before them but chaos and darkness visible. But that law is not thus to be inferred. It is not to be a sort of quintessence obtained by the sublimation of *all* the facts piled indiscriminately together in one vast crucible. It is, indeed, to be suggested by the phenomena, but only to the creative mind, to the mind familiar with the world of ideas, apt in the construction of theories, and possessed beforehand of some rule by which to distinguish the essential from the unimportant. Theory without induction is empty, but induction without theory is blind. Those, therefore, who are possessed with the prevailing prejudice that there is no way of inferring or learning any thing but from a plodding induction, may give up this search as bootless. But let us consider, for a moment, by what method the mind of man has succeeded in obtaining satisfactory results in other departments. . . . Let these illustrations suffice. A philosophy of history is possible. And it is not to be denied, because it cannot be evolved by a mere generalization of the facts, nor even because it may sometimes seem inconsistent with, or diametrically opposed to, any portion of the details. The central idea of such a philosophy must not be conceived by solitary experience, but begotten upon it by a higher power. Apparent, partial inconsistencies, when we cease to apply this idea, are what analogy authorizes us to expect. It must, first of all, correspond with the higher laws of the universe which reason recognizes; and, secondly be consistent with the *general tenor* of the most important historical phenomena, and serve as the key to their explanation.

What, then, is the great central principle of that indefinite series of changes and revolutions which at once . . . distracts our attention? . . . Analysis of the mere facts of history is but the dissection of a dead body. The vital principle is the true object of our investigation.

The author then proceeds to analyze the systems of Herder, Hegel, and Schlegel. In the final section of this paper he concludes that "The Bible contains the true philosophy of history."²⁴ The data of history are, one infers, to be used simply as illustrations of conclusions already arrived at, perhaps through revelation.

Somewhat sceptical, and perhaps sarcastic, is the attitude of Professor Enoch Pond,, of Bangor Theological Seminary, toward the scientific pretensions of a sociology based on historical data. Discussing Herder, he says: "On these views of history has been constructed the pretended science of *sociology*; which, if it shall succeed, as its votaries anticipate, will ere long enable us to resolve all questions in history or prophecy, with as much precision as we now do problems in mathematics; will enable

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 407.

us as accurately to predict the course of nations, in given circumstances, as we now do the orbits of the heavenly bodies." ²⁵

A Hopeful Point of View. A much more appreciative attitude is shown by "H," a Southerner, who points out that history is to furnish the data and social economics the laws thereof by which the most important questions of the day may be answered. His statement is significant.²⁶

Physical sciences have been cultivated at the expense of the ethical. . . . The Sphinx stands in our path, mumbling her dark oracles, propounding the great enigmas of life, the mysteries of a social organization, which can only hope a response from the more profound study of Sociological science. That response we are unable to give, because we have neglected to prosecute with due diligence the sciences which explain the phenomena, and establish the laws of human society. Yet, on this reply depend the conservation of States—the permanence of governments—the sustenance of human life—the security of property and institutions—the preservation of morals—and the general welfare of men.

We must restore the healthy combination of the constituent elements of our intellectual atmosphere, or perish by its disorganization. No speculations or discoveries in Natural science will enable us to do this—our sole therapeutics are contained in the Social sciences. . . . By a more profound study of the laws and mechanism of communities, we must probe the wounds of society and discover medicaments; and we must bring the past face to face with the present. . . .

The singular revival of historic literature . . . is sufficient to manifest that . . . mankind are disposed to seek aid in a renewed acquaintance with the experience and phenomena of human society in by-gone ages; and by tracing its progress and discovering its laws, to extract from the alembic, an elixir of life for the revivification of the paralyzed members. . . .

If any Moses is to stand between the living and the dead to stay the plague, he must derive his power from no quack nostrums of empirical pharmacy, but seek for the prescriptions of his State therapeutics in the profound study of social phenomena. For these reasons, History and the Sociological sciences are eminently the studies denounced [sic] by the necessities of the times; and their zealous cultivation is required imperatively at our hands, as the great duty imposed upon the living generation. . . .

Where can we look for any healing aid in this threatening and heart-sickening condition of nations, except to a more profound and diligent study of the kindred sciences of History and Social Economics? The former will furnish us with our instances—it will explain the causes, and consequences and the succession of events—and it will reveal the secret of their connection. The latter will afford

²⁵ Enoch Pond, D.D., "The Philosophy of History," *The Christian Review*, XXIV: 529 (1859).

²⁶ "H," "On the Importance of the Social Sciences in the Present Day," *Southern Literary Messenger*, XV: 77-80 (Feb., 1849).

us those laws of interpretation and those conclusions which may be applied to the industrial life of nations, and the improvement of the condition of the masses.

An Important Emphasis. The gamut is thus run from scepticism to profound faith with respect to the applicability of the new historically based science of society to current problems. But equally interesting with the faith that this writer displays in the ability of a philosophy of history to provide the key with which to unlock the chamber of secrets of the future is his insistence upon the necessity of producing a Social Science that is comparable with the physical sciences. Recently much emphasis has been given to the necessity of developing the social sciences and of applying them to the problems of human society in order to offset the destructive uses of the physical sciences made by dictators and war makers and other exploiters of mankind generally. But here is the same point clearly stated by an anonymous writer nearly one hundred years ago.

The Philosophy of History and Social Science: Early Attempts at Generalization

Character of American Historical Generalization. The actual philosophies of history worked out by the various North American writers were necessarily theoretical, and usually either direct imitations or adaptations of European prototypes. This dependence upon foreign inspiration was rendered inevitable by the fact of the isolation of the United States from the main currents of world history. It was rather late in the first half of the nineteenth century before a school of American historians arose who began to record our own history and it was not until near the end of that century that other historians began to interpret it intelligently and extensively.

The first efforts at a philosophy of history, as almost our first endeavors to write history itself in any pretentious way, had to do with the history of foreign countries. Prescott was intrigued by the exploits of the conquistadores and followed the lead of the early Spanish chroniclers and commentators and the example of Robertson. Washington Irving turned to the romantic history of Spain for his inspiration; and Motley spent his splendid energies upon the history of the Netherlands of the period of colonization, but he never reached the American colonies.

The men who wrote American history, such as Bancroft, Pitkin, Hil-dreth, and Tucker, did little in the way of generalizing their data into historical principles. They were concerned more frequently with the narration of events and more especially with the accounts of political happenings. Our political institutions were still in process of organization and maturation and they were, moreover, under active if sometimes friendly criticism from European publicists and observers. Consequently the attention of the more thoughtful public in the United States was concentrated primarily upon political problems and the evolution of the structure of our particular brand of democracy. To be sure economic problems confronted and troubled the men of the first three quarters of

the nineteenth century in America, but as yet they had not begun to write about them seriously or extensively from a historical standpoint. That phase of history came near the end of the century, and then somewhat haltingly.

Even less ready were the early historians to attempt a historical account of marriage, the family, culture, race relations, opinions, and similar processes and institutions. But as our problems respecting these matters matured and became pressing in the last third of the century our leading general historians, such as McMaster and Edward Channing, and a score of more specialized historical investigators poured forth numerous volumes dealing with American social history. But strange to say, nearly all of this writing, on whatever themes, was narrative and descriptive rather than philosophical and interpretive. Only the later and more specialized historians, like F. J. Turner and Charles A. Beard, ventured into the field of sociological generalization, and even then in a very informal manner.

However, the United States was not without its historical generalizers, as we shall soon see. Perhaps because of the brevity of our own history and its confusing nearness, they preferred foreign topics with a long perspective and a considerable degree of detachment. This work of historical generalization reached its greatest heights in the generation following the publication of Buckle's masterpiece on the *History of Civilization*, but there were earlier efforts doubtless inspired by the work of Vico, the French and Scotch philosophers of history, and especially by Hegel. Some of these cases we shall touch upon briefly.

Early Theories of Generalization. Some of our earliest writers in the field of historical generalization sought definitely for the discovery of general historical principles, sociological or otherwise. John Quincy Adams, for example, produced the following unity theory of civilization, from a study of events in general history. He said,¹

From this short and imperfect review of the history of man, the following deductions may be drawn:

1. That *civilization*, or that state of society in which the community is divided into two great primary classes, husbandmen and townsmen, is of all others the condition best adapted to the production of human happiness.
2. That the causes by which it most essentially contributes to this end, are *unity* of permanent habitation—unity of conjugal bondage—unity of the object of religious worship.

¹ John Quincy Adams, "Society and Civilization," *American Review*, II: 88 (July, 1845).

Another writer, in true Hegelian fashion, sees each age of history characterized by its own particular *Zeitgeist*. He comments, "It has been said—and with quite as much truth as generally belongs to such broad propositions, in social science—that since civilization began, it was possessed, at each several period, by the 'Spirit of the Age.'"²

Still another theorist in this field, also an advocate of the unitary view of historical development, attempts to improve upon Comte in the following statement:³

Society, an aggregate of certain relations among organized beings, must itself be, a fortiori, a system, an organism—its parts therefore concordant, and its movements concurrent and any apparent conflict between them but the mode of operating the machine. . . . To constitute these two fundamental laws [of order and of progress] so as to explain the present condition and the past career, intellectual and social, of mankind, is what we mean by the *Inductive Theory of Civilization*. . . . Instead of Comte's, our characteristics would be: That the tendency of mankind is, with respect to order, in the first place, to *maintain* it; in the second, to *make* it; in the third, to *find* it; and with reference to progress, in the first, to *practice* it; in the second to *preach* it; in the third, to *understand* and enjoy it.

Incidentally, this same author recognizes Comte as the full equal of Bacon. Comte, he says, however, merely modified Vico's discovery of the motion of progress from circle to cycloid. "What we owe the French philosopher, is the laws by which the evolution takes place."⁴ In discussing Comte's classification of the sciences, he takes exception to calling mental science a branch of physiology and prefers to give it a more sociological cast. "But," he adds, "if only to spare the lingering prejudice against this speculative amalgamation, we should rather rank the phenomena of mind, as far as *distinctively mental*, with those of society; by which, in fact, they are always more or less influenced inevitably."⁵ This orientation sounds distinctly Durkheimesque. The writer is also critical of Fourier—and of labor organizers.

Other Contributions to the Historical Point of View. The literature on the philosophy of history and historical method, but especially on the historical viewpoint in Social Science interpretation, is quite large in this early period of the development of Social Science. It is impossible to digest

² Unsigned, "The Progress and Disorganization," *ibid.*, II: 90 (July, 1845).

³ O, "Inductive Theory of Civilization: The Social System and Its Modern Reformers," *ibid.*, VI: 386, 390, 394 (July, 1845).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 390.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 393.

all of it within the limits of space at our disposal.⁶ Some of the conclusions reached or hypotheses set forth in these articles were of particular interest for one reason or another. For example, Charles Gayarré states that the tendency of civilization is toward unity and that social culture is diffusive in its instincts.⁷ W. S. Grayson speaks variously of "the science of the social state,"⁸ of social science, of a science of social life, of a science of social living, which govern the association of mankind.⁹ An interesting trend in the decade before the Civil War, although not an outstanding one, was what might be called a racial philosophy of history. Three articles indicate the nature of this minor eddy. Mrs. J. Ware's "The Anglo-Saxon Race,"¹⁰ presents a sort of racial interpretation of history. In the same year, 1851, A. W. Macken, in "Thierry's Studies in History," outlined a philosophy of history of his own and criticized the race-conflict philosophy of history.¹¹ In 1860, Henry A. Washington, a Professor at William and Mary College, wrote for the *Southern Literary Messenger* an article on "The Races of Men,"¹² in which the racial interpretation of social phenomena is also emphasized. The eighteen-sixties witnessed an intensification of attitudes with respect to the currents of thought in this field. The racial interpreta-

⁶ Among the important articles on the philosophy of history, laws of history, theories of history, etc., see especially the *North American Review* during the eighteen-forties and fifties. Some of the outstanding articles were: A. Gallenga, "Italian Historians," XLVIII: 325-333 (1839); A. P. Peabody, "The Progress of Society," LXIII: 334-357 (1846); Francis Bowen, "De Tocqueville's History of Louis XV," LXX: 238-254 (1850); Francis Bowen, "Hildreth's History of the United States," LXXIII: 411-413 (1851); A. W. Macken, "Thierry's Studies in History," LXXII: 326-331 (1851); A. P. Peabody, "The History of Rome," LXXII: 442-447 (1851); O. W. Wright, "Primary Law of Political Development in Civil History," LXXXVIII: 389-390, 425-426; H. Giles, "Leading Theories on the Philosophy of History," XCV: 163-188 (1862).

Debow's Review ran in 1848 an interesting series, unsigned, based on Cousin's *History of Philosophy*, on "The Science of History" (V: 58-64; 127-134; 211-220; 346-357; 445-454). Other articles along this line were: "Progress—The Past and the Present," XIV: 461-470; Charles Gayarré, "Influence of the Mechanic Arts on the Human Race," XVII: 229-344; "Relations of the Old and New Worlds," XX: 521-540. In addition to the above, there appeared: H. R., "Essay on the Slow Progress of Mankind," *Southern Literary Messenger*, XVIII: 403-410; George Fitzhugh, "Ancient Art and Modern Progress," *Debow's Review*, XXV: 507-512 (Nov., 1858); Fitzhugh, "Origin of Civilization," *ibid.*, 653-664; W. S. Grayson, "Civilization in Its Relation To Property," *ibid.*, XXVI: 161-173 (Feb., 1859). H. M. Dennison's "Commerce—The Harbinger and Test of Civilization," *ibid.*, XXVI: 149-161, and his "Relation of Commerce to Christianity," *ibid.*, 257-267, also illustrate the sort of philosophical interest in history that ran through the eighteen-fifties.

⁷ *Debow's Review*, XX: 521-540.

⁸ "Civilization in Its Relation to Property," *Debow's Review*, XXVI: 168 (Feb., 1859).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *North American Review*, LXXIII: 34-71 (1851).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, LXXII: 316-343.

¹² *Loc. cit.*, XXX: 251-260.

tionists were largely in the South. The article, "Superiority of Southern Races,"¹³ is a review of De Gobineau's work on race published in 1854; another article, "The Conflict of Northern and Southern Races,"¹⁴ explains the Civil War in terms of racial differences; and "The True Question: A Contest for the Supremacy of Race, as between the Saxon Puritan of the North and the Norman of the South," points out another angle to the racial interpretation of the Civil War.¹⁵

The Environmental Interpretation of History also found expression in several articles during this time, the most interesting being, perhaps, J. W. Scott's "Effect of Climate on Human Development,"¹⁶ and D. Campbell's "Climatic Influences as Bearing Upon Secession."¹⁷

There were also a considerable number of articles on the theoretical aspects of the philosophy of history.¹⁸ An unsigned article among these on "The Education of the World"¹⁹ identifies the philosophy of history with the history of civilization as a whole. This would seem to indicate that the author was an adherent of the Guizot school.

A Protest against a Materialistic Philosophy of History. A young Kentuckian, James Duncan Nourse, from Bardstown, the home of John Howard Payne, did not however find the philosophies of history which stemmed from the French Enlightenment, with their emphasis on the role of science in social organization, at all admirable. Confessing at the outset his love for Carlyle,²⁰ he presented a philosophy of history in which the advent of Christianity and the planting of American democracy are the chief events in history. From a person in this romantic tradition, the following attack on the "humbug" philosophies of history is quite understandable.²¹

And here I beg leave to enter my protest against what may be called the *un*-historical or *anti*-historical philosophy so fashionable at the present day, espe-

¹³ *DeBow's Review*, XXXI: 269-281 (1861).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, XXXI: 391-395 (1861).

¹⁵ *Southern Literary Messenger*, XXXIII: 19-27.

¹⁶ *DeBow's Review*, XXVIII: 495-504 (1860).

¹⁷ *North American Review*, CII: 24-47 (1866).

¹⁸ See especially: J. T. Wiswall, "Causes of Aristocracy," *DeBow's Review*, XXVIII: 551-566 (1860); J. W. Scott, "The Growth and Decay of Nations," *ibid.*, XXX: 19 ff. (1861); H. Giles, "Leading Theories on the Philosophy of History," *North American Review*, XCV: 163-188 (1862); G. F. Holmes, "Influence of Commerce and Finance on the Destiny of Nations," *DeBow's Review*, Vol. I (after the war series), pp. 334-352, 449-466.

¹⁹ *Southern Review*, I: 1-53 (1867).

²⁰ James Duncan Nourse, *Remarks on the Past and Its Legacies to American Society* (Louisville, Ky.: Morton and Griswold, 1847), p. vi.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

cially among the *physical* sciences, a philosophy which is at once the off-spring and parent of a shallow scepticism. This school of *illuminati* and radical reformers, looking too exclusively at the errors and imperfections that have incrustured the organized forms, in which the great principles of moral life and social progress have from time to time taken up their residence, have brought themselves to regard the Past, as an inextricable maze of weak self-delusion, or wholesale jugglery.

If deep and life-giving realities, which have given birth to the poetry, chivalry, and religion of the "fervent days of old," have been mixed up with error and superstition, our *philosophers* conclude that all these things have been founded in delusion or imposture. To save themselves the trouble of separating the pure bullion of truth from the alloy with which it has passed current among masses of men, they hastily consign the whole to the limbo of exploded chimeras. According to this philosophy nature is a machine, life is the motion of particles, history is a tissue of folly, selfishness and priestcraft.

The favorite themes of these lights of the world, at least of the most thorough-going and consistent among them, are the folly and ignorance of believing ages, the "march of the intellect," and the progress of the physical sciences, which are to regenerate the species, revolutionize our views of man and his destiny, and disenchant life of all those beautiful delusions of our benighted fathers, which have inspired self-devotion, moral heroism and hopes that grasp at infinity.

This spirit is manifestly incompatible with any *definite* religious belief, which must be founded upon historical evidence, corroborated by moral intuitions. . . .

The same spirit, brought to bear directly upon historical inquiry, has given birth to what may be called the "humbug" philosophy of history, of which Hume is perhaps the greatest representative, and which, by making a great show of wisdom and impartiality, has been the source of more fallacy and injustice, than all the most passionate disquisitions of the most enthusiastic partizans.

A New England Geologist Attacks the Problem. Like Nourse, in his opposition to materialistic interpretations of history, was Roswell D. Hitchcock, the New England geologist. Like Nourse, also, he had a positive theory to substitute for the one he discarded. He was also hostile to exclusively pantheistic and humanitarian theories which ruled out a divine order, although he accepted parts of all three types of historical theory and synthesized them into four great laws of civilization. Hitchcock expressed his point of view as follows:²²

²² Roswell D. Hitchcock, "The Laws of Civilization," *American Theological Presbyterian Review*, II: 573-575, 581 (Nov., 1860).

In the present essay it is proposed to investigate the laws of civilization as disclosed in the genius and achievements of the historic races and nations of the earth.

Of well-defined opinions on this subject, which must be pronounced erroneous, there are three great types. First, the most imposing of all, the Pantheistic, which rules out finite freedom, making human history, with all its reputed blunders and abominations, a Divine, a necessary and therefore an unimpeachable process. Secondly, the Humanitarian, which, on the other hand, rules Divine Providence out of the problem; making human history a motley procession of follies, crimes and sufferings, set off here and there by redeeming heroisms, but from first to last, a mere succession without a method or a goal. And Thirdly, what may be called the Materialistic, finding its most ambitious utterance in the recent remarkable work of Henry Thomas Buckle, which rules out of the problem both the freedom of man and the Providence of God, branding them as metaphysical dogmas, disowned by the inductive philosophy; subjugating all things to mere natural law, and thus making human history what is arrogantly called a "Positive Science," in the face and eyes of a vast multitude of positive facts. . . .

The true philosophy, of history stands equally opposed to all these theories, and yet accepts from each its solitary element of truth. With the Pantheistic philosophy it agrees in affirming a Divine intelligence, and the working of a Divine efficiency, throughout the historic course. With the Humanitarian it agrees in affirming a finite freedom, counter-working the Divine efficiency. With the Materialistic it agrees in admitting the force of outward circumstances, such as climate, soil, food and the general aspect of nature, conditioning the character, institutions and fortunes of men. But these diverse forces it blends together into one, not pretending, indeed, to have reconciled them in theory, and yet not presuming to deny their harmony in fact. It detects in every civilization the flavor of the soil which fed its roots; and yet claims for man a supremacy, always potential, though not always realized, over his outward circumstances; while above all, and through all, it discerns a Divine order, holding its firm and stately march from century to century. If man has sunk to be ruled by nature, it is denounced as the shameful abdication of a sovereign. If, by his abuse of moral freedom, he has disturbed the Divine order, and threatened chaos to history, there is no fear but that the rebellion will at length be quelled and the gracious purposes of God triumphantly accomplished.

Hitchcock's Great Laws of Civilization. The four great laws of civilization which Hitchcock found are as follows:²³

I. The first great law of civilization, everywhere discernible and dominant, and everywhere to be acknowledged by a sound philosophy, is what may be termed the Divine tuition, inspiring and shaping it. . . .

II. The second great law of civilization, is what may be called its dependence

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 575, 581, 590.

upon the Genius of Race. Of this, Buckle makes no account but the importance of it is immense. . . .

III. The third great law of civilization, is what may be termed the shaping pressure of its outward conditions; which have been reduced to four: climate, soil, food, and the general aspect of nature. . . .

IV. The fourth great law of civilization, is its dependence upon moral stamina.

These laws are strictly orthodox, both theologically and metaphysically. They accept revelation; they emphasize the importance of race as a determinative factor and of geography as a set of conditioning factors. They claim for morality a role which Buckle was willing to grant only to intellect. Intellectual determinants are not mentioned here. There is, it seems, really no inconsistency between the second and the third laws, as might appear to be the case upon a first view. The environmental conditions listed in the third law are not considered as causes, but as conditions of human development, whereas race appears to be fundamental. Hitchcock points out that there are various classifications of races, such as those of Cuvier, Blumenbach, Buffon, Prichard, Pickering, Guyot. But the best classification, if there must be one, he considers to be that based on the tenth chapter of Genesis into Semitic, Hamitic, and Japhetic. If there had been no fall of man, there might be only one race. Old races disappear and new ones appear; and the best races are amalgams. "An unmixed race will never hold its own and ordinarily, the deterioration is rapid."²⁴ But mixed or unmixed, race is determinative. There is much in blood. Some things cannot be taught or learned. The proper use of the ballot box is one of these things. "The Frenchman and the German try in vain to learn it. The born Englishman or American takes to it, as the lark to the morning-sky."²⁵ In brief, the physical environment is a conditioning factor in history, but race is the basic one, although the fundamental distinction between these two types of factors is not made clear by the author. And the best theory of race is that of the Bible. This makes interesting reading a century after it was written.

Biblical Philosophy of History. The philosophy of history presented in the Bible was, of course, the traditional American viewpoint, and numerous other presentations of it appeared, such, for example, as S. Comfort's *Elements of Man's Moral History from the Creation to the End of Time* (1853), and, on a much more erudite level, C. S. Henry's *Considerations on*

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 586.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

Some of the Elements and Conditions of Social Welfare and Human Progress (1861). These works were strictly orthodox both as to point of view theologically and as to their emphasis upon man's inability to influence the current of history fundamentally through any other means than by that of a mystical identification of the self with divine personalities. As late as 1882 a cyclical theory of history based on the Bible was offered by D. Z. Dantzler, in his *Science of History on an Evangelical Basis*. "The Science of History," he tells us, "has not yet been discovered; its discovery has hardly been attempted, for its existence has been only vaguely suspected."²⁶ This is strange, he continues, for it is a very important subject. "But History has hitherto eluded or defied its all-comprehending grasp. It is the more surprising that History has escaped the penetrating analysis of Science, since this subject, as a general study, has not been neglected by any means in recent times."²⁷ In fact, a great deal of research has been done, and archaeology and philology have been cultivated by learned men. He continues:²⁸

But not one of these writers has attempted to assert or define with scientific precision the laws which govern the vast and varied range of historical events, nor traced successfully the subtle track of moral and religious principle which runs like a golden thread through every part, and binds the whole into a beautiful and grand system of providential wisdom, justice, and power. Indeed, it seems scarcely to have entered into the thoughts of the wise that the Science of History might one day take its place beside that of Astronomy for the simplicity of its principles and the exactness of its verifications. Of course, we do not mean to say that men have not, from time immemorial, moralized and philosophized over the lessons of History. One of the most familiar claims and admissions in the literature of Christendom is that of the amenability of History to some sort of systematic government, either intrinsic or extraneous. From the times of Bossuet and Vico to those of Comte and Guizot, various extensive and ingenious systems of Philosophy have been constructed upon the *data*, supplied by Narrative History; but in every instance they are so vague in principles and results, so utterly incapable of verification, that they cannot claim to be scientific in character. Science is always consistent with itself; but so unscientific are these philosophies that the hand of each system is against that of every other. Indeed, the very spirit that animates the Philosophies of History seems inspired by the principle that History is not, and cannot be, a proper field for scientific study. So that, having no scientific aims at the beginning, it is but natural they yield no scientific results at the end.

²⁶ *Science of History on an Evangelical Basis*, published under the pseudonym "Eureka" (Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Methodist Publishing House. Printed for the Author, 1882), p. 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

A Good Beginning; A Poor Ending. The reasons for the failure to create a real science of history, says Dantzler, are two-fold. First, there is the apparent incompatibility between the innate and generally accepted belief in the free-agency of man and the claim that historical events are controlled by exact, invariable laws. Second, the confusion of data in the domain of history hinders the discovery of principles upon which they depend. Fortunately, however, the infallible word of revelation supplies the fundamental principles of historical science. "In the Bible is found the only rational and adequate statement of Providence that man possesses."²⁹ The author then proceeds to divulge the "only rational and adequate statement of Providence that man possesses," and, incidentally, it is interesting to note his method. The data of history are merely illustrations of the laws of history, not their bases.³⁰

Having indicated some of the first principles involved in our subject, we now proceed to state the propositions which we believe to lie at the basis of this science, and will then endeavor to illustrate and confirm them by numerous citations from the course of Ancient and Modern History.

I. All crises or events of History having social, political, ecclesiastical or spiritual significance, revolve in cycles of time of fixed and unchanging durations.

II. Each class of crises or events revolves in its own peculiar cycle, as follows: Social crises in terms of four years, political crises in terms of forty years, ecclesiastical crises in terms of four hundred years, and spiritual crises in terms of four thousand years.

And then, finally, he states the implications of such a theory:³¹

If it be conceded that these cited examples give a fair showing of demonstration to the theory of cyclical epochs we have advanced, the way is thereby opened to study the development and propagation of true religion, government, and society on the earth, under these providential laws. Thus the Moral History of Mankind, under the infallible tutorship of an ever-Present and perfect Providence, becomes a possibility of the near future. The bearing of this theory upon the miracles of prophecy among the Hebrews is of the utmost importance, and its explanations of the oracles of paganism are equally satisfactory. If the reception of this treatise by the public encourages to a continuance of these studies, these topics may be treated in a subsequent publication.

Apparently, however, the reception of this treatise by the public did not encourage a continuance of these studies, and the topics were not treated

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

in a subsequent publication. In this respect, but perhaps for a somewhat different reason, Dantzler shared the same fate as that which befell O'Connell and Hamilton, who also failed to meet with encouragement from the reading public for further publication. The author's method and approach, if not the actual contents of his theory of history, are typical of the Biblical school of philosophy of history.

Summary and Conclusion. With this presentation, we may close our brief discussion of the early American philosophies of history. We have seen that while there was not wanting a strong current towards a Positivist or scientific treatment of history, calling for a critical examination of data and an inductive process of generalization of these data into the laws and principles of Social Science, there was also a determined resistance to this trend on the part of the theologically and metaphysically minded. They were eager to preserve the doctrines of revelation and of divine personal intervention in history. It has not been possible to present all of the evidence here, but we may safely conclude that, before the close of the Civil War period and the opening of the new era of science that followed the war and reconstruction and the further fruition of the industrial revolution, the philosophy of history had not succeeded in generating out of its data a dependable Social Science. This was true even of those more scientific brands of the philosophy of history to which we have referred in this chapter. The history of Social Science, as we have traced it in the preceding chapters of this work, also bears testimony to this conclusion.

The old philosophy of history was too general and too speculative in its methods to produce the desired results. It lacked the verifying effect and supporting genius of an adequate inductive-procedure, which only a more rigorous application of science to the testing of the data of history could give. Consequently, the old philosophy of history was falling into disrepute by the end of this period and was being replaced by a new science of history, or rather by a scientific history, which was much interested in facts but as yet highly suspicious of attempts to generalize these data into social laws and principles which might be supposed to constitute a Social Science. We shall now turn to examine some of the developments of this new historical approach and seek to discover if it was able ultimately to make a more worthwhile contribution to the content of Social Science.

Transition to the Scientific History Period: John W. Draper

Faults of the Old Philosophy of History. The philosophy of history, in the eighteenth century sense or proper meaning of that term, came to a climax in the works of Hegel and Schlegel, and perhaps we may say also of Comte, in the early part of the nineteenth century. The emphasis of these older writers was primarily upon generalization rather than upon the reliability of the historical data from which they generalized. Most of them accepted almost anything that appeared in writing or in tradition as of equal value with any other datum. Furthermore, they selected their data to suit their own convenience and their own hypotheses. Not only were their data frequently questionable, however, but the uses these writers made of their data were, as suggested in the preceding chapter, sometimes almost equally questionable. They generalized in almost any manner, and for the most part uncritically. Sometimes they reasoned from analogy. Frequently they drew important conclusions from a single event or from a few poorly substantiated data. Perhaps for the most part they sought to be inductive in the method of their approach to social laws and general principles. But the product differed widely in the hands of different philosophers of history, and it could scarcely be said to be generally dependable. Yet, even at its worst, it constituted a valuable beginning in that struggle to supplant tradition and myth with accurate and positive knowledge about society and the laws of its behavior.

One of the greatest errors in the current philosophy of history arose from the fact that it was so difficult to eradicate from it the preconceptions and dogmas of the old theology and metaphysics that combined to color all or most of its conclusions. These dogmas and beliefs were too often taken as incontrovertible premises which might not be set aside, but which must be taken as a starting point in the further development of principles explaining human society. A philosopher of history who did not respect these vested interests in dogmas was bitterly attacked; but, worse still, few

philosophers of history possessed data with which to challenge these older conclusions arising out of tradition and myth.

The Aim of the New History. There were, by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a number of men who saw more or less clearly these faults of the old philosophers of history. They perceived that however great the service this movement had performed as an initial stage in the struggle to break away from the old theologically and metaphysically dominated social philosophies, it had now about served its purpose and would be capable of doing little more without a thorough overhauling. Such men as Von Jhering, Heeren, Ranke, Thierry, and Guizot saw more or less clearly that what was required was more and better data. This fact had been dawning upon the more careful historical investigators, such as Gibbon and Hume, for more than a generation. But these older historians did not possess the means of gathering and adequately testing their historical data. And, besides, historians like Gibbon, Guizot, and Sismondi were very fond of generalization.

It was not until after the beginning of the nineteenth century that the dream of scientific historical research and historiography began to be realized adequately. Of this movement Von Jhering was the main bulwark and the most insistent preceptor. But a host of other writers of like mind developed and followed, especially in Germany. For a period of nearly one hundred years the chief emphasis was upon the gathering and testing of data. Documents, monuments, inscriptions, ruins of all sorts were examined and appropriated wherever they could be found. Archaeology, epigraphy, philology, linguistics, ethnology, folk lore, and many other disciplines and sciences were progressively requisitioned as means to exploration of the past. The emphasis upon the fact was by no means diminished in this renewed and intensified search for data.

But data for what? Generalization was almost forgotten by the more enthusiastic searchers after facts. Fact-gathering had become an end in itself, instead of a means. Some men devoted their whole lives to the copying of inscriptions; to the examination of archaeological remains; to the collection, sorting, classifying, and filing away of documents and archives. To write a bibliographical article or to contribute erudite notes to a research journal was often considered more meritorious than to write a book. Lord Acton, one of the most learned of historiophiles, wrote no books and not many articles. The collection of data was an occupation highly regarded

and approved. To use these data as a basis of generalization in Social Science was in some cases regarded as little less than criminal.

Yet there were generalizers from historical data—no inconsiderable number of them—throughout the nineteenth century. Perhaps they were not the most distinguished scholars, but many of them were good scholars, and also distinguished, nevertheless. We shall endeavor to indicate the contributions of a few of these American generalizers to Social Science in the pages of this and the following chapters. We shall of course select for treatment those who consciously endeavored to make contributions to Social Science, devoting the bulk of the present chapter to the theories of the leading exponent of generalization in the field of intellectual history, John W. Draper.

Great Expectations. Great hopes were of course entertained by many of those engaged in the Social Science movement with respect to the contributions to be made by a scientific history to the subject matter of Social Science. For example, we find Simon Stern in 1865 pointing out that modern historians were doing more for Social Science than political economists. He said,¹

Social Science for its future development and extension does not solely depend upon political economists. Within the past ten years a class of historians have entered upon the field of literature, who bid fair to do more than political economists proper, for the further development of its principles. Foremost among these are Buckle, Gervinus, Draper, Meyer, Martin, and Momsen. History is now no longer a simple chronicle of events, which, as hitherto, simply served to give a detailed account of the fortunes of a few reigning families, and was almost wholly occupied with the pageants of war, and the idle chat and gossip of courts; but it has become the history of peoples, tracing and showing their gradual development and the laws of progress which underlie this development. It is of less moment to the world to know at what precise period of time the battle of Austerlitz was fought, than to know the social conditions of mankind which made Napoleon a necessary product of the age in which he lived. This system of study may lead to fatalism in philosophy, but we care not through the medium of what bugbears we arrive at the truth. That the historian should do more to develop the principles of Social Science than political economists, may appear a strange paradox, but like circumstance has occurred in the development of Esthetics as a science. While the teachers of Esthetics quarrelled about definitions and idle words, the science was advanced and its principles established by such men as Winkleman, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller,

¹ Simon Stern, "The Progress of Social Science," *New York Social Science Review*, No. 2, p. 111 (Apr., 1865).

and Humboldt. This holds equally true in Social Science. What with the progressive advance of History, Statistics, and Medical Police, the progress of Social Science is no longer dependent upon any one class of specialists.

Draper's Insistence upon Law in History. John William Draper, referred to by Stern above, created something of a stir with his *Intellectual Development of Europe* (1861) and his *History of the American Civil War* (1867). A reviewer of the latter work, in *The Radical* magazine, links Draper with Comte and Buckle as marking a new era in history. He says, "The works of Comte, Buckle, and Draper . . . mark an era in history."² The first named of these books was looked upon as an American twin to Buckle's great work, and as such distinctively as a Comtean product.³

Draper's contribution to the field of historical method was his insistence upon the rule of natural law in social development. This emphasis occurs throughout his works, as it does in the writings of Buckle and other interpreters of civilization of that time. These men lived at a period when a belief in a world controlled by fixed and regularly operating laws was definitely superseding the conception of a world moved by divine fiat and interpreted by means of revelation. One of Draper's most interesting works was written for the specific purpose of illustrating this transition in thought. Here he contrasts the Mohammedan belief in the operation of a fixed and inevitable law with the Christian belief in magic.⁴

In this respect the contrast between the Christian and the Mohammedan nations was very striking: The Christian was convinced of incessant providential interventions; he believed that there was no such thing as law in the government of the world. By prayers and entreaties he might prevail with God to change the current of affairs, or, if that failed, he might succeed with Christ, or perhaps with the Virgin Mary, or through the intercession of the saints, or by the influence of their relics or bones. If his own supplications were unavailing, he might obtain his desire through the intervention of his priest, or through that of the holy men of the Church, and especially if obligations or gifts of money were added. Christendom believed that she could change the course of affairs by influencing the conduct of superior beings. . . . To the Mohammedan . . . progress presented a very different aspect. Every corporeal motion was due to some preceding motion; every thought to some preceding thought; every historical event was the offspring of some preceding event; every human action was the result of some foregone and accomplished action. In the long

² J. S. P., Review of Draper's *History of the American Civil War*, *The Radical*, IV: 314 (1868).

³ J. Craik, "Positivism," *American Quarterly Church Review*, XVI: 35-56 (Apr., 1864).

⁴ J. W. Draper, *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (New York, D. Appleton & Co., 1875), pp. 107-108.

annals of our race, nothing has ever been abruptly introduced. There has been an orderly, an inevitable sequence from event to event. There is an iron chain of destiny, of which the links are facts; each stands in its preordained place—not one has ever been disturbed, not one has ever been removed.

Quite obviously Draper's sympathies were more closely bound up with the Mohammedan than with the Christian interpretation.

Again, summarizing the conflicting theories of the middle ages, Draper says, "Two interpretations may be given of the mode of government of the world. It may be by incessant divine interventions, or by the operation of unvarying law."⁵ It is unnecessary to say that Draper has patience only with the latter. He illustrates this principle of the rule of law in the universe from the history of the earth, with the conclusion that "These changes, and very many more that might be mentioned, must have taken place not in a discontinuous but in an orderly manner, since the master-fact, the decline of heat, that was causing them, was itself following a mathematical law."⁶

The Law of Individual Development. This reign of law made so obvious by an account of the evolution of the physical world is in no respect less evident when we come to consider the life history of living things. This inevitability of law is made clear in the doctrine of evolution itself and is illustrated in the life cycle of men, as follows:⁷

If any one should object to or deride the doctrine of evolution or successive development of the animated forms which constitute that unbroken organic chain reaching from the beginning of life on the globe to the present times, let him reflect that he has himself passed through modifications the counterpart of those he disputes. For nine months his type of life was aquatic, and during that time he assumed, in succession, many distinct but correlated forms. At birth his type of life became aerial; he began respiring the atmospheric air; new elements of food were supplied to him; the mode of his nutrition changed; but as yet he could see nothing, hear nothing, notice nothing. By degrees conscious existence was assumed; he became aware that there is an external world. In due time organs adapted to another change of food, the teeth appeared, and a change of food ensued. He then passed through the stages of childhood and youth, his bodily form developing, and with it his intellectual powers. At about fifteen years, in consequence of the evolution which special parts of his system had attained, his moral character changed. New ideas, new passions, influenced him. And that that was the cause, and this the effect, is demonstrated when, by the skill of the surgeon, those parts have been interfered with. Nor does the

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 249-250.

development, the metamorphosis, end here; it requires many years for the body to reach its full perfection, many years for mind. A culmination is at length reached, and then there is a decline. I need not picture its mournful incidents—the corporeal, the intellectual enfeeblement.

The Law of National Development. Draper completes his argument for the universal applicability of natural law in the direction of all phenomena by applying it to the life cycles of nations as well as to individuals and inanimate nature. Here we have the application of historical law to the interpretation of society or to Social Science. Says Draper: ⁸

But individuals are the elementary constituents of communities—nations. They maintain therein a relation like that which the particles of the body maintain to the body itself. These, introduced into it, commence and complete their function; they die, and are dismissed.

Like the individual, the nation comes into existence without its own knowledge, and dies without its own consent, often against its own will. National life differs in no particular from individual, except in this, that it is spread over a longer span, but no nation can escape its inevitable term. Each, if its history be well considered, shows its time of infancy, its time of youth, its time of maturity, its time of decline, if its phases of life be completed.

In the phases of existence of all, as far as those phases are completed there are common characteristics, and, as like accordances in individuals point out that all are living under a reign of law, we are justified in inferring that the course of nations, and indeed the progress of humanity, does not take place in a chance or random way, that supernatural interventions never break the chain of historic acts, that every historic event has its warrant in some preceding event, and gives warrant to others that are to follow.

Draper continues with the history of the contest between different philosophies with respect to the relative merits of fiat and law in the control of human affairs.

Draper's "Physiologic" Approach to the Laws of History. Draper illustrates so well the monistic attempt (advocated also by Lester F. Ward, who in turn followed Haeckel) to bring human affairs under the acknowledged control of law that we may be pardoned for describing here his method of approach to the conclusions we have already stated from his pen. Already Lyell and others had established the reign of law in the evolution of the earth, just as Kepler, Copernicus, Newton, and LaPlace had earlier established it in the evolution of the solar system as a whole. Darwin had likewise demonstrated, at least for all scientific minds, the supremacy of law in the organic world. It was the ambition of Draper to complete this

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 250-251.

process of introducing the theory of control by law, or by regular causal processes, into human and social affairs by showing the essential continuity of individual and social processes with the monistic movement in philosophy in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. The continuity of human thought had advanced to the point at which the next logical step was to bring man and his affairs under the same rules of impersonal interpretation and objective experimentation and measurement that had been applied previously to the more distant and objective aspects of nature, and monism was the most obvious general methodological approach to this end. It will be observed that this whole process had begun with the most distant, and therefore objectively the most easily observable, phenomena then adequately within the range of human vision—the solar system—and had proceeded by successive steps always in the direction of the more immediate and personal phenomena of men and their social interrelations. Draper had himself begun his career in chemistry and physiology. Stimulated by the work of Darwin and Buckle he had in 1861 essayed an extension of his evolutionary interpretation into intellectual history. In the preface to his *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* he says, "This work . . . is intended as the completion of my treatise on Human Physiology, in which man was considered as an individual. In this he is considered in his social relation."⁹

Draper's General Conceptions. For convenience we may arrange the basic principles underlying Draper's insistence upon the application of law to the interpretation of human affairs in the following sequence. It was by a historical demonstration of the validity of these principles that he hoped to establish the truth of his main thesis. It is interesting to note that he adopted the method of historical review of human thought just as Darwin, Lyell and LaPlace had applied the method of the history of the species, of the earth, and of the solar system to the demonstration of their own contentions.

1. First was Draper's contention as to the continuity of physiology and society, a point of view made intelligible by the current emphasis upon the organismic theory. Draper says,¹⁰

Social advancement is as completely under the control of natural law as is bodily growth. The life of an individual is a miniature of the life of a nation. These propositions it is the special object of this book to demonstrate.

⁹ *Loc. cit.* (New York, Harpers, 1861), I, iii.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, I: iii-iv.

No one, I believe, has hitherto undertaken the labour of arranging the evidence offered by the intellectual history of Europe in accordance with physiological principles, so as to illustrate the orderly progress of civilization, or collected the facts furnished by other branches of science with a view of enabling us to recognize clearly the conditions under which that progress takes place. This philosophical deficiency I have endeavored in the following pages to supply.

Seen thus through the medium of physiology, history presents a new aspect to us. We gain a more just and thorough appreciation of the thoughts and motives of men in successive ages of the world.

2. His second principle is the eternality of law. His insistence upon the eternality and reality of these general laws as compared with the transitoriness of the phenomena which they account for or explain reminds us of the emphasis Plato placed upon the eternal idea in contrast with the phenomena derived from it. At this point Draper is of course predominantly metaphysical and almost theological, instead of scientific, in assuming the existence of predetermined and preexisting natural laws governing the universe. But it is perhaps as far as he was able to advance at the time in the direction of a scientific Social Science interpretation. He says,¹¹

Forms are in their nature transitory, law is everlasting. If from visible forms we turn to directing law how vast is the difference. We pass from the finite, the momentary, the incidental, the conditioned—to the illimitable, the eternal, the necessary, the unshackled.

It is of law that I am to speak in this book. In a world composed of vanishing forms I am to vindicate the imperishability, the majesty of law, and to show how man proceeds, in his social march, in obedience to it. I am to lead my reader, perhaps in a reluctant path, from the outward phantasmagorical illusions which surround us, and so ostentatiously obtrude themselves on our attention, to something that lies in silence and strength behind. I am to draw his thoughts from the tangible to the invisible, from the limited to the universal, from the changeable to the invariable, from the transitory to the eternal; from the expedients and volitions so largely amusing the life of man, to the predestined and resistless issuing from the fist of God.

3. Draper's third principle is that of the immutability of law. He says, "The government of the world is accomplished by immutable law. Such a conception commends itself to the intellect of man by its majestic grandeur. It makes him discern the eternal in the vanishing of present events and through the shadows of time. . . . Leaving the individual beneath the eye of Providence, it shows society under the finger of law. And the laws of Nature never vary; in their application they never hesitate nor are

¹¹ *Ibid.*, II: 22.

wanting.”¹² This also is a metaphysical conception. We no longer believe that laws, natural or social, are unchanging. Laws based on arbitrarily standardized samples *seem* to be unchanging, until circumstances arise that cannot be adjusted to the laws; but statistically formulated laws change constantly as the fields of phenomena themselves vary.¹³ Although this principle enunciated by Draper is no longer acceptable, it served its purpose at the time it was postulated by him. He was in reality searching for a more stable principle of social control than divine whim and fiat, and merely overstated himself in his enthusiasm.

4. Draper's fourth principle is to the effect that the rule of the universe and of man by law is not inconsistent with free will. It is a matter of perspective, the more distant and detached events being wholly under the control of immutable and eternal law, while the more immediate and particular ones are subject to choice.¹⁴ In this principle Draper really gives away his whole argument in behalf of the dominance of natural laws. Here we come back again to the Platonic introspective fallacy of substituting the individual's method of postulating a general principle, by eliminating contradictory facts, for the general order of procedure of the universe. Events far away in time and space merge into generalities and lose their contradictions, while facts of consciousness near at hand are chaotic and contradictory and force us to give them preferential treatment.

If Draper had realized that the only natural laws we have are not innate uniformities in the structure of the universe itself, but are just these same synthetic generalizations produced out of time and space perspectives—smoothed curves, we call them in statistics—probably he would not have discussed the problem in terms of an antithesis of free will and natural law. But here again he probably went as far as either his vision or the needs of his time would lead him. It was necessary for him to reconcile introspectively the evidence of choice functioning as free will on the one hand with the assumption of universal law on the other, if he was to gain a hearing for the latter as applied to human affairs. Already the battle against fiat and revelation had been won. He solves the problem of the conflict between the subjective experience of choice and the postulate of impersonal law by making it a matter of perspective. The immediate we choose; the distant is determined for us. Obviously the solution is only a

¹² *Ibid.*, II: 20.

¹³ See L. L. Bernard, "The Method of Generalization for Social Control," *Amer. Sociological Rev.*, V: 340-350 (June, 1940).

¹⁴ J. W. Draper, *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (1876), II: 20-21.

makeshift, a compromise, until the postulate of free will could be examined critically.¹⁵

5. Draper's fifth principle consists of the postulation of a law of the evolution of collective logic or thinking. He believed that the history of European thought was divisible into five stages as follows: (1) the Age of Credulity, (2) the Age of Inquiry, (3) the Age of Faith, (4) the Age of Reason, and (5) the Age of Decrepitude.¹⁶ These historical ages, he is convinced, correspond to the stages of individual development known as infancy, childhood, youth, maturity, and old age.¹⁷ This organismic analogy was not new.¹⁸ He believed that we of the West are now in the age of reason. As yet the world apparently has not entered the age of decrepitude, but in a later work he speaks of "the impending crisis" between the old theological order and the new order of scientific law.¹⁹ He does not doubt, however, that this conflict will result in a further extension of the principles of science.

The Logic of European History. Draper concludes his work on the intellectual development of Europe with a general statement of the logic of the development of European history, as follows:²⁰

The civilization of Europe has not taken place fortuitously, but in a definite manner, and under the control of natural laws; that the procession of nations does not move forward like a dream, without reason or order, but that there is a predetermined, a solemn march, in which all must join, ever moving, ever resistlessly advancing, encountering and enduring an inevitable succession of events; that individual life and its advancement through successive stages is the model of social life and its secular variations.

I have asserted the control of natural law in the shaping of human affairs—a control not inconsistent with free-will any more than the unavoidable passage of an individual as he advances to maturity and declines in old age is inconsistent with his voluntary actions; that higher law limits our movements to a certain direction, and guides them in a certain way. As the Stoics of old used to say, an acorn may lie torpid in the ground, unable to exert its living force, until it receives warmth, and moisture, and other things needful for its germination; when it grows, it may put forth one bud here and another bud there; the wind may bend one branch, the frost blight another; the innate vitality

¹⁵ See L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology* (New York, 1926), pp. 168-170.

¹⁶ *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (1876), I: 19.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, I: 20.

¹⁸ See F. W. Coker, *Organismic Theories of the State* (1912) for antecedent theories of the same type.

¹⁹ *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science* (1874), Ch. XIII.

²⁰ *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe* (1876), II: 400-401.

of the tree may struggle against adverse conditions or luxuriate in those that are congenial; but, whatever the circumstances may be, there is an overruling power forever constraining and modelling it. The acorn can only produce an oak.

The application of this principle to human societies is completely established by a scientific study of their history; and the more extensive and profound that study, the better shall we be able to distinguish the invariable law in the midst of the varying events. But that once thoroughly appreciated, we have gained a philosophical guide for the interpretation of the past acts of nations, and a prophetic monitor of their future, so far as prophecy is possible in human affairs.

Comment on Draper. It will be easy to observe from the analysis here made of Draper's methodology that he had not divorced himself from some of the cruder errors so patent in the men whose theories were considered in the two chapters immediately preceding. But that he made a distinct advance in the use of historical data for purposes of generalization, in spite of his attachment to some of the older metaphysical dogmas, there can be no doubt. It is of course also true that he was in the main inspired by and was, in all essentials, a disciple of Buckle. But none the less he possessed considerable originality of his own, not only in the selection of his themes but also in the method of handling his data. It can scarcely be maintained, however, that he attained to that degree of accuracy in the selection and use of his basic facts demanded by the foremost experts in the scientific school of historiography to whom we have already referred. The composition of intellectual history was as yet too new an enterprise and the collections of data in this field were at that time far too scanty to make a high degree of accuracy possible. It should perhaps be more a matter of surprise that he should have done as well as he did than that he did not reach a higher degree of perfection. Andrew D. White, writing almost a generation later, and better trained in the art of historiography, did indeed achieve a higher order of success in this same field.²¹

It has not been our intention, however, to present Draper's theories of the operation of natural law in history as a typical contribution of scientific history to Social Science, but rather as an example of the use made of history by a Social Scientist. Draper would appear to be representative of this point of view in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. There will be occasion to consider other uses made of history by Social Scientists at a later date.

²¹ See his *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom* (1896), and *Seven Great Statesmen in the Warfare of Humanity with Unreason* (1910).

The Revolt against the Idea of Law in History. Neither is it our intention to represent the views of Draper as the only ones current in his time. The influence of Carlyle with his personalistic but non-theological interpretation of history cannot be ignored. Carlyle had many followers in America as well as elsewhere, but these were more likely to be theologians than Social Scientists, since theology itself is personalistic rather than abstract and general. These conventional and romantic students of history patterning after Carlyle rejected as a matter of course the whole idea of a social science based on history. It was not sufficiently poetic. We may take as an example of this romantic view of history the statement of James Freeman Clarke, in the Lowell Lectures of 1880, who said: ²²

I shall say something of the great thinkers, the heroes of faith, around whose lives, as on an axis, the history of human life has turned, and who have sometimes directed the main currents of human thought through many centuries. The tendency of scientific study in our time has perhaps led us to undervalue the influence of such great souls. History has been believed to advance according to definite laws, over which neither human genius nor human freedom has exerted any appreciable influence. But even Mr. Buckle, while attempting to explain national character as the result of circumstances, and while laying down as a fundamental position that History and Biography are wholly different in their spheres, has occupied a very large and a very interesting part of his history with the biographies of Adam Smith, Voltaire, Burke, Montesquieu, Bossuet, Bichat, Hutton, Cullen, and others. I shall call your attention to the vast influence exerted on the course of events by such personalities as Augustine, Anselm, St. Bernard, Savonarola, Luther, Loyola, and Wesley. Subtract from history names like these, and its course would cease to be intelligible.

Two Concepts of Law in History. It would be difficult to find two theories of history more diametrically opposed, on the surface at least, than those of James Freeman Clarke and John W. Draper as stated in this chapter. The one takes the neo-theological view that free will control of behavior or personal interposition in human events makes impossible any regularity or predictability in the sequence of historic events. Such a view necessarily denies the concept of Natural Law or even that of divine law which might supposedly predetermine the course of human events. Rather it ignores such laws or determinants in practice and looks upon history from a purely humanistic standpoint, divested of both theology and metaphysics. Only those who were completely emancipated from the metaphysical concept of Natural Law or the theological concept of divine inter-

²² J. F. Clarke, *Events and Epochs in Religious History* (Boston, 1881), p. 2.

vention could hold to such a theory fundamentally, and certainly such emancipation could not be predicated of either Carlyle or Clarke. They must therefore have arrived at such a theory as that expressed above when off duty as metaphysician and theologian.

The theory of Draper, on the other hand, not only that there are laws of history but also that there is a basic law of historical development, inherent in the very nature of historic events is reactionary and metaphysical in the highest degree. It is all the more surprising in Draper because he was radically opposed to theological dogma and frequently speaks with contempt in his works of the speculations of the scholastics. Doubtless he was in this respect overcome by his strong attachment to materialism and a deterministic philosophy as opposed to spiritualism and a fiatistic or free will theory of conduct in men. The endeavor of the nineteenth century scientists to find some dependable naturalistic basis for the causation of phenomena, in opposition to the fiatistic explanations of the theologians who still insisted upon the validity of miracles, often led them to the extreme of an unquestioning acceptance of the dogma of absolutistic natural law determination. That this was apparently the case with Draper is attested in part by his apparent acceptance of the Mohammedan belief in fate and his attempt to assimilate it to his theory of natural science. As a matter of fact it led him directly into a form of predestination which differs from the Calvinism which he detested only by being metaphysical instead of theological, if indeed it is not itself a form of theological dogma. There can of course be no general law of history without some sort of predetermination which, for all we know to the contrary, might also be predestination.

The Source of Error in these Views. It is clear, therefore, that both Clarke and Draper have missed the more rational conception of order in history. One denies it altogether, the other makes it iron clad and almost hopelessly predeterministic, in direct violation of his own general point of view in science. Clarke ignores in the first place the significance and power of suggestion in the shaping of mass action. This significance is so well known at the present time that no one would question it. However, mass behavior on the basis of suggestion would not in itself validate the concept of dependable historical laws, and much less a basic and invariable law of history. The uniformities arising from mass suggestion are still in large measure dependent upon a more or less variable and whimsical source of suggestion. Much, sometimes everything, depends on who is the source of

the suggestion. Of course even the originator of the suggestion is not himself free from the force of suggestion, but this fact does not in itself remove all possibility or likelihood of whimsical variability in historical succession nor does it establish the validity of uniform historical laws.

The real difficulty lies in the fact that both Clarke and Draper had the wrong, although apparently much the same, conception of law or laws in history. As we have already argued in this work, laws of any sort—historical, physical, biological, or otherwise—are not self-existent in the very nature of reality, lying back of visible phenomena as Plato and the metaphysical advocates of Natural Law determination have supposed, waiting to be discovered by the logician and the laboratory expert and applied by the administrator or technologist. They are formal or informal inductive generalizations from observed phenomena, man-made, and their reliability is always relative to the adequacy of the sample of phenomena—of whatever kind—at the investigator's disposal. When his sample changes his generalizations or laws also change. And as human culture advances and the accumulation of data becomes more extensive and more representative of reality, generalizations of increasing extent and validity can be made. Thus does the body of science grow and the validity and dependability of law—scientific law—increase. Thus are the laws of history produced and improved.

Highly variable as well as highly stable phenomena may be generalized in just this manner, and as a consequence, in spite of the great variability of human behavior in society mentioned by Clarke laws of history of increasing and growing validity can be formulated. But such laws are "discovered" only by being constructed by historical investigators, by being *made* like any other projective invention. They are not, as Draper supposed, preexistent in some sort of spiritual universe, such as Draper would himself be one of the first to deny. A recognition of this fact is in itself a complete refutation of Draper's concept of a general law of history. If there is ever to be a general law of history, it will not be "discovered" as a preexistent phenomenon, but will be constructed as the end process of a long series of successive and ever more synthetic generalizations of historical data and principles.

Transition to the Scientific History Period: The Use of Data

Application of Theory to Practice. There is no lack of theorizing among American Social Scientists with a historical bent regarding the use of historical data for purposes of sociological generalization. But most of this theory is relative to the benefits and probable results of the method, the need for historical generalization, and the availability and sources of the data when so used, rather than a straight-forward account of the specific methods to be employed in constructing sociological generalizations from historical data. This is the great weakness of the historical methodologists in Social Science. They have given us very little that can be successfully applied in the construction of a Social Science or sociological theory by means of the study of history. They were concerned more with a theory of methodology than with production as such. As a consequence, our treatment of this phase of the subject must perforce be disappointing. We shall, however, present such material as is available. Possibly one of the significant causes of the failure of the historical aspect of Social Science to develop to the proportions which its sponsors expected lies in this fact of the poverty of concrete methods with which it was compelled to operate in the production of Social Science principles. It seems altogether likely that, with all the eagerness displayed by the promoters of Social Science for its growth, any methodology whatever that could have produced a considerable body of valid generalization from any type of data whatever would have been welcomed enthusiastically and propagated assiduously.

What we say here should not be taken to indicate that there was an undue scarcity of historical generalizers among the Social Scientists, or that their results were of a low order. As a matter of fact there were some very adequate illustrations of the method, as we shall endeavor to show, especially in the last third of the nineteenth century, when history writing in this country became more definitely interpretative. But the difficulty

was that these historical generalizers, including even such able individuals as John W. Draper and Andrew D. White, were never able to tell others just how they managed to produce their results. To the uninitiated the process remained a sort of intuitive magic. In truth the method does not seem to have been very clear even to the men who used it most successfully. If they had been more adequately acquainted with the terminology of investigating methods in the other social sciences they might have described it as in part deduction by analogy, but more frequently as informal statistical generalization by induction. In any case they could not, at the stage of development in which they found their subject, use formal statistics, and laboratory methods of the ordinary type were out of the question. The historical seminar was the nearest approach they were able to make to the laboratory of the physical scientist. At all events the most valuable aids they had at their disposal were, objectively speaking, a growing wealth of documentary materials and, subjectively speaking, a well trained and well filled mind, in itself capable of serving as a cerebral laboratory in which the processes of amalgamation and synthesis of ideas on a large scale could be carried on with accuracy and vigor. These were the prime bases of their success. Beyond these terms they scarcely ventured to analyze their methodological processes in the art of historical generalization.

In the present chapter we shall endeavor to present such accounts of methods as are available from the field. Our attention will first be centered on historiography.

Saxton's Theory of Historiography. A very interesting dissertation on the proper method of writing history and on its editorial and didactic functions was contained in the Introduction to L. C. Saxton's treatise on the *Fall of Poland*. From a man who believes that "no infidel can write a philosophical history,"¹ and that "the highest aim and first duty of history is instruction, and not merely amusement,"² we may well expect a very interesting theory of history, and we are not to be disappointed. He says,³

History is something more than a mere record of dates, or a chronicle of wars and crimes. It investigates the laws of cause and effect, and the philosophy of sequences which are ever the same in the history of man; and reveals those motives and mainsprings of human thought, feelings, actions and destiny,

¹ L. C. Saxton, *Fall of Poland*; Containing an Analytical and a Philosophical Account of the Causes which Conspired in the Ruin of that Nation, together with a History of the Country from Its Origin (2 vols., 1851), I: 51.

² *Ibid.*, I: 45.

³ *Ibid.*, I: 19-21.

which, under the supervision of the Creator, control the human family, in harmony with the free agency of every human being.

History, as a science, may naturally be divided into three general departments; historical facts, historical philosophy, and historical style. Historical facts comprehend only such important events in the natural and moral world as may be usefully perpetuated by record, for the future benefit of man; regardless of such incidents as are unworthy of notice, and injurious of civil society, both as precepts and examples. The duties of the historian are multifarious, complicated and difficult. The man who writes a profound, useful and interesting history, not only serves his country, and the cause of humanity generally; but contributes to the cause of science an offering. . . . His facts must be credible, and drawn from the most truthful and learned sources; selected and arranged with wisdom and good taste, carefully distinguished between cause and effect, between sequent and coincident events, between truth and falsehood, between doubtful and well-authenticated occurrences, and between imaginary and real deeds.

A judicious classification and arrangement of facts, without unnecessary repetition and useless minutiae, so as to present the several national characteristics of civil society in the clearest light, are, perhaps, the most laborious duties which fall to the lot of the historian. A general array of historical annals, a confused mass of statistics, without regard to the appropriate principles they are to illustrate and sustain, are embarrassing to the reader and tasteless to the scholar. . . .

Nations, like individuals, have a character either good or bad; the leading features and characteristics of which it is the business of the historian to draw out, classify and delineate, in accordance with facts and philosophy, for the pleasure and profit of his readers. After laying down the geography and chronology of a nation, as the eyes of history, the most prominent national characteristics which present themselves for consideration, are, politics, progression, state representation, assemblies, military and naval affairs, aristocracy, democracy, slavery, sovereignty, great men, government, law, feudalism or land policy, literature, wealth, society, religion and civilization. Around each of these elementary features of a nation, may be classified and clustered all the facts and principles worthy of being perpetuated in history. These national lineaments, it is the peculiar province of history to portray, by all necessary useful facts, and philosophy, adorned with all the interest of which historical composition is susceptible.

It is clear that this historical science, or philosophy of history, is really a science of social forms and institutions. It requires the ability to deduce principles and laws from historical data, and great familiarity with social laws as such. Saxton continues: "Philosophical history requires, not only the greatest familiarity with chronology, geography and historical facts generally; but a profound acquaintance with the principles of government, jurisprudence, civil society, moral science, and religion; general literature,

science and the arts, political economy, and all branches of philosophy and learning.”⁴

The Lesson of the Forerunners: Conclusion. Machiavelli, Francis Bacon, and Hume are, he contends, the three great names in the history of the philosophy of history. Although Hume has never been surpassed, “in forming just and profound conclusions concerning the mutations of time, and the changes of centuries,”⁵ it was Machiavelli and Bacon who were the great pioneers.⁶ It was they

who, for the first time in the annals of literature, reasoned upon human affairs as a science. . . . These great masters, in their philosophical contemplations, regard the minds of men as permanently governed by well-established principles; which, under the supervision of the Deity invariably lead to the same results. They treated of politics as a familiar science, governed by certain known and fixed laws, as invariable as the laws of gravitation and physical attraction. This was a gigantic step in the march of science and human progression. . . . These two champions of philosophy were introduced to an immense store of facts, that had been accumulating by the experience of ages, which they analyzed in their mental laboratories, and from which they drew deductions and analogical conclusions in relation to the affairs of nations, never to be doubted or shaken. The celebrated *Discorsi* . . . contain the eternal truths of human nature, and those omnipotent laws of society applicable to every future generation, and to all the circumstances of men.

This static conception of the laws of society, as forms fixed for once and for all, although no longer accepted by historians or writers in the social sciences, is quite understandable in a man who could say that “Providence has so interwoven human affairs, and established such invariable laws of sequence, such intimate relations of cause and effect, that we can retrace the revolutions and existence of a people, and investigate the causes of their grandeur or misfortune, by pursuing their history and philosophy step by step, back to their birth”;⁷ or, in a historian who, in commenting on the didactic function of history, could hold to something like a fixed order in historical sequence, as indicated in the following statement: “In writing the philosophy of history, the great object is instruction—with as much interest as possible—by presenting the great and general facts of history, clothed with those elementary principles of politics, law, government,

⁴ *Ibid.*, I: 22.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I: 39–40.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I: 50–51.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I: 55.

morals, and religion, which will ever remain the fundamental laws of social and individual existence.⁸

But the most significant things to observe about Saxton are that he was a strong advocate of the collection and use of tested historical data and that he thought it eminently proper to utilize the facts thus obtained and verified to throw light upon the movement of human society by means of adequately controlled generalization corrected and guided by a wide knowledge of the sciences, and especially by the social sciences. This very thing he had himself attempted to do in his own work, *The Fall of Poland*.

The Theoretical Social Scientists on History. To offset this unfavorable evaluation of objective history as a basis for Social Science we may state very briefly the opinions of some of those systematic Social Scientists whose general theories we have already analyzed in some detail. James O'Connell, for example, speaks of "the science of Society, the philosophy of history" as though the latter were essentially the equivalent of the former.⁹ He asserts that in France alone was history dealt with scientifically. In America it was treated too biographically and not sufficiently philosophically. In Great Britain it was handled too empirically, and in Germany too scholastically.¹⁰ Elsewhere, however, he asserts that "history is written nowhere in the spirit or the method of science."¹¹ And "as to tracing systematically the universal laws of nature in the varieties and vicissitudes of society, the idea never found a lodgment in the head of a genuine Anglo Saxon."¹² Modern history writing, he says, treats "biography, morals, history, society, civilization, even science itself, without the semblance of a fixed standard whereby to judge the principles, the actions, the events, the characters, the objects, the ages, the institutions considered. Does it not, on the contrary, vary its test, with an aggravating unconsciousness, according to the locality, to the epoch, to the sect, to the sentiments or even the idiosyncrasies of the several writers."¹³ A proper theory of civilization would furnish a general scale of classification of historic values which would constitute a relatively fixed standard.¹⁴ According to O'Connell, a science of history implied the philosophy of civilization.¹⁵

⁸ *Ibid.*, I: 53-54.

⁹ *Vestiges of Civilization*, p. 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

Hamilton, like Draper, was inclined to emphasize the history of ideas rather than of events in reducing history to a science. He says,¹⁶

If history can ever be reduced to a Science, as many of the most eminent thinkers have been, of late, attempting to render it, it can only be by strict attention to method and order, in the presentation of its acts or events. Whether this can ever be accomplished for the History of the World of ACTION, or not, the attempt to accomplish it is highly creditable to those master minds by whom it has been made. If such attempt can be made, with any propriety, or prospects of success, in regard to the world of ACTION, with much more propriety, with much better prospects of success, may it be made, as it ought to be made undoubtedly, in regard to the world of THOUGHT, the history of which, in part, we are endeavoring here to unfold. If, indeed, the history of the world of ACTION can ever be reduced, even approximately, to the character of a Science, it can only be by making it a counterpart to that of the world of THOUGHT—by subordinating facts to ideas—by considering *facts*, as Cousin recommends, only in so far as they represent IDEAS.

How to Use History in Building a Social Science. To Wright, history appeared to be the main method by which systematic social observation can take place. He says,¹⁷

We have now to consider the means and data of the science of society. This can consist only in a very small degree of personal observations, and only in the persons of leading statesmen, and in times of peculiar contemporaneous national events. And such observation will be far less applicable to the government of great Nations, than to the government of small Precincts. The larger and more populous the territory, the less can its affairs be observed by one human mind, or conducted in one age of life. Social observation therefore mainly consists of history. The great want here is for brief histories which shall represent principles rather than events. Such works would be nearly the same thing as "histories of civilization" of each particular country. They should prove, as to the case of each Nation for itself, the *general rules* and general consequences of the various principles of national action. . . .

A society like an Individual, cannot understand itself by an effort of direct self-consciousness of its own characteristics. It can only understand itself by observing its history; having previously encouraged the faithful narration and publication of that history, by interested and morally as well as mentally competent persons. And the better any society is, the more it will criticize and improve its own characteristics, by the light of its own experience, in defiance of its passions, its prejudices, and its theories.

¹⁶ *Present Status of the Philosophy of Society* (1866), pp. 75-76.

¹⁷ R. J. Wright, *Principia, or Basis of Social Science* (1875), p. 34.

This is the first clear cut statement that we have been privileged to quote on the actual methods by which the data of history may be turned into the principles of Social Science. The other writings have either emphasized the value of history for Social Science or have hinted at the method of making it available for Social Science. Some, indeed, have identified the philosophy of history with Social Science. But Wright, with his usual directness and practical concreteness in dealing with the content and methods of Social Science, speaks precisely to the point of how to utilize the facts and principles of history in the building of a Social Science.

The idea of the identity of the philosophy of history with Social Science, which we have encountered from time to time in this discussion, was slow to die. As late as 1901, the philosophy of history and the science of sociology (as the successor of Social Science) were considered synonymous by at least one writer.¹⁸

A Division on History Proposed. The interest in history as a source of material for generalization in Social Science increased steadily among the members of the American Social Science Association, until in 1880 President Daniel C. Gilman of the Association proposed the organization of a historical group, alongside of the four other existing divisions of the Association. His argument for taking this step was, in brief, that "Sociology is based on history."¹⁹ Such a section on history was not established within the American Social Science Association, however, and four years later the historians had founded an independent American Historical Association and it was holding its first meeting. Shortly we shall have occasion to quote from the address of its first president, who was also a member of the American Social Science Association. There seem to be some grounds for raising the question as to whether Gilman was influenced in his desire for the establishment of a history division within the Social Science Association because he anticipated the possibility of the withdrawal from the Association of those especially interested in history into a separate association, just as others interested in penology and charities had formerly segregated themselves. Also, while Gilman was president of the University of California, there had been considerable agitation in that university and state for a strong emphasis upon American ethnology and frontier history, a

¹⁸ See, e. g., Stephen Southric Hibberd, *The Philosophy of History* (Lacrosse, Wis., 1901), p. 4.

¹⁹ D. C. Gilman, Abstract of the Opening Address at Saratoga Springs, Sept. 7, 1880, in *Journal of Social Science*, No. 12, p. xxiv (Dec., 1880).

fact which may have served to strengthen his appreciation of the desirability of having a section on history in the American Social Science Association. If such is the case, we have here some concrete evidence of at least an indirect recognition of the growing importance of ethnological studies as a basis for Social Science generalization.

Andrew D. White on Methods of Historical Study. Andrew D. White, the first president of the newly organized American Historical Association, had pretty much the same conception of history and of its functions as did J. W. Draper, whose theories were noticed above. Both men retained much of the old respect for the philosophy of history and both were interested primarily in the history of ideas. Both were also profoundly influenced by the example of Buckle. But Andrew D. White was also a German trained scholar, with a good knowledge of the technique of scientific history. For years, before going to the presidency of Cornell University, he had taught history with distinction at the University of Michigan. All the more interesting, therefore, is his emphasis upon generalization in history. In his presidential address before the American Historical Association he maintained that "there is room for both special and general investigations in history; both are valuable and important, but 'the highest effort and the noblest result toward which these special historical investigations lead is the philosophical synthesis of all special results in a large, truth-loving, justice-loving spirit.'" ²⁰ He adds, in support of his own views on historical methodology, that Buckle had listed observation first among historical methods, discovery next, and the philosophic method at the top.

White distinguishes special historical studies as representing the critical analysis of phenomena, while general studies represent their synthesis. He continues as follows.²¹

And here allow me to call your attention to the use of the term "investigation." There appears frequently an idea that the word can be justly applied only to search into minute material facts and documents; but is it not just as true that investigation can be made into the relations and laws of facts? So, too, regarding a phrase we constantly hear, "the advancement of knowledge." But is knowledge advanced alone by the study of minute facts and occurrences? May it not also be advanced by a study of relations and methods and of laws governing such facts and occurrences? Investigation is as truly a means to the advancement of knowledge in the hands of the philosophic historians dealing

²⁰ A. D. White, "Studies in General History and the History of Civilization," *Papers of American Historical Association*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1885), p. 6.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

with general history, as in those of the most minute annalist dealing with some forgotten piece of diplomacy or strategy. Did it not require as much original investigation, and was not the field of knowledge as much increased, when Guizot gave us his profound and fruitful generalizations as to the laws governing and consequences flowing from national development in civilization, under the influence of one or many elements, as when Gachard discovered the facts regarding the cloister life of Charles V., or when Mr. Poole showed the connection of Manasseh Cutler with the Northwestern territorial ordinance? The two—general and special investigation—must go together. So it was in Guizot's case; so it should be in all cases.

Historical vs. Descriptive or Statistical Social Science. White was a strong partisan of the historical in contrast to the current descriptive or statistical method, as he called it, as applied to Social Science generalization. The use of the statistical method was already strongly developed in 1884. But White defends the older historical method of generalizing by pointing out some of its psychological advantages for purposes of interpretation, while at the same time he fails to observe compensatory weaknesses of the historical method in respect to points in which the statistical method is strong. It is also pretty clear that he does not adequately distinguish between the general descriptive method of Spencer and the statistical method more properly speaking. His remarks follow.²²

And now allow me to call attention to some subordinate indications as to method, given by general history to special history. Greatly as I admire the main drift of Mr. Herbert Spencer's argument upon historical studies in his treatise on Education, some of his statements seem to me to require limitation. He seems at times to confuse the study of history with the study of statistics, and thus to demand scientific proof when the nature of the material can only give moral proof. The analogy between the study of history and of travel has justly struck many minds, and throws some side light upon Mr. Spencer's confusion. Let us observe this analogy in making a case. Two young Americans go to England for a year. One devotes himself, in strict accordance with Mr. Spencer's theory, to "descriptive sociology," which, under the rules laid down by Mr. Spencer, results in the statistical tabulation of a vast multitude of facts; the other occupies himself in getting at the thought of the time, dominant or militant, by reading the best books, by talking with the best man in every field, by noting ends and methods in work of all sorts, by studying, comparatively, various ways of solving political and social problems, by observing society in all its branches, even by listening to the current chatter and prattle, in the various social strata. Both may come back useful men; but I think that none of us will deny that, as a man, the second—the historian—will be far better

²² *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

developed, and as a thinker, writer, or man of affairs far better equipped than the first—the statistician.

The Intangibles Argument. Furthermore, he states, facts which would never appear in descriptive sociological tables, because they lack the concreteness requisite for statistical manipulation, often have great significance in practical affairs and for a wise interpretation.²³ He summarizes his point of view in this matter in the following sentences. "The simple rule and test which general history and the history of civilization give to special investigation is that if close knowledge of a battle, or an intrigue, or a man is important to our knowledge of the great lines of historical evolution, then these facts are important; if not, they are not important. . . . Meeting our ethical necessity for historical knowledge with statistics and tabulated sociology entirely or mainly, is like meeting our want of food by the perpetual administration of concentrated essence of beef."²⁴

Some statistics "increase our perception of truth, some decrease it," he points out. Moral statistics are as important as material. The writings of Lucretius, Cicero, Lucian, Juvenal, Tacitus, Gerome are important because of the abstract or intangible facts they present; "in each of these facts is included a whole column of moral statistics, which enable us to see far into the spirit of the time and the causes of that imperial decline, as columns of material statistics might not do."²⁵

The Ethical Outlook in History. White recognized that there may be various motives for historical investigation and study, such as curiosity, pride in one's country, love of fame, or the desire for professional success. But he considered the ethical the highest motive. In his own historical writing he always sought to establish those truths that would best promote the moral welfare of mankind. His comment on the ethical motive is as follows:²⁶

The great, deep ground out of which large historical studies may grow is the ethical ground,—the simple ethical necessity for the perfecting, first, of man as man, and, secondly of man as a member of society; or, in other words, the necessity for the development of humanity on the one hand and society on the other. Hence it would appear that, precious as special investigations may be, most precious of all is that synthesis made by enlightened men looking over large

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 16–18.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

fields, in the light of the best results of special historical research, to show us through what cycles of birth, growth, and decay various nations have passed; what laws of development may be fairly considered as ascertained, and under these what laws of religious, moral, intellectual, social, and political health or disease; what developments have been good, aiding in the evolution of that which is best in man and in society; what developments have been evil, tending to the retrogression of man and society; how various nations have stumbled and fallen into fearful errors, and by what processes they have been brought out of these errors; how much the mass of men as a whole, acting upon each other in accordance with the general laws of development in animate nature, have tended to perfect man and society; and how much certain individual minds, which have risen either as the result of thought in their time, or in spite of it—in defiance of any law which we can formulate—have contributed toward this evolution.

History and Social Science. It is but a step from this ethical emphasis upon history to a point of view which regards history as a valuable source for generalizations in Social Science. History is valuable in throwing light on our problems, he says. "What students of social science cannot better estimate the most fearful anti-social evil among us by noting the sterility of marriage in the decline of Rome and in the eclipse of France?"²⁷

It follows, therefore, that history must be rewritten from the American point of view, he says. Our new point of view in civilization demands this. White expresses the belief that there is a great field for the exercise of their talents by American philosophic historians in describing and interpreting the development of man as man and man in society. America illustrates the tragic results of the failure of its people to profit from the teachings of history, due largely to the lack of philosophic history available for their instruction. This is an historical age, as the eighteenth century was a philosophical age. Hence, there is no excuse for the lack of historical knowledge.²⁸ The main difficulty is that much history is so written as to be inadequate to meet this need. Consequently, "while the professor in an American university makes special studies, he ought to be laboring toward something like a conspectus of human history,—if not of all human history, at least of some great part of it. So shall he prevent his generalizations from becoming vague, and his investigations from becoming trivial."²⁹

White concludes his argument by saying that while the American His-

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 23–25.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

torical Association should have sections on special history, "there ought to be also a section or sections devoted to general history, the history of civilization, and the philosophy of history."³⁰

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

Goldwin Smith's Denial of Historical Method as the Basis of Social Science

Chief among the historians who opposed using history as the basis of the new Social Science was Goldwin Smith, a life member of the American Social Science Association.¹ His first essay in historical method, *Lectures on the Study of History*, delivered in 1859-1861 while Regius Professor of Modern History at the University of Oxford, attracted the attention of President White and brought him to Cornell University, where he taught history from 1868 to 1870. In 1904 he presented a paper on "The Treatment of History" before the American Historical Association. These two productions serve as the sources of his views on the relations of Social Science to historical method.

The Nature of History. In the earlier of these works Smith repeatedly refers to the new history as the "science of Man" and the "new science of Man."² This phraseology probably has some relation to the title of the great work of Vico—the *Scienza Nuova*—whom he acknowledges as the originator of the philosophy of history.³ Yet Smith denies that history can be a science. In taking this position he is not so much concerned with the question of whether history can or cannot be investigated and written scientifically as he is with the other now discarded metaphysical problem of whether there can be found an absolutistic law governing the course of history as a whole, such as Draper contended for. He says, "The first question which the student of history has now to ask himself is, Whether history is governed by necessary laws? If it is, it ought to be written and read as a science. It may be an imperfect science as yet, owing to the complexity of the phenomena, the incompleteness of the observations, the want of a rational method; but in its nature it is a science, and is capable of being

¹ See *Journal of Social Science*, No. 6, p. 6, July, 1874.

² *Lectures on the Study of History*, 1866, pp. 51, 83, 89, etc.

³ "The Treatment of History," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1904), p. 71.

brought to perfection.”⁴ Since the central fact in history for moral order or justice,⁵ the unvarying law which he would den basis of a science of history would necessarily be a moral law.

Science Finds no Moral Unity in History. But science can moral unity or constancy in history, he says.⁶

alone.”⁸ This does not necessarily mean revealed religion. In his own case it was rather a metaphysical religion, the religion of Plato rather than of Jehovah or Christ.

Why History Is not a Science. Besides the fact that he finds no universal and unchanging law of history, Smith offers five other reasons why history cannot be regarded as a science. These other five considerations are practical rather than metaphysical, as was the former. They are: (1) human will is free; (2) human history is never completed and therefore we cannot make valid generalizations about it; (3) we never have all the facts even about the events that have already transpired; (4) history is full of accidents, a fact which is fatal to the conception and verification of scientific law; and (5) prediction of future historic events is impossible.⁹

Of all of these problems that of free will troubles him most. He scouts the validity of “moral statistics,” or the regular recurrence of events so much emphasized by Buckle, largely on the ground that “they tell us only the outward act, not its inward moral character,”¹⁰ and all human adjustment is a matter of trial and error, not of action on the basis of general historical law or principle. “In philosophy and science . . . the race, like the man, advances by the trial of successive hypotheses, which are adopted and rejected in turn till the true one is at length found.”¹¹ And, besides, our own introspective evidence tells us that we are creatures of free will and choice.¹² How deceptive indeed might be the evidence of introspection he could not at that time know. But forty years later he was ready to confess his doubts in the statement: “I trust it is not presumptuous to say that this question of free will and necessity seems to me to be a mental puzzle and nothing more”¹³—one more evidence that wisdom comes with age, although perhaps not wisdom adequate for historical generalization.

Smith further denies that history can be a science because¹⁴

a complete induction from the facts of history is impossible. History can not furnish its own inductive law. An induction, to be sound, must take in, actually or virtually, all the facts. But history is unlike all other studies in this, that she never can have actually or virtually, all the facts before her. What is past she knows in part; what is to come she knows not, and can never know. The scroll

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 85.

⁹ “The Treatment of History,” *loc. cit.*, pp. 68–71.

¹⁰ *Lectures on the Study of History*, pp. 53–54.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 55, 81.

¹³ “The Treatment of History,” *loc. cit.*, p. 68.

¹⁴ *Lectures on the Study of History*, pp. 55–56.

from which she reads is but half unrolled; and what the other half contains, what even the next line contains, no one has yet been able to foretell. Prediction, the crown of all science, the new science of Man and History has not ventured to put on. That prerogative, which is the test of her legitimacy, she has not yet ventured to exert. . . .

This ignorance of what is to come destroys, it would seem, among other inductive theories of history, the famous one of Comte, who makes the course of history to be determined by the progress of science through its three stages, "Theological," "Metaphysical," and "Positive."

Some Rather Obvious Fallacies. If he had known more about science he surely would have been aware of the fact that no science has all of the facts at its disposal, but that it makes and uses inductively generalized laws just the same. All statistical generalizations are tentative and incomplete, but they are so in less degree than are generalizations drawn from the observation of historical events. Also, the best known of all physical laws—the law of falling bodies—is not based upon induction from the actual facts of falling bodies at all, for all falling bodies under natural conditions—does not nature "abhor" a vacuum?—violate the law of falling bodies. Hence, his denial, on the grounds cited in the following words, of the right of inductive science to the term *law* is without basis or point. He says, "Inductive science can discover at most only general facts; that the facts are more than general, that they are universal—in a word, that they are laws, is an assumption for which inductive science, while she instinctively builds on it, can herself supply no basis."¹⁵ Equally pointless and without validity is his argument against the conception of history as a science on the ground that its predictions are true only when it has for subject matter stabilized and standardized processes or uniformities: "Nor will it avail the constructors of a science of Man to cite the moral certainty with which we predict the conduct of men or nations whose characters are settled. This settled character was formed by action, and the action by which it was formed was free, so that the uncertain element which baffles science is not got rid of, but only thrown back over a history or a life."¹⁶

Prediction in any field of science is possible only under the same conditions of standardization. His assertion in the last sentence of the immediately preceding quotation is an assumption which throws his argument into the form of a circle. It seems scarcely necessary to conclude that Smith has not made his point against history as a science, if we conceive science in

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

the ordinary acceptation of that term rather than as a phase of metaphysical absolutistic logic. With respect to his contention that the large number of accidental events in history makes a science of history impossible, it need only be remarked that the modern physicist or physical chemist does not find fewer dissimilarities in his data than does the historian. To be sure, "accidents" or unaccounted phenomena, make impossible an absolute science. But no one now believes that there are any absolute sciences; all sciences are relative. We have ceased to believe that uniformities of behavior in any field of knowledge are inherent in the facts themselves; we now perceive that the uniformities in data are imposed by the scope and form of our generalizations, which in turn arise out of the adjustment need to see our environment—physical or mental—in perspective. Moreover, we now recognize that these generalizations are arrived at inductively in all sciences and that such inductions are the only laws about which we know anything at all.¹⁷

Erroneous Conceptions of History. Closely corresponding to Smith's arguments against the possibility of a science of history is his classification of the various theories of history. These are: ¹⁸ (1) the necessarian or "physical views" which would seek to give a causal explanation of events. This is the theory he has been arguing against in greatest detail. (2) The phantastic or imaginative, which places the events in some straight-jacket of metaphysical theory, such as Hegel's philosophy of history. (3) The unilateral theories, which attribute the events of history to such single causal influences as race, climate, food, or great men. He warns against such exaggerations as the struggle for existence theory of Buckle,¹⁹ or the great man theory of Carlyle, saying that great men are products, not creators of their generation.²⁰ (4) The analogical theories which presuppose some mysterious law of development of nations on the analogy of human lives, such as was expounded by Draper. (5) The parallelistic theories, which find similar patterns of historical development among all peoples. (6) The providential theory of history which presupposes the special intervention of the supernatural. All of these theories of history he rejects.

The Concreteness of History. In the opinion of Smith, history is a very concrete and empirical thing. It is not the cut and dried fulfillment of a general metaphysical principle of natural law nor the product of the mind

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, pp. 58–59, for Smith's views to the contrary.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 65–69.

¹⁹ "The Treatment of History," *loc. cit.*, p. 72.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

of God thinking out loud, as Vico would have it. It is simply the aggregate of the free will actions of men. Thus,²¹

History is made up of human actions, whether those actions are political, social, religious, military, or of any other kind. The founding and maintaining of institutions, the passing and keeping of laws, the erecting and preserving of churches and forms of worship, the instituting and observing of social customs, may be all resolved into the element of action. So may all intellectual history, whether of speculations, observation, or composition, with their products and effects, the bending of the mind to thought being in every respect as much an action as the moving of the hand. What we call national actions are the actions of a multitude of men acting severally though concurrently, and with all the incidents of several action; or they are the actions of those men who are in power. Whatever there is in action, therefore, will be every where present in history, and the founders of the new physical science of history have to lay the foundations of their science in what seems the quicksand of free-will.

This point of view should have prepared the author for the acceptance of the theory of relativistic historical laws arrived at by induction. But his mind was so thoroughly obsessed by a metaphysical, to the exclusion of a scientific, conception of law that it did not.

History Distinguished from Social Science. In keeping with this concrete view of history Smith distinguishes it from sociology, or from Social Science, as he would have said thirty or forty years earlier, when the term Social Science was in vogue. History, he believes, should be well written, because it has a lesson to teach and this lesson should be made easily available. "There is perhaps rather a tendency in this scientific and sociological age to underrate the value of narrative skill," he says.²² History is not sociology and should not be considered or written as such, he continues. "Moreover, to instruct, touch, and elevate humanity a history must be human. It must be a lively presentation of character and action. Sociology is a thing by itself. So is every historical treatise written on the sociological principle. So are those special treatises on an infinite variety of subjects in which character and action have no place."²³

The Philosophy of History Is Acceptable. Although there can be no science of history, according to Smith, history is not necessarily a chaos because there is no general law of history; for there is a philosophy of history.²⁴

²¹ *Lectures on the Study of History*, pp. 48-49.

²² "The Treatment of History," *loc. cit.*, p. 75.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Lectures on the Study of History*, p. 89.

That the actions of men are, like the events of the physical world, governed by invariable law, and that, consequently, there is an exact science of man and history, is a theory of which, even in the attenuated form it is now beginning to assume, we have still to seek the proof. But a science of history is one thing, a philosophy of history is another. A science of history can rest on nothing short of causation; a philosophy of history rests upon connection—such connection as we know, and in every process and word of life assume, that there is between the action and its motive, between motives and circumstances, between the conduct of men and the effect produced upon their character, between historic antecedents and their results.

This philosophy of history has been recognized. It rests upon and deals with two great classes of facts: "the division of nations and the succession of ages."²⁵ He particularizes the idea and function of the division of nations as follows:²⁶

It is clear that the division of nations has entered deeply into the counsels of creation. It is secured not only by barriers of sea, mountains, rivers, intervening deserts—barriers which conquest, the steam-vessel, and the railroad might surmount—but also by race, by language, by climate, and other physical influences, so potent that each in its turn has been magnified into the key of all history. The division is perhaps as great and as deeply rooted as it could be without destroying the unity of mankind. Nor is it hard to see a reason for it. If all mankind were one state, with one set of customs, one literature, one code of laws, and this state became corrupted, what remedy, what redemption would there be? None, but a convulsion which would rend the frame of society to pieces, and deeply injure the moral life which society is designed to guard. Not only so, but the very idea of political improvement might be lost, and all the world might become more dead than China. Nations redeem each other. They preserve for each other principles, truths, hopes, aspirations, which, committed to the keeping of one nation only, might, as frailty and error are conditions of man's being, become extinct forever.

The Moral Unity and Continuity of Mankind. The other great theme of the philosophy of history is that of the succession of ages. Smith does not treat this as a process of evolution, as does Draper. This would be an empirical approach, and to him the underlying processes of history are not empirical, but fundamental and metaphysical, although the data of history, consisting of the free will actions of men, are empirical and ephemeral. These underlying processes are, for Smith, essentially moral.²⁷

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 69.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 69–70.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91.

The philosophy of history, in its highest sense . . . is the offspring of a great fact which has but recently dawned upon mankind. That fact is the moral unity of the human race. The softening down of mere dogmatic and ecclesiastical divisions between different parts of Christendom, the intercourse, the moral relations, the treaties and bonds ratified by common appeals to God, into which Christendom has entered with nations beyond its pale, have let in the conviction that virtue and truth, however they may vary in their measure, are in their essence the same every where, and every where divine. . . . No one can doubt, if he would, that through the life of each of us there is carried a distinct line of moral identity, along which the retrospective conscience runs.

He is emphatic on this point. "History could not be studied as a whole—there could be no philosophy of history—till we thoroughly felt that unity of the human race."²⁸ This unity and this continuity assume the character of progress—a fact "which needs no logical proof and no rhetorical enforcement."²⁹

Value of the Study of the Philosophy of History. It is also clear to Smith that this progress of society may be helped along very decisively by the study of the philosophy of history. He says, "Moral philosophy may gain new truth and additional power by taking the philosophy of history into its counsels, and contemplating not only individual humanity, but the whole estate of man."³⁰

What does not seem so clear to Smith is that the character of this moral process which is basic to history may itself be determined by the study of history, that is, by means of the discipline he calls the philosophy of history. On this point he says:³¹

What has been said as to the incompleteness of the phenomena of history, and the consequent impossibility of a final induction as to its law, leads to a remark on the theory that "Man is to be studied historically," and its necessary corollary that morality is not absolute, but historical. If there can be no complete historical induction, and if, at the same time, Man is to be studied historically, not morally, and the rule of right action is to be taken, not from our moral instincts, but from the observation of historical facts, it is difficult to see how there can be any rule of right action at all. Morality and our moral judgment of characters and actions must, it would seem, always remain in suspense till the world ends, and history is complete. History of itself, if observed as science observes the facts of the physical world, can scarcely give man any principle

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 58–59.

or any object of allegiance, unless it be success. Success accordingly enters very largely into the morality of the thorough-going Positivist.

He fears that such an inductive origin of the principles of morality would not produce absolute laws for the guidance of social progress, and in this he is of course quite correct. But does he imagine that he has such laws now from any other source? Yes, from religion, as stated above.³²

How Is Social Progress Achieved? How then is this underlying moral principle of progress made manifest to man for his guidance, if not through science and the philosophy of history? It appears that the philosophy of history, although useful to the moral order, is inadequate for this task as a whole. The urge to perfection is indeed strong. "History is a series of struggles to elevate the character of humanity in all its aspects, religious, intellectual, social, political, rising sometimes to an agony of aspiration and exertion, and frequently followed by lassitude and relapse, as great moral efforts are in the case of individual men."³³ But this effort is not guided by knowledge, through science, but rather through instinct.³⁴

To such a view seem to point all the instincts which lead man to sacrifice his individual life to his fellows, his country, and when his vision becomes more enlarged, to his kind. These instincts are regardless of the state of moral perfection at which he whom they propel to destruction has personally arrived. They do not calculate whether the soldier who rushes first into the breach, the man who plunges into a river to save one who is drowning, the physician who loses his own life in exploring an infectious disease, is, to use the common phrase, fit to die. They seem distinctly to aim at a moral object beyond the individual moral life, and affecting the character of the race. Yet, at the same time, they give strong assurance to him whose life they take that it is good for him to die. . . .

Again: what is it that persuades the lowest and most suffering classes of society, when the superiority of physical force is on their side, to rest quiet beneath their lot, and forbear from breaking in with the strong hand upon civilization, which in its tardy progress will scarcely bring better times to their children's children, and has too plainly no better times in store for them? Is it not an instinct which bids them respect the destinies of the race? And why should they be bidden to respect the destinies of the race, if those destinies are not theirs?

So we learn at last that the only use of a philosophy of history is to enlighten the instincts which are themselves the prime moral guides.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 85.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 94.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

The Moral Uncertainty of the World. But with all this reading of history off the record as a science and the substitution of the feeble light of the philosophy of history to guide the moral instincts in showing us the path to progress, Smith does not seem at all sure of the goal toward which we are headed in the end. He says our method is one of trial and error.³⁵ He asks, "Can we find any hypothesis in accordance with the facts of history which will reconcile the general course of history to our sense of justice"?³⁶ He cannot answer, except by putting another question, as follows:³⁷

Let us treat the subject as we may, scientifically, philosophically, or in any other method, what can we make of the history of man? Is the race the creation of a directing Providence, or a production of blind nature on this planet—fortuitous in its course and in its end? We have, preceding the birth of man, eons, it may be almost said, of abortion; eons of animal races which destroyed each other or perished on the primeval globe; a glacial era; man at length brought into existence, but remaining, perhaps for countless generations, a savage, and afterwards a barbarian; wild tribal conflicts and cataclysms of barbarian conquest. Then comes the dawn of civilization, which has been retarded and marred by wars, revolutions, persecutions, crimes, and aberrations of every kind, besides plagues, earthquakes, and other calamities of nature. Through all this mankind, or at least the leading members of the race, have been struggling onward to social, moral, perhaps spiritual life. Are things tending to a result answerable to the long preparation, the immense effort, and the boundless suffering which the preparation and the effort have involved? Or will the end of all be the physical catastrophe which science tells us must close the existence of the material scene? That question not even a "Cambridge Modern History" attempts to answer.

He assumes that there is some sort of divine justice which must be reconciled to a human sense of justice somewhere and somehow.³⁸ But it is the task of ethics to enlighten us on this matter and we must be patient.³⁹

Where the essence of morality lies, history must wait to be taught by ethical science. Till she is taught, it is impossible that she can form her philosophy on a sound basis; and, therefore, those who are devoted to historical studies may be excused for impatiently desiring a more rational inquiry into this, the central secret of the world. It is not by verbal definitions, however philosophic in appearance, that we shall ascertain what morality really is.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 98.

³⁷ "The Treatment of History," *loc. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

³⁸ *Lectures on the Study of History*, pp. 101-103.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-111.

But where does he expect ethics to get its wisdom? Some of it may come from history: "On the other hand, history, as we have said, may lend light to the moral philosopher."⁴⁰ For the rest, apparently, it must come out of the infinite or perhaps from Social Science. He does not say.

Summary and Conclusions regarding the Historical Method. For the most part our quest has been barren. The much vaunted historical source for Social Science has not measured up to the promises made by its defenders. In the hands of Draper and White it bore some fruit because they were not afraid to generalize empirically from history. Draper, well trained in the physical sciences, understood the method of inductive generalization and applied that method to historical data in the same way that he applied it to the facts of physiology and chemistry. His metaphysical and speculative notions about the nature of laws had little or no bearing upon his historical inductions. White, with less knowledge of physical science and more training in historical method, produced better results in historical induction, although he followed essentially the same procedures as did Draper, but without his metaphysical speculations. He in particular made a worthy contribution to scientific historical methodology. Goldwin Smith, trained only in the classics as Oxford men were in his time, understood adequately neither the methods of science nor the theory of historical investigation. Yet he possessed a brilliant mental equipment and a striking personality, both of which enabled him to gain a hearing for an obsolete metaphysics of history, the reputation of which completely outweighed its value. Fortunately it had but little influence upon historical investigation.

History as a source of Social Science (now sociological) generalization has been largely neglected since the time when Andrew D. White did his work, mainly because the statistical study of trends and of current data has proved so much more useful to the social sciences. But doubtless it is capable of much greater utilization than has been vouchsafed it. At any rate we no longer engage in voluminous controversies over whether history is a science, but endeavor to make historical method scientific.

Perhaps the most significant comment to be made upon all of these writers on the relation of history to Social Science is that they contributed very little to a concrete methodology of building historical data into Social

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

Science. They had, many of them, much to say about the nature of history, much less about the methodology of Social Science from the standpoint of historical data. The reason is that many of the men were primarily historians rather than Social Scientists, although they belonged to the American Social Science Association, and Draper and White made important contributions to Social Science through history.

Andrew D. White and Goldwin Smith were prominent and active in the Association before the formation of the American Historical Association. But it is significant that most of the men who were actually engaged in the upbuilding of Social Science made little use of historical data. The theoretical Social Scientists referred to in the preceding chapter wished thus to employ historical data and, as we have seen, occasionally did so. Now and then they also made comments on the proper methods of procedure. But the practical Social Scientists turned to statistics and direct observation of social phenomena rather than to history for their data. History was giving way to statistics as the more adequate basis for sociological generalization.

In the following chapters, therefore, we shall trace the development of this other great method of Social Science, the application of statistics to the generalization of current social data.

PART TWELVE

Statistical Methodology and Social Science

Early Conception and Promotion of Social Statistics in the United States

Two Early Periods of Enthusiasm. The history of statistics in the United States may be said to fall into four more or less clear-cut and distinct periods, each with its own peculiar characteristics. The first of these, from the beginning of national independence to about the middle or late eighteen-thirties, properly might be denominated the "almanac" period; for at this time statistics was thought of primarily as data or information rather than as scientific method,¹ and the data themselves were not generalized, nor even necessarily quantitative.² They were, so to speak, just so many "quaint and curious" or useful sets of facts. The second period, beginning in the eighteen-thirties and extending, roughly, up to the eighteen-sixties or thereabouts, was a period of "great expectations." The new science was to become the basis of legislation, government, and social policy and the figures of arithmetic were to take the place of the figures of rhetoric.³ In addition, political economy and Social Science were to be based on the solid foundation of statistics. During this period also there was a great stir of organization. Statistical societies were either organized or at least projected, state bureaus were established, and agitation for improved governmental statistics became strong. Finally, it was in this period that the first abstract discussions as to the possibility of applying mathematics to social phenomena, stimulated by the work of Quetelet and Comte, took place. In many respects this was the most interesting period in the history of statistics in this country. It was hopeful and buoyant and undaunted.

Two Periods of Intensive Application. But in the eighteen-sixties a change began. This third period was one of transition. The great expecta-

¹ Willford I. King, in his book on *The Elements of Statistical Method* (1921), pp. 16-18, distinguishes descriptive and scientific statistics. "Almanac" statistics would fall within King's category of descriptive statistics.

² *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XIV: 356-357.

³ L. A. Hinc, "A General Statistical Society for the United States," *The Merchants' Magazine*, XVIII: 398 (1848).

tions of the earlier days had not been realized. The figures of arithmetic did not, any more than the figures of rhetoric, silence controversy on matters of policy. Men came to exactly opposite conclusions from reasoning with the aid of precisely the same statistical data. A critical reaction set in. But it was during this transition period that men began to learn gradually how to state their problems in such a way as to render a statistical solution possible. The culmination of this particular movement came with the discovery of correlation by Galton in 1888, although a number of other workers in the field had been groping their way to this same discovery for some time. This was also the period of the first actual academic recognition of statistics in this country, although agitation for the introduction of statistics into college curricula had taken place in the preceding period many years earlier.

Finally, the fourth or modern period in the history of statistics in this country, may be said to be characterized by the use of statistics primarily for measurement and analysis, although the survey or inventory use of statistics has by no means been abandoned.⁴ A detailed discussion of this phase of statistical method lies outside the province of this volume. We may, however, examine in more detail the earlier periods, especially the second and third, which coincided most nearly with the Social Science movement itself and the beginnings of the application of statistics to sociology.

The Almanac Period—Early Treatises. The American passion for statistics, which General Walker commented upon,⁵ was, in the early days at least, no doubt primarily the result of the naive self-glorification of a new nation because of its prodigious material progress. Statistics afforded the visible symbols of this expansion and as such came to share much of the satisfaction which the growth itself evoked. The Americans of that early period must have derived from the statistics of national growth much the same sort of pleasure as that which the medieval cathedral builders experienced from the visible symbols of the growth of their church. The almanac nature of statistics at this time may be seen in the contemporary works then considered of most importance. These works were: Warden's *Statistical, Political and Historical Account of the United States* (1819), Timothy Pitkin's *Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States* (1817),

⁴ In fact the invention by Hollerith of the principle of electric counting and its use in the census of 1890 greatly stimulated nation-wide surveys.

⁵ Quoted by S. N. D. North, in John Koren (ed.), *The History of Statistics* (1918), p. 22.

Adam Seybert's *Statistical Annals* . . . 1789-1818 (1818), William Darby's *View of the United States Historical, Geographical, and Statistical* (1828), and Watterston and Van Zandt's *Tabular Statistical View* (1828).⁶ Nile's *Weekly Register*, established in Baltimore in 1811, contained "Political, Historical, Geographical, Scientifical, Astronomical, Statistical, and Biographical Documents, Essays and Facts," and the miscellaneous nature of the statistics which were published were quite in the almanac tradition of the period. The Boston *Journal of Philosophy and the Arts*, launched in 1824, included natural philosophy, mechanics, chemistry, geology, mineralogy, natural history, comparative anatomy, physiology, geography, statistics, and the fine and useful arts.

The first article in this journal was a reprint of an article from the *Edinburgh Philosophical Journal*, by George Hamey, Esq., on the increase of population in the United States. "The subject is important," says the author, "and connected as it is with so many other interesting objects of investigation, it cannot but have awakened the curiosity and attention of every one engaged in the cultivation of statistical science."⁷ Among the author's indirect sources was Pitkin's *Statistical View of the United States*. In discussing the census of 1820 he says that "the elements of some very important branches of statistical science were introduced; and the survey assumed a much more interesting and scientific form than either of the preceding."⁸ The improvements referred to were more detailed classifications of the data.

It is perhaps not strange that Francis Lieber, in spite of these favorable comments, spoke contemptuously of what was "generally understood in this country by statistics, namely, a limited account of a few relations numerically expressed."⁹ Thus, notwithstanding the passion for statistics, even at that early date, "the science of statistics," we are told, had "hardly

⁶ Report of an Address at the American Statistical Association in Hazard's *United States Commercial and Statistical Register*, II: 200 (1840). See also *The American Almanac* for 1830, Vol. I, 2d ed., 1833, p. 140. Seybert's treatment included the following chapters: 1. Preliminary Observations, concerning the progress of the United States; 2. Of the Population; 3. Of the Commerce; 4. Of the Navigation; 5. Of the Fisheries; 6. Of the Public Lands; 7. Post Office Establishment; 8. Of the Revenues; 9. Of the Mint Establishment; 10. Of the Military; 11. Of the Naval; 12. Of the Expenditures; 13. Of the Public Debt and Sinking Fund. Seybert, speaking of Samuel Blodgett's *Statistical Manual for the United States of America* (based on 1804 data) of 1806, says that his tables "do not furnish sufficient data for legislative purposes" (*loc. cit.*, p. v).

⁷ *Loc. cit.*, I: 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

⁹ *Memorial relative to Proposals for a Work in the Statistics of the United States*, 24th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 314, Apr. 18, 1836.

an existence in this country,"¹⁰ even as late as 1838. It was soon, however, to have more adequate recognition, for about this time began the second or great expectations period, in which much emphasis was to be placed upon generalization and upon the necessity of basing political economy and Social Science upon statistics.

The Later Almanac Period. The almanac tradition, however, persisted and continued long after the eighteen-thirties. Indeed, it continues to this very day among laymen and cultivators of the esoteric who love to quote miscellaneous statistics on almost every conceivable subject. We may get some idea of the fragmentary and uncoördinate nature of statistics of the almanac type from the statistical items which appeared in Hazard's *Commercial and Statistical Register* in the eighteen-thirties and the eighteen-forties. We find, for example: church statistics in Virginia, immigration statistics, statistics on new houses in Philadelphia, statistics of newspapers, magazines, and periodicals in the United States, statistics on the number of vehicles passing a certain house in the Bowery, New York (anticipating modern traffic counts), statistics of pauperism in Massachusetts in 1838, statistics of Hinds County, Mississippi (including the number of billiard tables), statistics of colleges in the United States, statistics of crime in Kentucky, statistics of education in Pennsylvania, statistics of new buildings in New York City, wage statistics for 1836 and 1840, statistics of the Ohio penitentiary, statistics of the Boston almshouse, statistics of churches in Washington, D.C. and Georgetown, statistics of speeches made at the United States Constitutional Convention, New York prison statistics, statistics on the number of vagrants in New York City, statistics on the number of pardons granted in New York from 1820-1840, statistics of the poor in Charleston, prison statistics, statistics of the Catholic church in America, crime statistics in New York, statistics of the distilleries in the United States and the number of gallons distilled, statistics of confirmations in New Jersey, statistics of insanity in various states, statistics of law suits in Philadelphia courts, statistics of murders in the United States, statistics of convictions of murder in New York, New York state prison statistics, statistics of taverns in Philadelphia in 1840 (an ecological item), statistics of suicides in the United States, crime statistics of New Orleans, statistics of the deaf and dumb in Mississippi, Connecticut, Pennsylvania,

¹⁰ F. B. (probably Francis Bowen), "Wayland's Political Economy," *Christian Examiner*, XXIV (n.m. VI), p. 5 (1838).

Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and the United States, statistics of the Boston House of Correction, of insane and idiots in the United States, of Methodists in Ohio and the United States, and finally, of widows in Marblehead, Mass.

There was no attempt at generalization or interpretation, or even of organization, of all these statistics. Even as late as the eighteen-fifties we find similar fragmentary statistical items, in DeBow's *Review* for example, dealing with southern universities and colleges, with newspapers and libraries in the United States, with northern and southern education, with the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia, and various other subjects. Evidently the readers of such publications had become accustomed to quantitative statements and had come to prefer them to mere literary or rhetorical generalizations about the events and social processes in which they were interested.

Nevertheless, although the almanac tradition persisted, beginning in the eighteen-thirties a definitely new and characteristic note was struck in the discussions of statistics. The generalization of statistical data was now stressed and a new period was ushered in.

The Period of Great Expectations: Emphasis upon Generalization. The transition from the almanac period to the period of great expectations was concisely described some years later by Cyrus Bartol in a review of Jarvis and Shattuck's *Massachusetts Sanitary Survey* of 1850. The author of this survey, Mr. Shattuck, says Bartol, "does not regard questions concerning census, population, immigration, births, marriages, and deaths, as matters of curiosity, but as great philosophical truths, on which human elevation must be, in great measure, based, and out of which individual and social progress may be educed."¹¹

Emphasis on the importance of generalizing statistical data for purposes of social progress appeared also in an address before the newly organized American Statistical Association. Here we learn that "the object of statistical science is to consider the results which those facts [that illustrate the condition and prospects of society] produce, with the view to determine the principles upon which the well-being of society depends."¹² As contrasted with history, which studies the past, "the science of statistics de-

¹¹ *Christian Examiner*, vol. L (n.s. XV), p. 384 (1851). Incidentally, it may be said in passing, the various statistical reports issuing from Massachusetts during this period were the delight and envy of statisticians in other parts of the country from Louisiana to Ohio.

¹² Reported in Hazard's *United States Commercial and Statistical Register*, II: 199 (1840).

lineates the changes which are now going on. It seeks to collect and classify all the facts which pertain to the existing arrangement of society.”¹³ Unlike political economy, the author continues, although it has the same end in view, “it does not discuss causes, nor reason upon probable effects. Its object is the collection and comparison of facts which illustrate the condition of mankind, and tend to develop the principles by which the progress of society is determined.”¹⁴

This last statement is significant, for it illustrates the characteristic attitude of the time, namely that statistics should give us social laws, and thus renders the method of statistics functional in that field which was beginning to be known as Social Science. The author points out the close relations between statistics and geography, population, education, finance, government and religion. He insists that we need statistics to understand our civil institutions; statistics give us certain and specific knowledge and thus replace the mere guess. Then comes another of the great tenets of the period, namely that rational reform must be based on thorough knowledge. And finally, “if we value our institutions, we should be able to show good grounds for our favorable estimate, not only in our actual prosperity, but by our recorded knowledge, by facts well ascertained, and philosophically classified.”¹⁵

Lieber's Proposals. For the sake of convenience we may take Francis Lieber's *Memorial relative to Proposals for a Work in the Statistics of the United States* as marking the beginning of this second period, since it is in many respects thoroughly representative of it. Lieber emphasizes the value of statistics for government use, and points out the necessity for governmental cooperation in gathering and publishing them. He begins this important document as follows:¹⁶

It may be considered as one of the characteristic traits of our times, that, with regard to many branches of importance to the well-being of society, a careful collection of detailed facts, and the endeavor to arrive at general results by a comprehensive view and judicious combination of them, have been substituted for mere theorizing. Not only the strictly scientific portion of that great family of civilized nations, which part of Europe and America now constitute, has acknowledged the great importance to the legislator, and every one else who occu-

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

¹⁶ *Loc. cit.*, p. 1.

pies himself with the welfare of his species, of statistical inquiries, when made on a large scale and used with proper caution, but several governments have shown how much they value accurate statistics, by ordering them to be collected and properly digested.

He illustrates this point by citing Prussia, France, Austria, Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, a number of the Italian governments, Britain, and, in some measure, the United States. He is not, however, he says, suggesting the creation of a permanent board for the collection of statistics, although that would be eminently desirable, but he believes ¹⁷

that it would be highly useful to all our legislators, and the community at large, if Congress should order the publication of a work containing the statistics of the United States, i. e. an account of the actual state and condition of the United States, in respect to the surface, soil, and natural resources; of all that it yields by the industry of man, (of agriculture and industry); of the exchange of the produce of articles, (commerce); of all the relations, social, religious, and political, of those who dwell on the soil, and the relations of civilization, so far as it can be indicated by definite facts, such as schools, publications, printing presses, etc.

Lieber also sees statistics from a more generalized point of view than had the earlier writers. He says,¹⁸

Statistics consist, in a great degree, in the collection and classification of a number of isolated facts, which thus isolated have little value for human experience, or lead not unfrequently to views entirely erroneous. If they are patiently and faithfully collected, judiciously arranged and applied, and wisely digested, they lead to a more positive knowledge of the **real state of things, with** regard to all subjects of which we are able to collect statistics, than any other mode of inquiry. They often exhibit errors, though cherished for centuries, in their real light, unveil errors never suspected before, or show their roots where they were never expected to be found, thus enabling us to choose the most or the only efficient means of counteracting them. They are, therefore, of the greatest use to the legislator, and to every one whose duty it is to frame general measures for his community, on whatever branch.

Further Evolution of Lieber's Proposals. Although nothing concrete and immediate seems to have come of this *Memorial*, it was a very suggestive and significant document. When the history of trend studies in the United States is written the outline submitted by Lieber will undoubtedly occupy

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

an important position. It may have been the model upon which later studies were patterned. The outline consists of fourteen sections, including the following: I. The Country (geographical, geological, etc.); II. The Inhabitants (population, races, "ethnographical sketch" of the various idioms, and emigrants); III. Nature and Man in Relation to Each Other; Industry and Commerce (including Human Labor, Slave Labor, etc.); IV. Intercourse and Communication; V. Standard of Comfort; VI. Charity; VII. Moral and Intellectual Culture (religion, education, libraries, fine arts, theatres, books, book-trade and publications, etc.); VIII. Political State (including criminal statistics); IX. Army; X. Navy; XI. Pensions; XII. Medical Statistics; XIII. Miscellaneous; and XIV. "Results from combinations of the preceding in tables or drawn otherwise."¹⁹ The fifth heading deserves special mention, coming as it did almost twenty years before the publication of Le Play's studies. It is called "Standard of Comfort," and includes both cost-of-living and planes- and standards-of-living items, such as the price of food, of clothing, of rent, consumption, dress, etc. The sources which Lieber specified for his data were: existing publications, Congressional documents, state documents, newspapers, correspondence, personal inquiries, and the contributions of distinguished citizens. Comparisons with more recent studies indicate that modern ingenuity has not greatly improved the comprehensiveness of our sources and methods.

It is certainly regrettable that the project proposed by Lieber was never carried through, for we can thoroughly agree with the reviewer who said that Lieber "presents a comprehensive view of all the subjects, the facts of which can be useful to the statesman, the philosopher, or the historian. If the work were executed in the spirit of Dr. Lieber's plan, we do not hesitate to say, that it would be one of the most valuable contributions that have ever been made to the materials of political philosophy."²⁰ And even if we might disagree with the reviewer's statement that "it would exhibit the elements of American prosperity, and the blessings of a free government, in a most impressive light,"²¹ it would certainly have been invaluable for students of later trends.

Statistics and Geography. The transition from the almanac to the great expectations period was, of course, by no means abrupt. Just as the almanac tradition continued on into the thirties and forties, the ideas of statistics

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-17.

²⁰ Unsigned review in *North American Review*, XLIII: 264-265 (July, 1836).

²¹ *Ibid.*

as an inventory or survey had existed in the earlier period.²² It was current in the early eighteen-thirties, as is evidenced by the definition given in the *American Almanac for 1830*. "The word *Statistics*," says this authority, "is of modern origin, and denotes a detailed view of the population, industry, agriculture, and commerce of a country, or an inventory of its resources, force, revenues, and productions of every description."²³

It was characteristic of this second period to emphasize the importance of statistics to all the social sciences—geography, history, political economy, political philosophy, and Social Science. As early as 1829 there had appeared in Portland,²⁴ "A Survey of the State of Maine, in reference to its Geographical Features, Statistics, and Political Economy, illustrated by maps," by Moses Greenleaf, exemplifying concretely the close relation even then conceived to exist between geography and statistics. The writer of the *Almanac* article cited above likewise conceived statistics and geography, the two disciplines which were ultimately to eventuate in the new science of social geography or human ecology, as complementary and indispensable for social well-being. This writer distinguishes the two disciplines as follows: "Geography and Statistics have this difference; the former treats of the earth, in relation to its figure and geometrical measurement; to its structure, its physical characteristics, and political divisions; whereas the latter gives an account of whatever influences the conditions of the inhabitants, or the operations of government in the welfare of men in promoting the ends of social being, and the best interests of the communities."²⁵ A writer some twenty odd years later even considered statistics as superior to geography as a supplement to history. He says,²⁶

It is a most inadequate conception of the science of geography, to limit it to a knowledge of the surface of the earth, as it may be explored by a surveyor and delineated on a map. Geography, in its higher sense, takes the most perfect map

²² Timothy Dwight's *Statistical Account of the City of New Haven* was published in 1811 by the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences (*Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XIV, p. 356).

²³ Vol. I, 2nd ed., 1833, p. 139. The word "statistics" was first used in the English language in 1770, but it did not gain wide currency until 1791–1799, when the publication of John Sinclair's *Statistical Account of Scotland* rendered it popular (*Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XIV: 356).

²⁴ Published by Shirley and Hyde.

²⁵ *American Almanac for 1830*, p. 140.

²⁶ "Geographical and Statistical Science," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, Vol. XXXV, 4th series, 1853, pp. 252, 254. In this same article the author defines geography as "the science of the earth, as the abode of man" and statistics as "the science of the life of man developed upon the earth" (*ibid.*, p. 250).

as but the ground-plan, on which it constructs delineation of all the physical qualities that affect the condition of mankind, the vegetable and animal growth, the races and characteristics of the people, and the political institutions and social arrangements of nations. Its high aim is the improvement of man's moral nature, by enlarging his knowledge of the homes and lives of his fellow-men. . . . A scholar of the last age called 'geography and chronology the two eyes of history'; but we submit that, for the philosophical study of history, for the comparison of events, their causes and consequences, the help of chronology is far inferior in value to that of statistics. The mere time when an event took place is of much less moment than the number and extent of the theatre on which they acted. Take, for instance, the history of the middle ages; and how much light is thrown upon it by a clear idea of political geography and its changes in those times. And what a vast interest is added to the study of physical geography by the lectures of Professor Guyot, in comparing and classifying the physical structure of countries, and thus accounting for the characters and destinies of the people who inhabit them.

About this time also (in 1852) there was organized in New York an American Geographical and Statistical Society,²⁷ which "engaged in the most active services calculated to advance in our country the very much neglected branches of geographical and statistical science," showing the close relations conceived to exist between these two disciplines. Its purpose, as stated in its charter included the "collection and diffusion of geographical and statistical information." Among the trustees were George Bancroft, Henry Grinnell, Francis L. Hawks, and John C. Zimmerman, Sr. The charter was dated April 30, 1852. Bancroft was the first president, Hawks the second vice-president. Annual meetings were provided to take place the first Thursday of each December, but monthly and special meetings were also allowed. It published the *Journal of the American Geographical and Statistical Society* which was mainly geographic in its interests. There was, however, a "Department of Statistics," which published a series of papers on Statistics of American States. DeBow and Mansfield (see below) were corresponding members; Quetelet was an honorary member.

Statistics and Political Economy—Dugald Stewart and American Opinion. With respect to the relations of political economy and statistics, it should be stated that there seems to have been an ancient grudge dating back at least to the eighteenth century between the political arithmeticians and the political economists. Dugald Stewart, the celebrated Scotch philosopher, who at that time exerted great influence upon American philosophic

²⁷ Organized May 20, 1852.

thought, had many years earlier expressed his annoyance with the political arithmeticians and their supercilious pretensions. He had declared:²⁸

They who have turned their attention, during the last century, to inquiries connected with population, national wealth, and other collateral subjects, may be divided into two classes: to the one of which one may, for the sake of distinction, give the title of *political arithmeticians*, or *statistical collectors*; to the other, that of *political economists*, or *political philosophers*. The former are generally supposed to have the evidence of *experience* in their favour, and seldom fail to arrogate to themselves exclusively, the merit of treading closely in the footsteps of *Bacon*. In comparison with *them*, the latter are considered as little better than visionaries, or, at least, as entitled to no credit whatever, when their conclusions are at variance with the details of *statistics*.

In opposition to this prevailing prejudice it may with confidence be asserted, that, in so far as either of these branches of knowledge has any real value, it must rest on a basis of well-ascertained facts; and that the difference between them consists only in the different nature of the facts with which they are respectively conversant. The facts accumulated by the statistical collector are merely *particular results*, which other men have seldom an opportunity of verifying or of disproving; and which, to those who consider them in an insulated state, can never afford any important information. The facts which the political philosopher professes to investigate are exposed to the examination of all mankind; and while they enable him, like the general laws of physics, to ascertain numberless particulars by *synthetic reasoning*, they furnish the means of estimating the credibility of evidence resting on the testimony of individual observers. . . . Instead of appealing to political arithmetic as a check on the conclusions of political economy, it would often be more reasonable to have recourse to political economy as a check on the extravagances of political arithmetic. . . . The object of the political arithmetician is too frequently to record apparent exceptions to rules sanctioned by the general experience of mankind; and consequently, that in cases where there is an obvious or a demonstrative incompatibility between the alleged exception and the general principle, the fair logical inference is not against the truth of the latter, but against the possibility of the former.

But apparently Americans did not share Stewart's animus against the "statistical collectors." As early as 1838, F. B. (Francis Bowen?) pointed out the necessity for a science of statistics, not only because statistical data were important for legislation and policy, but also because "a mere account of the variation of prices in the different markets of our extensive territory, and at different periods of time, must throw great light on the circum-

²⁸ *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, Vol. II (Boston ed., 1814), pp. 365-367.

stances that affect production,"²⁹ as well as on the best way of regulating commerce. And in 1852 Ezra Seaman, variously of Detroit, Ann Arbor, and Washington, tells us that one of the objects of his work, the *Progress of Nations*,³⁰ "has been to connect political economy with statistics."³¹

Statistics and Social Science—Mansfield. It was with the rising discipline of Social Science, however, that statistics in this second period was most closely identified, a fact not difficult to understand when we remember that this synthetic discipline embraced in essence all of the social sciences as we now conceive them. Among the most important statements in this respect is that of Edward D. Mansfield,³² Commissioner of Statistics for Ohio from 1857 to 1867.³³ Statistics, he tells us in answer to the question, "What is Statistical Science?" is a branch of Social Science, a science in process of integration, as chemistry had been a century earlier. He says,³⁴

Social Science . . . has been gradually growing up, especially in Europe, just in proportion as liberal institutions advanced, as the people became enlightened, and governments cared for the people. It is not written out in any formal treatise, like mathematics, mechanics, or astronomy, but exists in detached frag-

²⁹ "Wayland's Political Economy," *Christian Examiner*, Vol. XXIV (n.s. VI, 1838), p. 53.

³⁰ In 1846, Seaman began publishing his *Essays on the Progress of Nations*, in Civilization, Productive Industry, Wealth and Population, Illustrated by Statistics of Mining, Agriculture, Manufactures, Commerce, Coin, Banking, Internal Improvements, Emigration, and Population." In 1852 the essays were revised and the resulting volumes were "more theoretical than the former work, with fewer details of statistics; though it contains the results—the mere aggregates—of a much greater amount of facts and statistics. It comprises the leading principles of political economy and social philosophy, and the facts from which they are deduced, united in a systematic series of essays, logically arranged, showing the connection of the whole, and the bearing of each upon the development of the faculties of man, upon productive industry, civilization and the progress of nations." (*op. cit.*, p. vi).

³¹ *Essays on the Progress of Nations* (First Series, third ed., 1868), pp. v-vi.

³² This important figure in the history of Social Science in this country was born in New Haven, Conn., in 1801. His father, Jared Mansfield, was a mathematician of some note, his book *Essays on Mathematics* (of which but few copies were sold, "for there were but few men in the country who could understand it") finally securing him a position at West Point, in 1802. Mansfield himself was raised in Ohio, but was sent east to Farmington to school, where he knew Timothy Pitkin personally. He studied law under Judge Gould at Litchfield, Conn., and returned to Cincinnati in 1825. He was not particularly interested in the practice of law, however, and turned his attention increasingly to writing and editing. Among his most significant books was one on *The Utility of Mathematics* (1834). He taught at Cincinnati College where he knew and greatly admired McGuffey, one of the earliest teachers of the Philosophy of Society (*Personal Memories Social, Political, and Literary*, by Edward D. Mansfield, 1879). In 1826, a friend, Mr. Benjamin Drake, and Mansfield took a census of Cincinnati, probably his first introduction to statistical work. He enjoyed it greatly (*ibid.*, 200).

³³ "His reports upon the condition of the State, materially and morally, are the best representation ever given of a territory of equal extent, and a population of equal numbers" (*History of Cincinnati and Hamilton County, Ohio, Their Past and Present*, 1894, p. 476).

³⁴ *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Statistics, for the year 1857* (Columbus, Ohio, 1858), p. 64.

ments, and yet unformed states. This has been the case with all science, till each separate fact and principle has been discovered in sufficient numbers to constitute general laws and systems. Then they become embodied in elementary treatises, and take place among the branches of fixed knowledge. Social Science is no more doubtful or confused than chemistry was a century since. Yet chemistry is now an established and beautiful science; and so will the laws of society become in another generation.

Of this new science, he continues,³⁵

Statistics is the real basis. Its object is to ascertain both the facts and the laws of social movement. Its inquiries extend to the physical laws of man as a social being; to the resources of the country in which he lives; to the growth of society; to its labor and production; to its commerce, manufactures, and arts; to its property and wealth; to crime, poverty, and mortality; to education and religion; and, in fine, to all those facts of condition which may increase or diminish the strength, growth, or happiness of a people. With an extent so broad, and objects so useful, statistics are raised to a dignity even higher than that of those fixed sciences whose beauty and utility have so long been the objects of admiration to mankind; for the laws which govern his own condition and happiness must be of higher importance to man than a knowledge of those, however useful, which no effort of his can change.

The Measure of Social Change. After presenting a brief history of statistics, Mansfield sets forth his important theory of Social Science as a science of social change and of statistics as its chief method.³⁶

No statistician has yet risen up to calculate and deduce the general laws of growth or decline. This is really the most valuable part of statistics,—that which points out, with unerring accuracy, the causes which advance or retard society. Heretofore, statisticians have been chiefly, like the geologists, and, a short time since, the chemists, engaged in ascertaining the facts of their science, rather than the general and universal laws which govern it. The SCIENCE of statistics, like the mechanics of the natural world, embraces two systems of principles: 1. The principles of man and society as a fixed existence, simply as beings; 2. The principles of man and society in movement. All the elements of the physical man, and the natural relations of age, sex, ailment, and disease, belong to the first system; and, in the present state of society, may safely be left to men of science pursuing their own inquiries in their own modes. All the principles which relate to growth, industry, production, culture, art, commerce, education, religion, invention, and vitality, belong to the second system, or SOCIETY IN MOVEMENT. It is the last which most interests the people. The principles which govern the movements of society can only be deduced by ascertaining all the elements of society, with exactness, at *successive periods* of time.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

In other words, the *precise state of facts*, at precise periods, must be ascertained. The relation which this state of facts, in one period, bears to the state of fact in another period, in any one line of movement, is the relative measure of that movement, and when all the movements of population, production, art, education, property, religion, vitality, crime and pauperism have been ascertained at different periods, it will be seen, at once, how they have influenced each other—how they have been influenced, by natural causes, and what legislation has proved injurious or beneficial.

We find here exhibited the cardinal tenets of this second period in the history of statistics in this country. In contrast to the almanac period, the emphasis is now upon generalizing laws. The author has boundless faith in the new method; he even speaks of "unerring accuracy." He sees statistics as basic to Social Science. He conceives of statistical method as a tool to be used in promoting human happiness.

Other Social Scientists also identified, or at least related, the two disciplines. Thus the circular which called the meeting to organize the American Social Science Association as late as 1865 spoke of "those numerous matters of statistical and philanthropic interest which are included under the general head of 'Social Science.'" The American Social Science Association received a marked statistical bias from many of the men who figured among the first members. Among them were Edward Jarvis, Nathan Allen, and Samuel G. Howe, all enthusiastic statisticians of the first rank. Howe, as secretary of the Massachusetts Board of State Charities had laid great stress on the necessity of statistics as a basis for procedure. Both Jarvis and Allen did important statistical work. This statistical tradition was carried on by the early men in the National Conference of Charities and Correction also, which split off from the American Social Science Association in the early seventies. Carroll D. Wright and Richmond Mayo Smith maintained the same tradition of statistics in Social Science right up into the twentieth century.

Statistics and Education. The relations of statistics and education did not come in for extensive discussion until the following period when preliminary experiments in correlation technique were tried out. The emphasis in this second or great expectations period was on trend studies rather than on correlation analyses.

The Era of Organization for Statistical Work and Interpretation

The American Statistical Association. It is in this second period that the history of social statistics in the United States enters into its organizational phase. Promotion of statistical methodology and publication had now begun to bear fruit in the form of various local and national statistical associations for the study and recording of statistical data and trends. Some of these associations were private, while others were public or official.

Among the non-official bodies, the American Statistical Association, established in 1839, was perhaps the most important. Organized in Boston,¹ it declared its intention "to visit and examine every State and Territory in our Union, and to secure authentic information upon every department of human pursuit and social condition."² Apparently, however, this good intention, like so many others, was not carried out and the organization remained local in scope, for in 1847 agitation was begun for the establishment of a truly national statistical association. In that year, George Tucker, of the University of Virginia, whom DeBow called a profound statistical writer,³ wrote an article on "A General Statistical Society for the United States,"⁴ in which he presented a plea for the establishment of a statistical society for the whole Union. He requests all who are friendly to such a project to communicate with Mr. Freeman Hunt, editor of *The Merchants' Magazine*.⁵ Statistics, he tells us, are important in studies of population, of

¹ For a detailed history of this organization, see John Koren (Ed.), *The History of Statistics* (1918), pp. 3-14.

² Unsigned review of the Collection of the American Statistical Association, *Christian Examiner*, LII (n.s. XVII, 1852), p. 147.

³ "Operation of the Laws of Population in Europe and the United States," *DeBow's Review*, VIII: 207 (Mar., 1850).

⁴ Hunt's *Merchants' Magazine*, XVII: 571-577 (1847).

⁵ Tucker thought "it would probably be found sufficient for such a society to meet but once or twice a year, alternately at New York and Philadelphia; and the business of the society could be prepared for them by standing committees, annually appointed" (*ibid.*, p. 577).

defectives, of racial longevity, of immigration, of industries, such as agriculture, manufacture, transportation, fisheries, mining, etc., of banking, of medical science, of intellectual culture (such, e. g., as schools, colleges, number of books printed annually, reprints of foreign books, newspapers, libraries), of fine arts (number of painters, sculptors, engravers, architects, number and value of works of art imported, number of public exhibitions, cost of public buildings), and finally, of moral and religious advancement (crime statistics, number of preachers, sects, endowments, public charities). He would, in brief, reduce the whole of culture to statistical indexes. He concludes with the typical creed of this period: "We have thus seen that accurate statistical knowledge makes us acquainted with everything which concerns a nation's greatness, or morals, or happiness; and that it affords us the only materials for settling all doubtful questions of national policy, as it brings them to the test of actual experience."⁶

In reply to this point of view, L. A. Hine, of Cincinnati, author some years later (1853) of Hine's *Progress Pamphlets*,⁷ wrote that he agreed as to the necessity of such a society. Indeed he believed there ought to be local branches also in every principal city and town in the country, "in order that collections may be made from the broadest field possible, and under the most varied circumstances."⁸ His plan was that delegates from these local or auxiliary societies should meet once a year in a general conference at New York or Philadelphia, report progress, and discuss the best method of collecting facts, etc. The local societies, however, should meet at least quarterly and thus awaken interest in the object of the society. He then proceeded to point out that accurate statistical knowledge was needed to clarify the subjects of capital punishment, prison discipline, punishment, the government of force, laws for the collection of debts, the social condition (i. e., how fast is the wealth of the few increasing and the poverty of the many), education, poverty. In connection with the item of capital punishment he indicated the need for data comparing the influence of severity and leniency on prisoners, as well as "facts showing the condition of the culprit from infancy, so that we may know the real causes of crime, and be the better enabled to judge of the true means of prevention," indicating that his enthusiasm for statistics did not preclude a keen appreciation of

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 576.

⁷ These pamphlets included *Earth and Man*; and *Science and Man*.

⁸ "A General Statistical Society for the United States," *The Merchants' Magazine*, XVIII:

the value of case histories.⁹ He complained that "there is now no thorough system of collecting statistical information in any point touched above, nor, indeed, on any subject whatever. Thus, the most valuable kind of knowledge is now lost. This should not be."¹⁰ Apparently, however, in spite of these earnest pleas, nothing came of the proposals here suggested. Government and scholarship were not yet prepared for a program so extensive.

The Goliad Association. But in 1848 there was organized in Texas the Goliad Statistical Society.¹¹ Thirteen committees were appointed¹² to have charge of the work and they were to interpret their subject broadly. They were to report from time to time, "using care to ascertain facts with precision."¹³ Communications were solicited, for the members were a modest lot with "no pretensions to enlighten others by their own present knowledge—they look to future acquisitions for themselves, and for others through the organization of the society, and particularly its committees."¹⁴ They were semi-apologetic about the project, for some considered it premature in that new raw country. But, they argued, since the country was unknown, the need for the whole truth was so much more pressing. Its members hoped to secure much valuable information which they would convey to the public "in a manner entitled to confidence." With proper support, "the Society may be the instrument of much good, and whatever it may accomplish of real value, will be so much done in the line of utility and improvement."¹⁵ The actual reports of these committees, however, are not available.

Other local statistical societies were also organized during this period, although they have not left records. In 1850 DeBow tells us that "in many States of the Union, a multitude of facts, concerning the soil, traditions, localities and population, are brought to light and published through the operation of historical, statistical and other societies."¹⁶ We have already

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 399.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

¹¹ Reported in *DeBow's Review*, VI: 374 (1848).

¹² 1. Finance and Accounts; 2. Library and Cabinet; 3. On the general state of Religion and Morals; 4. Literature and Education; 5. History and Biography; 6. Animated and Vegetable nature; 7. Geography and Topography; 8. Geology and Mineralogy; 9. Agriculture and Grazing; 10. Manufactures and Mechanical Arts; 11. Commerce and Population; 12. Correspondence; 13. Enrollments, Revisions and Publications.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ "Statistical Bureaus in the States, etc.," *DeBow's Review*, VIII: 432 (1850).

mentioned the establishment in 1852 of the American Geographical and Statistical Society, among whose purposes were "the collection of books and maps of reference; the origination and promotion of explorations and surveys; the preparation of papers to be read and discussed at the stated meetings; the collection of foreign documents, and the publication of a periodical bulletin of transactions."¹⁷ We have also commented on the fact that apparently the statistical activities of this organization were subordinated to the geographical, for of the thirteen papers reported for the meeting of 1858, only 2 were statistical in nature: one by Dr. Hough on the "Late New York Census" and the other by Dr. James Wynne, M.D., on "The Condition of Benevolent Societies among the Laboring Classes, as Developed by Their Statistics."¹⁸

The Movement for Government Statistics. The organizational interest in statistics at this period did not, however, spend itself entirely in these non-official associations. It extended itself to agitation for the improvement of official government statistics as well, emphasizing the necessity of statistics as a foundation for useful legislation. As early as 1831, a delegation of business men meeting in New York had declared that "a well organized system of statistics would not only be a guide to the statesman, enabling him to legislate on the intricate subject of trade understandingly, but it would inform the merchant on the important matter of consumption and supply, and save him from the many errors into which he is liable to be led by reason of his unavoidable ignorance in this particular."¹⁹ The *American Almanac for 1830* had pointed out in 1833 that individuals "have not the means nor the power to gather from all the branches of social economy" the necessary statistical details and the best statistical work can be done only by governments.²⁰ Lieber's *Memorial* of 1836 was in fact, as we have already seen, a request that Congress make possible just such extensive statistical research as this.

The agitation for better statistical service from the government continued until in January, 1844, Mr. Zadoc Pratt introduced a resolution into the National House of Representatives providing for a committee of five to enquire into the expediency of establishing a Bureau of Statistics of Com-

¹⁷ Unsigned, "American Geographical and Statistical Society," *ibid.*, XXV: 274 (1858).

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Quoted from the New York *World-Telegram* by the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch*, May 19, 1931.

²⁰ *Loc. cit.*, p. 140.

merce in connection with the Treasury Department.²¹ P.T., writing in support of this resolution in that year, reaffirmed the current belief so often repeated that statistics are the only safe basis for legislation. Yet, he continued, they have been neglected. The individual work of men like Peter Force, Hazard, Niles, and Hunt is important, he says, but it is scattered and loses value through lack of collection and juxtaposition. This could be remedied by a Bureau of Statistics in the national government which "would record the history of the past; furnish most important information for our guidance in the present, and the best means of judging correctly as to the future."²² As if this were not optimistic enough, he adds, "if knowledge of this description were spread before the people, all the conflicting theories of political economists and one-sided politicians would soon give way to the sober truths of figures and the unerring demonstration of facts."²³

Legislators, however, appeared to be immune to these arguments. Says an anonymous writer of the time: "The science of statistics is almost unbroken ground among the great body of our intelligent citizens. Look among the legislators of the nation, and those of the several States, and see how few there are of them who are able to arrange into a statistical table any considerable number of the facts which they are called to act upon in regard to a given subject, or to judge of the value of an argument based on statistical tables, so as to detect the latent fallacy, or to feel a mathematical certainty in the conclusion."²⁴ This lack of appreciation of the value of statistics greatly annoyed DeBow. He said: "Statistics will never rise to the dignity of science among us until our public functionaries realize that they mean something more than the mere aggregating of figures, which any sciolist can direct."²⁵ It was not until 1866 that a Bureau of Statistics was finally established in the United States government and then, due to the critical and ambitious activities of its director, Alexander Delmar, it

²¹ Although the Treasury Department had been collecting and publishing statistics on national finance and foreign trade ever since the government had been established, it was not until 1821 that the publication of trade statistics was definitely provided for. The import and export statistics of the Treasury Department and the work of the decennial censuses constituted the entire statistical work of the government until the close of the Civil War. See Laurence F. Schmeckebier, *The Statistical Work of the National Government*, 1925, p. 1.

²² "Statistics of the United States," *The Merchants' Magazine*, X: 353 (1844).

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 353.

²⁴ "Geographical and Statistical Science," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXV (4th series, V, 1853), p. 252.

²⁵ "American Geographical and Statistical Society," *DeBow's Review*, VI: 79 (1848).

was of only a few years' duration.²⁶ The statistical work of the government has, apparently, never been wholly satisfactory to anyone.

State Departments of Statistics Urged—DeBow. In the meanwhile similar agitation was going on to extend and improve state statistical work also. Each state, DeBow argued, should have its own department of statistics.²⁷ The arguments in favor of state bureaus of statistics were the same as those for a national bureau, namely, the belief in the importance of statistics for legislation, government, and social policy generally. On this point DeBow contended that "without facts to proceed upon, all reasoning must be unsatisfactory and legislation result rather in injury than good. The industry, habits and condition of a people should be accurately understood, before attempting to extend or improve them. . . . There is something formidable to most persons in a long array of figures, and many are disposed to smile at the minute labors of the statistician as impracticable and useless. Yet, from these may be deduced the wisest rules in the government of society and in the amelioration of man."²⁸

As a result of DeBow's agitation, the first State Bureau of Statistics in the United States was established at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in 1848, with DeBow himself in charge.²⁹ He immediately began to gather material by means of an elaborate circular, dated July 1st, 1848, which was in part as follows: "Sir, A Bureau of Statistics having been established, and the undersigned entrusted with its charge, he begs to invite citizens in every section of the state, such information as they can impart in regard to its present condition and past history. The appended queries will give an idea of the character of the facts required, and will be suggestive of others. The plan of the Bureau contemplates every kind of information concerning the state. . . ."

DeBow in this communication requests the aid of the legislature, of editors, and of public officers and solicits the donation of old newspaper files, records, etc. There are 13 categories in his outline. They deal with such antiquarian lore as Indian names, anecdotes and biographies as well as with topographical and agricultural descriptions and "instances of longevity and fecundity;" and "statistics of diseases; deaths." Under the head-

²⁶ For a history of the statistical organizations of the national government, see John Koren (ed.), *The History of Statistics* (1918), pp. 573-689.

²⁷ "Statistical Collections of the Several States," *DeBow's Review*, VI: 79 (1848).

²⁸ "Statistical Bureaus in the States, etc.," *ibid.*, VIII: 423-424.

²⁹ Charles F. Gettemy (in John Koren, ed., *History of Statistics*, 1918, p. 692) states that the Massachusetts Board of Labor Statistics, established in 1869, was the first such board in the United States. The Louisiana bureau however preceded it by some twenty years.

ing of Population he wishes to know "increase and progress, distinguishing white and black; Spanish, French, American, or German origin; foreigners; classes of population; number in towns; growth of towns and villages, etc.; condition, employment ages; comparative value of free and slave labor; comparative tables of increased marriages, birth, etc.; meteorological tables of temperature, weather, rains, etc." What the weather may have had to do with population we can only guess. Under Education and Religion he lists "advantages of schools, colleges, libraries enjoyed; proportion educated at home and abroad; expense of education; school returns; churches or chapels in parish, when and by whom erected; how supplied with clergy; how supported and attended; oldest interments; church vaults, etc." He has categories for Products in Manufactures and the Arts, for Commercial Statistics, for meteorological and climatic phenomena, for literary productions, manuscripts, public or private records, letters, journals, etc., and then one category on "General Statistics—Embracing banking, railroads, insurances, navigation, intercommunication; learned and scientific societies; crime, pauperism, charities, public and benevolent institutions; militia, newspapers, etc.; application of parish taxes; expenses of roads, levees, etc.; number of suits decided in different courts; expenses and perfection of justice; number of parish officers, lawyers, physicians, etc." ³⁰

The Failure of DeBow's Plan. DeBow's idea of what a Bureau of Statistics should do was very broad. He was over ambitious and certainly too sanguine with respect to the possibilities of his method. At any rate, although his Bureau aroused some enthusiasm and stimulated some imitators,³¹ he was himself dissatisfied and disappointed with the results of his researches and his Bureau was soon discontinued. He complained of the lack of statistical interest in the South. "One readily acquires," he says, "the character of a cold abstractionist or dull plodder, who devotes any consideration to the results of statistics. The labor is almost thankless and must be endured without sympathy. The South has thus produced scarcely a single statistician, whilst at the North, the number, though small, is continually increasing." ³² Louisiana, he continues, has been very careless

³⁰ "Statistical Collections of the Several States," *DeBow's Review*, VI: 79 (1848).

³¹ The Hon. Edmund Burke, United States Commissioner of Patents (1845-1849), hoped that other states would follow Louisiana and establish similar bureaus, for if all states had such bureaus the legislators would have ample data to guide them (J. D. B. DeBow, "Statistical Bureaus in the States, etc.," *DeBow's Review*, VIII: 425-426).

³² *Ibid.*, p. 424.

about her statistics of wealth and life and mortality. "In vain has the importance of a registration system of births, marriages and deaths, been pressed by statisticians in every part of the Union, by committees of medical associations, by the late National and State Medical Conventions, etc." ³³ Massachusetts was the only state with adequate registration and much of the rapid advance made by that state was, he tells us, due to the fact that it is so far ahead of all the other states in its statistical data. The Annual Reports of the Lunatic Asylum and the annual reports on births, marriages, and deaths are models of their kind. And then, as a final argument, calculated perhaps to secure much needed local support, he states that we must have statistics to defend and bolster the institution of slavery. ³⁴

Other State and Local Efforts. Although the experience of Louisiana was abortive other states were also thinking seriously of state bureaus of statistics at this time. In 1848 a special committee of the South Carolina legislature pointed out that "the appointment of such a committee [i. e., on commerce, agriculture and mechanics] will soon lead to the establishment of an efficient Bureau of Statistics," ³⁵ and the following year (in December, 1849) the governor recommended "the careful collection of Statistical Information on all branches of industry," ³⁶ as well as population data; for these would "enable the legislature to adjust and regulate the various interests of society, and to reduce a chaos of details . . . into order and system." ³⁷ In 1850 a memorial was also presented to the Rhode Island legislature requesting that a Superintendent of Statistics be appointed. ³⁸ A number of cities, such as Boston, New York, and Charleston, were also doing good statistical work, of which DeBow spoke appreciatively. ³⁹ By 1858 excellent statistical reports were also being made in New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Kentucky, and Ohio, ⁴⁰ although not necessarily always by special statistical bureaus. In that year E. D. Mansfield, Commissioner of Statistics of Ohio, proposed a "simple and cheap plan of a bureau of statistics," for his own state which would coordinate and enlarge and correct the statistical work of various independent bodies, such as, e. g., the

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 433.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 433-434.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 426.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 426-427.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 427.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 432.

⁴⁰ E. D. Mansfield, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Statistics, for 1857* (Columbus, 1858), p. 64.

Canal Commissioners, Trustees of Benevolent Institutions, and the Auditor of the State.⁴¹ He recognized, however, that "law will not accomplish so much as personal effort, although the last cannot be put forth advantageously without the aid of the former."⁴²

Statistics as an Academic Discipline. It was also in this second or great expectations period that the first sporadic attempts were made to introduce statistics into college curricula. As early as 1843-1844 statistics was listed at Transylvania College in the junior year⁴³ (along with the evidences of natural and revealed religion, the Septuagint, etc.), but it is doubtful if it was ever actually taught. DeBow had himself long been agitating for the academic recognition of statistics and in this he was warmly seconded by Freeman Hunt,⁴⁴ editor, as we have already seen, of *The Merchants' Magazine*. But there is no record that any of these attempts at establishing statistics in the college curricula was successful. The nearest approach, aside from the Transylvania venture, was the appointment of DeBow to a chair endowed by his friend, Marcus White, in political economy and commercial statistics at the University of Louisiana (now Tulane University) in the late eighteen-forties; and the inclusion in the Constitution and Code of Statutes for the new University of the South, adopted in 1860, of a provision for a "School of Political Economy, Statistics, Law of Nations, Spirit of Laws, General Principles of Government and Constitution of United States."⁴⁵ DeBow, however, had no students and soon abandoned his chair and the projected curriculum of the University of the South apparently never materialized.

Actuarial Work. One more organizational factor should be mentioned as contributing to the statistical movement during this period, namely the establishment of life insurance companies. In 1843, the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company and the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York opened offices in this country. In 1855 and 1857 Massachusetts and New York respectively established state insurance departments and they were soon followed by other states also.⁴⁶ The exigencies of actuarial practice were as stimulating to vital statistics as those of business and commerce were to economic statistics.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁴³ *Catalogue of Transylvania College for 1843-1844.*

⁴⁴ *The Merchants' Magazine*, XVII: 224 (1847).

⁴⁵ Reported in *DeBow's Review*, XXVIII: 488 (1860).

⁴⁶ Henry Moir, "Life Insurance," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, IX: 465.

Although they did not become of major importance until late in the nineteenth century,⁴⁷ some mention should also be made here in passing of the importance of mechanical devices invented to facilitate statistical computation in the development of large scale statistical work, especially of an institutional character. This subject has been emphasized by S. N. D. North.⁴⁸

The invention of mechanical computing, sorting, and tabulating machines has greatly facilitated the mass production of statistical data. At the present time, thanks to the advances in this aspect of our technology, the production of statistical monographs has become a large scale industry. Raw materials from the original schedules are processed in a mannner closely analogous to the way in which other raw materials are processed in factories. The researcher of the present day, except in many of the colleges and universities where the "handicraft" tradition still lingers, tends to be an executive or administrator rather than the brooding scientist of the older school, as described by Cooley. He must be able to handle a corps of technicians and clerks and chart the progress of data through punching, sorting, and tabulating machines, rather than formulate incisive problems. Machine technology in sociological research divorces the technician from the theoretical scientist. It has a profound influence on the kinds of questions asked and hence on the course of the science itself.

⁴⁷ Automatic tabulating machines were first used in analyzing the returns of the 1890 census.

⁴⁸ See John Koren (ed.), *The History of Statistics* (1918), p. 25.

An Era of Theoretical Discussion and of Monographic Production in Statistics

Theoretical Discussion—Quetelet and Comte. Finally, this period of great expectations, on its more theoretical side, was marked by the beginning of abstract discussions of the possibility of applying statistical method to social phenomena. In order to understand to the best advantage this phase of the movement in the United States it will be advisable to seek its origins in Europe, and in theoretical sociology and Social Science as well as in statistical theory as such.

As Professor Small has pointed out,¹ statistical work was early developed in Europe, and especially in Germany in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, due to their strong emphasis upon state administration. The Cameralists found quantitative measurement and recording indispensable to efficient administration and accurate accounting of the financial, commercial, and vital (population control) business and processes of the German states of this period. They had already developed much of that efficiency of administration which has so markedly characterized modern German administrative procedures and details, especially in Prussia. Something of this careful accounting with the aid of statistics had also manifested itself in France, Belgium, and England. But in these countries there had been a larger development of theoretical than of practical interest in the mathematics of social relations and processes. This theoretical interest had developed especially in Belgium by the time our account of statistical theory and practice in the United States opens.

Quetelet, it will be remembered, had written his great statistical masterpiece, *Social Physics*, in 1835, and Comte his *Positive Philosophy* in the eighteen-forties, in which mathematics was accorded a place of the highest honor in the hierarchy of the sciences. Comte, however, had not always been altogether consistent with respect to the applicability of mathematics

¹ A. W. Small, *The Cameralists* (1909).

to social data. Although he claimed that logically or theoretically social phenomena are just as reducible to questions of number as physical facts are, actually they are not subject to mathematical analysis. On this point Comte says,²

In a logical view, this science [mathematics] is necessary and rigorously universal. There is no inquiry which is not finally reducible to a question of Numbers; for there is none which may not be conceived of as consisting in the determination of quantities by each other, according to certain relations. . . . The limitations of Mathematical science are not, then, in its nature. The limitations are in our intelligence; and by these we find the domain of the science remarkably restricted, in proportion as phenomena, in becoming special, become complex. . . . At the utmost it is only the phenomena of the first three classes,—that is, only those of the Inorganic Physics,—that we can even hope to subject to the process of mathematical analysis. It is not that a mathematical basis does not exist in these cases, as truly as in phenomena which exhibit, in all clearness, the law of gravitation; but that our faculties are too limited for the working of problems so intricate.

Comte was, furthermore, very much opposed to the application of the “pretended” theory of chance to social data. In this connection he says,³

As for any application of number and of mathematical law to sociological problems, if such a method is inadmissible in biology, it must yet be more decisively so here, for reasons of which I have already said enough. The only error of this class which would have deserved express notice, if we had not condemned it by anticipation, is the pretension of some geometers to render social investigations positive by subjecting them to a fanciful mathematical theory of chances. . . . It is impossible to conceive of a more irrational conception than that which takes for its basis or for its operative method a supposed mathematical theory, in which, signs being taken for ideas, we subject numerical probability to calculation, which amounts to the same thing as offering our own ignorance as the natural measure of the degree of probability of our various opinions.

In connection with this latter stand, Comte was no doubt fearful of the metaphysical worship of the normal law of errors which Quetelet's work had tended to foster. It must have seemed to Comte that the followers of Quetelet were simply beginning all over again with a new metaphysical

² *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, tome premier, pp. 113–117. The translation in the text is from Miss Martineau's abridgment, I: 42–44.

³ *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, tome quatrième, pp. 512–518. Translation from Miss Martineau's condensation, II: 120–121.

entity. Indeed, his fears were in part justified by subsequent history.⁴ At any rate, the apparent inconsistencies⁵ of Comte did not escape the critical attention of his American critics.

Criticisms of Comte's View. The criticisms of Comte in this connection were numerous and may be represented fairly by one which pointed out that Comte rejected logic and metaphysics and substituted mathematics. It asked,⁶

But is this possible in the case of social phenomena,—History, Law, Morals, Political Economy, etc.,—to say nothing of the rejected claims of Metaphysics and Religion? There is a large verge in these for the application of mathematical procedure, as the brilliant researches of M. Quetelet have proved; but these sciences cannot be entirely absorbed by Statistics. M. Comte has himself mentioned Pathology as an exception to his maxim. Certainly, in the present state of that science, Mathematics is not applicable to it, though we may readily conceive it to be so improved as to permit a partial employment of mathematical processes. But, in the other sciences, which we have mentioned, the diversity and the varying intensity of the operative influences, the constant flux of modifications which they are ever undergoing, must at all times continue to withdraw them from the range of an exclusive mathematical treatment. Hence the complaints of writers on the sociological sciences against the introduction of such modes of reasoning or illustration. It will not suffice to say that Mathematics is applicable, but the phenomena are too complex to admit of mathematical treatment. From whatever cause the impossibility to apply it to such questions may arise, that impossibility is proof of inapplicability. M. Comte admits that the difficulty of its application to any but the most simple phenomena is insurmountable; and this, though not actually inconsistent with his previous assertion of its logical universality, is repugnant to it. If it may be conceived applicable in theory, but is found inapplicable in practice, this discrepancy might be reconciled upon a metaphysical basis; but after the abnegation of all Metaphysics, it

⁴ See, for example, Galton's attitude (*Natural Inheritance*, p. 86, quoted by Helen M. Walker, *Studies in the History of Statistical Method*, 1929, p. 348). "I know," he says, "of scarcely anything so apt to impress the imagination as the wonderful form of cosmic order expressed by the 'Law of Frequency of Error.' The law would have been personified by the Greeks and deified, if they had known of it. It reigns with serenity and in complete self-effacement amidst the wildest confusion. The huger the mob and the greater the apparent anarchy, the more perfect is its sway. . . ."

⁵ The *apparent* nature of this inconsistency is here emphasized because it seems clear from Comte's discussion of the historical method (Martineau translation, 1880 ed., pp. 483 ff.) that he would have been in sympathy with trend studies. Also his analysis of the study of co-existences and sequences leads one to believe that correlation technique would probably have found favor with him.

⁶ "Faith and Science—Comte's Positive Philosophy," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, Vol. xxxiv (4th series IV, 1852), pp. 186-187.

would be an inadmissible explanation, and M. Comte can seek no aid from that source.

Another writer, after elaborating upon the seeming inconsistency in Comte, states his point of view as follows:⁷

That these limitations to the application of mathematical processes are correct, will be acknowledged, we presume, by all, and the only remark we would make is to express our surprise at the rash general assertions which the author first makes, and then is afterwards forced to limit and qualify. It is surely somewhat strange to see him on one page describing the mathematics as rigorously universal, and on the next describing the limitations and complexities which hinder its application to all but the simplest classes of phenomena. A more serious objection also occurs to us, for which we crave a solution. . . . What is the worth of a method, rigorously mathematical, which cannot be applied? Is that positive philosophy which is not established by the positive method? M. Comte's mutterings about pushing the method too far, will not do. Either his philosophy must be established by the positive method, or it ceases to claim that pretentious title.

This author concludes that "mathematical analyses cannot give us as yet, and will never give us, the laws which regulate epidemics, or furnish us with the data from which to construct a faultless theory of government."⁸

Lyman Hotchkiss Atwater, the Presbyterian divine, dwelt less on the apparent inconsistency of Comte, in his discussion of the matter, than upon his, to him, transparent absurdity. With the greatest scorn he says of Comte: "He teaches that physiology, biology, and sociology, are all in their nature as capable of mathematical computation as astronomy. . . . Thus virtue and vice, holiness and sin, beauty and deformity, liberty and order, magnanimity and baseness, truth and falsehood, can be brought to the test of arithmetic."⁹ And finally, one writer, probably Dr. Dabney, concluded that the objects of Social Science "are too immaterial; they are no longer defined, as in physics, by magnitude, or figure, or quantity, or duration, or ponderosity, or velocity,"¹⁰ to be susceptible to the experimental method of physics.

Henry C. Carey, however, as we have seen, believed wholeheartedly in

⁷ Unsigned, "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *Southern Presbyterian Review*, IX: 207-208 (1855).

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 208.

⁹ "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte," *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, XXVIII: 75-76 (1856).

¹⁰ "Positivism in England," *Southern Review*, V: 379 (1869).

the application of mathematics to Social Science.¹¹ He said, "Mathematics must be used in social science, as it is now in every other branch of inquiry, and the more the former is used, the more the latter takes the form of real science, and the more intimate are shown to be its relations with other departments of knowledge."¹²

The Best Work of This Period: in the North. So far as the actual statistical production of this period of great expectations is concerned, we must point out that although a great many articles on statistical subjects appeared in various journals and reviews,¹³ these remained, as we have already seen, largely of the almanac or of a specifically business character. Already, in the preceding chapter some typical statistical items from Hazard's magazine have been presented. Among the more important statistical articles published in Hunt's *Merchants' Magazine* were an ecological study entitled "Progress and Population in Boston"¹⁴ and William Kirkland's "The United States Census of 1850: with Reference to the Political Relations of the Eastern and Western States."¹⁵ There were also, of course, miscellaneous data, such as the table of lunacy in the United States.¹⁶ It is interesting to note in connection with this table that even the staid and scholarly *North American Review*, one of the most learned American journals of the time, published an article by Isaac Ray on "Statistics of Insanity in Massachusetts."¹⁷ The work of Dorothea Dix and S. G. Howe had apparently created a great deal of interest in "lunacy" and especially in statistical information on the subject.

In addition to these articles, some very substantial statistical monographs were undertaken. Especially important were the various reports and surveys of the commissions and boards of Massachusetts, especially those written by Shattuck,¹⁸ Jarvis, Howe, and Allen. Incidentally, it might be

¹¹ *Principles of Social Science* (1858), I: 25.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹³ The important statistical journals were: "Hazard's *United States Commercial and Statistical Register*, containing Documents, Facts, and other Useful Information, Illustrative of the History and Resources of the American Union, and of Each State; Embracing Commerce—Manufactures—Agriculture—Internal Improvements—Banks—Currency—Finance—Education, etc., etc. Edited by Samuel Hazard, Philadelphia," which began in 1839; Freeman Hunt's *The Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review*, which also began in 1839; and DeBow's *Review*, established in 1846.

¹⁴ *Loc. cit.*, Vol. XIII, pp. 555-557 (1845).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, XIV: 115-121.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, VIII: 460-461 (1843).

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*, Vol. LXXXII, pp. 78-100 (1856).

¹⁸ Lemuel Shattuck (1793-1859) was the author of *Vital Statistics of Boston* (1841); *The Census of Boston* (1845), and *Report on the Sanitary Condition of Massachusetts* (1850).

pointed out in passing that this Massachusetts school of statisticians was the nucleus of the American Statistical Association, which, as we have seen, had been organized in 1839.

Work in the South. In the south there were only two outstanding statisticians, namely George Tucker, of the University of Virginia,¹⁹ and James Dunwoody DeBow.²⁰ Tucker's title to recognition as a statistician rests mainly on his important monograph on demographic and economic trends in the United States from 1790 to 1840, based on census data.²¹ This was a very ambitious project for one man to undertake and whatever shortcomings it may possess in the light of more recent and pretentious studies are due not to the lack of a comprehensive ideal, but to the want of adequate data and technique. The study contained twenty-one chapters, including The Proportion between the Sexes; The Probabilities of Life—the Deaf, Blind, and Insane; Emigration; The Future Progress of Slavery (in which he concluded that “the decline in the value of labour must in time terminate slavery”);²² The Distribution of Political Power; Cities and

The last named work drew very appreciative comments from DeBow (*DeBow's Review*, X: 371). Edward Jarvis (1803–1884) was the author of commission reports, but is known chiefly for having written the part on vital statistics of the 1850 federal census. For his valuable contributions to the subject he was honored by the American Statistical Association by being made president and later president emeritus of that body (John Koren, ed., *The History of Statistics*, 1918, pp. 7, 11). S. G. Howe, as “Nestor” of American philanthropy had consistently emphasized a “knowledge of the fact” and his reports as Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of State Charities were largely statistical. He emphasized the value of statistical data as part of an experimental technique in learning how best to handle dependents and defectives. (See Jessie Bernard, “The Social Theories of Samuel Gridley Howe,” *Sociology and Social Research*, XVII: 314–323, 1933). Nathan Allen (1813–1889) produced a number of important statistical monographs, viz.: *The Physiological Laws of Human Increase* (Phil., 1868); *Changes in the New England Population* (Lowell, 1877); *The Intermarriage of Relations* (1869); *Physical Degeneracy* (1870); and *The Treatment of the Insane* (1871). He might perhaps legitimately be considered as belonging to the third period, rather than to the second, in the history of statistics in this country. He made a very ingenious study of differential infant mortality rates according to different sections of the city of Boston by examining the tombstones of various cemeteries. This was one of the earliest ecological studies of a significant character.

¹⁹ George Tucker (1775–1861), Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy in the University of Virginia, 1825–1845.

²⁰ James Dunwoody DeBow (1820–1867), among many other labors in statistics, supervised the 1850 federal census.

²¹ *Progress of the United States in Population and Wealth in Fifty Years as Exhibited by the Decennial Census from 1790 to 1840*. This work first appeared in Hunt's *Merchants' Magazine* (Vols. VII, VIII, IX) in 1842–43. In 1843, when it first appeared in book form, Hunt said of it: “It should be in the hands of every statesman and political economist in the country; and, indeed, all who wish to see and understand on what solid basis rests the hopes of the Anglo-Saxon race on this continent” (*Merchants' Magazine*, footnote, IX: 509, Dec., 1843).

²² *Loc. cit.*, p. 109.

Towns; Distribution of the Industrious Classes; Education; and The Annual Products of Industry. With respect to population, he felt his inquiries conclusively showed "that, as the number of children bear a less and less proportion to the women, in every State of the Union, the preventive checks to redundant numbers have already begun to operate here, although there is no increased difficulty in obtaining the means of subsistence. From this fact we are able to ascertain the law of our natural increase, and thus, in the estimates of our future progress, correct some prevalent errors."²³ He predicted a population of 74,000,000 in 1900.²⁴

DeBow's three volume work on the *Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States* (1852) was largely encyclopaedic in nature, for DeBow, although an enthusiastic promoter of statistics and perhaps the greatest single force in the statistical movement, at least in the South, was not himself a great statistician. He saw the importance and value of statistics, but he was not a generalizer. He was, however, extremely appreciative of good statistical work and he published a number of excellent statistical articles in his *Review*.²⁵ The work of Ezra Seaman in attempting to relate statistics to political economy, and of E. D. Mansfield in relating statistics to Social Science, has already been commented upon.

The Statistical Work of Delmar. The end of the period of great expectations and the heralding in of the period of critical reaction is reflected in Alexander Delmar's *International Almanac* for 1866.²⁶ Retaining the almanac form, but omitting "the usual astronomical observations, calendar of holidays and festivals of the year, etc., as unbecoming a work of this character,"²⁷ this work, designed to be "a concise International Statistical Hand-Book for the year, and nothing more,"²⁸ epitomizes all three periods. Disappointment in the actual results of statistical method, and yet a yearn-

²³ *Ibid.*, p. iii.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

²⁵ Among these were: Josiah Nott, "Statistics of Southern Slave Population," Vol. IV, pp. 275-289; DeBow, "Operation of the Laws of Population in Europe and the United States," Vol. VIII, pp. 207-216; DeBow(?), "History of Statistics," Vol. XVII, pp. 129-131; DeBow published a translation of Otto Hübner's "Statistical Congress of Nations at Brussels" (XVI: 570-580) in which the work of Quetelet is mentioned. The *Review* also contained appreciative reviews of Reverend R. Everest's two studies of crime and immigration in Europe and the United States (XXIII: 99-100).

²⁶ *The International Almanac for 1866*; or, Handbook of Geographical, Agricultural, Manufacturing, Financial, Scientific, Social, Political, Revenue, Commercial, and Industrial Statistics, Relating to Every Country in the Known World. New York, Published by the *Social Science Review*, 1866.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

ing hope for what might be accomplished by it—in the true great expectations tradition—are evidenced by such passages as the following:²⁹

In preparing the following pages, the Compiler has endeavored to exercise the greatest caution; knowing full well that the value of statistical data depends upon their absolute correctness; yet, as the general arrangement, and much of the matter, is entirely new, and as the compilation of statistics has not yet become a pursuit in which adequate rewards are offered to private enterprise, and is therefore principally confined to governmental bureaus, the reader is warned not to rely too much upon them as grounds for social and economical theories. It is only where the foundation is too broad to admit of doubt that natural laws can be deduced from such social statistics as are afforded in these times. The officials who compile the groundwork for them are rarely gifted with that intimate knowledge of sociology, without which their work is almost certain to be incomplete and delusive.

The schedule used by Delmar in gathering his data is itself of considerable interest as an example of the methodology then used in statistical investigation. It is as a consequence presented as follows:³⁰

STATISTICAL DATA.

GEOGRAPHICAL. . . .

POLITICAL.—I. Form of govt. II. Laws and customs which mainly affect the rights of persons and property. III. Usury laws in particular. IV. State religion. V. Land tenures and land owners. VI. Institutions which tend to encourage or restrict the migration of persons to and from other countries. VII. Institutions which tend to encourage or restrict the migration of capital to and from other countries. VIII. Institutions which tend to restrict the internal mobilization of persons; such as passport and local license laws, &c. IX. Institutions which tend to the internal mobilization of capital; such as tax exemptions, monopolies, local mal-administration of justice, &c. X. Tariffs, excises, licenses, navigation dues, tonnage dues, &c. XI. Extent to which the same are enforced; evasions, smuggling, &c. XII. Castes, social ranks, titles of nobility, &c. XIII. Rulers; powers, and prerogatives; name and residence of chief magistrate, with date of birth, accession to office, &c., and duration of same when fixed by law. XIV. Ministry. XV. Judiciary. XVI. Ministers to foreign countries. XVII. Congress, parliament, or diet. XVIII. Army and Navy. XIX. Finances; debt, revenue, expenditure, and future budget.

DYNAMICAL DATA.

SOCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL.—I. Language. II. Population at various periods. III. Density of population. IV. Ages and sexes. V. Nativity. VI. Population of principal towns. VII. Extent of political suffrage exercised. VIII. Edu-

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

cation: universities, colleges, schools, libraries, book and newspaper publishing, written correspondence, elementary knowledge, &c. IX. Religion; churches, sects, attendance, &c. X. Internal migration. XI. Foreign migration. XII. Market rates of interest. XIII. Dividends and profits. XIV. Occupations of the population. XV. Currency, banks, and other institutions for mobilizing moneyed capital, and extent to which used. XVI. Market prices of leading articles and of labor in various localities. XVII. Value of yearly product of the country at various periods. XVIII. Total wealth in real and personal estate at various periods. XIX. Principal buildings and permanent works of public interest. XX. Artificial means of internal and external transit, and extent to which used; railroads, canals, turnpike roads, and post-routes, with their lengths and termini; also statistics of mobilization of commodities other than money. XXI. Other commercial statistics. XXII. Insurance: 1. Number of companies, extent of business, rates of life, fire, and marine insurance, degree of risks. 2. Failures in business. 3. Other risk statistics. XXIII. Births, marriages, crimes, deaths. XXIV. Blind, insane, and idiotic persons. XXV. Pauperism.

Delmar then comments on the difficulty of securing accurate data on the basis of such a schedule, and on the importance of accurate data for the maintenance of good government and social control, in the following words.³¹

Could this schedule have been filled with reliable statistics of all countries, the whole problem of government might at once be solved through its aid; for here would appear side by side a concise account of the principal circumstances by which human progress is influenced, and the actual effects which flow from the varying extent to which these circumstances surround the different nations of the earth: but such completeness in the present stage of statistical science was not to be expected; though it is believed that all has been done that was possible. Attention is invited to the plan, however, in the hope that the economists of other countries may pursue it, and improve upon it, so that ultimately the whole subject of social science may be enabled to enter upon that inductive phase to which it has hitherto been a stranger.

Conclusions. With this brief sketch, then, we end our discussion of this second or great expectations period in the history of statistics in the United States. We have seen that it was characterized by a strong belief in the necessity of generalizing, on the basis of statistical data, the fundamental laws of society, and especially the laws of social welfare. It was marked also by a great spurt of organizational activities, resulting in both official and private organizations concerned primarily with the collection and analysis of statistical data. During this period also came the first theoretical

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

discussions as to the applicability of mathematics to sociological data. And throughout all there ran the optimistic belief in the unerring logic of numbers. In the eighteen-sixties, however, a reaction began to take place, which may be said to mark the end of the second and the beginning of the third period. Let us, then, turn to an examination of this critical-transitional or third period in the history of social statistics in the United States.

The Period of Criticism and of Transition

General Criticisms. The period of development in statistics upon which we are now entering was by no means without popular enthusiasm, nor was the popularity of the statistical method on the wane. Indeed, Dr. Grace Peckham in 1885 spoke of a mania for statistics at this time, characterizing the period as a statistical age. She says: "The present is a statistical age. There is a mania for gathering statistics on every conceivable subject. 'What are the statistics in regard to it?' is almost invariably asked, when any question comes up for discussion."¹ Nor had the old faith in statistics as the basis of legislation and Social Science disappeared. In 1873 a writer, who signed himself J. M. B. pointed out that "statistics lie at the basis of all sound legislation, and of social science in all its departments."²

But in spite of this enthusiasm, a definitely critical attitude went along with it. The time for stock-taking had arrived and those most interested in exploiting the new method of arriving at a dependable understanding of society through the statistical generalization of the known concrete and specific facts pertaining to social life were beginning to check up on the store of knowledge they had actually gained from their mathematical efforts. The period of unquestioning acceptance and enthusiasm had yielded its maximum results without further examination of the efficiency of the methods employed and an attempt at their improvement.

As a matter of fact, the actual results of statistical investigation were disappointing in contrast with the results that had been anticipated. The great expectations of the earlier period had not materialized. The returns were not commensurate with the labor invested. The inadequacies of sources were partly to blame, but so also were the deficiencies of statistics as a method of fact gathering and generalization. Thus, as Sanborn pointed

¹ "Influence of City Life on Health and Development," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 21, 1886, p. 79.

² *Journal of Social Science*, No. 5, 1874, p. 179.

out, although each succeeding census was an improvement on its predecessor, none had been satisfactory. "Perhaps the best lesson that this enormous library of calculations, and frustrated or half-completed inceptions, can teach us, is this: that statistics, on which so many able men have depended to teach the world politics, economy, philosophy, and morals, are but a frail dependence after all, unless corrected and employed under the guidance of great general principles, such as statistics alone can never teach us."³

Statistics, then, had failed to provide in the full measure expected the general principles on which social progress depended. It had not proved to be the tool to social reform and social rehabilitation so ardently desired. Dr. Peckham concluded that although the statistical method was the ideal one, actually it fell far short of this standard in practical application.⁴

The work which is spent on vital statistics is something enormous. The painstaking efforts of those engaged in it are certainly commendatory; but the result as yet as an aid to purely scientific work is not in any way commensurate with the labor. The returns at best are inaccurate, for no matter with how much zeal the statistician may work, he cannot overcome the negligence of some who fail to report; or of others who report inaccurately. . . . In the present state of statistics, therefore, the statistical method though the ideal cannot be relied upon; that of observation must be in the main employed.

Criticism by the Statisticians. It was the statisticians themselves, however, who, probably because of the popular mania for statistics, were most fearful of the unintelligent use of their method. Their comments and warnings in this respect sound very modern. For example, if the word "correlation" be substituted for "percentages" it is easy to imagine that the following statement by S. N. D. North, one of the leading technical statisticians of the time, might have been written today.⁵

The craze of modern statistics is the desire to reduce everything to percentages. Percentages have great statistical and practical utility, when properly employed; but they are full of pitfalls for the unwary. There is no conceivable absurdity which may not be demonstrated by the use of percentages. . . . Statisticians, both amateur and professional, have an inordinate fondness for ciphering relationships where none exist. It may be legitimate, as a mathematical curiosity, to figure out what proportion the population of the United States is to the number of fixed stars; but when the calculation is made it means nothing, and therefore it ought not to be made at all.

³ "Aids in the Study of Social Science," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 29, 1892, p. 51.

⁴ Grace Peckham, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

⁵ "Some Fallacies of Industrial Statistics," *Journal of Social Science*, No. 34, 1896, p. 141.

North then proceeds to state some of the pitfalls and dangers of statistical method, as follows: ⁶

Absolute certainty is never predicable of statistics, for it is never certain that the data have been fully and properly collected. Unlike pure mathematics, the science of statistics does not consist of abstract suppositions, clearly defined, to the exclusion of all possible causes of disturbance. . . . In statistics, disturbances and variations constantly interfere; the conditions are never the same; fallibility lurks everywhere. We may measure certain things, like the population, the crops, the products of mines, with approximate accuracy, sufficient for ordinary economic purposes; their relationships to each other may also be approximately measured; but, when we attempt to measure the relation of the several elements of each to the other elements, we are at once in dangerous waters.

Hostile Criticisms. But this critical movement was not always so understanding and sympathetic. In the hands of the opponents of the statistical method it could be withering and dogmatic. As early as 1850 DeBow had complained that it was "still too common to sneer at the results of statistical inquiries, as of little practical value, and always capable of proving whatever is required for the occasion." ⁷ It was probably at this time that the ancient saw about statisticians and liars gained wide currency.

Statisticians, it would seem, have always been peculiarly irritating to those who have made use of methods of generalization less quantitative in character. Already, in a previous chapter, attention has been called to the unfavorable opinion of statistics expressed by the Scotch metaphysician, Dugald Stewart, whose apriori methods rendered him particularly antagonistic to attempts at quantitative induction. In some cases this opposition toward statistical generalization on the part of those philosophically inclined had no better basis in fact than their natural aversion to being shown up in their own gratuitous conclusions based largely on wishful thinking. In other cases, the objections were of a much more legitimate character, being based upon the fact that the statistician in his search for concrete and definable data and exclusion of all uncertain elements from his calculations frequently neglected the imponderables and the mathematically incalculable. Bismarck once remarked that it is the imponderables that count for most in a political situation and that the political genius is the one who can sense them and properly estimate them beforehand. This is often the case in all sorts of social situations, and it must be confessed that a rule of

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ "Statistical Bureaus in the States, etc.," *DeBow's Review*, VIII: 423 (1850). Slightly adapted.

thumb statistician could scarcely be expected to grasp or portray by means of his method such intangibles. Still another basis of criticism was the occasional actual perversion of the statistical method in the service of those who wished to force conclusions in their own interest or in that of some faction or issue to which they adhered. Such perversions were, of course, not unknown, although they were not perhaps as common as represented. Perhaps an even more legitimate objection was made to the inexperienced and ignorant employment of the method by statisticians who were untrained in the rules of statistical procedures and of legitimate and refined methods of generalization.

Bowen's Criticism of Buckle's Conclusions. Perhaps the most penetrating early criticism by a non-statistician was that of Francis Bowen, precipitated by Buckle's use of the statistical method in his *History of Civilization in England*. For it was not only the failures of statistics which caused the critical reaction. In the case of Buckle's brilliant use of statistical data, it was his very signal success which caused it. It became evident in his work that statistical generalizations could be used to assault basic theological conceptions, to deny Biblical interpretations as well as to prove them. And therefore the theologically minded must refute the basic assumptions of the method. Bowen may be characterized as one of the abler men of the nineteenth century in this country who managed, because of his orthodox and conservative bias, to be wrong about almost every important intellectual tendency of the age. Being himself a theologian, he criticized the statistical method chiefly on the basis of its assumptions of mechanical and non-magical cause and effect. He pointed out that behavior assumed to be dependent on free will can be just as uniform as mechanical behavior⁸ and that therefore the uniformities which Buckle had interpreted as denying the existence of free will might be the result of free will just the same. "After all," he said, "the attempt to discover laws of nature through the rude approximations of statistics, employing numbers enormously large, and manipulating them by the method of averages and the doctrine of probabilities, is a procedure that can hardly be dignified with the name of science."⁹

Bowen next proceeds to discuss the meaning of averages, concluding that "an average is only a compensation of errors."¹⁰ And then, by a play

⁸ "Buckle's History of Civilization in England," *North American Review*, XCIII: 530 (1861).

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

on words, he comes to the conclusion that according to Buckle's type of reasoning, "the mean result of two falsehoods is a truth."¹¹ Classification, basic to statistical manipulation, also comes in for its share of criticism in the following words: "In order to attain his approximate result, rude as it is, he is obliged to class together events which are really very dissimilar. A suicide caused by failure in business is not the same thing with one produced by religious fanaticism, or another committed when the patient was raving mad. It is idle to suppose that one law of nature governs cases so unlike as those of Chatterton, Clive, Romilly, Castlereagh, Haydon, and Sadlier."¹² And, finally, he attacks the theory of probabilities which is, he says, psychological and not physical: "That is said to be *probable* or *likely*, which we *expect* to happen; but it is a vulgar error, and one into which Mr. Buckle has fallen, to believe that such *expectations*, however great, creates any physical impulse or tendency which will contribute to *make* it happen."¹³

Buckle no doubt would have been very much surprised to learn that he espoused such errors as were here attributed to him. The real animus behind Bowen's criticism, however, appears in his statement that Buckle's statistical method was the product "of those who overlook or condemn the testimony of consciousness, deny the freedom of the will, and extend the dominion of physical laws to the entire exclusion of the supernatural or providential element in human affairs."¹⁴ It may be added by way of an aside that Bowen himself was in the old metaphysical tradition of Dugald Stewart and that, in fact, he abridged Stewart's *Intellectual Philosophy* and other productions of the Scottish school, adapting them for textbook purposes in this country.

The Important Advance of This Period. The most important fact with reference to this period was not, however, that it was a time of disillusionment and disappointment with respect to prevailing statistical method, nor that it was a period of critical reaction in the development of statistical procedures. A most important advance was achieved in statistics, in that men learned to state their problems in such a way as to render them amenable to statistical solutions.

To the earlier statisticians in the period of great expectations it had seemed that once one had the statistical data he could quite easily see their

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 531.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 542.

relationships and meaning. They had emphasized primarily the getting of the raw facts and had largely neglected the problem of dependable methods of generalization. Statistical data were considered to be in themselves inventories of the nation. They were primarily descriptive of economic, sanitary, political, moral, and other social conditions, and as such they appeared to be sufficient for the purpose of social interpretation and social control. Necessary generalizations from such descriptive data appeared to these earlier compilers and users of statistics to be largely self evident and in need of little or no refinement of procedure or critical conviction. They took alike their facts and their generalizations from these data largely at their face value. This was one of the sources of the more candid criticisms referred to above. The more sensitive and penetrating non statistical students of social problems could not always be content with some of the conclusions the users of crude but voluminous statistics came to. Greater refinement in statistical methodology, especially on the side of definition and proving of data and in generalization, was clearly indicated to those who knew best the value and limitations of the statistical method.

In other words, to put it briefly, the statisticians of this later period had learned that statistical descriptions were not enough. Statistics must become analytical. They must measure, not alone in the crude mass, but also differentially and comparatively. They must be made to show relationships, since they did not do so ipso facto. The culmination of this experimental movement came with the invention of correlation technique by Galton in 1888 and the extension and elaboration of it by Pearson and Spearman in the following decades. Until the technique for measuring correlation was invented it was impossible to answer the types of questions that were beginning to be framed at this time. But it was, nevertheless, a great advance when men did learn how to state questions in such a way as to render it possible to secure statistical data to answer them.

The Use of Correlation as a Case in Point. For many years Social Scientists had been working their way toward a more adequate statistical formulation of their problems. Dr. Helen Walker, in discussing the history of correlation, gives special recognition to the study on the growth of children in 1877 by H. P. Bowditch, in which the author hovered about the idea of correlation and even constructed regression curves of weight on height.¹⁵ Much earlier, however—in 1851, to be exact—although not mentioned by

¹⁵ Helen M. Walker, *Studies in the History of Statistical Method* (Baltimore, 1929), pp. 98–100.

Dr. Walker in her tracing of the technical terms used in statistics, George Frederick Holmes had said, in discussing the nature of science: "Hence, the object of science and systematic philosophy must be to lay down rigorously these laws, which are to be received as the formal links of observed correlation, but are not to be received as the series of genetic causation."¹⁶ This distinction between the existence of correlation and a causal relationship has been frequently repeated in more recent times. Holmes' perception of it illustrates his intellectual acumen. Another, but less significant and less technical use of the term correlation occurred again in that same year, 1851. Stephen Pearl Andrews, introducing his little volume on *The True Constitution of Government*, says: "The series of works, of which this is the first in order, will . . . propound definite principles which demand to be regarded as having all the validity of scientific truths, and which, taken in their co-relations with each other, are adequate to the solution of the social problem."¹⁷

It was not, however, until some ten or more years later that research students began to state their problems in terms of correlation method. In the paragraphs that follow we shall present a number of illustrations of this trend in several different fields.

An Illustration from Education. We may take as our first illustration of the analytical trend in statistical research a problem formulated in the field of education by President Hill of Harvard. At the second general meeting of the American Social Science Association in December, 1865, he read a paper on problems in education. He "specified . . . problems toward the solution of which statistical and deductive inquiries might be directed: such as the relative importance of physical, mental, moral and religious training; the extent to which special tendencies in the pupil should be fostered or thwarted; the selection of text-books and the order of studies."¹⁸ He then proceeded to sketch a problem with which modern educationists are quite familiar, that is, what is the relationship between schooling and industrial success. He said, in part,¹⁹

The best preparation for special pursuits is a general education. It was in defence of this doctrine that Horace Mann brought forward the striking fact . . .

¹⁶ "Philosophy and Faith," *Methodist Quarterly Review*, XXXIII (4th series, III, 1851), p. 212.

¹⁷ *Loc. cit.*, p. vi.

¹⁸ American Social Science Association, *Constitution, Address, and List of Members*, etc. (1865), p. 38.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

that the wages earned by piecework in a cotton mill were in proportion to the time previously spent by the operative in studying arithmetic and geography and grammar. Similar statistics to show the advantages of general education in special pursuits might doubtless be gathered in other departments of labor. It might be worth while for example to compare the income lists with the catalogues of schools and colleges, and see what ratio may exist between income and education. A recent writer has shown how favorable mental culture is to longevity, by actual statistics. The relation of culture in one department of general life and activity of thought in other departments, could be shown from the depopulation of observatories and laboratories during the revolution of 1848, and from the rolls of honor of our colleges during the late war in our country, especially if, as has been stated, the percentage of graduates who entered the service, proved to have been in proportion to the height of the standards of scholarship in the institution.

Although Hill spoke of "ratios" and "proportions" instead of correlations, it is clear that he was thinking of his problems in terms that rendered them readily solvable by correlation technique. This was a decided advance over the earlier statement of problems in terms simply of trends or inventories. Several years later, for example, an anonymous writer, commenting on a series of articles on education by President Barnard of Columbia in *The Palladium* pointed out that "Hitherto the merits of educational systems have been discussed mainly *a priori*, and upon theoretic grounds alone. . . . It is to be hoped that hereafter educationists will devote more thought than they have done hitherto to the statistics of this subject; and that they will co-operate with each other in the endeavor to make those statistics at once full and exact."²⁰ Perhaps it was because educational problems were more amenable to this type of treatment than the more broadly diffuse and scattered economic and social problems that such analytical advances were earlier indicated in this field.

An Illustration from Anthropology. It was not, however, in the field of education but in that of physical anthropology that the nearest approaches to correlation technique were made. And this is readily understandable. The correlation between age and height or height and weight is quite perceptible, even without the aid of mathematical formulas. "The older the child the taller he is likely to be," "the taller the child the heavier he is likely to be." Generalizations of this type were of everyday occurrence. It would, therefore, be a natural area to experiment in. It was, indeed, in this very field that Galton himself first applied correlation. The most im-

²⁰ *Journal of Social Science*, No. 4, 1871, p. 174.

portant of the earlier experimental work of this period in the United States was perhaps the statistical work done in connection with the Civil War by the Sanitary Commission.²¹ This important work, not referred to by Dr. Walker, has received perhaps less recognition than it deserves.

Among the more interesting of these studies are those which deal with the relationship between age and height for different nativities, with the relationships between weight and height, and with the changes of the home population during the Civil War. In connection with the first of these there are charts showing for fifteen different nativity groups the regression curves of height on age.²² The author was attempting to secure the law of growth from the ages of seventeen to thirty-eight, but did not succeed. He said, "After various unsuccessful attempts to obtain a formula which should represent in some simple form the law of growth between the ages of seventeen and thirty-eight years, this endeavor has been abandoned. Such a formula would have small value unless it represented equally well the law for earlier ages; and the investigation of this interesting topic, from our military statistics, is of course impossible."²³ He did feel, however, that he had discovered the relationship between weight and stature. He tells us that he was "irresistibly led to the singular and interesting discovery that the mean weights, at least within the limits of the present researches, appear to vary strictly as the squares of the statures. This is made manifest by Table X, which gives for each stature the hypothetical weight based on this assumption (using the modulus 0.03156), and in the next column the difference between this hypothetical, or as we may fairly say, theoretical, weight, and the mean weights actually obtained by observation, and presented in Table IX. No reasonable doubt seems admissible that this is the true law of normal variation in weight for statures within our limits, and we are thus led to the inference that the product of the ratios of increase in the breadth and thickness of the body is on the average equal to the simple ratio of the increase in length."²⁴ He considered this law much more reliable than the similar law of Quetelet, namely, that the square of the weight was as the fifth power of the stature.

These studies, which show very marked influences from Quetelet, are

²¹ Benjamin Apthorp Gould, *Investigations in the Military and Anthropological Statistics of American Soldiers* (New York, 1869).

²² *Ibid.*, Charts I and II, between plates 112 and 113. The curves are parabolic. The correlation ratio is the measure represented.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 409.

significant as illustrating the more analytic uses to which statistical data and methods were now being put. Statistics were no longer merely descriptive inventories or surveys; they were becoming tools for the discovery of relationships. It was to be some time, of course, before similar advances were to be made in the application of these more refined statistical techniques to more truly sociological data. Such application had to await the development of indexes of various types and kinds, a problem which occupied economic and educational and psychological statisticians for a good part of the first quarter of the present century.

An Illustration from Social Work. A final illustration, this time from the field of social work, of the transition from an almost exclusive emphasis upon survey or census data to at least the beginning of an emphasis upon the analysis of statistical data, will complete our account of this critical process. An examination of the *Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Correction*²⁵ reveals the fact that in general the eighteen-seventies and eighties tended to emphasize the gathering of uniform census data on the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes, and several committees labored—unsuccessfully, to be sure—to accomplish such an end.²⁶ In the eighteen-nineties, however, there began to emerge an emphasis on the analysis and interpretation of data, as illustrated, for example, by E. R. L. Gould's paper on the "Statistical Study of Hereditary Criminality," which appeared in the *Proceedings* of 1895.²⁷ The emergence of this emphasis was gradual. Moreover, the recognition of the importance of this type of analysis preceded by some years its successful application. As early as 1876, Dr. Diller Luther had pointed out the importance of "carefully constructed tabulated statements, with . . . accompanying analyses and deductions."²⁸ And in 1877 Mr. Dugdale of New York had commented on the need for exact means of measurement in the field of Social Science analogous to the barometer and thermometer in the physical sciences.²⁹ However, it

²⁵ This Conference, it will be recalled, was an outgrowth of the American Social Science Association.

²⁶ This Committee on Uniformity of Statistics consisted of F. B. Sanborn, of Massachusetts, W. P. Letchworth, of New York, and H. H. Giles, of Wisconsin (*Proceedings of the National Conference of Charities and Corrections*, 1874, p. 33). After an abortive attempt to secure uniform statistics from the several states the Committee lapsed until 1885, when it was reconstituted (*ibid.*, 1885, pp. 383-384). But apparently this new committee was no more successful than the earlier one.

²⁷ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 134-143.

²⁸ "Statistics as Connected with Insanity, Medical Charities and Out-Door Relief," *ibid.*, 1876, p. 151.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1877, pp. 28-29.

must not be supposed that the interest of social workers in uniform statistical data of the census type disappeared with the rise of the analytic interest. It is perhaps still the predominant interest in this field. The point we desire to emphasize here is simply that, in the period of transition which we are now discussing, even social work began to conceive of its problems in a manner which rendered them amenable to a more refined and critical statistical analysis, as well as merely to statistical descriptions and summaries of the older type.

Other Advances in Statistical Methodology. Among the more familiar and important works in this transitional period were those of General Walker, known chiefly to sociologists at least for his statement of the law of the displacement of native population by immigrants,³⁰ of Richmond Mayo-Smith, whose work, although called sociological was largely demographic,³¹ and of C. D. Wright, who systematized a great deal of statistical data into practical or applied sociology.³² It was during this period also that the American Statistical Association was rejuvenated and expanded to become a real force in the development and application of statistical methods. Other advances were also made. The census, for example, was improved and new sources of data were increasingly exploited. The numerous state and local boards, public and private, which were gathering statistical data, were gradually accumulating a tremendous amount of material, although it was usually but roughly generalized and not ordinarily treated analytically. Business and industry began to collect statistical information of their own.

Statistics in the Colleges. Academic recognition also was accorded to statistics in many schools during this period. Johns Hopkins University, for example, listed statistics as a course of instruction in 1888. Carroll D. Wright lectured on "The Value of Statistics" at Vassar College in the same year, thus indicating not only the cultural significance of the subject, but also foreshadowing its vocational importance for women. Four years earlier—in 1884—David C. Wells' course on Social Science at Dartmouth College had been made to include statistical instruction. At the University of the South (Sewanee, Tennessee) Richmond Mayo-Smith's *Statistics and Economics* was being used as a text in 1900. Mayo-Smith himself had been teaching statistics as an adjunct to his Social Science courses in Columbia

³⁰ Francis H. Walker, *Economics and Statistics* (New York, 1899), II: 421-426.

³¹ Richmond Mayo-Smith, *Statistics and Sociology* (1895); *Statistics and Economics* (1899); *Emigration and Immigration* (1890).

³² *Principles of Practical Sociology* (1899).

College since the early eighteen-eighties. But Mayo Smith wrote no treatise on the subject, although he did contribute a number of papers on statistical subjects and the methodology of statistics to learned societies in this and other countries. The exigencies of teaching confined his interest primarily to the employment of statistical data and generalizations to the treatment of Social Science phenomena.

In a warm plea in behalf of emphasizing statistical instruction in the college curricula long before he himself became a college teacher, Carroll D. Wright summarized what was being done in the late eighteen-eighties as follows:³³

Our colleges are beginning to feel that they have some duty to perform, in the work of fitting men for the field of administration, and specifically in statistical science. Dr. Ely is doing something at Johns Hopkins, giving some time, in one of his courses on political economy, to the subject of statistics, explaining its theory, tracing the history of the art or science, and describing the literature of the subject. He attempts, in brief, to point out the vast importance of statistics to the student of social science and to put his student in such a position that he can practically continue his study. Johns Hopkins, as soon as circumstances will admit, will probably secure teachers of statistics and administration, in addition to its present corps of instructors.

Dr. Davis R. Dewey, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is also devoting some time, in connection with his other work, to statistical science. He has two courses:

First, a course of statistics and graphic methods of illustrating statistics, in which attention is chiefly given to the uses of official statistics of the United States. Students are directed to the limitations there are in this respect, what compilations have been and are made, and to the possible reconciliation of discrepancies which appear in official reports. This course is taken in connection with a course in United States Finance, and the student is trained to find and use the statistics which will illustrate the points taken up, and to present them graphically.

Second, an advanced course is given in statistics of sociology, in which social, moral, and physiological statistics are considered, in short, all those facts of life which admit of mathematical determination to express the "average man." . . .

Perhaps the most systematic teaching of the science of statistics in America is given at Columbia College, under the direction of Professor Richmond M. Smith. He has lectured on the subject of statistical science in the Columbia College School of Political Science since the year 1882. His course is an advanced one for the students of the second or third year of that school. In the first year of the work there were but three students of statistical science; at present there are about twenty-five. Professor Smith gives them lectures two hours per week

³³ "Statistics in Colleges," *Pub. Amer. Economic Assn.*, III: 12-15 (March, 1888).

through the greater part of the year. The theoretical lectures cover a brief history of statistics; a consideration of statistical methods; of the connection of statistical science with political science and social science; of the attempt to establish social laws from statistical induction; the doctrine of probabilities. . . .

From a circular of information from the Columbia College School of Political Science I find the following, relating to the teaching of statistical science:

"Statistical science; methods and results. This course is intended to furnish a basis for social science by supplementing the historical, legal, and economic knowledge already gained, by such a knowledge of social phenomena as can be gained only by statistical observation. Under the head of statistics of population are considered: race and ethnological distinctions, nationality, density, city and country, sex, age, occupation, religion, education, births, deaths, marriages, mortality tables, emigration, etc. Under the head of moral statistics are considered: statistics of suicide, vice, crime of all kinds, causes of crime, condition of criminals, repression of crime, penalties, and effect of penalties, etc. Finally is considered the method of statistical observations, the value of the results obtained, the doctrine of free will, and the possibility of discovering social laws."

There may be other instances of the teaching of statistical science in American colleges, but those given are all that have come to my knowledge. At Harvard, Dr. Bushnell Hart is teaching the art of graphically presenting statistics, while at Yale and other institutions the theory and importance of statistics are incidentally impressed upon the students in political economy.

Carroll D. Wright. The statistical work and promotion of Carroll D. Wright himself were especially important during this transitional period. As director of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics during many years and later as director of the Federal Bureau of Statistics at Washington, and finally as Director of the United States Census (1890) he perhaps did more than any other man in this country before 1900 to improve the methods of large scale statistical applications in official bureaus and in governmental publications. He was not a great statistical theorist, but he was a remarkable statistical administrator who made use of much of the best knowledge available in his time. His course on Methods of Investigation at Clark University, where he was professor of Social Science from 1902 to 1909, was somewhat unique for its breadth of view at that time.

Speaking of the importance of thorough college training in statistics, Dr. Wright in 1888 outlined the three great divisions of the subject as he conceived they should be presented in a suitable course in the subject:³⁴

The teaching of statistical science in our colleges involves three grand divisions:

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

1. The basis of statistical science, or, as it has been generally termed in college work, the theory of statistics.
2. The practice of statistics, which involves the preparation of inquiries, the collection and examination of the information sought, and the tabulation and presentation of results.
3. The analytical treatment of the results secured.

Strongly urging the need for better training in statistics, he quoted from a letter from General Francis A. Walker written in 1874 on the contemporary avid interest in statistics as follows: "The country is hungry for information: everything of a statistical character, or even of a statistical appearance, is taken up with an eagerness that is almost pathetic; the community have not yet learned to be half skeptical and critical enough in respect to such statements." Wright then added that "Statistics are now taken up with an eagerness that is serious."³⁵ Wright concluded his plea with the argument that "The statistician writes history," and therefore academic recognition of the subject is vitally important.³⁶

The Significance of the Period. This was a period of incubation for new ideas and methods which were later to blossom forth in the fourth or modern period—a period which we shall not consider here because it falls within the era of sociology rather than of Social Science as an independent and preliminary discipline. This transitional period, extending from that of Great Expectations treated above to that of Painstaking Measurement which was destined to follow, lasted until the beginning of the present century. At that time, stimulated chiefly by the work of the British school of statisticians, and especially by Pearson, there was inaugurated in this country a new period of growth and development characterized by an increasing application of refined statistical techniques to all sorts of data for both measurement and analytic purposes. Old techniques were simplified and vastly improved upon until there appears to be scarcely a problem for which adequate statistical procedures are not now available.

Thus, at last, in spite of his critics—whose words have been recorded in these chapters—Comte's assertion that all fields of knowledge seem to be, at least theoretically, amenable to mathematical statement and manipulation would appear to have been justified. What would be probably more surprising to these critics, if they could behold the advances in present day statistical methods, is that there seems to be some warrant for a greater

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

optimism than Comte himself entertained with respect to the range of statistical manipulation. The so-called limitations of human faculty, which Comte believed would always prevent certain types of very complex data from being generalized mathematically, have not served to render impossible the development of new techniques of measurement which have made these limitations of little or of no significance. It would indeed be a very hardy metaphysician or theologian (either acknowledged or disguised) who in our day would be as conservative as Comte was in stating the limitations of statistical methods in their application to the generalization of social phenomena.

PART THIRTEEN

Summary and Evaluation

The Meaning of the Social Science Movement

The Changing Panorama. The preceding account of the Social Science Movement has represented it as successively (1) Utopian aspiration and humanitarian idealism, (2) metaphysical speculation and the search for unificatory general principles, (3) an effort to establish certain realistic working principles of social welfare and reform, largely philanthropic and economic in character, (4) the organization of a national association and of local groups for the discussion and promotion of these reforms, (5) an academic discipline, (6) an attempt at systematization through the development of a succession of methodologies which gradually eventuated into the firm establishment of (7) dependable statistical procedures and organization, (8) the differentiation and redistribution of effort into the several social sciences, and especially into (9) the new discipline sociology.

In this development we have seen the movement evolve from wishful thinking into critical theory; from a theory based largely on metaphysical disputation regarding the foundation principles of human association, resting mainly upon Natural Law, into a practical movement emphasizing social investigation, planning, and legislation; and, finally, again into a renewed effort to establish competent intensive theoretical disciplines capable of dealing effectively with rapidly increasing bodies of social data. The special disciplines that thus arose, or were reinforced by separate organization, were the leading social sciences securing official academic recognition in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The general discipline thus emerging from the decaying body of Social Science was Sociology.

Along with these more abstract changes, we have seen many concrete human figures come and go. For awhile some of these Social Scientists achieved considerable prominence, even marked distinction. But later they dropped largely out of the picture. Several of them, like Warren, Andrews, Elder, Peshine Smith, Colwell, George Frederick Holmes, and Wright, have been all but forgotten by the general run of present-day sociological

students. Others, like Hamilton, O'Connell, and Masquerier, were perhaps never well known, not even locally. Others still, like Brisbane, Bascom, Perry, Wells, Atkinson, S. G. Howe, and Sanborn, once in the thick of an energetic and resounding struggle for human betterment, are already relatively faint memories. Only a few of them—and mostly the latter ones at that—Carey, Sumner, Andrew D. White, President Gilman, and Goldwin Smith—have left us memories still largely intact.

Causes of These Changes in Subject Matter and Personnel. It is perhaps not easy in all cases to account with complete accuracy for these changes in the movement and in personnel.

The transformations in subject matter followed in the main several general lines of development: (1) the growth of a more adequate body of scientific data which could be generalized into dependable conclusions in the form of Social Science principles and laws; (2) the development of an improved methodology—especially in the form of statistics—for the adequate generalization of these accumulating data; (3) the gradual realization that not mere wishful thinking and metaphysical speculation nor propagandism would bring about a better social order; (4) neither would the planting of idealistic colonies composed of imperfect human beings do it, (5) nor could even earnest and worthy attempts at legislative reform without an adequate foundation in scientific knowledge and investigation bring about the desired results. Consequently the movement turned from an effort primarily to secure practical results in social welfare to the slower and more intensive study of data and of principles as embodied in the several social sciences. But the effort at immediate social welfare results was not abandoned. Among the most vigorous of the offspring—immediate and more remote—of the Social Science Movement were the American Prison Association, the National Conference of Social Work, the National Child Welfare Committee, and their several state and local extensions. These and other agencies kept the struggle for human betterment alive and growing.

From the standpoint of the persistence of personal fame, or the lack of it, we may account for the greater present reputation of some of the men in terms of their comparative recency and the larger bodies of data and more dependable methods of investigating procedure at their disposal. But we must also remember that we have before us in the history of the Social Science Movement an exhibit of the rapid and panoramic development of a new science of human affairs comparable to the earlier development of

the physical sciences. We have here similar crudities of conception, at first much speculation and but little controlled investigation, and many blind alleys to be explored before final success in building dependable systems of knowledge could be achieved. It should not be surprising that there was much growth in specialization, that new special social sciences appeared and gained prominence, and that many early explorers who helped to establish the geography of the new continent of science missed their Eldorados or perished before they discovered that they were on false tracks. But the De Sotos, Coronados, and John Smiths of Social Science did help to explore the new continent, even if they failed to find that for which they were seeking. In telling the story of the continent we cannot omit their names from the roster. The task of this book has been largely to give an account of preliminary explorations. The story of the empire builders—the men who finally carved out durable special and general fields of social science—is yet to be told.

In Defense of the Idealists. A word should also be spoken by way of clarification and defense, if defense is needed, of some of the more radical early leaders of Social Science. We must not forget the extent to which their theories and pronouncements met the universal desire of their followers for Utopias and for a prophecy of deliverance from the hard and unwelcome facts of life as they found them. Such was in the main the basis of the reputation of the early radical Associationists and Post-Associationists, including Brisbane, Andrews, and Warren. If these men could have delivered the Elysium which they promised they would have become immortal. They were enthusiasts of a high order, but they were as powerless as many other men, who were perhaps inferior to them in intellect and in nobility of character, to bring into existence the new world which they had prophesied. As a consequence, they have suffered somewhat unjustly at the hands of our contemporaries, who, if they remember these leaders of radicalism at all, are too prone to dismiss them as mere impractical theorists. As a matter of fact they were men with vast insight into human nature and social processes. If they had chosen to seek their own profit rather than to espouse the cause of human welfare as they saw it they might have been great figures on Wall Street, in the railroad world, or in manufacturing enterprise. In this respect they were probably not unlike Robert Owen, who first made a fortune in industry and then spent it in vain and oversanguine humanitarian endeavors. If we condemn men merely because

they hoped and expected too much of mankind in the way of intelligent cooperation and self-improvement, surely the fault lies with us rather than with them.

The Struggle for Scientific Control. Undoubtedly, there was an intense desire in the minds of many men in the nineteenth century to subject human personalities and social processes to the same logical or scientific controls as those under which inanimate objects and lower living forms had been brought. Following the idealism of Turgot and Condorcet, a generation of social philosophers arose in Europe and America who believed that a true science of man was now within view. These hopeful philosophers were of many kinds. Of course the theologians were present in large numbers with their age-old formula of "‘Believe and be saved,’ and humanity will be saved with you—if it believes." But most of these prophets of a new social order carried as their symbol, not a theological maxim, but some form of the banner of science, fantastic as some of these emblems now appear to the modern eye. There were the phrenologists, the spiritualists, the new-thought people, the Associationists—whom we have examined in considerable detail—the anarchists, the communists, the socialists, the republicans, and the social radicals generally. But much more deserving of our attention than any of these were the theoretical or the systematic Social Scientists who sought to construct a dependable theory of society rather than to promote piecemeal social reform as such. It was their belief that if only man first learned the science of society he would then be able to plan for the realization of adequate social reform programs in an intelligent manner and could build his ideal social world—his Utopia, perhaps—in reality.

The Genius of Comte—His Followers. Of these general theorists and idealists Comte was of course the great and outstanding leader. We have seen how he was attacked by the theologians and the mystics who still clung to a more or less magical method of solving human social problems long after it had been abandoned in the realms of physics, chemistry, and biology, and while it was actually being discarded in the field of psychology. We have also seen how his leading ideas and principles were espoused by a considerable group of social philosophers in this country, especially in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. But the remarkable fact confronts us that, with the exception of Lester F. Ward, not one of these social philosophers who was in some noticeable degree a follower of Comte has preserved his reputation as a thinker to the present day. Among the sec-

ondary men, Wright perhaps comes nearest to this achievement, but almost no one, even among the social scientists, remembers him now. Occasionally one runs across a copy of his *Principia* in the second hand book stores, but it is safe to say that it is never read. He made a contribution which survived in Cooley; but the form of its expression had changed. There must be some intelligible explanation for this failure of what was a rather brilliant, if premature and unappreciated, group of social philosophers of fifty to seventy-five years ago to keep the memory of their work before the thinking public.

Perhaps there were many reasons for this failure, including unclearness of style, a public untrained to follow abstract arguments couched in unfamiliar terms, and confusion of thought in the thinkers themselves. But most important of all explanations was undoubtedly a fact which we have already insisted upon: they were metaphysicians, and sometimes theologians, rather than genuine Social Scientists. They still argued from premises now discarded and by analogy instead of seeking to discover concrete, demonstrable social facts, which they might have defined and verified and generalized into sociological principles for guidance in sociological thinking and social reconstruction. The era of metaphysical speculation and of apriori reasoning was already drawing to a close, and quite naturally these men went out with it. A new order of thought—the more genuinely scientific—was coming in. And, in spite of their partial appreciation of the scientific insight of Comte, they could not measure up to Comte's standard or sufficiently follow his brilliant lead in sociological analysis.

Influence of the Comteans upon Later Social Thought. Yet some of the later sociologists learned much from these followers of Comte. That is, the sociologists who read American as well as European literature profited from their contacts with these earlier systematic Social Science theorists. We have already indicated some probable ways in which Lester F. Ward drew anonymously upon the writings of Andrews and others for his early insight into social problems. When Ward was still an omnivorous student of all the sciences in the decade or two of his shifting employment in Washington after the Civil War, these men were at the height of their limited influence, such as it was. It is regrettable that Ward has not told us more about the sources of his ideas during this period. His *Glimpses of the Cosmos* is much more concerned with the content of his thinking than with the sources of his thought. Yet one who is familiar with both Ward's early

works and the writings of the dominant systematic Social Science philosophers of this time is clearly able to perceive a close relationship between them.

Another American sociologist who, as we have already remarked, appears to have been influenced by these early writers was Charles H. Cooley. Cooley, although almost a generation later than Ward, was also a generous reader of this and other types of American literature. His similarity in certain respects to Wright, whose *Principia* was in its prime during his student days, is observable especially in his concept of the primary group and of primary group relationships. But Cooley also fails in the main to cite the sources of his thought. Like all the arm chair essayists, of whom he was a late example, he was probably himself largely unaware of many of the origins of his synthetic thought.

Dominance of the Economic Interest. It remains to note that the Social Scientists best known to us in the present generation are those who lent their support to the American Social Science Association in the first two decades of its existence and who drifted gradually away from it when the American Economic Association was formed. This means of course that the economic Social Scientists have continued to impress us more powerfully than those of other stripes. Undoubtedly there was something in the subject matter of their type of Social Science as well as in their point of view which gave survival power to their ideas, in so far as this persistence is not merely a matter of relative recency. Economic problems are of course central in American life, in fact in all modern life.

But the problems these economists discussed under the aegis of Social Science were not primarily economic in the ordinary sense of the term. They were, as we have had occasion to see, more properly of the character of social economy, or in the nature of the economic aspects of social welfare, such as standards of living, poverty and relief, housing, sanitary improvements, working conditions, labor problems, sometimes tariffs and free trade, rents, property rights, and production. These problems still seem to us to be among the fundamental ones, as do those of education and social legislation generally, which likewise occupied the attention of Social Scientists like Gilman and Goldwin Smith and Andrew D. White. The philosophy of history writings of these last three men, on the other hand, are much less vivid to us now, and their methodological discussions appear to us to be decidedly elementary. But we nevertheless clearly recognize their earlier

importance as efforts in the general line of Social Science development which have eventuated into the present types of sociological thinking.

Decline of Old Views of Human Nature. The curve of theoretical development in the Social Science Movement is as significant as is the changing emphases upon science and social reform. The insistence of Brisbane and the early Associationists upon the innate normality of the human passions and appetites and the theory of the essential goodness of inborn human nature upon which they so stoutly relied in the eighteen-forties were no longer issues after the Civil War. It was not that this great political conflict had convinced these social philosophers that human nature was, after all, bad, as well it might have done according to their rather primitive notions of social psychology. Rather, by the time of the advent of the second generation of Social Scientists, scientific analysis, both in psychological and in sociological theory, had sufficiently advanced so that no one of importance any longer supposed that one could inherit his general moral and social attitudes. It was more or less clearly recognized that one's morality was the function of his adjustment to environment and circumstances rather than the gift of biological inheritance.

It is true that the mediaeval and the Scottish metaphysical conceptions of instinctive patterns of behavior still persisted in the vacuous metaphysical psychology of the time, and that classifications of social instincts were published even then. But no one seemed to suppose that such so-called instincts were really accountable for the general patterns of people's behavior, good or bad. At least, the Social Scientists did not appear in any considerable number to be the victims of such notions or to attempt to apply them in their efforts to solve social problems.

At the same time, and in a similar manner, the old belief that badness was due to a mythical and mystical inheritance of sin from the reputed first parents of the race had fallen practically into desuetude among scientists. To be sure this dogma persisted in the pages of Milton and other literary classics, still sometimes read in the schools, and the theologians piously preserved it in their creeds, to which intellectual storerooms they relegated most of the other archaeological impedimenta of their faiths as well. It was dragged out now and then to do ornamental service on ceremonial and ritualistic occasions and it would have been regarded as scandalous for anyone formally to deny it. Indeed, when the Unitarians and the Universalists did repudiate it they created a sanctimonious and per-

haps a somewhat hypocritical furor among their more orthodox and magic-serving opponents. The ignorant part of the laity quite generally joined the more naive clergy in continuing to regard it as a fundamental article of psychology as well as of Christian dogmatics. But for practically the whole group of Social Scientists it played no part in the applied social psychology by means of which they interpreted social relationships and conduct.

The New Emphasis in Social Science. The truth is that the Social Scientists who came after 1865 were but little concerned with metaphysical theories of human nature of any sort. They had little or no place for it in their repertoire of causal explanations. Quite properly they were absorbed in the much more fruitful task of analyzing social institutions and processes into their constituent elements, with a view to finding out and evaluating and controlling those environmental and institutional forces—both physical and social—which were shaping, and could be made to shape, human behavior into conformity with the best standards and patterns of social organization that they knew. Thus they studied the family, the community, the state, the church, economic life and problems, and even the geographic, climatic, and biological environments. They developed as methods to this end various types of analysis and measurement, which we have described.

Among these methods the philosophical and the apriori at first predominated. But later the historical and the statistical succeeded to major prominence. When the era of Social Science closed, in the eighteen-nineties, or a little later, and merged into the sociological period, the statistical method of analysis and synthesis of social phenomena had already become respectable, if not dominant. Remnants of the older methods were still evident enough, especially in attempts to make generalizations regarding the wider and more abstract relationships and trends in society. But scarcely anyone would any longer attempt either to present or to solve major concrete social problems without the aid of all the statistical information and methodological accessories available. Certainly no Social Scientist of prominence looked to revelation as a method for an adequate understanding of society; nor did the more intelligent theologians for that matter, although they might do lip service to the idea on Sundays.

Neither did any Social Scientist attempt to solve social problems by means of any species of magic, theological or metaphysical. They were all intent upon employing such resources of legislation, the courts, civil administration, private and public economic and welfare organization, and any other secular methods, that were within their reach. We have seen how

the American Social Science Association and its various offshoots, tributaries, and kindred organizations—including the National Prison Association and the national and state conferences of charities and correction—were employed for both the discussion and the solution of such problems. Their essential emphasis, first and last, was obviously upon an intelligent and scientific system of social control.

Demand for a General Social Science. The Social Scientists had scarcely abandoned their subjective and individualistic attempts to find a solution to the problem of human welfare by means of a metaphysical theory of original human nature before they had launched upon a thorough-going endeavor to produce an objective social philosophy. Undoubtedly Comte and Spencer were the two great inspiritors in this new endeavor. The sublime achievements of these two great social philosophers in presenting an objective view of the fundamentals of social organization could not but make a deep impression upon the more profound intellects and those with open minds among the Social Scientists. They succeeded for the first time adequately in making men—at least intelligent men—see society as an organized and unified functioning whole. As we pointed out in Chapter II, the philosophers of the Eighteenth Century Enlightenment had first achieved that difficult feat for themselves, and Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Condorcet had endeavored to make their vision of the great abstract unity visible to others also. Perhaps Condorcet had drawn the picture best from a historical standpoint,¹ while Montesquieu had presented it more adequately in cross section.² But neither had succeeded in conveying his impression with sufficient clearness to the masses of men who were to compose the democracies of the nineteenth century. Prejudices, anathemas, superstitions, tyrannies, as well as individual ignorance and obtuseness, had hung up numerous veils in front of the display and had thus shut it off from view.

The Influence of Comte and Spencer. But Comte and Spencer thought and wrote in more propitious times. They had a much improved public to receive their message, and the old obscurantist barriers had been largely broken down before the time of their coming. We have seen how the Social Scientists, especially after 1865, seized upon their writings and digested them, worked them over, and more or less crudely paraphrased or sought even to improve upon them. The period of Systematic Social Science which

¹ In the *Esquisse d'un Tableau Historique des Progrès de l'Esprit Humaine*.

² In the *Esprit des Loix*.

we have described in this work was obviously an epoch in which the teachings of Comte and Spencer were being assimilated by a group of social philosophers none too adequately prepared for their work. But assimilated and adapted they must be, for these American theoretical Social Scientists or social philosophers saw almost as clearly as we do that no adequate results in social betterment and reform could be achieved without a pattern and a plan. Society must be viewed as a whole if it was to be adequately reconstituted in its parts for social justice and social welfare.

So these American systematizers in Social Science labored at the task of social theory with such light and understanding as they possessed and as they could draw from the various sources available abroad. Comte and Spencer were therefore guides of the utmost importance to these men, although they were perhaps more influenced by the general conclusions of Comte and Spencer than by their methods in the concrete. If Comte was more heeded than Spencer by the earlier theoretical Social Scientists, this fact was perhaps due in part to his earlier availability and to the more speculative character of his method. The impact of Spencer's stupendous collection of ethnological data, with its obvious implications as to the non-theological origins of human institutions, was stunning to the mind trained in traditional ways of thinking. His ideas were regarded as even more dangerous than those of Comte.

The Corresponding Emphasis upon Applied Social Science. If it was impossible to achieve a consistent scheme of social betterment without an adequate and comprehensive theory of society as a unified whole, as little was it thinkable that the construction of such a theory would in and of itself produce the social reforms that were believed to be needed. Consequently the period of enthusiasm for a systematic Social Science which was to produce a theoretic sociology was accompanied and even survived by a strong movement for practical human betterment. This soon proliferated into many related and supplementary movements for practical discussion and the promotion of concrete social reforms.

Partly because of the greater concreteness of these reform movements and organizations, and partly because the average person possessed of a humanitarian motivation is more impressed by emotional appeals than by abstract concepts and logic, the concrete movements early attracted much the larger following. Also, the quality of these reform movements was constantly improved at the same time that they grew in number and size. Corresponding attempts at theoretical formulations of a social system which

would plot the social terrain and guide the social reformers grew more slowly, although their quality perhaps improved more markedly than their number increased.

Thus in 1874 John Fiske's *Cosmic Philosophy* and in 1883 Lester F. Ward's *Dynamic Sociology*—which were essentially in the tradition of Spencer and Comte respectively, and therefore within the scope of systematic Social Science as it was then conceived—became landmarks in this advance toward a theoretical conceptualization of society as a whole. Ward's book was definitely characterized as sociology and marks the obvious beginning of the transition of theoretical Social Science into sociology. The social betterment and reform organizations which constituted the concrete-practical phase of Social Science a little later merged into the subsience called applied sociology and a variety of other more or less practical social disciplines and technologies.

Summary. Thus we are able to see in brief perspective the whole panorama of the Social Science movement. It began as an effort to improve the condition of mankind by constructing a social order which would give intelligent free play to man's natural impulses and appetites, which were conceived as adequate, if untrammelled, to restore him to felicity. The movement ended by seeking (1) to construct a theory of social organization and evolution which would provide an adequate blue print for detailed human betterment and (2) to work out through a careful application of scientific methods, largely quantitative in character, those concrete steps in social reform, mainly through legislation and cooperative private endeavor, which would fill out this larger abstract pattern of an ideal social order. In the end, the movement was both systematic and opportunistic or piecemeal.

At this point at last it ceased to have an integrated and independent existence, not because of a failure to achieve its ideal and aim, but because its growing success had compelled it to divide and specialize its forces of reform on the practical side and also to divide and specialize its theoretical endeavors into the various special social sciences. Sociology, as the most general of these several special social sciences, may therefore be regarded as the closest of its theoretical successors.

Conclusions. The American Social Science movement, like any other historical movement, was transitional. Our studies have made it evident that from the beginning two elements characterized Social Science and these continued to possess it throughout its existence. These two ruling

motivations were a passion for social reform and an adoration of science. The first of these was by all odds much the more emphasized in the early period. When, however, half a century later Social Science emerged from a period during which the ideas of Comte had seethed and bubbled throughout the intellectual world, the passion for reform was, for the time being, at least, somewhat spent. It was becoming decidedly secondary to the growing worship of science. Indeed, in our day there are sociologists who wish entirely to repudiate the reformistic tradition in their science.

Social Science was also transitional within the scientific ideal itself, in its emphasis upon a new world view. It was, in fact, the very essence of the intellectual and social ferment which in the nineteenth century produced the secular scientific world outlook corresponding to the new industrial order. In spite of the superficial worship of science early in the nineteenth century, men's thoughts were still essentially and basically theological and metaphysical. Before the time of Comte even the physical sciences were theologically and metaphysically conceived, as the works of Hitchcock and even of Agassiz show. It was not until Comte proposed to extend the scientific method to social facts that the true nature of science became apparent. It was in threshing out this problem that the implications of the scientific method became clear to those leaders most closely in touch with the average run of men. The credit for this modern intellectual revolution is usually attributed to Darwin—especially through the popularizations of Huxley—or to Spencer. But back of all these men stood Comte, who had prepared the intellectual soil for their tillage.

Social Science, as one of the battle grounds upon which the "science versus religion" controversy was fought out, retained the markings of theology and metaphysics to the end. Social Scientists long spoke of "discovering" a "true" social system. They thought of science not so much as a method by means of which facts were isolated and defined as of a system inherent in the Universe which human diligence would uncover or discover.

Enamoured as these Social Scientists were of science as a shibboleth and an ideal, they were, as a matter of fact, for the most part, grand scale system builders. Minute fact grubbing would have seemed to many of them beneath their dignity. They had no adequate conception of the real and painstaking methodology of science. They saw the results of science, which are grand, but they did not see the drudgery which is necessary to produce

these results, or, if they saw it, they were impatient of it and sought to avoid it.

The Social Science movement was transitional in a third sense also, namely, in its concept and method of approach to social reform. Beginning in the grand panacea manner characteristic of the romantic early nineteenth century, it was forced, after the Civil War, to come to grips with an entirely new social and industrial set-up. This caused it, in the process of working for social betterment, to revamp its whole approach to reform. Slums, strikes, disease, unemployment, migratory labor, tariffs, trusts—a bewildering host of problems—rendered further retreat into gilded Utopias impossible. Only vaguely sensing that all these problems were somehow or other integrally related to the new mode of making a living which the Industrial Revolution was producing, the Social Scientists nevertheless long continued to attack each one of them severally or in turn. The total reconstruction approach was unfortunately left to cranks, visionaries, and socialists or communists. The accepted and respectable attack of conventional Social Science upon social and economic problems now became pedestrian, concrete, piecemeal, and wary—one which began with sober statistics and ended in mild remedial laws, which were hesitatingly conceived and cautiously applied.

The Social Science movement was, therefore, transitional in a triple sense; first in its emphases, second in its concept of science in general, and, finally, in its concept and method of approach to social reform. In spite of the complete transformation in both the scientific and the reform aspect of the new discipline, Social Science remained throughout its history more of a vision and an aspiration than a scientific reality. To some it was a religion. To others it was a day-dream merely, arising out of wishful thinking, recognized as unreal, but nevertheless fascinating to the dreamers. To others still it was a wish fulfillment in theory which they ardently hoped to see realized in social practice. Whether blue-printing Utopias in the clouds or puttering with babies in the slums, whether appealing to Utopian natural law or to idealized science, Social Science epitomized always the tough hard strain of idealism which, from the beginning of the Republic, has characterized the American people. A very noble impatience with social and economic injustice, and an earnest determination to do something about it—that was Social Science.

How the two ideals—science and reform—became divorced and went

their separate ways; how one became academic sociology, economics, political science, and the other social work—all this belongs to another chapter in the history of American social thought. We pause a moment here, however, to pay tribute to the monumental dream of the nineteenth century, the dream of a society in which men took council from science in their dealings with the problems of human existence and betterment.

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